Anthony Luzzatto Gardner1
(1)
London, UK
Anthony Luzzatto Gardner
When I arrived in Brussels in March 2014, I assumed that military cooperation would be an insignificant feature of the US–EU relationship. I knew that we were cooperating on a wide array of foreign policy areas with security dimensions, including sanctions against Iran and Russia, the promotion of good governance, human rights and anti-corruption around the world, foreign aid and humanitarian assistance, climate change, and energy security. But I was surprised to note the range and depth of the US–EU military and broader security relationship and to realize the significant potential for further progress.
My negative preconceived notion about the military relationship was largely due to my memories of the EU’s inability to deal with two major crises on its very doorstep. I was working as an intern in the European Commission when Jacques Poos, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister and President of the EU’s Council, declared solemnly on the eve of Yugoslavia’s civil war in 1991 that European governments had a special responsibility to act. “This is the hour of Europe,” he said. “It is not the hour of the Americans.”1 Alas, that proved to be wide off the mark. It was only thanks to US airpower and diplomacy that the bloodshed stopped several years later and that a peaceful resolution emerged through the Dayton Agreement.
Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens gave a far more accurate, and equally widely quoted, summary of the situation in early 1991 when he said that “Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm.”2 The EU’s political and even military influence grew in the subsequent two decades, but Europe’s efforts in 2011 to prevent dictator Muammar Gaddafi from committing crimes against humanity in Benghazi indicated once again the need for US military support. The NATO-led operation, largely conducted through air strikes in which France and the UK played leading roles, could not have succeeded without significant US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as smart munitions and air-to-air refuelling.
The EU’s Military and Civilian Security Operations in Africa and Beyond
During my frequent meetings with leading US military commanders I heard rather positive assessments of the EU’s military and security contributions in Africa. David “Rod” Rodriguez, the four-star general and Commander of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) from April 2013 to August 2016, was one notable supporter. Headquartered in Stuttgart, AFRICOM was established in 2007 and is the most recent and perhaps least well known of the six US regional “combatant commands.” Responsible for US military activities and relations with 53 African nations and several African regional security organizations, it was thrust into the limelight during the 2011 Libya operation, the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi in September 2012 that resulted in the deaths of US diplomats, and once again in October 2017 when four US troops were tragically ambushed while on patrol in Niger while helping the government fight Islamist terrorist organizations.
General Rodriguez, a physically imposing, battle-hardened, and frequently decorated officer directed very large and well-equipped military operations. I couldn’t help being surprised that he would consider the EU’s military and civilian missions, employing only 2000 civilians and slightly more than 3000 military staff, as anything more than sideshows. As of 2017, AFRICOM has 6000 military personnel spread across the continent, with significant presences in Djibouti, home to the only US permanent military base in Africa and a key base in surveillance and combat operations against al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations (4000); Niger (800) and Somalia (400).
The EU’s military and civilian missions are conducted under its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Lisbon Treaty, the equivalent of the EU’s Constitution, provides that the EU may draw on civilian and military assets on missions outside the EU in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The missions include disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue missions, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, and crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization. “All of these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”3 The EU carries out those tasks with the unanimous approval of the EU Council (representing the member states) and with assets provided by the member states. Civilian CSDP missions and operations are financed through the EU budget, with current expenditure running around €350 million per year. Common costs of military missions and operations fluctuate between €80 and €150 million per year and are financed outside the EU budget by all member states. Most of the costs are borne directly by member states participating in the missions and operations following a “costs lie where they fall” principle similar to that of NATO.
Of the EU’s sixteen ongoing military and civilian operations conducted under its CSDP, nine are in Africa. Of the six ongoing military missions, five are in Africa. Two are maritime operations: The first is an anti-piracy maritime operation off the Horn of Africa and the other a maritime operation off the coast of Libya to disrupt migrant smuggling and human trafficking routes. The maritime operations can detain people, destroy illegal assets, and use force to implement their mandate within rather restrictive rules of engagement. There are also training, institution-building, and law enforcement operations in Somalia, Mali, and the Central African Republic. There have been other military operations (now terminated) in Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Of the EU’s ten ongoing civilian operations, four are in Africa: in Niger, Mali, Somalia, and Libya. There have been others in Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. General Rodriguez believed that these military and civilian operations make a real contribution to security and stability on the continent, especially to the safety of shipping; the disruption of networks for the smuggling of people, weapons, and narcotics; and the fight against Islamist terrorist groups such as Boko Haram in West Africa, al-Shabaab in Somalia, al Qaeda, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The EU has also invested heavily in promoting the economic and political resilience of fragile African states, including through political engagement and significant development assistance (as described in Chapter 12).
During the decade beginning in 2007, the most significant of these operations was the anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa to protect vulnerable commercial shipping from Somali pirates. That waterway is strategically important because it is often the shortest route in and out of Europe through the Suez Canal; the alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope is significantly longer and more expensive. The problem of piracy in this region was highlighted by the award-winning film Captain Phillips starring my favorite actor, Tom Hanks. In April 2009, the captain of the Maersk Alabama ignored numerous warnings to mariners to stay at least 600 nautical miles from the Somali coast. The ship, loaded with relief supplies bound for Kenya, was boarded by Somali pirates 300 nautical miles from the coast and the captain was taken prisoner for five days, before being rescued by the US Navy. The piracy was leading not only to armed attacks and the taking of hostages, but also to significant costs to merchant shipping because of ransom payments, security precautions, and higher insurance premiums.
The EU launched its anti-piracy naval force a few months before the incident with the Maersk Alabama. It has had the challenging task of patrolling 8.7 million square kilometers of sea—an area almost the size of Europe and covering the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and a large part of the Indian Ocean—with up to seven surface combat vessels and several marine reconnaissance aircraft. NATO has had a similar anti-piracy mission that has worked closely with the EU; other countries (including from China, Russia, and Korea) have contributed vessels.
The EU and NATO missions have been unquestionable successes: Whereas 736 hostages and 32 ships were being held by pirates at the height of Somali piracy in early 2011, almost no hostages or ships have been held and few attacks have occurred in the past few years. While there were a few other reasons for the decline in piracy (including the requirement of insurance companies that vessels steer well clear of the Somali coast), the naval mission has been a key factor. Importantly, the anti-piracy operation has cooperated with other naval forces in the area and the shipping industry in the fight against piracy.
In addition to the maritime mission, the EU has managed an onshore military mission in Somalia since 2008 to cooperate in training Somali soldiers and advising the Somali armed forces. The United States has cooperated with the mission by paying for salaries of thousands of Somali troops, as well as providing food, fuel, uniforms, and other necessities. Since 2012, the EU has also managed an onshore civilian mission in Somalia to assist federal and regional authorities to develop coast guard and maritime law enforcement. Moreover, the EU has covered nearly all of the costs—over €1 billion over the past decade—of the African Union’s Mission to Somalia, a peacekeeping force of roughly 8000 men. To the West, the EU has worked through the African Union to finance a Multinational Joint Task Force, including Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, that combats Boko Haram’s threat to regional stability. That is in addition to significant development assistance (worth over several billion euros per year) to address the root causes of radicalism by creating jobs and improving agricultural practices, physical security, basic social services, and infrastructure.
Elsewhere on the continent, the EU has military training missions in the Central African Republic and Mali to train and advise the armed forces of those countries, including in counterterrorism. These are, to put it mildly, pretty dangerous places to be, as the armed attacks on the EU’s military mission headquarters in Mali made clear in 2016 and 2019.
The EU’s naval operation off the coast of Libya has disrupted refugee smuggling routes and performed the humanitarian mission of saving lives of refugees in the south central Mediterranean. This operation began during the migrant crisis of 2015 during which the sea route from Libya to Italy was one of two main corridors used by just under 100,000 refugees per month to reach Europe. Traffic along that route remained high at over 100,000 per year in 2016 and 2017 before declining significantly over the subsequent years. Further progress has been hampered by the inability of Libyan leaders and the international community to bring Libya’s warring factions together in a government of national unity. The EU’s maritime mission and Italy have had some success in reducing migrant flows by helping regional and local Libyan authorities to develop a more effective coastguard that now stops most smugglers’ ships from leaving the coastline. The EU remains concerned about conditions in detention centers for migrants in Libya; the continuing conflict around Tripoli has made conditions even worse.
The EU’s civilian missions in Mali and Niger have focused on helping those countries combat the smuggling of weapons, narcotics, and humans. And the EU has been a significant provider of humanitarian and development assistance in many other African countries, including Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, and Sudan.
Why did General Rodriguez have a high opinion about these missions? Put simply, if the EU were not present in many African countries with its military and civilian operations, the political and economic conditions in the region would deteriorate further. That would result in greater instability, terrorism, famine, warfare, and an increase in refugees seeking European asylum (a phenomenon fueling European populism). These consequences would eventually demand a costly response, including by military forces, from the United States. In many of the African countries cited above, the EU (and its member states, especially France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom) simply has better local knowledge than the United States. General Rodriguez also appreciated the EU’s unique mix of military and “soft power” tools, including diplomacy, trade, and development assistance. Without the investment in strengthening the resilience of unstable African states, there would be greater need to spend blood and treasure on military conflict. Furthermore, the EU’s security activities mesh well with the strategic reorientation of the US military toward a lighter and more nimble military footprint, a concentration on a few key theaters like Afghanistan and Iraq, and a greater focus on training and equipping partner countries to enable them to be more self-sufficient.
As noted above, the EU’s military and civilian missions under CSDP are also making valuable contributions in many areas outside of Africa, including in the Balkans. Since 2004, for example, the EU replaced a NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force deployed to Bosnia Herzegovina after the Bosnian War. The EU’s military mission there oversees the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement and provides a secure environment in the country. Importantly, the mission is able to rely on the “Berlin Plus” arrangements agreed in 2003, whereby the EU is able to access NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led operations.
Since 2008, the EU has managed a major civilian mission in Kosovo that promotes the rule of law, multi-ethnic democracy, and the fight against corruption. It also supports the implementation of the agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, Serbia’s former province, brokered by the EU in 2013 to normalize relations after Kosovo declared independence in 2008. The United States has contributed to that mission by providing police officers, prosecutors, and judges. It has also played an important role in supporting the Special Investigative Task Force charged with investigating and prosecuting alleged war crimes and other criminal behavior conducted by former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The EU (and especially the Netherlands) has supported the specialist court established in The Hague to hear these cases.
The EU also exerts significant influence in the Balkans through financial and technical assistance, as well as by holding out the prospect of accession in return for reform. Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania, and Serbia are candidates to become new EU members (although several EU member states have recently blocked opening accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania). So-called Stabilisation and Association agreements with these countries establish a free trade area and identify common political and economic objectives that encourage reform and regional cooperation. If it weren’t for the EU’s military and civilian involvement, it is quite possible that the historic achievement of the Dayton Agreement would have unravelled long ago, possibly into another armed conflict.
It is of vital importance that the EU continues to deliver on its promises of eventual EU membership to those candidates that fulfill the criteria. Internal EU reform is indeed necessary before new members are welcomed into the club. But that doesn’t mean that a pathway to membership, or some form of closer relationship, over a period of time cannot be maintained for promising candidates. Even if membership remains a distant prospect for some, it would be a mistake to slam the door after candidates have cleaned up their houses. Doing so would leave a dangerous vacuum that would be filled by Russia, China, and militant Islam.
There are also CSDP missions in the Middle East and in the former Soviet Republics. The EU is often derided as not being a key player in the Israel–Palestine conflict. But it certainly makes a significant contribution, and wields influence, through its checkbook. A civilian mission was set up in 2005 to monitor the critical border crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. Unfortunately, the mission has not been able to operate since the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2006 and has been limited since then to providing advice on border management. Another CSDP mission provides support to the Palestinian police and criminal justice systems. The EU provides significant financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority to pay for salaries, pensions, and allowances. Without this assistance, the rule of law in the Occupied Territories could collapse, with dire consequences for the region.
The EU also provides significant financial assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, an international relief organization that provides education, health care, and social services to more than 5 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank. Together with its member states, the EU provides significant humanitarian assistance to those affected by the war in Syria, both inside Syria itself and in Jordan, Lebanon, and other countries hosting refugees. Elsewhere in the Middle East, the EU provides advice to the Iraqi government on civilian aspects of its security strategy.
A previous civilian mission in Afghanistan assisted the government during 2007–2016 in building and training a police force that operates under a rule of law, including a respect for human rights. The EU has committed over €1 billion euros (on top of member states’ financial contributions) for a wide range of goals in Afghanistan, including police training, justice sector reform, health, and border management.
In the former Soviet Republics, the EU provides a monitoring mission in Georgia along the border to help ensure the durability of the EU-mediated peace agreement that brought an end to the war with Russia in 2008. In Ukraine, a police advisory mission has been in place since 2014 to assist in security sector reform. In Ukraine and Moldova, the EU helps border and customs agencies combat customs fraud, drug smuggling, and human trafficking, particularly in Transnistria.
The EU’s Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policy Can Support US Interests
In all of these cases, the EU advances not only its own common defense and security policy, but also that of the United States. It has been because of this clear harmony of interests that the US and the EU signed a Framework Agreement on the participation of the US in EU crisis management operations in 2011. That agreement enabled US civilian participation in the missions in Congo, Kosovo, and Somalia mentioned above. In addition, there have been increasing staff-to-staff consultations between the EU Military Staff, on the one hand, and AFRICOM and the US European Command (EUCOM), on the other.
During my tenure, EUCOM and the EU Military Staff signed an administrative agreement to facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information between the organizations. I encouraged the Pentagon to make an exemption to National Disclosure Policy to enable the disclosure of US classified military information to the EU. And, most importantly, I contributed to the conclusion of an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement that enables the US Department of Defense to provide (and charge for) logistics support, supplies, and services to EU military operations. Importantly, the agreement does not obligate the United States to sell equipment when it does not approve of the mission. Despite my encouragement, however, the US and EU have not yet put in place a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement to enable the exchange of geospatial information between the US National Geospatial Intelligence Agency and the EU Satellite Centre; that is a pity as it would have helped the EU in many of the missions described above, especially in Africa.
Over the past few decades, there have inevitably been some commentators in the United States who have warned that a stronger EU common foreign policy, including a defense and security policy, will lead to frictions with the United States. With regard to foreign policy, the fear is that a common policy will inevitably be at the lowest common denominator in order to achieve consensus among member states with different histories, culture, and views of the world. In some areas, such as the Middle East, the European view has diverged persistently from the US view, thereby complicating Washington’s objectives.
It is, of course, more convenient to have the EU simply play along with whatever the United States decides. But that is certainly not what partnership is all about. A real partnership of equality is so much more powerful because it contributes to the effectiveness of US foreign policy in the overwhelming number of cases where the interests of the US and EU coincide. The real problem of the EU’s foreign policy for the United States, at least before the changes implemented by the Lisbon Treaty, was that it was uncoordinated, slow, and ineffective. With regard to security policy, some commentators have voiced concerns about proposed measures that might undermine NATO, the bedrock of the transatlantic security relationship. But these concerns have usually been misplaced or at least overstated.
I collaborated with my mentor and former US ambassador to the EU, Stuart Eizenstat, in 2010 to write an article in Foreign Affairs in which we praised the Lisbon Treaty’s useful features. One of them was the creation of the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, essentially a foreign minister in all but name. Federica Mogherini of Italy, one of my sister’s oldest Italian friends, proved to be a highly competent High Representative and earned the admiration of Secretary John Kerry, including for her work on the thorniest issues of Russian sanctions and the Iran nuclear negotiations.
The High Representative also serves as Vice President of the European Commission during her five-year term. She is responsible for chairing and setting the agenda for various configurations of council meetings in which ministers in charge of foreign affairs, defense, and development participate. And most important, she speaks for the EU on matters of foreign and security policy when the member states have agreed by consensus (which is overwhelmingly the case). That replaced the unworkable pre-Lisbon situation in which the member state holding the presidency of the EU in six-monthly rotation would chair the meetings and speak for the EU.4
In our article, Eizenstat and I warned that the EU might still struggle to ensure a consistent foreign policy, partly because the rotating presidency continues to chair and set the agendas for monthly Council meetings on “general affairs”—which include some issues having international significance, such as the accession of new members to the EU, humanitarian aid, climate change, energy security, and economic and monetary policy. The concern was misplaced as the High Representative and the relevant commissioners in charge of these policy areas have worked closely together. We also warned that the Lisbon Treaty’s creation of a new post, a President of the European Council (the body that represents the heads of government of the member states), might cause confusion and conflict with the High Representative because the former is tasked with representing the EU on issues of foreign policy with presidents and prime ministers of non-EU countries. But that has not occurred because of the close coordination between the two officials. Indeed, the position of President of the European Council has enhanced the ability of the EU to engage in long-term agenda-setting in foreign policy.
Another key innovation of the Lisbon Treaty was the creation of an European External Action Service, an EU foreign ministry in all but name. Like the title of High Representative, this name reflects the aversion in some member states (especially the UK) to the idea that the EU should behave like a state with wide-ranging diplomatic relations. The EEAS is a highly professional corps of roughly 4500 officials in Brussels and in 143 delegations in countries and international organizations worldwide. The delegations represent the EU, not just the European Commission, as past delegations did. That means the delegations (rather than the embassy of the country holding the rotating presidency of the EU) represent the EU in non-EU countries. They cooperate with and supplement, but do not replace, the diplomatic missions of the member states around the world.
The Lisbon Treaty made clear that neither the High Representative nor the EEAS affects the “responsibilities and powers of each member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation in international organizations.” In other words, EU foreign policy decision-making remains inter-governmental rather than supranational. Nonetheless, the EEAS has developed a broad and deep expertise on foreign policy and has facilitated the emergence of an EU-wide foreign policy perspective. It has unquestionably enhanced the EU’s credibility, continuity, and communication on the global stage.
In one important respect, Eizenstat and I were right: The Lisbon Treaty has not yet addressed the problem of the EU’s over-representation. As we noted, the EU’s claims to be a single, coherent actor are undercut by the high number of European officials in attendance. At the three US–EU Summits I attended with President Obama, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and the High Representative, Francesca Mogherini, were present and spoke for Europe. At meetings of the G-20, the EU is represented by the presidents of the European Commission, the European Council, the European Central Bank, as well as leaders from six different member states (four as G-20 members and two as guests).
The EU’s Response to Growing External Security Challenges
The EU’s search to develop and project a coherent foreign and security policy has taken on added urgency over the past decade. Europe’s security has rarely looked so precarious as Russia seeks to threaten it militarily or destabilize European societies. These objectives are readily apparent in Russia’s occupation of two provinces in Georgia, annexation of Crimea, occupation of Southeast Ukraine and repeated incursions into the airspace and territorial waters of EU member states. They are also reflected in its efforts to undermine European elections and support extremist groups, spread disinformation to sow disaffection with democracy, and interfere in the choices of several Balkan countries to move closer to the EU and NATO.
Europe’s security has also suffered from the instability and internal conflict of its neighbors. A devastating civil war in Syria triggered massive refugee flows into Europe from the eastern Mediterranean. Desperate economic conditions in Africa, exploited by terrorist and criminal gangs, triggered massive refugee flows into Europe from the southern Mediterranean. These flows not only stretched the ability of the main European destination countries to absorb them, but also tested European solidarity to the breaking point. On top of all these threats, Europe has had to cope with repeated terrorist attacks on European soil, Turkey’s continued drift toward authoritarian rule, and the effort by Beijing to use its economic leverage to prevent unified EU policies toward China.
Perhaps most troublesome has been the change of US foreign policy toward Europe under the Trump administration. From the beginning of its term, the new administration has abandoned 60 years of bipartisan foreign policy by routinely attacking the EU as merely a protectionist vehicle of German power whose main purpose is to beat the United States in trade. It has been a cheerleader of Brexit and urged other member states to follow the UK out the door. It has undermined two of the EU’s most prized foreign policy achievements—the Paris Agreement on climate change and the agreement with Iran to limit its nuclear program in return for an easing of sanctions. President Trump has even declared the EU a “foe” of the United States, while repeatedly refusing to criticize Russia or Vladimir Putin. His support for NATO, and its Article 5 guarantee of collective defense, has been inconsistent and grudging. His attacks on Germany, and even Chancellor Merkel, for Germany’s trade surplus with the United States and its inadequate defense spending have been sharp. And the Trump administration has justified import duties on steel and aluminum, and potentially on cars, by stating that imports of these goods represent a national security threat, even at a time of peace and when purchased from allies (including the EU).
No wonder that the European Council President listed the United States as one of the main risks facing Europe in a letter to EU heads of government soon after the Trump administration took office.5 Juncker concluded that the United States is “no longer interested in guaranteeing Europe’s security in our place.” By mid-2018, Tusk asked: “With friends like that, who needs enemies?” Trump has been an important wake-up call to Europe, he concluded; it cannot assume that the United States would be a steadfast ally in times of need. “He has made us realise that if you need a helping hand, you will find one at the end of your arm.”6 Chancellor Merkel, not known for exaggeration or sense of drama, noted that “the era in which we could fully rely on others is over to some extent…we Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands.”7
The darkening geopolitical landscape led the EU to conclude in its Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence, published in 2017, that “peace and security at home can no longer be taken for granted…the European Union and its member states have a duty and responsibility to protect citizens and promote European interests and values.”8 The problem, as the Reflection Paper recognized, is that Europe had failed to invest in its capacity to do so. Since 2005, military expenditures among the EU 28 had fallen by 12% in inflation-adjusted terms, while expenditures among many other powers, including Russia and China, had increased significantly. Europe had for many years been spending half of what the United States spends on defense, in terms of both gross expenditures and as a percentage of GDP. Most EU members of NATO were spending well below the agreed 2% GDP goal. Two EU members, France and the UK, have represented nearly half of total EU military spending; following Brexit, the figures for the EU 27 look even worse.
Inadequate spending inevitably has had dire consequences on military readiness. In my many meetings at the EEAS, senior officials pointed out that readiness levels for many key defense equipment, such as fighter jets and attack and transport helicopters, stood at less than 50% in several member states. Studies have claimed that less than 3% of European troops (40,000 men) are deployable due to shortages of equipment. That compares to the 200,000 troops that the United States deploys overseas. But the problem has been even worse than a lack of resources; just as serious, the EU 28 have been wasting vast resources by failing to achieve economies of scale through common weapons procurement and research and development, as well as failing to achieve interoperability of existing weapons systems. Around 80% of defense procurement in Europe is on a national basis, leading to duplication and capability gaps. Europe has not only been underspending, it has been spending wastefully.
The result is predictable. According to the European Commission, there are 178 different weapons systems in the EU, compared to 30 in the United States; there are 29 types of destroyers/frigates in the EU, compared to four in the US; there are 20 types of fighters planes in the EU, compared to six in the US; there are 42 tanker aircraft (of twelve different types) for air-to-air refuelling in the EU, compared to 55 units of four types in the United States; there are 37 types of armored personnel carriers in the EU, compared to nine types in the United States; there are 17 types of main battle tanks in the EU, compared to four in the United States; and there are more helicopter producers in the EU than there are governments able to buy them.9 This is plainly absurd. But fixing the problem has been hard as many European governments are intent on protecting their national defense “champions” who often have significant political clout.
Perhaps the most egregious problem has been that many member states spend a small percentage of their defense budgets on equipment. Although NATO agrees that members should spend 20% of their defense expenditures on equipment, few actually do so. Belgium has been, perhaps, the most striking example. My jaw dropped when I noted that it was not only spending a paltry 0.9% of its €500 billion GDP (roughly €4.5 billion) on defense, and that 90% of that amount was earmarked for personnel (salaries and pensions, for example). If it were to meet the twin NATO guidelines above, Belgium would be spending considerably more on equipment. The failure of many European countries to shoulder their burden is clearly unacceptable, as US presidents of both parties have pointed out over several decades.
In response to the challenge of spending scarce euros to maximum effect, the EU has focused on creating the conditions for more defense cooperation, maximizing output and efficiency of defense spending, including by promoting collaborative armaments projects, pooling of resources, encouraging role specialization, and reducing redundancies in weapons programs. Some progress has been made over the past decade. The European Defence Agency serves as a central hub for European defense cooperation by promoting collaboration among its 27 EU members (Denmark opted out) in many areas, including procurement policies and research and development efforts. The Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation, among Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK, serves as a central procurement body for important armament programs. Some countries have joined together in the European Air Transport Command to pool and share assets in military air transport, air-to-air refuelling, and aeromedical evacuation. There are examples of EU member states working together closely, such as the Belgian and Dutch navies. Since 2010, the UK and France have agreed to share equipment, conduct exchanges among their armed forces, provide access to each other’s defense markets, and set up a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. European defense cooperation remains largely a patchwork of bilateral or multilateral arrangements.
The EU recognizes that it needs to do more. Shortly after the start of the Juncker Commission’s five-year mandate in 2015, President Juncker declared:
I believe that we need to work on a stronger Europe when it comes to security and defence matters. Yes, Europe is chiefly a ‘soft power.’ But even the strongest soft powers cannot make do in the long run without at least some integrated defence capacities.
The EU’s Common Defense
The Lisbon Treaty provides that CSDP shall include the development of a common Union defense policy that will lead to a common defense, when the member states decide unanimously. Over the past few years, there has been some rhetoric (albeit rare) by a few EU officials, including by President Juncker, about the need for an EU “army.”10 It was ill-advised because it complicated the debate in the UK regarding Brexit. The UK tabloid press pounced on these statements as confirmation that the EU is seeking to create a “super state” when there is no evidence to suggest that this is indeed the direction of travel.
Despite the occasional rhetoric about a European army, the reality is that there has been very little traction for such an idea ever since 1954 when the French Parliament ended discussions about a European Defence Community that would have included a European army, a European Minister of Defence, and a common defense budget. A European Corps (Eurocorps), consisting of troops from five EU member states, became operational in 1995 and remains outside of both EU and NATO structures. But it remains a relatively modest affair: A Franco-German Brigade, established in 1987 and consisting of about 5000 troops, is the only military formation permanently under the command of the Eurocorps.
At a 1998 summit meeting between French President Jacques Chirac and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair at St. Malo, France, the two countries agreed that the EU should “have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” The concept of what “autonomy” is and from whom Europe should be autonomous was left unclear. The meeting at St. Malo gave birth to CSDP, new institutions such as the EU Military Staff and the Intelligence Centre, and the headline goal of deploying 60,000 troops for up to 60 days and 6000 kilometers from Brussels.
The crisis in transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the US decision to invade Iraq prompted French President Chirac to propose a fully fledged defense union among France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg—described by The New York Post as the “Axis of Weasel.”11 Although that didn’t lead anywhere, there has been slow but consistent progress toward a far more modest objective of creating an autonomous European military capability.
Between 2000 and 2006, the EU worked on developing a rapid reaction force capable of being deployed on the ground within 5–10 days of EU approval and capable of being sustained for several months in a variety of “limited intensity” CSDP operations, such as conflict prevention, evacuation, brief support of existing troops, delivery of aid, and post-conflict stabilization (prior to the deployment of larger forces). In 2007, the EU announced that the rapid reaction force was fully operational, meaning that the EU could deploy simultaneously two battalion-sized forces (“Battlegroups”) of 1500 troops each, plus command and support services. The Battlegroups are drawn from every EU member state (except Denmark and Malta), as well as five non-EU countries. Larger member states have generally contributed their own Battlegroups, while smaller ones collaborate to create common groups. Each group has a “lead nation” that takes operational command. While the rapid-reaction force looks good on paper, none has ever been deployed, largely due to slow decision-making and uncertainties about how missions would be financed. Participating member states must cover their own costs, a burden that is especially troublesome for smaller states.
The deterioration of Europe’s security environment during 2013–2017 led 25 EU member states (all EU members minus the UK, Denmark, and Malta) to activate in September 2017 a hitherto unused provision of the Lisbon Treaty. This provision, called the “sleeping beauty” of the Treaty by President Juncker, is related to the ability of certain EU member states to enter into “permanent structured cooperation” (PESCO) with one another to jointly develop defense capabilities and make them available for EU military operations. Like the Battlegroups, one of the purposes of this cooperation is to rapidly deploy and sustain combat missions for the purposes of joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization, peacekeeping, and peacemaking. But the aim appears broader than the Battlegroups in that it seeks to promote cooperation on very specific projects. Among the first projects to be approved were the development of a prototype for a European Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the creation of a European Medical Command to provide collective EU medical capabilities to support military operations, a Cyber Rapid Response Team, and a project to standardize and simplify European cross-border military transport.
PESCO has been trumpeted by its supporters as a step-change in EU military cooperation and operational readiness. One of the reasons is that the commitments of PESCO members—including the pledge to regularly increase defense budgets in real terms and to pursue national investments in defense with due consideration for the EU’s collective needs—are intended to be binding. These commitments will be subject to regular review by the European Defence Agency and the European Union External Action Service. A member state that underperforms can, in theory, be removed from PESCO by a qualified majority vote by the other members (although that seems quite unlikely).
Nonetheless, there is reason to be skeptical about PESCO. The relevant provision of the Lisbon Treaty envisages that PESCO would be suitable only for member states “whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria” for the purpose of entering into “the most demanding missions.” Although specific PESCO projects are exclusive to a subset of EU member states, PESCO itself applies to nearly every EU member state, including minnows with extremely modest military capabilities, but not the UK (one of the two most effective military powers in the EU) after Brexit. That suggests that it may not serve as a truly effective vanguard.
PESCO has reawakened old concerns in the Trump administration about the “three D’s” that Secretary of State Madeline Albright had warned about in 1998: That an enhanced European defense identity would duplicate NATO force planning, command structure, and procurement decisions; de-couple European decision-making from broader alliance decision-making; and discriminate against NATO members who are not EU members (including the US, Canada, Turkey and Norway).
Importantly, the point about non-duplication was neither defined nor intended to mean that the EU should not develop certain capabilities that already exist in NATO. Indeed, the Clinton administration sought to prod European allies into developing precisely such capabilities. PESCO does not seem to pose a risk to NATO. Capabilities developed under PESCO remain the property of the member states, rather than becoming collective EU assets, and therefore remain available to NATO, as well as the EU. Moreover, one of the criteria taken into account in the selection of PESCO projects is whether they respond to NATO priorities. With 22 countries belonging to both the EU and NATO, strengthened EU capabilities are destined to benefit NATO. The PESCO projects that have been launched so far appear to bear this out; for example, NATO’s heavy military forces will be the greatest beneficiary of the PESCO project to improve cross-European military mobility. While NATO officials have occasionally expressed fears about duplication, especially if the EU moves to build a fully functioning operational headquarters, they have usually concluded that it should be welcomed if PESCO improves Europe’s ability to contribute to the common defense.
With regard to the fear of de-coupling, the Lisbon Treaty recognizes the pre-eminence of NATO in terms of European security and does not interfere with the choices of member states regarding their security and defense policies. President Trump’s grudging reaffirmation of the NATO Article 5 mutual defense guarantee has done more to promote de-linking than any European defense initiative by giving rise to questions about the dependability of US military support in the hour of need.
With regard to the third “D”, the Trump administration appears to be concerned about a different form of discrimination, namely against US defense contractors. This fear may be legitimate, but it has nothing to do with PESCO. EU member states have often given preference to national or European suppliers, over US competitors, even when the former provide less cost-effective or technologically advanced solutions. Washington has raised the alarm about alleged “poison pills” that would prevent companies based outside the EU, including the US, from participating in military projects.12 Given the critical importance of stretching limited defense budgets and enhancing military capabilities, US-headquartered companies should not be excluded from defense procurement or research in Europe, especially when those companies have shown long-term commitment to investing and creating jobs and skills in Europe. Fortunately, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has stated her commitment to “an open and competitive European defense equipment market.”13
US charges of discrimination ring pretty hollow. The Defense Department is required to “Buy American” first as a general rule. “Buy American” laws, tightened under the Trump administration, require foreign firms competing for federal defense contracts to show that more than half of their products’ contents is US-made. There are other laws, especially the so-called Berry Amendment that requires certain items purchased by the Defense Department to be entirely domestic in origin.
It also needs to be acknowledged that a true transatlantic partnership in defense requires a European partner that has an economically healthy and technologically advanced defense industry. That can’t be the case if the US aggressively lobbies European governments to purchase US military equipment. I remember attending a meeting between National Security Adviser Tony Lake and Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli when I was a young staffer at the National Security Council. The briefing paper I had written contained many economic and political issues of importance to US–Italian relations, but Lake chose to raise the last and arguably least important talking point about Italy’s pending purchase of air-to-air missiles. Agnelli’s response was tart: “The relationship between our two countries is not just about Italy buying your military equipment.” Similarly, French Foreign Defense Secretary Florence Parly has recently observed that the mutual defense clause of the NATO treaty does not require European allies to buy American fighter aircraft: “It’s called Article 5, not Article F-35.”14
If PESCO contributes to higher European military expenditures, it should be welcomed. The United States has called for precisely that during many decades. The real concern in the United States should be whether PESCO will do anything at all, not whether it will do too much. It appears to bear the hallmarks of yet another political statement, short on substance; indeed, Berlin favored an all-inclusive club in order to send the message of European unity at a time of increasing European fragmentation.
Concerns about the Battlegroup concept and the limitations of PESCO led French President Emmanuel Macron to propose creating another EU military force, called the European Intervention Initiative (EI2), in a major foreign policy speech at the Sorbonne University in September 2017. Launched in July 2018 with nine EU members, EI2 is intended (like the Battlegroup concept) to be a force that can be rapidly deployable in times of crisis. But it is different in that is that it lies outside of EU structures and is not tied to CSDP, includes a smaller group of European countries, and has a common budget and doctrine. EI2 also ultimately aims to create a shared vision regarding security concerns and the means to address them. It is intended to operate with streamlined decision-making and enhance the ability of its members to act together on missions as part of NATO, EU, UN, or other ad hoc coalitions.
One of the reasons EI2 is significant is political, rather than military. Despite France’s commitment to the EU, it has lost faith in the EU’s ability to deliver an effective military solution and it was, furthermore, willing to break with Germany on this significant issue. Germany has joined the initiative, but unwillingly. As a rare example of a split between Paris and Berlin, it risks causing another fracture line in the European project.
While it remains too early to assess whether the objectives of PESCO or EI2 will be achieved, several things are already clear. The concepts fall well short of an ambition to create a European army. Their purpose is to complement NATO, not to undermine it, as NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has himself observed. There is no reason to think many Europeans are trying or will ever try to undermine or replace NATO. Even the UK, traditionally opposed to any effort at creating a European defense alliance, joined EI2 because it believed that the initiative is compatible, rather than competitive, with NATO. (It also joined to ensure a seat at the table in order to prevent the project from ever evolving in that direction.)
No one seriously believes that Europe can defend itself against a major threat, such as a Russian invasion of the Baltic Republics, without NATO’s support. Increased European defense integration may well complement NATO by generating military efficiencies to the benefit of both NATO and the EU. As a series of collaborative projects, PESCO does not risk diverting limited resources away from NATO. EI2 might hypothetically do so in the event of concurrent EI2 and NATO missions that drew on the same military assets. The risk does not appear significant, especially as the French seem focused on using EI2 to relieve their own operations in Africa. Moreover, the small risk would be worth the price if Europe’s military asset base grows.
The ambition of EI2 to develop a common “strategic culture” in the EU is laudable but challenging. I witnessed repeatedly during my mandate how different groups of EU member states have radically different perceptions of external threats. The UK and France have been the only EU member states that have frequently assumed responsibilities for major military engagements in the region (including in Africa and the Middle East). Member states in Scandinavia, the Baltics, and Eastern Europe understand very well the dangers from an aggressive Russia. Those in the South, on the other hand, consider migration as a far bigger threat; in the years following Russia’s invasion of Crimea and Southeast Ukraine, Italy and Greece (joined by many others) consistently tried to water down sanctions on Russia and pleaded that sanctions were having a disproportionately negative effect on their economies. Germany has been extremely reluctant to deploy its soldiers in military operations (most notably refusing to support the EU-led NATO mission to prevent Gaddafi’s crimes against humanity in Libya). Four of the six non-NATO EU countries decided not to get involved.15
Adding to the challenge of developing a common “strategic culture” is the fact that European publics appear unwilling to fight, even for NATO allies. As noted in Chapter 7, a 2015 opinion poll by the Pew Research Center indicated that if Russia were to attack one of its neighboring countries that is a NATO member, nearly half of those Europeans polled would oppose using military force to defend it. Of those Germans polled, 58% said that they would not be willing to fight, as opposed to 38% who said they would. The figures were similar for the French and the Italians. With attitudes like that, it will be politically very challenging to justify increased military spending and to ensure that the Article 5 mutual defense guarantee appears rock solid to those who might be tempted to challenge it.
While the EU continues to speak about “strategic autonomy,” the idea remains ill-defined. If it is about acting independently on major international issues, including security challenges, the EU will continue to fall short for some time. If it is about setting objectives, making decisions, and mobilizing resources in less challenging areas without having to depend on the decisions and assets of others (including the United States), the progress is more promising.
The EU has enhanced its ability to manage modest operations autonomously (without relying on bases belonging to NATO or post-Brexit Britain). As a step in that direction, the EU opened a permanent headquarters for military operations in March 2017. Its immediate objective has been to assume the management of the three existing EU training missions in Mali, Somalia, and the Central African Republic. By the end of 2020 it aims to have the ability to assume command of military operations of roughly 2000 troops deployed as part of the CSDP.
In the past few years, there has been important progress toward the goal of improving defense cooperation on weapons systems. Launched in 2016, for example, a European Defence Fund has focused on maximizing the output of military expenditures by coordinating and supplementing national investments in defense research. From 2020 onward, the Fund expects to provide €500 million in grants, fully and directly funded from the EU budget, for collaborative research in critical areas of innovation to be agreed by the member states. The Fund has also focused on creating incentives for member states to cooperate on the joint development and acquisition of defense equipment and technology. The Fund expects to provide €1 billion per year in co-financing for collaborative projects, involving at least three EU member states, in areas of defense equipment and technology such as drone technology and satellite communications. Every euro in EU funding is expected to generate an additional four euros from the private sector, for a total investment of €5 billion per year.
In sum, there is reason to believe that despite past failures and the present hype, the EU is both investing more in defense and improving the operational capabilities of its armed forces. The EU has realized that it cannot continue to be the only vegetarian in a world of carnivores. Many recent developments underpin the renewed focus on defense. These include external threats from Russia, more widespread violence in the Middle East, the continued attacks of Islamic terrorist groups and a new US administration that is unpredictable and eager to break up the EU. At the same time, an economic recovery has made it easier to spend taxpayers’ money on security. On the negative side of the ledger, the exit of the UK from the EU results in the loss of significant operational military capabilities in the EU. The EU’s short-sighted decision to exclude the UK from the more military sensitive parts of its Galileo Navigation System has pushed the UK to build its own system, requiring substantial investment that could be better deployed elsewhere. Nonetheless, Brexit also removes one of the biggest obstacles to greater European military integration.
Most important, the European Union and NATO are working more closely than ever before. This is only natural as the two institutions are based on common values, resources and challenges. The “Berlin Plus” arrangements described earlier show that the US and NATO are willing to facilitate European efforts to assume greater burdens of European security without having to rely on the United States. Admittedly these arrangements have only been used twice by the EU, in 2003 when it replaced a NATO mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and since 2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
EU-NATO relations are evolving. Until 2016, closer EU-NATO ties were blocked due to the tense relationship between Cyprus, a non-NATO EU member, and Turkey, a non-EU NATO member. In February 2016, however, NATO responded favorably to a joint request by Germany, Greece, and Turkey to assist in efforts to deal with the refugee crisis in the eastern Mediterranean. The maritime mission provided the EU’s border management agency FRONTEX and the Greek and Turkish navies valuable reconnaissance about human trafficking, as well as ensured that the navies did not encroach on each other’s territorial waters (that abutted each other in the narrow passage between the Greek island of Lesbos, the main destination of Syrian refugees, and the Turkish coast).
Efforts that US Ambassador to NATO Doug Lute and I undertook to deepen EU-NATO ties bore fruit in a joint declaration by the two organizations at the NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016. The declaration identified 42 concrete proposals to work more closely together in seven different areas, including countering “hybrid threats,”16 cyber security, and operational cooperation at sea and on migration.
An EU-NATO declaration in July 2018, two years after the Warsaw summit, noted that the organizations now exchange real-time warnings on cyber attacks, participate in each other’s exercises, and work together in responding to the refugee and migrant crisis. And the declaration urged strengthened cooperation in a number of areas, including military mobility, counterterrorism, and the ability to cope with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-related risks. A European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats has been established in Helsinki to provide EU member states and NATO allies with analysis, training, and exercises. There has been increased cooperation between the two organizations’ strategic communication teams about how to combat disinformation, including through social media.
The time may finally have arrived when the EU can take serious steps toward greater military integration. The European public wants this, as does NATO. The geopolitical environment demands it. Most important, there are signs that, unlike previous proposals that focused on facilitating information exchange and building bureaucratic institutions, such as command structures, current proposals quite rightly focus on building additional capabilities. While higher defense spending has never been popular in most European countries, justifying it as an EU project may well make it more palatable than doing so because NATO, dominated by Uncle Sam, demands it. There are many threats of a not purely military nature that can more appropriately be met by the EU because of its unique mixture of coercive military power and “soft power” tools—including diplomacy, trade, foreign aid, and the promise of entry into the EU club. The fact that President Macron involved article 42.7 of the EU Treaty, consisting of a mutual defense obligation among member states, rather than NATO’s Article 5 guarantee of collective defense, is just one illustration.
Greater EU military integration is something that should be embraced in Washington as it is squarely in line with the justified demand, made by US administrations over many decades, that Europe should assume greater responsibility for its own defense. As long as NATO’s centrality continues to be recognized and the focus remains on building capabilities, improving efficiency, and ensuring interoperability of weapons systems, EU military integration can only benefit European and transatlantic security.
As this book was going to press, the new Commission was outlining its priorities for its five-year term. It is already clear that President von der Leyen, formerly Germany’s minister of defense, believes that the new Commission should more forcefully use the powerful tools at its disposal, including with regard to other global powers. She has stated that the EU “needs to be more strategic, more assertive, and more united in its approach to external relations.” This focus is clearly prompted by concerns that the EU is facing a more threatening and uncertain global context than ever before.
She has instructed Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy, to strengthen the EU’s capacity to act “autonomously” and to promote its values and interests around the world. When putting forward proposals, Borrell is instructed to use EU treaty clauses that allow certain decisions on CFSP to be adopted by qualified majority voting (rather than unanimity). He will also seek to promote a genuine “European Defence Union” during the next five years. As long as the UK was a member of the EU, such proposals were unimaginable.
It is also significant that von der Leyen has instructed Thierry Breton, commissioner for the internal market, to lead a new focused portfolio on defense industry and space, backed by a newly created directorate-general responsible for that area. The fact that Breton is French and close to French President Emmanuel Macron, who has repeatedly stressed the need for greater EU ambition in defense, suggests that the EU may finally place defense higher on its list of priorities.17
Acknowledgements
The contribution of Caroline Wefer is gratefully acknowledged.
Footnotes
1
Alan Riding, “Conflict in Yugoslavia: Europe Sends High Level Team,” The New York Times, June 29, 1991. https://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/29/world/conflict-in-yugoslavia-europeans-send-high-level-team.html.
2
Quoted in Craig Whitney, “Gulf Fighting Shatters European’s Fragile Unity,” The New York Times, January 26, 1991. https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-europe-gulf-fighting-shatters-europeans-fragile-unity.html.
3
Articles 42–43 of the Treaty.
4
Anthony Luzzatto Gardner and Stuart E. Eizenstat, “New Treaty, New Influence?” Foreign Affairs, March–April 2010.
5
Letter by President Donald Tusk to the 27 EU heads of state or government on the future of the EU before the Malta summit, January 31, 2017. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/01/31/tusk-letter-future-europe/.
6
Remarks by President Donald Tusk ahead of the EU-Western Balkans summit and the Leaders’ agenda dinner, May 16, 2018. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/05/16/remarks-by-president-donald-tusk-ahead-of-the-eu-western-balkans-summit-and-the-leaders-agenda-dinner/.
7
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/g-krise-wir-europaeer-muessen-unser-schicksal-in-unsere-eigene-hand-nehmen-1.3524718.
8
Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence, June 7, 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-defence_en.pdf.
9
European Commission Factsheet on Defending Europe. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/defending-europe-factsheet_en.pdf.
10
Andrew Sparrow, “Jean-Claude Juncker Calls for EU Army,” The Guardian, March 8, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/08/jean-claude-juncker-calls-for-eu-army-european-commission-miltary.
11
https://nypost.com/2003/01/24/axis-of-weasel-germany-and-france-wimp-out-on-iraq-colin-raps-french-german-wimps/.
12
Guy Chazan and Michael Pell, “US Warns Against European Joint Military Project,” Financial Times, May 14, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/ad16ce08-763b-11e9-bbad-7c18c0ea0201.
13
Mission letter to Thierry Breton, commissioner-designate for the internal market. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/president-elect_von_der_leyens_mission_letter_to_thierry_breton.pdf.
14
https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/french-defense-chief-its-called-article-5-not-article-f-35/.
15
http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/nato-publics-blame-russia-for-ukrainian-crisis-but-reluctant-to-provide-military-aid/.
16
The EU defines “hybrid threats” as the combination of “conventional and unconventional, military and non-military activities that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific political objectives.” They can be “multidimensional, combining coercive and subversive measures, using both conventional and unconventional tools and tactics.”
17
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/president-elect_von_der_leyens_mission_letter_to_thierry_breton.pdf