11.
WU TING’S REIGN can be summarized as a progressive reassertion of authority, expansion of the domain of control, and the projection of power beyond the core states in order to stifle independent peoples who had sought to exploit increasing weakness by mounting incursions and plundering the state’s growing wealth. Benign trading relations no doubt predominated, but the idyllic portrait of a virtuous dynasty whose charismatic power enthralled contiguous states is certainly a highly romanticized construct of later centuries.
Many enemy actions were simply the sort of minor predatory foray that would interminably plague Imperial China throughout its history. As ephemeral as the bite of a mosquito, they were easily absorbed and had no discernible impact on the central court apart from the king perfunctorily ordering some minimal action in response to incoming reports. Others, particularly the challenges mounted by the Ch’iang, T’u-fang, and Kung-fang during the latter half of Wu Ting’s reign, constituted a matter of focal concern. Nevertheless, unlike the subsequent Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, when staggering fiscal amounts and massive manpower would be allotted just to ensure a state’s survival, martial activities didn’t extensively draw upon or deplete the Shang’s resources.
Comparatively fewer inscriptions have been recovered for the dynasty’s remaining century and a half, but they are sufficient to discern a general contraction of Shang power and a shift in military focus eastward. After Wu Ting’s vibrant era, nine kings reigned from Anyang, including the much-demonized Emperor Hsin, many of whom received the epithet of “martial,” indicative of ongoing military activity. Based on the PRC chronology project, they have been assigned the following dates:
Tsu Keng, Tsu Chia, Ping Hsin, K’ang Ting, forty-four years, 1191-1148
Wu Yi, thirty-five years, 1147-1113
Wen Ting, eleven years, 1112-1102
Emperor Yi, twenty-six years, 1101-1076
Emperor Hsin, thirty years, 1075-1046
Under their aegis the Shang has traditionally but simplistically and incorrectly been depicted as descending into inebriation and irreversible weakness before finally collapsing.1 Without doubt Shang authority receded in the north, northwest, west, and south, any strongpoints that had been established in the initial period of fluorescence at Cheng-chou or by campaign forces during Wu Ting’s resurgence generally being abandoned. Formidable Shang towns like Chin-hsi and minority cultural enclaves such as Hsia-chia-tien (which derived its bronze and stamped earth techniques from the Shang) enjoyed newfound independence and a period of indigenous cultural resurgence. Despite military outposts and strong bastions that anchored what might be viewed as fingers of power, Shang awesomeness diminished somewhat even in the northeast, and the territory in which the king could freely hunt visibly contracted.
However, contrary to impressions of weakness and ineptitude, the Shang not only remained militarily active in the east and southeast, where the states and peoples would never be more than nominally submissive, but also increased their efforts out of various motives, including a quest for natural resources such as salt.2 Their continued ability to undertake sustained expeditions eastward and down into the Huai River area suggests that any failure to maintain their earlier dominance over the realm stemmed from factors other than incompetence, corruption, or formidable external challenges.
Although the Shang probably originated in eastern China, and numerous artifacts and practices that show significant interaction and cultural intermixing indicate that the Yi were close, predynastic allies of the Shang, both Shandong and southeast China became zones of contention during the dynastic era.3 Relations with groups in these areas varied from voluntary submission through indifference and outright rebellion. The submissive continued to accept Shang values, customs, and aspects of material culture and were accordingly rewarded with nominal participation in the Shang hierarchy. However, depending upon such strategic factors as location, mineral resources, and degree of threat posed, Shang clan forces were apparently deputed to establish control over more hostile regions by exploiting the enticements of material culture, awesome displays of power, or brutal force. The presence of these Shang military colonies is well attested by ritual items, particularly cauldrons marked with clan names such as Chü otherwise unknown from oracular inscriptions, and disproportionate numbers of bronze weapons, including oversized axes of authority and other dramatic symbols of power.4
Shang expansion into the east and southeast occurred in two waves, the first while ensconced in Yen-shih and Cheng-chou and the second during the Anyang phase, when aggressive actions and the development of dozens of sites accompanied retrenchment.5 Oracular inscriptions inquiring whether certain commanders (including Fu Hao) should be dispatched against the Yi or whether the king himself should assume command show the first campaigns were initiated in Wu Ting’s era.6 According to traditional records, during Wu Yi’s reign the Tung Yi moved back into the Huai and Hsi, areas previously dominated by the Shang, and began to prove generally troublesome.7 Some inscriptional and archaeological evidence indicates that in addition to two well-known expeditions that were undertaken late in the era, campaigns were mounted against the Yi in all the other reigns.8
Late Shang relations with the Yi who inhabited the upper Huai were equally characterized by friction and turbulence. Shang determination to control the area is attested by the shift of the Ch’ang clan, a prominent martial family, to the Lu-yi district of Henan sometime during the last few reigns at Yin-hsü.9 (Evidence for the family’s military importance is visible in a munificent Anyang tomb dating to late in Wu Ting’s reign that ranks second only to Fu Hao’s in the number of ritual bronzes, weapons, and jades recovered. Among the more than 310 bronze objects, including square cauldrons emblematic of power, are seven axes, three large knives, seventy-one dagger-axes, and seventy-six spearheads, many of which are discussed below. Seven jade chi, two jade axes, and seven jade dagger-axes were also found.) Sacrifices were also being made to a commander Ch’ang immediately following Wu Ting’s reign, and the clan may have been related to the king.
The discovery of a Lu-yi tomb containing numerous Shang ritual bronzes quite similar to those recovered at Anyang is interpreted as evidence that the clan controlled the minor state of Ch’ang located in this region. Although archaeologists have avoided speculation, it seems likely that the clan had been dispatched to a problematic area for security purposes rather than having originated there and early on provided the screening actions for which they were subsequently honored. Somewhat surprisingly, a number of early Chou dynasty bronzes were also discovered in the tomb and certain Chou burial characteristics noted, suggesting that the clan managed to remain powerful after the Chou conquest by acknowledging Chou authority.
Late Shang artifacts have similarly been recovered in Shandong at Chi-ning, Ho-che, Lin-hsi, and other locations in a pattern of diminishing eastward prevalence. The highest density has been found around two slightly separated Shandong locations, T’eng-hsien Ch’ien-chang-ta, which may have been the location of the former Shang capital of Yen or Pi and where the Shih clan seems to have exercised administrative and military control, and T’eng-chou Ching-hsiang, where a royal clan member, possibly even one of Wu Ting’s brothers or sons, was ensconced. 10 Whether the indigenous peoples were nominally submissive or actively repressed remains unclear. However, wherever found, Shang culture primarily affected the upper classes, particularly those controlling the Yi clan states.11
In the Hai-tai region the struggle for dominance between the late Shang and the Yi in their incarnations as the Jen-fang, Yü-fang, Huai Yi, and various minor states such as Ku, Feng, Hsü, Ts’ai, and Yen saw conquest and varying degrees of displacement and amalgamation.12 Extensive Shang artifacts have been found in the Chiao-tung peninsula, in the eastern Chiao-lai plains area (extending to Lin-tzu), in Anhui and northern Jiangsu down as far as the Yellow Sea coast, and even around the Huai River. They are especially prominent in the area of Lu and around Chi-nan City, as well as Su-fu-t’un.13 Whether Su-fu-t’un was a satellite state with foreign kingship or a purely Shang military site remains unknown, but the governing clan clearly must have been entrusted with military responsibilities because great symbolic axes (yüeh inscribed with “commander Ch’ou,” a name that also appears in the oracular inscriptions) have been recovered.
Inscriptions attributed to this era convey the general impression that the level of military activity, though intermittently intense, was only a fraction of that during Wu Ting’s reign. Although this may be because insufficient numbers have been recovered to accurately characterize martial developments, it more likely stems from warfare (understood as an ongoing effort to defend the integrity of the borders and keep contiguous peoples reasonably submissive) having become more routine and thus normally assigned to standing units rather than undertaken on an extemporaneous basis. Even though the Shang had the power to undertake extensive campaigns, few appear to have been mounted, with those discussed below being exceptional. Furthermore, Shang kingship did not consist of static governance exercised from a single imperial site as in later history, but was highly peripatetic, essentially a form of “rulership in movement” intended to display royal power and facilitate, if not ensure, personal participation in local issues.
Even though comparatively fewer inscriptions can be attributed to the post-Wu Ting era and difficulties remain in assigning them to arbitrarily schematized reigns, Anyang military activity tends to be understood in terms of five distinct periods, the first devoted to Wu Ting, the remainder encompassing four pairs of rulers each. These late monarchs varied in their aggressiveness, some of them being particularly noted for provoking enmity among otherwise quiescent peripheral peoples. However, analyzing Shang actions purely in terms of these segmented reign periods obscures the essential continuity of regional dynamics and implies a causative relationship where none may have existed. Steppe/sedentary interactions over the centuries would always be highly complex, never a simple reflection of Imperial Chinese actions. 14 Sudden changes in peripheral aggressiveness may have resulted simply from internal issues (such as leadership clashes) or from external factors totally irrelevant to Shang attitude and policies, especially ongoing weather changes that may have caused food shortages, compelling predatory actions.15
Given the decline in temperature and moisture that resulted in some drying out and harsher conditions in the semiarid regions following Wu Ting’s reign, it is hardly surprising that old enemies such as the Ch’iang and Yi were active following his demise. Others reappeared after apparently having been vanquished, and several new names emerged to command Shang attention, some briefly, a few across the era. Of particular interest is the apparently coordinated action undertaken by three or four states in temporary alliance, leading to them being termed the san pang and ssu pang, the “three allies” and “four allies.”
Little is known about the relatively brief second period that basically refers to Tsu Keng and Tsu Chia. Although several clashes with the Kung-fang seem to have arisen, the major nemesis continued to be the Ch’iang, who mounted numerous minor incursions. Thereafter, despite indications that Tsu Keng and Tsu Chia had hunted in Hsia-wei territory, the Hsia-wei apparently rebelled and had to be suppressed during the third period identified with Ping Hsin and K’ang Ting. The king and the Hsiao-ch’en Ch’iang led a coalition campaign that captured weapons, chariots, and four of their leaders, who were subsequently sacrificed to the ancestors.16 Cowed by their defeat, they apparently remained submissive right through the Chou conquest, because the last two Shang emperors again conducted hunts in their territory.
Infantry campaigns were mounted against the Hsiu-fang and the Hsiang-fang, both of whom would later reappear as members of the ssu pang. Hsiu-fang prisoners were captured,17 and warriors seized from the Hsiang-fang were sacrificed by the Shang.18 However, K’ang Ting apparently directed the era’s major efforts toward the various Ch’iang,19 who must have again become powerful as well as aggressive because repeated inquiries show considerable concern about the fate of expeditions mounted against them.20 Multiple queries on the same plastron suggest the king carefully pondered what units to employ, which commander to appoint, what the response might be, and whether to further augment his field forces.21
Rather than ordering Shang allies forth as in Wu Ting’s era, various clan forces, including the five clans, were deputed in response.22 In addition, the shu (border specialists) were dispatched, indicative of a long-term defensive commitment over and above any effort to extirpate the enemy as well as further evidence of an ongoing shift from extemporaneous response to routine engagement.23 Although their strength and mobility made the task difficult, allowing the Ch’iang to shift, reorganize, and resurge, they were eventually engaged in their heartland and vanquished. Apart from those slain, a number of prisoners were taken and two Ch’iang leaders sacrificed.
Despite the usual difficulties involved in apportioning the extant inscriptions to Wu Yi and Wen Ting, both fourth period rulers were noted for their aggressiveness, expansion of the standing forces, and love of hunting.24 Later (and therefore merely speculative) writings also claim that Wu Yi was brutal and repressive and thus provoked revolts among otherwise subjugated peoples.25 Wen Ting is generally known to posterity as Wen Wu Ting, the wu (meaning “martial,” just as in Wu Ting’s and Wu Yi’s names) indicating his penchant for military activity. As usual, clashes that resulted in the capture of Ch’iang prisoners are intermittently noted, indicating that Ch’iang groups continued to be troublesome until Wu Yi’s successor. 26
Wu Yi’s lengthy reign of thirty-five years (1147-1113 BCE) was punctuated by a few campaigns of note, including one against the Chih-fang who, despite having been quiescent since Wu Ting’s era, now had to be vanquished by troops from the five clans.27 Similarly, the Fang-fang, previously suppressed by Wu Ting, began to make incursions from out of the north,28 prompting an active Shang response.29 Even members of the Yi dwelling in the northwest had to be targeted anew for repressive measures that carried Shang forces out into Sui territory.30 (The Yi presence in Sui is generally cited as proof of the proximity of the two groups, but their mobility and apparent mutual cooperation are more noteworthy, evidence that loose coalitions of contiguous states had begun mounting coordinated actions against the Shang.)
The Ch’a-fang, Hsiang-fang, and Sui-fang are similarly noted as having acted in concert, and the Ch’a also joined with the Man in making incursions.31 (The Man had previously appeared in Wu Ting’s period down in the south, especially around the area that would become Ch’u, but they also populated more northern areas. Just like “Ch’iang,” the term came to encompass numerous peoples.)32 Suppressive efforts mounted by augmented border defense units (shu) succeeded in neutralizing the threat from the Ch’a, who temporarily disappeared only to be counted among the ssu pang (along with the Sui) in the fifth period.
Little is known about Hsiang-fang (or Hsing-fang) activity in this period, but they are recorded as being jointly targeted with the Li33 and were apparently vanquished since the Shang eventually opened fields in their territory.34 However, without doubt Wu Yi’s most important military effort was directed against the Li, a formidable enemy reputedly located in the Hu-kuan (Hu Pass) area of Shanxi that occasioned much Shang consternation, compelling the king to take the field.35 He not only exercised sole command36 but also directed Shang measures in conjunction with well-known commanders such as Chih Kuo37 and Ch’in.38
A number of inscriptions inquire about pummeling the Li,39 having the king’s clan forces and the three clans pursue them,40 seize them,41 clear them out,42 and even “kill” or “slay” them, a very uncommon term,43 all of which indicate they must have been convincingly defeated. Based on an entry in the Bamboo Annals that indicates severe clashes between the Li and the Chou while the latter served as the so-called Hsi Po or Western Duke, at least one analyst not unreasonably believes that the conflict’s intensity reflects a battle to control the intervening area.44
Few enemies or concerted martial efforts have yet been assigned to Wen Ting’s brief era apart from routine repressive activities mounted against the Ch’iang.45 The last two reigns of Emperor Yi (1101-1076 BCE) and the notorious Hsin (1075-1046) in the fifth period were each marked by lengthy campaigns intended to eliminate Eastern Yi threats.46 Some one hundred inscriptions dating to Yi’s era allow reconstruction of a punitive expedition personally commanded by the emperor against various members of the Yi, including the Jen-fang, in the east and southeast just across the Huai River.47 The forty-one queries that can be attributed to the outward journey and thirty-seven to the return encompass twenty-five 10-day periods, commencing with the ninth month of his tenth year and extending into the fifth month of the eleventh year, or slightly more than eight months, variously calculated as 250 or 260 days, the former expended in actual campaigning plus an additional 10 days for final sacrifices and presumably ceremonial demobilization.
After an initial detour northwest to conduct preliminary sacrifices and announce the campaign to the ancestors, the army was marshaled and ordered in the traditional hunting area of Ch’in-yang slightly southeast of Anyang. Rather than cutting overland and thereby being compelled to contend with numerous mountains and bodies of water, they marched along relatively flat riverside terrain after emanating from Ta-yi Shang.48 Proceeding past Wei,the army reached You, a clan state whose forces under the Earl of Hsi joined them and (in one possible sequence) then subjugated important Yi forces (discussed below). Continuing their progress, the conjoined forces turned down and crossed the Huai River to engage their final enemy, the Lin-fang. From inception to final victory consumed 106 days, but the army moved in spurts interrupted by encampments of a day or more for rest, training, hunting, and ritual sacrifice. Furthermore, the inscriptions specify that they were marching, implying only a very small chariot component was present for command and control purposes, not unexpected because chariots were ill suited for operations in the comparatively moist Huai river valley.
In contrast to the lengthy period required to reach their objective, time on target was apparently minimal, because they are known to have been at Ling-fang on keng-yin and returned on kuei-mao, the twenty-seventh and fortieth days of the sixty-day cycle, respectively. The slightly less than two weeks available at the southernmost point implies that the conflict consisted of a single clash or at most a short sequence of brief but decisive battles. After being joined by the Earl of Hsi, Shang forces scored a preliminary victory over the Lin-fang, another member of the Eastern Yi, and then vanquished the Jen, who must have been startled at being attacked by a Shang army so far afield.
Unfortunately, the inscriptions are silent on the nature of the actual encounters, only a couple of fragments suggesting that Shang forces managed to capture a local chief and burn an enemy encampment, certainly the first recorded use of incendiary measures. However, additional inscriptions indicate that the Huai River clashes had been preceded by what might be termed a “clearing-out” operation around the Wei and Hua rivers in Shandong that focused on the area around Lin-tzu and targeted the enemy’s city of Ch’iu (or Chü) for attack. The assault had to employ a variety of forces, including left, right, and center border protective units (shu), masses (chung) from the left and right lü, and the king’s own clan troops, to severely pummel and suppress the enemy.49
The return march paralleled the outward journey but initially progressed several kilometers south of the original route, often on the opposite side of local rivers, presumably to facilitate foraging and resolve other logistical problems, before revisiting most of the major fortified towns initially traversed. Despite making frequent, often lengthy stops to feast, hunt, sacrifice, and no doubt manifest the monarch’s enhanced awesomeness, only ninety-nine days were required. Based on a limited number of inscriptions (including one on a skull) and a bronze commemorative vessel, it appears that a second campaign targeting the Eastern Yi was undertaken in Yi’s fifteenth year. However, little is known beyond the fact that two tribal leaders were captured and sacrificed.50
Whether the Jen-fang campaign is attributed to Emperor Yi’s reign or Emperor Hsin’s, it is certain that Emperor Hsin commanded a Shang punitive expedition eastward into Shandong to repress the Yü-fang, another troublesome member of the Eastern Yi that had been growing in strength and attacked Shang interests at Mao-shih and Kao not far from Shang-ch’iu.51 After starting out once again from Ta-yi Shang, imperial forces were augmented by clan troops from several nearby nobles. Despite the target being considerably closer, the effort consumed an entire year, during which the emperor exploited the intermediate terrain for logistical support, implying that displaying his awesomeness among the faithful might have been an equally important objective.
Scholars who ascribe three campaigns to Emperor Hsin’s reign have frequently claimed that these lengthy campaigns exhausted the state,52 yet in contradictory fashion contemporary PRC historians have blamed their success for fostering greater arrogance in an already dissolute ruler. Impetus for the former derives from two statements in the Tso Chuan, “the Tung Yi rebelled when Chou of the Shang held a martial convocation at Li,” and “King Chou conquered the Tung Yi and lost his life.”53 The first instance is cited in the context of enumerating arrogant or presumptuous behavior in kings who coerced other states into gathering for a military assembly. (In this case the state of Ch’u not only held one, but then foolishly proceeded to invade the state of Wu.)
However, having unfolded in the eighth and ninth years of his lengthy reign,54 Emperor Hsin’s expeditionary effort would have occurred far too early to constitute a debilitating factor in the Shang’s demise. In addition, once in the field the army certainly lived off the land and provisions furnished by submissive allies, reducing the direct burden on the state. Victories should have resulted in the acquisition of valuable spoils and perhaps large numbers of prisoners who could be forcibly employed in productive labor (if not sacrificed), increasing the Shang’s wealth rather than depleting it. Without doubt these lengthy efforts attest to the power and willingness of the last two “debauched” emperors to mount extensive campaigns, whether simply motivated by the insult of obstreperous behavior or intended to be preemptive.
The Tung Yi clearly played a pivotal role in the Shang’s ascension to power even though the Shang had acted on behalf of the Hsia in an attack on the Yu Yi as they were developing their own military power.55 Perhaps from their inception, predynastic Shang and Yi (Yüeh-shih) cultures had been closely intertwined, many Yüeh-shih elements including core divination practices being incorporated by, or at least common to, the Shang.56 Yüeh-shih participation in an uncertain but probably active conquest role is indicated by the presence of their artifacts among Shang deposits in the postconquest fourth period at Erh-li-t’ou57 as well as around Yen-shih.58 Prior to the final campaign the Yi had been known as allies of the Hsia,59 their submissiveness being attested by Chieh’s expectation that they would attend military conclaves when summoned. According to Mo-tzu’s account, when King T’ang had first acted in a rebellious manner, the Nine Yi’s response to Chieh’s summons was all that deterred him from initiating an attack. Only after further developments, including a Hsia attack on a Yi proto-state, saw a similar summons fail did Yi Yin, reputedly a member of the Yi, conclude the moment to strike had finally arrived.
King T’ang thus not only neutralized the potential Yi threat but continued the Shang’s close relationship with them and somehow persuaded or cajoled them into participating in the final campaign. Nevertheless, before the end of Hsin’s reign the Shang would subjugate the area to the east, eliminate Yüeh-shih culture, and penetrate the southeast. However, the rapidity of the process and the exact nature of the displacement or conquest of Yüeh-shih groups, resulting in the amalgamation of Shang and Tung Yi cultures, remain open to question. Without doubt the process was clearly affected by topographical factors, being easier on the plains of Shangdong than in the mountainous region of the upper Huai, with its many tributaries and streams.60
Serious conflict apparently began during Chung Ting’s reign when, despite reputed internal dissension and a general withdrawal from the P’an-lung-ch’eng region, artifacts recovered from Ao show a major victory must have been achieved and the immediately contiguous area in nearby Shandong subjugated. Sporadic military efforts over the Shang’s two centuries of reign from Yin-hsü culminated in lengthy expeditionary campaigns under Emperors Yi and Hsin that concluded the archaeologically attested process of bringing the greater Hai-tai region and much of the upper Huai river basin under Shang control. The latter were never integrated into the Shang hierarchy of proto-states and military bastions; 61 nevertheless, these Shang thrusts initiated the separation and displacement of the Yi subsequently known as the Huai Yi, a process that would be completed in the early Chou.62 Although it may be fashionable to attribute the Tung Yi’s extirpation to simple cultural superiority, Shang violence, force, and outright military aggression thus played the crucial role in expanding its dominance to Shandong, northern Jiangsu, and upper Anhui.
Enmity with the ssu pang or four allied states is also frequently mentioned with reference to the final period. The four are normally identified as the Ch’iang, Ch’a, Hsiu, and Sui. The Ch’iang are of course well-known but apparently suffered significant defeats just prior to or during the early part of Hsin’s reign, because the emperor is noted as hunting in their former domain63 and performing divination there. The Sui had previously been active in K’ang Ting, Yi, and Hsin’s eras, and even Wu Ting had deputed Ch’üeh and his own infantry to strike them.64 The Ch’a, who were located near the Ch’iang and thus a western force,65 had previously cooperated with the Sui during Wu Yi’s reign and been temporarily dispersed. Threats from the Hsiu had also been deflected in the third period.
The era ultimately ended with the Chou’s precipitous victory at the Battle of Mu-yeh following a rapid but direct march from their homeland in the Wei river valley. For whatever reason, Emperor Hsin’s defenses were easily shattered and his fate quickly sealed. Extensive moppingup activities and forays onto contiguous terrain concluded the effort, leaving many inexplicable questions, including the reason for the execrable performance of the Shang forces; Hsin’s failure to anticipate the campaign in view of highly transparent Chou intentions and an aborted, earlier thrust; and the unfolding of the battle itself. However, these and other aspects, such as the nature of the forces and tactics employed, are best discussed in the context of the Chou’s rapid rise and astounding conquest in our succeeding volume, Western Chou Warfare.