1. When Leaders Use Preventive Military Force
1. Michael Dobbs, “The Price of a 50-Year Myth,” New York Times, October 15, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/16/opinion/the-eyeball-to-eyeball-myth-and-the-cuban-missile-crisiss-legacy.html.
2. Saunders 2011; Green 2012.
3. Nuclear optimism and pessimism are two academic theories of nuclear proliferation; I use (nuclear) “optimist” and “pessimist” slightly differently to describe policy makers who subscribe to such views regarding stability and otherwise.
4. A related question is whether or not the proliferating state observes the would-be preventer’s decision making and uses this information in the proliferating state’s own decisions. This question requires a different research design to assess. For relevant work, see Monteiro and Debs 2014.
5. Greenstein and Immerman 1992; Saunders 2011; Waltz 2001.
6. George 1969; Byman and Pollack 2001, 2019; Jervis 2013.
7. Hermann 1980; Goldgeier 1994; Horowitz and Stam 2014; Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Croco 2011; Colgan 2013; Saunders 2009; Rosen 2009; Hymans 2006; Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015; Lebovic 2013; Way and Weeks 2014; Whitlark 2017.
8. George 1969.
9. The operational code research program was continued by Stephen Walker and his protégés. For example, Schafer and Walker 2006.
10. Barber 1968; Hermann and Hagan 1998.
11. E. E. Jones and Harris 1967; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Simon 1985; Khong 1992; B. D. Jones 1999; Mercer 2010.
12. McCrae and Costa 1985; Gerber et al. 2011; Gallagher and Allen 2014.
13. Horowitz and Stam 2014 explore the role of previous military experience. This variable offers no useful traction in explaining either variation in preventive military behavior among similarly experienced individuals or varying behavior by the same leader; see also Sechser 2004.
14. These beliefs might be part of a larger belief system. To explore this question would require a different book.
15. Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 2005.
16. Murray 1996; Eden and Miller 1989.
17. Jervis 1976; Kirshner 2000.
18. Holsti 1962; J. Goldstein et al. 1993; Saunders 2011; Green 2012; Stein 2017; Hafner-Burton et al. 2017.
19. Waltz 1979; Morgenthau 1948; Gilpin 1981; Copeland 2000.
20. Fearon 1995.
21. Levy 2011.
22. Levy 2011, 88.
23. I use “preventive war,” “preventive use of force,” and “preventive intervention” interchangeably. Distinctions between these terms are discussed in chapter 2.
24. Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010; Debs and Monteiro 2014; Schneider 1995; L. Goldstein 2006.
25. Debs and Monteiro 2014, for example, do not discuss substate dynamics within the bureaucracy or at the executive level. Debs and Monteiro, 2016, 19 notes explicitly, “We wager that more explanatory leverage can be obtained by focusing on the features of the security environment a state faces than on the psychological makeup of its leaders.”
26. The choice of a large-N quantitative analysis for this small universe is questionable, given the disproportionate role that the United States and Israel play. These two states may be skewing the findings.
27. L. Goldstein 2006; Schneider 1995.
28. Tannenwald 2007, 374–76.
29. For state-centric work, see Sagan 1996/1997; Solingen 2007; Paul 2000. For leader-centric work, see Hymans 2006; Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015; Way and Weeks 2014; Whitlark 2017.
30. On why this is so, see Saunders 2009, 120; see also Byman and Pollack 2001.
31. Thaler 2000; M. Rabin 1998; Jervis 1976; McDermott 1998.
32. See Saunders 2011 for a comparable research design.
33. Darnton 2017/2018, 111–15.
34. Lustick 1996.
35. Saunders 2009; Green 2012.
36. Braut-Hegghammer 2019.
37. George and Bennett 2005.
38. Saunders 2011.
2. Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy
1. Reiter 1995, 6–7.
2. The preventive logic features prominently in realist literature, including Waltz 1979, Morgenthau 1948, Gilpin 1981, and Copeland 2000.
3. I use “proliferation” and “acquisition” to refer to the same phenomenon of horizontal proliferation: new, successful attainment of nuclear weapons by another state.
4. Following the 2003 war in Iraq, the mere mention of preventive war raises questions of legality, distinctions between prevention and preemption, and US domestic politics. Here I set aside the legal questions for legal experts. For a discussion of terminology, see Reiter 1995, 6.
5. Levy 2011. This is arguably the case because nuclear weapons may dramatically alter the balance of power, significantly augmenting the power of the previously nonnuclear state.
6. Levy 1987, 90.
7. For an alternative perspective on this classification, see Kurtulus 2007.
8. Organski 1968; Gilpin 1981; Copeland 2000.
9. Copeland 2000, 5.
10. Monteiro and Debs 2014.
11. Debs and Monteiro 2014.
12. L. Goldstein 2006.
13. Waltz 1979, 2001; Jervis 1970.
14. Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010.
15. For bureaucratic politics, see Allison 1969; on public opinion, Berinsky 2009; other possible explanations exist, including normative arguments and explanations concerning civil-military relations. These are not compelling. Normative arguments have difficulty explaining the post–Cold War period, in which prevention was used frequently; the cases demonstrate that leaders often go against the military’s recommendation. On these arguments see Silverstone 2007, Quester 2000, Sechser 2004, and Sagan 1993.
16. See for example, Wright 1964, Fordham 1998, and Mansfield and Snyder 1995.
17. Saunders 2017.
18. I do not explain belief formation or why certain people have certain beliefs; both topics are beyond the scope of this book.
19. Saunders 2011; Horowitz and Stam 2014; Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Croco 2011; Colgan 2013; Rosen 2009.
20. Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015; Hymans 2006; Lebovic 2013; Way and Weeks 2014.
21. Allison and Halperin 1972.
22. Milner and Tingley 2015.
23. On Congress’s constraining role, see Howell and Pevehouse 2007; for a more limited role, see Meernik 1994.
24. Saunders 2019.
25. Goldgeier and Saunders 2018.
26. This may be less true in the US-Soviet context when the Soviets first developed a nuclear capability, but even then potential conflict became existential only when both states had massive arsenals. Moreover, because what is “existential” is a subjective question, beliefs should still be relevant, though variation may be narrower.
27. Jervis 1976, chap. 1; Wolfers 1962, chap. 1. For an example of recent first-image scholarship, see Yarhi-Milo 2018.
28. I leave the question of origins for future work.
29. Wendt 1999; Finnemore 2004; Barnett 1998; Jervis 1976; Tetlock 1999.
30. This notion draws on Saunders 2009.
31. Belief divergence is consistent with rationalist models. See Kirshner 2000, 145–50; and Fearon 1995.
32. “Belief,” Oxford English Dictionary, accessed September 24, 2018, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/belief.
33. J. Goldstein et al. 1993, 7–8.
34. Stein 2017.
35. Simon 1985; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Allison 1971; Janis 1972; Jervis 1970, 1976; Larson 1989; McDermott 1998; Khong 1992; Neustadt and May 1988; May 1973.
36. Hafner-Burton et al. 2017, S14.
37. Holsti 1962; George 1969; cited in Saunders 2011, chap. 2.
38. Hafner-Burton et al. 2017, S4; 2014.
39. Saunders 2011; Kertzer 2017; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015.
40. Hafner-Burton et al. 2017, S18–21.
41. Hafner-Burton et al. 2017, S22.
42. George 1969; Schafer and Walker 2006.
43. Saunders 2011, 5.
44. Yarhi-Milo 2013.
45. Saunders 2011.
46. On relative power, see Morgenthau 1948, Gilpin 1981, R. Powell 1991, and Copeland 2000. On reputation and credibility, see, for example, Press 2005 and Mercer 2010. From the voluminous audience costs literature, see Fearon 1994 and Schultz 2001. On the nuclear taboo, see Tannenwald 2007. On legal considerations, see Silverstone 2007.
47. J. Goldstein et al. 1993. On decision making under uncertainty, see Tversky and Kahneman 1974; March and Olsen 1975.
48. Disagreement over other factors is less likely; while leaders may disagree about the meaning derived from intelligence estimates (reflecting beliefs I argue are consequential), debating content is less likely. While we might suspect beliefs about the efficacy of the use of force or leaders’ relative risk propensities to be causally significant, empirically those suspicions are not borne out.
49. Jervis 1976, 20.
50. For an overview of the debate, see Lavoy 1995 and Feaver 1995.
51. For optimism’s intellectual history, see Kroenig 2015 and Lavoy 1995. Well-known examples include Waltz 1981; Sandoval 1976, 17–19; Viner 1946, 53–58.
52. Sandoval 1976, 19.
53. Waltz 1981; those arguing similarly include Weltman 1995, Mesquita and Riker 1982, Brito and Intriligator 1983, and Van Creveld 1993.
54. Additional optimists have focused on specific regions: Shai Feldman, Steven Rosen, and Paul Jabber on the Middle East; George Perkovich, Devin Hagerty, and Peter Lavoy on South Asia; and John Mearsheimer, Steven Van Evera, and Barry Posen on Europe.
55. Sagan and Waltz 2002; Sagan 1993; Iklé 1960.
56. Dunn 1977.
57. Sagan 1993; see especially chapters 2 and 5 in Sagan and Waltz 2002.
58. Many pessimists noted the special factors that governed the US-Soviet relationship, making it relatively stable. These included geographic separation, learning that developed before the Soviets acquired a large arsenal, and good intelligence about each other.
59. This relativist view has been articulated by scholars including Michael Mandelbaum, Robert Jervis, and Jed Snyder and, as Peter Lavoy describes in detail, has characterized much of American administration proliferation policy in the latter part of the twentieth century. See Mandelbaum 1995, Jervis 1988, and Wohlstetter et al. 1991.
60. Schlesinger, 174–84 in Dougherty and Lehman 1967.
61. Following Glaser, I define state type according to motivations and identify states as either status quo or revisionist. Glaser 2010.
62. Glaser 1989; Jervis 1984, 37–40.
63. Glaser 1989, 111; Snyder 1961; Jervis 1979.
64. Eden and Miller (1989) describe the nature of nuclear arguments as mostly irresolvable and resting on people’s interpretations. For example, though some data were available for attempting to understand the Soviets’ intentions, much remained unknown. It is almost impossible to perfectly divine another’s intentions. Analyzing the other’s actions for hints about intentions requires significant amounts of interpretation. State intentions are often shrouded in secrecy, especially when facing an adversary; enemies locked in a contest of survival often deliberately aim for misperception. Even when unintentional, so much requires interpretation that the same evidence often appears differently to different people.
65. Yarhi-Milo 2013.
66. Jervis 1976, 19–20; Saunders 2011, 28.
67. International relations uses the language of a state’s type and level of resolve. With national executives unlikely to use this vocabulary, I explore instead what leaders believed regarding the other state’s goals or intentions, the adversary’s desire and ability to limit the would-be preventer state’s mobility, and the adversary’s level of cost sensitivity.
68. Eden and Miller 1989.
69. Eden 1989, 4; quoting Howard 1981, 8.
70. Morgenthau 1967 uses this terminology; Jervis 1976 describes acceptance or rejection of the status quo or definitions of state behavior based on the costs and risks a state is willing to tolerate in achieving its goals.
71. Jervis 1976; see chap. 3 for the deterrence and spiral models of interaction.
72. Seay 1989, 52.
73. Seay 1989, 49. Champions of this perspective include former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Defense Department official Richard Perle, and Russian historian Richard Pipes.
74. Glaser 1989, 118, 120.
75. Proponents of this view include Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I negotiator Raymond Garthoff, scholar David Holloway, and former ambassador George Kennan.
76. Seay 1989, 51. Subscribers to this view include former national security advisor Henry Kissinger, Sovietologist Coit Blacker, and Adam Ulam, among others.
77. See for example, Morgenthau 1948; Glaser 2010; Schweller 1994.
78. Another significant issue in deterrence calculations is the credibility of the would-be preventer. The preventer’s credibility or lack thereof should affect the state attempting to go nuclear. For a similar discussion concerning proliferation, see Debs and Monteiro 2014. Since this project examines only the decision making of the would-be preventer and not that of the proliferator, this issue is beyond the scope of analysis here.
79. Seay 1989, 120.
80. An alternative possibility is that a state could be highly resolved and also deterred, if the complementary assurance is clear and credible. If, however, leaders focus on resolve as high-cost tolerance (as described earlier), such resolve would indicate greed or a desire to overturn the status quo. I treat this question as an empirical one.
81. An interesting duality exists regarding the dilemma of timing: a preventive strike can theoretically be most effective if done early in a program’s development, but unambiguous information about a program often develops only later.
82. This decision remains centrally a cost-benefit analysis in which the various costs and consequences of an intervention are assessed against the various costs and consequences of not intervening. The leader’s nuclear beliefs facilitate individual assessment of the relevant input factors.
83. Raas and Long 2007, 30.
84. For simplicity, I describe this process as linear, though in reality components may interact simultaneously.
85. Planning for and conducting a preventive intervention may occur in secret. To enter into the universe, however, cases must become known, even if after the fact.
86. US intelligence estimates have often been inaccurate regarding other states’ nuclear programs—their speed of development and their very existence or lack thereof. See, for example, Bowen, Dover, and Goodman 2014. Despite such flawed estimates, the situation can still catalyze the belief-driven decision-making process described here.
87. Kreps and Fuhrmann 2011.
88. Madeleine Albright, interviewed by Jim Lehrer, December 17, 1998, transcript, US Department of State Archives, Washington, DC, accessed July 27, 2020, https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/1998/981217b.html.
89. People may therefore have different valuations as well as definitions of success. Such differences should affect individuals’ assessments of the potential costs and benefits of any particular intervention.
90. I use “prepresidential” and “preexecutive” interchangeably to refer to the period before a leader assumes executive office.
91. On learning, see Jervis 1976, chap. 4; Axelrod 1984; Levy 1994; Reiter 1994; Renshon 2008; On learning from history, see Jervis 1976, chap. 6; Khong 1992; Vertzberger 1986; Bennett 1999; May 1973; see also Saunders 2009, 131.
92. Leaders without much thought on related topics may be more susceptible to persuasion by advisers. Where relevant, this possibility is explored in the cases. Saunders 2017.
93. Kapur 2005; Bell 2015. Leaders are unlikely to speak in terms of “emboldenment” or the “stability-instability paradox” but could engage similar concepts regarding the potential implications of nuclear weapons acquisition.
94. For each president, I describe other nuclear behavior undertaken during his administration. This behavior includes, but is not limited to, arms control negotiations and treaties and participation in relevant international organizations. This material is not specifically related to the coding of the first independent variable. However, I present the information to provide a more complete portrait of the leader in question. The security studies scholarship does not directly address potential connections between one’s views on the consequences of nuclear proliferation and positions on arms control. While some logical connections can be hypothesized, future work should explore this intersection.
95. Saunders 2009; Green 2012.
96. The present analysis combines the types of use of force. Future work should separate the types according to their associated costs and analyze the pathways that lead to each type of intervention strategy.
97. The possibility principle holds that “only cases where the outcome of interest is possible should be included in the set of negative cases; cases where the outcome is impossible should be relegated to a set of uninformative and hence irrelevant observations.” Mahoney and Goertz 2004.
98. As an example, consider the combination of Samoa and Tuvalu. Samoa has no armed forces and thus it is beyond the realm of possibility for them to attack Tuvalu, or any state in the manner described here. Furthermore, Tuvalu never pursued a nuclear weapons program, so there is no program for Samoa to target.
99. Cases are bounded to reflect the time period when one state had under consideration the use of force against the adversary, and cases include the short-term post-nuclear test period when a state might have had a nascent nuclear arsenal, as appropriate. While some might argue cases should conclude with an adversary’s first nuclear test, the posttest period may still be considered appropriate for preventive military force, as it is unlikely that changes in the strategic balance would happen immediately thereafter. Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010, appendix.
100. Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010, 837.
101. Stated differently, an adversarial relationship is a necessary but not sufficient condition to trigger the contemplation of the use of force.
102. This is not to say that elites in these circumstances uniformly supported these instances of proliferation. Rather, the use of force was simply not contemplated as a potential strategy to prevent the proliferation.
103. For work exploring a broad array of counterproliferation tools, see Cone 2020 and Mehta 2020. On US nonproliferation policy and decision making, see Taliaferro 2019 and Miller 2018. On US nuclear policy broadly, see Maddock 2010 and Gavin 2012a.
104. Schweller 1992; Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010.
3. JFK and LBJ Confront China’s Nuclear Program
1. For a similar research design, see Saunders 2009.
2. Theoretically there could have been some latent quality of electability that Kennedy used in choosing Johnson, thinking of a future presidential election. This possibility is unlikely, however, given the well-documented and terse relationship that existed between the two. Furthermore, Kennedy frequently excluded Johnson from important matters especially on foreign affairs. As one illustrative example, after the Cuban missile crisis JFK did not include Johnson on a list of people from Kennedy’s team whom he would like to see as president. See Caro 2012, 196, 222, for a discussion of this episode and the broader relationship.
3. Debs and Monteiro 2014; Goldstein 2006.
4. Allison and Halperin 1972; Bendor and Hammond 1992.
5. Allison 1971, 175.
6. Mintrom 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Kingdon 1984.
7. Johnson had a very limited role in Kennedy’s foreign policy deliberations, as Kennedy believed LBJ to be of little to no value in foreign relations. Indeed, Kennedy deliberately kept LBJ “at arm’s length in the management of foreign affairs” and “had no desire to give Johnson a more central part in shaping foreign policy.” Dallek 1998, 16–17, citing an oral history by Charles Bartlett, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter LBJL).
8. “Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, Subject: Status of the Gilpatric Report Authored by Spurgeon Keeny” March 26, 1965, document 17, folder “Gilpatric Panel [2 of 2],” National Security File, Files of Spurgeon Keeny, box 6, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
9. “Selected Statements on Non-dissemination of Nuclear Weapons by President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, and Secretary of Defense McNamara: January–November 1964,” no author listed, folder “General Selected Statements on Non-dissemination of Nuclear Weapons—Pres./Rusk/McNamara, 1/64-11/64,” National Security File, Committee File Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, box 7, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
10. I thank the LBJ Library for assistance with Rowen’s identification.
11. Memo to McGeorge Bundy from Robert W. Komer, September 18, 1964, document 94, folder “Nuclear Testing China, Vol. 1 [2 of 2],” National Security File, Subject File, box 31, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
12. “Selected Statements on Non-dissemination of Nuclear Weapons by President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, and Secretary of Defense McNamara: January–November 1964,” folder “Nuclear Testing China, Vol. 1 [2 of 2],” National Security File, Subject File, box 31, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
13. “Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, Subject: Status of the Gilpatric Report Authored by Spurgeon Keeny,” March 26, 1965, document 17, folder “Gilpatric Panel [2 of 2],” National Security File, Files of Spurgeon Keeny, box 6, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. This document further confirms McNamara’s nuclear pessimism in contrast to Rusk’s perceived optimism.
14. In late 1964, LBJ convened a group of distinguished private citizens to consider the spread of nuclear weapons globally. Following weeks of discussion, the group recommended a major change in US policy, including a sharp increase in nonproliferation efforts.
15. “Memorandum of Conversation Secretary’s Meeting with the Gilpatric Committee on Non-proliferation,” January 7, 1965, document 36, folder “Presidential Task Force Committee on Nuclear Proliferation [2 of 2],” National Security File, Subject File, box 35, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
16. Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). National Security File, Nuclear Testing—China. Top Secret. FRUS 1964–68, vol. XXX, document 51, LBJL. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d51.
17. Thomas L. Hughes, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Secretary (of State), “The Possibility of Greater Chinese Communist Militance,” Research Memorandum RFE-70, August 12, 1963, folder “China (CPR) 1961–63,” folder 1 of 3, box 410, Papers of President Kennedy, National Security File (NSF), Robert W. Komer, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston (hereafter JFKL).
18. Opinions were also mixed inside the NSA: Bundy was interested in force through 1964. Deputy Komer was more skeptical. M. Jones 2010, 432.
19. The Gallup question asked, “Looking ahead to 1970, which country do you think will be the greater threat to world peace—Russia or Communist China?” Gallup Poll (AIPO), conducted November 6 to November 11, 1964, and based on 1,568 personal interviews. From the iPOLL Databank, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
20. Folder “Nuclear Control—Miscellaneous,” Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, National Security File, Intelligence File, box 9, LBJL. This folder contains a variety of documents describing Senator Barry Goldwater and nuclear issues in the context of the 1964 presidential campaign. There are speech notes, memoranda, news articles and other miscellaneous items that recount Goldwater’s misstatements and high-ranking individuals coming out prominently to correct him, including President Eisenhower.
21. For a broad overview and additional intelligence records, see “China’s First Nuclear Test 1964–50th Anniversary,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 488, edited by William Burr, October 16, 2014, National Security Archive, George Washington University, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb488/.
22. Memorandum from General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense, “Strategic Analysis of the Impact of the Acquisition by Communist China of a Nuclear Capability,” June 26, 1961, Secret, John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Robert W. Komer Files, box 410, China (CPR) Nuclear Explosion (folder 2 of 2), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb488/docs/Doc%202%206-26-61%20JCS%20report.pdf.
23. Special Intelligence Estimate Number 13-2-62, “Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program,” April 25, 1962, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001097940.pdf.
24. Memorandum from George C. Denney, Jr., Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Secretary of State, “Probable Consequences of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation,” INR Research Memorandum R-17, May 6, 1963, Secret; RG 59, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Subject, Personnel, and Country Files, 1960–63, box 21, CSM-Communism, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb488/docs/Doc%209%205-6-63%20inr%20report.pdf.
25. Special Intelligence Estimate Number 13-2-63, “Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program,” July 24, 1963, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001097947.pdf.
26. Director of Central Intelligence to US Intelligence Board, Special National Intelligence Estimate 13-4-64, “The Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion,” August 26, 1964, Top Secret, excised copy, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001095915.pdf.
27. W. W. Rostow, Policy Planning Staff, to Secretary Rusk, “The Handling of a Possible Chinese Communist Nuclear Test,” September 26, 1964, Secret; RG 59, Policy Planning Council Records, 1963–64, box 265, RJ Chron File July–December 1964, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb488/docs/doc%2019%20handling%20(1).pdf.
28. NIE, December 6, 1960.
29. Richelson 2006, 143.
30. Rusk and Papp 1990, 157.
31. NSC 5810/1 5-5-1958, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1958–60, vol. III (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), 100–101; see also Lüthi 2008, 249.
32. Rusk and Papp 1990, 158.
33. NIE 4-2-1961 in FRUS 1961–63, vol. VII, 37; see also Lüthi 2008, 251.
34. Lüthi 2008, 77.
35. Hilsman 1967, 285, 290.
36. Hilsman 1967, 289–290.
37. Rusk and Papp 1990, 289.
38. John F. Kennedy, television and radio interview, “After Two-Years—a Conversation With the President,” December 17, 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, 903.
39. JFKL, John F. Kennedy 1, Personal Papers, box 26, series 10.1, “Appeasement at Munich”; series 10.2, Why England Slept; folder “Final Thesis, Carbon Typescript with Corrections, Preface—Page 29,” pp. 1, 6.
40. Saunders 2011.
41. Memo from Robert W. Komer to McGeorge Bundy, May 1, 1964, document 164, folder “Komer Memos, Volume 1 [3 of 3],” National Security File, Name File, box 6 [1 of 2], Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
42. JFKL, John F. Kennedy 1, Personal Papers, box 26, series 10.1, “Appeasement at Munich”; series 10.2, Why England Slept; folder “Final Thesis, Carbon Typescript with Corrections, Preface—Page 29,” pp. 1, 6.
43. JFKL, John F. Kennedy 1 Personal Papers, box 26, series 10.1, “Appeasement at Munich”; series 10.2, Why England Slept; folder “Final Thesis, Carbon Typescript with Corrections, Preface—Page 29,” pp. 1, 6.
44. Kennedy entered service in the US Navy in October 1941 as an ensign. He served initially for the Foreign Intelligence Branch of the Office of National Intelligence in Washington, DC. Eventually, after persistent petitioning, Kennedy was granted active duty and sent to the South Pacific.
45. J. F. Kennedy 1960, xxxi. In the introduction to Kennedy’s diary, journalist and Kennedy friend Hugh Sidey argues that by the time Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin met at Yalta to discuss the post–World War II reorganization of Germany and Europe, Kennedy had already discerned the Soviet threat and the looming Cold War. As Sidey says, “at the very least he discerned Soviet brutishness, the dark clouds that would turn into the cold war and the need for allied arsenals to face that challenge.”
46. JFK, floor debate, August 17, 1951, Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 1st session, 10234–35.
47. Reeves 1993, 140.
48. J. F. Kennedy and Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service 1964, 520; speech entitled “Imperialism: The Enemy of Freedom,” delivered on July 2, 1957.
49. J. F. Kennedy and Sorensen 1988, 117–18; campaign speech, San Francisco, California, November 2, 1960.
50. J. F. Kennedy 1960, 227; discussion with John Fischer, editor-in-chief of Harper’s Magazine, December 9, 1959.
51. Reeves 1993, 140; referring to President Kennedy’s May 25, 1961, speech entitled “The Goal of Sending a Man to the Moon.”
52. Rusk and Papp 1990, 294.
53. Hilsman 1967, 211; Kennedy, John F., “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba,” October 22, 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, 80.
54. J. F. Kennedy 1995, 7.
55. J. F. Kennedy 1995. Hugh Sidey makes this point in the volume’s introduction.
56. JFK, floor debate, House Congressional Resolution 252, August 24, 1950, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd session, 13400.
57. J. F. Kennedy 1960, 19; “Student Convocation at UCLA,” Los Angeles, California, November 2, 1959.
58. J. F. Kennedy 1960, 26–30.
59. The JFK Library collection has a variety of constituent letters penned by Kennedy in which he describes his views on the dangers of proliferation and the need to have a concerted effort for international disarmament. See for example, letter from JFK to Mr. Albert Rudnick, August 11, 1959, folder “Foreign Policy Disarmament,” box 718, Papers of President Kennedy, Pre-presidential Papers, Senate Files, Legislation, Legislation Files 1953–60, JFKL. This folder contains a variety of constituent letters with very similar content.
60. For JFK’s views on European proliferation, see “Multilateral Nuclear Force,” Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting no. 41, February 12, 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, vol. 13, document 173; Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting no. 38 (pt. II), January 25, 1963, FRUS 1961–63, vol. 13, document 169.
61. One potential exception is French proliferation. Gavin 2012a argues that Kennedy appeared to assist the French nuclear development.
62. Beschloss 1991, 570.
63. John F. Kennedy, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8032.
64. Coleman 2006, 44.
65. Lüthi 2008, 249.
66. Quoted in Reeves 1993, 477; J. F. Kennedy and Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, 1964, 280.
67. J. F. Kennedy 1960, 24; “Student Convocation at U.C.L.A. Los Angeles, California, November 2, 1959.”
68. Dallek 2003, 344.
69. Dallek 2003, 344.
70. Reeves 1993, 175.
71. Dallek 2003, 705.
72. Dallek 2003, 346, 608.
73. Oral history interview with Walt Rostow, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKOH-WWR-01.aspx; Dallek 2003, 343.
74. Rusk and Papp 1990, 251.
75. “Draft—Avoiding Nuclear War,” folder “Foreign Policy: “Avoiding Nuclear War,” Office Files of Harry J. Middleton, box 90, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
76. J. F. Kennedy and Sorensen 1988, 118.
77. Dallek 2003, 613.
78. “U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency: Mission,” Wayback Machine, accessed July 27, 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20060603002952/http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/aboutacd/mission.htm.
79. Dallek 2003, 613; Lebovic 2013, 54. See also Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 188.
80. Dallek 2003, 615; J. F. Kennedy 1964, 280, “President’s News Conference of March 21, 1963.”
81. R. F. Kennedy 1988, 327.
82. Rusk and Papp 1990, 251.
83. “State of the Union,” January 30, 1961, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8045.
84. Dallek 2003, 462.
85. Dallek 2003, 463; John F. Kennedy, “President’s News Conference of January 15, 1962,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, 18.
86. Dallek 2003, 348.
87. Dallek 2003, 148.
88. J. F. Kennedy 1995, 74.
89. Dallek 2003, 74. Quoting JFK’s unpublished article “Let’s Try an Experiment for Peace.”
90. Dallek 2003, 115.
91. Dallek 2003, 222; “Imperialism: The Enemy of Freedom,” July 2, 1957, J. F. Kennedy and Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service 1964.
92. Dallek 2003, 132–33. JFK Speech, “The Time Has Come,” October 1946, JFKL Pre-presidential Papers, box 94.
93. Dallek 2003, 357; quoted in Hersh 1997.
94. Dallek 2003, 159.
95. Dallek 2003, 149.
96. Dallek 2003, 160. J. F. Kennedy, “Our Foreign Policy in Connection with China,” January 29, 1949, 81st Congress, 1st session, compendium, p. 41.
97. J. F. Kennedy, “China-Statement of Hon. John F. Kennedy, of Massachusetts,” February 21, 1949, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st session, A993.
98. J. F. Kennedy and Sorensen 1988, 83. Nomination of Adlai E. Stevenson for President of the United States, Democratic National Convention, 1956.
99. JFK, “Future of Soviet Foreign Policy by John Fox,” April 7, 1953, Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 1st session, A1833–34.
100. J. F. Kennedy 1960, 103; emphasis in original.
101. Dallek 2003, 164. JFKL, John F. Kennedy Pre-Presidential Papers, box 95, “Remarks of Representative John F. Kennedy Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,” Washington, D.C., February 22, 1951. https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/united-states-senate-committee-on-foreign-relations-19510222.
102. J. F. Kennedy and Sorensen 1988, 238.
103. Reeves 1993, 222.
104. This was not a new theme for Kennedy. In 1952 on the House floor, Kennedy articulated this sentiment, arguing that falling behind the Soviets militarily would invite danger. J. F. Kennedy, April 9, 1952, Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 2nd session, 3871–72.
105. John F. Kennedy, “Radio and Television Address to the American People: “Nuclear Testing and Disarmament,” March 2, 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, 188.
106. Dallek 2003, 112. JFK to Billings, February 12, 1942, Nigel Hamilton Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
107. J. F. Kennedy and Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service 1964, 994.
108. J. F. Kennedy 1960, 226.
109. J. F. Kennedy and Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service 1964, 932–33. Kennedy, “A Time of Decision,” June 14, 1960.
110. Bundy 1988, 381, 485.
111. J. F. Kennedy 1964, 611.
112. J. F. Kennedy 1960, 20.
113. J. F. Kennedy 1960, 48. John F. Kennedy, “The Economic Gap,” February 2, 1959, Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 1st session.
114. J. F. Kennedy and Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service 1964, 932–33. Kennedy, “A Time of Decision,” June 14, 1960.
115. Chang 1988, 1290, citing Arthur Krock, no. 393, Memoranda, Book III, October 1961, Arthur Krock Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey; “Summary of the President’s Remarks to the National Security Council, January 18, 1962,” National Security Council Meetings, 1962, box 313, National Security files, Kennedy Papers.
116. Lüthi 2008, 249.
117. Letter from President Kennedy to President Chiang Kai-Shek, April 16, 1961, President’s Office Files, Countries, box 113A (China), JFKL.
118. “Summary Record of National Security Council Meeting, July 31, 1963, 4:30 p.m.—Chinese Communist Intentions,” document 26, folder “BKS (Kennedy Admin.—NSC Meetings, [1 of 2],” box 23, Papers of Bromley Smith, LBJL.
119. Burr and Richelson 2001, 67, as described by McGeorge Bundy to John McCone.
120. R. F. Kennedy 1988, 385.
121. Gavin 2010, 402–3. See also “Memo from Bundy to JFK,” FRUS 1961–63, vol. VII, 598.
122. Saunders 2011.
123. See Saunders 2011, 134, on the change in Johnson scholarship over time. See, for example, Goodwin 1976 for scholarship that portrays Johnson as ignorant on foreign affairs. See Dallek 1991, 1998, for the revisionist view.
124. Heinrichs 1994, 23.
125. Johnson and Beschloss 2001, 327.
126. “General,” dated January 31, 1964, document 8a, folder “The President and Foreign Affairs,” National Security File, Intelligence File, box 9, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
127. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Exchange of Letters with President Goulart of Brazil,” December 23, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963, 81.
128. Wicker 1968, 195.
129. Dallek 1991, 198.
130. Dallek 1991, 225.
131. Ellis 2010, 250.
132. Dallek 1991, 272.
133. LBJ, “Our Stake in Greece,” May 9, 1947, Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st session, A2202-4.
134. Walker 1999, 83.
135. Unger and Unger 1999, 131, citing Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2nd session, March 5, 1948, 1056.
136. Wicker 1968, 200–202.
137. Dallek 1998, 86.
138. Dallek 1991, 275, citing “Johnson Would Give Bomb to Russia,” Austin Statesman, January 9, 1946. I am grateful to librarian Andrea Schwartz at the Austin Public Library, Austin, Texas, for assistance in acquiring this article.
139. LBJ, February 18, 1946, Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd session, A827-8.
140. “Text of Speech Transcribed for Broadcast on Texas State Network” from Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, July 18, 1950, folder—“7/18/50 Release by Sen. Johnson, regarding ‘Korean Situation,’ ” Statements of Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1950–October 1951, box 10, LBJL.
141. June 3, 1953, Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 1st session, 5945.
142. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Memorandum Approving Agreement on Exchange of Atomic Information with NATO and Member Nations,” June 30, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963, 837.
143. Dallek 1991, 275, 300.
144. Burr and Rosenberg 2010, 91.
145. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks in Seattle on the Control of Nuclear Weapons,” September 16, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, 1079.
146. Costigliola 2010, 127.
147. Costigliola 2010, 127.
148. Caro 2012, 208.
149. Caro 2012, 212, quoting “Memorandum for the File, Meeting with the Vice President on October 21, 1962,” in The Presidential Recordings, John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, vol. III, October 22–28, 1962, 7.
150. Rusk and Papp 1990, 340.
151. Lyndon B. Johnson, “President’s News Conference of October 3, 1964,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, 1199; text of speech transcribed for broadcast on Texas State Network, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, July 18, 1950, “7/18/50 Release by Sen. Johnson, regarding ‘Korean Situation,’ ” Statements of Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1950–October 1951, box 10, LBJL.
152. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Address to the U.N. General Assembly,” December 17, 1963, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-17-1963-address-un-general-assembly#embed-code.
153. “Editorial Note,” Johnson Administration, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. 9, document 49. “Telephone Conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Under Secretary of State George Ball,” October 29, 1964, 9:10 a.m., Ball Papers, Disarmament, box 3, LBJL; see also Gavin 2012a, chap. 4.
154. “Meeting of the Committee of Principals, Monday, November 23, 1964–4:30 p.m. Secretary of State’s Conference Room,” document 3, folder “CMTE of PRINS MTG Minutes Years 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965 (except those in other folders),” National Security File, Files of Spurgeon Keeny, box 2, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
155. Seaborg and Loeb 1987, 136–37.
156. “The President’s Committee on Nuclear Proliferation: A Report to the President,” RAC no. NLJ-009R-9-1-2-1, RAC Work Station, LBJL.
157. “US Opens Review of Atomic Policy,” New York Times, December 2, 1964, document 7, folder “Gilpatric Panel [1 of 2],” National Security File, Files of Spurgeon Keeny, box 6, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
158. “Memorandum for the President Subject: Your Meeting with the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation,” January 21, 1965, document 37, folder “Presidential Task Force Committee on Nuclear Proliferation [2 of 2],” National Security File, Subject File, box 35, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
159. “Memo from Robert W. Komer to McGeorge Bundy, October 6, 1964,” folder “Komer Memos, Volume 1 [3 of 3],” National Security File, Name File, box 6 (1 of 2), Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
160. On Johnson’s foreign and nuclear policy, see Gavin 2012a; Brands 1999; Schwartz 2003.
161. Costigliola 2010, 126, citing Fetzer 1989, 182.
162. Costigliola 2010, 126, citing Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 219; “Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Bundy,” May 27, 1964, FRUS 1964–68, vol. 27, 135.
163. Johnson and Beschloss 2001, 181–82. Later, in March 1965, Johnson made very similar remarks expressing the dangers of appeasement and backing down when confronting a dictator: “I don’t believe I can walk out [of Vietnam].… If I did, they’d take Thailand.… They’d take Cambodia.… They’d take Burma.… They’d take Indonesia.… They’d take India.… They’d come right back and take the Philippines … I’d be another Chamberlain and … we’d have another Munich. The aggressors feed on blood”; quoted in Johnson and Beschloss 2001, 238.
164. Saunders 2011.
165. Dallek 1991, 198.
166. Dallek 1991, 225.
167. Dallek 1991, 382.
168. Dallek 1991, 383–86.
169. Dallek 1998, 291.
170. “Letter to Mr. William F. Wingren from Lee Thomson Stull, Foreign Affairs Aide,” February 14, 1963, folder “Foreign Relations [CHINA],” Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, Vice President, 1961–63, box 195, LBJL.
171. Garson 1997, 63.
172. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” January 8, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963, 116.
173. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks at Miami Beach at a Democratic Party Dinner,” February 27, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963, 319.
174. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Commencement Address in New London at the United States Coast Guard Academy,” June 3, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963, 742.
175. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks in Manchester to the Members of the New Hampshire Weekly Newspaper Editors Association,” September 28, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, 1161.
176. “Outgoing Department of State Telegram,” August 3, 1967, document 4, folder “NUCLEAR—Nuclear Detonation—Chinese Nuclear Tests, Joint Comm. Report On,” National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson, box 36, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
177. Rusk and Papp 1990, 282.
178. Rusk and Papp 1990, 283.
179. Hilsman 1967, 291.
180. M. Jones 2010, 404.
181. M. Jones 2010, 416.
182. Richelson 2006, 145.
183. Richelson 2006, 152.
184. Richelson 2006, 144.
185. Richelson 2006, 145.
186. Richelson 2006, 149.
187. Reeves 1993, 136–37.
188. “Memorandum to Mr. Bromley Smith from McGeorge Bundy,” July 30, 1963, document 34, folder “BKS (Kennedy Admin.—NSC Meetings, [1 of 2]),” box 23, Papers of Bromley Smith, LBJL.
189. Dallek 2003, 615. See also “Record of the 508th Meeting of the National Security Council,” January 1963, FRUS 1961–63, vol. 8 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996), document 125.
190. Reeves 1993, 510.
191. Reeves 1993, 734.
192. “Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,” July 3, 1961, signed by Acting Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, folder “China (CPR) 1961–63,” folder 2 of 3, box 410, Papers of President Kennedy, National Security File, Robert W. Komer, JFKL.
193. “The President’s Appointment with General Chiang Ching-Kuo,” September 11, 1962, folder “China, Security, 1962–63,” box “President’s Office Files, Countries, Box 113A (China),” JFKL.
194. Richelson 2006, 155.
195. Richelson 2006, 155.
196. “The Bases for Direct Action against Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities,” April 22, 1964, document 111, folder—“China Memos Vol. 1, 12/63-9/64 [2 of 2],” National Security File, Country File, Asian and the Pacific, Cambodia, China, box 237, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
197. “Memorandum for the Record by McCone,” January 11, 1963, editorial note, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 12 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996), document 162, p. 339.
198. Lüthi 2008, 254, citing Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 181, and “Notes on Remarks by the President Kennedy before NSC, 1/22/1963,” JFK, National Security Files, box 314, JFKL, “NSC Meetings 1963 No. 508, 1/22/1963.”
199. Chang 1990, 241; Lüthi 2008, 262.
200. For Kennedy and Harriman’s discussions, see “Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State,” July 15, 1963, FRUS 1961–63, vol. 7, document 325, and also Chang 1990, 243; Lüthi 2008, 262.
201. See “Editorial Note,” FRUS 1961–63, vol. 12, document 164, describing a January 23 letter to JFK from Harriman; Richelson 2006, 548; see telegram to Soviet Union Embassy of the United States, FRUS 1961–63, vol. VII, 832.
202. Reeves 1993, 547; Richelson 2006, 154.
203. Richelson 2006, 154; see also Public Papers of the President, August 1, 1963; FRUS 1964–68, vol. XXX, China, 24 n.7.
204. Richelson 2006, 155.
205. “Counterfactual Analysis in Security Studies: A Symposium,” 2015.
206. Richelson 2006, 160; see August 26, 1964, SNIE—“Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion,” FRUS 1964–68, vol. XXX, China, document 43.
207. “Memo to Bundy from Rostow: The Bases for Direct Action Against Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities,” April 22, 1964, document 111, folder—“China Memos Vol. 1, 12/63-9/64 [2 of 2],” National Security File, Country File, Asian and the Pacific, Cambodia, China, box 237, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
208. George Rathjens, “Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities,” December 24, 1964, National Security File, Committee File Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, box 5, folder “China,” Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
209. Rathjens, “Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities.”
210. Rathjens, “Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities.”
211. “Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” draft position paper, August 14, 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. 11 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), document 44.
212. George G. Rathjens, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities,” December 14, 1964, National Security Archive, George Washington University, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB38/document21.pdf.
213. McGeorge Bundy, “Memorandum for the Record,” September 15, 1964, document 2, folder “Meetings, Records, Memoranda on the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” National Security File, Intelligence File, box 9, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
214. Richelson 2006, 162.
215. Caro 2012, 208, 212, quoting “Memorandum for the File, Meeting with the Vice President on October 21, 1962,” in The Presidential Recordings, John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, vol. III, October 22–28, 1962, 7.
216. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Statement by the President on the First Chinese Nuclear Device,” October 16, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1357.
217. Lyndon B. Johnson, “President’s News Conference of October 19, 1964,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, 1381.
218. Johnson, Lyndon B., Radio and Television Report to the American People on Recent Events in Russia, China, and Great Britain, October 18, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1379.
219. Johnson, Lyndon B., Joint Statement Following Discussions With the President of the Philippines, October 6, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1213.
220. Johnson 1971, 469.
221. Johnson 1971, 469–70.
222. Johnson and Beschloss 2001, 43. Bundy is referring to the fiftieth anniversary of Chairman Mao’s 1949 Communist Revolution.
223. Johnson and Beschloss 2001, 43.
224. Johnson and Beschloss 2001, 97.
225. Richelson 2006, 153.
226. Burr and Richelson 2001. The contents were conveyed to LBJ but not explored. Moreover, even if the report ended discussion, the lack of previous presidential attention is not explained. To explain this lack of attention, beliefs are required.
227. For example, State Department cable, “Trends and Prospects in Communist China; Implications for US Policy,” August 16, 1963, folder “China (CPR) 1961–1963,” folder 1 of 3, Papers of President Kennedy, National Security File, Robert W. Komer, box 410, JFKL.
228. “SNIE 13-4-63 Possibilities of Greater Militancy by the Chinese Communists,” document 20, 31 July 1963, folder “BKS (Kennedy Admin.—NSC Meetings, [1 of 2], box 23, Papers of Bromley Smith, LBJL. SNIE 13-2-63 Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program, dated July 24, 1963, folder “13–61 to 13–65, Communist China [2 of 2],” National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, box 4, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
229. Saunders 2011.
230. We can similarly speculate that had Kennedy lived to order an intervention, Johnson would likely have opposed the mission given such feasibility and cost-centered concerns and in light of his dramatically different view of the (much more limited) threat posed by the Chinese nuclear program.
231. Beschloss 1991, 701.
232. Burr and Richelson 2001.
233. LBJL, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, vol. 1, Secret; prepared by Bundy on October 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/d45
234. “Summary Notes of 543rd NSC Meeting October 17, 1964: Communist China—Nuclear Weapon Test,” folder “NSC Meetings, Vol. 3, Tab 25, 10/17/64 Communist China,” National Security File, NSC Meetings File, box 1, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.
235. Gavin 2012a, chap. 4.
236. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Report to the Nation on Events in China and the USSR,” October 18, 1964, LBJL, accessed June 9, 2020, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/october-18-1964-report-nation-events-china-and-ussr.
237. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Statement by the President on the First Chinese Nuclear Device,” October 16, 1964, accessed June 9, 2020, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-president-the-first-chinese-nuclear-device.
238. Hilsman 1967, 339.
239. Chang, 1988, 1293.
240. Untitled typed notes by Bromley Smith, document 4a, p. 6, especially “Portion of the NSC Meeting Minutes, Monday, October 22, 1962,” folder 5, “BKS (Kennedy Admin)—NSC Meetings, 1962 [1 of 2],” box 22, Papers of Bromley Smith, LBJL.
241. Costigliola 2010, 113, citing Fetzer 1989, 182.
4. Presidents 41 and 42 Engage North Korea’s Nuclear Program
1. Monteiro and Debs 2014.
2. There is no indication that the intervention’s feasibility was questioned. Rather, each military campaign (from limited to expansive) was deemed doable given US air force superiority and outmatched North Korean defenses. More problematic were intelligence gaps about the full DPRK program and escalation risks. The risks of a wider war, however, though grave, were insufficient to prevent Clinton from pursuing the military option, according to Charles Allen, national intelligence officer for warning, who briefed the president on these matters. Sigal 1998, 155.
3. Carter and Perry 1999, 123–24.
4. Allison 1971, 176.
5. This theme is discussed in chapter 5.
6. In the Chinese case, a more perfect comparison results from JFK’s assassination, yielding an exogenous shock whereby facts on the ground remain nearly constant between presidents, with the exception of the leadership change, which no one could have predicted. This comparison allows for a much stronger demonstration of the causal impact of leader beliefs. However, it is important that the argument carries into the contemporary period even if it does so imperfectly, given the longer time period of the DPRK case.
7. Bleiker 2003, 725.
8. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 2.
9. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 2.
10. Mazarr 1995a, 93–94; Perry 2006, 80–81.
11. Oberdorfer 1997, 252.
12. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 2.
13. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 3.
14. Central Intelligence Agency, “North Korea: Nuclear Reactor,” July 9, 1982, National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk01.pdf.
15. Oberdorfer 1997, 250.
16. Oberdorfer 1997, 250.
17. Experts dispute the specific time line of these assessments from 1984 to 1986 and from 1987 to 1989. However, by 1989 there was no doubt in the US government that the North was pursuing a nuclear program.
18. Oberdorfer 1997, 251.
19. Mazarr 1995a, 94.
20. “Department of State briefing paper, ca. January 5, 1985,” National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk05.pdf.
21. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 3.
22. Perry 2006, 80–81.
23. Koch 2006, 9.
24. Halberstam 2001, 69–70.
25. G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 407. Bush ran first for this seat in 1964. Though unsuccessful, the campaign revealed his discomfort with Republican Party ideologies, especially the anti-internationalist.
26. From March 1971 to January 1973, Bush served as ambassador to the United Nations; from January 1973 to September 1974, Bush was chairman of the Republican National Committee.
27. The China diary Bush kept demonstrates his prepresidential beliefs. Although many presidents write memoirs, usually they are written after the author’s tenure in office, allowing for memory modification, alterations for self-preservation, or preferential historical revision. Very few presidents, by contrast, have kept private journals documenting their prepresidential period. Additionally, only a smaller number of presidents have expounded on international politics prior to hitting the campaign trail, and those who do are often seeking high office and writing for the public. By contrast, Bush wrote for himself and never intended the diary to be read by anyone, let alone be published. Thus, his diary reveals private views written as events were unfolding, allowing scholars a unique glimpse into his person, his experiences, and their effect on later decisions. Like all historical records, however, the diary is imperfect: its entries are not consecutive, and the surviving records are what assistants transcribed. The original tapes of this process have been lost. For more on this, see G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, xviii–xix. Engel described the diary as follows: “His China Diary was thus more than a daily record of his activities. It became instead his private sketchbook for his later presidential diplomacy, the canvas upon which he first seriously began to paint his own diplomatic image” (G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 400).
28. G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, xxii.
29. For an example of Bush’s aggressive attitude during World War II, see “Letter to Mum and Dad,” August 24, 1944, Donated Historical Records, George H. W. Bush Collection, Personal Papers, World War II Correspondence, August 1944, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, College Station, Texas (hereafter GHWBPL). For Bush’s commentary on the domino theory in South East Asia, see Donated Historical Materials, George H. W. Bush Collection, Personal Papers, China File, Peking Diary, box “Range Peking Diary Volume I to Peking Diary Volume III,” folder “Peking Diary Volume I,” p. 162, GHWBPL.
30. The absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence. Thus, firm conclusions remain elusive on this point.
31. Naftali 2007, 14.
32. The Americans and Soviets put forward an argument to this effect to justify the pressure they exerted on the Chinese to sign the treaty prior to becoming a nuclear weapons state.
33. Bush’s stance could also represent a broad opposition to limitations on US freedom of action, but that spirit is not evidenced by hostility to all treaties or participation in international organizations, undermining this alternative.
34. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the United States Congress 1967–1971.
35. G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 210n39.
36. It is difficult to know definitively whether this is evidence of nuclear optimism. Working with the GHWBPL, I have attempted to acquire this cable, which would offer a more certain assessment of its significance for Bush’s nuclear beliefs. Until then, conclusions remain preliminary.
37. Donated Historical Materials, George H. W. Bush Collection, Personal Papers, China File, Peking Diary, box “Range Peking Diary Volume I to Peking Diary Volume III,” folder “Peking Diary Volume I,” p. 15, GHWBPL.
38. G. H. W. Bush and Gold 1987, 41.
39. G. H. W. Bush 2009, 48, remarks at the United States Coast Guard Academy Commencement Ceremony, Nitchman Field, New London, Connecticut, May 24, 1989.
40. G. H. W. Bush 2009, 57, remarks to the citizens of Mainz, Rheingoldhalle, Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, May 31, 1989.
41. Chemical weapons were used in March 1988, when Hussein attacked the Kurdish population in Halabja. This background should make chemical weapons a seemingly more urgent point of concern. Nevertheless, arguably a nuclear pessimist would have mentioned both chemical and nuclear weapons as dangerous and necessitating action. Both in Halabja’s aftermath and subsequently, that Bush did not is revealing for his lack of focus on nuclear proliferation. It could also be the case that ballistic missiles were a proxy for nuclear weapons in Bush’s mind, but I find no evidence to support this possibility. Nor do I find a specific focus on ballistic missiles elsewhere in the documentary record.
42. On the stability-instability paradox, see for example G. Snyder 1961; Kapur 2005.
43. For this view, see Trachtenberg 1999. For an alternative view, see Mueller 2009.
44. G. H. W. Bush 2009, 49, remarks at the United States Coast Guard Academy Commencement Ceremony.
45. G. H. W. Bush 2009, 49, remarks at the United States Coast Guard Academy Commencement Ceremony.
46. One might wonder whether Bush believed that nuclear weapons caused stability only in the hands of “responsible” actors, such as the United States. The documentary record reveals no evidence connecting regime type to consequences for proliferation.
47. George H. W. Bush, “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a White House Luncheon for Journalists,” March 31, 1989, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush, 1989, 339.
48. George H. W. Bush, “Message to the Congress Transmitting the Annual Report on Nuclear Nonproliferation,” July 19, 1989, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush, 1989, 984.
49. National Security Directive 29, “The FY 1990 Aqueduct Nuclear Test Program,” October 30, 1989, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/prez_policies/bush1/aqueduct.pdf. National Security Directive 52, “The FY 1991 Sculpin Nuclear Test Program,” October 22, 1990, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/prez_policies/bush1/sculpin.pdf.
50. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests (and Protocol Thereto) (also known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty), US Department of State archives, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5204.htm.
51. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Strategic Offensive Reductions (START II), available on Nuclear Threat Initiative website, https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-between-united-states-america-and-union-soviet-socialist-republics-strategic-offensive-reductions-start-ii/.
52. On Bush’s Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, see Fuhrmann and Early, “Following START,” 21–43.
53. For more on the program, see “Agency Functions,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency, https://www.dtra.mil/Mission/Partnering/Cooperative-Threat-Reduction-Program/.
54. I have filed Freedom of Information Act and Mandatory Declassification Review requests with the GHWBPL for access to classified materials that might shed light on these issues. While I preliminarily code Bush as a weak nuclear optimist regarding the consequences of additional nuclear proliferation in the international system, it is difficult to know whether the absence of evidence is suggestive of Bush’s views in this way.
55. George H. W. Bush, floor debate, April 21, 1969, Congressional Record, 91st Congress, 1st session, 9684.
56. G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 264.
57. G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 270–71.
58. During Kim Il Sung’s visit to Beijing, which produced the communiqué, he called for the communist world to seize the opportunity of the fall of Saigon to “reinvigorate his dream of unifying the Korean peninsula, by force if necessary.” See G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 264n12.
59. For a discussion of the arms buildup and subsequent arms control policies of the Reagan administration, see Lebovic 2013, chap. 4.
60. Later in his administration, Reagan initiated critical arms control efforts between the United States and the USSR and emerged as a strong nuclear pessimist. I would argue, going beyond the analysis presented in this book, that this transition was possible only after the massive buildup over which he presided. Bush may have undergone a similar transition, beginning as a weak nuclear optimist but then presiding over the START I arms control treaty process, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, when Bush began to recognize the dangers of nuclear proliferation.
61. Arms Control Association 1989. See also Kimball 2004.
62. For a general discussion of Bush as Reagan’s vice president, see Naftali 2007, 42; G. H. W. Bush 1999, 303, “Letter to President-elect and Mrs. Ronald Reagan,” November 10, 1980.
63. The United States discovered North Korea’s nuclear program in 1982, so it is unsurprising that Bush’s record before then does not mention this issue. Later, however, given that Bush was vice president when the discovery occurred, we might expect more information on this topic to emerge during that period. That it does not is revealing.
64. Bush could not have known about the nascent North Korean nuclear program during this period, as even the US government did not. At the same time, North Korea—its regime, its behavior, and so on—could have been seen by Bush as more directly threatening or challenging to US interests and allies. That Bush did not describe North Korea in such terms and wrote only briefly about it lends support to the view that North Korea was more of an annoyance to Bush than a threat.
65. Don Oberdorfer, “On Global Matters, Two Candidates’ Positions Are Mostly in Sync,” Washington Post, September 29, 1992, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/09/29/on-global-matters-two-candidates-positions-are-mostly-in-sync/a505fc9c-ccf0-4266-ba28-cfd75f69f221/.
66. Saunders 2011, 191–96, for a discussion of Bush’s and Clinton’s contrasting approaches on Somalia.
67. “A New Covenant for American Security,” speech delivered at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, December 12, 1991, cited in Clinton and Smith 1996, 114.
68. During the 1992 campaign, Clinton gave three formal platform addresses dubbed “New Covenant” speeches. They focused on responsible citizenry, the economy, and foreign policy. While these speeches are highly political in nature, they are also telling because they offer Clinton’s vision for presidential office. Especially since the other Democratic candidates avoided addressing foreign policy issues as much as possible given Bush’s subject matter expertise, these are issues that Clinton chose to engage.
69. Clinton and Smith 1996, 114.
70. “Remembering Truman: Be Bold in Fighting for America’s Future,” speech delivered to the Democratic National Convention, San Francisco, California, July 16, 1984, Clinton and Smith 1996, 47.
71. “A New Covenant for American Security,” speech at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., December 12, 1991, Clinton and Smith 1996, 115, 116, 119, 120.
72. “Strategic Security in a Changing World,” speech at Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, California, August 13, 1992, Clinton and Smith 1996, 275.
73. Lebovic 2013, 197.
74. William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 27, 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1993, 1612–16.
75. Warren Strobel, “Foreign Policy Mars Clinton’s First Year: Clinton Fails to Define Foreign Policy in First Year,” Washington Times, November 9, 1993.
76. “Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by National Security Adviser Lake,” Pierson College, Yale University, February 24, 1994, “Lake—Proliferation—Yale 2/24/94,” box FOIA 2006-0459-F, Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files, National Security Council, box 1 of 39, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, Arkansas (hereafter WJCPL).
77. “Executive Order #12938,” September 30, 1994, document 4137, Clinton Presidential Records, Press Office, Press Release Subject File, box 14, OA number 8692, folder 13 Nuclear Weapons, WJCPL.
78. Bush also supported Ukraine as a nonnuclear state following the dissolution of the USSR. However, as I argue in chapter 5, only in the aftermath of the Gulf War did Bush internalize a more systematic concern for nuclear proliferation.
79. Carter and Perry 1999, 76.
80. William J. Clinton, “The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao of India,” May 19, 1994, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1994, 955–56.
81. For both Clinton and Bush, it is difficult to prove the counterfactual that they would have wanted to draw down the US nuclear arsenal absent the disappearance of the Soviet Union. However, what is important for the argument here is that Clinton pegged this issue of lower numbers to the nuclear pessimist logic, saying that fewer states armed with nuclear weapons would be better for international relations. Bush, conversely, did not, and thus disarmament was merely about lower numbers for the sake of stability.
82. Clinton 2004, 597, 786.
83. “A New Covenant for American Security,” speech delivered at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, December 12, 1991, Clinton and Smith 1996, 115.
84. “A New Covenant for American Security,” Clinton and Smith 1996, 116.
85. “A New Covenant for American Security,” Clinton and Smith 1996, 118.
86. There is a voluminous literature on democratic peace theory. Early examples include Doyle 1986; Russett 1994; D. A. Lake 1992. For overviews, see Chan 1997; Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller 1996. See Bell and Quek 2018 for an assessment of the more recent literature.
87. “A New Covenant for American Security,” Clinton and Smith 1996, 114.
88. “A New Covenant for American Security,” Clinton and Smith 1996, 115.
89. “A New Covenant for American Security,” Clinton and Smith 1996, 116.
90. Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. Vision of Foreign Policy Reversed,” New York Times, September 22, 1993.
91. Carter and Perry 1999, 153.
92. Memorandum from George Bush to National Security Cabinet, March 3, 1989, “National Security Review 12,” OA/ID 20091, GHWBPL, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsr.php.
93. Maynard 2008, 137.
94. Oberdorfer 1997, 255.
95. Mack 1991, 88.
96. Department of State “Talking Points” paper for Under Secretary of State Bartholomew’s China trip, ca. May 30, 1991, subject: North Korean Nuclear Program (for China) (FOIA-declassified 2002), National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk15.pdf.
97. Baker and DeFrank 1995, 595.
98. Memorandum from George Bush to National Security Cabinet, March 3, 1989, “National Security Review 12,” OA/ID 20091, GHWBPL, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/nsr/nsr12.pdf.
99. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 7.
100. Mazarr 1995a, 94–95. The safeguards system provides credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The North, though it acceded to the NPT in 1985, did not conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA until 1991. For more on safeguards, see http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/sv.html.
101. Sigal 1998, 26.
102. “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” US Capitol, Washington, DC, January 29, 1991, in G. H. W. Bush 2009, 185.
103. Albright and O’Neill 2000, 204.
104. Sigal 1998, 27.
105. “Paper, US-ROK Basic Positions, ca. August/September 1991,” National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed February 14, 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4176668-Document-03a-Paper-US-ROK-Basic-Positions-ca.
106. “Paper, US-ROK Basic Positions, ca. August/September 1991,” p. 1.
107. Bush kept some tactical weapons stationed in Europe.
108. “Briefing Book, Deputies Committee Meeting on North Korea,” ca. December 13, 1991, National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed February 14, 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4176673-Document-07-Briefing-Book-Deputies-Committee.
109. “Memorandum for ASD/ISA, DC Meeting on North Korean Nuclear Program” in “Briefing Book, Deputies Committee Meeting on North Korea,” p. 5, National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed February 14, 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4176673-Document-07-Briefing-Book-Deputies-Committee.
110. “Strategy for Dealing with North Korean Nuclear Issue,” in “Briefing Book, Deputies Committee Meeting on North Korea,” pp. 8–16, National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed February 14, 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4176673-Document-07-Briefing-Book-Deputies-Committee.
111. “Strategy for Dealing with North Korean Nuclear Issue,” in “Briefing Book, Deputies Committee Meeting on North Korea,” p. 14.
112. Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, available on Nuclear Threat Initiative website, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/joint-declaration-south-and-north-korea-denuclearization-korean-peninsula/.
113. George H. W. Bush, “Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul,” January 6, 1992, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush, 1992, 41.
114. “Memorandum for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Subject: North Korean Nuclear Issue and DC Meeting, February 7, 1992,” p. 2, National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed February 14, 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4176674-Document-08-Memorandum-for-Undersecretary-of.
115. “Memorandum: North Korea Deputies’ Committee, March 12, 1992,” p. 1, National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed February 14, 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4176675-Document-09-Memorandum-North-Korea-Deputies.
116. “Memorandum: North Korea Deputies’ Committee, March 12, 1992,” pp. 1–4.
117. “Memorandum: North Korea Deputies’ Committee, March 12, 1992,” p. 4.
118. A March 20 memo updated the previous one and noted three types of coercive measures the United States could pursue outside of international organizations following additional DPRK delays: economic, political, and a third that has been redacted. “Memorandum: North Korean Deputies’ Committee, March 20, 1992,” p. 4, National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed February 14, 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4176676-Document-10-Memorandum-North-Korean-Deputies.
119. Albright and O’Neill 2000.
120. Baker and DeFrank 1995, 597.
121. A memo from National Security Advisor Scowcroft to a presidential scheduler describes a September 1992 meeting between Bush and Korean president Roh. On the meeting’s agenda is the “nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula.” The meeting’s details remain classified. “Schedule Proposal from Brent Scowcroft to Katherine Super, Deputy Assistant to the President for Appointments and Scheduling,” document 6313, “[Korean President] Roh [Tae-Woo] Visit—September 1992 OA/ID CF01492-010.” NSC, Torkel Patterson Files, Subject File, OA/ID CF01492, GHWBPL.
122. Secretary of State Baker’s memoirs confirm that “the situation never reached the point of our actively considering a military strike against North Korea’s nuclear facilities.” See Baker and DeFrank 1995, 596.
123. Berry 1995, 28, citing the Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 5 (December 1991).
124. Jack Anderson and Michael Binstein, “North Korea: Loose Nuclear Cannon,” Washington Post, March 29, 1992, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1992/03/29/north-korea-loose-nuclear-cannon/1a87a86d-1c4e-4abc-a1db-87dbe19691a0/.
125. The NSC was aware of these sales and was “monitoring the situation,” according to a letter from National Security Advisor Scowcroft to Congressman Jim Saxton. No alarm is evident in the tone of the letter. “Letter from Brent Scowcroft to Congressman Jim Saxton, March 27, 1992, North Korea-US [OA/ID CF01519-005].” NSC, Torkel Patterson Files, Subject Files OA/ID CF01519, Range CF01519-001 to CF01519-020, GHWBPL.
126. One folder in the GHWBPL contains materials concerning the 1981 Israeli raid on Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear facility. The files reference a memo entitled “Available Legal Options to Dissuade North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program”; given its enclosure with materials on the Osiraq bombing, it is possible that the Bush administration gave force more attention. I have requested the memo’s declassification and related files, but presently there is no evidence of considerations of preventive force. “North Korea, Nuclear Issues, Draft,” Ronald Von Lembke Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF00751, box NSC, GHWBPL.
127. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 17.
128. William J. Clinton, “Remarks Announcing the National Export Strategy and an Exchange with Reporters,” September 29, 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1993, 1630.
129. Litwak 2002, 75.
130. Les Aspin, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, January 1994), 34–35, http://history.defense.gov/resources/1994_DoD_AR.pdf.
131. Aspin, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, 12.
132. Christopher 1998, 213.
133. For the text of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, see https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/.
134. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 27. Wit and Poneman served also in the Bush administration; Gallucci joined the Clinton administration in February 1993. This consistency of administration officials undermines a bureaucratic political argument and demonstrates the transformation from the Bush to Clinton administrations.
135. Oberdorfer 1997, 280.
136. Litwak 2002, 64.
137. For an account of the negotiations, see Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004.
138. Berry 1995, 13.
139. Berry 1995, 14, citing “Fundamentals of Security for a New Pacific Community,” July 10, 1993, in US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Dispatch 4, no. 29 (July 19, 1993), 509–12.
140. Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010, appendix 13.
141. On the varying estimates and growth potential, see Sigal 1998, 91; Oberdorfer 1997, 308.
142. Carter and Perry 1999, 126.
143. Sigal 1998, 71.
144. Mazarr 1995a, 102, citing Clinton’s comments on “Meet the Press” cited in FBIS-EAS, November 8, 1993, 29.
145. William J. Clinton, “Interview with Timothy Russert and Tom Brokaw on Meet the Press, November 7, 1993,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1993, 1923.
146. Michael R. Gordon, “Pentagon Begins Effort to Combat More Lethal Arms in Third World,” New York Times, December 8, 1993.
147. Litwak 2002, 55.
148. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 177.
149. Barton Gellman, “Trepidation at Root of U.S. Korea Policy,” Washington Post, December 12, 1993.
150. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 102.
151. Oberdorfer 1997, 312. See https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027.htm.
152. Carter and Perry 1999, 128. Perry replaced Les Aspin as secretary of defense on February 3, 1994.
153. A. Lake 1994, 46–47.
154. Carter and Perry 1999, 221.
155. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 179; Oberdorfer 1997, 304.
156. Oberdorfer 1997, 301–03.
157. Oberdorfer 1997, 316.
158. Clinton 2004, 591.
159. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 164–65.
160. Perry 1994, 277.
161. Perry 1994.
162. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci describe this briefing as critical for shaping events to come. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 179.
163. Oberdorfer 1997, 323.
164. Oberdorfer 1997, 315.
165. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 107.
166. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 104. Luck is referring to Israel’s 1981 raid on Iraq’s nuclear reactor, discussed in chapter 6.
167. Oberdorfer 1997, 324–25.
168. Sigal 1998, 117.
169. Sigal 1998, 118.
170. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 205.
171. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 210.
172. Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter, “Korea: Time for Action,” Washington Post, June 15, 1994, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1994/06/15/korea-time-for-action/73e7cb5b-73e9-4503-916f-9b601b67087d/.
173. Oberdorfer 1997, 323.
174. While the United States could target the known facilities, there was significant uncertainty regarding aspects of the program that remained hidden. In addition, though estimates indicated the United States would ultimately win a war against North Korea, the costs (direct and indirect, to allies, and so on) would be considerable. In a narrow sense, while there was a high likelihood of success estimated for the mission, the larger contextual picture was more complicated.
175. An initial public statement about the agreement was given by Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci on June 16, 1994, at 4:52 p.m. For the text of his remarks, see “Press Briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs Robert Gallucci,” June 16, 1994, document 3391, Clinton Presidential Records, Press Office, Press Release Subject File, box 14, OA number 8692, folder 10 North Korea, WJCPL.
176. “Press Conference of the President,” June 22, 1994, 5:34 p.m., document 3434, Clinton Presidential Records, Press Office, Press Release Subject File, box 14, OA number 8692, folder 10 North Korea, WJCPL. The Agreed Framework was signed by the United States and North Korea on October 17, 1994. For a detailed description of the run-up to the agreement and the agreement itself, see Mazarr 1995b, 163–80.
177. Gwen Ifill, “In Korea, Chilling Reminders of Cold War,” New York Times, July 18, 1993, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/18/weekinreview/in-korea-chilling-reminders-of-cold-war.html; quoted in Sigal 1998, 68.
178. Oberdorfer 1997, 316 citing Perry’s remarks at the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, November 3, 1994.
179. The long-term legacy of this era is less clear, however; while this crisis did not escalate to force, the challenge from North Korea and its nuclear program has escalated over time.
180. For a year-by-year chronology, see “Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” accessed February 16, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.
181. Rice 2000.
182. “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” press release, January 29, 2002, accessed February 15, 2018, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.
183. Bajoria and Xu 2013.
184. G. W. Bush 2010, 422–26.
5. Three US Presidents Tangle with Iraq’s Nuclear Program
1. See for example, Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010; Goldstein 2006.
2. Chiozza and Goemans 2003; Mitchell and Prins 2004.
3. J. Snyder 2013.
4. For a deep dive into the Iraqi nuclear program, see Braut-Hegghammer 2016.
5. Richelson 2006, 318.
6. On the campaign itself, see Richelson 2006, 321–22; Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph 2003; Raas and Long 2007; Claire 2004. See also chapter 6.
7. Richelson 2006, 333–34; Director of Central Intelligence, Interagency Intelligence Assessment, “Implications of Israeli Attack on Iraq,” July 1, 1981, p. 3, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000211961.pdf.
8. Reiter 2005; Braut-Hegghammer 2011; Sadot 2016.
9. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq’s National Security Goals: An Intelligence Assessment,” December 1988, National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd02.pdf.
10. Richelson 2006, 348–49.
11. “Reconstitution of Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Post Desert Fox,” n.d., National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB129/part3-icnuclear.pdf.
12. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq’s Continuing Program for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” October 2002, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Iraq_NIE_Excerpts_2003.pdf.
13. Intelligence and Security Committee, “Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction—Intelligence and Assessments,” September 2003, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272079/5972.pdf.
14. George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Iraq,” Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-iraq-from-cincinnati-ohio.
15. G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 452, 454.
16. Naftali 2007, 101.
17. George H. W. Bush, “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Luncheon Hosted by the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, California,” February 7, 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush, 1990, 176.
18. National Security Directive 26, October 2, 1989, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library (hereafter GHWBPL), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/nsd/nsd26.pdf.
19. Remarks to the Citizens of Mainz, Rheingoldhalle, Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, May 31, 1989, G. H. W. Bush 2009, 57.
20. L. Goldstein 2006.
21. G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 307.
22. George H. W. Bush, “Statement on the Seizure of Nuclear Weapon Component Shipments to Iraq,” March 28, 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush, 1990, 429.
23. Woodward 1991, 230.
24. Powell 1995, 493.
25. J. A. Baker and DeFrank 1995, 331.
26. Koch 2006, 335.
27. Woodward 1991, 236–7.
28. G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 305.
29. Russell 2002, 201.
30. National Security Directive 45, August 20, 1990, Subject: US Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, Bush Presidential Records, GHWBPL, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/nsd/nsd45.pdf.
31. G. H. W. Bush 1999, 476.
32. G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 566.
33. G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 371.
34. G. H. W. Bush 1999, 476.
35. G. H. W. Bush 1999, 478.
36. Private letter to Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, November 22, 1990, G. H. W. Bush 1999, 490.
37. Remarks to American and coalition troops in the Persian Gulf Area on Thanksgiving Day, November 22, 1990, G. H. W. Bush 2009, 154.
38. See, among others, Naftali 2007; Halberstam 2001.
39. G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 454–55.
40. Remarks to Allied Armed Forces near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, November 22, 1990, G. Bush 2009, 163.
41. On the misuse and nature of false historical analogies, see Jervis 1976, chap. 6.
42. G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 340.
43. Powell 1995, 491.
44. Woodward 1991, 343–44.
45. G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 435.
46. Woodward 1991, 308.
47. Woodward 1991, 290, 305.
48. Woodward 1991, 305.
49. Rebecca Friedman Lissner, “The Long Shadow of the Gulf War,” War on the Rocks 24, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/the-long-shadow-of-the-gulf-war/.
50. Woodward 1991, 207, 269.
51. On casualty estimates, see Woodward 1991, 349.
52. G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 324.
53. Powell 1992.
54. Woodward 1991, 319.
55. Woodward 1991, 314.
56. Woodward 1991, 347. This suggests an improving intelligence estimate over time.
57. G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 455.
58. Reuters, “Confrontation in the Gulf; Remarks by Baker at News Conference in Geneva on Standoff in the Gulf,” New York Times, January 10, 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/10/world/confrontation-gulf-remarks-baker-conference-geneva-standoff-gulf.html.
59. Had the United States preferred war by this point, with Geneva serving only political ends, this would be akin to a game of “Big Bully.” G. H. Snyder and Diesing 2015, 46–47.
60. It is also possible that Bush was incorrect in this view and Saddam was deterrable. US assurances to not intervene were instead insufficient and failed to end Hussein’s campaign.
61. Address to the nation announcing allied military action in the Persian Gulf, Oval Office of the White House, Washington, DC, January 16, 1991, G. H. W. Bush 2009, 166–67.
62. Woodward 1991, 330–31.
63. For a detailed account of Gulf War decision making, see Woodward 1991.
64. L. Goldstein 2006, 129.
65. G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 323.
66. As described, the United States knew of Hussein’s nuclear program beginning at least in the 1970s. It was only in 1990 and 1991, however, with intrusive inspections and coalition troops on the ground, that the extent of the program became clear.
67. L. Goldstein 2006, 130.
68. G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 399–400.
69. Powell 1995, 541.
70. G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 508.
71. G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 544.
72. Naftali 2007, 107.
73. Woodward 1991, 319.
74. G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 354.
75. Woodward 1991, 300, 302.
76. Hymans 2012.
77. Hymans 2012, 84; Committee on Armed Services 1993, 24.
78. Braut-Hegghammer 2011, 110.
79. “A New Covenant for American Security,” speech delivered at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, December 12, 1991, cited in Clinton and Smith 1996, 115.
80. Clinton 2004, 435.
81. Clinton and Smith 1996, 112.
82. Western 2005, 182–83.
83. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 184.
84. William J. Clinton, “Remarks at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony in West Point, New York,” May 29, 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1993, 781.
85. “Continuation of Iraqi Emergency,” Office of the Press Secretary, July 19, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records Press Office, folder 18, box 10, Iraq, Press Release Subject File OA 8691, William J. Clinton Presidential Library (hereafter WJCPL).
86. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 185.
87. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 148.
88. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 189.
89. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 192.
90. The preventive angle and the seriousness of consideration are documented in speech notes from November 1997: “Insert on Iraq for POTUS Remarks,” November 19, 1997, 11:45 a.m., “POTUS Insert on Iraq 11/19/97” [OA/ID 3378], box FOIA 2006-0459-F, Clinton Presidential Records: White House Staff and Office Files, National Security Council, box 32 of 39, WJCPL.
91. Western 2005, 183.
92. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 193.
93. “President William Jefferson Clinton Radio Address, The White House, February 6, 1998,” “Blair Radio Address 2/6/98” [OD/ID 3380], box FOIA 2006-0459-F, National Security Council, box 34 of 39, WJCPL; Branch 2009, 498.
94. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 195.
95. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 195.
96. For a full articulation of the administration’s concern with Iraq in February 1998, see “Iraq and the National Interest,” a speech given by National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger, “As prepared for Delivery,” Samuel R. Berger, assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, Washington, DC, February 13, 1998, “SRB Iraq Speech 2/13/98 [OA/ID 3378],” box FOIA 2006-0459-F, National Security Council, box 34 of 39, WJCPL.
97. Clinton 2004, 827.
98. “Memorandum for Samuel R. Berger, November 2, 1998, from Joseph Marty, Subject: Briefing Memo for POTUS Call to Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia,” WJCPL, http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/storage/Research%20-%20Digital%20Library/Declassified/2009-1292-M.pdf.
99. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Telcon with President Chirac of France, The White House, November 4, 1998, 3:08–3:31 p.m.,” WJCPL, http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/storage/Research%20-%20Digital%20Library/Declassified/2009-1292-M.pdf.
100. Branch 2009, 516–17.
101. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 178.
102. Western 2005, 183.
103. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 201–202.
104. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 201–202.
105. Conversino 2005.
106. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, The President and Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, December 15, 1998, 1:00–1:15 p.m. EDT, Oval Office,” WJCPL, http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/storage/Research%20-%20Digital%20Library/Declassified/2009-1292-M.pdf.
107. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, The President and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, December 17, 1998, 12:18 p.m.–12:23 p.m. EST, Oval Office,” WJCPL, http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/storage/Research%20-%20Digital%20Library/Declassified/2009-1292-M.pdf.
108. Regarding the mission and military campaign, see “Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Briefing on Operation Desert Fox,” December 19, 1998, http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=1791.
109. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 295.
110. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 298.
111. G. W. Bush 2010, 83.
112. “Text From New Hampshire Debate Involving G.O.P. Presidential Candidates,” New York Times, December 3, 1999, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/politics/camp/120399wh-gop-debate-text.html; Saunders 2011, 198–99.
113. Rice 2000, 45.
114. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 295, 310.
115. Saunders 2011, 199.
116. Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, xvi.
117. Branch 2009, 657.
118. Western 2005.
119. Woodward 2004, 21.
120. “Address to the Joint Session of Congress,” Washington Post, February 27, 2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/bushtext022701.htm; Litwak 2002, 57.
121. Rice 2011, 157. Bush also spearheaded the Proliferation Security Initiative.
122. Renshon 2008; see also Saunders 2011, 203.
123. Saunders 2011, 203, citing “George W. Bush, News Conference,” March 6, 2003, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush, 2003, 247.
124. G. W. Bush 2010, 144.
125. Nicholas D. Kristof, “An American Hiroshima,” New York Times, August 11, 2004. https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/11/opinion/an-american-hiroshima.html; Allison 2004, 1–2; Massimo Calabresi and Romesh Ratnesar, “Can We Stop the Next Attack?” Time, March 11, 2002. http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1001961,00.html.
126. G. W. Bush 2010, 145.
127. The ABM Treaty between the United States and Soviet Union limited antiballistic missile systems used for defense against nuclear weapons delivered via ballistic missiles. US Department of State, accessed February 12, 2018, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/101888.htm.
128. Bumiller 2007, 171.
129. Woodward 2004, 1–2.
130. Rice 2011, 237.
131. Bumiller 2007, 168.
132. G. W. Bush 2010, 228–29.
133. G. W. Bush 2010, 228–29.
134. George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-29-2002-state-union-address.
135. Bumiller 2007, 174.
136. George W. Bush, “Commencement Address, United States Military Academy, West Point,” New York Times, June 1, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/01/international/02PTEX-WEB.html?pagewanted=all.
137. Western 2005, 197.
138. Bumiller 2007, 193. Though the administration used the language of preemption, preemption requires an imminent threat, which is mitigated by (or is attempted to be mitigated by) the threatened state moving first. Part of the criticism of the 2003 Iraq War concerns a lack of intelligence demonstrating that there was an imminent threat by Saddam Hussein to target the United States with nuclear weapons or more generally. Though I do not attempt to adjudicate this debate here, I argue that if Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapons program, if successful, it would have caused a relative decline in the balance of power between the United States and Iraq. That the United States acted to prevent such a decline, or to forestall a future need to fight a now-nuclear armed adversary, makes this a case of preventive war (not preemptive). Thus, it is rightfully included as part of the present analytical universe.
139. “The National Security Strategy,” September 2002, White House: President George W. Bush, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/.
140. Western 2005, 213.
141. Western 2005, 203.
142. “President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat: Remarks by the President on Iraq,” Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002, White House: President George W. Bush, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html; Western 2005, 209.
143. Donald Rumsfeld, “Secretary Rumsfeld Contrasts Iraq and North Korea,” US Department of Defense news release, January 20, 2003, http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=3605.
144. Rice 2011, 170.
145. Rice 2011, 198.
146. The United Kingdom, like Israel, demonstrates that the leader-centric argument travels beyond the US context.
147. Excerpt of Blair speech, January 1998, cited in The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, vol. 1, 103, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry.
148. Campbell 2007, 279.
149. Prime Minister Tony Blair remarks to the House of Commons, UK Parliament, April 10, 2002, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020410/debtext/20410-04.htm.
150. Prime Minister Tony Blair remarks to the House of Commons, UK Parliament, March 18, 2003, columns 760–774, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030318/debtext/30318-06.htm#30318-06_head1.
151. Chilcot et al., The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary, 14, 22, 27, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry.
152. Rice 2011, 198.
153. G. W. Bush 2010, 236.
154. G. W. Bush 2010, 253.
155. For a detailed accounting of the iterative process that lead to the Iraq invasion, see Woodward 2004.
156. Woodward 2004, 41–42.
157. P. Baker 2013, 207.
158. Woodward 2004, 326.
159. Woodward 2004, 327.
160. P. Baker 2013, 208.
161. P. Baker 2013, 262.
162. Woodward 2004, 327.
163. Woodward 2004, 206.
164. Brent Scowcroft, “Don’t Attack Saddam,” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2002, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1029371773228069195; P. Baker 2013, 209.
165. Eric Schmitt, “Army Chief Raises Estimate of G.I.’s Needed in Postwar Iraq,” New York Times, February 25, 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/25/international/middleeast/army-chief-raises-estimate-of-gis-needed-in-postwar.html.
166. P. Baker 2013, 243, 248.
167. Woodward 2004, 405.
168. P. Baker 2013, 239–40.
169. P. Baker 2013, 253.
170. P. Baker 2013, 257.
171. Woodward 2004, 188.
172. Woodward 2004, 206.
173. Bumiller 2007, 201.
174. G. W. Bush 2010, 224.
175. Gates 2014, 104.
176. Western 2005, 216.
177. CIA, “National Intelligence Estimate: Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” October 2002, National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB129/nie.pdf. See also Rice 2011, 169.
178. Woodward 2004, 12.
179. Woodward 2004, 25.
180. G. W. Bush 2010, 267.
181. G. W. Bush 2010, 228–29.
6. Israel’s Preventive War Decision Making
1. Brom 2005, 133.
2. Johnston 1995.
3. Bar-Joseph 2009, 512.
4. Adamsky 2017, 166.
5. Brom 2005, 140.
6. In 2016, Israel closed the reading room of the state archive and made its collection available online; to date, less than 5 percent of the holdings are estimated to be available, and very little is relevant for counterproliferation. Ofer Aderet, “Ninety-five Percent of Israel State Archives Files Concealed From the Public,” Haaretz, November 2, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-95-of-israel-state-archives-files-concealed-from-public-1.5461925.
7. I do not speak Hebrew and thus am limited to English-language sources or translations. Even for those who speak Hebrew, however, a lack of available evidence remains the main barrier.
8. Freilich 2012, 17.
9. Freilich 2012, 18.
10. Krasna 2018, 29–31.
11. A similarly limited role is played by the Israeli Supreme Court, which usually does not interfere in national security. Cohen 2014.
12. Israel is not alone in ceding similar power to the executive. The British prime minister is vested with royal authority for national security. Likewise, France’s semipresidential system historically delegates much of foreign policy to the president. Dover 2005; Heffernan 2005; Risse-Kappen 1991; Wong 2006.
13. Kaarbo 1997; Freilich 2012, 53.
14. Brom 2005; Freilich 2012, 54.
15. Israeli law mandates certain offices are represented within the cabinet, though which individual fills each role is determined by coalition bargaining.
16. In 2019, Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition contained five parties; the wider Knesset had ten.
17. Huber 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998.
18. Freilich 2012, 18.
19. Freilich 2012, 44.
20. Krasna 2018, esp. 14.
21. Freilich 2012, 47.
22. Freilich 2012, 54.
23. Freilich 2012, 53–56.
24. Freilich 2012, 49.
25. Preventive military force is considered mobilization, and thus the cabinet or subcabinet must be engaged.
26. Israeli Defense Forces, https://www.idf.il/en/. Only the cabinet has the authority to authorize IDF missions; the prime minister lacks independent authority.
27. Freilich 2012, 61.
28. Bar-Joseph 2009, 520.
29. Israel has approximately 20,000 square miles; Syria has 185,887. “Syria,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/syria/. In 2007, Syria’s population was 19,878,254, whereas Israel had 7,180,100. Israel’s GDP per capita was $24,924.33; by contrast, Syria’s measured $2,032.62. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=IL-SY.
30. For population statistics, see World Bank Open Data (data updated through 2019): https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=IL, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=IQ, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=PK.
31. For territorial geography, see “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed January 26, 2019, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/.
32. For GDP per capita, see World Bank Open Data (data updated through 2019): https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=IL, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=IQ, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=PK.
33. Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972.
34. A CINC score of 1 represents 100 percent of global capabilities; 0 indicates 0 percent. The Correlates of War Project, “Data Sets, National Material Capabilities,” n.d., accessed February 17, 2021, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities.
35. It is tempting to think of modern Israel as economically and militarily powerful compared to current foes. Even examining Israel as the stronger state in each dyad, however, does not reveal consistent preventive war behavior, as a structural argument would expect.
36. Freilich 2012, 37.
37. Allison 1969, 711.
38. Freilich 2012, 37.
39. Freilich 2012, 40.
40. Partisanship may be more consequential during domestic elections, but this is an empirical question.
41. Brom 2005, 144.
42. Braut-Hegghammer 2011, 105.
43. Tamsett 2004, 73.
44. For a comprehensive analysis of the Iraqi nuclear program, see Braut-Hegghammer 2016.
45. Sadot 2016, 653.
46. J. C. Snyder 1983, 567.
47. Government of Israel 1981, 9.
48. J. C. Snyder 1983, 569.
49. Government of Israel 1981, 1.
50. Tamsett 2004, 73.
51. Braut-Hegghammer 2016, 53–56.
52. Times of Israel Staff, “35 Years on, IAF Pilots Recall Daring Mission to Bomb Saddam’s Nuke Reactor,” Times of Israel, June 4, 2016, https://www.timesofisrael.com/35-years-on-iaf-pilots-recall-daring-mission-to-bomb-saddams-nuke-reactor/#:~:text=Thirty%2Dfive%20years%20after%20Operation,aired%20on%20Channel%2010%2C%20Col.
53. Brands 2011, 504.
54. Brands 2011, 504.
55. Government of Israel 1981, 3.
56. Government of Israel 1981, 5.
57. Zionism is the movement for the establishment or development of a Jewish nation inside Israel.
58. Inbar 1997, 25.
59. Avner 2010, 179.
60. Avner 2010, 180.
61. Inbar 1997, 35; Avner 2010, 183.
62. Inbar 1997, 29.
63. I. Rabinovich 2017, 106.
64. I. Rabinovich 2017, 129.
65. Inbar 1997, 31; Rabin, “Israel’s Security Policy After the 1991 Gulf War,” in Israel’s National Security Thinking (Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar Ilan Center for Strategic Studies, August 1991).
66. Author conversation with former government official.
67. I. Rabinovich 2017, 43, 75; Rabin changed his mind in 1963 upon recognizing that Israel could not sustain a conventional arms race with the Arab world.
68. Inbar 1997, 31.
69. I. Rabinovich 2017, 156.
70. Y. Rabin 1979, 100, 105.
71. Memoirs are admittedly problematic sources of evidence. Conclusions therefore remain preliminary.
72. Brands and Palkki 2011, 141.
73. Brands and Palkki 2011, 141–42.
74. Silver 1984, 23.
75. Silver 1984, 23; see also Avner 2010, 551.
76. Silver 1984, 182.
77. Silver 1984, 182.
78. Sofer 1988, 234.
79. Sofer 1988, 237.
80. Shilon 2016, 263–64.
81. Sofer 1988, 30.
82. On Begin’s general worldview, see Sofer 1988.
83. Gordis 2014, 10.
84. Gordis 2014, 13.
85. Sofer 1988, 115.
86. Gordis 2014, 23.
87. Gordis 2014, 239. Betar was the Revisionist Zionist youth movement founded by Jabotinsky and closely affiliated with the Irgun. Begin was a Betar member from his youth in Poland.
88. Oren 2002, 89.
89. Avner 2010, 251.
90. Sofer 1988, 116 citing “Bituchen or Security,” Herut, December 24, 1954.
91. Sofer 1988, 117.
92. Sofer 1988, 112. The Second Temple was the Jewish holy temple that stood on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem from 516 BCE to 70 CE. The Romans destroyed the Temple in 70 CE as retaliation against an ongoing Jewish revolt against Roman rule.
93. Sofer 1988, 144.
94. Sofer 1988, 116.
95. Sofer 1988, 144.
96. Gordis 2014, 187, citing “On the Dangers of Non-Conventional Weapons in the Hands of Arab states,” Menachem Begin address during Knesset deliberations on June 24, 1963; Israel’s Strike Against the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor 7 June 1981: A Collection of Articles and Lectures, edited by Moshe Fuksman-Sha’al (Menachem Begin Heritage Center, 2003).
97. Sofer 1988, 124.
98. Avner 2010, 552.
99. Mueller et al. 2006, 213.
100. Brands and Palkki 2011, 155; Gordis 2014, 187.
101. Sadot 2016, 652.
102. Sadot 2016, 656.
103. Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph 2003, 66.
104. Sadot 2016, 656.
105. Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph 2003, xliv.
106. Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph 2003, 2.
107. Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph 2003, 38.
108. Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph 2003, 70.
109. Although this progression might explain the distinctiveness of Begin’s approach relative to Rabin’s, Begin’s different problem prioritization when he entered office in 1977 suggests something else. Peres’s continuing opposition to military force in 1981 following these developments supports the theory that individual beliefs, not the Iraqi program’s advancement, did the work.
110. Gordis 2014, 187.
111. Sadot 2016, 657; Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph 2003, 54–55.
112. Government of Israel 1981, 4.
113. Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph 2003, xxxv.
114. Mueller et al. 2006, 215.
115. Mueller et al. 2006, 214.
116. Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph 2003, 77–79; see also chap. 12.
117. In September 1980, Iranian jets attacked Osiraq but caused little damage.
118. Gordis 2014, 188.
119. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference with Prime Minister Begin, Chief of Staff Eitan, I.A.F. Commander Ivri and Director of Military Intelligence Saguy,” June 9, 1981, https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook5/Pages/28%20Press%20Conference%20with%20Prime%20Minister%20Begin-%20IDF.aspx.
120. Parsi 2007, 60.
121. Parsi 2007, 104.
122. The F-16 Fighting Falcons were intended for Iran. Following the Iranian revolution, they were sold to Israel instead.
123. Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph 2003, 97.
124. Times of Israel Staff, “35 Years on, IAF Pilots Recall Daring Mission to Bomb Saddam’s Nuke Reactor,” Times of Israel, June 4, 2016, https://www.timesofisrael.com/35-years-on-iaf-pilots-recall-daring-mission-to-bomb-saddams-nuke-reactor/#:~:text=Thirty%2Dfive%20years%20after%20Operation,aired%20on%20Channel%2010%2C%20Col; this sense of risk was confirmed in an author conversation with a former Israeli Air Force F-16 pilot with knowledge of the mission.
125. Gordis 2014, 188.
126. Silver 1984, 75.
127. Gordis 2014, 190, quoting Shamir, “The Failure of Diplomacy,” 16.
128. Silver 1984, 219.
129. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement by the Government of Israel on the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear facility near Baghdad,” June 8, 1981, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook5/Pages/26%20Statement%20by%20the%20Government%20of%20Israel%20on%20the%20Bo.aspx.
130. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Interview with Prime Minister Begin,” June 8, 1981, https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook5/Pages/27%20Interview%20with%20Prime%20Minister%20Begin-%208%20June%20198.aspx.
131. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference with Prime Minister Begin, Chief of Staff Eitan, I.A.F. Commander Ivri and Director of Military Intelligence Saguy,” June 9, 1981, https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook5/Pages/28%20Press%20Conference%20with%20Prime%20Minister%20Begin-%20IDF.aspx.
132. Avner 2010, 555.
133. Gordis 2014, 185.
134. Gordis 2014, 189.
135. Avner 2010, 552.
136. Gordis 2014, 185.
137. Avner 2010, 553.
138. Times of Israel Staff, “35 Years on, IAF Pilots Recall Daring Mission to Bomb Saddam’s Nuke Reactor.”
139. Author conversation with former government official.
140. Khan 2012, esp. chap. 2.
141. For additional program details, see Khan 2012; Perkovich 1999; Sagan and Waltz 2002.
142. Sidhu 1997, 240–41.
143. Edward Cody, “Sadat’s Arab Antagonists Salute His Killers,” Washington Post, October 7, 1981, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/10/07/sadats-arab-antagonists-salute-his-killers/28406159-30ee-47ff-ba46-0abe4eba394e/.
144. Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph 2003, 17–18.
145. Khan 2012, 110–12.
146. Schneider 1999, 38; Weissman and Krosney 1981, 210–13.
147. Braut-Hegghammer 2016, 141, 162.
148. Khan 2012, 110–11.
149. “Letter from Israeli PM Menachem Begin to British PM Margaret Thatcher on Pakistan’s Nuclear Program,” May 17, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, FCO93/2105, Israel: nuclear matters (Kew: National Archives, January 8, 2010). Obtained for the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP) by Or Rabinowitz. Wilson Center Digital Archive, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/120204.
150. “Letter from Israeli PM Menachem Begin to British PM Margaret Thatcher on Pakistan’s Nuclear Program.”
151. “Memorandum for Margaret Thatcher in Response to a Letter from Menachem Begin,” May 22, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, FCO93/2105, Israel: nuclear matters (Kew: National Archives, January 8, 2010). Obtained for NPIHP by Or Rabinowitz. Wilson Center Digital Archive, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/120208.
152. Rabinowitz 2014, esp. 151.
153. Levy and Scott-Clark 2007, 87.
154. Rabinowitz 2014, 151.
155. Rabinowitz 2014, 143; see also Don Oberdorfer, “Pakistan Concerned About Attack on Atomic Plants,” Washington Post, October 12, 1984, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/10/12/pakistan-concerned-about-attack-on-atomic-plants/a63b98e0-f7cb-4629-8ade-14088c4d1af2/; Richard Burt, “U.S. Will Press Pakistan to Halt A-Arms Project,” New York Times, August 12, 1979, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/08/12/archives/us-will-press-pakistan-to-halt-aarms-project-series-of-steps.html.
156. Khan 2012, 211; Rabinowitz 2014, 18.
157. Exact timing remains unclear, though all possibilities are during Begin’s tenure. Perkovich and Sidhu suggest 1981, Rabinowitz suggests 1983, and Karnad suggests 1983. Perkovich 1999, 240–41. See Sidhu 1997, 331; Rabinowitz 2014, 151; Karnad 2002.
158. Kahuta is Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons research laboratory as well as the central location for uranium enrichment.
159. Karnad 2002, 346.
160. Karnad 2002, 347.
161. Sushant Singh, “In Fact: Did India Plan a Covert Military Attack on a Pakistani Nuclear Reactor?,” Indian Express, October 26, 2015, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/in-fact-did-india-plan-a-covert-military-attack-on-a-pakistani-nuclear-reactor/.
162. Kreps and Fuhrmann describe joint Israeli-Indian activity through 1987, as Begin’s successor, Yitzhak Shamir, continued serious planning for an attack. See Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010. See also Perkovich 1999, 280; Sagan 2001; Sagan and Waltz 2002, 95; Karnad 2002, 350.
163. Karnad 2002, 349.
164. “India and Israel Planned to Hit Kahuta in 1980s,” Business Recorder, October 29, 2007, https://fp.brecorder.com/2007/10/20071029645356/.
165. Feaver, Sagan, and Karl 1997.
166. Schneider 1999, 148.
167. Singh, “In Fact: Did India Plan a Covert Military Attack on a Pakistani Nuclear Reactor?”
168. Because of the temporal proximity of this case and the fact that the government of Israel claimed responsibility only in 2018, there are significant evidentiary limitations. Nevertheless, I include a brief discussion of the Syrian episode here, as the most recent empirical example of the consideration and use of preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. With more evidence, future work can address events more fully.
169. Makovsky 2012.
170. Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2008.
171. Alexandre Mansourov, “North Korea: Entering Syria’s Civil War,” 38 North, November 25, 2013, https://www.38north.org/2013/11/amansourov112513/; Samuel Ramani, “North Korea’s Syrian Connection,” Diplomat, February 27, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/north-koreas-syrian-connection/.
172. Michael Bar-Zohar and Nissim Mishal, “The Long Road to Syria,” Ynetnews, August 26, 2010, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3944303,00.html.
173. Cheney and Cheney 2011, 466–67.
174. Bar-Zohar and Mishal, “The Long Road to Syria.”
175. Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2008, 1–2.
176. Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2008, 6.
177. Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2008, 2–3.
178. Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2008, 4–6.
179. Bar-Zohar and Mishal, “The Long Road to Syria.”
180. Bar-Zohar and Mishal, “The Long Road to Syria.”
181. Erich Follach and Holger Stark, “The Story of ‘Operation Orchard’: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor,” Der Spiegel Online, November 2, 2009, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-story-of-operation-orchard-how-israel-destroyed-syria-s-al-kibar-nuclear-reactor-a-658663.html.
182. Follach and Stark, “The Story of ‘Operation Orchard’: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor.”
183. Makovsky 2012, 39.
184. Makovsky 2012, 39.
185. A former government official described the administration’s sense that Israel’s very existence was threatened and that Israel could not allow the program to materialize.
186. Nazila Fathi, “Wipe Israel ‘off the Map’ Iranian Says,” New York Times, October 27, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/27/world/africa/wipe-israel-off-the-map-iranian-says.html.
187. Bar-Zohar and Mishal, “The Long Road to Syria.”
188. Bar-Zohar and Mishal, “The Long Road to Syria.”
189. Makovsky 2012.
190. Bush’s memoir was published in 2010, prior to the Israeli government’s disclosure of its involvement. We now know Bush is referring to Israel.
191. Bush 2010, 420–21.
192. Given Bush’s nuclear beliefs, described in chapter 5, the leader-centric argument would expect Bush to have seriously considered the preventive option. With the US political climate and fallout over the Iraq War, however, it is not surprising that Bush did not view the available options as worth the costs. In this way, the model would also account for Bush’s refusal to attack.
193. Makovsky 2012.
194. P. Baker 2013, 542.
195. P. Baker 2013, 542.
196. Hayden 2017, 257–58.
197. Hayden 2017, 258.
198. Hayden 2017, 259.
199. Abrams 2013, 20.
200. Makovsky 2012.
201. Abrams 2013, 20.
202. Abrams 2013, 21.
203. Cheney and Cheney 2011, 468.
204. Cheney and Cheney 2011, 469.
205. Hayden 2017, 259.
206. Makovsky 2012.
207. Hayden 2017, 259.
208. Bush 2010, 420–22; Abrams 2013, 21, confirms this logic but notes it does not explain why Bush did not support an Israeli attack.
209. Makovsky 2012; Hayden 2017, 262.
210. Hersh 2008.
211. P. Baker 2013, 533; Abrams 2013, 22.
212. Tal Kra-Oz, “The Last Dove: An Interview with Ehud Olmert,” Fathom, February 2020, https://fathomjournal.org/the-last-dove-an-interview-with-ehud-olmert/.
213. Ronen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti, “The Secret History of the Push to Strike Iran,” New York Times, September 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/magazine/iran-strike-israel-america.html.
214. Makovsky 2012, 36.
215. Follach and Stark, “The Story of ‘Operation Orchard’: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor.”
216. Follach and Stark, “The Story of ‘Operation Orchard’: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor.”
217. Makovsky 2012.
218. On the relationship between intelligence and international organizations, see Carnegie and Carson 2019.
219. Hersh 2008.
220. Abrams 2013, 18.
221. Barak 2018, 412.
222. Members of the Israeli political elite, including participants in these deliberations, suggested privately that political self-interest drove Barak’s position.
223. “English Summary of the Winograd Commission Report,” New York Times, January 30, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/30/world/middleeast/31winograd-web.html.
224. Makovsky 2012.
225. Makovsky 2012.
7. Conclusions and Implications
1. Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark, “Where Will the Next President Stand on Nuclear Weapons?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 3, 2016, https://thebulletin.org/where-will-next-president-stand-nuclear-weapons9391.
2. Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, “Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ against North Korea if It Endangers U.S.,” New York Times, August 8, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html; Rebecca Kheel, “Trump Official Denies US Planning ‘Bloody Nose’ Strike on North Korea,” The Hill, February 15, 2018, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/374049-state-official-senators-administration-does-not-have-bloody-nose-strategy-for.
3. Meghan Keneally, “From ‘Fire and Fury’ to ‘Rocket Man,’ the Various Barbs Traded between Trump and Kim Jong Un,” ABC News, June 12, 2018, https://abcnews.go.com/International/fire-fury-rocket-man-barbs-traded-trump-kim/story?id=53634996.
4. David E. Sanger, “Trump-Kim Summit’s Collapse Exposes the Risks of One-to-One Diplomacy,” New York Times, February 28, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/world/asia/trump-north-korea-nuclear-sanctions.html.
5. North Korea Warns of ‘Undesired’ Outcome if No Change in US Nuclear Stance,” NBC News, April 30, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/30/north-korea-warns-of-undesired-outcome-if-us-fails-to-change-position-in-nuclear-talks.html.
6. Buhite and Hamel 1990; Trachtenberg 1991, 109–112.
7. “Discussion at the 204th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 24, 1954,” in Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States (Ann Whitman File), 11–12, box 5, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas, and also on the Declassified Documents Reference System website (record number CK3100224086); cited in Trachtenberg 1988.
8. Trachtenberg 2007; 1988.
9. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The Growing Danger of a U.S. Nuclear First Strike on North Korea,” War on the Rocks, October 10, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/the-growing-danger-of-a-u-s-nuclear-first-strike-on-north-korea/.
10. Michael Green and Matthew Kroenig, “A New Strategy for Deterrence and Rollback with North Korea,” War on the Rocks, October 19, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/a-new-strategy-for-deterrence-and-rollback-with-north-korea/; Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, “Nuclear Stability, Conventional Instability: North Korea and the Lessons from Pakistan,” War on the Rocks, November 20, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/nuclear-stability-conventional-instability-north-korea-lessons-pakistan/; Hecker 2017.
11. These actions may be strategic or coercive behavior. Sobelman 2018; See also Ronen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti, “The Secret History of the Push to Strike Iran,” New York Times, September 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/magazine/iran-strike-israel-america.html.
12. Chubin 2010; Dueck and Takeyh 2007; Hymans 2012.
13. Brom 2005; Kroenig 2012; Kahl 2012; Reardon 2012; Posen 2006; Parsi 2007.
14. Raas and Long 2007; Lindsay 2013.
15. Michael Crowley, “The Iran Crisis, Explained,” New York Times, June 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-uranium.html.
16. Samore, et al, 2017.
17. For a list of US sanctions on Iran, see US Department of the Treasury, “Sanctions Programs and Country Information,” https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/iran.aspx.
18. Andrea Mitchell and Ken Dilanian, “Why Is Netanyahu Sharing Old Iran Nuke Info? To Get to Trump,” NBC News, May 1, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/netanyahu-s-info-iran-nukes-known-u-s-intelligence-years-n870456.
19. David D. Kirkpatrick, Richard Pérez-Peña, and Stanley Reed, “Tankers Are Attacked in Mideast, and U.S. Says Video Shows Iran Was Involved,” New York Times, June 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/13/world/middleeast/oil-tanker-attack-gulf-oman.html; Helene Cooper, “What We Know About Iran Shooting Down a U.S. Drone,” New York Times, June 20, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/us/politics/drone-shot-down-iran-us.html.
20. Edward Wong, Helene Cooper, and Megan Specia, “Trump Adds Troops after Iran Says It Will Breach Nuclear Deal,” New York Times, June 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-compliance.html.
21. Vali R. Nasr, “Trump Might Not Want War With Iran. Without Diplomacy He Will Get One,” New York Times, June 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/opinion/iran-america-crisis.html.
22. Ronen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti, “The Secret History of the Push to Strike Iran,” New York Times, September 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/magazine/iran-strike-israel-america.html.
23. Peter Hirschberg, “Netanyahu: It’s 1938 and Iran Is Germany; Ahmadinejad Is Preparing Another Holocaust,” Haaretz, November 14, 2006, https://www.haaretz.com/1.4931862.
24. Ronen Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?,” New York Times, January 25, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/magazine/will-israel-attack-iran.html.
25. Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, “Biden Taps Obama Administration Diplomat as New Iran Envoy,” Foreignpolicy.com, January 29, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/29/biden-iran-envoy-rob-malley-nuclear-deal-negotiations-republican-criticisms-sanctions/.
26. “Joseph R. Biden Jr. Foreign Policy,” New York Times, January 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/politics/joe-biden-foreign-policy.html; “Remarks by the Vice President to the AIPAC Policy Conference,” March 4, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/04/remarks-vice-president-aipac-policy-conference.
27. Braut-Hegghammer 2011; Reiter 2005; Tamsett 2004; Kreps and Fuhrmann 2011.
28. Quester 2000; Buhite and Hamel 1990.