Part III
The belief that Genoa had two separate seats of power—San Giorgio and the Commune—was widespread and can be seen in many sources from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Many historians in early modern Genoa and scholars today, however, discuss the two institutions without explicitly regarding them as separate powers. Few examine San Giorgio’s territorial power in detail or from a long-term perspective. This chapter presents three such analyses that diverge substantially from each other. The authors of the first two texts were experts in Genoese finance and political advisors who observed the situation in the 1460s and tried to influence it. The third is a passage from Niccolò Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories, written in the early sixteenth century about the events of previous decades. Its subsequent impact will be discussed in later chapters.
7
7.1. The Officium Monetae
The Officium Monetae administered the financial system of the Commune of Genoa. Before the founding of San Giorgio, it was one of the three institutions that formed the government, along with the Officium Antianorum (Office of the Anziani) and the dogeship. It was established in the fourteenth century and lasted until the end of the fifteenth century. Its authority, however, was weak: at times the doges supported it; at other times the external powers that took possession of Genoa opposed it. Eight elected magistrates, called the otto di moneta, ruled the office. An election took place every year according to the laws (regulae) of Genoa, which divided the offices among the populares (merchants and artisans) and the nobles—as with other offices. The officers of the Officium Monetae of the previous year had the right to elect the new ones. They each cast one vote; the doge cast two.1 The Officium Monetae’s main task was to deal with Commune finances—in other words, to prepare and manage the budget and expenses. Since the regulae of the city did not include specific rules on all financial matters, the Officium Monetae developed them autonomously over time. These internal rules stated that if a citizen had to make a payment such as an expense, donation, or alienation or had to deal with ways to find money that had not been mentioned within the regulae, he had to seek permission from the doge and the Office of the Anziani. This office would consider the application and then contact the Officium Monetae.2
The sources on the Officium Monetae are scattered and scarce.3 One possible explanation is that Genoa established multiple offices in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, some of which handled the same tasks as the Officium Monetae—such as the Officium Expense Ordinarie, which often functioned for only a few years at a time and was set up for specific purposes.4 However, when we compare the sources for the Officium Monetae with those of the other main financial institution, San Giorgio—which became more autonomous through the fifteenth century but was, at least formally, an office of the Genoese Commune, the quantitative difference in surviving sources is huge. The memory of the Officium is preserved in a handful of registers and scattered papers, while that of San Giorgio is perpetuated by hundreds of thousands of pages classified in orderly series. More than the fates of their archives, it is the waning importance of the Officium and the rising power of the Commune’s creditors, who jointly formed San Giorgio, that most likely account for the difference.
The Officium Monetae was founded in 1363 and its functions developed over several decades. The surviving documentation of its activities is continuous only after 1453, mostly for ordinary expenses.5 The Officium’s task was to raise financial resources for these expenses, for which it prepared the annual budget. It also dealt with the management of the compere (the set of credits held by various investors) until their aggregation into San Giorgio in the mid-fifteenth century. In 1443 the Officium Monetae was reformed. It was granted the privilege—along with the Officium Antianorum and San Giorgio—of electing the partitori dell’Avaria, the officials in charge of reviewing the groups subject to ordinary taxation.6 Office holders were chosen for the three groups through an alternating system of appointments and the drawing of lots. The Officium Monetae was also responsible for imposing direct taxation (the so-called avaria) in the coastal areas (the Riviera) stretching westward and eastward from Genoa.7
Among its prerogatives, the Officium Monetae could revise and even abrogate the decrees regulating the tax system.8 It could also amend the laws (Ordines et Regulae) of the administrative districts. In 1444, a year after the reform, it replaced the Officium Castrorum Visitatorum (Office of Castle Visitors), which superintended the expenses of the castles and fortresses.9 A law (lex de castellanis) required the Officium Monetae to update and verify the inventories of weapons and supplies held in the castles and fortresses of the Genoese districtum.10 Citizens who could not afford to pay the avaria petitioned the Officium Monetae, as did those who had the loca and pagae they held with San Giorgio sequestered by the Commune—an infrequent occurrence. The Officium Monetae administered certain public resources such as land. It granted mining concessions to prospectors of precious minerals and metals and issued fines for illegal uses of public space.11 The latter functions were not spelled out in the regulae but are documented in sources recording the Office’s activities. These sources—currently scattered and not well studied—point to the fact that the Officium Monetae controlled the soil, as in cases of surveying for precious minerals. The fact that someone owned a piece of land did not authorize them to use the soil as they wished.
In earlier chapters, we saw the conflicts that broke out between the Commune and San Giorgio over political and financial issues—for example, when San Giorgio’s loca were seized, when the subject population in Corsica protested, when factions administered the territories, during diplomatic crises (the war of Sarzana seen through the Florentine sources from Rome), when privileges were renewed by an external signory, and when the administration of the paga floreni was called into question.12 These disagreements did not always have the same intensity. Sometimes, they could be set aside in pursuit of a broader goal such as the protection of Genoa’s territories in their entirety or in defense of a specific interest like that of the powerful Genoese families, who were rooted in both San Giorgio and the Commune. The Officium Monetae also regularly competed with San Giorgio, and its officers seemed more unwilling to reach any agreement with San Giorgio. As in many other offices of the Commune of Genoa, the Officium Monetae’s political appointments were allocated according to political dynamics, with positions distributed according to the influence of prominent families and factions. Bureaucratic appointments, however, were not distributed this way; notaries, scribes, and chancellors often inherited offices, and it was these officeholders who voiced a fundamental criticism of San Giorgio, probably because they could see how financial power moved from the Commune and the Officium Monetae to San Giorgio. This shift occurred largely in the fifteenth century, when the Officium Monetae weakened, losing its rights and power when direct taxation (the avaria) was ended in 1490. As we have seen, the early sixteenth-century historian Bartolomeo Senarega wrote that the end of the avaria, combined with the consequent rise of San Giorgio, was among the main causes of political instability.13 The avaria was phased out in favor of the paga floreni, the taxation of one florin on San Giorgio’s loca (the shares of the public debt administered by San Giorgio). Economic historian Mario Buongiorno maintained that the Officium Monetae opposed San Giorgio in the fifteenth century and that this opposition created a balance in the Genoese republican system. He also argues that this tension can be glimpsed, but not studied, since the sources are scarce.14 As we will see, however, it is clearly visible in sources from outside Genoa.
7.2. First Memorial Against San Giorgio
Two analyses originating from the circle of the Officium Monetae emphasized the duality of power in Genoa and offered a radical critique of San Giorgio in two secret memorials dating from the second half of the fifteenth century and addressed to the duke of Milan, Francesco Sforza, ruler of Genoa from 1464 (Appendices 1 and 2).15 I describe the two texts as the “first” and “second” only because the former contains more information than the latter. The second memorial may predate the first; it is undated and the signature, although visible, is illegible. Both are unofficial, informal documents written as suggestions for the duke of Milan. While we cannot be entirely sure that a member of the Officium Monetae penned the second memorial, the author probably knew the author of the first, as the texts are similar. The author of the first memorial, Giovanni Capello, was a notary and scribe of the Officium Monetae. He was not a prominent figure or a key player in Genoese finance or politics, and we know little about him. The few sources are from the Milanese and Genoese archives and include a financial document: the budget for the ordinary expenses of Genoa for 1462–63. Like other members of the chancellery of the Officium Monetae such as Paolo Cortese and Bartolomeo Soldano, Giovanni Capello had close ties to the Milanese governor, Sagramoro Visconti, and the Milanese offices.16 Administrative personnel such as Capello, especially those who worked in the financial offices, typically left few documents behind, although some, like Bartolomeo Senarega, chancellor of the Commune, and Antonio Gallo, chancellor of San Giorgio, not only drafted official acts but also wrote chronicles and histories of their city, then a widespread practice.17 Capello had a dual role as official of the Officium Monetae and advisor on Genoese matters to the duke. His relationship with the Sforza family in Milan probably predated the Milanese dominion over Genoa. In October 1462, Francesco Sforza, duke of Milan, signed a receipt of 200 gold ducats for Giovanni Capello, who had advanced the sum for an unspecified “secret service” (servitio secreto).18 The Milanese duke had already started to plan the occupation of Genoa, which he captured in 1464, and was probably already using Giovanni Capello as an advisor or agent. Capello also wrote the budget of the Commune of Genoa for 1462–63, which had a powerful impact on the Genoese economy: it cut expenses by an historically unprecedented 35%. In the previous year, the budget was set at ₤77,141.50, and its average in prior years ranged between ₤76,000 and ₤80,000. Capello slashed it to ₤50,000. Although Jacques Heers has defined it as a “military budget,” one of the heaviest reductions was in military expenditures, from around 64.1% of the total in 1461 to 48.65% in 1462.19 The cuts focused on soldiers and territorial control. A galley that patrolled the coasts was decommissioned, for the meager resources available could now be used only to maintain a lembo, a smaller boat. In the city, the number of knights assigned to the doge and the podestà were reduced by roughly half (from 40 to 25 and from 25 to 12, respectively); similar reductions were implemented for foot soldiers. The garrisons of the towers of the city (San Tommaso, dell’Arco, Luccoli, Pietra Minuta, San Michele, Olivella, Carbonara, and San Niccolò) were scaled back. On the Riviera, Capello reduced expenditures on fortresses: the Riviera di Levante and Riviera di Ponente were only given funds to maintain three out of seven locations, with those remaining receiving less funding than in previous years.20 Only the doge and his court, which included the salaries of the Officium Monetae officers, were exempt from budget cuts. Geo Pistarino, who studied the 1462–63 budget and the massive spending cuts of the previous year, noted that they might explain why Genoa was independent for only 11 of 48 years from that period to the end of the fifteenth century.21 His argument is that the city was undefended and thus easily conquered by external powers. The doge most likely decided on and approved new expenses, but it is highly plausible that an officer of the Officium Monetae such as Giovanni Capello would have seen the link between the cuts in military expenditure in the ordinary budget and the risk of Genoa falling prey to external powers. On the other hand, Capello may have played a role in cutting these expenses.
In addition to these documents, there is a memorial addressed directly either to the duke of Milan, Francesco or to Gian Galeazzo Sforza. It was not produced by Capello in his duties as officer of the Officium Monetae, but as secret advisor to the duke of Milan. A strong criticism of San Giorgio, it shows that Capello clearly understood the connections between military defense and the system of government. The text is titled Ricordi di Zoan Capello.22 While undated, information contained in it suggests it may have been written in the 1460s, probably between late 1465 and early 1466.23 The first part of the memorial offers suggestions on grain supply (res frumentaria), a traditional issue for consensus-seekers, especially for obtaining support from lower social groups. Capello recommended acquiring wheat in Provence, Tunis, Sicily, and Spain and giving the revenues from its sale in Genoa to the poor.
The next part of the memorial, titled “How to govern all the Genoese without any party” (Reger bene tuti genoesi sensa ulla parte), discusses Genoa’s social and political conflicts, focusing on the two pillars of the city’s political system: the parties and the cetus. At the time, “party” designated two entities: the factions, also called Cappellacci in Liguria—that is, the Adorno and Fregoso families, which had held the dogeship since the fourteenth century; and the cetus (such as nobles and populares) or, in Capello’s text, one of its subdivisions. Capello, however, established his own classification. He distinguished the rich “middlemen” (mezzani), who occupied intermediate positions (he classified them into three subcategories), from the poor (classified into two subcategories).24 He advised the duke not to join any of the existing parties. The duke should not follow the ancient idea of “divide and rule” (divide et impera, which Capello rendered as “si vis regnare divide”), as it gave power to the parties and aggravated social divisions. Calling the ancient saying “pestilential advice” (pestifero consegio), Capello said that the duke could rule Genoa alone. Capello suggested the following course: the duke should occupy the ports of Finale, Savona, and Pisa militarily to prevent the Cappellacci from entering and ruling Genoa and the Riviera. He should not form an alliance with the rich, because they would then seek to create a signory, which would provoke the mezzani. An alliance with the poor posed a similar risk, exposing the duke to the same fate as Louis de la Vallée, the French governor in the preceding period, who had tried to gain the support of the populus and was overthrown by a revolt in 1461.25 La Vallée, Capello argued, had “destroyed himself by giving too much power to inferiors” (distrutto per aver dato audacia agli inferiori). Using a metaphor, Capello reminded the duke that someone rich enough to be the sole owner of a boat should not form a partnership to possess it.
The third section deals with the Genoese financial system and contains one of the harshest criticisms of San Giorgio ever written. Capello wrote:
The reason why the governments in Genoa are short-lived is because there are two kingdoms: one in the Palace and the other in San Giorgio, and it is not possible to hold two kingdoms for a long time.26
“Palace” (Palazzo) was the term traditionally used to designate the Commune. According to Capello, Genoa’s political instability was due to the division of power between the Commune and San Giorgio. San Giorgio originated from an office of the Commune and the Commune was the established seat of jurisdiction—the two kingdoms could not coexist.
The phrase “the governments in Genoa are short-lived” refers to Genoa’s severe political instability, which became evident in the fifteenth century when the Adorno and Fregoso alternated in the dogeship except when interrupted by French and Milanese powers. Capello’s idea was that the state was weak because of San Giorgio’s presence and power. The existence of San Giorgio was fragmenting the state. We may assume that Capello was referring to the dogeship of the factions rather than the external signories, since his memorial was addressed to the duke of Milan, an external power.
The power division in Genoa was the general context for the third part of the memorial. What followed was a specific analysis of the corrupt officers and administrators of San Giorgio. Capello began with the loca of San Giorgio, maintaining that the shares belonged to three groups of investors: the boteschi (lit. those of the barrel), the non-boteschi, and foreigners. The section was titled “Two solutions against the boteschi if they do not help” (Doi remedi contra boteschi si non se adiutano). Botesco was not a traditional term in Genoese political discourse, and it is seen in only one other contemporary document.
Capello described the boteschi as a category distinct from the three social groups: the rich, the “middlemen,” and the poor. They were a faction that speculated in San Giorgio shares.27 We do not know whether this was their only occupation or whether they also had other roles. The memorial stated that the boteschi sometimes managed other investors’ resources and at other times let these investors harvest profits. It also mentioned that in 1464 some boteschi became protettori of San Giorgio and set the price of the pagae at 9 soldi per lira. They then bought thousands of pagae and let the price rise to 13 to 14 soldi, reaping a huge profit from their financial speculation. An analysis of pagae price movements in 1464 confirms Capello’s data: from 9 soldi in January, the price of pagae rose to over 10 in February, 11 in June, over 12 in October, and 13 to 14 in November.28 Capello wrote that the boteschi were “lupi” (wolves): “they were supposed to be sheepdogs protecting the sheep, while in reality their business was that of wolves.”29 Capello argued that foreign investors would have been happy to see the defeat of the individuals who had let their resources melt like snow in the sun. He proposed reforming the protettori of San Giorgio by establishing a list of 40 names among San Giorgio investors who would serve as protettori in the next four years. Every year the different social groups would choose the new protettori from this list. At the end of the third year, a new list of 40 names would be prepared. He also suggested auditing the protettori’s profits for possible theft or corruption. As supreme magistrate, the duke could access the protettori’s account books. Capello mentioned that Duke Filippo (probably Filippo Maria Visconti) had done this. If members of the protettori proved guilty, the duke could appropriate their funds and use them to defend the Castelletto (a fort) and to eliminate customs duties on fodder and wine—which would enhance his prestige.
The memorial contains detailed recommendations about San Giorgio’s bureaucracy. Capello suggested that the duke should remove Paolo Mainero, a powerful chancellor of San Giorgio, who had had a long and difficult career. He had started as chancellor in 1431 but was removed in 1436 at the start of Tommaso Campofregoso’s dogeship; he returned as chancellor in the 1450s, remaining active to the mid-1460s.30 Mainero’s brother had been chancellor of San Giorgio and the Officium Monetae, as well as governor of San Giorgio in Corsica in 1457–58.31 The memorial stated that Paolo Mainero “has been a pilot for the dogeship from the deep of San Giorgio” (fu piloto al ducato de profunde de San Giorgio).32 This may mean that Mainero had a strong influence in the previous years over the Commune of Genoa, possibly maneuvering (“piloting”) the doge. He should now be removed—the memorial continued, but it would take some effort, since he was sustained by the boteschi.33 Capello noted that the office of San Giorgio’s chancellor was often inherited, unlike chancellors in the Commune who were appointed by the anziani.34 He suggested that San Giorgio should operate the same way the Commune did.
The next section of the memorial was entitled “Of the florin of the loca and the growth of the pagae” (Del fiorino de’ loci et de crescer le paghe). The paga floreni revenues went to the Commune but, as noted, in recent decades San Giorgio had appropriated them by taking over the functions of the Commune.35 Giovanni Capello suggested to the duke that he should appropriate the paga floreni for his own use or cancel taxes on wheat or wine—a move, he added, that would make him more popular among the poor. Capello focused on the pagae and their relationships with the loca. He noted that the value of the loca had increased from 23 to 33 lire between 1463 and 1466, while, surprisingly, the pagae—which constituted the loca’s interests—had not risen at all. The taxes (gabelle) levied on the territories were directly linked to the loca; usually, when the former rose, the loca and the pagae did as well. When good government prevailed in Genoa (by which Capello probably meant the government of the duke of Milan), taxes were profitable. Capello described the non-revaluation of the pagae as an unproductive situation. Today, financial-product prices are set by the market on an economic basis. At the time, the price-maker was San Giorgio, and Capello observed that it did not make sense not to revalue the price of the pagae. In the end—whether because of Capello’s suggestion or other reasons—the price of the pagae increased in the following months and years, under Milanese rule.36
Capello’s memorial had attributed the pagae price movements of 1464 to the boteschi alone, but the absence of a price revaluation in subsequent years may also be due to them.
7.3. The Boteschi
There are few surviving sources in Genoa itself on the history of local factions—or perhaps not many were produced. It is easier to find information in sources written or archived elsewhere. This is also true of the boteschi, who—to the best of our knowledge—are referred to in only one source besides that of Capello. An anonymous writer has left us a complex description of several influential Genoese, indicating whether they were affiliated with the Guelphs or the Ghibellines, nobles or commoners, and so on.37 This source offers insights into the informal ties among the persons named. The document provides information about one of San Giorgio’s strongest supporters—and one of the fiercest opponents of the policy advocated by Giovanni Capello: Battista de Goano, whom he calls a member of the boteschi.
Battista was a powerful Genoese who was very active in local political life between 1440 and 1464.38 I have discussed his role in San Giorgio’s acquisition of territories.39 Battista was born into an affluent family, and his father served as a doge for a few months in 1415. A legal expert, he was frequently sent on diplomatic missions to the Milanese and Neapolitan courts between 1443 and 1444, the papal court in 1453 and 1456, and Charles VII’s court in France in March 1461.40 He played a key role in Genoa when it joined the Italian league in July 1454 and was very active in the management of the city’s financial affairs. As legal consultant, he was asked to find ways for the Officium Monetae to raise funds for the army.41
Battista was often in charge of reviewing the ordinary budget. In 1461—when Giovanni Capello was preparing the severely reduced budget—Battista analyzed the avaria and denounced its supposedly unfair, incoherent provisions. The careers of Giovanni Capello and Battista de Goano were to intersect again. Both had strong ties with Francesco Sforza. Giovanni Capello appears to have forged them in 1462 and maintained them in subsequent years, authoring the secret memorial; by contrast, Battista, who had been sent as ambassador and received the title of miles (knight) from the duke in 1464, was absent from the political scene for several years, probably because of illness.42 He re-entered politics in 1478, helping Battista Fregoso become doge. In the 1467 document on the factions, the governor of Milan wrote that Battista was a Ghibelline, from the populares (i.e., non-noble), and “feisty and exalted” (fumoso in exaltatione), and added that the Milanese could probably convince him to side with Duke Giangaleazzo Sforza.43
Battista did not just play a prominent role in the offices of the Commune, as senator and an envoy of the Republic, but as we have seen, he was also involved with San Giorgio, particularly when it acquired the territories. He supported the acquisition of Pietrasanta and Caffa, Famagusta, and Corsica. He defended the loca of the people of Asti when the Commune wanted to confiscate them in 1448. He played an important role when Caffa became a territory of San Giorgio in 1453 and again in 1456 when San Giorgio created a secondary market of pagae (see Chapter 5), bringing a lawsuit concerning Caffa to the papal court of Callixtus III.
Giovanni Capello’s memorial states that there were boteschi among the eight protettori of San Giorgio in 1464. The protettori that year were Pancrazio Gentile Falamonica, Alessandro Spinola, Battista di Albaro, Baldassarre Lomellino, Baldassarre Adorno, Bendinelli Sauli, Salvago Vivaldi, and Antonio de Palatine. We do not know whether all the protettori that year were boteschi, but the prosperous banker and merchant Bendinelli Sauli may have been. When he was dying in 1481, he added a clause to his will about the sale of pagae.44 The clause stipulated that if a transaction—especially one involving the sale of pagae—that could be considered usurious was discovered among his contracts after his death, his son, Pasquale Sauli, should reimburse the buyer. Pasquale wrote to Pope Callixtus III, who asked Angelo da Chivasso, the Franciscan theologian and usury expert who in the 1467 meeting in Genoa had discussed the discounting of pagae (§ 5.2. Usury), asking for an opinion. After studying Bendinelli’s account books, the theologian absolved him of the sin of usury in January 1484, under the condition that Pasquale donate 15,000 lire to Genoese institutions, of which 4,000 lire went to the Monte di Pietà of Genoa, 100 ducats to the Monte di Pietà of Savona, and the rest to San Giorgio, establishing a moltiplico (a long-lasting financial foundation established by some family or group of people). The plan was that the initial capital of 250 loca would earn enough interest to be worth 300 loca.45 Bendinelli Sauli’s sin may have been that he wanted to discount the pagae or it may be that he was worried about the very speculation Capello considered the boteschi’s major sin—that is, the forced, discounted sale of the 1464 pagae that Capello himself, as San Giorgio’s protector for the year, had voted for. The two transactions were in fact quite different. The first was a common practice in Genoa, although it could pose ethical problems for Christians and, as we saw, was discussed in Commune meetings in 1467 and declared illicit by Chivasso himself. The second was a specific transaction denounced to the duke of Milan by a layman—namely, Capello. The sources do not allow us to clarify the matter completely. One certainty is that Bendinelli Sauli wanted to clear his conscience, and Angelo da Chivasso absolved him in exchange for a substantial donation.
It is also possible that—far from merely speculating on the financial market—the boteschi may have been advancing a broader plan to support San Giorgio’s rising power against the Commune. If so, Battista de Goano’s career and actions in the decade 1446–56, which focused on increasing San Giorgio’s territorial power, may be connected to the boteschi’s strategy, which had a wider scope than other small swindles that occurred in San Giorgio. In the 1470s, for example, a San Giorgio notary had his ledgers confiscated, for he had probably stolen a large sum and three San Giorgio account books (cartulari).46 These were minor incidents compared with an organized, corrupt network of speculators and rulers.
Another memorial to the duke of Milan contains even sharper criticism of San Giorgio, regarding both corruption and territorial power.
7.4. Second Memorial Against San Giorgio
The second memorial is undated and now anonymous, since the author’s name has become unreadable.47 While its internal structure does not allow precise dating, its arguments and some specific references resemble those of the first memorial, and its proposal for reforming San Giorgio was similar to Capello’s. Like his memorial, it cites the review of the account books at the time of “Duke Philip” as a relevant precedent for controlling San Giorgio’s officials. It also recommends seeking a consensus of the poor, the artisans, and the humblest workers (popolo minuto).48 The analysis of San Giorgio’s power and the following criticism are quite harsh:
Firstly your Excellence [the duke of Milan] should know that in Genoa we have two dominions, the first in the Palace [the Commune], the other in San Giorgio, which is governed by a certain community of ambitious citizens always seeking to destroy those who govern the Palace [the Commune] in order to seize full power in Genoa. They have occupied the best members (membra) of the city—Caffa, Famagosta, Corsica, Pietrasanta. Step by step, they are trying to occupy all the rest, and they have won over a large group, promising and giving them charges, since they have many more charges, and far better ones, than those who govern the Palace.49
In other words, San Giorgio had established full authority over some Commune territories and wanted to extend its reach to others. In the fifteenth century, this type of power was defined as plena iurisdictio and ius gladii—rights political bodies exercised over people and lands. As a creditors’ institution, San Giorgio sought to take over the other institution—that is, the one belonging to the citizens.
In the first sentence, the author uses the term “dominion” (dominio), while Capello uses “kingdom” (regnum), but the meanings are very similar. A significant difference is found in the following sentence, where the unidentified author states that the group of ambitious citizens in San Giorgio wants to destroy the Commune and has taken over the Commune’s best territories (called “members” of the city probably because Genoa was considered the “head”). The word “communion” used for that group of ambitious citizens is analogous to the boteschi faction that Capello referred to in the first memorial. Both refer to a closed group. The charges against San Giorgio in the anonymous memorial are harsher and go deeper. In his criticism of San Giorgio, Capello argued that the dual power in Genoa was a negative phenomenon and cited the corrupt group: the boteschi. The anonymous author of the second memorial, however, linked the two phenomena, arguing that corruption fueled San Giorgio’s rising dominion that aimed to capture many more territories and defeat the other seat of power: the Commune. Just as San Giorgio’s corrupt members sought to rule over the honest citizens administering the Commune, so, according to the anonymous author, did they seek to conquer the Commune by defeating first the people, then the institutions. This scenario envisaged a dramatic ending: the collapse of the Commune.
The anonymous memorial goes on to propose remedies against corruption. Its author invites the duke to defeat the tyranny of the corrupt by reforming San Giorgio. Eight or ten men—including, the author suggests, the archbishop’s vicar—would investigate the clerics, the monasteries, and even laymen of the city and the Riviera, driving them to plead “not to be devoured by these rapacious wolves.”50 This maneuver, he suggests, would afford the duke an excuse to act. The duke would convene the general assembly, called the assembly of the Compere di San Giorgio, and form a special eight-member commission empowered to reform San Giorgio’s government and review its accounts. The memorial notes that there the duke would not have to remove too many corrupt individuals from office, but that the fines could amount to 100,000–200,000 florins, as was the case—both memorials used the same example—under Duke Philip. The duke, writes the author, could then use those monies to abolish some of the taxes on the poor, reform San Giorgio’s government to return it to its earlier form (al modo antico), and make San Giorgio free.
The memorial’s final section deals with social divisions and ways to raise revenues. The author points out that nobles usually allied with the merchants, while the artisans remained isolated, and the fourth class—the working poor (popolo minuto)—was not only isolated but also defeated. These divisions would prevent the duke from raising funds or forming an army. Here, the memorial connected the problem of endemic, complex political unrest to the Genoese system of political representation. It proposed abolishing all the parties, the social divisions between nobles and populares, and the factions.
Calls for broader political representation and political reform to target the factions were frequent in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Genoa. The most despised social groups in the fifteenth-century popular uprisings were the Guelph and Ghibelline parties and the powerful Adorno and Fregoso families who controlled the dogeship. The lower social strata also targeted the nobles and merchants. Arguing that the division between the nobility and the populares did not correspond to reality, the lower strata called for a division into three parties (nobles, merchants, and artisans) or for a single class encompassing all categories. A request for a division of the offices across four sections was made when Doge Pietro Fregoso formed an alliance with the artisans in 1454.51 This has been documented and studied; however, we do not know whether the Fregoso plan called for the inclusion of the popolo minuto in the four sections. In 1465 a Franciscan friar, Battista Tagliacarne, proposed the abolition of all social distinctions and the formation of a single political group. The proposal reached the Officium Antianorum, the highest political office, but was rejected.52
Well after both memorials—and a full year of political unrest—reform was implemented in 1506 and offices divided among three parties: nobles, merchants, and artisans. The reform lasted several months until the French dominion dismantled it. A lasting solution was implemented in 1528 when a single group of citizens was formed—called the nobles, it encompassed the three categories.53 The anonymous memorial proposed wide participation from below to meet the Milanese dominion’s need for military and economic resources. This proposal was like the 1506 reform, except the memorial wanted the popolo minuto allied to an external dominion (the Milanese).
The two memorials shared an analysis of the dual power of San Giorgio and the Commune and a focus on the lower social strata (artisans, popolo minuto, povera gente), but they differed in other respects. Capello focused on the Adorno and Fregoso factions, while the second text examined political conflicts among social groups. For the anonymous author, even the criticism of San Giorgio related to social issues, because the need to eliminate corruption was related to finding resources for the lower social strata. Both authors stressed that the greatest victims of San Giorgio’s corruption were the lower social classes, who were oppressed by taxes. The anonymous memorial, however, went further in addressing the military implications: the popolo minuto’s consensus was important in forming an army, but if the other social strata oppressed the popolo minuto, it would be impossible to man the army.54
7.5. Attempting to Take Over the Commune (1453–58)
At least one of the memorials was written around 1465–66, when Francesco Sforza had just taken over Genoa. Both texts took a long-term view of the division between San Giorgio and the Commune, pointing out that the former had captured the most important compere and the first territories (Pietrasanta and Famagosta, in 1446–47). However, the memorials should be viewed specifically in the context of the decade 1454–64. Two events in this period shed light on their relevance: Francesco Sforza’s plan to take over Genoa and its subsequent implementation.
The anonymous memorial discusses the possibility that San Giorgio could take total possession of Genoa by capturing its territories one after the other. In the years preceding the memorials, this appeared to be a real political option, not an implausible event. It was mentioned three times in letters sent to the Sforza court in the autumn of 1453 and once in 1458.
Francesco Sforza planned several attempts to take over Genoa in the early 1450s before succeeding in 1464, but the French took possession of the city between 1458 and 1461. These two external signories were preceded by the dogeship of Pietro Campofregoso, which was weak, since Genoa was involved in the war against the Kingdom of Aragon and the Ottomans threatened the eastern Mediterranean Genoese possessions. Pietro tried to strengthen his power through an alliance with the artisans, one of the components of the populares. In 1454, he pledged to protect artisans’ rights like the right to hold one-quarter of the offices—a measure designed to shield them from tax increases; he also promised that artisans banished for political reasons could return as free men.55 In exchange, Pietro gained their support. Contemporary sources describe him as fearing the imminent arrival of Genoa’s enemies, depicting a frightened doge pacing up and down atop the city walls, scrutinizing the hinterland for the invaders’ imminent arrival.56 In September–October 1454, again to win over the artisans and the popolo minuto, Pietro persuaded San Giorgio to abolish the wine tax and launched a plan to draw up a cadastre with the aim of taxing the nobles more than the populares. The nobles joined San Giorgio in opposing the doge. They reportedly took a dim view of his plans, with some sources saying that they “fell in disgrace” because of these plans—that is, they felt the doge could weaken their power and make them poorer.57 When San Giorgio took Caffa—then threatened by Mehmed II—in the autumn of 1453, the doge initially opposed it, relenting in exchange for loans.58 Spinetta Fregoso, a relative but an enemy of the doge, wrote that the concession proved that “the doge was finished” (lo stato del doge [era] spacciato). For Spinetta, the transaction signaled “the great diminution of the dogeship” (grande diminuzione del dogato)—that is, that the Commune was losing its power as it lost its territories.59
There were few options. The traditional one was for Genoa to end up controlled by a foreign power. In the same letter, however, Spinetta made clear that the duke of Milan, Francesco Sforza, was not seeking the signory of Genoa at the time. Other possibilities included taking possession of Genoa himself as doge, or “putting this dominion in the hands of San Giorgio” (mettere questo dominio in mano a San Giorgio).60 The latter option was first proposed by Giacomo Spinola in a letter of September 12, 1453, describing the Genoese situation to the Sforza court. If the duke waited too long, Spinola wrote, Genoa might end up in the hands of the French signory or under San Giorgio’s control, making it difficult for the duke to take Genoa.61 Both documents evoke the possibility of San Giorgio taking control of Genoa and its dominion a decade before Giovanni Capello’s memorial (and perhaps about the same amount of time before the other, undated memorial). Unlike the memorials, however, the two documents outlined a political plan. They also show how, at that time, San Giorgio’s takeover of a territory not only created the possibility of an external signory, but paved the way for potential internal fragmentation, with one power center (San Giorgio) taking control of the other (the Commune).
A second reference to San Giorgio’s dominion is in a letter of November 10, 1453, from Pietro Cotta to Francesco Sforza, in which he relates that a Genoese merchant, Borbone Centurione, had offered 30,000–40,000 ducats to Doge Pietro Campofregoso on behalf of San Giorgio, requesting the signory of Genoa in exchange. The doge replied that he wanted Pietrasanta, at which point Borbone Centurione dropped the offer.62 Borbone Centurione had dealt with unrest in the community of Pietrasanta back in 1436, guaranteeing a loan to enable the poor to acquire wheat.63 He had also been one of the supporters of the alienation to San Giorgio of the paga floreni—that is, the tax on income from the loca, traditionally levied by the Commune.64 His support for San Giorgio in these smaller affairs seems to have prepared him for the alienation of the rights of the Commune and even the alienation of the Commune itself, if he wanted to sell Genoa and the Commune to San Giorgio.
A third reference to the signory of San Giorgio, in a different context, dates from 1458. Francesco Sforza again wanted to take possession of Genoa but did not want to disappoint Venice, which had formed closer ties with Milan after the creation of the Italian League in 1454. Genoa’s economy was faltering. In early April 1458, San Giorgio, invoking a public necessity and a “great peril,” decided to help the Commune honor its debts, taking in exchange the paga floreni of 1468.65 Here, San Giorgio obtained the right to collect the entire paga floreni many years in advance but would not have taken it until 1468. It was a sort of financial promise. A few days earlier, at a council meeting in Milan where everyone had expressed a different opinion, someone proposed “placing the state in the hands of San Giorgio”—in other words, handing over all of Genoa to San Giorgio.66 This proposal was mentioned by a Mantuan ambassador at the Sforza court—that is, someone in the duke’s inner circle, rather than a Genoese or an individual outside the Milanese milieu. If the memorials indeed date from the 1460s, given that they both proposed changes to San Giorgio, we can hypothesize that the Milanese court initially planned to place the entire Genoese dominion under San Giorgio’s control (1453 and 1458) and later envisaged a reform of San Giorgio.
Christine Shaw has studied the events of 1453, considering the three references as possible indications of a takeover of the Genoese dominion by San Giorgio. However, Shaw dismisses the sources and concludes that this was never a real possibility. If it had been, she adds, it would have required a power group within San Giorgio; but, she writes, “there was no such group, and there is no evidence that the Casa was a center of political intrigue, a base for individuals or groups with their own political agenda.” Shaw argues that the notion of San Giorgio taking possession of Genoa, well documented in Milanese and Mantuan sources, was “a way of getting rid of an unpopular doge [Pietro Campofregoso].”67 She notes that, in the vast amount of material analyzed, she has found no other references to San Giorgio’s dominion over the government of Genoa, adding that if such a group had existed, someone would have alerted the duke of Milan:
At the least, it might be expected that someone among those who repeatedly urged Francesco Sforza to take the signoria of Genoa for himself, or one of the Campofregoso or Adorno urging him to support them in a bid to become Doge (or to help them to remain Doge) would have referred to the need to come to terms with, circumvent, or combat, a political group based at the Casa di San Giorgio. But none of them did.68
Shaw’s meticulous research in the Genoese papers led her to conclude that there is no evidence of any attempt by San Giorgio to take over Genoa in the period 1477–99.69
Looking at the sources related to San Giorgio’s involvement in the Milanese projects and its competition with the Commune, however, it is possible to maintain—as I will show—that Shaw’s skepticism is unjustified and a takeover of Genoa by San Giorgio was plausible. The key issue is the existence of an internal group at San Giorgio. San Giorgio itself, Shaw argues, was not strong enough to justify the Milanese plans, and no internal group at San Giorgio existed. However, such a group did exist, albeit buried in the Sforzesco archive related to Genoa. At the very least, we have evidence of a power group denounced by Giovanni Capello: the boteschi. We know Battista de Goano was a member, but Borbone Centurione, who, in 1453, offered to give the doge financial compensation in exchange for San Giorgio taking full possession of Genoa, may have been as well.
We can offer some conjectures about references to a possible signory of San Giorgio over Genoa. The authors of the two memorials examined here were Genoese, but it may be that such memorials could not circulate in Genoa. While one could criticize San Giorgio in Milan when advising the duke, criticizing San Giorgio in Genoa was a different matter. Furthermore, San Giorgio’s signory over Genoa was not a traditional political option. It would have weakened the Adorno and Fregoso factions and would probably have eliminated the doge’s power.
Lastly, since one of the allusions to San Giorgio’s signory in the Milanese papers concerns a plan fostered by the duke himself, we do not need to assume the existence of a power group within San Giorgio (as Shaw did) to believe that contemporaries envisaged a San Giorgio takeover as an option. As an external power, the duke did not need such a group to facilitate San Giorgio’s signory.
7.6. Francesco Sforza (1464)
Documents from prior to the Milanese takeover of Genoa (1464) provide clues to the relations between San Giorgio and the duke of Milan, Francesco Sforza. The duke had sought to take Genoa in the 1450s, but the city instead fell to King Louis XI of France. In the same years, San Giorgio extended large loans to Sforza, acquiring as collateral the ability to collect salt taxes.70 Between the French and Milanese signories (1461 and 1464), a series of weak powers ran Genoa: Ludovico Campofregoso, his cousin Paolo, the government of eight “captains of the people,” Ludovico again, and lastly Paolo, who violently defeated his cousin and became doge again in January 1463.71 In late 1463, Francesco Sforza, now allied with Louis XI, obtained Savona from the French, then Genoa, considered traditionally as a French fief.72 Francesco Sforza’s secret emissaries, the Milanese merchants Cristoforo Panigarola and Biagio Gradi, gave the duke step-by-step advice on what to do in Genoa in 1464–65. They reported frequently on San Giorgio, an institution they saw as crucial to conquering Genoa. In January 1463, after Paolo Fregoso became doge, Panigarola and Gradi encouraged Francesco Sforza not only to pay homage to the doge, but also to maintain good relations with San Giorgio.73
Before the Milanese occupied Genoa, Panigarola and Gradi informed the duke that San Giorgio wanted to offer him Corsica.74 From this we see that San Giorgio had the autonomy to make an alliance with the duke of Milan. The latter played for time, preferring to finalize the conquest of Genoa before taking over San Giorgio’s territories. In early January 1463, Gradi and Panigarola warned Sforza that “ill-intentioned people” (maligni) at San Giorgio had criticized the duke’s plan to take Genoa. They emphasized that without San Giorgio on his side, the duke would incur the hatred of all of Genoa (l’odio universale).75 The duke’s actions in the following months apparently did not disappoint San Giorgio. With a Sforza signory becoming more credible, the doge, realizing he would lose power, tried to obtain compensation. He asked for Pietrasanta, Montrone, and Roccabruna, plus 30,000 ducats, since these territories produced little revenue. The sum of 30,000 ducats was identical to San Giorgio’s offer to Pietro Fregoso in 1453, when the institution tried to take over the Commune. Like Pietro, Paolo asked for Pietrasanta, probably because it had once been a Fregoso territory. But the Sforza duke did not respond to these requests, since he was trying to ingratiate himself with San Giorgio.76 That he succeeded is attested to by a letter of May 1464 from San Giorgio’s protettore to the officials of Caffa, assuring them that Francesco Sforza had expressed warm feelings toward San Giorgio.77 While San Giorgio had always enjoyed strong, privileged ties with external signories (whether Milan or France), which had always recognized its rights and privileges, Sforza’s attitude before his arrival in Genoa in 1464 was particularly promising. In prior external dominations, San Giorgio had not pursued an autonomous policy with respect to the Commune; this changed in 1463–64, in the run-up to Francesco Sforza’s takeover.
Notes
1. BCB, mr. V.3.15, fol. 9r e regulae dell’Officium Monetae in ASG, Manoscritti di Parigi, 20, fol. 7r.
2. BCB, mr. V.3.15, fol. 1r–v.
3. Sources produced by the Officium Monetae include the following: the laws (regulae) of the Office are entitled “De Officio Monetae eiusque Regulis” (On the Officium Monetae and its laws), ASG, Manoscritti tornati da Parigi, 20. The baliae (exceptional commissions) are entitled Bailia Offitii Monetae (BCB, mr. V.3.15). The folders of papers and registers of the Commune of Genoa from item 713 to item 751 (under the series “Archivio Segreto” [AS] of the ASG), for the period 1442–1512, are recorded in the index of the state archives as documents of the Officium Monetae. Some are folders of petitions sent to the Office, ASG, AS 733C and 733E; others are registers containing payments by the Officium Monetae to the Office of the Anziani or the governors (AS 718–736). The latter are called manuali apodisiarum and contain the salaries and payrolls for every office of the Commune (the doge, the massari, the guards of the doors, castles, and towers, the soldiers, and so on). See also Mario Buongiorno, “Stipendi e ricompense dei funzionari della repubblica di Genova nel tardo medioevo,” Bollettino storico biografico subalpino 68 (1970): 602–635, at 609 and note. The series of diversorum registers of the ASG (AS 619–629) of the second half of the fifteenth century is also useful (the first register contains material from 1480 to 1516; the others cover 1481–86). This series contains documents from the Officium Antianorum, but some papers were produced by the Officium Monetae. Other papers can be found in the Primi cancellieri di San Giorgio, series 92 of the ASG. In the index of the state archives, some registers are classified under the Officium Monetae; these, however, do not include registers from AS 567 to AS 582 (1459–66).
4. On the chaotic situation of the offices in Genoa during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, see Rodolfo Savelli, “ ‘Capitula’, ‘regulae’ e pratiche del diritto,” 447–502. On the Officium Expense Ordinarie, for which only one register survives, see Mario Buongiorno, Una burocrazia del XV secolo: Genova e la finanza ordinaria (Lecce: Milella, 1979).
5. Buongiorno, Una burocrazia del XV secolo, 13.
6. BCB, mr. V.3.15, fol. 11r–12v.
7. BCB, mr. V.3.15, fol. 28r.
8. For example, the Officium Monetae amended a decree to compensate persons who had loca and were required to pay the avaria, BCB, mr. V.3.15, fol. 25r–v.
9. Mario Buongiorno, Il bilancio di uno stato medievale, 262, note 14.
10. BCB, mr. V.3.15 fol. 27r, from 1444 (see also ASG, MS Parigi, 20, fol. 35v–36v). A law called Castellanorum dates from 1449, ASG, Manoscritti tornati da Parigi, 20, fol. 34v.
11. Giuseppe Pipino, “Documenti su attività mineraria in Liguria e nel Dominio Genovese dal Medioevo alla fine del Seicento,” Atti e Memorie della Società Storica Savonese 39 (2003): 39–112, at 52. See also the mining concession in ASG, AS 733 C.
12. See here Part I.
13. Part I, § 3.5.
14. Buongiorno, Una burocrazia del XV secolo, 41.
15. Rodolfo Savelli gave me Giovanni Capello’s memorial before I started research on San Giorgio. The document enabled me to develop the entire research project and establish the connection between the San Giorgio model and corporations of the early modern age.
16. Some references to the activities of Giovanni Capello in the Officium Monetae are in ASM, Sforzesco, 432 (letters of October 18 and 26, 1467), ASM, Sforzesco 430 (letter of June 5, 1467), ASM, Sforzesco 429 (March 12, 1467).
17. Antonio Gallo, Commentarii de rebus Genuensium et de navigatione Columbi (Città di Castello: S. Lapi, 1910); Bartolomeo Senarega, “De Rebus Genuensibus Commentaria ab anno 1488 usque ad annum 1514.”
18. ASM, Registri Ducali, 158, fol. 195r. The receipt of October 7, 1462, with the promise to repay the debt to Giovanni Capello, was signed by Cicco Simonetta. I thank Federico Piseri for bringing this document to my attention.
19. Heers was the first to use the term “military budget” for this document. See Heers, Gênes au XVe siècle, 9. Both G. Pistarino and M. Buongiorno have criticized the phrase. See Geo Pistarino, “La spesa ordinaria della Repubblica di Genova nella crisi del 1461–62,” in Miscellanea ligure in memoria di Giorgio Falco (Genoa: Università di Genova, Istituto di Paleografia e Storia Medievale, Fonti e studi, 1966), 239–264, esp. at 257; Buongiorno, Il bilancio di uno stato medievale, 302.
20. Pistarino, “La spesa ordinaria,” 258–259.
21. Pistarino, “La spesa ordinaria,” 259; Buongiorno, Il bilancio di uno stato medievale, 303.
22. ASM, Sforzesco, 1319.
23. See Appendix 1, introduction.
24. The “Ricordi of Zuan Capello” probably included another document, because the author listed the social groups schematically with a number. He used six figures to designate groups or classes: the rich, represented (figurati) by the number 6; the “middlemen” (mezzani), represented by 5, 4, and 3; and the poor, numbered 2 and 1. The text may have referred to a complex list of groups of citizens or simply to a division into six social groups, with rich and poor at either end and “middlemen” at the center.
25. Christine Shaw, “The French Signoria Over Genoa,” in Libertà e domînio. Il sistema politico genovese: Le relazioni esterne e il controllo del territorio, ed. Matthias Schnettger and Carlo Taviani (Rome: DHI-Viella), 39–54.
26. “Perché governi in Genoa sunt brevi, questa è la causa, che duo sunt in ea regna: unum in Palacio, alterum in Sancto Georgio et regni duos diu retinere nequit.” ASM, Sforzesco 1319, Ricordi di Giovanni Capello, fol. 1v. See also Appendix 1.
27. He was explicit: “postquam le sei assumpte figure è d’aperirne l’inzegno per contra lur astucia,” which can be roughly translated as “after the six categories that I have assumed, it is difficult to defeat their [i.e., the boteschi’s] shrewdness.” ASM, Sforzesco, 1319, fol. 1v.
28. Heers, Gênes au XVe siècle, without page numbers [670]. On the matter of the pagae, see here Part I § 2.1.2. Heers gives the data in a table, with average values. The information is in ASG, Banco di San Giorgio, 4484. Here are some monthly figures in soldi from the same volume: January 3, 1464: 8.10 (Luca de Novaria); February 4: 8.6 (Luca de Novaria, 728); February 7: 9.4 (Luca de Novaria); March 3: 10.2 (Luca de Novaria); May 25: 10.6–10.8 (Luca de Novaria and others); June 21: 10.6 (various individuals); July 9: 10.6; September 13: 11.7; October 8: 12.2; the price peaked on November 13 at 13.4–14 soldi, easing to 12.7 on December 10, then settling at 13.2 on December 24 and again on February 23, 1465.
29. “erano stati posti come cani a custodia delle pecore e invece facevano un ufficio da lupi.” ASM, Sforzesco 1319, Ricordi di Giovanni Capello, fol. 1r–v.
30. ACG 103.C.6: here Mainero is listed as chancellor in 1431–35; he was removed on May 2, 1436 (ASG, AS 518, fol. 14r): “De mandato Illustri et excelsis domîni ducis ianuensis etc. et spectabilis consilii dominorum antianorum. vos Paule Mainerie consignetis seu consignari faciatis egregio Gotardo de Sarzana concellario quecumque cartularia et scripturas cancellariae.” (“As ordered by the illustrious and sublime lord the doge of Genoa etc. and the council of the lords senators, you, Paolo Mainero, shall hand over every register and all writings of the chancellery to the distinguished Gotardo da Sarzana, chancellor.”). He is named in one of the registers of the chancellery of San Giorgio, dated 1449–52. He was likely reinstated in his office in the same year; see ASG, Sala 34/607, 2239. He is also mentioned as chancellor in 1453, 1455–56, and 1460: see Vigna, “Codice diplomatico delle colonie tauro-liguri,” 185, 534. For information on Paolo Mainero’s daughter, see ASG, NA 869, 49.
31. Ambrogio Pesce, “Di Antonio Maineri governatore della Corsica per l’Ufficio di S. Giorgio (1457–1458),” Giornale storico e letterario della Liguria 2 (1901): 24–35.
32. ASMi, Sforzesco 1319, fol. 1v.
33. ASMi, Sforzesco 1319, fol. 1v.
34. Rodolfo Savelli, “Le mani della repubblica: La cancelleria genovese dalla fine del Trecento agli inizi del Seicento,” in Studi in memoria di Giovanni Tarello, vol. I (Milano: Giuffrè, 1990), 541–609.
35. On the paga floreni see here Part I § 2.2.2.
36. Heers, Gênes au XVe siècle, 627.
37. The document was found and transcribed by Serena Ferente, Gli ultimi Guelfi: Linguaggi e identità politiche in Italia nella seconda metà del Quattrocento (Rome: Viella, 2013), 168.
38. See Giustina Olgiati’s biography of Battista de Goano, “Battista di Goano, ‘politico’ del Quattrocento genovese,” in Storia dei Genovesi, Atti del convegno di studi sui ceti dirigenti nelle istituzioni della Repubblica di Genova, Genoa, 11–14 giugno, 1991, ed. Cesare Cattaneo Mallone, vol. 12 (Genova: Tipolitografia Sorriso Francescano, 1994), 145–169.
39. See here, Part II.
40. Olgiati, “Battista de Goano,” 146–151.
41. Olgiati, “Battista de Goano,” 153–154. On these activities, see ASG, AS 572 fol. 7r–v, ASG, AS 571, fol. 28v, ASG, AS 571, fol. 34v–35r.
42. ASG, AS 582, fol. 2v, 5v, fol. 7r, fol. 11v, fol. 22r.
43. ASM, Sforzesco, 1514.
44. Kirshner, “The Moral Problem,” esp. at 135–136.
45. The moltiplico during the years is documented by the journal and ledger of Bendinelli Sauli’s foundation. For the figure of 250 loca, see ADP, Sauli 685, fol. 2v.
46. ASG, San Giorgio 3,00038, fol. 57v e, www.lacasadisangiorgio.eu/main.php?do=scheda&ricerca=0&idscheda=99375&page= (accessed February 11, 2022).
47. ASM, Sforzesco, 1287. On the verso, one can make out: “Q … genovexe.” A hypothesis about the text’s authorship, which requires further study, is proposed in Appendix 2, which also provides a full transcription of the text.
48. A clue supporting the hypothesis that this anonymous memorial was contemporaneous with Giovanni Capello’s is a reference to “the Duke Giovanni,” to whom the populares in Genoa were reportedly close. Since John II of Anjou was lord of Genoa and signed a peace treaty with Francesco Sforza handing him the city, and since the details of the peace were being discussed in 1465, “Duke Giovanni” probably refers to John II of Anjou.
49. “Prima de’ sapere v.ex.ta che a Genoa habiamo doi domîni l’uno del palatio, l’altro di Sancto Georgio il qual he gubernato da certa comunione di citadini ambitiosi chi sempre pretendono a la destructione di quelli guberna il palatio per reducere in loro il guberno totale di Genoa e cuosì già havviano occupato le megliore membra de la citate cioè Caffa, Peyra, Famagusta, Pietrasancta e Corsica e cuosì a puocho a puocho cierchano di occupar il resto et hanno conducto una grande brigata a la soa voglia cum prometterli e dargli officii però che questi hanno più officii da dare cha quelli che guverna il palatio et molto megliori.” ASM, Sforzesco, 1287, fol. 1r; see here Appendix 2.
50. ASM, Sforzesco, 1287.
51. Antonia Borlandi, “Ragione politica e ragione di famiglia nel ducato di Pietro Campofregoso,” in La storia dei Genovesi, vol. 4 (Genova: Sorriso francescano, 1984), 353–402.
52. If, as I suggest, the memorial was written in 1465–66, then the political reform proposed in the text—apportioning the political offices among the social and political groups—can be connected to that of Battista Tagliacarne, which dates from the same years.
53. For the political reforms of the fifteenth century, see Riccardo Musso, “ ‘Viva el Duca et lo Sancto Padre’: Savona al tempo degli Sforza e di Sisto IV (1464–1478),” Atti e memorie della Società Savonese di Storia Patria 37 (2000): 59–153, esp. at 104. On the 1506 political reform, see Taviani, Superba discordia, 101–103. For the 1528 reform, see Pacini, “I presupposti politici del ‘secolo dei genovesi.’ ”
54. The anonymous memorial also discusses two major issues of the period: the Commune’s creditors (here, San Giorgio) and the “milizia propria” (own militia), which relied on the consensus of the poorest population. The author offers no structured analysis of these issues, nor does he connect the two, except when stating the need to control San Giorgio to control the population. The link between the two issues has recently been noted in Machiavelli’s thought. See specifically Barthas, L’Argent n’est pas le nerf de la guerre. On Machiavelli and popular conscription, recent studies include Andrea Guidi, Books, People, and Military Thought; Machiavelli’s Art of War and the Fortune of the Militia in Sixteenth-Century Florence and Europe (Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2020).
55. Borlandi, “Ragione politica e ragione di famiglia nel ducato di Pietro Campofregoso,” 378–382.
56. ASM, Sforzesco, 409, letter of September 24, 1454.
57. ASM, Sforzesco, 409, letter of September 24, 1454.
58. See here, Part II § 5.1.
59. ASM, Sforzesco, 408, October 31, 1453, letter by Pietro Cotta, quoted in Borlandi, “Ragione politica e ragione di famiglia,” esp. at 362 and note at 373 (but incorrectly referenced as ASM, 409).
60. ASM, Sforzesco, 408, October 31, 1453, letter by Pietro Cotta, quoted in Borlandi, “Ragione politica e ragione di famiglia,” esp. at 362 and note at 373 (but incorrectly referenced as ASM, 409).
61. ASM, Sforzesco, 408, September 12, 1453, letter by Giacomo Spinola.
62. Christine Shaw, “Principles and Practice in the Civic Government of Fifteenth-Century Genoa,” Renaissance Quarterly 58, 1 (2005): 45–90, at 62. Borbone Centurione founded a bank with Geronimo Lercari in 1447; he financed silk trading, and in 1454 he is mentioned as manager of the old drictus of Tunis (together with Giovanni Tommaso de Negro, AS, 547, fol. 191r). See Heers, Gênes au XVe siècle, 93, 250; Emilio Marengo, Genova e Tunisi, 1388–1515, ASLSP, XXXII, 78.
63. ASG, AS 518, fol. 60r. On the revolt, see here part II § 4.3.
64. Part I § 2.2.2.
65. ASG, Sala 34, 607, 2246, fol. 42r–v, April 13, 1458.
66. Isabella Lazzarini (ed.), Carteggio degli oratori mantovani alla corte sforzesca (1450–1500), general ed. Franca Leverotti, vol. 1 (Rome: Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, 1999), 151, Vincenzo della Scalona to Ludovico Gonzaga, April 8, 1458.
67. Shaw, “Principle and Practice,” 63.
68. Shaw, “Principle and Practice,” 63.
69. Shaw, “Principle and Practice,” 63: “Nor does the Casa appear as a political power base in the correspondence from Genoa in the A. Sforzesco files for 1477–1499-bb, 967–978, 980–999, 1209–1226, 1228–1229, 1281–1284, 1287, 1572, that I have studied.”
70. See here Part I § 2.2.4.
71. Albano Sorbelli, Francesco Sforza a Genova (1458–1466) saggio sulla politica italiana di Luigi XI, con L documenti inediti tratti dalle bibliotheche e dagli archivi di Parigi (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1901), 64–65.
72. Sorbelli, Francesco Sforza a Genova, 72–109; Lévy, La monarchie et la commune; Fabien Levy, “ ‘L’universelle araigne’: Louis XI, Gênes, Milan et la Savoie dans la crise de 1474–1476,” Études Savoisiennes 13–14 (2004–2005): 69–92; Fabien Levy, “Gênes, ville de France? Aspects juridiques de la domination française à Gênes,” Atti della società ligure di storia patria 1, 47 (2007): 329–356; Levy, La monarchie et la commune, 97–98.
73. Sorbelli, Francesco Sforza a Genova, 193. On Panigarola and Gradi, see Franca Leverotti, Diplomazia e governo dello stato: I “famigli” cavalcanti di Francesco Sforza (1450–1466) (Pisa: GISEM, 1992), 219, note.
74. Sorbelli, Francesco Sforza a Genova, 112.
75. Sorbelli, Francesco Sforza a Genova, 247.
76. Sorbelli, Francesco Sforza a Genova, 134.
77. Geo Pistarino, “La politica sforzesca nel Mediterraneo orientale,” in Gli Sforza a Milano e in Lombarda e i loro rapporti con gli stati italiani ed europei, Atti del Convegno internazionale (Milano 18–21 maggio 1981), Milano (Milan: Cisalpino-Goliardica Editori, 1982), 335–368, esp. at 348.