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Public Military Service of Bishops in the Piast Monarchy (Twelfth to Early Thirteenth Centuries)

Radosław Kotecki

Preserved sources shedding light on the issue of the military service of bishops in the Piast monarchy are few and far between. This is lamentable, as a richer source base would enable scholars to better understand the scope and nature of the Polish church’s public duties. The latter, in turn, would make it possible to provide a more precise definition of the place of the episcopate within the structures of the monarchy in the period before the position of bishops became increasingly autonomous from the early thirteenth century onwards. At that time, until approximately the middle of that century, bishops managed to free themselves from the sovereignty of dukes and obtain exemptions from most public duties, including those of a military nature. The process was compounded by the parallel break-up of the monarchy into numerous principalities ruled by dukes from several branches of the Piast dynasty.¹ As Jacek Maciejewski recently observed, at that time bishops ceased to take part in monarchs’ military campaigns for good. With the restoration of the unified Kingdom of Poland in the fourteenth century, there emerged tendencies to change this situation, but they did not lead to the militarisation of the episcopate.²

Yet the period preceding the dismantling of the state church model and the break-up of the monarchy was a time when the links between bishops and monarchs’ military power may have been close. Proving this, of course, is no easy task because of the scarcity of sources, but it must be said that the modest number of available accounts has not prompted any comprehensive research so far. Interest in the topic has not gone beyond the enumeration of exemptions from military service stated in charters for individual recipients. In addition, these servitia have been interpreted only in the context of the system of state organisation, which is defined in local and static terms of the long-entrenched concept of “ducal law.”³ This a sore point in any research on military organisation in the eleventh–thirteenth centuries, including more recent studies,⁴ although it should be noted that the need to modify the approach had already been recognised over a decade ago by Marcin Rafał Pauk and Ewa Wółkiewicz in a valuable study devoted to the impact of the German Reichkirche “system” in Poland and Bohemia in the eleventh–twelfth centuries.⁵ Importantly, both scholars observed the possibility of a reception of the episcopal military service from the Empire and called for comparative studies to be carried out, especially in the context of the impact of the servitium regis model.⁶ Although when it comes to the assessment of the intensity of military service by the Polish episcopate, conclusions from these studies have been cautious, but they do make it possible to challenge⁷ the view that bishops did not fulfil any obligations to monarchs other than those of a religious nature.⁸

It is worth treating the Pauk and Wółkiewicz’s concise contribution as an introductory step to broader analyses, especially given the fact that some of their proposals do not seem to be entirely convincing. What is questionable is their treatment of the personal participation of bishops in monarchs’ campaigns with “their own select armed retinue” as the main criterion for the reception of military service and its juxtaposition with the obligation of sending contingents of troops made up of people from ecclesiastical estates to take part in military operations as the practical implementation of the principles of ius ducale.⁹ Another rather artificial juxtaposition is that between religious ministry during campaigns and military service “proper.”¹⁰ It is clear that both activities were two sides of the same coin, at least until the separation of the spiritualia from the temporalia and the spread of the service with regalia, making it possible for bishops to fulfil the service in a secular, though not necessarily military, manner.¹¹ That is why the celebration of religious rites by prelates for the troops until the collapse of the old state church ideas should be regarded as a fully fledged form of public service for the realm (understood as an ethnic-political-religious community).¹² In studies carried out so far, the church’s military service has been treated too narrowly.

Such shortcomings suggest that, despite the scarcity of sources, it is still possible to make some contribution to the existing scholarship. This requires a different approach to the matter and, in addition to a comparative perspective, at least sensitivity to various forms of military support and not just their “institutional” but also their cultural connotations. The value of such an approach has already been confirmed. For example, Craig Nakashian pointed out that bishops as dignitaries placed between the monarch and the church usually did not operate in one, clearly defined sphere, be it secular or religious, but in both simultaneously, and their military engagement meant service rendered to both the earthly and the heavenly suzerains. Such integrity of function was facilitated by the fact that prelates actively involved in warfare usually had a clear vision of the hierarchy of power, seeing the king ruling gratia Dei at the top. Therefore, it is not surprising that service to the monarch required support from the bishops not only due to feudal ties but also due to loyalty understood in religious terms.¹³ Daniel Gerrard, in turn, stresses that the military engagement of bishops was not only associated with fulfilling the duty of servitium regis; it also served to create a “society organised for war” on many levels. In practice, rendering service was expressed through various activities, from boosting the monarch’s military potential with the bishops’ clientele, to sending troops and manning royal strongholds, to participating in army mobilisation, to involvement in military and diplomatic missions, and to religious ministry.¹⁴

It is impossible to examine all of these issues from the perspective of Polish sources. Some of them have been studied recently, while others still require detailed analysis. This chapter focuses on key aspects such as the personal service of prelates in monarchs’ military campaigns, the sending or bringing of homines as part of the expeditio obligation, and the contribution of bishops to local defence. The objective is to determine whether the modest traces of the military obligations of prelates, until the emergence of exemptions, can be placed in a broader context. Can these traces be regarded as yet another sign of the Europeanisation of the peripheries?

Episcopal Military Service on the Eastern and Northern Frontiers of Latin Europe

Recent studies demonstrate more and more emphatically that military service was a common phenomenon for prelates in the High Middle Ages and in monarchies beyond the Carolingian successors. The influence of patterns of ecclesiastical military service has been recently demonstrated, for example, even in small and peripheral monarchies like medieval Georgia or Wales.¹⁵ One might conclude that wherever rulers were able to enforce public duties and to create feudal ties, the service of bishops could function there as a custom. Sometimes this custom died out, especially as a result of efforts to obtain exemptions going along to churches resorting to the idea of libertas ecclesiae. However, this was not always the case, because of prelates who did not want to abandon the lucrative royal service. In monarchies like the Anglo-Norman kingdom, the Plantagenets, or the Kingdom of Castile and León, episcopal obligations proved to be so firmly rooted that even the reform ambitions of the papacy were unable to eradicate them in full.¹⁶ Another characteristic example is France, where bishops’ obligations were reduced after the weakening of royal power in the tenth century,¹⁷ though with the consolidation of the king’s position in the second half of the twelfth and first half of the thirteenth centuries, they began to be enforced again from bishoprics within the influence of royal power.¹⁸ In addition, the most notable aspect of the service was recognised in canon law at the time. Beginning with Gratian, canonists accepted the ruler’s right to enforce it from churches owning regalia.¹⁹ Some even believed that the ruler was entitled to demand that bishops not only send but also bring troops to him and that prelates should not oppose the monarch’s will.²⁰

Wondering how this phenomenon may have unfolded in Poland, one should ask not about the western part of Europe but about its eastern and northern peripheries. Yet so far, scholars studying these regions have not been greatly interested in the topic, which sometimes finds its effect in the belief that episcopal military service did not exist in the region. However, such a view may stem from the scarcity of sources and a lack of research. Significantly, Pauk and Wółkiewicz have concluded, seeking to contextualise the Polish reality, that in the case of Bohemian bishops, who were members of the German episcopate, there is no clear evidence of military service. However, this is not entirely true. The evidence is, for example, the account by Vincentius of Prague about Bishop Daniel, who took part in Frederick I’s Italian campaign (1158) “in servitium Domini sui regis Bohemiae cum militia sua, et cum Deslao, Peregrino, Dethebo, Vincentio, Ottone, et aliis capellanis comitatus.”²¹ According to both scholars, it is hard to judge, however, whether the term militia sua here denotes the bishop’s private retinue or a troop of king’s knights sent with a bishop to support the emperor. Yet the chronicle provides enough evidence to believe it is about the people of episcopal familia.²² The presence of the bishop’s knights in the campaign is confirmed by Vincentius himself (who took part in the expedition) in mentioning the scutarius episcopi who was killed during the campaign.²³ Even if Daniel’s militia included the ruler’s knights, the bishop’s actions conformed to the rules of military service.²⁴

In any case, there are other positive examples. One was given already by Cosmas, when he mentioned how, in 1104, Duke Bořivoj positioned a strong garrison (fortia paesidia) in the stronghold of Prague and entrusted its command to the local bishop, Hermann, who was to defend Prague in the case of a supposed attack by another Přemyslid duke.²⁵ Other, clear information concerns the figure of Bruno of Schauenburg, a thirteenth-century bishop of Olomouc. Chronicles praise him for his devotion to the ruler, and the author of an anonymous vita, probably written during the prelate’s lifetime, informs us that Bruno served the king with dedication at the Battle of Kressenbrunn (1260). He concludes by saying “reddens Deo, que Dei sunt, et que Cesaris, Cesari, a quo recepit regalia sue episcopatus.”²⁶ Even if Bruno’s involvement was a result of the consolidation of the Bohemian king’s power in the second half of the thirteenth century, this does not change the fact that some rules of episcopal military service can be found in Poland’s culturally closest neighbour, in both the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Traces of similar rules that are even more evident can also be found in other realms around the Piast monarchy, in Hungary, and in Denmark. In the former, bishops are confirmed to have participated in royal expeditions in the early twelfth century. In the following century, one can see, especially in the accounts of the Mongol invasion of 1240–1241, that the links between prelates and the local military organisation must have been close. During the invasion, bishops not only brought troops when summoned by the monarch but also carried out royal orders, manned fortresses, commanded troops, and even defended towns and participated in battles.²⁷ The situation in Denmark seems to have been similar. The episcopal military service developed there as early as in the eleventh century, reaching its climax during the pontificate of the Absalon (d. 1201), when bishops were part and parcel of the Danish military system. As Niels Lund recently demonstrated, the challenging of the royal investiture of bishops and the reception of reform ideas weakened the relations between bishops and monarchs in the thirteenth century, and, consequently, some prelates sought to reduce their military duties, even obtaining a temporary exemption from the expeditio from Christopher I in 1252. However, the strong position of Danish monarchs partially thwarted these attempts.²⁸

Denmark was not the only Scandinavian realm in which evidence of prelates’ military duties can be found. Louisa Taylor recently unearthed several facts about Norwegian bishops, including the Archbishop of Nidaros, Eysteinn, who distinguished himself in the service of King Magnus against Sverre, a pretender to the throne. According to the Sverris Saga, the archbishop took part in the military operations with the fleet and his people and followed the order to defend the territory, although he probably did not fight personally, limiting himself to mustering knights, contributing armed forces, and commanding them.²⁹ Another telling source is the Hákonar saga, where one can read that, in the mid-thirteenth century, King Haakon summoned all bishops to join him in a war against Denmark. In addition, sources mention the names of bishops who took part in monarchs’ expeditions, sometimes even with fleets, although, as in the case of Eysteinn, they do not confirm any militaristic behaviour on the bishops’ part.³⁰

The message of the cited examples seems unequivocal. Actions like bishops’ participation in royal expeditions, mustering troops, sending them on the king’s order, commanding them, and organising local defence seem to have occurred on the eastern and northern peripheries of Latin Europe. If we were to indicate differences in comparison with the key monarchies of the West, these would be found in a lesser formalisation of these rules.³¹ On the other hand, we can see that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries rulers in these regions usually had the right the enforce military support from prelates, which included providing the rulers with the prelates’ resources. This by no means applied only to kings. A bishop may also have been summoned with his milites by a less powerful duke with a loyal bishop at his disposal. An example of this can be found in a Polish source, the Annals of the Poznań Chapter. Under the year 1258, it mentions Herman von Gleichen, Bishop of Kammin, taking part cum suo exercitu in an expedition of Duke Wartislaw III of Pomerania against Duke Sviatopolk of Gdańsk. The account explicitly says that the bishop followed Wartislaw’s orders. According to the account, the duke positioned some of his forces – including the episcopi milites³² – at the rear of his army, entrusting their command to the bishop. Thus, Bishop Herman was to carry out defensive procedures, as befitted his status. However, he unexpectedly had to face the enemy, as Sviatopolk, seeking to avoid Wartislaw, attacked the posts entrusted to the prelate. Herman, seemingly, was not prepared for this, because he was easily defeated and had to flee, losing many of his men.³³

There are no accounts that would present Polish bishops active in the service of the Piasts just as vividly. Yet this example should make us aware of how thin the line was that separated passive from active involvement. It is unlikely that Wartislaw demanded anything more from Herman than the provision of men and the performance of quasi-military tasks at the rear of the army. The positioning of the prelate was no coincidence as it respected his clerical status, which did not allow him to take up arms, although this was not always avoidable.³⁴ An order going any further would have violated a generally accepted norm, which was probably best expressed by Bruno of Merseburg, rejoicing at the defeats suffered by Henry IV; whenever the emperor entrusted command in battle to his bishops, they – more familiar with religious matters than combat – would flee, like Herman, at the sight of the enemy and take their troops with them.³⁵ The correct attitude for a bishop to adopt in the royal army was one of passivity. Having delivered his contingent to the ruler, the bishop should limit himself to auxiliary functions, to providing inspiration to fight, and to prayers.³⁶ There are no reasons to expect Polish bishops to have been more active or to have been involved in battle with their troops. Of course, such behaviour did sometimes occur, but it was not common.³⁷ Does the lack of evidence of militaristic attitudes have to mean that there were no military duties imposed on Polish bishops?

Polish Bishops’ Participation in Monarchs’ Military Campaigns

According to Pauk and Wółkiewicz, the personal participation of bishops in warfare, as already confirmed by Gallus Anonymus (fl. ca. 1115) and Master Vincentius (fl. ca. 1200), can hardly be regarded as evidence of military service. That is because these accounts only confirm that the prelates provided spiritual ministry during military operations.³⁸ Such a conclusion may seem correct. The accounts concerning bishops of Płock defending Mazovia against Pomeranians and Prussians indeed highlight the significance of the prelates’ prayers.³⁹ The same applies to evidence of participation in operations to which the term expeditio can be applied.

In fact, this does not mean much, because both chroniclers preferred episcopal ideals that are consistent with canonical prescriptions and, at the same time, presented bishops’ actions following reform tendencies and the model of a bishop as the good shepherd.⁴⁰ That is why Gallus writes that the bishops participating in Bolesław III’s 1110 expedition against Bohemia behaved as befitted model pastors, celebrating masses and preaching suis parrochianis.⁴¹ What makes the account interesting is the fact that it suggests that bishops were assigned to specific units of the army called stationes, which were arranged according to the division of the domain into provinces or dioceses. As I have suggested, this may be evidence of the church’s involvement in mass levy procedures in the main sedes of the realm⁴² – that is, mostly centres that were seats of bishoprics or important collegiate churches and, at the same time, capitals of the principal territorial units.⁴³ Mustering of the royal army with the help of church structures and with the objects at the disposal of churches and the clergy, like relics or holy banners, fits in well with the reality of the early and High Middle Ages.⁴⁴

Another matter worthy of note is Gallus’ reference to the seniores advising the duke during the same expedition.⁴⁵ This is no doubt a reference to the ruler’s counsellors who made up his general staff. Presumably, the seniores also included bishops present in the army, in line with the practices known in the West and the long entrenched right of prelates to advise monarchs on military matters.⁴⁶ We find a similar value in Vincentius’ account of the Bishop of Płock, Vitus, who took part in Casimir II’s expedition against the Pollexians (ca. 1192). We learn from the account that, following an order from the duke, the bishop celebrated Holy Mass before the battle and gave Holy Communion to the knights.⁴⁷ There is no evidence that – as Stanisław Smolka once suggested – the bishop set out on the expedition with Mazovian knights.⁴⁸ However, the bishop can certainly be counted among the monarch’s supporters and thus seen as a member of the monarch’s council. We know from elsewhere that Bishop Vitus served as a mediator during the military campaigns of Casimir’s sons, which confirms his position by the monarch’s side, as well as in the army.⁴⁹

This perspective can be broadened thanks to thirteenth-century sources. Particularly worthy of note is an immunity charter issued in 1258 for the Cracow Cathedral by Bolesław the Chaste, Duke of Cracow. The information that is of key importance is the statement that the bishops, the canons, and the diocesan clergy receive an exemption to freely offer up prayers tempore hostilitatis as they had been released from the obligation of expeditio. Given the belief, firmly established in Poland, in the value of prayers offered by bishops and the clergy in the vicinity of battles,⁵⁰ presumably the duke’s consent enabled the clergy to pray for victory not in military camps or on battlefields but in their own churches.⁵¹ Yet the exemption was not only about the location of prayers, because the charter clearly states further that the bishop, the canons, and the diocesan clergy are exempted from participating in expeditions in person and from bringing military reinforcements (with the exception of homines from the castellanies of Tarczek and Kielce in case of an attack by Lithuanians).⁵² It is difficult to say unequivocally whether the whole clause is taken from some earlier immunity charter. However, the very fact that the exemption was presented in such a way in the mid-thirteenth century suggests that, in some earlier period, if not until the moment the diploma was issued, rulers had required the local bishops and even canons and lower clergy to turn up for expeditions personaliter and to bring with them homines. Although it is not clear whether churchmen taking part in expeditions were expected to provide much more than religious ministry, it seems that the exemption from personal participation testifies to the existence of some earlier, more developed rules of military service. At the same time, we would be justified in suspecting that the practice could arise only if the Cracow church was strictly subordinate to rulers, and this before the end of the twelfth century, if not much earlier. After all, the contents of the charter correspond to Gallus’ account of the presence of bishops (the entire episcopate?) in Bolesław III’s Bohemian expedition, which suggests that, at that time, the episcopate was already obliged to provide military support.

Another source in which it is possible to discern some evidence of the functioning of such rules is a charter issued at the assembly in Wierdzelew during the Piast dukes’ 1223 expedition to Prussia. Unfortunately, we learn nothing specific from it about the role of bishops, but it does confirm the involvement of what must have been a complete representation of the episcopate in military operations, a fact intriguing in itself.⁵³ It will probably not be too much of an exaggeration to say that the function of these bishops could not have been much different from that of their fellow prelates from other regions of Europe during crusades in that period.⁵⁴ Such a model of service is best evidenced by accounts concerning one of the participants in the assembly, Wrocław’s Bishop Lawrence. We know from the Bohemian annals that as early as in 1218 he set off for Prussia with Přemyslid Duke Diepold, probably as co-commander,⁵⁵ and took part in two subsequent crusades by the side of his duke, Henry the Bearded.⁵⁶ It is worth noting that the so-called Lonyz Charter (1222) describes Lawrence and his namesake from Lebus (Lubusz) as crusaders and even suggests that, together with the duke, they led their barones.⁵⁷ Given the earlier relations between both Lawrences and the duke, as well as Henry’s conservative idea of his position vis-à-vis bishops,⁵⁸ it is highly unlikely that the involvement of these two prelates in the crusades stemmed solely from pastoral needs. Presumably, the bishops co-organised these expeditions and contributed to the forces operating in Prussia. This form of participation by bishops would reflect current trends at the time that were evident during the Third Crusade, which featured many bishops from the milieu of Frederick Barbarossa or Richard the Lionheart.⁵⁹ When assessing this issue, one ought to bear in mind that this kind of involvement in crusades by bishops was also by no means unique in a region closer to Poland. It will suffice to mention Hungarian prelates taking part in Andrew II’s Levantine expedition (1207)⁶⁰ or Danish prelates in Valdemar II’s crusades to Estonia (1207, 1219).⁶¹

It could be said that Polish bishops’ personal participation in monarchs’ expeditions was not rare until the 1230s, and it probably did not stem only from the need to ensure a religious setting for these campaigns. Bolesław the Chaste’s charter explicitly states that the role of bishops was to bring homines to expeditions, while other thirteenth-century sources additionally point to an important role played by these prelates at the ruler’s side. The lack of an account confirming a prelate’s service with his own select troops does not do away with evident analogies with the Western realities, like the practice of providing military contingents and being active in the royal council. In any case, it is unlikely that such great weight should be attached to the question of a systematic approach to the military dimension of episcopal ministry. Even in the Empire, only some bishops were personally involved in monarchs’ campaigns, which does not mean that most of the others did not contribute in any way to military activities.⁶² Monarchs’ campaigns and other forms of military activity linked to the needs of the monarchy generally attracted prelates who were either strongly dependent on their ruler or shared the ruler’s policy and wanted to implement it with him. Therefore, providing the monarch with personal support should be interpreted as a manifestation of close relations between the rulers and specific prelates. On the other hand, one ought to remember that, in Poland before the fourth decade of the thirteenth century, such strong relations between rulers and bishops were natural. However, it is impossible to say whether, in this politically chaotic period of dynastic divisions and the emergence of new duchies, bishops regarded themselves as vassals of dukes. If they did, then the cultivation of vassal ties must have been more and more difficult, not only because of increasing efforts to achieve goals of liberatas ecclesiae but also because the territories of duchies overlapped less and less with those of dioceses.

The homines of the Polish Bishoprics and the Obligation of expeditio

Another issue is the composition of the contingents brought or sent following the monarch’s summons under the expeditio obligation. According to Pauk and Wółkiewicz, drawing peasants from church estates, confirmed by immunity charters, to take part in military expedition and other defence duties was entirely different from personal involvement of prelates in expeditions or from sending their own, select troops maintained by the prelates.⁶³ This assertion suggests that only the latter – not confirmed in the sources – constitutes service in the full sense of the term, as “drawing peasants” from church estates was beyond the control of bishops, that is, it occurred under the general provisions of ius ducale.

The fundamental problem hindering the analysis of the question stems from a limited source perspective in Poland, a perspective provided almost exclusively by laconic privileges exempting bishoprics from service. What makes the interpretation of these diplomas particularly difficult is their formulaic language, especially their way of describing the men providing the services as homines, without any indication as to whether we are dealing with ordinary subjects from church villages, peasants, or bishops’ clients. Although Polish bishops had servile milites,⁶⁴ a fact already demonstrated by Marian Friedberg, the dominant approach in Polish historiography for many years was to interpret – sometimes almost obsessively – the term homines as referring to the ordinary rural population.⁶⁵ This idea is still firmly entrenched even today. It is, therefore, not surprising that scholars fail to see that this way of defining men obliged to render military service on behalf of churches is not original in any way. Yet unlike Polish historians, Western scholars largely believe that the church homines serving in the army were usually in military condition. This opinion stems from a belief that, from Carolingian times, the core of royal armies was made up of vassals of magnates strengthened by select levies of men capable of obtaining the required military equipment. So, the opinion held that the contingents taking part in warfare were largely “professional.” Yet this model has been rightly challenged today. Walter Goffart and Bernard S. Bachrach have shown that there is no evidence that Carolingian armies were dominated by “professional” milites; on the contrary, masses of ordinary people were still involved.⁶⁶ A similar view is expressed by David S. Bachrach regarding the armies of German rulers. He argues that, in the late eleventh century, they operated in accordance with the traditional three-part formula: in addition to nobles and their vassals, professional milites, they were composed to a large extent of elements of the non-milites kind.⁶⁷ When trying to understand the meaning of the Polish church’s service, we should not reject any of these eventualities.

There is no doubt that the term homines (ecclesiae) was used in the West to describe not only peasants but also members of (quasi-)military ecclesiastic clienteles.⁶⁸ The latter–alternately called (homines) casati/proprii/sui/vassi or fideles/mil ites/pueri⁶⁹/servitores/vasalli – were clients usually living on an immunised church property who were obliged to provide services to their lord, including services requiring familiarity with the art of war. Such services provided by bishoprics and abbeys were very common in the West, which should be linked to the lasting usefulness of methods for forming the clientele according to the formula of service in exchange for a benefice.⁷⁰ Under such conditions, the service of bishops as royal vassals must have included supporting the ruler with the help of the bishop’s own clients, as was the case with secular magnates. In any case, bishoprics were predestined for this, as they possessed considerable land resources, enabling them to create clientele. Although, as Daniel Gerrard has rightly argued, the phenomenon was a result of various factors, including the churches’ efforts to build up their own potential, there is no denying that one important reason for this was the need to fulfil their military duties. This is already observable in the complaints of Carolingian prelates opposing the requirement to keep homines on church land for the royal army.⁷¹ Monarchs, long before the principles of service with regalia were endorsed in canon law, were convinced that land property was reason enough to expect churches to participate in military action.⁷²

It is worth considering whether the homines, mentioned in Polish sources, from church estates who were released from military service always denote only the ordinary rural population or also include episcopal vassals or miles. The first view hardly seems realistic in the light of findings by some older scholars. For example, Stanisław Arnold noted that in the first half of the thirteenth century in the castellany of Wolbórz, belonging to the bishopric of Włocławek, military duties were also discharged by “petty knights” who were vassals of the bishop.⁷³ Particularly valuable to our understanding of the matter is a ducal immunity charter received by the Bishop of Włocławek, Michael, in 1250. In the charter, Casimir of Kuyavia defines the bishopric’s military duties, noting that each bishop will be obliged to send homines liberi on a ducal expedition that is an expeditio publica, adding a proviso that the obligation does not apply to those who “in negociis vel seruicio episcopi remanserint,” but without specifying their quota.⁷⁴ The clause indicates that, in addition to “ordinary” men, the bishop also had within his castellany subjects who were in his service and handling his businesses. Such a picture suggests that this concerns individuals bound to the bishops by a formal tie on account of negotia, which corresponds to what we know about episcopal milites performing various duties both at the bishop’s court and on the bishopric’s estates.⁷⁵ Thus, the term liberi homines used in the charter does not really reflect their social or economic status, but – as the matter is understood by scholars studying the Carolingian military organisation – in the general legal sense reflects people of various categories and wealth.⁷⁶ In any case, the entire phrase seems to refer to the practice, well known from the West, of establishing the number of clients sent by churches to royal expeditions. As Niels Lund has recently observed, from as early as the Carolingian times there were regulations concerning the quotas of men sent to expeditio, including the specification of a certain number among them allowed to “stay at home” to defend strongholds, manage estates, etc.⁷⁷ According to the scholar, in the second half of the thirteenth century the matter was not strictly regulated in Denmark, which is why bishops sought to reduce the size of their contingents by means of a fait accompli, prompting the king to complain that he received less support from the church than his predecessors.⁷⁸

Similar tendencies could be found in Casimir of Kuyavia’s charter. The bishop was authorised by the duke to retain as many men as he needed, sine numeri prefinicione, which left the bishop to decide the size of the contingent. It is possible that the previous hierarchs of Włocławek may have been allowed to retain only a certain number of homines; thus, according to the principle still applicable to members of the episcopal chapter, “prepositi, decani, cantores … de hominibus liberis pro suis seruiciis quilibet sex, et simplex canonicus tres inpune retinebunt.”⁷⁹ If the relations between the duke and the bishop were amicable, this was not a great problem for the ruler. The bishop’s homines could still fulfil their public function by, for example, guarding the episcopal stronghold in Raciążek, which thus remained part of the duchy’s military infrastructure.

The situation would change when a conflict erupted between the duke and the bishop, as happened in the case of Michael’s successor, Bishop Wolimir. In view of the bishop’s disloyalty and expansion of the Raciążek fortress without the duke’s permission, the ruler seized some of the bishopric’s villages, destroyed the disputed stronghold, and ordered that the episcopal homines be resettled to ducal estates.⁸⁰ By reacting so violently, the duke did not want to allow the bishop to be the sole ruler of an object that was the property of the bishopric, but had until that moment functioned as part of the military system of the duchy.⁸¹ The same logic must have lain behind the decision to move the bishop’s people to the ducal estates, which was to prevent the bishop from becoming independent in military terms. Presumably, some of these homines were clients with benefices in the villages seized by the duke, most likely located near the Raciążek stronghold. Some must have been part of the stronghold garrison.⁸² Garrisons of episcopal strongholds were made up mainly of milites, although men with non-military professions also served in them. In case of a military threat, they, too, took up arms, which were stockpiled there for such a purpose.⁸³

Tadeusz Wasilewski noted that a few, less schematic diplomas may suggest the non-peasant nature of the obligations of churches. Particularly interesting in this respect seems to be a charter ending a dispute between Wrocław Duke Henry IV and Wrocław Bishop Thomas II. Therein, the parties agree that, in some circumstances relating to the need to defend the duchy, the bishop and his chapter will support the duke, providing him not only with funds but also with armatorum subsidium from estates and homines in a number as decided by the bishop and the chapter.⁸⁴ The phrase used clearly indicates that the bishopric was to provide the duke with armed men.⁸⁵

It is also worth paying attention to the aforementioned charter by Bolesław the Chaste for the Cracow Cathedral (1258), which features the term aliquos homines, testifying at least to the fact that not all but only part of the men living on the bishopric’s estates took part in military expeditions. Yet scholars have so far failed to notice that the same source retains the bishop’s duty to provide (mittere) men described as homines episcopi from the episcopal castellanies of Kielce and Tarczek for expeditions against the Lithuanians. The phrase used here seems to refer to episcopal clients rather than ordinary peasants, a conclusion also supported by Friedberg’s research demonstrating that the lands making up these church units were the main basis for recruiting clientele by granting benefices.⁸⁶ Such an interpretation of the phrase is also supported by a charter issued by Casimir the Great (1354), in which the king exempts the bishop and his homines from this “too onerous a duty” (nimis onerosa servitium), hitherto maintained by the will expressed in the charter by Duke Bolesław. Most importantly, the king’s charter refers to the men from the castellanies not only as the bishop’s homines but also as sui homines bellicuosi and homines pugnaturi.⁸⁷ No less interestingly, according to the charter the bishop had until that point brought these armed men to expeditions cum ceteris terrigenis, so in addition to the armed men, most likely his client milites, he had to provide several ordinary villagers living in the castellanies.

That the episcopal clientele was covered by the obligations to the monarchy is evidenced by the popularity of the model of creating milites by Polish bishoprics through the granting of benefices⁸⁸ and, it would seem, the large number – certainly not limited to members of the retinues – of episcopal milites seen in the diplomatic sources from the first decades of the thirteenth century.⁸⁹ If Polish bishops had armed clienteles – rather sizeable and created just like in the West long before the thirteenth century – it would have been strange if Piast rulers summoning church contingents under the obligation of expeditio, and sometimes demanding that bishops deliver them personally, had been satisfied with only ordinary peasants.

That is why it is even more curious that, in the case of the Cracow bishopric, the number of episcopal knights mentioned in the sources fell significantly in the second half of the thirteenth century, which Friedberg links to the takeover of their administrative functions by clergymen and to the emergence of the mayors of church villages obliged to military service.⁹⁰ Yet in the light of the these observations, it seems that the potential reasons would also have to include broad exemptions, obtained by the bishopric, from military duties, which made it unnecessary to maintain the clientele on the previous scale. Without excluding such a possibility, we should perhaps take into account several other and overlapping tendencies, including bishops’ desire to become completely free from obligations. It is widely known that churches wanted exemption from an expeditio or the conversion of this obligation into a payment in money. A late, but nevertheless clear confirmation of such a tendency in Poland comes from Janko of Czarnków’s chronicle, according to which bishops and chapters did not provide Louis the Great with homines armatos for his Lithuanian expedition because they did not have them, instead offering financial support in the form of a tax levied on peasants on pain of ecclesiastical censures.⁹¹ If by that time bishoprics had obtained full exemptions from all military duties, like the one granted by Casimir the Great to the bishop of Cracow in 1354, then we can assume that, indeed, they did not have many armed men even in the castellanies.

However, we also cannot rule out that in Poland even the dukes themselves no longer wanted the bishops to contribute to the armed forces, especially in view of the bishops’ growing independence and the emerging rivalry between themselves and the dukes. This is suggested not only by the behaviour of Duke Casimir during the conflict with Bishop Wolimir or Duke Henry IV’s actions against Bishop Thomas II⁹² but also by the emphasis on the conditional nature of the exemptions, as in the case of Conrad of Głogów’s charter (1268). In this diploma, the duke retained the obligation of exercitum with regard to the homines from the Otmuchów castellany belonging to the bishopric of Wrocław, in case of a conflict between the bishop and the duke.⁹³

Worthy of note is also the fact that the main categories of obligations seen in Piast diplomas – that is, expeditio (al. exercitum/bellum/Polish woyna) and defensio terrae – are undoubtedly equivalent to the obligations that had existed in the West since Carolingian times under analogous names: expeditio/exercitum/host/hostilitas and defensio terrae or patriae/lantweri/lantwehr.⁹⁴ While we should not rule out the participation of ordinary men in the expeditio, there is no doubt that the obligation also covered milites – naturally, if churches had them, as was the case of Polish bishoprics in the twelfth and first half of the thirteenth centuries.

The existence of such analogies should prompt us to also examine the military service of Polish bishoprics in terms of prerogatives to levy troops from church estates. In the West, the duty to recruit soldiers and send them to battle by prelates is confirmed by sources from many monarchies, although it is often hard to distinguish it from a bishop’s contribution of his milites and sometimes is mistaken for it. It seems that the practice of combining these two forms of support was by no means rare. For example, in 1138, during an invasion by the Scots, Thurstan, Archbishop of York, furnished an armed contingent made up of cathedral milites as well as men mobilised under a local levy procedure, that is, fyrd. As a sign of its ecclesiastical affiliation, the archbishop gave the contingent symbols of the cathedral, the archbishop’s cross, and the banner of St. Peter, patron of the cathedral church.⁹⁵ However, very similar procedures are already mentioned in connection with the duty of defensio terrae by late Carolingian sources, where we find information about bishops and abbots sending their homines together with men mustered under the lantweri. According to an 865 capitulary, in such situations the prelates apparently organised troops, put “ensigns” at their head, and then transferred them under the command of counts.⁹⁶ In the light of German sources, too, it seems that prelates routinely combined forces from local levies and members of armed clienteles.⁹⁷ As David S. Bachrach has demonstrated, when summoned by a monarch, German bishops brought with them or sent troops made up of both milites and people referred to as gregarii, plebei, rustici, or vulgus, mobilised in accordance with old Carolingian select levy procedures.⁹⁸

Particularly worthy of note in the Polish context are the Carolingian and Otto-nian immunities studied by Bachrach. They make it possible to look at the scope of military services from the perspective of the ability to muster men for military operations. The charters leave no doubt that the task of prelates was to provide the monarch with a mixed force of both clients and recruits from levies, men of various social categories. The system had been in operation since the Carolingian period and was based on an immunity forbidding counts to recruit men from church lands to their own troops. As Bachrach stresses, these immunities did not abolish military obligations; instead, their purpose was to facilitate mobilisation through a division of competences between prelates and counts. The only change occurring as a result of the granting of immunity was the imposition on the church of a duty to muster levies from the lands included in its domain and to send or bring the recruited contingent. From the point of view of the monarchy, such a division made mobilisation more efficient, though the churches benefitted from it as well, for they retained control over their resources. Sometimes churches would even obtain the right to collect the heribannum from those who avoided service.⁹⁹

The obligations of Polish bishoprics before the era of exemptions from the expeditio seem to have their roots in the same tradition. This is indicated primarily by the fact that the charters make no mention of royal officials being responsible for providing men from episcopal estates. Waived or retained obligations are addressed to bishops and cathedral chapters, which suggests that levying by rulers did not (at least not always) take place without the active involvement of churches. In this context, of particular significance is the reconstruction of the early organisation of the castellanies (castelaniae, castellaturae) belonging to Polish bishoprics providing for partial exemption of these districts from ducal authority as a result of immunity. As in the case of immunised church estates in the Empire, immunity given to castellanies did not mean exemption from military service; its effect was a transfer to the bishop of public powers with regard to people under his jurisdiction.¹⁰⁰ This meant that, in the castellanies, public military duties were to be fulfilled by the bishop himself and his apparatus.¹⁰¹ This is confirmed by Bolesław the Chaste’s and Casimir the Great’s charters for the Cracow cathedral. It is worth stressing that, according to the latter diploma – which describes an old practice – up until that moment the bishop had contributed not only homines pugnaturi but also ceteri terrigieni from the Kielce and Tarczek castellanies. The latter must have been levied from the rural population and thus corresponded to the gregarii, plebei, rustici, or vulgus from the Carolingian and Ottonian diplomas. It is not surprising that in the diploma issued by Duke Sambor II of Gdańsk for the Bishop of Włocławek the duke, retaining the defensio terrae obligation regarding people from the Goręczyn castellany, confirmed the bishop’s right to collect fines for failure to appear following military summons, which is an analogy to the right to collect the heribannum by Carolingian and Otto-nian prelates as well as evidence that bishops mustered levies.¹⁰²

All of this points to parallels between Polish military services furnished by the church and Western models, suggesting reception. A lack of sources makes it impossible to reconstruct the process, but there is no doubt that it must have progressed with the expansion of the endowment of bishoprics. The initiating role in the process perhaps should be attributed to royal donations increasing from the mid-eleventh century, especially generous gifts in the form of strongholds together with land, people, and secular jurisdiction, which has been suggested by Sławomir Gawlas as a manifestation of the adaptation of German models and action aimed at securing the church’s support by integrating the organisation of the church with that of the state.¹⁰³

What must remain an open question is how formalised the solutions implemented in Poland were. A lack of any trace in the charters of precise definitions of the scope of the service, especially including the size and composition of episcopal contingents,¹⁰⁴ suggests that the solutions were not as systematic as they were in the Empire and other Western monarchies. In this respect, the situation emerging from the Polish sources resembles the situation in Denmark, where it was only in the second half of the thirteenth century, under the impact of the local episcopate’s emancipation efforts, that attempts were made to specify the scope of episcopal obligations.¹⁰⁵ This does not have to mean that the forces mustered by Polish bishoprics under the expeditio were always very modest. An indication in this respect comes from Master Vincentius reporting about 300 loricati commanded by the Bishop of Płock, Alexander.¹⁰⁶ It is certainly not a credible number in the factual sense, but it is significant that at the turn of the thirteenth century, it was believed that a bishop could command such forces. In particular, we should take into consideration the fact that Archbishops of Gniezno may have already had considerable resources at their disposal in the twelfth century. A source from the 1210s mentions the archbishop travelling around the country with a large retinue and 110 horses.¹⁰⁷ There are many suggestions that the Gneznensis acies patrono Poloniae dedicata taking part in Bolesław III’s Bohemian campaign and mentioned by Gallus Anonymus was a unit made up of subjects of the archbishopric; significantly, it was one of the stronger units in the army.¹⁰⁸ However, given that it may have been composed of both milites and levied men, its strength comes as no surprise. As early as the first decades of the twelfth century, the archbishopric had at its disposal a huge and varied endowment, including immunised, landed estates with strongholds, people, and secular jurisdiction as well as servile milites, a fact confirmed by the Gniezno Bull (1136).¹⁰⁹ Thus, Gallus’ account contains not only an argument supporting the thesis that the Gniezno church provided troops under expeditio but also information about the deployment of such troops as a military formation retaining its ecclesiastical identity thanks to the St. Vojtěch-Adalbert attribution. The information may even be considered that the acies Gnesnensis, like the Archbishop of York’s contingent of clients and levied men or similar troops, had on its banner an image of the cathedral’s patron as a sign of belonging to the church. Significantly, in a neigh-bouring country we also read about a standard accompanying ecclesiastical troops during an expeditio, a contingent made up of inhabitantes of the bishopric’s lands, that is, both episcopal clients (fasalli, feodales) and “other” or ordinary homines.¹¹⁰

Bishops and the Obligation of defensio terrae

In the literature, the subject of episcopal military service is too often limited to the issue of the participation of bishops in monarchs’ hostile expeditions. Such a perspective is also present in Pauk and Wółkiewicz’ study, which leaves aside the matter of the defensive role of Polish bishops. Yet the matter deserves closer scrutiny, especially as there is relatively substantial source material on the topic.

Firstly, an important note: in the light of recent research, the local defence obligation no longer appears as a relic of the “primary” or “ancient” military organisation, nor is it equated as much with “mass levies of peasants.” What is acknowledged, on the other hand, are its institutional roots as a public obligation. The matter may not be completely resolved yet, but Goffart’s studies of Carolingian defensio patriae or lantveri show that it was a public obligation just as expeditio, the difference being that its formula was simplified. While an expeditio was carefully prepared, with vassals and their men being summoned and levies being organised, in the case of defensio patriae such rules did not apply. The subjects were expected to abandon whatever they were doing and set off with others to drive back the enemy. According to Goffart, the obligation covered not the entire populace but the army, men obliged to perform military service.¹¹¹

There is no doubt that the defensio terrae (or lantwere in Pomerania¹¹²) even in the thirteenth century, usually retained by the Piasts with regard to the church’s men,¹¹³ was an obligation at least partially modelled on the defensio patriae. As in the case of Carolingian sources, the information we find in Polish material that church subjects should defend the land omnes and cum aliis does not have to denote the mobilisation of all men from church villages, but rather, in line with Goffart’s findings, a military campaign without formal mobilisation.¹¹⁴

If we look at the problem of the defence duties of bishops and bishoprics, we will easily see that they were quite considerable in many monarchies across Europe. Whether they always stemmed from the Frankish defensio patriae or some more general concept of bishops’ obligations, including ideas sanctioning the defence of the patria rather than offensive actions, is a matter requiring further discussion. Sources suggest at least a broader and a narrower meaning of the obligation. In the narrower sense, the defensio terrae obligation referred to the defence of one’s domain. As Bachrach has demonstrated, in the Carolingian and Ottonian monarchies, magnates received immunities from rulers according to which they were able to organise the defence of their estates. In fact, these privileges created territories with a special status. It was the same, it would seem, in the case of Polish church castellanies. In all castellanies, homines were obliged to perform defensive duties, although this was not only about defending the territory of the castellany.¹¹⁵ However, in Poland the local dimension of the defensio terrae (suae) is traceable in the sources as well.¹¹⁶

Yet thirteenth-century charters refer to the defensio terrae obligation in the form of the duty to defend not only terra sua but also entire regions of the country. This is by no means unusual.¹¹⁷ As Verbruggen indicated, an identical obligation functioned in Flanders as landweer (terrae defensio or custodia patriae) and meant that ducal subjects “were liable to be mustered, for other exemptions for military service did not apply to the landweer.”¹¹⁸ As in the West, in Poland, too, this obligation applied not only to peasants, as Polish historians often argue,¹¹⁹ but also to omnes, including knights, and in the case of homines episcopales episcopal clients as well. This suggests that bishops actively participated in such obligations; however, only the privileges analysed for the Cracow cathedral (1258, 1354) explicitly state that, in case of an external attack, the bishop was to bring or send his homines to the battlefield.

Despite its defensive nature, the obligation also encompassed retaliatory expeditions, which is why in practice it may not have been significantly different from expeditio. However, it is worth stressing that in Poland there may have been a desire to deploy episcopal men against a threat from a specific direction. According to Bolesław the Chaste’s charter, men from the castellanies of Tarczek and Kielce were to be mustered for defensive expeditions against Lithuanians, while according to Casimir the Great’s diploma, in practice the bishop’s men were called up in case of an attack by Tartars, schismatic Ruthenians, or Lithuanians. These castellanies, probably from their very beginning, had the special duty of defence against attacks from the north and the east. Another interesting aspect is that, according to Casimir’s diploma, episcopal men were obliged to take part in defensive wars, if an enemy attacked the Sandomierz land where the castellany was located. This testifies to some correlation between the obligations of men from these church lands and the military organisation of the realm. Initially, it may have applied to the defence of the Province of Sandomierz.

Something similar seems to be suggested by references to the duke mustering men from the Otmuchów castellany of the bishopric of Wrocław for expeditions against the Bohemians. Some interesting information can also be found in Bolesław the Chaste’s diploma for the villages of the Płock bishopric located in the Duchy of Cracow (1258). The conclusion that can be drawn is that men from these settlements did not have to take part in the expeditio, apart from cases when the duke himself or the governor of Sandomierz set off in person to repulse the pagans’ attack.¹²⁰ Similar logic may be discerned in the duke’s diploma for the Cracow cathedral, although there is no information about the bishop having to bring his own men. It is hardly surprising in this case, as the Bishop of Płock had only some estates in Bolesław’s duchy and his seat was in another duchy. However, the duty of episcopal men to take part in a defensive expedition whenever the duke himself or the governor participated in it seems to be a relic of older customs, perhaps predating the break-up of the monarchy in the early thirteenth century. Similar content can be found in Conrad of Mazovia’s diploma (1230) in which the obligation of the Bishop of Płock’s men to participate in the defensio terrae and expeditions against Prussians was maintained, provided that the campaign in question were to be an expeditio publica, that is, if the duke himself led it.¹²¹ So, it would be justified to ask whether bishops originally were also to set off on such “official” expeditions to serve the duke or to accompany his highest secular official. An answer seems to be provided by the immunity granted to the Cracow cathedral, which exempted the bishop and the clergy from personal participation in an expeditio publica. One can also refer, in this case, to the information about the presence of the Bishop of Płock, Vitus, in Casimir II’s campaign against the Pollexians. In addition, we know of the presence of this bishop and his Cracow colleague, Pełka, in a defensive expedition made by Casimir’s sons the Dukes of Mazovia and Cracow, Conrad and Leszek, against Prince Roman of Halych (1205).¹²² As Jacek Maciejewski notes, the presence of the bishops may have been linked in this case to the custom of entrusting bishops with the role of mediator, for the source informs of their mediation.¹²³ It is possible, however, that the account confirms the bishops’ duty to become involved in expeditions in which the ruler participated, especially given that we are dealing here with a defensive expedition. It is unlikely that the custom of entrusting bishops with mediatory missions was the main reason for their presence in the army. During monarchs’ military operations, such missions were usually entrusted to bishops with close ties to the ruler and, at the same time, fulfilling military service.¹²⁴

Irrespective of the interpretation of specific matters, the information cited here must be considered as the trace of a policy of using the forces of bishoprics to protect the realm against external threats.¹²⁵ It would be appropriate to establish how old customs stand behind this. In this matter, too, it is hard to find clear statements, though it is worth pointing out that church castellanies, which were the basis of the military power of bishoprics, came from royal donations made in the first decades of the twelfth century at the latest, that is, in the period of united monarchy.¹²⁶ At the same time these were usually districts situated in the peripheral regions of the realm or even in its frontier regions.¹²⁷ Examples include the Otmuchów castellany of the Wrocław bishopric, bordering Bohemia, as well as four castellanies of the bishopric of Płock situated almost along the Polish-Prussian border. Particularly in the case of the last bishopric, the location of such castellanies could not have been accidental and testifies to a desire to involve the cathedral in the defence of Mazovia against attacks by pagans from the north.¹²⁸ The problem needs broader contextualisation, but it can already be argued that there is an analogy here with “frontline” dioceses, such as the eastern or Lotharingian bishoprics of the Empire, whose pastors were known for their efforts to defend not only the capitals and lands of their dioceses but also entire regions, often in cooperation with the state apparatus.¹²⁹

Yet the similarities are not limited to the territory of the Reich. Analogies are also provided by studies of the military role of English bishoprics bordering Wales and Scotland. As Gerrard has demonstrated, from the tenth century onwards some of these dioceses would receive royal powers, with estates located in peripheral regions. The donations were linked to the expectation that bishops and their men would take part in the fight against external attacks.¹³⁰ In the context of the charters of Dukes Bolesław and Conrad for the Bishop of Płock, particularly interesting is the well-known mention of Bishop Leofgar of Hereford, who, according to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, paid for his involvement in the defence of the border with his and his priests’ lives (1056).¹³¹ What is striking is the information that the bishop was killed during a retaliatory expedition organised together with the local sheriff. The link between the bishopric and the office of sheriff is also confirmed by the Domesday Book, according to which the people of Hereford were obliged to take part in warfare against Wales, if the sheriff personally took part in it,¹³² as in the case of the Bishop of Płock’s men who were expected to take part in the campaigns against pagans in the case of personal involvement by the duke or the local governor. Such parallels likely stem from similar formal solutions.

Does this mean that in Poland’s case we should expect solutions providing for a correlation between the obligations of bishoprics and the public authorities in the defence of the monarchy? This cannot be ruled out, although Gerrard’s studies pointed out the need for cautious generalisations. On the other hand, there were factors in Poland, especially up until the early thirteenth century, that may have been conducive to such a correlation and, at the same time, the militarisation of bishoprics: uniform public authority with a strong influence on bishops, correlation between the territories of dioceses and those of administrative units, the front-line nature of virtually all Polish dioceses, and the proximity of pagans in the north.

Of some value for such an analysis is also the oldest historiography, despite the fact that it highlights the religious function of prelates in defensive wars.¹³³ For example, Gallus Anonymus clearly stresses the collaboration between Simon, Bishop of Płock, and Magnus, the ducal governor of Mazovia. True, Gallus emphasises the fact that Simon took part in the operations aimed at repelling the attacking Pomeranians in order to offer prayers, but the chronicler also suggests that his role in the expedition complemented that of Magnus. One could ask whether the presence of the bishop in the operation was not determined by the fact that this was a defensio terrae campaign in which the governor participated in person. In addition, it is worth paying attention to one detail. According to Gallus, the bishop took part in the expedition cum clericis suis. Bishop Leofgar, too, who accompanied the Hereford sheriff in his campaign against Wales, was apparently accompanied by his clerici, who were killed with him. Also, in his privilege for the Cracow Cathedral, Bolesław the Chaste exempted not only the bishop but also cathedral canons and totumque clerum from the expeditio and defensio terrae duties. Interestingly, the Flemish diplomas analysed by Verbruggen feature an explicitly formulated demand that papen end clerken take part in the landweer as well.¹³⁴

The connections developed between the church and the duty to defend the monarchy’s lands are also evidenced by the impressive literary portrait of Simon’s successor, Bishop Alexander of Malonne. Although the portrayal is highly stylised, the figure emerging from it is one actively fighting the Prussian threat, resorting not only, like Simon, to the power of his prayers but also to armed forces. More importantly, however, in Vincentius’ chronicle the bishop is presented as the only force capable of defending the Mazovian province against pagan attacks. What were the reasons for such a major change? According to Czesław Deptuła, it may have been prompted by a transformation of the Bishop of Płock’s position into that of the main representative of the prince in Mazovia.¹³⁵ This cannot be ruled out in view of the fact that bishops ruling frontline dioceses were sometimes entrusted with delegated royal military powers for the purposes of regional defence.¹³⁶ Nor are there reasons to question the account with regard to Alexander’s merits or his methods because of the chronicler’s truly convoluted attempts to reconcile the facts known to him with legal requirements. In addition, another source, to which scholars have only recently turned their attention, indicates that personal dedication in the fight against the Prussians was shown by at least one of Alexander’s successors, Gunter (d. 1232).¹³⁷ It cannot be a coincidence, however, that there are only sources regarding Płock that indicate the presence of militaristic traits in the local bishops. The militarisation of the Mazovian prelates must have been determined by local conditions, primarily by the constant threat of external attacks in Mazovia. Yet this does not mean that some obligations aimed at the defence of the monarchy were not fulfilled by other bishops. But if they were, they must have been limited mainly to the defensio terrae obligation. At a certain point later, even this obligation was regarded as an onerosa servitium and was reluctantly fulfilled by bishops.

Conclusion

The available sources provide us with a highly fragmentary insight into the practice of military service performed by Polish bishops. No narrative sources have survived to this day to provide us with descriptions of how prelates performed their roles during royal expeditions in a manner free from the restricting corset of legal and religious ideals. In addition, there is a lack of monarchs’ decrees ordering prelates to deliver specific quotas of milites for expeditions, charters like Otto II’s famous Indiculus loricatorum. However, the present discussion shows that the source basis for the subject matter is not completely worthless. The available sources confirm a gradual loosening of the links between the Polish church and the monarchs’ military activities. This very fact strongly supports the view that, before the thirteenth century, with its collapse of the state church system and the break-up of the monarchy, these links may have been close and the obligations of bishoprics in some measure regulated and correlated with the needs of the monarchy and its military organisation.

Obviously, the modest source evidence means that it is only hypothetically possible to formulate conclusions concerning some aspects of the problem, but we also need to remember that the sources reveal only a minute fragment of a much wider reality. Consequently, we cannot rule out the existence in Poland of solutions going far beyond the occasional deployment of bishops and their men on military campaigns. This is because the responsibilities of bishoprics were part of a wider context of military service customs and the system of military obligations received from the West and based on Carolingian models. Therefore, the basic requirement imposed on bishops was to bolster the troops operating as part of the expeditio and defensio terrae. It is highly unlikely that the bishops did so by merely sending peasants to take part in warfare if, in the period of broad exemptions from military duties and reductions in the numbers of church milites, diplomas still refer to homines armati, bellicuosi, or pugnaturi expected to take part in some, albeit limited, defensive operations. However, these were merely relics of a more developed practice that originally must have encompassed the duty of the personal delivery of armed men by prelates, especially for public expeditions, that is, those in which the monarch himself or his governor participated. The presence of bishops during such expeditions may have been part of a permanent custom, additionally strengthened by the duty to advise the monarch, to be involved in the diplomatic service, and to provide pastoral care. The fact that narrative sources focus exclusively on that last aspect does not in any way undermine the possibility of bishops performing other tasks, including those of a quasi-military nature, for the monarch.

On the other hand, it is impossible to say whether Polish bishops were personally involved in warfare as bellatores. In order to confirm this, we would need to establish whether the milites brought by bishops to expeditions remained under the command of their lords while on the battlefield,¹³⁸ or whether they were incorporated into the army under secular command. Gallus’ information about the acies Gnesnensis and the assignment of bishops to the stationes in the army may be a suggestion that the former was indeed the case. However, given the laconic nature of the accounts, this is very weak evidence. The assignment may have stemmed from the bishops’ involvement in the mobilisation of troops and identification with the mustered men coming from the provinces linked to their dioceses, particularly given that these troops must have included men mobilised by the bishops from the lands of their cathedrals as part of levies. This last aspect, especially regarding homines from castellanies, should also be treated in terms of the episcopate’s military service in the full sense of the word. So, it should not be juxtaposed with bringing or sending their own clients for the purposes of warfare. As early as in the twelfth century, Polish bishoprics had substantial landed estates and so ecclesiastical contingents may have been quite large, although given that there were few dioceses – only five in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries – they certainly could not have constituted the main part of the troops commanded by Piast rulers. However, we need to bear in mind that men were sent to take part in ducal wars by other churches as well¹³⁹ – first of all, those with rich endowments and closely linked to the princes’ collegiate churches, together with cathedrals making up the core of the state church of the Piasts,¹⁴⁰ as well as monasteries.

A comparative analysis of the Polish reality reveals more parallels and similarities with the Western reality than differences, especially if we do not take as our point of reference the Empire with its extensive deployment of bishops in its war machine. Sources indicate that, in the twelfth century and even in the first decades of the thirteenth century, Polish bishops provided military support for the monarchy in a manner corresponding to the general principles of the public service of prelates in Western monarchies, as well as those in closer proximity, like Denmark, Bohemia, and Hungary. However, it is difficult to say how the Polish reality was influenced by the concept of the service with regalia and the idea of the separation of the spiritualia from the temporalia – but if there was an influence, it was probably limited, because by the time these ideas spread in this part of Europe, the practice of military service had begun to die out in Poland. Yet we cannot rule out that representatives of the last generation of bishops active in royal service in the first half of the thirteenth century regarded themselves as Piast vassals obliged to do military service on account of holding estates treated as regalia. However, until that moment in Poland – unlike in the Empire after the crisis associated with the challenge to the royal investiture of bishops – the provision of military support by prelates had had a strong religious basis. In Poland, too, its disappearance – though much later – went hand in hand with the withdrawal of bishops from ruler’s service and an increasing focus on ecclesiastical functions.¹⁴¹

Acknowledgments

This chapter was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland, project no. 2014/15/B/HS3-02284.

Notes

· 1 For an overview of factors that shaped the military activity of medieval Polish bishops, see Radosław Kotecki and Jacek Maciejewski, “Ideals of Episcopal Power, Legal Norms and Military Activity of the Polish Episcopate Between the Twelfth and Fourteenth Centuries,” Kwartalnik Historyczny 127, Eng.-Lang. Ed. 4 (2020): 5–46.

· 2 Jacek Maciejewski, “Biskupi polscy na wojnach monarchów w XIII–XIV wieku,” Res Historica 51 (2021): 63–101 at 93. See also Kotecki and Maciejewski, “Ideals of Episcopal Power,” 35.

· 3 For the ius ducale from the perspective of deconstructive research, see Marcin R. Pauk, “Lords and Peasants: Polish Society and Economy in Transition,” in Writing History in Medieval Poland: Bishop Vincentius of Cracow and the “Chronica Polonorum,” ed. Darius von Güttner-Sporzyński, Cursor mundi 28 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 243–66.

· 4 Józef Matuszewski, Immunitet ekonomiczny w dobrach Kościoła w Polsce do r. 1381, Prace Komisji Historycznej 10 (Poznań: Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, 1936), 16–35; Tadeusz Wasilewski, “O służbie wojskowej ludności wiejskiej i składzie społecznym wojsk konnych i pieszych we wczesnym średniowieczu polskim,” Przegląd Historyczny 51, no. 1 (1960): 1–23; Stanisław Zajączkowski, “Udział ludności wiejskiej w polskiej wojskowości do polowy XV stulecia,” Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości 27 (1984): 2–80. Among newer works, see Michał Bogacki, Przemiany w wojskowości polskiej od połowy X wieku do 1138 roku (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2007).

· 5 Marcin R. Pauk and Ewa Wółkiewicz, “‘Ministri enim altaris ministri curie facti sunt’. Ottońsko-salicki ‘system’ Kościoła Rzeszy i jego oddziaływanie w Europie Środkowej XI–XII wieku,” in Kościół w monarchiach Przemyślidów i Piastów, ed. Józef Dobosz (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2009), 105–38.

· 6 Ibid., 116–19.

· 7 Especially taken together with newer research by Marcin Pauk on the early Polish church under a monarch’s power: Marcin R. Pauk, “‘Capella regia’ i struktury Kościoła monarszego w Europie Środkowej X–XII wieku. Ottońsko-salickie wzorce ustrojowe na wschodnich rubieżach łacińskiego chrześcijaństwa,” in Granica wschodnia cywilizacji zachodniej w średniowieczu, ed. Zbigniew Dalewski (Warszawa: IH PAN, 2014), 211–77; Marcin R. Pauk, “‘Quicquid pertinebat ad imperium’. Kościół w Polsce a Rzesza do połowy XII wieku,” in Chrzest Mieszka I i chrystianizacja państwa Piastów, eds. Józef Dobosz et al. (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza, 2017), 249–80.

· 8 For such a minimalist view, see Dariusz A. Sikorski, “Die Rolle der Geistlichen ausländischer Herkunft in der polnischen Kirche des 10.–12. Jahrhunderts,” in Fernhändler, Dynasten, Kleriker. Die piastische Herrschaft in kontinentalen Beziehungsgeflechten vom 10. bis zum frühen 13. Jahrhundert, eds. Dariusz Adamczyk and Norbert Kersken, Deutsches Historisches Institut Warschau 30 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2015), 241–62 at 249.

· 9 Pauk and Wółkiewicz, “‘Ministri’,” 116.

· 10 Ibid., 118.

· 11 For the service with regalia, see Robert L. Benson, Bishop-Elect: A Study in Medieval Ecclesiastical Office (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 207, 308, 311–13, 317–24; Melodie H. Eichbauer, “The Bishop with Two Hats: Reconciling Episcopal and Military Obligations in Causa 23 of Gratian’s ‘Decretum’,” in Civilians and Warfare in World History, eds. Nicola Foote and Nadya Williams (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 120–40.

· 12 Radosław Kotecki, “Bishops and the Legitimisation of War in Piast Poland until the Early Thirteenth Century,” Przegląd Historyczny 111, no. 3 (2020): 437–70.

· 13 Craig M. Nakashian, Warrior Churchmen of Medieval England, 1000–1250: Theory and Reality (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016), 4, 8, 22–23, 107, 113. Also, Spanish scholars emphasise that the military service of the clergy was conditioned in terms of not only feudal auxilium but also at least politically and religiously. See Carlos de Ayala, “Obispos, guerra santa y cruzada en los reinos de León y Castilla (s. XII),” in Cristianos y musulmanes en la Península Ibérica. La guerra, la frontera y la convivencia, eds. Juan de La Peña and Miguel A. Ladero Quesada (Ávila: Fundación Sánchez-Albornoz, 2009), 219–56.

· 14 Daniel Gerrard, “Why Study Fighting Clergy? Knight Service, Integrated War, and the Bounds of English Military History, c. 1000–1200,” in Between Sword and Prayer: Warfare and Medieval Clergy in Cultural Perspective, eds. Radosław Kotecki, Jacek Maciejewski, and John S. Ott, Explorations in medieval culture 3 (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 117–58 at 117–19, 149–50; Daniel Gerrard, The Church at War: The Military Activities of Bishops, Abbots, and Other Clergy in England, c. 900–1200 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).

· 15 For Georgia, see Mamuka Tsurtsumia, “The Church of Georgia in War,” Historia i Świat no. 8 (2019): 115–32. For Wales, see Sean Davies, War and Society in Medieval Wales 633–1283 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2014), 79–81. Davies revealed the efforts of the Welsh prelates to abolish the military obligations. Along with the reform influence, it was possible to reduce them, including the requirement of personal service by the clergy, but church properties were still utilised by rulers, and men from church properties were an important military resource.

· 16 Especially Stefanie Schild, “Bishops in the Service of the Staufens and the Plantagenets,” in Staufen and Plantagenets: Two Empires in Comparison, eds. Alheydis Plassmann and Dominik Büschken, Studien zu Macht und Herrschaft 1 (Göttingen: V&R, 2018), 121–50 at 139–43. For Spain, see Richard A. Fletcher, “Regalian Right in Twelfth-Century Spain: The Case of Archbishop Martín of Santiago de Compostela,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 28, no. 4 (1977): 337–60 at 359; Kyle C. Lincoln, “Beating Swords into Croziers: Warrior Bishops in the Kingdom of Castile, c. 1158–1214,” Journal of Medieval History 44, no. 1 (2017): 1–21 at 7–8; Kyle C. Lincoln, “‘Mihi pro fidelitate militabat’. Cruzada, guerra santa y guerra justa contra cristianos durante el reino de Alfonso VIII de Castilla según las fuentes episcopales,” in Hombres de religión y guerra. Cruzada y guerra santa en la Edad Media peninsular, eds. Carlos de Ayala and José Santiago Palacios Ontalva (Madrid: Sílex, 2018), 13–33; Kyle C. Lincoln, “‘In exercitu loco eius pontificalia exercet’: Warrior Clerics in the Era of Fernando III,” in The Sword and the Cross: Castile-León in the Era of Fernando III, eds. Edward L. Holt and Teresa Witcombe, The medieval and early modern Iberian world 77 (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 85–104.

· 17 For comparison, see Hartmut Hoffmann, “Der König und seine Bischöfe in Frankreich und im Deutschen Reich 936–1060,” in Bischof Burchard von Worms, 1000–1025, eds. Wilfried Hartmann, Quellen und Abhandlungen zur mittelrheinischen Kirchengeschichte 100 (Mainz: Gesellschaft für mittelrheinische Kirchengeschichte, 2000), 79–127 at 109–24.

· 18 John W. Baldwin, The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French Royal Power in the Middle Ages (Oakland: University of California Press, 1986), 281–86; Fabien Rou-cole, “Quand porter les armes pouvait favoriser une carrière ecclésiastique. Les clercs de cour et le service armé au XIV^e siècle,” Francia 47 (2020): 59–76; Fabien Roucole, Prélats et hommes de guerre dans la France du XV^e siècle (Aix-en-Provence: Presses Universitaires de Provence, 2020), 11–50, 125–66.

· 19 See endnote 12.

· 20 In practice, even the requirement to obtain a papal licence for military service with regalia was abandoned. See Benson, Bishop-Elect, 318–19, 324; Frederick K. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 109–11; Kurt V. Jensen, “Bishops on Crusade,” in “Dominus Episcopus”: Medieval Bishops Between Diocese and Court, eds. Anthony J. Lappin and Elena Belzamo (Stockholm: Kungliga Vitterhetsakademien, 2018), 83–99 at 85.

· 21 Annales Bohemorum Vincentii Pragensis, ed. Josef Emler, Fontes rerum Bohemicarum 2 (Praha: Muzeum Království českého, 1875), 407–60 at 429.

· 22 See Kazimierz Skalski, “Drużyna przyboczna władców zachodniosłowiańskich,” in Z dziejów średniowiecznej Europy środkowowschodniej, ed. Jan Tyszkiewicz, Fasciculi historici novi 2 (Warszawa: DiG, 1998), 17–34 at 32.

· 23 Annales Bohemorum Vincentii Pragensis, 433. See also Zdeňka Hledíková, “Biskupské a arcibiskupské centrum ve středověké Praze,” Pražský sborník historický 27 (1994): 5–25 at 7; Dalibor Janiš, “Ke skladbě dvora olomouckých biskupů ve 13. století,” in Dvory a rezidence ve středověku, ed. Dana Dvořáčková-Malá, Mediaevalia historica Bohemica. Suppl. 2 (Praha: Historický ústav AV ČR, 2008), 347–62; Dalibor Janiš, “‘Milites ac famuli episcopi olomucensis’: Feudal System of the Bishopric of Olomouc and Military-Service Relations in the Medieval Czech Lands in the 13th Century,” in “Ecclesia et bellum.” Kościół wobec wojny i zaangażowania militarnego duchowieństwa w wiekach średnich, eds. Radosław Kotecki and Jacek Maciejewski (Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego, 2016), 256–71 at 257–58, for more on the milites of the Bohemian bishops by 1230.

· 24 Daniel took part in the Italian campaigns twice, in 1158 and 1167. He was close to military affairs, but sources are silent about his military involvement. On Daniel’s role in the 1158 campaign, see Joanna A. Sobiesiak, Od Lechowego Pola (955) do Mediolanu (1158). W służbie monarchów Rzeszy relacje czeskich źródeł narracyjnych o wyprawach Przemyślidów (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2011), 75–77, 79–83, 92–96, 99, 102, 104, 106, 109–10, 114–15, 117, 122. On prelates in Barbarossa’s service, see Jan-Peter Stöckel, “Reichsbischöfe und Reichsheerfahrt unter Friedrich I. Barbarossa,” in Kaiser Friedrich Barbarossa. Landesausbau, Aspekte seiner Politik, Wirkung, eds. Evamaria Engel and Bernhard Töpfer, Forschungen zur mittelalterlichen Geschichte 36 (Weimar: Böhlau, 1994), 63–80; Gregory J. Liebau, “Barbarossa and His Bishops: War and Politics during the Italian Campaigns,” Medieval Warfare 3, no. 2 (2013): 14–19.

· 25 The duke himself went to Vyšehrad to defend this second fortress of the Prague agglomeration. Cosmae Pragensis Cronica Boemorvm, lib. III, c. 17, ed. Berthold Bretholz, MGH Sr Germ in usum schol., n.s. 2 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1923): 180.

· 26 Cited after Jana Nechutová, “Vitae Brunonis,” Časopis Moravského muzea. Vědy společenské 71 (1986): 175–82 at 176. Because of old age, the bishop did not take part in the Battle of Dürnkrut (1278), but his knights fought there. For more on Bruno’s service to Přemysl Otakar II, see Libor Jan, “Věrně po boku svého krále. Bruno ze Schaumburku,” in Osobnosti moravských dějin, ed. Libor Jan (Brno: Matice moravská, 2006), 63–76.

· 27 Though it is impossible to say whether they fought personally. On bishops defending Hungary in 1240–1241, see Gábor Barabás, “Thirteenth-Century Hungarian Prelates at War,” in Christianity and War in Medieval East Central Europe and Scandinavia, eds. Radosław Kotecki, Carsten S. Jensen, and Stephen Bennett (Leeds: ARC Humanities Press, 2021), 39–56 at 43–47.

· 28 Niels Lund, “The Military Obligations of the Danish Church in the High Middle Ages,” in The Medieval Way of War: Studies in Medieval Military History in Honor of Bernard S. Bachrach, ed. Gregory I. Halfond (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 295–307.

· 29 Louisa Taylor, “Bishops, War, and Canon Law: The Military Activities of Prelates in High Medieval Norway,” Scandinavian Journal of History 7, no. 2 (2019): 1–23 at 3–5, 8, 16. The Sverris Saga also mentions how Eirik, the Bishop of Stavanger, assisted Magnus by contributing troops and advising him on military strategy (ibid., 4).

· 30 Ibid., 14.

· 31 Compare with Lund, “Military Obligations,” 302; Maciejewski, “Biskupi,” 70.

· 32 The composition and size of episcopal exercitus in 1258 is somewhat of a mystery, for Herman began building up his clientele in 1254, and by the mid-1260s he had very few knights. Could it be that the milites came mainly from the select levy? On Herman’s clientele, see Dariusz Wybranowski, “Początki świeckiego kręgu wasali biskupa Hermana von Gleichena (1251–1288/89) na tle jego działalności politycznej i kolonizacyjnej,” Gdańskie Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza 9 (2003): 321–59; Krzysztof Guzikowski, Obce rycerstwo na Pomorzu Zachodnim do początku XIV wieku (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2015), 89–96.

· 33 Rocznik kapituły poznańskiej, c. 91, in Roczniki wielkopolskie, ed. Brygida Kürbis, MPH n.s. 6 (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1962): 21–78 at 45. Kronika wielkopolska, c. 125, ed. Brygida Kürbis, MPH n.s. 8 (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1970): 111–12, adds that Świętopełk “episcopum cum suo exercitu devictum fugavit plurimos militum et servientes armorum occidit et quosdam captivavit.”

· 34 Compare with Carsten S. Jensen, “Clerics and War in Denmark and the Baltic: Ideals and Realities Around 1200,” in Fighting for the Faith: The Many Crusades, eds. Carsten S. Jensen, Janus M. Jensen, and Kurt V. Jensen, Scripta minora 27 (Stockholm: Runica et mediævalia, 2018): 187–217 at 195.

· 35 Brunos Buch vom Sachsenkrieg, ed. Hans-Eberhard Lohmann, MGH Deutches Mittelalter 2 (Leipzig, Hiersemann, 1937): 89; David S. Bachrach and Bernard S. Bachrach, “Bruno of Merseburg’s ‘Saxon War’: A Study in Eleventh-Century German Military History,” Journal of Military History 81, no. 2 (2017): 341–67 at 351.

· 36 Taylor, “Bishops,” 17. See also the accusations made against the Hungarian bishops in endnote 52 to follow.

· 37 Even in the Empire, bishops fighting personally are rare examples. See Schild, “Bishops,” 140–42.

· 38 Pauk and Wółkiewicz, “‘Ministri’,” 118.

· 39 Galli Anonymi Cronicae et gesta ducum sive principium Polonorum, lib. II, c. 49, ed. Karol Maleczyński, MPH n.s. 2 (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1952): 116–17; Magistri Vincentii dicti Kadłubek Chronica Polonorum, lib. III, c. 9, ed. Marian Plezia, MPH n.s. 11 (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1994): 92–95. On those accounts, esp. see Radosław Kotecki, “Lions and Lambs, Wolfs and Pastors of the Flock: Portraying Military Activities of Bishops in Twelfth Century Poland,” in Between Sword and Prayer [cited before so the citation should be abbreviated (like the next one)] (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 303–40; Jacek Maciejewski, “Memory of the ‘Warrior Bishops’ of Płock in the Writings of Jan Długosz,” in Christianity and War (Leeds: ARC Humanities Press, 2021), 75–95, esp. at 78–83.

· 40 Kotecki and Maciejewski, “Ideals,” 18–19.

· 41 Galli Anonymi Cronicae, lib. III, c. 23, p. 150: “missa generalis per omnem stationem celebratur, sermo divinus suis parrochianis ab episcopis predicatur, populus universus sacrosancta comumnione confirmatur.”

· 42 Kotecki, “Bishops,” 451–53. Under the Carolingians, the largest civitates served as capitals of administrative units, were also centres of troop mobilisation, and often at the same time were the seats of bishoprics and the most important abbeys. Hence, the hierarchs, like the counts, may have had a role in convening the expeditio. See Bernard S. Bachrach, “Charlemagne and Carolingian Military Administration,” in Empires and Bureaucracy in World History, eds. Peter Crooks and Timothy Parsons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 170–96 at 172, 175–76, 187. In both the Carolingian and the Ottonian monarchies, the mobilisation procedure provided for the use of writings, which also implies clerical participation. See Karl Leyser, “Ottonian Government,” English Historical Review 96, no. 381 (1981): 721–53 at 726–27.

· 43 On some correlations between diocesan and provincial divisions, as well as on the military importance of the main sedes in eleventh- to twelfth-century Poland, see Tadeusz Wasilewski, “‘Sedes regni principales’ i ‘sedes regni’ państwa polskiego jako ośrodki wojskowe, administracyjne i gospodarcze w XI i XII wieku,” in Sedes regni principales, ed. Barbara Trelińska (Sandomierz: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczno-Przyrodnicza, 1999), 57–66, esp. at 58–59. Tadeusz Lalik, “Organizacja grodowo-prowincjonalna w Polsce XI i początków XII wieku,” Studia z Dziejów Osadnictwa 5 (1967): 5–47 at 13, noted that

some capital and provincial strongholds were not at the same time the seats of bishoprics, especially Sandomierz in Lesser Poland and Łęczyca in central Poland. But it is no accident that both of these centres became seats of the largest Polish collegiates in the twelfth century.

· 44 As Bernard S. Bachrach, in Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 150–51, points out, units mustered in various localities were in practice accompanied during an expeditio by at least some of their local saints. For examples of prelates mustering armies with religious means on behalf of the ruler, see Hannelore Zug Tucci, “Il carroccio nella vita comunale italiana,” Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 65 (1985): 1–104 at 81–82; Edward Coleman, “Sense of Community and Civic Identity in the Italian Communes,” in The Community, the Family and the Saint, eds. Joyce M. Hill and Mary Swan, International medieval research 4 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 45–60; Dominique Barthélemy, “The Peace of God and Bishops at War in the Gallic Lands from the Late Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century,” Anglo-Norman Studies 32 (2009): 1–23 at 18–22; Gerrard, Church at War, 118–35.

· 45 Galli Anonymi Cronicae, lib. III, c. 22, p. 148.

· 46 For churchmen as military advisors and as part of general staff, see Bernard S. Bachrach, “Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff,” Journal of Military History 66, no. 2 (2002): 313–57 at 317–18, 322, 325–25, 328. For examples of prelates advising rulers in war campaigns, see Gerrard, Church at War, 43, 191, 237; Nakashian, Warrior Churchmen, 125–26, 152, 155, 159–60, 172, 178, 190–91, 195, 213–14, 247; Taylor, “Bishops,” 4; Lincoln, “‘In exercitu loco’,” 93. Some interesting examples are in Chronica Adefonsi imperatoris, lib. I, cc. 15–16, ed. Antonio Maya, in Chronica Hispana saeculi XII. Pars 1, eds. Emma Falque, Juan Gil, and Antonio Maya, Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio medievalis 71 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1990): 109–248 at 157–58.

· 47 Magistri Vincentii dicti Kadłubek Chronica Polonorum, lib. IV, c. 19, p. 166.

· 48 Stanisław Smolka, Mieszko Stary i jego wiek (Kraków: Avalon, 2009; 1st ed., 1881), 318.

· 49 See endnote 124 to follow.

· 50 Apart from works cited in endnote 40 earlier, see Jacek Maciejewski, “Biskup krakowski Pełka a bitwa nad Mozgawą w 1195 roku,” Kwartalnik Historyczny 124, no. 3 (2018): 411–38, esp. at 420–21.

· 51 Compare a contemporary charge against the Hungarian bishops serving in the royal army in 1240. They should pray “in their sacred dwellings” and not spend “the night in the camp of laymen.” See Maciejewski, “Memory,” 83. On the 1258 charter, see also Maciejewski, “Biskupi,” 80–81.

· 52 Compare with Karol Modzelewski, “Między prawem książęcym a władztwem gruntowym. II,” Przegląd Historyczny 71, no. 3 (1980): 449–80 at 468. In 1227, the Bishop of Cracow, Ivo Odrowąż, complained that Cracow Prince Leszek plunders the bishop’s homines under the guise of organising expeditions (Codex diplomaticus Cathedralis ad S. Venceslaum ecclesiae Cracoviensis, ed. Franciszek Piekosiński, Monumenta medii aevi historica res gestas Poloniae illustrantia 1 (Kraków: Academia Literarum, 1874), no. 10, pp. 25–26). This is not evidence of a tax levied in exchange for exemption from expeditio but a trace of the financing of expeditions by the participants themselves. On such practices, see Timothy Reuter, “The Recruitment of Armies in the Early Middle Ages: What Can We Know?” in Military Aspects of Scandinavian Society in a European Perspective, ed. Anne Nørgård Jørgensen, Studies in archaeology & history 2 (Copenhagen: Nationalmuseet, 1997), 32–37 at 35; Walter Goffart, “The Recruitment of Freemen into the Carolingian Army or, How Far May One Argue from Silence?” Journal of Medieval Military History 16 (2018): 17–34 at 22.

· 53 Preußisches Urkundenbuch, 1.1, ed. Rudolf Philippi (Königsberg: Hartung, 1882), no. 48, pp. 35–36. Only the Bishop of Plock was missing, but the Mazovian bishopric was vacant at the time.

· 54 For more on the profile of a crusader bishop, see Thomas Haas, Geistliche als Kreuzfahrer. Der Klerus im Konflikt zwischen Orient und Okzident 1095–1221, Heidelberg transcultural studies 3 (Heidelberg: Winter, 2012); Nakashian, Warrior Churchmen, 229–53; Jensen, “Bishops”; Sini Kangas, “The Image of ‘Warrior-Bishops’ in the Northern Tradition of the Crusades,” in Christianity and War (Leeds: ARC Humanities Press, 2021), 57–73.

· 55 “1218. episcopus Wraislaviensis Laurentius cum Theobaldo duce Bohemiae in Prussiam profecti sunt.” Annales Pragensium pars I, ed. Rudolf Köpke, MGH SS 9 (Hannover: Hahn, 1851), 169–81 at 170.

· 56 For more on Bishop Lawrence’s participation in the crusades, see Tomasz Jasiński, “Stosunki śląsko-pruskie i śląsko-krzyżackie w pierwszej połowie XIII w.,” in “Ars historica.” Prace z dziejów powszechnych i Polski, eds. Marian Biskup et al., Seria Historia 71 (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza, 1976), 393–403 at 393, 396, 308; Tomasz Jasiński, “Trzy nieznane oryginalne bulle Grzegorza IX dotyczące misji pruskiej z lat 1232–1234,” Zapiski Historyczne 53, no. 3–4 (1988): 57–67 at 59–60.

· 57 “H. ducem Zlesie, L. Wrazlauiensem, L. Lubucensem episcopos crucesignatos et eorum barones”: Preußisches Urkundenbuch, 1.1, no. 41, pp. 27–28.

· 58 Jacek Maciejewski, Episkopat polski doby dzielnicowej, 1180–1320 (Kraków: Societas Vistulana, 2003), 51; Przemysław Wiszewski, “‘Chrześcijański książę Henryk’ – wokół pobożności księcia śląskiego Henryka I Brodatego,” in Dynamika przemian społecznych i religijnych w średniowieczu, eds. Tadeusz Grabarczyk and Tadeusz Nowak (Warszawa: DiG, 2011), 187–221 at 204.

· 59 A quarter of the German episcopate stood by Barbarossa’s side. See Graham A. Loud, “Introduction,” in The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa, ed. and trans. Graham A. Loud (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 21–23; Stöckel, “Reichsbischöfe,” 63–80. On the role of the English bishops in the Third Crusade, see Nakashian, Warrior Churchmen, chap. 8; Gerrard, Church at War, 53. Compare works on Spanish bishops listed in endnotes 14 and 17.

· 60 Barabás, “Thirteenth-Century Hungarian Prelates,” 41–43.

· 61 Jensen, “Clerics,” 194–97.

· 62 Lund, “Military Obligations,” 307; Schild, “Bishops,” 140–41. It may be recalled that, in the light of the famous Indiculus loricatorum for the Italian campaign of Otto II, some of the bishops were to cross the Alps with their troops, while others were only to send the appropriate contingents.

· 63 Pauk and Wółkiewicz, “‘Ministri’,” 116. My italics.

· 64 Marian Friedberg, “Klientela świecka biskupa krakowskiego w w. XII–XIV. Ze studiów nad organizacją społeczeństwa w Polsce średniowiecznej,” in Studia historyczne ku czci Stanisława Kutrzeby, 2 vols. (Kraków: s.n., 1938), 1, 165–216.

· 65 See especially Stanisław Zajączkowski, “Udział”; Stanisław Krakowski, “Polska sztuka wojenna w okresie rozdrobnienia feudalnego (XII–XIII w.),” Studia i materiały do historii wojskowości 2 (1956): 388–442.

· 66 Bernard S. Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Expeditionary Levy: Observations Regarding ‘liberi homines’,” Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 12 (2015): 1–65; Goffart, “Recruitment.”

· 67 David S. Bachrach, “Feudalism, Romanticism, and Source Criticism: Writing the Military History of Salian Germany,” Journal of Medieval Military History 13 (2015): 1–25; David S. Bachrach, “Civilians and ‘militia’ in Ottonian Germany: Warfare in an Era of Small Professional Armies,” in Civilians and Warfare in World History, eds. Nicola Foote and Nadya Williams (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 99–119.

· 68 Karl Leyser, “Henry I and the Beginnings of the Saxon Empire,” English Historical Review 83, no. 326 (1968): 1–32 at 4–12. On episcopal vassal clientele, see, among others, Benjamin Arnold, “German Bishops and Their Military Retinues in the Empire,” German History 2, no. 7 (1989): 161–83 at 182; Timothy Reuter, “‘Episcopi cum sua militia’: The Prelate as Warrior in the Early Staufer Era,” in Warriors and Churchmen in the High Middle Ages, ed. Timothy Reuter (London: Hambledon Press, 1992), 79–94 at 83; Gerrard, Church at War, 80.

· 69 Compare with Guy Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West (London: Rout-ledge, 2003), 35; Lund, “Military Obligations,” 304.

· 70 Janet L. Nelson, “The Church’s Military Service in the Ninth Century: A Contemporary Comparative View?” Studies in Church History 20 (1983): 15–30 at 22; Arnold, “German Bishops,” 169–70; Matthew Innes, State and Society in the Early Middle Ages: The Middle Rhine Valley, 400–1000, Cambridge studies in medieval life and thought. 4th ser. 47 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 152–53. See also Francois-Louis Ganshof, “Benefice and Vassalage in the Age of Charlemagne,” Cambridge Historical Journal 6, no. 2 (1939): 147–75.

· 71 Giancarlo Andenna, “Carolingi, vescovi e abati in Italia settentrionale (secolo IX). Riflessioni sul ‘militare servitium’ degli ecclesiastici,” in Le origini della diocesi di Mantova e le sedi episcopali dell’Italia settentrionale, IV–XI secolo, ed. Giancarlo Andenna, Antichità altoadriatiche 63 (Trieste: Editreg, 2006), 3–34 at 7. Carolingian policy was marked by contradictions. Bishops were required to abandon a secular lifestyle and contact with arms, while at the same time the obligation to provide homines for armed expeditions was maintained. See Jinty Nelson, “Charlemagne and the Bishops,” in Religious Franks: Religion and Power in the Frankish Kingdoms, ed. Rob Meens (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 350–69 at 360–62.

· 72 Bernard S. Bachrach, “Military Lands in Historical Perspective,” Haskins Society Journal 9 (1997): 95–122 at 114; Halsall, Warfare, 71, 76, 96, 99.

· 73 Stanisław Arnold, “Władztwo biskupie na grodzie Wolborskim w wieku XIII,” in Z dziejów średniowiecza. Wybór pism (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1968; 1st ed., 1921), 5–147 at 96–97. Also Wasilewski, “O służbie,” 8.

· 74 “Ad exercitum autem idem liberi homines, quocienscunque nos omnibus aliis publicam fecerimus expedicionem, et non aliter, uenire tenebuntur, eis exceptis sine numeri prefinicione, qui in negociis vel seruicio episcopi remanserint.” Dokumenty kujawskie i mazowieckie przeważnie z XIII wieku, ed. Bolesław Ulanowski (Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1887), no. 13, p. 185. That the clause in negociis vel seruicio episcopi applies to servile episcopal knights was advocated by Arnold, “Władztwo,” 97; Wasilewski, “O służbie,” 8; Karol Buczek, “Prawo rycerskie i powstanie stanu szlacheckiego w Polsce,” Przegląd Historyczny 69, no. 1 (1978): 23–46 at 27n18.

· 75 Friedberg, “Klientela.”

· 76 Louis Halphen, Charlemagne et l’Empire carolingien (Paris: Michel, 1947), 167–69, 172; West, “Lordship,” 25; Goffart, “Recruitment,” 20–21; Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Expeditionary Levy.”

· 77 Lund, “Military Obligations,” 302.

· 78 Ibid., 299, 300–2.

· 79 Dokumenty kujawskie i mazowieckie, no. 13, pp. 185–86. My italics.

· 80 Ibid., no. 34–36, pp. 204–11; Maciejewski, Episkopat, 132–33. In the end, the duke consented to the homines’ return to their episcopal villages. See Dokumenty kujawskie i mazowieckie, no. 36, p. 211.

· 81 Marcin Pauk rightly suggests that episcopal fortifications were not new constructions in the thirteenth century, as they had previously functioned with the ruler’s permission and served a public function. See Marcin R. Pauk, “Funkcjonowanie regale fortyfikacyjnego w Europie Środkowej w średniowieczu,” Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej 51, no. 1 (2003): 3–16.

· 82 On ministeriales-like men dwelling in the villages near church strongholds, see Marek Barański, “Załogi grodowe w Polsce wczesnopiastowskiej,” Społeczeństwo Polski Średniowiecznej 6 (1994): 91–99. On vassal milites settled close to the strongholds of the Płock bishopric’s castellanies, see Kazimierz Pacuski,“Drobne rycerstwo w służbie kościoła płockiego w pierwszej połowie XIII wieku,” in HistorioZofia. Księga jubileuszowa Zofii Teresy Kozłowskiej, eds. Danuta Konieczka-Śliwińska and Stanisław Roszak (Warszawa: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne, 2016), 175–92 at 180–81. See also Friedberg, “Klientela,” 200–1, who noted that most of the milites of the Cracow bishops came from villages located in episcopal castellanies in Tarczek and Sławków. On armed clients (castrenses) who served in the castle of the Archbishops of Gniezno in Łowicz, see Michał Słomski, Urzędnicy i personel zamku arcybiskupów gnieźnieńskich w Łowiczu (XIV w.-1531 r.) (Warszawa: IH PAN, 2017), 183–85.

· 83 Before the fifteenth century, not much is known about the stockpiles of episcopal castles or the military and non-military but also duty-bound personnel. See Słomski, Urzędnicy, 182–83. It is most likely, however, that the church strongholds and castles possessed weapons depots much earlier. According to a local source (Kalendarz i spominki włocławskie, ed. Brygda Kürbis, in Roczniki wielkopolskie, MPH n.s. 6, 79–91 at 83), when Teutonic Knights seized Raciążek in 1330, they found there arma et baliste quam plurime. It is hard to say whether these weapons were the usual stockpile of the castle or, as Maciejewski suggests (“Biskupi,” 87), they were gathered for the expected invasion. In England, the stockpiling of military equipment in episcopal castles is confirmed for the mid-twelfth century. See Gerrard, Church at War, 99.

· 84

[I]n quo quidem casu non solum pecunie, verum eciam armatorum subsidium per episcopum, capitulum et ecclesiam supradictos de terris et hominibus iuxta discrecionem et moderanciam episcopi et capituli eorundem necessitate considerata instante duci … pro eiusdem terre defensione volumus exhiberi.

(Schlesisches Urkundenbuch V: 1282–1290, ed. Winfried Irgang (Köln: Böhlau, 1993), no. 28, p. 25). My italics.

· 85 It is known from foreign sources that bishops who identified themselves with the policies of their rulers ensured that their milites were well equipped when going on expeditions. For example, Lund, “Military Obligations,” 304. The rulers themselves also required bishops to provide appropriately armed men. Frederick I ordered the Bishop of Augsburg, Conrad, to equip the milites for an expedition in armis et clipeis, as well as tents because of the scarcity of lodging. See Arnold, “German Bishops,” 173–74. Duke Mieszko of Opole, releasing homines from three villages of the bishopric of Wrocław from expeditio, demanded instead four homines competenter armatos to man ducal castles. Schlesisches Urkundenbuch II: 1231–1250, eds. Heinrich Appelt, Winfried Irgang, and Josef J. Menzel 137 (Köln: Böhlau, 1977), no. 226, p. 137. On the obligation to man a ruler’s castles by episcopal servile milites, see Gerrard, Church at War, 103–4; Lund, “Military Obligations,” 303.

· 86 Friedberg, “Klientela,” 202.

· 87

Ceterum quia dux Boleslaus clare memorie Aws noster … sibi in Tharsensi et Kelciensi Castellanijs, quandam reseruauerat seruitutem, videlicet. dum per Thartharos, Ruthenos scismaticos, vel Lythuanos, terra Sandomiriensis hostiliter vastaretur, Episcopus de eisdem Caslellanijs. homines suos bellicuosos in defensionem, cum ceteris terrigenis, mittere tenebatur. Sed quia hec nimis onerosa. ipsi Episcopo. ex suis hominibus videbantur. Nos volentes, ut idem Episcopus, cum Clero suo maxime hostilitatis tempore, deuocius oracionibus intendam, ipsum et successores suus ac predictis Tharsensem et Kelciensem Castellanias, et homines quoslibet in eisdem degentes … a … mittendis hominibus, contra Thartharos, Ruthenos, et Lythuanos, exnunc absoluimus et liberamus omnino. Ita quod decetero homines pugnaturos Episcopus et sui successores de eisdem Castellanijs mittere minime teneantur.

(Codex diplomaticus Poloniae Minoris, vol. 1, ed. Franciszek Piekosiński, Monumenta medii aevi historica res gestas Poloniae illustrantia 3 (Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1876), no. 198, p. 253)

· 88 On the milites of the Bishops of Plock, see Pacuski, “Drobne rycerstwo,” 175–92. Military benefices were also granted by the Bishops of Wrocław, even before obtaining the princely rights to the Nysa-Otmuchów land. See Zygmunt Wojciechowski, “La condition des nobles et le problème de la féodalité en Pologne au moyen âge,” Revue historique de droit français et étranger 16 (1937): 20–76 at 61–63; Tomasz Jurek, “Geneza szlachty polskiej,” in Šlechta, moc a reprezentace ve středověku, eds. Martin Nodl and Martin Wihoda, Colloquia mediaevalia Pragensia 9 (Prague[Praha elsewhere, as Warszawa, Kraków etc.!]: Filosofia, 2007), 63–140 at 97–98. On the knightly service from the lands of the Bishops of Wrocław, see especially Mateusz Goliński, “Służba rycerska a potencjał militarny księstw śląskich w późnym średniowieczu,” Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka 53, no. 1–2 (1998): 33–67. The author wrongly (56–57) links the origin of this service with the patterns coming from Bohemia in the second half of the thirteenth century.

· 89 One has to agree with those who suggest that the number of milites of Polish bishoprics was considerable at the beginning of the thirteenth century: Pauk and Wółkiewicz, “‘Ministri’,” 119; Pacuski, “Drobne rycerstwo,” 185–87; Słomski, Urzędnicy, 22; Maciejewski, “Memory’,” 92. At the same time, it cannot be doubted that the episcopal charters record mainly members of the closest court staff.

· 90 See Friedberg, “Klientela,” 179.

· 91 Kronika Jana z Czarnkowa, ed. Jan Szlachtowski, MPH 2 (Lwów: Bielowski, 1872), 619–758 at 678; Maciejewski, “Biskupi,” 90. In the second half of the thirteenth century, one duke collected taxes from people from the church properties exempt from expeditio. See Modzelewski, “Między,” 472.

· 92 Goliński, “Służba,” 54.

· 93 Schlesisches Urkundenbuch IV: 1267–1281, ed. Wilfried Irgang (Köln: Böhlau, 1988), no. 50, p. 48.

· 94 On terminology, see especially Jan F. Verbruggen, “Military Service in the County of Flanders,” Journal of Medieval Military History 2 (2004): 17–37. Traces of similar solutions also come from Scandinavia. See Niels Lund, “Is ‘Leidang’ a Nordic or a European Phenomenon?” in Military Aspects of Scandinavian Society in a European Perspective, AD 1–1300, eds. Anne Norgård Jørgensen and Birthe L. Clausen (Copenhagen: National-museet, 1997), 195–99.

· 95 Richard Sharpe, “Banners of the Northern Saints,” in Saints of North-East England, 600–1500, eds. Margaret Coombe, Anne Mouron, and Christiania Whitehead, Medieval church studies 39 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 245–303 at 275.

· 96 Simon Coupland, “The Carolingian Army and the Struggle against the Vikings,” Viator 35 (2004): 49–70 at 52–54.

· 97 Leyser, “Henry I,” 18–19; Bernard S. Bachrach and David S. Bachrach, “Early Saxon Frontier Warfare: Henry I, Otto I, and Carolingian Military Institutions,” Journal of Medieval Military History 10 (2012): 17–60 at 35–36; David S. Bachrach, Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012), 82–85.

· 98 Bachrach, “Feudalism,” 20–23.

· 99 David S. Bachrach, “Immunities as Tools of Royal Military Policy under the Carolingian and Ottonian Kings,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung 130 (2013): 1–36, on the right of bishops and abbots to collect heribannum from the people of their domains at 26, 29, 30, 36.

· 100 Modzelewski, “Między,” 475.

· 101 It is worth noting the bishop’s official called tribunus (Pol. wojski – derived from wojna meaning “war”) was present in the episcopal castellanies. Modzelewski (“Między prawem,” 475) guessed that tribuni were responsible for mobilising the population from the lands of the castellany for military service; also Franciszek Dąbrowski, “Urząd wojskiego w Polsce XIII wieku,” Roczniki Historyczne 70 (2004): 111–44; Franciszek Dąbrowski, Studia nad administracją kasztelańską Polski XIII wieku (Warszawa: Neriton, 2007), 16–19; contra Słomski, Urzędnicy, 56–61. English bishops had officials called constabularii, ductores, and marschalci responsible for mustering people for campaigns, as shown in Gerrard, Church at War, 69–73. In Polish sources, the judicial function of the tribuni is more pronounced. This is not surprising given the prevalence of exemptions from expeditio in the first half of the thirteenth century.

· 102 “[A]d huiusmodi expedicionem non procedenencium pena epyscopo reservata.” Pommerellisches Urkundenbuch, ed. Max Perlbach (Danzig: s.n., 1882), no. 76, p. 64. Compare with Modzelewski, “Między,” 475–79. On similar prerogatives given to Danish prelates, see Lund, “Is ‘Leidang’,” 198; Niels Lund, “A Bishop in Arms and the ‘Leding’,” in Archbishop Absalon of Lund and His World, eds. Karsten Friis-Jensen and Iinge Skovgaard-Petersen (Roskilde: Roskilde museums forlag, 2000), 9–19 at 13–14.

· 103 Sławomir Gawlas, O kształt zjednoczonego królestwa. Niemieckie władztwo terytorialne a geneza społeczno-ustrojowej odrębności Polski (Warszawa: DiG, 2000), 75–76. Also Pauk and Wółkiewicz, “‘Ministri’,” 119–25.

· 104 Only few diplomas from the second half of the thirteenth century specify the dimension of service. However, they all refer to monasteries. See Matuszewski, Immunitet, 18, 25.

· 105 Lund, “Military Obligations,” 298, 302.

· 106 Magistri Vincentii dicti Kadłubek Chronica, lib. III, c. 8, p. 94.

· 107 Codex diplomaticus et commemorationum Masoviae generalis, ed. Jan K. Kochanowski, 2 vols., (Warszawa: Łazarski, 1919), here vol. 1, no. 199, p. 190. It must have been a retinue composed to some extent of milites. See Jan Szymczak, “W kwestii liczebności oddziałów wojskowych w Polsce okresu rozbicia dzielnicowego,” Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica 2 (1981): 51–75 at 60. Such huge retinues can be considered a sign of military power. See Arnold, “German Bishops”; Taylor, “Bishops,” 4, 10, 17; Lund, “Military Obligations,” 304–6. See also Arnold (“Możnowładztwo,” 24, 26–27), who noted that the evidence of possessing extensive military service are huge herds of horses and cattle in the possession of bishoprics and magnates.

· 108 Galli Anonymi Cronicae, lib. III, c. 24, p. 151.

· 109 In the light of other twelfth-century papal bulls for Polish bishoprics, the welfare of the Wrocław and the young Włocławek bishoprics is no less impressive, which should be taken into account when assessing the possible dimension of military service of those seats. See Pauk, “Quicquid,” 266; Marcin Pauk, “Początki Kościoła na Pomorzu,” in Europa sięga nad Bałtyk. Polska i Pomorze w kształtowaniu cywilizacji europejskiej (X–XII wiek), ed. Stanisław Rosik, Scripta historica Europaea 5 (Wrocław: Uniwersytet Wrocławski, 2020), 403–70 at 413–14. See also Stanisław Arnold, “Możnowładztwo polskie w. XI i XII i jego podstawy gospodarczo-społeczne,” Przegląd Historyczny 25 (1925): 1–32 at 20; Jurek, “Geneza,” 79.

· 110 According to the treaty of Bishop Christian with the Teutonic Order (1230), the bishop, while obtaining secular power in a certain district in Chełmno land, undertook that omnes inhabitantes of the bishopric – vassals and other Prussians (feodales quam alios Prutenos) – would participate in the military action of the Order at their cost as the bishop’s troop. In expeditions, the bishop’s banner was to precede that of the brothers: “in expeditionibus vexillum … episcopi … ante vexillum sepedictorum fratrum incedere”: ibid. For arguments that the phrase inhabitantes tam feodales quam alios Prutenos means no less than feodales quam alios homines, in analogy to homines eiusdem episcopatus, tam feodales, quam ceteros (the bold is mine), see Preußisches Urkundenbuch, 1.1:54, no. 74; Maciej Dorna, “Uwagi o interpretacji tzw. układu włocławskiego pomiędzy biskupem Prus Chrystianem a Krzyżakami ze stycznia 1230 r.,” Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie, no. 2 (2013): 181–201 at 192.

· 111 Walter Goffart, “‘Defensio patriae’ as a Carolingian Military Obligation,” Francia 43 (2016): 21–39.

· 112 One of the ducal diplomas calls it “terre communis custodia, que lantwere wulgariter appellatur.” My italics.

· 113 For sources mentioning defensio terrae, see Matuszewski, Immunitet, 16–34.

· 114 Although contrary to the literature, Wasilewski claimed that not “the entire peasant population” was obliged to participate in the expeditio, but wealthy vassals, servile knights, and homines formed the select levy; interpreting the duty of defensio terrae, he succumbed to the deceptive terminology and stated that “the duty [was] only binding on rural population”: Wasilewski, “Służba,” 8. For some valuable comments on defensio terrae in Poland, see Jan Dąbrowski, “Obowiązek obrony kraju w XI–XIII wieku,” Sprawozdania z Czynności i Posiedzeń Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności 52, no. 10 (1951): 885–94.

· 115 Modzelewski, “Między,” 475.

· 116 Wasilewski, “Służba,” 8–9.

· 117 Coupland (“Carolingian Army,” 52–54) suggests that the well-known practice of defending the coasts against the Normans by Carolingian officials, including bishops, was based on the rules of lantveri.

· 118 Verbruggen, “Military Service,” 25. He claims that landweer was a continuation of Frankish lantweri.

· 119 Compare with Modzelewski’s statement in “Między,” 475.

· 120 “[N]isi cum nos personaliter vel palatinus Sandomiriensis contra instantem paganorum insultum processerimus.” Codex diplomaticus Poloniae Minoris, 1:63, no. 51. [cited before so the citation abbreviated as in other cases]

· 121 “[P]reterquam ad pruthenicam, videlicet quando dux publicam fecerit expedicionem, et ad terre defensionem.” Codex diplomaticus et commemorationum Masoviae, 2:462, no. 396. See also Maciejewski, “Memory,” 92.

· 122 Joannis Dlugossi Annales seu cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae, lib. 1–12 (Warszawa, Kraków: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1964–2005), lib. 6:194.

· 123 Maciejewski, “Biskupi,” 70–71.

· 124 Liebau, “Barbarossa,” 19; Nakashian, Warrior Churchmen, 240, 256; Shild, “Bishops,” 141. The situation was quite different in thirteenth-century Livonia, where Christian armies had no royal leadership. Bishops still acted as peacemakers there, but mostly as religious figures and Christianisers. See Jensen, “Clerics,” 210–14.

· 125 Szymczak, “W kwestii liczebności,” 56.

· 126 Pauk and Wółkiewicz, “‘Ministri’,” 121–22.

· 127 Modzelewski, “Między,” 476.

· 128 Compare with Pauk, “‘Capella regia’,” 274.

· 129 Radosław Kotecki, “Ordynariusz płocki Szymon w Gallowej narracji o bitwie Mazowszan z Pomorzanami (Gall II, 49),” in “Ecclesia et bellum.” [cited before so the citation should be abbreviated as in other cases] (Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego, 2016), 142–67 at 143n2; Maciejewski, “Memory,” 92–93.

· 130 Gerrard, Church at War, 136–50.

· 131 On the chronicle’s account, see Ibid., 32–33.

· 132 Ibid., 140.

· 133 These accounts have been discussed in detail in Kotecki, “Ordynariusz”; Kotecki, “Lions and Lambs”; Maciejewski, “Memory”; Kotecki and Maciejewski, “Ideals,” 16–18.

· 134 Verbruggen, “Military Service,” 24n30 and 25. See also my discussion regarding the presence of Bohemian clergy at the Battle of Chlumec (1126) in Radosław Kotecki, “Bohemian Experiences with Military Religion in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, or How to Secure the Intercession of the Patron Saint,” in Religious Rites of War: Eastern and Northern Europe (900–1500), eds. Radosław Kotecki, Jacek Maciejewski, and Gregory Leighton (forthcoming with Brill in 2023).

· 135 Czesław Deptuła, “Płock kościelny u progu reform XIII wieku. Biskup Lupus i jego czasy,” Roczniki Humanistyczne 21, no. 2 (1973): 43–90 at 88–89. See also Kotecki, “Bishops,” 452.

· 136 Gerrard, Church at War, chap. 5.

· 137 Joannis Dlugossi Vitae episcoporum Plocensium, ed. Wojciech Kętrzyński, MPH 6 (Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1898), 592–619 at 604. For an in-depth analysis of this account, see Maciejewski, “Memory,” 85–87, 89–91.

· 138 As it sometimes happened in the case of German bishops. See Arnold, “German Bishops”; Bachrach and Bachrach, “Bruno of Merseburg’s ‘Saxon War’,” 351–52.

· 139 Jurek, “Geneza,” 78.

· 140 According to Marcin R. Pauk (“‘Capella regia’,” 267–70), cathedrals together with collegiate churches were, before the thirteenth century, part of a system controlled by rulers through the practice of promoting chaplains to the ranks of provost and bishop.

· 141 As Thomas Wünsch has noted (“Der heilige Bischof – Zur politischen Dimension von Heiligkeit im Mittelalter und ihrem Wandel,” Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 82, no. 2 (2000): 261–302 at 278–79), in the Empire

[a]ls Erklärung für dieses (rekonstruierte) Verhalten bietet sich an, daß die weltlich-politische Tätigkeit als Reichsdienst in ottonisch-frühsalischer Zeit noch sakral ummantelt war, was für die Zeit nach dem 11. Jahrhundert nicht mehrgalt. Vor dem 11. Jahrhundert wurden offensichtliche Anstößigkeiten im Verhalten eines Bischofs wie Heerfahrt u.a.m. durch das Institut des “regale sacerdotium” (und die Beteiligung des Bischofs daran) gleichsam neu-tralisiert; in späterer Zeit trat nach dessen Wegfall ein anderer Mechanismus in Erscheinung – eben die Kompensation weltlicher Tätigkeit mit Hilfe spirituell-kirchlicher Leistung.