Part II

The Casa di San Giorgio’s Territories (1407–1518)

4

Origins of San Giorgio’s Territorial Power

4.1. Sources

San Giorgio endured as a territorial power for far less time than as a holder of public debt and a bank. It was a bank and managed the public debt for around four centuries, but owned and controlled territories only between 1446 and 1562. These territories were in Liguria, Corsica, Cyprus in the Aegean Sea, and Crimea in the Black Sea. The bank acquired its first territorial dominion, Pietrasanta, together with Mutrone (nowadays Marina di Pietrasanta) in the northern area of Tuscany, in 1446. The duration of territorial dominions and their geographical locations are shown in Table 4.1 and Maps 4.1–4.3. San Giorgio took control of all these territories between 1446 and 1518, but did not hold them continuously. Corsica, the largest territory, was ruled by San Giorgio from 1453, but between 1464 and 1483 it was under the Sforza, who held the signory of Genoa in those years. Some of San Giorgio’s territories were part of the Genoese dominion in Liguria, including Levanto, Ventimiglia, Pieve di Teco, and the Valle Arroscia. The bank took control of these territories in the early sixteenth century, when it had already lost all its other possessions to the Ottomans—Corsica and the small island of Capraia excepted.

San Giorgio was not always or uniformly interested in territorial acquisition. Sometimes the Commune exerted pressure on San Giorgio to step in and take the territories, and at other times San Giorgio was looking for profit. A territorial loss could put the wealth of Genoese merchants—investors in San Giorgio—at risk. At other times it was economically convenient for San Giorgio to control and rule a territory, and it did not always have to pay to acquire it. In most cases, the Commune, trying to save money, gave the territory to San Giorgio. In a few cases, San Giorgio tried to recover control over a territory, but failed, as with Crimea in 1481, which it lost to the Ottomans in 1475.

At other times, San Giorgio received a territory not from the Commune but from other powers such as the Fregoso family or the duke of Milan. Over the decades, the Commune and later the Republic of Genoa provided funds to assist San Giorgio in maintaining its territories. When the territories returned to the Republic’s control in 1562, San Giorgio received ₤75,000 as compensation.¹ San Giorgio took advantage of the Commune of Genoa which, step by step, lost some of its wealth and privileges.

Table 4.1 List of the territories of San Giorgio
Name today	Old name	Area	Dominion’s duration	Years
Corsica	Corsica	Island	1453–1464	90
Feodosia	Caffa		1453–1475	22
Sudak	Soldaia		1453–1475	22
Balaklava Sevastopol	Cembalo		1453–1475	22
Amasra	Samastri		1453–1475	22
Trabzon	Trebisonda		1453–1475	22
Sinop	Sinope		1453–1475	22
Azov	Tana		1453–1475	22
Slavjansk na Kubani	Copa		1453–1475	22
Kerch	Vosporo		1453–1475	22
Eupatoria	Kerkinitis	Black Sea	1453–1475	22
Chersonesos	Chersoneso		1453–1475	22
Alupka	Lupico		1453–1475	22
Yalta	Gialita		1453–1475	22
Alushta	Lusito		1453–1475	22
Olenivka	Rosso far		1453–1475	22
Bilhorod Dnistrovskyi	Moncastro		1453–1475	22
Odessa	Seraticia		1453–1475	22
Kiliya	Licostomo		1453–1475	22
Pietrasanta	Pietrasanta		1446–1484	38
Marina di Pietrasanta	Mutrone		1446–1484	38
Ameglia	Ameglia		1476–1562	86
Lerici	Lerici		1479–1562	92
Sarzana	Sarzana		1484–1487 / 1496–1562	65
Sarzanello	Sarzanello		1484–1487 / 1496–1562	65
Nicola	Nicola	Lunigiana	1494–1562	65
Ortonovo	Ortonovo		1494–1562	65
Castelnuovo	Castelnuovo		1494–1562	65
Santo Stefano Magra	Santo Stefano Magra		1499–1562	63
Falcinello	Falcinello		1500–1562	65
Bolano	Bolano		1510–1562	52
Godano	Godano		1510–1562	52
Capraia	Capraia	Island	1506–1562	56
Pieve di Teco	Pieve di Teco		1512–1562	50
Valle Arroscia	Valle Aroscia		1512–1562	50
Ventimiglia	Ventimiglia	Liguria	1514–1562	48
Levanto	Levanto		1515–1562	47
Ponzano Superiore	Ponzano		1517–1562	45

Map 4.1 San Giorgio’s dominions

Map 4.2 San Giorgio’s western dominion. The length of the occupation is described by the intensity of the grey scale.

Map 4.3 San Giorgio’s dominions in the Black Sea

As it acquired more and more territories, San Giorgio developed a culture of controlling and governing them. San Giorgio’s governors became experts at ruling people, and when necessary, San Giorgio raised an army. It employed artists to represent—on city doors, bas-reliefs, and statues—its power over land. Even though San Giorgio and the Commune had similar organizational structures, and officers often moved between the two, San Giorgio developed new practices of government and paid its administrators better. The bank even developed specific formulas for territorial contracts when it asserted its ius gladii and the plena iurisdictio over its territories. Its first contract was not written and signed with Pietrasanta, San Giorgio’s first dominion, but with the acquisition of its second territory, Famagusta. This contract established the pattern for future contracts. During the fifteenth century and the first two decades of the sixteenth, the Commune of Genoa not only gave San Giorgio its territorial iurisdictio (territorial power) within its boundaries, but also beyond Genoa.

The Commune was often in the hands of an external power, usually France or the duke of Milan. In two cases, San Giorgio acquired new territories—Ameglia (1476) and Levanto (1518)—when the Commune was ruled by the king of France. At other times, San Giorgio acquired new territories during a political crisis, when the Commune was on the verge of ending up in the hands of an external power. Caffa (modern-day Feodosia in Crimea) became a territory of San Giorgio in 1453, when Francesco Sforza wanted to acquire Genoa. It was when the Sforza family ruled Genoa that a relationship between two kinds of dominions was established. Externally, the Sforza took Genoa; internally, San Giorgio took some territories.

At that point San Giorgio became an ally of the duke of Milan. Some contemporary observers considered San Giorgio’s territorial acquisition to be a weakness of the doge and, as we will see, during the middle of the fifteenth century, someone within the council of Francesco Sforza considered the possibility that San Giorgio could take the entire dominion of the Commune of Genoa.² As will be shown in Chapter 7, at the end of the fifteenth century an argument maintaining that San Giorgio had taken the best parts of the Genoese dominion circulated. Several decades later, Niccolò Machiavelli wrote, “the Commune had put under the administration of San Giorgio the greater part of the towns and city subject to the empire of Genoa.”³ It is difficult to evaluate the statement that the territories were the best parts of the Genoese dominion because we have no way of valuing the resources of these dominions, some of which were very far from Genoa and one another. Caffa and the other trading bases in the Black Sea and Famagusta located in the eastern Mediterranean were lively commercial areas that were affected by the arrival of the Ottomans. The island of Corsica was much poorer. Even though it was close to Liguria, it did not participate in the same system of laws and practices as other territories there.

Some territories, such as the Lunigiana, were close to Genoa but outside the dominium of the Commune (from Capo Corvo to Monaco, between Tuscany and the Principality of Monaco). Some of the territories became part of the Genoese dominium before the foundation of San Giorgio. Both Corsica and Pietrasanta were dominions of the Fregoso (or Campofregoso), but the island of Corsica, like Cyprus, passed under the rule of a maona—the institution that San Giorgio absorbed. No studies have measured the wealth or population of these territories, which, again, makes it impossible to judge if they were the best part of the Genoese dominion. What it does tell us, however, is how San Giorgio’s power was perceived.⁴ Machiavelli’s view is different. If we consider Liguria—part of which was in the hands of noble families that had feudal territories—and the closest dominions, such as Corsica and Lunigiana, then San Giorgio’s territories were larger than those of the Commune. The majority of the territories were not populated by Genoese citizens but by subjected populations like the inhabitants of Corsica, or by a melting pot of peoples. Both Famagusta (Cyprus) and Caffa (Black Sea) were inhabited by Armenians, Jews, Russians, Tatars, and other groups. Formally, none of these territories outside Liguria was called a “colonial dominion,” but a consolidated tradition of studies has described them as “colonies.”⁵

Despite their different populations, the territorial and maritime space of San Giorgio’s dominions changed along similar patterns. San Giorgio had a system for administering its territories: it transformed the landscape, founded ports and cities, built defensive systems, and in places such as Corsica—where its dominion lasted for decades—even set up plantations inhabited by peasants sent from Liguria. The territories all had similar laws, political processes, and military practices. San Giorgio’s governors made these effective in similar ways. In Famagusta and in Corsica, the laws and rules predated San Giorgio’s dominion; they were created by the maone. But in all its dominions, San Giorgio acted against factions. In Corsica, Lunigiana, and the territories in Liguria (Ventimiglia and Pieve di Teco), it built a rhetoric against divisions, parties, and the power of elite local families. San Giorgio marked its territories with epigraphs, bas-reliefs, and statues representing its symbol—Saint George and the dragon. In Caffa in the far-flung Levant, preachers who in 1453 collected indulgences brandished the insignia of the Casa di San Giorgio.⁶ We can still see these markers in the territories close to Genoa. Those further away have signs of the Genoese presence, but no signs specific to San Giorgio.⁷

Some bas-reliefs and fortresses remain in Ventimiglia, Lerici (Lunigiana), Corsica, and the small island of Capraia.⁸ San Giorgio also showed its power through rituals—these, of course, are even more difficult to locate than material indicators. When governors were established on Corsica, they performed a ritual with a stick—a sort of scepter. Where San Giorgio’s power is still visible is in Genoese and external written sources. The letters of Florentine and Mantuan ambassadors and papers of the papal chancellery, for example, considered San Giorgio a territorial power. Some of these documents, such as the papers of inhabitants of Corsica, contain multiple voices of the subjected inhabitants; others are quite complex analyses written by erudite figures. Historians Niccolò Machiavelli and Agostino Giustiniani wrote detailed and thoughtful assessments of two of San Giorgio’s territories: the Lunigiana (Machiavelli) and Corsica (Giustiniani).⁹ A financial expert of the Officium Monetae, Giovanni Capello and an anonymous author mentioned earlier—looked at San Giorgio’s organizational structure.¹⁰ It happened that the inhabitants of San Giorgio’s territories integrated themselves into the administration of territorial power, primarily through financial investments. Some members of local oligarchies in San Giorgio’s territories invested in San Giorgio’s capital, obtaining interest in return.¹¹ Not only did these figures have a direct relationship with the central power in Genoa, they shared an information network and resources with Genoese merchants and traders—as did powerful persons in other territories controlled by San Giorgio.

We can divide the archival sources related to San Giorgio’s territories according to typology and chronology. The first group of sources runs from the third decade of the fifteenth century to the first decade of the sixteenth. For this period, many volumes containing the deeds of the council’s meetings and the series of sent letters (litterarum registri) remain. These documents resemble, respectively, the volumes of the Commune, called diversorum, the registers that recorded the meetings of the 12 anziani, and the so-called litterarum, the registers of the letters the Commune sent to the communities in Liguria. The registers of the first years of the sixteenth century are quite disorganized: the handwriting becomes less readable page by page, the language more disorganized, the frequency of the meetings’ registration less homogeneous, and the binding less careful, and many months are left unregistered.

It is thus more difficult to study the central activities of San Giorgio in the first decades of the sixteenth century. Similarly, in 1562, when San Giorgio returned its territories to the Republic, much information is missing, making it difficult to study the end of San Giorgio’s territorial power. On the other hand, the documentation related to the various territories becomes richer in the same years during which documents on the central administration decrease. At the end of the fifteenth century, the series of the Primi Cancellieri (First Chancellors) begins and proceeds with the series called Cancellieri di San Giorgio (Chancellors of San Giorgio). The latter is particularly detailed. The deeds are collected in filze (folders) that contain documents related to various local activities of San Giorgio. Here are letters of governors who ruled the dominions, letters sent by the protettori of San Giorgio, inventories of materials stored in the fortresses, legal proceedings against inhabitants of the dominions, and so on. For example, just for Corsica, hundreds of folders were preserved. Overall, the central power of San Giorgio is visible for the period from 1446 to the early years of the sixteenth century, while its local activities are well documented from the beginning of the sixteenth century until around 1562. It is difficult to know why the documentation was produced or accumulated this way. Did the practice of meeting registration change? Or document conservation practices? Were fewer meeting minutes taken from the early sixteenth century on?

These questions each start from a different hypothesis, and until now researchers have not looked at the different sources. But these rich sources make it possible to write a territorial history of San Giorgio that changes along with the chronology. The local history of territories can be studied for some of the fifteenth century and the sixteenth century, while the central institutions of San Giorgio can be studied for the fifteenth century and the initial years of the sixteenth.

4.2. A Territorial State’s Accountability

Along with its financial transactions, San Giorgio also kept records of its territorial administration in its ledgers. Papers describing the expenses for the territories are preserved in series of registers, a set for each territory. Two of four territories administered by a maona became territories of San Giorgio: Cyprus and Corsica. The maona of Chios remained in the hands of the Giustiniani family until 1566, while Ceuta (founded as a maona in 1235) did not develop any territorial power. The continuity between the maona and San Giorgio is particularly notable in the institutional papers: San Giorgio acquired the registers of the maona of Cyprus, collected them, and reassembled them in new registers. The volume that contains San Giorgio’s privileges on Cyprus starts with the papers of the maona of Cyprus.¹²

The old historiography and new research by scholars has identified an institutional continuity between the maone and San Giorgio.¹³ Caffa and Famagusta had a massaria, an administrative office that collected detailed information on various local economic activities. In total, hundreds of registers document the activities of all the territories, with and without massaria. Eighty-eight volumes document, for instance, San Giorgio’s expenses for the territory of Sarzana in the Lunigiana for the period 1484–1562.¹⁴ The expenses for the territories are also indicated in the main record series of San Giorgio, the so-called Introitus et exitus (Incomes and Expenditures). Composed of ledgers that contain the expenses for a year, this series contains all the accounts of San Giorgio’s main activities, including the pagae, the loca, the bank, and the territorial expenses.¹⁵

In the 1453 ledger of Introitus et exitus, for instance, the expenses of Caffa are recorded under the expense item “Dominium Caffae” (Dominion of Caffa), while those of Corsica were called “Inceptum Corsicae.”¹⁶ There is also information here on the loca issued by San Giorgio to retain both territories.¹⁷ Information on Sarzana appears in some volumes of the 1480s labeled as “expenses Sarzanae” (expenses of Sarzana).¹⁸ These volumes of the Introitus et exitus contain information on the territories only in years when the administration faced important matters. The volumes contain only the most relevant territorial expenses: the salary of soldiers, the cost of gunpowder, the expenses of ambassadors, and money spent on constructing fortresses and on territorial defense in general. Sometimes the notes are highly detailed. The structure of the series is very precise: the main accounts of San Giorgio—the Introitus et exitus—branch into the specific series (e.g., ledgers of the loca, pagae, and those of the territories). This system is more detailed than that of the Commune of Genoa, which has not preserved any sources of this kind. Almost certainly this difference does not relate to preservation, but to the production of sources. The Commune (until 1528) and the Republic (from 1528) did not produce a system of registration comparable to that of San Giorgio.¹⁹ It is possible to hypothesize that the complex practices of accounting that San Giorgio developed to manage the debt—the columns of loca, the registers of the pagae and the gabelle—and the banking system (from 1408 to 1444) informed the management of territories. If so, it was probably despite the fact that the two systems had two different purposes. San Giorgio’s scribes kept track of the shares—the loca and pagae—because they had to pay the owners of these shares and resolve possible conflicts around their ownership. Since each transaction had to be properly recorded to guarantee it as virtual money, San Giorgio’s accounting was probably among the most refined of the time. While it is difficult to make a direct comparison among all Renaissance states, San Giorgio’s territorial accounting system was probably more refined than were those of Mantua, Florence, Milan, or Venice.

4.3. Pietrasanta: Land for Debt

When San Giorgio took Pietrasanta, in1446, it had not yet consolidated the practice of acquiring lands. Later, chancellors established a standard for territorial contracts, and governors and officials followed standardized practices in ruling territories, but these rules and laws did not yet exist. All other territorial acquisitions were made by contract, but no contract exists for Pietrasanta. Only one line within the registers of the chancellery remains to attest to the territorial transition. Pietrasanta passed through the hands of various creditors through various crises. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, it was under the territorial jurisdiction of Lucca. In 1430, the Commune of Genoa loaned the Republic of Lucca 15,000 florins, and Pietrasanta was pledged to guarantee the money.²⁰ An agreement was signed that forced the people of Lucca to give the fortress of Pietrasanta to at least one citizen of Genoa and to provide for all the expenses of defending the buildings.²¹ The Commune of Genoa committed itself to defending Pietrasanta if Lucca had to go to war. In 1436, the citizens of Pietrasanta rebelled against Lucca, and the Genoese—who probably instigated the revolt—took possession of the town.²² In 1446, San Giorgio took Pietrasanta as a pledge for a credit it had with the Commune, after a short but intense war that weakened the dogeship of Raffaele Adorno. This was not a traditional war but a conflict between the doge and a group of Genoese pirates.

Genoese and other merchants often dedicated themselves to piracy, and at the beginning of 1446, a group of Genoese merchants headed by Benedetto Doria left the island of Chios, bringing alum and malvasia toward Flanders. They stopped along the coast of Liguria and attacked various Genoese vessels.²³ Doria’s ship and those of other members of the convoy had been used for military tasks and were equipped for a war.²⁴ But Doria was not just looking for money; he wanted to attack the doge. The reason for the attack is not completely clear, although we know that in the previous months he had protested against the institution of a new compera established to collect money to protect Famagusta.

The doge reacted by fostering diplomatic contacts and looking for monies from abroad. He asked for military help from Alfonse of Aragon and for new funds from the Genoese to arm a fleet. In Genoa a new magistracy was instructed to collect funds.²⁵ An expert lawyer, Battista de Goano, an anziano in the Commune office since 1440, followed the various phases of the conflict—especially when the doge wanted to increase the Commune’s financial resources. As we have seen, de Goano had supported San Giorgio when it had battled with the Commune over seizing loca of non-Genoese citizens.

San Giorgio financed the Commune with a loan of 15,000 florins, obtaining in exchange the gains of the pagae of 1447. At the end of March, Battista de Goano was put in charge of a committee tasked with calculating all the credits of the Commune and obtaining funds.²⁶ The Commune requested additional loans in April, and the committee tried to keep the interest rate low at 12%, giving back some taxes in exchange.²⁷ In the same month, an armed fleet was sent against the pirates, and soon an agreement was reached.²⁸ It was short lived, however, as Benedetto Doria quickly renewed his war. The doge launched new counteroffensives and founded a new small compera in early May, and the Commune was given permission to use the rest of the interest of the 1447 pagae.²⁹ This was not enough, because in June the Fregoso faction joined Benedetto Doria.³⁰

In July the Commune found new resources, obtaining a loan of 2,700 lire, guaranteed by a drictus of 1%. Then the doge discovered that the Florentines had helped Benedetto Doria, providing resources for his ships in Porto Pisano (the port near Pisa) and giving him soldiers.³¹ At the end of July, the doge also received information that Doria had received help from Majorca and Barcelona, so he requested help from the queen of Aragon, hoping at least to have Doria’s goods sequestered in the Aragonese ports.³² In the same period, Doria offered the signory of Genoa to the king of France, using his contacts in Provence. By that point, the war had spread far past piracy. In August, the doge renewed the contract of the ships hunting Doria, and San Giorgio issued another loan of 14,500 lire. This time the guarantee was not only financial—San Giorgio acquired the paga floreni of 1448—but also territorial. The doge gave San Giorgio Pietrasanta, with all its small, annexed lands and all the rights and fiscal resources that pertained to the Commune.³³ One of the territories of the Commune thus passed to San Giorgio during a war with pirates that helped destroy the dogeship of Raffaele Adorno. Benedetto Doria was not imprisoned, as his allies the Fregoso now controlled the dogeship. Once back in Genoa, Doria obtained permission to not pay taxes the following year (cancellation of avaria), an indemnification of 10,000 lire for his ship, and a pardon for all his prior actions as a pirate.³⁴

Battista de Goano carefully monitored San Giorgio’s acquisition of Pietrasanta, and a magistrature was put in place, formed by Gaspare Gentile, Bartolomeo de Mirteto, Filippo Cattaneo, and Manuele Oliva. These individuals received the money from San Giorgio and gave it to the Commune. Gaspare Gentile had invested consistently in San Giorgio. In May 1428, the Commune had issued 640 loca for a total of 64,000 lire with a yearly interest of 7%, and Gaspare had acquired 200 loca (20,000 lire). This compera was named Censariae and was absorbed by San Giorgio in 1437.³⁵

Even though San Giorgio acquired Pietrasanta in 1446 when the dogeship was weak and in need of money, it had already been interested in the town. A document dated April 4, 1444, preserved within San Giorgio’s registers, mentions that a delegation from Pietrasanta petitioned San Giorgio, requesting that all officials sent from Genoa to Pietrasanta for administrative purposes not belong to any faction—neither Guelph and Ghibellines, nor Adorno and Fregoso.³⁶ At that time, Pietrasanta was under the control of the Commune of Genoa, not San Giorgio. Why then did the people of Pietrasanta appeal to San Giorgio? We can only hypothesize that even before 1446, San Giorgio exerted influence over Pietrasanta, that its power went well beyond fiscal and financial duties such as the levying of taxes (gabelle), and that the Commune’s influence was diminishing. San Giorgio did not receive the taxes in 1446. At the end of the year, it solicited the Commune for them, but the doge did not permit San Giorgio to take the taxes because he wanted the inhabitants to deal with the defense of the town on their own.³⁷

In the first years of its dominion, Pietrasanta brought San Giorgio some resources. The territory was rich in iron, and San Giorgio’s dominion extended to the soil. In 1455, San Giorgio contracted out the iron mining to Martino de Grimaldi and Francesco Scalia, two rich merchants.

The history of Pietrasanta shows how the town moved slowly into the hands of creditors, from Lucca to the Commune of Genoa and then to the organization that issued the funds, San Giorgio. This shows how the weakness of the dogeship left room for San Giorgio to take over a territory and how rich merchants played a role as intermediaries in the transition by lending money.

4.4. Famagusta: The First Contract

In August 1446, during the same period when the doge sold Pietrasanta to San Giorgio to obtain resources to pursue his fight against Benedetto Doria, troubles arose over the administration of Famagusta in Cyprus. This led San Giorgio to acquire this territory, as well. Between the 8th and 10th of August, since the Commune could not redeem a debt it had contracted with some merchants for the administration of Famagusta, it issued a drictus (see § 2.2.4.).³⁸ The merchant Manuele de Oliva acquired the drictus and, in exchange, obtained the right (drictus) to levy taxes for the following years on Genoese trade in Cyprus. This was a somewhat risky proposition, because trade could rise or fall: a drictus paid higher returns than San Giorgio’s shares because it was riskier. A drictus was often assigned in areas far from Genoa, where risk was higher, and it was more difficult to calculate or predict a return.

Manuele de Oliva was the same banker who had formed the special office together with Battista de Goano and other citizens in the very same days of August to deal with the acquisition of Pietrasanta. They had received the money from San Giorgio and given it to the Commune.³⁹ In the early months of 1447, a group of Genoese residents in Famagusta—Quirico Pallavicino, Giacomo Centurione, and Michele Grillo—traveled to Genoa bringing information about the problems affecting Famagusta.⁴⁰ Funds for the city were scarce, the Office of the Massaria was neglected, and the king of Cyprus was ignoring the agreements he had with the Genoese to control the ports. Famagusta had a special right: it was the only port in Cyprus which had permission to trade. The king of Cyprus, however, was not enforcing that right. According to the envoys, this lax policy was detrimental to the levying of taxes (gabelle). As seen in Chapter 1, there was a maona of Cyprus and attached to it a compera. The gabelle were sold in advance to private collectors (gabellotti), and if the latter forecast a lower return, they consequently offered less to the compera. The money obtained in advance from San Giorgio became the interest (proventi) on pagae and loca. The report from the envoys of Famagusta showed that the last pagae had reached a value of only 5 soldi, down from 9–10 soldi the previous year.⁴¹ This kind of decrease in the pagae’s value could affect San Giorgio, which administered this and other comperae. San Giorgio was highly interested in the government of Famagusta, and more generally of Cyprus, because the king of Cyprus—whose court was in Nicosia—owed money to the maona. In 1410, the Genoese had imposed a payment of 22,500 florins on the king, due to the maona. In 1428, since he could not repay his debts—now up to 150,000 ducats—he gave San Giorgio the taxes of his residence in Nicosia as a pawn. In 1441, San Giorgio requested that the king pay a perpetual revenue of 6,000 ducats yearly or recognize a debt of 200,000 ducats to be repaid through yearly payments of 7,000 ducats.⁴²

The next developments show how important Famagusta was to San Giorgio. In April 1447, after the request of the envoys from Famagusta, the Commune found the money to send weapons to Cyprus.⁴³ On June 10, an assembly of 200 citizens met to discuss whether San Giorgio should take over Famagusta; the assembly was also attended by the Officium Antianorum, the Officium Monetae, and a representative from San Giorgio.⁴⁴ The chancellor’s minutes report the details of the translatio (transfer), the reason San Giorgio was taking charge, and the description of the location. All this information was written into the contract, which was signed on July 8.

This was the first document that granted San Giorgio power over a territory and defined it. The main text described San Giorgio’s power over a territory, which was compared to that of the Commune, and described specific characteristics so that the situation would remain stable over time. It also stated that if the Commune had contacts with other external powers, such as the king of Cyprus, San Giorgio would manage them. San Giorgio thus became the major authority for the inhabitants of Famagusta. The contract, a long document of 28 paragraphs, was written by the chancellor of the Commune, Matteo de Bargagli, in the presence of other chancellors, including Giacomo Bracelli, Ambrogio Senarega, Francesco Vernazza, and Nicola de Credenza.⁴⁵ The introduction explained the reason for the translatio: Famagusta had been in great danger for years and representatives of the city had asked Genoa for help, because Famagusta lacked the resources to deal with its problems unaided. They had asked for a translatio; it was the only solution. The document stated that the city was to be transferred with every possession—the port, the fortress, weapons, munitions, gabelle (taxes), income, and revenues. San Giorgio could exercise the merum et mixtum imperium and the gladii potestas and any kind of iurisdictio, the fullest extent of territorial power existing in Genoa at that time.⁴⁶ The document stated that all the former powers of the Commune were now held by San Giorgio—for instance, the agreement that no other ports could be built on the island.⁴⁷ The doge and the anziani who represented the Commune renounced the Commune’s rights for 29 years. San Giorgio was committed to ruling, governing, and taking care of the city, the fort, and the territory and to paying 10,000 lire on top of the income to the city of Famagusta.⁴⁸

The translatio was approved after waiving a section of the laws of the Commune (regualae) titled De non alienando terras sive castra etc (On the prohibition of alienating territories or fortresses).⁴⁹ The regulae (reformed in 1443) were the most important laws of the Commune.⁵⁰ The contract also regulated the administration of Famagusta. San Giorgio acquired the right to elect the captain, the massaro (the treasurer who administered the massaria), and various officials. The captain and the massaro regulated the judicial system, but protettori of San Giorgio in Genoa had the final say in justice. San Giorgio also had the right to abolish all the offices except the sindicato, the office that controlled all the other offices.⁵¹ San Giorgio took the fiscal rights (gabelle) that pertained to the Commune, which was now forbidden to impose them.

The contract limited San Giorgio’s rights to 29 years and stated that during this period San Giorgio could not give Famagusta and its rights to anyone or any corporate body.⁵² San Giorgio acquired the right to fine the king of Cyprus if he transgressed the agreement on the translatio of Famagusta or the maona of Cyprus, which was already in San Giorgio’s hands.⁵³ Both parties, San Giorgio and the Commune, agreed to pay 100,000 gold florins should they infringe the contract in any way.

Some of the terms of the contract were taken from the terminology used for the medieval enfeoffment. The terms referring to San Giorgio’s rights over territory were used for a text when Enrigucius and Raniero of Cinerca gave the island of Corsica to the Commune of Genoa in 1282.⁵⁴ During the Middle Ages, many Genoese families acquired territories as enfeoffments from the Commune of Genoa, usually in Liguria. Rarely did a family receive territory abroad, although this happened occasionally, for instance with the Gattilusio in the eastern Mediterranean.⁵⁵ The translatio of Famagusa and other territories—from the Commune to San Giorgio—can be compared to these acquisitions.

San Giorgio attempted to improve the economic situation of Famagusta and its port, which had lost their importance in the previous decades. In 1448, San Giorgio issued a set of statutes, addressed mainly to the captain, the massaro, and city officials, to regulate the government of Famagusta. Similar statutes were issued in Caffa, which at that time was still governed by the Commune.⁵⁶ Among the most important articles of the statutes of Famagusta was the one giving a monopoly on the island’s trade to the port of Famagusta. The captain of Famagusta made sure that the merchants used only the port of Famagusta and no other ports.⁵⁷ San Giorgio was particularly interested in this because it used the taxes (gabelle) on goods to pay interest on the shares of debt of Cyprus (the Maona Vecchia and Nuova of Cyprus).⁵⁸ Other rules regulated the formation of offices in order to provide rights for non-Genoese inhabitants. The population of Famagusta was culturally mixed: there were Genoese, Syrians, Greeks, Armenians, and the so-called white Genoese, people (mostly Syrians) who received specific privileges and could hold some administrative positions.⁵⁹ The statutes stated that the non-Genoese who lived outside the castrum (the city center), who were called burgenses, could be elected as vice-count, an office which we know little about other than that it assisted the captain and the massaro.

Two burgenses could assist two Genoese to form a yearly elected magistracy to repopulate and restore the city.⁶⁰ The captain and all other officials together with four burgenses elected the sindicatori (two Genoese and two burgenses), who audited the work of officials at the end of their terms.⁶¹ Though the statutes governed the monopoly to protect San Giorgio’s interested in the gabelle, San Giorgio did not orient all its policies toward stopping trade. In 1449, it revoked the drictus which the Commune had given to Manuele Oliva in 1446, hoping it would allow more merchants to visit and trade in the port of Famagusta.⁶²

Notes

1. ASG, Ms. Membranacei, XXXIV, 81.

2. See here Part III § 7.5.

3. Laura F. Banfield and Harvey C. Mansfield (eds.), Florentine Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 352. See here, Part III § 8.2.

4. Part III § 8.2.

5. Giorgio Felloni has created three different groups for San Giorgio, Colonie del Levante, Corsica, and Terraferma, www.lacasadisangiorgio.eu/main.php?do=node&tag=6 (accessed February 11, 2022).

6. ASG, San Giorgio, Introitus et exitus del 1453 [185,02049], fol. 336v, 7 lire and 4 soldi.

7. Turkey and Ukraine proposed in 2013 and 2010, respectively, two projects to have the Genoese trading posts in the Black Sea declared UNESCO World Heritage sites. When Russia reclaimed Crimea, the project was interrupted. It seems that Russia will resubmit the projects. No studies have been done on what San Giorgio built on the Crimean peninsula and the Black Sea.

8. On Ventimiglia, see Gianni De Moro, Ventimiglia sotto il Banco di San Giorgio (1514–1562) (Pinerolo: Alzani, 1991); the images are on non-numbered pages. On the Lunigiana, Andrea Bernardini, Ai confini della Repubblica: Il dominio di San Giorgio in Lunigiana (1476–1500) (University of Pisa, Pisa, 2009), 201; on Capraia, Roberto Moresco, “Capraia sotto il governo delle Compere di San Giorgio (1506–1562),” Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria 57, 1 (2007): 357–428, at 390–391; on Corsica, Antoine-Marie Graziani, “Des preside à la ville ouverte,” in Corsica Genovese: La Corse à l’époque de la République de Genes, XVe–XVIIIe siècles (Bastia: Museé de la Ville de Bastia, 2017), 110–116; Audrey Giuliani, “L’influence génoise à travers l’urbanisme et l’architecture civile des villes de Bonifacio et Bastia (XIVe–XVIIIe siècles),” in Corsica Genovese: La Corse à l’époque de la République de Genes, XVe–XVIIIe siècles (Bastia: Museé de la Ville de Bastia, 2017), 117–125. There no images in these two articles, but they offer information on the changes in urban centers in Corsica and San Giorgio.

9. Part III § 8.3.

10. Part III § 7.2, 7.4.

11. Part III § 7.3.

12. ASG, MS. Membranacei, IX.

13. See Part I § 1.2.

14. ASG (index room), Pandetta 18 and Felloni, http://lacasadisangiorgio.eu/main.php?do=node&tag=6.

15. The list of the ledgers, www.lacasadisangiorgio.eu/main.php?do=genere_elenco&genere=188 (accessed February 11, 2022).

16. ASG, San Giorgio, Introitus et exitus, 1453 [185,02049], fol. 132v–133r, fol. 135v–137r, 126v–128r, 121v–122r.

17. ASG, San Giorgio, Introitus et exitus, 1453 [185,02049], fol. 148.

18. ASG, San Giorgio, Introitus et exitus del 1484 [185,02143], fol. 61v; ASG, San Giorgio Introitus et exitus del 1486 [185,02150], fol. 54v–55r.

19. The series of the registers on the expenses of Pietrasanta is complete from 1480 to 1560. For Corsica, eight series exist, which contain information on topics such as on building construction and reviews of soldiers, city by city.

20. Michael Bratchel, Lucca, 1430–1494: The Reconstruction of an Italian City-Republic (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 243.

21. Bratchel, Lucca, 1430–1494, 243.

22. Bratchel, Lucca, 1430–1494, 245–247.

23. The other merchants were Angelo Giovanni Lomellino, Girolamo Cattaneo, Domenico Doria, Cosma, Domenico Dentuto, and Giacomo Grillo.

24. Giustina Olgiati, “Genova, 1446: La rivolta dei ‘patroni’ contro il dogato di Raffaele Adorno,” Nuova Rivista storica 72, 3–4 (1988): 341–464.

25. Gaspare Gentile, Giovanni de Albaro, Peregro di Promontorio, e Dorino Grimaldi. See Olgiati, “Genova, 1446,” 393.

26. On the committee were Salvago Spinola, Bartolomeo da Multedo, Antoniotto de Franchi, Meliaduce Salvago, and Andrea di Bassignana. Olgiati, “Genova, 1446,” 395.

27. Olgiati, “Genova, 1446,” 398. ASG, AS 538, fol. 42r.

28. Olgiati, “Genova, 1446,” 402.

29. Olgiati, “Genova, 1446,” 403.

30. Olgiati, “Genova, 1446,” 409.

31. Olgiati, “Genova, 1446,” 412.

32. Olgiati, “Genova, 1446,” 420.

33. “et preterea oppidum Petram Sanctam cum omni sua dicione et pertinentiis omniaque iura in eis spectantia ac pertinentia quovismodo Communi Janue, et denique omnem peccuniam dicti Communis,” ASG, AS 538, fol. 89v–90r. The document was mentioned by Buongiorno, Il bilancio di uno stato medievale, 203 and by Olgiati, “Genova, 1446,” 421.

34. Olgiati, “Genova, 1446,” 448.

35. Sieveking, “Studio sulle finanze genovesi,” vol. 2: 93.

36. ASG, Ms. Membranacei, XXIV, fol. xiiiir, September 4, 1444. The document lists the castellan and the commissar of Pietrasanta, officials who did not deal with financial tasks but had mostly territorial duties.

37. ASG, AS 532, fol. 139v.

38. Nicola Banescu, Le Déclin de Famaguste: Fin du royaume de Chypre (Bucarest: Institut Roumain d’Études Byzantines, 1946), 87–96.

39. See here Part II § 4.3.

40. Valeria Polonio, “Famagosta genovese a metà del’400: Assemblee, armamenti, gride,” in Miscellanea di storia ligure in memoria di Giorgio Falco (Genova: Università di Genova, Istituto di Paleografia e Storia Medievale, 1966), 221–237, at 214–215; Nicolas Iorga, Notes et extraits pour servir à l’histoire des croisades au XVe siècle (Paris and Bucarest: E. Leroux, 1915), 218–220. The report of the meetings is in ASG, Sala 34 590, 1308/3, fol. 65v–66r.

41. ASG, Sala 34, 590, 1308/3, fol. 65v.

42. Sieveking, “Studio sulle finanze genovesi,” vol. 2: 119–120 and note.

43. Polonio, “Famagosta genovese a metà del 400,” 215.

44. ASG, Sala 34, 590, 1308/3, fol. 70r–v.

45. The text was published by Louis Mas Latrie, Histoire de l’île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan, vol. 3 (Paris: Imprimerie impériale, 1852), 34–47.

46. Mas Latrie, Histoire de l’île de Chypre, 37.

47. Mas Latrie, Histoire de l’île de Chypre, 37.

48. Mas Latrie, Histoire de l’île de Chypre, 40.

49. Mas Latrie, Histoire de l’île de Chypre, 47.

50. Savelli, “ ‘Capitula,’ ‘regulae’ e pratiche del diritto,” 447–502.

51. Silvana Fossati Raitieri, Genova e Cipro, L’inchiesta su Pietro de Marco capitano di Genova in Famagosta (1448–1449) (Genova: Università di Genova, 1984), 24, note 10.

52. Mas Latrie, Histoire de l’île de Chypre, vol. 3, 46.

53. Mas Latrie, Histoire de l’île de Chypre, vol. 3, 46.

54. “Ipsum comune agere, experiri, excipere, replicare, transigere,” ASG, Libri Iurium, I, 7, 3–5.

55. On the Gattilusio, see Christopher Wright, The Gattilusio Lordship and the Aegean World 1355–1462 (Leiden Boston: Brill, 2014). The Giustiniani family had administered a maona in Chios without the plena iurisdictio. See Daniele Tinterri, Divergenze parallele. Negroponte e Chio: Due colonie latine nel Levante greco (metà XIV–metà XV sec.) Divergences parallèles. Négrepont et Chios: deux colonies latines au Levant grec (moitié XIV–moitié XV siècle). Ph.D. dissertation, Università di Torino and EHESS, Turin 2016.

56. Amedeo Vigna, “Codice diplomatico delle colonie tauro-liguri durante la signoria dell’Ufficio di San Giorgio (MCCCCLIII–MCCCCLXXV),” Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria 6–7 (1869–1881): 567–680. On this see Michel Balard, “Il Banco di San Giorgio e le colonie d’Oltremare,” in La Casa di San Giorgio: Il potere del credito. Atti del convegno, Genova, 11 e 12 novembre 2004 (Genova: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2006), 63–73.

57. Vito Vitale, “Statuti e ordinamenti sul governo del Banco di San Giorgio a Famagosta,” Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria 64 (1935): 391–454, 413.

58. Vitale, “Statuti e ordinamenti,” 397; Wilhelm Heyd, Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter von (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1879), 989.

59. On the “white Genoese” and Venetians, see David Jacoby, “Citoyens, sujets et protégés de Venise et de Gênes en Chypre du XIIe au XVe siècle,” Byzantinische Forschungen 5 (1977): 159–188; Laura Balletto, “Genovesi e Piemontesi nella Cipro dei Lusignano nel tardo Medioevo,” Rivista di storia arte archeologia per le province di Alessandria e Asti 103 (1994): 83–137, at 92 and note. We don’t know whether the reference “white” was an administrative definition or had some other meaning.

60. Vitale, “Statuti e ordinamenti,” 397.

61. Vitale, “Statuti e ordinamenti,” 398. Between 1448 and 1449 the sindicatori investigated the captain of Famagusta. Fossati Raitieri, Genova e Cipro.

62. Mas Latrie, Histoire de l’île de Chypre, 56–58.