Abbreviations and Glossary
AEMG |
Autorisations d’exportation de Matériels de Guerre. An export licence the French Ministry of Defence gave for arms shipments |
AFP |
Agence France-Presse |
Akazu |
Literally ‘little house’ or inner circle around Madame Habyarimana, which became a meeting point for Hutu power extremists and the planning group behind the genocide |
APC |
armoured personnel carrier |
bourgmestre |
local government leader in charge of a ‘commune’ or district. There were 229 communes |
CDR |
Coalition pour la Défense de la République. A |
CEA |
Central and Eastern Africa |
CEPGL |
Communauté économique des Pays des Grands Lacs |
CIEEMG |
Commission interministérielle pour l’étude des exportations des matériels de guerre. French commission that gave official sales notice to arms exports |
CNN |
Cable News Network. American news channel |
CRAP |
Commandos de Recherche et d’Action en Profondeur. Elite reconnaissance/special forces unit based within French regiments |
DAMI |
Détachement d’assistance militaire et d’instruction. French military training and assistance troops based in Rwanda from late 1980s to instruct Habyarimana’s army |
DGSE |
Direction générale de la Sécurité extérieure. French external secret service comparable to British MI6 |
DPKO |
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations) |
DST |
Direction de la surveillance du territoire. French interior secret services |
EICA |
Escadron d’Intervention des Commandos de l’Air |
ETO |
École technique officielle. Technical school run by priests near Kigali and massacre site after UN and French troops pulled out in April 1994 |
EU |
European Union |
EUC |
end user certificate needed for arms shipments |
FAL |
fusil automatique léger – light automatic rifle |
FAR |
Forces armées rwandaises. Rwandan government army |
FIDH |
Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’homme (international human rights federation) |
FMLN |
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional |
GIGN |
Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale. French police anti-terrorist branch |
IBUKA |
Rwandan association of genocide survivors |
ICTR |
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Based in Arusha, Tanzania, set up under UN auspices to judge the main organizers of the genocide |
IFRI |
Institut Français des Relations Internationales |
Impuzamugambi |
‘Those who have the same goal’. CDR youth militia involved in the genocide |
inkotanyi |
‘those who fight bravely’. Term often used for RPF, but with older monarchical connotations |
Interahamwe |
‘Those who work together’. MRND youth militia and leading participant in the genocide policy |
inyenzi |
‘cockroaches’. Nickname given to Tutsis in 1959 with a view to dehumanizing them |
IRIN |
Integrated Regional Information Networks |
MAM |
Military Assistance Mission. French military campaign in Rwanda |
MilOb |
military observer |
MRND(D) |
Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie (et le développement). Habyarimana’s political party implicated in the genocide |
MSF |
Médicins Sans Frontières. French medical aid agency |
NATO |
North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
NGO |
non-governmental organization |
NRA |
National Resistance Army. Formed in 1981 by later Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, a rebel group that fought to overthrow Milton’s Obote’s regime |
OAU |
Organization of African Unity. Umbrella body of African nations |
ORINFOR |
Office Rwandais d’information |
PSD |
Parti socialiste démocratique (Democratic Socialist Party) Rwandan opposition party |
RDP |
Régiment des dragons parachutistes |
RGF |
Rwandan Government Forces (also known as FAR) |
RPA |
Rwandese Patriotic Army. National army formed from RPF after its victory in 1994 – military wing of RPF |
RPF |
Rwandese Patriotic Front. Mainly Tutsi guerrilla army that fought against the Habyarimana regime |
RPIMA |
Régiment parachutiste de l’infanterie de marine (d’Assaut). Regular army parachute regiments that served in Rwanda from late 1980s |
RPR |
Rassemblement Pour la République. French rightwing political party |
RTLM |
Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines. Radio station set up in 1993 as mouthpiece for genocidaires and Hutu extremists, with links to the Habyarimana government |
SHZ |
safe humanitarian zone |
Sofremas |
Société française d’exploitation de matériels et systèmes d’armement contrôlé par l’Etat. |
UNAMIR |
United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda, deployed in October 1993 in line with the Arusha accords |
UNAMIR II |
United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda II, voted into being on 17 May 1994, it was eventually deployed to relieve Operation Turquoise in August 1994 |
UNDP |
United Nations Development Programme |
UNICEF |
UN children’s fund |
UNICOI |
United Nations International Commission of Inquiry |
In 1991 I set out for the tiny central African country of Rwanda, lured like so many Western tourists with the prospect of trekking into the dense jungle of the Volcano Park region in search of the legendary mountain gorilla. Unfortunately, the tour operator had forgotten to mention that the country was in the middle of a civil war, with the result that my travel companion, a journalist with a local newspaper in Devon, was barred from leaving Kigali after intimating his line of work on his landing card. It was the first sign we received of a regime with more than a little to hide from the outside world, as it set about massacring its own people. My interest was heightened when I discovered that behind this Rwandan government, with its increasing catalogue of human rights abuses, lay the unconditional support of a permanent member of the Security Council and a nation that prided itself on democracy and the ‘rights of man.’
While in France individuals and pressure groups such as Survie have have worked tirelessly to bring the truth to light, the English-speaking world has largely ignored the collusion of ‘one of its own’ in this shameful matter. It is hoped that this book will go some way towards encouraging further debate on the subject, not least because, as the recent tragedy in Darfur has shown, genocide is still occurring. Public debates about how to respond to genocide are framed around whether the international community can be made to do more. The point gets overlooked that genocide often occurs because of too much, not too little, Western interference.
It is no longer excusable for Western nations to write off African conflicts as ‘ethnic wars’, and to rekindle the usual racist arguments that such violence is to be expected from ‘uncivilized’ and ‘black’ peoples. What, after all, does that make the civilized ‘West’ that continually arms and trains the participants in the African wars?
In 2004 the Canadian, and former UN mission commander, General Romeo Dallaire returned to Rwanda a decade after the genocide. It was his misfortune to be in charge of the tiny United Nations force based in Rwanda during the genocide, and to end up an unwilling bystander to the slaughter. He spoke to a crowd in the Amahoro stadium in Kigali, a place where thousands had sought refuge during the genocide, and where hundreds had been killed by disease, shell-fire and marauding militiamen. In a highly-charged speech the former UN commander admitted his own failure to save those who were killed – but went further, attacking the very mindset of the West and its politicians in allowing the slaughter to take place without question or concern.
The world is ruled by a belief that will permit other genocides. The superpowers had no interest in you, they were only interested in Yugoslavia. Thousands upon thousands of soldiers were sent there, and here I barely had 450. The guiding principle was that in Rwanda it’s tribalism, it’s history repeating itself. In Yugoslavia, it’s different…It’s ethnic cleansing. It’s European security. It’s white. Rwanda is black. It’s in the middle of Africa. It has no strategic value. And all that’s there, they told me, are people, and there are too many anyway.
France, under Mitterrand, was the only Western nation to take an interest in Rwanda in the years leading up to, and including the period of the genocide. Unfortunately for its people, this interest was borne out in supporting a government that was intent on solving its political problems by mass murder. Paris had few qualms about its political and military backing for Habyarimana and the later interim government that organized and so effectively carried out the genocide. Each day, each cabinet meeting, each debriefing session of returning officials from Rwanda gave Mitterrand and his selected officials, who included his own son Jean-Christophe, the chance to admit a massive policy failure and to change tack. Instead, then, as now, the French government is in denial about the effects of its actions, and its responsibility second only to the murderers themselves, in the final genocide of the twentieth century. ‘Never again’ to Mitterrand spelled out only ‘never without gain’; while there was perceived cultural and strategic value for France in keeping a genocidal government in place in Rwanda that took precedence over any amount of killing.
This work has been made possible by the immense kindness and support of a number of individuals. Many of the unique testimonies are from interviews carried out in early 2004 by Georges Kapler, and I am very grateful for being allowed to use them here for the first time. Georges produced a documentary ‘Rwanda, Un Cri d’un Silence Inoui’, and is a member of Support Rwanda – an association that helps survivors of the genocide. The testimonies here are from former militiamen and genocide survivors, each of whom witnessed, first-hand, French action in Rwanda. I am very grateful for the assistance of Dr Andrew Brown in Cambridge for his help in translating these testimonies, and Betty Vainqueur in Bradford. The Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford has given me space and support for this project, and in particular I am indebted to the enthusiasm of Professor Shaun Gregory to undertake the work, and Professor Paul Rogers and Dr Jim Whitman for their encouragement and publishing assistance. This project could never have happened without the tremendous help of James Bell and John and Beth Maynard, Cecile Carlsson in Stockholm for her biting assessments and humorous critique and the calm atmosphere of the Community of the Resurrection, Mirfield as a retreat from the research frontline when needed. And to Tony MacDougal, who shared that initial trip to Rwanda and whom I hope one day will finally get to see those gorillas.
In Rwanda the hospitality of many made my visits both enjoyable and constructive. To protect identities I have changed the names of all those whom I interviewed for this research and, indeed, this is also true of those Georges Kapler interviewed. However, I am particularly grateful to the following for their help. Aloys, Veneranda, Speciose, Apollinaire, Moses Rugema, John Rusibuka, Tom Ndahiro, Marie Immaculée, African Rights in Kigali, François, Benoit at Ibuka, Jean-Damescene, Martin Ngoga, Frank Rusagara and editors of the Rwandan press; also to members of the ex-FAR, local government, businessmen and villagers who consented to testify to what they had seen. Finally, I wish to thank the survivors at Bisesero for reliving the horror one more time. I am equally grateful for the hospitality and help of those Rwandans working in Arusha at the War Crimes Tribunal, and for news agency staff there who gave me important assistance.
In France, this research has benefited immeasurably from the knowledge and professionalism of Sharon Courtoux at Survie, and the dedication of all who work at this organization, notably the late and much-missed Francois-Xavier Verschave, who died in summer 2005 after many years of exposing the complicity and corruption of La Françafrique. I have benefited enormously from the advice and support of Patrick de Saint-Exupéry and Mehdi Ba, and the calm analysis of Frédérick Charillon. The very helpful staff at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défence Nationale and the Bibliotèque IFRI in Paris found me important material and made visits very welcoming.
Finally my love and thanks to my mother for her incredibly positive outlook that has kept this project afloat.
Much has happened in the years from 2006, when this book was first published. I have attempted to outline, in Chapter 10, the major events, including the Bruguière, Mucyo, Mutsinzi and Trevidic reports and the political ramifications each has had on Rwandan-French relations. There has not been the space to delve deeply into the contents of each report and I would urge interested readers to look through them individually. I am indebted to the Faculty of POLIS at the University of Cambridge, and especially Dr Devon Curtis and Professor Chris Hill for their kind support, to Simon Wall at the University of Huddersfield for much needed IT assistance and staff at the Social Sciences Reading Room at the British Library. Jean-Baptiste Nsanzimfura and Jean-Baptiste Kayigamba have given me the benefit of their exceptional knowledge as have a number of friends in Rwanda, Brussels, Paris and Arusha. My grateful thanks to all.
Andrew Wallis Cambridge May 2013
Note from the translator
The interviews by Georges Kapler, conducted in Kinyarwanda, which I have translated here, have posed a number of difficulties. The French version is rather rough and ready, and at times grammatically approximate; furthermore, the respondents – as would be expected from people who have experienced horrendous events first hand – often find it difficult to express what they witnessed. Occasionally, they repeatedly use pronouns (in particular ‘they’) in a way that leaves it unclear to what the pronouns are referring, so that a certain amount of interpretative re-creation is necessary if the original situation is to be understood by an English-language reader. Given these constraints, I have tried to preserve some of the colloquial and informal nature of the respondents’ speech, while at times clarifying their statements in the interests of greater intelligibility.