✦ NOTES ✦

COMMON JOURNAL AND COLLECTION titles used throughout the notes and bibliography are abbreviated as follows:

CHAPTER 1

1 Just as China’s “failure” to foster scientific and industrial revolutions has been too readily attributed to the stultifying effects of Confucian doctrine, the complex question of the perceived antagonism between the civil (wen) and the martial (wu)—frequently posed as an assertion that Confucianism enervated the national will to action, thereby rendering the state impotent in the face of brutal, militant hordes who were, however, vastly outnumbered—has so far been treated simplistically. Disparate power groups exploited doctrine to their own ends, and what might be termed a debased, hypocritical form of Confucianism (as distinguished from the pristine doctrine of Confucius and his early followers) often muddled martial discussions and frequently thwarted the implementation of realistic measures. Conversely, many reigns were marked by a decidedly martial ethos and embraced outwardly directed aggressive actions that vigorously challenged all but the most sincere believers in evolved Confucian doctrine. (Naturally, beyond necessarily acknowledging core concepts such as righteousness and benevolence, “Confucian” doctrine varied greatly over the centuries and assumed many guises, ranging from simple dogma to abstruse Sung formulations.)

2 If anything has been learned from the astonishing archaeological discoveries of the past few decades, including from the so-called tomb texts—early bamboo-strip editions of books entombed millennia ago—it should be that from the Chou onward, even within well-defined schools incredible diversity has always characterized Chinese thought. Some of these “schools” consist of a single vision or particular understanding, others of immense, highly convoluted philosophical structures. Several flourished for centuries; others disappeared in mere decades. Moreover, although records of court debates and modern reconstructions of intellectual history naturally tend to discern organized, patterned activity, the voices were usually multiple. Similarly, virtually every possible viewpoint seems to have been expressed in the martial sphere at one time or another, even if only briefly, and become a motivation or justification for action. (Despite the current penchant for denigrating traditional terms such as “Confucian” and rejecting their applicability, they are retained here for their convenience in charting relative viewpoints and organizing essential concepts.)

3 Recovered from a Han dynasty tomb in 1972, Sun Pin’s Military Methods (Sun Pin Ping-fa) was composed in the last half of the fourth century BCE or slightly later by disciples or descendants of the legendary Sun Pin, whose biography is coupled with Sun-tzu’s in the Shih Chi. Badly fragmented, the text tends to focus more on tactical matters than does Sun-tzu’s Ping-fa, generally known as the Art of War. (For clarity and the convenience of readers, in lieu of appending extensive footnotes and parenthetical material, our translations are sometimes abridged or slightly amplified. A close translation with extensive notes for this passage may be found in Sawyer, Sun Pin Military Methods.)

4 “Audience with King Wei,” Sun Pin Ping-fa. It would have been foolhardy for him to deny, outright, the possibility that Virtue could affect others since it was already becoming a well-entrenched belief. However, Sun Pin could have mentioned several other conflicts involving lesser or almost unknown early Sage authorities. (For a reappraisal of purported clashes, see Wang Yü-ch’eng, CKSYC 1986:3, 71-84.)

5 “Preparation of Strategic Power.”

6 “Military Strategy.”

7 “Li Lun” (“Discussion of Ritual”).

8 “Shih Chün,” Lü-shih Ch’un-ch’iu.

9 “Li Lun.”

10 “Military Strategy.”

11 “Military Strategy,” Huai-nan Tzu.

12 “Benevolence the Foundation,” Ssu-ma Fa. (A complete translation of the Ssu-ma Fa, parts of which probably predate Sun Pin’s Military Methods, may be found in Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China.)

13 “Audience with King Wei.” Sun Pin’s attribution of the four fundamental military concepts—formations, strategic power, changes, and strategic imbalance of power—to the ancient cultural heroes credited with creating the essential artifacts of civilization is uncommon.

14 “Inferior Strategy.” (A complete translation of the Three Strategies may be found in Sawyer, Seven Military Classics.) “Huang-shih Kung” means “duke of Yellow Rock.”

15 At least according to an incident recorded in his Shih Chi biography, which, though dubious, was accepted as genuine throughout the imperial period. In the midst of a crisis he reportedly advised an endangered ruler, “I have heard that in civil affairs there must be martial preparation and that in martial affairs there must be civil preparations.” (He is also noted as having asserted that he never studied military affairs, only ritual and ceremonial ones, thereby providing crucial ammunition for antiwar factions. The Analects also contains his offhand remark that he never studied military deployment.) Certainly one of the core issues of Chinese military history, it is beyond the scope of the present volume. However, for an interesting defense of Confucianism not being responsible for China’s military weakness over the centuries, see Kuo Hung-chi, CKCHS 10 (1994): 65-71; for an overview of Chinese attitudes toward warfare and its causes, see Sawyer, “Chinese Warfare: The Paradox of the Unlearned Lesson,” American Diplomacy Magazine (Fall 1998); and for contrast, the initial chapters of Military Technology: Missiles and Sieges.

16 In addition to the PRC’s dedicated effort to establish the historicity (and priority) of ancient Chinese culture, Chinese popular media draw on every aspect for plots and content.

17 Some of the more insightful among the many articles that have appeared in recent decades include Li Yung-hsien, HCCHS 1988:10, 13-20; Li Hsien-teng and Yang Ying, HCCHS 2000:3, 9-19; Huang Huai-hsin, KKWW 1997:4, 33-37; Ting Shan, BIHP 3, 517-536; Liu Fan-ti 1999, 70-74; Wang Wen-kuang and Chai Kuo-ch’iang, 2005:9, 1-8; Li Tsung-t’ung, BIHP 39, 27-39; Chao Shih-ch’ao, HCCHS 1999:2, 43-45; Ch’en Ku-ying, HCCHS 1985:7, 4-16; Liu Chung-hui, CKCHCHS 1 (1997): 11-15; Ch’en Hsü, HSLWC 293-302; and Ho Kao, LSYC 1992:3, 69-84. Articles by Western writers include Charles Le Blanc, 45-63, and Gopal Sukhu, EC 30 (2005- 2006), 91-153.

18 This is anachronistic because the “hundred surnames,” later a term for the ordinary people but initially a reference to those granted the equivalent of surnames, the nobility, did not exist in this period.

19 Generally taken as atmospheric factors or the ch’i (pneuma or vapor) of the five quarters: north, south, east, west, and middle. This reflects Warring States five-phase (or -element) correlative thought.

20 Five types of animals are enumerated, including two bears, reflecting the theme of “five” throughout. They are variously interpreted as the symbols or totems for five clans or tribes, although practitioners in China’s long martial arts tradition like to believe he trained his warriors in fighting techniques derived from the individual animals.

21 “Wu Ti Pen-chi.” Although most scholars assign the Yellow Emperor to the Lungshan period, a few such as Hsü Shun-chan (KKWW 1997:4, 19-26) date his activities as early as the middle Yangshao.

22 “Tao Shih.” The clause “the blood flowed for a hundred li” is a recurrent literary device used to describe other battles as well, particularly the Chou conquest at Mu-yeh. (A li was about a third of a mile.)

23 The “blood was great enough to float a pestle” is another trope often employed to describe the battle at Mu-yeh.

24 T’ai-p’ing Yü-lan, chüan 15, citing the Chih-lin. Chuo Li is said to have been in the vicinity of Beijing, as a local name implies.

25 Chüan 17, “Ta Huang-pei Ching,” Shan-hai Ching. For a more extensive mythical recounting, see T’ao Yang and Chung Hsiu, 1990, 504-508.

26 Snakes and dragons figure prominently in several legends about the Yellow Emperor and Ch’ih Yu, both men supposedly being descended from snakes on their mothers’ side but from the bear and ox respectively on their fathers’. The Yellow Emperor is frequently associated with a white dragon, and one legend has the white dragon battling with either a red or black tiger, presumably Ch’ih Yu’s clan, which perishes (T’u Wu-chou, HCCHS 1984:3, 9-14).

27 “Feng Shan Shu,” Shih-chi. Ssu-ma Ch’ien notes the eight were said to have been established by the T’ai Kung (traditionally recognized as the founder of the state of Ch’i) and that an altar to Ch’ih Yu had been found on Ch’i’s western border (which would befit Ch’i’s strong military heritage). Somewhat contradictorily, Ch’i is also noted for having esteemed the Yellow Emperor. (See Hu Chia-ts’ung, HCCHS 1991:1, 19-26.) Various dates based on myths, archaeology, and outright assumptions have been suggested for this clash, 2700 to 2600 BCE being the most common.

28 “Ti Shu,” Kuan-tzu.

29 As will be discussed in the weapons section, nothing more than a dirk existed around 2600 BCE. There are various lists for the five weapons, some of which include chariots and armor.

30 See Hsiao Ping, CKKTS 1994:11, 7-12.

31 Because maple leaves turn red in the fall, the (bronze) shackles that restrained Ch’ih Yu are said to have turned into a forest of maple trees; maple trees continue to be venerated by Miao remnants even today. (Wang Yen-chün, HCCHS 1988:6, 11-12.)

32 For further discussion, see Wang Chih-p’ing, 1999:4, 95-98.

33 For a discussion of the widespread Han admiration for Ch’ih Yu (contrary to the idea that the Han only esteemed Confucian values), see Wang Tzu-chin, HCCHS 2006:6, 70-75.

34 Found at Ma-wang-tui and now included among the collated texts known as the “Huang Ti Ssu-ching.”

35 See Chang Ch’i-yün, 1961, vol. 1, 22-25.

36 Directing troops deployed for battle was one of the most formidable problems of antiquity. China early on developed formations and segmentation and control measures that allowed generals to command rather than simply lead from the front. Citing an ancient text, in “Military Combat” the Art of War states: “Because they could not hear each other, they made gongs and drums. Because they could not see each other, they made pennants and flags.” Drums were particularly emphasized. (For example, see “The Tao of the General,” Wu-tzu; “Strict Positions,” Ssu-ma Fa; and “Orders for Restraining the Troops,” Wei Liao-tzu.)

37 The classic military writings adroitly exploit righteousness as a motivating factor. For example, the Ssu-ma Fa’s first chapter, “Benevolence the Foundation,” elaborates the conditions under which justified campaigns might be mounted.

38 Chang Ch’i-yün believes they crossed during the winter when the Yellow River would have been frozen (which would obviate any need for boats). However, the climate was considerably warmer at this time, and the water’s volume probably was greater due to higher rainfall levels, making it unlikely that it would have fully frozen; crossings in later times required placing a rope across to create an ice barrier.

39 Several scholars have noted that stories about important events, particularly those identified with place-names, tend to enjoy localized preservation. Although not primary evidence, some have proven to retain surprising vestiges of ancient events.

40 Lü Wen-yü, HCCHS 2000:1, 10-17. Conversely, Teng Shu-p’ing (KKWW 1999:5, 15-27) identifies the Tung Yi with Ch’ih Yu and sees the conflict as emblematic of the clash between Hua-Hsia cultural predispositions in the middle and upper reaches of the Yellow River and Tung Yi manifestations in Shandong. (Teng’s interpretation seems somewhat problematic because the Tung Yi totem was a bird, whereas Ch’ih Yu had an ox head, a difficulty that Teng somewhat unsatisfactorily deflects by claiming that they subsequently acquired the bird association.) Teng also believes that four jade Tung Yi artifacts discovered in the west in Shanxi and Shaanxi provide evidence of the severity of this primordial clash, because Ch’ih Yu’s clan had to disperse to the west and south after their defeat.

41 Li Yu-mou, CKKTS 1994:2, 39-45.

42 Wang Yen-chün, HCCHS 1988:6, 11-15.

43 However, note that the Fu and Sui may have been two tribal groups rather than a single individual. In addition, not everyone agrees that the Yellow Emperor came from the west and Ch’ih Yu from the east, while arguments about whether Ch’ih Yu should be identified with the Miao in the south or the Tung Yi continue unabated. For example, Hsiao Ping (CKKTS 1994:11, 7-12) argues for Ch’ih Yu having been one of the great ancestors of the early southern Miao chieftains, who were in turn descendants of the Nine Li and active around the Yangtze’s middle reaches, especially the vicinity of Tung-t’ing and P’o-yang lakes.

44 Not impossible if they represent the late Shandong Lungshan cultural strata, in which bronze weapons began to appear, although in minuscule numbers.

45 How much wetter the east would have been is highly questionable. (There has always been a significant difference in total rainfall between the north and south rather than the east and west, accounting for rice being a southern staple.) This interpretation would require that Ch’ih Yu be a representative of lower Yangtze culture and may perhaps be grounds for rethinking the conflict, as these coexistent cultures were quite dynamic and resilient.

46 Although such claims lack any evidence, this sort of interpretation is frequently found in popular works on China’s military history, such as Chang Hsiu-p’ing’s One Hundred Battles That Influenced China.

47 The twenty-seventh century BCE is frequently suggested as the Yellow Emperor’s reign period, whether actual or mythical/symbolic. (See, for example, Teng Shu-p’ing, KKWW 1999:5, 15.)

48 “All under Heaven” is a late term, and this well-known passage is found in the late part known as the “Shih Ts’u.” (The second part may also be translated as “Availing himself of bows and arrows, he overawed all under Heaven,” thereby emphasizing the Yellow Emperor’s aggressiveness.)

49 See Fang Li-chung, HCCHS 1989:3, 21.

50 Widespread belief in his magical powers is found in the Warring States and thereafter.

51 Recorded in some versions, the fog is apparently a later addition that may have been prompted by Warring States experience in employing smoke screens. (For the history of smoke and smoke screens in Chinese warfare, see Sawyer, Fire and Water.)

52 Joseph Needham, in Physics and Physical Technology: Mechanical Engineering, 286-303, has speculated that some sort of differential gearing may have been employed and considers it the first homeostatic machine and an initial step in cybernetics. Andre Sleeswyk, in “Reconstruction of the South-Pointing Chariots of the Northern Sung Dynasty,” has provided a further examination of the gearing, and a modern PRC reconstruction has been prominently displayed over the past decade.

53 See Yang K’uan’s extensive discussions, 1941, 65ff. As symbolized by their respective totems, the Yellow and Red Emperors’ tribes are said to have merged through these conflicts, creating the heritage venerated (and exploited) by Warring States Confucian culture. (See Lin Hsiang-keng, HCCHS 1984:1, 3-10; Wang Yen-chün, HCCHS 1988:6, 11-15; and Wu Jui and Cheng Li, CKCHS 1996:3, 4-8.)

54 Lin Hsiang-keng, HCCHS 1984:1, 3-10; Wang Yen-chün, HCCHS 1988:6, 11-15; Wu Jui and Cheng Li, CKCHS 1996:3, 4-8.

55 Several monographs on the topic have appeared in the past two decades, significantly diminishing the value of H. H. Turney-High’s classic discussion, Primitive War; they include Jean Guilaine and Jean Zammit, The Origins of War: Violence in Prehistory; Elizabeth N. Arkush and Mark W. Allen, eds., The Archaeology of Warfare: Prehistories of Raiding and Conquest; Steven A. LeBlanc, Constant Battles: The Myth of the Peaceful, Noble Savage; John Carman and Anthony Harding, eds., Ancient Warfare; Anthony Stevens, The Roots of War; and Arther Ferrill, The Origins of War. Although no more than a hundred men could have been effectively fielded without a minimal administrative hierarchy, modern studies still tend to claim that China’s legendary period lacked any form of military organization, placing their forces below the military horizon in accord with Turney-High’s conception. (For example, see Liu Chan, 1992, 4 and 20ff.)

56 This is considered another characteristic of so-called primitive warfare. (One of the remarkable, largely unnoticed aspects of later Chinese warfare was the common practice of armies simply reflagging vanquished enemy troops and integrating them en masse, as advocated in “Waging War” in the Art of War. How loyal, dedicated, and enthusiastic they historically proved has yet to be examined.)

CHAPTER 2

1 Two examples would be Chi-kung-shan and Wu-chia Ta-p’ing at Wei-ning in Kuei-chou, both dating to about 1300 to 700 BCE (Kuei-chou-sheng WWKK YCS et al., KK 2006:8, 11-27 and 28-39, and Chang Ho-jung and Luo Erh-hu, KK 2006:8, 57-66).

2 A classic Lungshan site of some 140,000 square meters known as “the defensive ancient city” (“Fang-ku-ch’eng”), located in Shandong, furnishes a particularly good example of fortification continuity; it was employed right through the Warring States, when it served as a stronghold on Lu’s eastern border. (See Fang-ch’eng K’ao-ku Kung-tso-tui, KK 2005:10, 25-36.)

3 Even Paul Wheatley’s erudite but now outdated examination of city growth, The Pivot of the Four Quarters, never ponders the craft of wall building. Furthermore, the two volumes in Needham’s Science and Civilisation in China series that contemplate essential aspects of fortification—Civil Engineering and Nautics and Military Sieges and Technology—barely mention Neolithic and Shang fortifications.

4 Despite many hundreds of archaeological reports, only a few synthetic overviews such as P’ei An-p’ing, KK 2004:11, 63-76, and Shao Wangping, JEAA 2 (2000), 195-226, have appeared. (See also Shao’s “The Interaction Sphere of the Longshan Period.”) A few works have discussed city history, including Ch’ü Ying-chieh, Ku-tai Ch’eng-shih, 2003; Ning Yüeh-ming et al., Chung-kuo Ch’eng-shih Fa-chan-shih, 1994; and Yang K’uan, Chung-kuo Ku-tai Tu-ch’eng Chih-tu-shih Yen-chiu . Valuable materials also appear in Li Liu, The Chinese Neolithic: Trajectories to Early States, and Chang Kwang-chih and Xu Pingfang, eds., The Formation of Chinese Civilization.

5 Other than at Ma-chia-yüan Ku-ch’eng, no evidence has yet been reported for defensive works atop walls, not unexpectedly since erosion has affected almost every wall so far excavated.

6 For the history of aquatic warfare in China, see Ralph Sawyer, Fire and Water.

7 In “Military Disposition,” Sun-tzu states: “One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture, one who can be victorious attacks. By assuming a defensive posture your strength will be more than adequate.” In “Planning Offensives” he further observes: “The highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities.” The passage continues with a sweeping condemnation of the wastefulness of citadel assaults, though not their complete exclusion. (For further discussion and a complete translation of the Art of War with historical introduction and textual notes, see Sawyer, Sun-tzu Art of War.)

8 The eighty-eight pits at Ts’u-shan near Wu-an in Hebei held varying amounts of desiccated grain, which, when freshly stored, would have weighed over 50 metric tons. (See Jen Shih-nan, KK 1995:1, 38-39.) Similar reserves (such as 120 metric tons at Ho-mu-tu) have been found at other sites. However, rather than a surplus, they may have been the basic subsistence requirement for the coming year.

9 The Neolithic is generally taken as encompassing 10,000 to 3500 BCE, though others extend it to 2100, the reputed date of the Hsia’s inception. Bronze metallurgy emerged during the Hsia; nevertheless, as it remained primarily a stone culture, the first two centuries are sometimes subsumed within the Neolithic as well.

10 “A Small State with Few People” in the traditionally received text. (For a complete translation and contextual discussion, see Sawyer, The Tao of War.)

11 See Jen Shih-nan, 37. (Various dates have been derived from the recovered artifacts, resulting in controversy.)

12 Jen Shih-nan, 37-38.

13 Yen Wen-ming, KKWW 1997:2, 35.

14 Site descriptions are based on P’ei An-p’ing, KK 2004:11, 66-67, and Chang Hsüeh-hai, KKWW 1999:1, 36-43. There are numerous difficulties reconstructing the earliest stage and disagreements about how to interpret the archaeological evidence. Some archaeologists have dated the site to nearly 6000 BCE, but the more commonly recognized range is Yen Wen-ming’s 5450 to 5100 BCE (cited on page 35 of The Formation of Chinese Civilization).

15 Another P’ei-li-kang platform site in Henan was not only surrounded by water on three sides, but also further protected by two shallow ditches about half a meter deep that could have functioned for drainage or demarcation as much as defense. (One of the ditches varied between a functional 1.65 and 5.15 meters in width, but the other was only 0.75 to 1.1 meters wide.) However, the location’s desirability is evident from its continuous occupation into the Erh-li-t’ou cultural phase (Chang Sung-lin et al., KK 2008:5, 3-20).

16 For site reports see Kan-su-sheng WWKK YCS, KK 2003:6, 19-31, and Lang Shu-te, KK 2003:6, 83-89. Only minimal information on the ditch has yet been provided.

17 Lin-t’ung Chiang-chai, which was continuously occupied right into the Warring States, was protected by a circular ditch that encompassed approximately 55,000 square meters or slightly more than Pan-p’o. However, as the ditch itself has not yet been analyzed, little can yet be said about its profile or overall significance. (For a basic report, see Honan Sheng Kung-yi-shih Wen-wu Pao-hu Kuan-li-suo, KK 1995:4, 297-304, as well as Ning Yüeh-ming’s appraisal, Ch’eng-shih Fa-chan-shih, 13.)

18 For a basic discussion of the Yangshao culture that was originally defined by its red-tinged pottery (in contrast to the black pottery of the later Lungshan period), see K. C. Chang, 1986 (which covers Pan-p’o on pp. 112-123) or Yen Wen-ming, Yang-shao Wen-hua Yen-chiu. Yangshao culture, generally dated from 5000 to 3000 BCE, was centered in the Kuan-chung area and included Gansu around the T’ien-shui River and the upper reaches of the Ch’ing-shui, the middle and upper reaches of the Luo River, the upper portion of the Han River in Shaanxi, the southern portion of Ching-hsi, and the Yü-hsi area, with the Wei River as the focus (Chang Hung-yen, KKWW 2006:5, 66-70, and WW 2006:9, 62-69, 78). Our discussion of Pan-p’o is primarily based on Ch’ien Yao-p’eng’s two articles, KK 1998:2, 45-52, and KK 1999:6, 69-77. However, also see Yen Wen-ming, SCKKLC, 146-153. (Evidence indicates that Lin-t’ung Chiang-chai was occupied well into the Warring States period.)

19 For example, Ch’ien Yao-p’eng believes the site flourished from 4770 to 4190 BCE or almost 600 years, but others such as Ning Yüeh-ming et al., 1994, 12-13, date it as late as 4000 BCE.

20 Ch’ien Yao-p’eng, KK 1999:6, 69.

21 Both Pan-p’o and Lin-t’ung Chiang-chai are marked by raised platforms and well-smoothed earth. It should be noted that Ch’ien Yao-p’eng, 46, believes that simply widening the walls, as was also done at P’eng-t’ou-shan, should be understood as an afterthought to ditch excavation rather than a deliberate attempt to solidify them and increase their height. In contradiction, Chang Hsüeh-hai concludes that the interior mounded wall was actually the result of a later, more deliberate effort, and notes that there is evidence for a third ditch some ten meters beyond the main one that may have partially furnished the dirt for the inner wall or a no longer visible outer wall. (See Chang Hsüeh-hai, KKWW 1999:1, 41-43.)

22 See Ch’ien Yao-p’eng, KK 1998:2, 48-52.

23 For a recent discussion see Pi Shuo-pen et al., KKWW 2008:1, 9-17. Yen Wen-ming, WW 1990:12, 21-26, also briefly discusses the site’s significance, but cites somewhat different measurements, including 160 by 210 meters for a total area of 33,600 square meters. (The settlement’s probable appearance is depicted in Chang Kwang-chih and Xu Pingfang, eds., The Formation of Chinese Civilization, 68-69.)

24 For three illustrative sites, see SHYCS Nei Meng-ku Ti-yi Kung-tso-tui, KK 2004:7, 3-8.

25 Liu Kuo-hsiang, KKWW 2001:6, 58-67. In contrast, the settlement at Hou-ma Tungch’eng-wang identified with the Miao-ti-kou culture has a ditch about 11 meters wide and 2.6 meters deep. (See Kao T’ien-lin, KK 1992:1 62-68, 93.)

26 Hu-pei-sheng WWKK YCS, KK 2008:11, 3-14.

27 For a general discussion of the nature of the Chinese city, see Liu Ch’ing-chu, KK 2007:7, 60-69.

28 Key site reports include Hunan-sheng WWKK YCS et al., WW 1993:12, 19-30, and Hunan-sheng WWKK YCS, WW 1999:6, 4-17. Also useful are Chang Hsü-ch’iu, KK 1994:7, 629-634, and P’ei An-p’ing, KK 2004:11, 69-70. (The diameter to the interior side of the walls is just 310 meters.)

29 The account that follows is based on P’ei An-p’ing, KK 2004:11, 69-70.

30 Discussion of this site is based on Chang Yü-shih et al., WW 1999:7, 4-15; Ch’ien Yao-p’eng, WW 1999:7, 41-45; Li Hsin, KK 2008:1, 72-80; and Jen Shih-nan, KK 1998:1, 1.

31 Contrary to claims of analysts such as Ch’ien Yao-p’eng.

32 Based on Hsi-shan’s engineering, Ch’ien Yao-p’eng, WW 99:7, 41-45, claims that the Yangtze area lagged behind the Yellow River in tamped earth techniques. (Pan-p’o is marked by a gradual slope rather than the sharp profile that can only be accomplished with framing.) However, others have claimed that the Yangtze area was more advanced.

33 See Li Hsin, KK 2008:1, 72-80.

34 For a brief overview of Lungshan sites and culture, see Shao Wangping, “The Interaction Sphere of the Longshan Period.”

35 For site reports see Ho-nan-sheng WWKK YCS, KK 2000:3, 1-20; Yüan Kuang-k’uo, KK 2000:3, 21-38; and Yüan Kuang-k’uo, KK 2000:3, 39-44. Although Shao Wangping cites a core date of 2300 BCE for the site and most would see a break about 2100, some controversy has arisen over whether it was immediately occupied by Erh-li-t’ou cultural members or there was a hiatus. The site was finally abandoned late in Erh-li-t’ou’s fourth period.

36 Yüan Kuang-k’uo believes climatic warming may have speeded the demise of Lungshan civilization, but few others would attribute it directly to increased rainfall, especially since the climatic optimum had long been passed and disagreement exists over the actual pattern. However, the western wall was apparently destroyed by flooding near the end of the Lungshan period but then rebuilt. Yüan identifies Meng-chuang with the legendary Kung Kung, who reputedly helped quell the floods of antiquity (but should have considerably predated this era, being closely identified with Yü), and asserts that the site was abandoned for two centuries after the flood.

37 Shao Wangping, “Interaction Sphere of the Longshan Period,” 103. See also Wu Ju-tso, CKKTS 1995:8, 12-20, and Li Liu, The Chinese Neolithic, 193-208.

38 Also referred to as Ch’eng-tzu-ya, it is summarily discussed by K. C. Chang in 1986, 248- 250. However, his observation that this constitutes the “first erection of a defensive wall by a prehistoric settlement” has been outdated by discoveries over the past twenty years, as will be seen from the examples given in the discussion. (Other useful contextual discussions are found in Ning Yüeh-ming et al., Chung-kuo Ch’eng-shih Fa-chan-shih 27; Chang Hsüeh-hai, WW 1996:12, 41-42; and Jen Shih-nan, KK 1998:1, especially 2. Unfortunately, there are a number of unresolved discrepancies in the dimensions provided for various aspects of the walls, with Jen giving 430 meters east to west and 530 north to south.)

39 However, the Chung-kuo Ch’eng-shih Fa-chan-shih, 27, notes the wall’s width as 10.6 meters and suggests it suddenly cuts inward just above the broad platform of the foundation.

40 One analyst even believes that the walls were constructed between 1900 and 1700 BCE and concludes that rather than being a prototypical city or Hsia capital, it acted as a ch’eng-pao, a fortified town or early castle. (See Chung-kuo Ch’eng-shih Fa-chan-shih, 27, where the various arguments about its identification are conveniently summarized.)

41 Jen Shih-nan, KK 1998:1, 2. Chang Hsüeh-hai (1996, 50) cites a similar tree calibrated date of 4565± 130 BP.

42 Discussions of the site may be found in K. C. Chang, 1986, Archaeology, 262-267; Ho-nan-sheng WW YCS et al., WW 1983:3, 21-36; Jen Shih-nan, KK 1998:1, 2.

43 Only Jen Shih-nan, KK 1998:1, 2, has described the presence of this moat.

44 Shan-tung-sheng WWKK YCS et al., KK 1997:5, 11-24.

45 Based on Tu Tsai-chung, CKKTS 1995:8, 5-11. Significant nearby sites include Ting-kung at 108,000 square meters interior area, T’ien-wang with 150,000, Wu-lien T’an-t’u at 250,000, and T’eng-chu Yu-lou at 250,000.

46 Following the dates provided by Tu Tsai-chung. However, Shao Wangping dates the inner wall to the late middle Lungshan period and the outer to the early late Lungshan.

47 Ching-chou Po-wu-kuan, KK 1997:5, 1-24.

48 Chang Hsü-ch’iu, KK 1994:7, 629-634. The site descriptions that follow are taken from Chang and others, as individually noted.

49 Ching-chou-shih Po-wu-kuan et al., KK 1998:4, 16-38; Chang Hsü-ch’iu, KK 1994:7, 630.

50 Dimensions from Jen Shih-nan, KK 1998:1, 6.

51 The best site report is Ching-chou Po-wu-kuan and Chia Han-ch’ing, WW 1998:6, 25-29.

52 Dimensions reported for this site vary greatly. (These are taken from Wang Hung-hsing, KK 2003:9, 68.)

53 Wang Hung-hsing, 65-68. (For a brief discussion of Shih-chia-ho culture, see Fan Li, KKWW 1999:4, 50-60.)

54 Chang Hsü-ch’iu, KK 1994:7, 632. (Chang’s article does not include Chi-ming-ch’eng.) Other sites include Ch’i-chiao-ch’eng at 150,000 square meters, Chin-men Ma-chia-yüan at 240,000, and Yin-ch’eng T’ao-chia-hu at a vast 670,000.

55 Chang Hsü-ch’iu believes that the conditions and the technology for wall construction were first realized in the middle Yangtze area rather than the Yellow River and that any influence from the latter’s cultures was relatively weak.

56 For the initial report see Che-chiang-sheng WWKK YCS, KK 2008:7, 3-10, and for context see Chang Li and Wu Chien-p’ing, WW 2007:2, 74-80. No radiocarbon dates have yet been provided, but Liang-chu culture is generally dated from 3400 or 3200 to 2250 or 2200 BCE.

CHAPTER 3

1 Liu Kuo-hsiang, KKWW 2001:6, 58-67. In contrast, the settlement at Hou-ma Tung-ch’engwang identified with the Miao-ti-kou culture has an 11-meter-wide, 2.6-meter-deep ditch (Kao T’ien-lin, KK 1992:1, 62-68, 93).

2 Articles appraising their differences and similarities are beginning to appear. For example, see Wei Chien and Ts’ao Chien-en, WW 1999:2, 57-62, upon which the following discussion is based.

3 Chin Kuei-yün, KKHP 2004:4, 485-505. Huai-ko-erh-ch’i Pai-ts’ao-t’a, the oldest of the Yellow River sites, has been dated to 3000 BCE, roughly comparable to Pan-p’o’s fourth stage. Three others are dated to 2700 BCE, and Chai-tzu-shang, the youngest, to 2300. The sites at Tai-hai cluster around 2500 BCE, those at Pao-t’ou around 2700 BCE.

4 Wei-chün, A-shan, Hsi-yüan, Sha-mu-chia, and Hei-ma-pan.

5 In Ching-ch’eng-hsien, Mt. Lao-hu, Hsi-pai-yü, Pan-ch’eng, and Ta-miao-p’o.

6 At Huai-ko-erh-ch’i: Pai-ts’ao-t’a, Chai-tz’u-t’a, Chai-tz’u-shang, and Shao-sha-wan. At Ch’ing-shui-ho-hsien: Ma-lu-t’a and Hou-ch’eng-tsui.

7 Ch’en Kuo-ch’ing and Chang Ch’uan-chao, KK 2008:1, 46-55. Unfortunately, full details of the stone walls visible on the site diagrams have yet to be published. Additional sites continue to be uncovered, such as a complex dating to the lower Hsia-chia-tien composed by adjoining twin stone citadels marked by massive walls constructed from moderate-sized stones. (See Nei-Meng-ku WWKK YCS, KK 2007:7, 17-27.)

8 Ch’en and Chang, KK 2008:1, 48. However, Yen Wen-ming (JEAA 1 [1999]: 143), has surprisingly asserted that it and all Chinese walls were basically tamped earth with stone facings.

9 Rather than solely or directly exerted by the early Shang, these pressures may have indirectly resulted from vanquished Hsia population groups fleeing to safer, if less hospitable, terrain. However, this is not one of the article’s conclusions.

10 Liao-ning-sheng WWKK YCS, KK 1992:5, 399-417. Although identified with the lower Hsia-chia-tien and termed a mixed Bronze Age culture, except for a single 13.2-cm. long bronze knife, all the implements so far recovered were fabricated from stone (axes, knives, and arrowheads) or bone (arrowheads). Reportedly the indigenous populace was subsequently displaced by Bronze Age or other unspecified northern peoples.

11 Somewhat divergent dates appear in the literature, ranging from 2800-2000 to 2500-1800.

12 See Wang Yi and Sun Hua, KK 1999:8, 60-73. (The Pao-tun culture heavily influenced San-hsing-tui, but other factors also played a role over the intervening centuries.)

13 For overviews see Tuan Yü and Ch’en Chien, HCCHS 2002:2, 57-62, and Wang Yi, JEAA 5 (2006): 109-148. Tuan and Ch’en believe the homogeneity of the sites suggests common development, evidence of having evolved from the clan stage to a more centralized power. However, the strong defensive character of the fortifications suggests an environment pervaded by threats and aggression, though whether caused by internal strife or external enemies is unclear.

14 Ch’eng-tu-shih Wen-wu K’ao-ku Kung-tso-tui et al., WW 1998:12, 38-56; Jen Shih-nan, KK 1998:1, 9. (It is also referred to as Yü-fu-ch’eng.)

15 In addition to Wang Yi, 122-125, see Ch’eng-tu-shih WWKK Kung-tso-tui, WW 1999:1, 32-42.

16 Wang Yi, 122-125.

17 For Shuang-ho see also Ch’eng-tu-shih WWKK Kung-tso-tui, KK 2002:11, 3-19. (The site was occupied between 2500 and 2000 BCE but there are discrepancies in the reported dimensions. For example, Wang Yi [127-128] gives 270 meters for the north, 420 for the east, and 110 for the south as the dimensions of the inner perimeter, the west wall having been destroyed, and 325 on the north, 500 in the east, and 120 on the south, with walls that were 18 to 30 meters wide at top, for the outer.)

18 The best analytical article to date is Tuan Yü, HCCHS 1993:4, 37-48. There is considerable disagreement over whether the cultural enclaves at these two sites are lineal predecessors of Shu and Pa. (For context see Chang T’ien-en, KKWW 1998:5, 68-77; Chao Tien-tseng, WW 1987:10, 18-23; and Sung Chih-min, KKHP 1999:2, 123-140.)

19 For a concise discussion, see Robert Bagley’s “Shang Archaeology,” 212-219.

20 For further discussion of San-hsing-tui and Ch’eng-tu, see Tuan Yü, CKKTS 1994:1, 63- 70, and HCCHS 2006:5, 16-20; Sung Chih-min, who emphasizes local origination, KKHP 1999:2, 123-140; Ssu-ch’uan-sheng Wen-wu Kuan-li Wei-yüan-hui et al., WW 1989:5, 1-20; Yang Hua, KKWW 1995:1, 30-43; Huang Chien-hua, HCCHS 2001:6, 21-27; Lothar von Falkenhausen, JEAA 5 (2006): 191-245; Jay Xu, JEAA 5 (2006): 149-190 (who suggests it was contemporary with the late Shang, 1300-1050 BCE); Ch’ü Hsiao-ch’iang, San-hsing-tui Ch’uan-ch’i (1999); and Robert Bagley, Ancient Sichuan.

21 Tuan Yü, HCCHS 2008:6, 3-9, has suggested that Shu/San-hsing-tui controlled Yünnan’s copper, tin, and lead deposits, compelling the Shang to trade with them and that Shu was never a conquest objective or a subordinate state. (There was a shortage of tin in the Shang core domain. Although the Sichuan plains area had ample copper supplies, it lacked tin, but Shu could have acquired it, just like lead, from Yünnan. Tuan concludes that the absence of Shang artifacts in Yünnan indicates the Shang must have employed Shu as an intermediary and therefore left them alone to guarantee continuity of supply. This would explain the presence of Shang ritual vessels in Shu but almost the complete absence of Shang weapons.) Tuan believes San-hsing-tui flourished around the middle of the Shang.

22 See Tuan Yü, CKKTS, 1994:1, 45, for calculations and methods. Various areas for family space have been proposed, ranging from a very small 30 square meters to a spacious 268. Based on later population densities, approximately 155 to 160 square meters per household seems supportable, with each household encompassing five people.

23 Yang Hua, KKWW 1995:1, 30-43.

24 Using the population density at Lin-tzu in the Warring States period as a reference yields 280,000, but if 155 square meters is employed, the total population could have been 484,000. (See Ch’ü Hsiao-ch’iang, San-hsing-tui—Ku-Shu Wang-kuo te Fa-hsiang, 1999, 73.)

25 Tuan Yü, HCCHS 1993:4, 37-54. (A useful study of Ch’eng-tu culture is Chiang Chang-hua et al., KKHP 2002:1, 1-22.)

26 For an overview see Zhu Zhangyi et al., JEAA 5 (2006): 247-276. It has been characterized as the defining site for Shih-erh-ch’iao culture and a precursor of the Shang-wang-chia-kuai culture of the strong Sichuan states that developed in the Warring States period.

27 Many contemporary analysts postulate that the development of targetable wealth constitutes the minimum requisite condition (and motivation) for “true” rather than “ritual” warfare. However, when all men exist at the subsistence level, plundering may be the best alternative.

28 “Ching Chu.”

29 “Ch’i Su.”

30 Chao Kung, thirty-second year. At that time the feudal states under Chin’s nominal leadership had been defending the Chou capital at Ch’eng Chou, and the work was prompted when the king of Chou requested that they wall it instead of maintaining (threatening) forces there.

31 A Chou dynasty chang or rod was about eight feet.

32 “Mien,” Mao # 237 in James Legge’s classic translation, The She King, 440.

33 Building fires against walls, although not unknown, was primarily done in the Neolithic period for the interior of houses, house foundations, and floors and in the Yangshao period even for clay smeared onto wooden interior beams to increase their hardness and reduce water absorption (Li Nai-sheng et al., KK 2005:10, 76-82).

34 Tu Cheng-sheng, BIHP 58:1, calculated the lower figure; An Chin-huai, “Shih-lun Cheng-chou Shang-tai Ch’eng-chih—Ao-tu,” 77, the larger.

35 An Chin-huai, “Ao-tu,” 77. A moderately fit individual digging in a pile of soft soil or sand with a modern shovel can remove two to three cubic feet per minute or several cubic yards per hour, easily sustaining a rate of one cubic yard per hour over a full day.

36 An Chin-huai, “Ao-tu,” 77. Even though An’s estimates for bronze tools seem ridiculously low, his calculations for the walls, based on employing a mixture of bronze and stone tools, may actually be somewhat optimistic. Agricultural tools were almost always fabricated from stone or bone at this early date, bronze being reserved for ritual vessels and weapons. However, given the low excavation rate, it is more likely that the majority of workers—perhaps 8,000 out of the 10,000—would have been employed in digging, the rest in transporting and pounding the soil.

37 Modern rammed earth construction in the American Southwest reveals that compacting the layers, even with hydraulic tampers, requires a lengthy period. For example, the relatively small area of two feet in width by ten feet in length easily demands an hour to achieve the required consistency.

38 A questionable assumption given the highly varying densities found in various urban situations, although perhaps appropriate since the site is described as having considerable open space. (Even in the absence of multiple-level dwellings, some early settlements in China were so densely packed that each family often occupied a scant forty square meters.) Despite the analysts’ earnestness, calculations of this sort venture far beyond speculative.

39 Tsou Heng, HSCLWC, 59, estimates five years; Tu Cheng-sheng, BIHP 58:1, 10, estimates eight years based on a wall width of 20 meters at the base, 5 meters at the top, and an original height of 10 meters. He would apportion the 10,000 workers as 3,000 excavating dirt, 3,000 moving it, 3,500 pounding it, and 500 employed in miscellaneous tasks; and David Keightley, EC 3 (1977): 58, and JAOS 93.4.1973:530-531, estimates 12.5 years.

40 The rate of 0.5 cubic meter/day has been employed to estimate a construction time of fourteen days for the ditch at Pa-shih-tang, assuming that 700 cubic meters had to be excavated and the work was undertaken by 100 people. (See P’ei An-p’ing, KK 2004:11, 63-76.) On an unstated basis Fang Yen-ming (KK 2006:9, 22-23) estimates that 1,000 sturdy men working eight hours per day would have taken fourteen months to construct the fortifications at Wangch’eng-kang, with additional personnel having been required for planning and supervisory tasks. He further asserts that this is far more than the site could provide, clear evidence that central authority was capable of coercing the surrounding twenty or so villages to furnish perhaps 100 men each. However, though Wang-ch’eng-kang clearly attests to the growth of centralized authority and coercive power, based on the average living area of 150 square meters per family, a site of 300,000 square meters could have had 2,000 families of five, a number easily capable of diverting 1,000 males from farming and other tasks even if the work were continuously undertaken.

41 For example, a village dated to roughly 2700 BCE located at Yung-lang on the eastern side of the Pearl River near Hong Kong was able to exploit the surrounding hills for protection. It therefore merely added a moat for protection, thus showing regional variation in an already typical pattern of combining walls and moats. (For the site report see Hsiang-kang Ku-wu Ku-chi Pan-shih-ch’u, KK 1997:6, 35-53.)

CHAPTER 4

1 For a discussion of Hsia writing see Ts’ao Ting-yün, KK 2004:12, pp. 76-83; Li Ch’iao, HCCHS 1992:5, 21-26; and Ch’ang Yao-hua, HYCLC, 1996, 252-265. For writing’s inception in China see Feng Shih, KK 1994:1, 37-54; Wang Heng-chieh, KK 1991:12, 1119-1120, 1108; or Wang En-t’ien et al., “Chuan-chia P’i-t’an Ting-kung Yi-chih Ch’u-t’u T’ao-wen,” KK 1993:4, 344-354, 375. Feng Shih (KKHP 2008:3, 273-290) has recently argued that the two characters on a pottery shard recovered from T’ao-ssu at Hsiang-fen should be interpreted as “wen yi” and therefore evidence for the Hsia capital and proof of the Hsia’s existence. Chao Kuang-hsien (HYCLC, 1996, 122-123), among others, sees sufficient proof of the Hsia’s existence in early texts.

2 Ch’en Ch’un and Kung Hsin, HCCHS 2004:6, 3-12. See also Ch’en Chih, CKSYC 2004:1, 3-22.

3 For example, see Ho Chien-an, HCCHS 1987:1, 33-46; Chang T’ien-en, KKWW 2000:3, 44-50, 84; Li Wei-ming, HCCHS 2005:5, 40-45; and Chang Te-shui, HYCLC, 1996, 170-175.

4 Tu Cheng-sheng, KK 1991:1, 43-56; Chang Te-shui, HYCLC, 1996, 170-175.

5 For typical expressions see Shen Ch’ang-yün, HCCHS 2005:5, 8-15, or Tu Yung, HCCHS 2006:6, 3-7; for a brief summary of the conflicting viewpoints, see Wang Hsüeh-jung and Hsü Hung, KK 2006:9, 83-90; for Hsin-chai see, for example, Fang Yu-sheng, HCCHS 2003:1, 35- 39, or Yao Cheng-ch’üan et al., KK 2007:3, 90-96; and for a concise overview of later literary materials referring to the Hsia, see Chao Kuang-hsien, HYCLC, 1996, 122-123.

6 For a convenient summary of the Warring States textual records, see Ch’en Ku-ying, HCCHS 1985:7, 10-13. Although it subsequently received great impetus from Confucian thinkers and Mo-tzu, the myth of yielding first appeared in the early Western Chou, roughly four hundred years before Confucius. (For the latter see Yu Shen, HCCHS 2006:3, 39-44, and for a general analysis Chiang Ch’ung-yao, HCCHS 2007:1, 41-46, or Ch’ien Yao-p’eng, HCCHS 2001:1, 32-42.)

7 Mencius’s discussion in “Wang-chang” may be taken as definitive, but see also Fang Chieh, HHYC 11:1 (1993): 15-28. There is no evidence that Heaven was ever conceived of as an active entity in Yü’s time.

8 This was the essential premise of Wittfogel’s well-known but now (perhaps too thoroughly) rejected work, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power. (The need to coerce people into building embankments and organize them for the work must have stimulated bureaucratic growth to at least some extent.) For recent discussions of the “hydraulic thesis”—primarily rejections—see Chang Kung, CKKTS 1994:2, 4-18; Chou Tzu-ch’iang, CKKTS 1994:2, 19-30; Liu Hsiu-ming, CKSYC, 1994:2, 10-18; and Yü Shu-sheng, CKSYC, 1994:2, 3-9. Nevertheless, water management is seen as a decidedly important Hsia accomplishment. (See, for example, Li Hsien-teng, HYCLC, 1996, 27-34.)

9 For further discussions see Joseph Needham, Civil Engineering and Nautics, 247ff, or the more traditional account in Meng Shih-k’ai, Hsia Shang Shih-hua, 149-154. In two different passages (IIIB9 and VIB11), Mencius clearly asserts that Yü accorded with water’s natural patterns and removed obstacles to its flow.

10 Mencius, IIIA4, “T’eng-wen Kung, Hsia.” (Since it recurs while describing other sages in IVB29, “passing one’s gate three times” apparently represents Mencius’s ideal of self-denial.) The legend of Yü taming the waters dates to the middle of the Western Chou. (See Li Hsüehch’in, HCCHS 2005:5, 6; Tuan Yü, HCCHS 2005:1, 110-116; and Anne Birrell, TP 83 [1997]: 213-259.) Water played an important role in early China’s contemplative tradition, including as a focal element in the Tao Te Ching and as an image for irrepressible power in the military writings.

11 “Yüan Tao.”

12 Variants of this perspective are preserved in military writings as the Ssu-ma Fa, Six Secret Teachings, and Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung. (For further discussion, see Sawyer, Tao of War, or T’ai Kung Liu-t’ao [Six Secret Teachings].)

13 Apart from the problems invariably posed by seasonal rains, there was a period of maximum flooding from 4000 to 3000 BCE due to increased moisture levels that effectively sundered Hebei. (See Han Chia-ku, KK 2000:5, 57-67.) Miao Ya-chüan (HCCHS 2004:3, 13-19, 26) has even asserted that flooding caused the demise of the Lungshan culture and facilitated the Hsia’s rise because their leaders combined warfare with expertise in curbing water’s destructive effects.

14 “Hsia Pen-chi,” Shih Chi. However, see Hsia Shih Shih-hua, 149-164, for a more extensive examination of the relevant accounts.

15 Just as in the Shang Shu (upon which the Shih Chi account is probably based), the chapter continues with a lengthy description of Yü’s accomplishments and enumerates the chief characteristics of the Nine Provinces he demarked. These descriptions represent early attempts to compile topographical knowledge for administrative and military purposes.

16 Every conceivable intellectual discipline has been employed to demythologize tales about the ancient sages. (See, for example, Yi Mou-yüan, HCCHS 1991:2, 4-12; Huang Hsin-chia, HCCHS 1993:11, 25-32; and Feng T’ien-yü, HCCHS 1984:11, 5-14.)

17 Yen Wen-ming, WW 1992:1, 25, 40-49.

18 Yen Wen-ming, WW 1992:1, 25, 40-49.

19 See, for example, Hu Chia-ts’ung, HCCHS 1991:1, 19-26; Li Hsüeh-ch’in, HCCHS 2005:5, 5; and Wang Hui, KKHP 2007:1, 1-28. More compressed dates have also been suggested for the semilegendary Sages, such as 2400 to 2000 BCE. (For example, T’ien Chi-chou, HCCHS 1985:9, 25-32.)

20 See, among many, Ch’eng P’ing-shan, HCCHS 2004:5, 10-21, and P’an Chi-an, KKWW 2007:1, 55-61. (P’an believes that T’ao-ssu, which has been suggested as Yao’s capital of P’ing-yang, served as the Yellow Emperor’s capital.)

21 These are the dates suggested by Chao En-yü, HCCHS 1985:11, 17-19, who opts for eras rather than realistic life spans. Based on astronomical data, he also claims that Yü’s reign had to commence in either 2221 or 2161 BCE and that it lasted for thirty-three years. (However, Chao contradicts his own astronomical dating in concluding that Yü ascended the throne in 2227 and ruled for thirty-nine years.)

22 Stimulated by David Nivison, a series of articles by David Pankenier, Edward Shaughnessy, Kevin Pang, and others two decades ago argued whether the data found in traditional accounts are original or the result of later accretions and reconstructions; whether the phenomena would have been observable or were just extrapolated from other observations; the resolution of various discrepancies; and which records might be deemed authoritative. Based on a passage in the Mo-tzu and a five-planet conjunction, David Pankenier, concluded that Shun’s fourteenth year—1953 BCE—was Yü the Great’s first de jure year as the Hsia’s progenitor (EC 9-10 [1983- 1985] : 175-183, and EC 7 [1981-1982]: 2-37). Other critical articles, some of which focus on the broader issue of the reliability of the old and new text versions of the Bamboo Annals, include E. L. Shaughnessy, HJAS 46, no. 1 (1986): 149-180, also reprinted in Before Confucius, and his important article in EC 11-12 (1985-1987): 33-60; and David S. Nivison and Kevin D. Pang, EC 15 (1990): 86-95, with additional discussion and responses, 97-196. (For useful discussions of the Old Text/New Text controversy, see Michael Nylan, TP 80:1-3 [1994], 83-145 and TP 81:1-3 [1995], 22-50, and Hans Van Ess, TP 80:1-3 [1994]: 149-170.)

23 For example, see Chao Chih-ch’üan, KKWW 1999:2, 23-29.

24 The late K. C. Chang is most prominently associated with this debate, but for concise versions of single origination see Cheng Kuang, KKWW 2000:3, 33-43; T’ien Chi-chou, HCCHS 1985:9, 25-32; and Yü Feng-ch’un (who examines the Shih Chi’s depiction), 2007:2, 21-34.

25 Ho Chien-an, HCCHS 1986:6, 33-46; T’ien Chi-chou, HCCHS 1985:9, 25-32; Li Min, HCCHS 2005:3, 6-8, 13; and Hsü Shun-chan, HYCLC, 1996, 128-135.

26 His failure to yield, a topic of heated argument over the centuries, continues to be an issue. (For a recent example, see Fang Chieh, HHYC 11:1 [1993], 15-28.)

27 For an expression of this view see T’ien Chi-chou, HCCHS 1985:9, 25-32.

28 For an overview that charts the period of greatest eastern influence see Luan Feng-shih, KK 1996:4, 45-58.

29 For example, see Tsou Heng, KKWW 1999:5, 50-54.

30 For one formulation of the amalgamated view, see Wang Hsün, KKWW 1997:3, 61-68. For a useful discussion of Yüeh-shih culture, see Tsou Heng, HSCLWC, 64-83. (Note that Tsou cites dates of 1765 to 1490 BCE, far too late to have contributed to the predynastic Hsia.)

31 Among many, see Tu Cheng-sheng, KK 1991:1, 43-56.

32 For example, see Wang Ch’ing, CKSYC 1996:2, 125-132.

33 Fang Yu-sheng, HCCHS 1996:6, 33-39, and Shen Ch’eng-yün, CKSYC 1994:3, 113-122.

34 Wu Ju-tso, CKKTS 1995:8, 12-20.

35 For expressions of this thesis, see An Chin-huai, KKWW 1997:3, 54-60; Chu Kuang-hua, KKWW 2002:4, 19-26; and Wei Ch’ung-wen, HCCHS 1991:6, 29-31. However, Ho Chien-an, HCCHS 1986:6, 33-34, believes that the Lungshan Wang-wan manifestation found there and in the eastern part of Yü-hsi around the Loyang plains and in the Yü-hsien to Cheng-chou corridor would have had to pass through the Mei-shan stage before possibly expanding to transform to Erh-li-t’ou culture.

36 For example, Wei Ch’ung-wen, HCCHS 1991:6, 29-31, believes T’ao-ssu was probably the focal location for Yao, Shun, and Yü, while Feng Shih, KKHP 2008:3, 273-290, has concluded that the Hsia should be identified with T’ao-ssu culture.

37 Just like bronze in the Shang, jade was the material of privileged artifacts in the Hsia (Wen Hui-fang, HCCHS 2001:5, 61-68).

38 Ch’en Sheng-yung, HCCHS 1991:5, 15-36. These assertions raise more questions than they answer—did the Hsia prevail through warfare, cultural power, or some other factor that allowed them to absorb the Liang-chu manifestation ? (Some historians have suggested that Liang-chu culture was essentially contemporaneous.)

39 Li Liu and Hung Xu, Antiquity 81 (2007): 893-894, and WW 2008:1, 43-52, claim that the Hsia (in its Erh-li-t’ou manifestation) was populated by multiple groups rather than a single clan that emigrated into the area and that it had precursors in Yangshao and Lungshan cultures.

40 Various dates (such as 3200 BCE) have been suggested for the inception of the simple chiefdoms that mark a transition from (Marxist-postulated) matriarchical societies to patriarchical ones. (For example, see Chang Chung-p’ei, HCCHS 2000:4, 2-24.) The power to sacrifice or punitively slay others clearly existed in the Hsia and apparently the late Lungshan as well, though decapitated and contorted bodies pose the different problem of distinguishing sacrificial and battle victims. (An example would be the three recovered at Shaanxi Ch’ang-an K’o-shengchuang, for which see Chang Chih-heng, HYCLC, 1996, 109-112.)

41 Wei Chi-yin, KKWW 2007:6, 44-50.

42 Wang Wei, KK 2004:1, 67-77.

43 Suspicion has often been inappropriately cast on these and other efforts because they are largely being pursued under a cultural manifest from the central government and are thus viewed simply as another nationalistic manifestation.

44 Chang Chih-heng, 109-112; Chang Li-tung, 113-118; Yü T’ai-shan, 176-196; and Fang Hsiao-lien, 266-273, all in HYCLC, 1996.

45 Chang Li-tung, HYCLC, 1996, 113-118.

46 One of the sites tenuously identified with Yao and pre-Hsia culture is P’ing-yang, noted in traditional historical accounts as Yao’s capital. Neolithic tools and weapons (including jade axes and stone and bone arrowheads) have been recovered from this former T’ao-ssu settlement that apparently was occupied in 2600-2000 BCE, Yao’s reign being projected as 2600-2400. (See Shan-hsi-sheng Lin-fen Hsing-shu Wen-hua-chü, KKHP 1999:4, 459-486.) Just like Wang-ch’engkang, it has also been termed the first Chinese city (Ma Shih-chih, HYCLC, 1996, 103-108).

47 Wei Ch’ung-wen, HCCHS 1991:6, 29-31. Calculating Yao’s era as 2300 to 2200 and the site as 2600 to 2100 BCE, Li Hsüeh-ch’in has suggested that many aspects of the site indicate it might have been Yao’s capital of P’ing-yang. (See HCCHS 2005:5, 3-7.) However, P’an Chi-an, KKWW 2007:1, 56-61, who dates Yao and Shun to the twenty-second century BCE, though concurring in P’ing-yang’s identification, ascribes it to the era of the Yellow Emperor and Ku.

48 Tu Cheng-sheng, KK 1991:1, 43-56; Shan-hsi-sheng Lin-fen Hsing-shu Wen-hua-chü, KKHP 1999:4, 459-486.

49 Chang Chih-heng, HYCLC, 1996, 109-112.

50 Feng Shih, KKHP 2008:3, 279-283. Feng holds the unusual view that powerful rulers didn’t require walls, explaining the failure to refurbish them at Hsiang-fen and their absence at Anyang.

51 For the inner citadel see Ho-nan-sheng WW YCS, WW 1983:3, 8-20. Subsequent reports include Fang Yu-sheng, KK 1995:2, 160-169, and KKWW 2001:4, 29-35; Pei-ching Ta-hsüeh K’ao-ku Wen-po Hsüeh-yüan, KK 2006:9, 3-15; and P’ei Ming-hsiang, HYCLC, 1996, 60-65.

52 From the eastern section only 30 meters of the southern part of the common wall and 65 meters in the western part of the south wall remain. The western section, which is marked by a slight tilt of 5 degrees, is defined by foundation remnants of 92 and 82.4 meters on the western and southern sides respectively and 29 meters of wall on the north.

53 An Chin-huai, “The Shang City at Cheng-chou and Related Problems,” 30, cites a date of 4010 ± 85 BP or 4415 ± 140 BP after calibration, which he concludes places it within the Hsia dynasty. However, 2415 BCE—at the extreme limit—would have to be considered pre-Hsia at best if the Hsia is dated as 2100 to 1600 BCE. Chang Chih-heng, HYCLC, 1996, 109-112, asserts it clearly postdates T’ao-ssu.

54 For an overview see Fang Yen-ming, KK 2006:9, 16-23. Fang Yu-sheng, KK 1995:2, 164, and KKWW 2001:4, 29-35, is among those identifying the site as Yü’s capital of Yang-ch’eng. (See also Wei Ch’ung-wen, HCCHS 1991:6, 29-31. Prior to the discovery of the outer walls, scholars such as Tu Cheng-sheng, KK 1991:1, 43-56, had felt that Wang-ch’eng-kang was too small for a great chief such as Yü.)

55 Based on its size, location, dating, and a reference in the Mu T’ien-tzu Ch’uan, it has been proposed as a good candidate for Ch’i’s capital. (For site reports see Hsü Shun-chan, HCCHS 2004:6, 13-17; Ma Shih-chih, KKWW 2007:3, 54-58; Ch’eng P’ing-shan, KKWW 2007:3, 59- 63; SHYCS Ho-nan Hsin-chai-tui, KK 2009:2, 3-15, and KK 2009:2, 16-31.)

56 Chang Hsüeh-lien et al., KK 2007:8, 74-89; Chao Chih-ch’üan, KKHP 2003:4, 459-482; and SHYCS Ho-nan Hsin-chai-tui, KK 2009:2, especially 15.

57 Although recent reports are increasingly detailed, they cover only small, scientifically excavated sections, making it difficult to accurately estimate the remaining dimensions.

58 See Cheng-chou-shih WWKK YCS, KK 2005:6, 3-6.

59 Ch’en Hsü, HSLWC, 8-15. Useful site analyses include T’ung Chu-ch’en, WW 1975:6, 29-33, 84; Fang Yu-sheng, KK 1995:2, 160-169, 185; Hsü Hung, KK 2004:11, 32-38; and Fang Yu-sheng, HYCLC, 1996, 81-91. (See also Robert L. Thorp, EC 16 [1991]: 1-38.)

60 See, for example, Li Po-ch’ien, HCCHS 2003:3, 2023, and Li Liu and Hung Xu, Antiquity 81 (2007): 886-901, or WW 2008:1, 43-52.

61 The foundations for the large, palatial structures discovered in the royal quarters average one to three meters thick and consist of highly uniform layers of four to six cm. reinforced by interspersed pebbles.

62 For summaries of recent discoveries, including the second wall described in the next paragraph, see SHYCS Erh-li-t’ou Kung-tso-tui, KK 2004:11, 3-13, and KK 2005:7, 15—20.

63 Tu Cheng-sheng, KK 1991:1, 43-56, for example, has concluded it was not the Hsia capital. Similarly, based on a brief reference in Mo-tzu to King T’ang having destroyed the walls, Chang K’ai-sheng, HYCLC, 92-102, believes that Erh-li-t’ou could not have been the last royal city and opts for Yen-shih instead.

64 Important site reports and assessments include Cheng-chou-shih WWKK YCS, WW 2004:11, 4-18; Wang Wen-hua et al., WW 2004:11, 61-64; Li Feng, 2006:2, 67-72, and KKWW 2007:1, 62-66; and Hsü Chao-feng and Yang Yüan, KKWW 2008:5, 26-30.

65 Wang Wen-hua et al., WW 2004:11, 64.

66 Their exact locations are a matter of ongoing disagreement, with Ta-shih-ku itself sometimes being suggested as having been either the satellite state of Ku or Wei. (Based on the site’s date and degree of destruction, Li Feng, 2006:2, believes it may have been the fabled Shang capital of Po.)

67 Cheng-chou-shih WWKK YCS, WW 2004:11, 14—15.

68 For example, see Li Liu and Chen Xingcan’s State Formation in Early China.

69 For a discussion, see Liu and Chen, State Formation, 69-73. Erh-li-t’ou’s remains have been dated to between 1900 and 1600 BCE.

70 Ch’in Hsiao-li, KKWW 2000:4, 46-57, especially 55-56.

CHAPTER 5

1 The Bamboo Annals state that in his eighth year, when Yü assembled the feudal lords at Kuai-chi, he killed the clan leader of the Fang-feng, an act that commentators try to justify by claiming he had arrived late. Some analysts date the Hsia’s inception to Yü’s conquest of the San Miao. (See, for example, Han Chien-yeh, HCCHS 1998:1, 44-49.)

2 In contrast to the Chinese approach that early on stressed molding and quickly developed multiple-cavity molds for the efficient production of small items such as axes, knives, and arrowheads that would emerge late in the period, hammering was the fundamental Western technique.

3 Our account basically follows Yang Hsin-kai and Han Chien-yeh, CKKTS 1995:8, 32-41, and HCCHS 1997:2, 25-30.

4 See Yang and Han, CKKTS 1995:8, 32-41. The San Miao had bird totems.

5 For example, in the area that would become Ching/Ch’u.

6 The Chan-kuo Ts’e (“Wei Ts’e, 2”) states that when Yü attacked the San Miao, the Tung Yi didn’t move.

7 Kung Wei-ying, HCCHS 1988:9, 40-41.

8 An unusual view of the conflict has been offered by Chao Kuang-hsien (LSYC 1989:5, 24- 34), who believes it arose in the Yellow river area rather than the south and that the San Miao remnants, despite having been pushed out of the Yellow River valley, remained defiant, provoking further clashes.

9 Appearing among the so-called Ku-wen chapters of the Shang Shu that are generally acknowledged as having been fabricated centuries later than the Spring and Autumn and Warring States portions, such passages reflect post-Han Confucian concepts more than historical events. (The concepts of a “campaign of rectification” and “five phases” postdate the early Hsia by more than a millennium.) However, scholars have traditionally cited the appearance of common passages and other references in Mencius and Mo-tzu, both Warring States works, as evidence of the chapter’s early origins and presumed authenticity. (In actuality, the Shang Shu chapter was presumably created on the basis of these earlier passages, perhaps on the basis of some common text, and simply incorporated them for authenticity. Nevertheless, its authoritativeness remained unquestioned until well into the Ch’ing dynasty.)

10 And having enormous difficulty with his parents, who reputedly even tried to kill him. (The travails that Shun underwent to prove his filiality became a defining characteristic for Mencius and subsequent Confucians.)

11 Although the concept of “returning the army” seems inappropriate here, this is the understanding offered by the traditional commentators for the well-known term chen lü.

12 “Fei-kung, Hsia,” Mo-tzu.

13 “Chao Lei,” Lü-shih Ch’un-ch’iu. See also Luo K’un, HYCLC, 1996, 197-204.

14 “Yao Tien,” Shang Shu, also found in “Hsiu-wu” in the Huai-nan Tzu.

15 Bamboo Annals.

16 See Fan Li, KKWW 1999:4, 50-61; Liu Yü-t’ang, HCCHS 2001:4, 53-55; and Yang Hsin-kai and Han Chien-yeh, CKKTS 1995:8, 32-40.

17 Liu Hsü, HCCHS 1989:7, 21.

18 The battle reportedly unfolded on the bank of the Kan River, but other places, such as southwest of Loyang, have also been suggested. (The Bamboo Annals record the clash under Ch’i’s second year, but other accounts place it in his third year.) The much-quoted oath is certainly a Warring States fabrication, but many contemporary scholars still believe the “Kan Shih” preserves authentic material, including Chin Ching-fang and Lü Shao-kang, HCCHS 1993:5, 13- 17; Li Min, CKSYC 1980:2, 157-161; and even Yang Sheng-nan, CKSYC 1980:2, 161-163.

19 Variously interpreted as calendrical referents or Heaven, Earth, and Man. (References to the “five elements” and seeking Heavenly justification indicate the oath’s anachronistic nature.)

20 That is, his mandate to rule, but also his life. (The concept of the mandate of Heaven does not appear until the late Shang or early Chou.)

21 “Obligations of the Son of Heaven,” Seven Military Classics, selected from pages 130 to 132.

22 Yang Sheng-nan, HCCHS 1991:9, 46, is basically inclined to recognize the existence of chariots in the Hsia despite, as he acknowledges, the lack of evidence.

23 Bamboo Annals, Emperor Ch’i, eleventh and fifteenth years. Wu Kuan’s fate is not specified.

24 Yang Po-chün, 1990, 936, locates it south of Loyang.

25 Reading chung as troops rather than simply laborers or retainers.

26 Also pronounced “chiao.”

27 Tso Chuan, Duke Hsiang, fourth year.

28 Tso Chuan, Duke Ai, first year. A virtually identical passage is preserved in the Shih Chi’s “Wu T’ai-po Shih-chia.” Vanquishing Yi was no mean feat, as he was said to have such great strength that he could push a boat on land (“Hsia Pen-chi,” Shih Chi).

29 Note the presence of the Ch’üan or Dog people, who will become important in subsequent periods. (Their name is written with the radical for field next to “dog.”)

30 The Hsia campaign (seen in the “Yin Cheng” and also the Shih Chi’s “Hsia Pen-chi”) has traditionally been assigned to Chung-k’ang’s reign but more recently demythologized as probably dating to Shao-k’ang’s restoration. (See Hsü Chao-ch’ang, HCCHS 2004:4, 22-27.)

31 “Chieh-ts’ang, Hsia.” Some of these myths are obviously conflated because Shun is also said to have perished in a conflict with the Tung Yi.

32 These and other conflicts with the Yi listed in the Bamboo Annals suggest that their submission was nominal rather than total.

33 According to the Shih Chi’s “Hsia Pen-chi”: “Chieh did not concentrate upon Virtue but on the martial, thereby harming the hundred surnames who no longer sustained him.”

34 Although the Hsia populace seems to have primarily dispersed via the upper Yellow River to Shaanxi, Gansu, Ching, and the northwest, scattered Hsia elements have been found in Shandong, Jiangsu, and Anhui, especially in the ancient areas of Wu and Yüeh, as well as Ching/ Ch’u. (See Wang K’e-lin, KKWW 2001:2, 48-53.) It is commonly thought that they were the ancestors of numerous steppe peoples, including the T’u-fang, Chiang, and Hsiung-nu. (For a contrary argument see Ch’en Li-chu, LSYC 1997:4, 18-35.)

35 The plan is enunciated in the Shang Shu and incorporated in the Shih Chi’s “Hsia Pen-chi.” The theory of administrative domains known as the “wu fu” received its paradigm expression in the late Chou Li, but the concept evolved during the Chou. Although a creative idealization (if not absolute nonsense), it has been interpreted as providing a possible framework for understanding the Hsia’s relationship with Lungshan and other cultural groups. (See Chao Ch’un-ch’ing, HCCHS 2007:1, 9-19. Other important discussions include T’ien Chi-chou, HCCHS 1985:9, 25-32, and Ch’en Lien-ch’ing, 1991, 863-891. For a general discussion of the utility of these classical texts, see Ts’ui Ta-hua, CKCHS 1995:1, 55-63.)

36 The character tien has long been understood as designating the “imperial domain,” with tien basically encompassing all the territory within 500 li.

37 Contemporary enunciations even occasionally appear in PRC theoretical publications, embedded in articles advocating a new world order based on revitalizing this ancient outline.

38 Unfortunately, every characterization of specialized assignments and identification of correlative titles is invariably based on statements in the Shang Shu and later works, at best Western Chou and Warring States writings. Even allowing for the possibility of institutional continuity and accepting the presumptuousness of categorically denying that these historical vestiges could accurately depict early practices, even the broadest claims lack substantiation.

39 For analyses that envision a complex structure already in existence, see Ko Sheng-hua, HCCHS 1992:11, 13-18, or Ch’ao Fu-lin, HYCLC, 1996, 136-142.

40 Yang Sheng-nan, HCCHS 1991:9, 45.

41 Analysts such as Ch’ao Fu-lin envision a key transition from a simple chiefdom style—rule by one man, through personal charisma—to the recognition that a certain clan or even family has the right to rule. (See HCCHS 1996:6, 23-32.)

42 For a contrary view, see Ko Sheng-hua, HCCHS 1992:11, 13.

43 “T’eng-wen Kung,” Mencius.

44 This statement has also been employed to claim that population records were already being kept and then undertake population estimates for the Hsia and subsequent periods, a seemingly flawed approach given the many quantitative unknowns. (See Sung Chen-hao, LSYC 1991:4, 92.)

CHAPTER 6

1 Until recently oracle bone discoveries had been confined to Anyang, but a number of small finds have now been made in other, even peripheral areas, including ancestral Chou locations and at the pre-Shang sites of other cultures, though most of them lack inscriptions. (For example, see Shan-tung Ta-hsüeh Dung-fang KK YCS, KK 2003:6, 3-6, and Sun Ya-ping and Sung Chen-hao, KK 2004:2, 66-75.)

2 Primarily by Tung Tso-pin, Shima Kunio, Kuo Mo-jo, Ch’en Meng-chia, and others in China, as well as David E. Keightley and Paul Serruys in the West. It should be noted that the nature of these inscriptions, whether they represent reports, charges, or entreaties to the ancestors or some other transcendent entity, remains uncertain. (For example, see Qiu Xigui, EC 14 [1989]: 77-172.)

3 For a brief discussion of the dynasty’s name see Chang Kwang-chih, EC 20 (1995): 69-78.

4 In addition to the essential materials found in The Cambridge History of Ancient China, Bruce G. Trigger, JEAA 1 (1999): 43-62, has advanced an interesting analysis of the Shang state. Among the key issues is whether the Shang should be considered a city or territorial state (even though neither may be applicable). The presence of non-Shang clans in the core domain and their degree of participation in Shang power raises further questions.

5 Articles arguing one or another cause constantly appear. However, the often seen claim that the ruler initiated the move to curb abuses and restore monarchial authority is particularly puzzling, because any tenuousness in his authority would have precluded having the power to compel such a move.

6 The Shang’s theocratic nature has been particularly emphasized over the past two decades. For example, see Yang Sheng-nan, CKSYC 1997:4, 16-23; Wang Hui, HCCHS 2000:6, 36-41; Li Shao-lien, STWMYC, 304-312; and David N. Keightley, History of Religions 17 (1978): 211-224, and PEW 38 (1973): 367-397.

7 From the oracular inscriptions it is obvious that Ti was held in awe because he had the power to inflict misery, defeat, and disaster on the Shang. Although probably not an anthropomorphic entity, it is unclear whether Ti was conceived of as a titular deity, the spirit of an immediately preceding ruler or ancestor, or some collective but numinous entity. Ti’s sanctification was deemed necessary before military campaigns could be undertaken, explaining the importance of announcing them in the ancestral temple, a martial practice that would persist well into imperial times. (For contending viewpoints on Ti’s nature and role see, for example, Robert Eno, EC 15 [1990]: 1-26; Chou Chi-hsü, HCCHS 2008:1, 3-11; Yang Hsi-mei, CKSYC 1992:3, 36-40; Fu Pei-jung, Chinese Culture 26, no. 3 [1985]: 23-39; and David N. Keightley, JEAA 1, nos. 1-4 [1999]: 207-230. It should be noted that repeated inquiries about undertaking particular campaigns suggest the decision had already been made, that the divinatory process was a mere formality or psychological ploy.)

8 The archaeological records are replete with descriptions of sacrificial burial pits. Family members and retainers followed their lords and masters into death, but prisoners of war were slain in more general rites, often in exceedingly brutal fashion and numbers that could exceed a hundred. However, whether because productive labor assumed greater importance as the economy burgeoned or there was a shift in religious attitude, the totals diminish as the era progresses. (For overviews see Tuan Chen-mei, 1991, 182-191; Loewe and Shaughnessy, The Cambridge History of Ancient China, 192-193 and 266-267; Li Hu, 1984, 130-136; Yang Sheng-nan, LSYC 1988:1, 134-146; and the discussion on the Ch’iang that follows in the focal military section. For just one example of a major sacrificial burial site, see Shan-tung-sheng Po-wu-kuan, WW 1972:8, 17-30. Dramatic statues of sacrificial victims have also been recovered farther afield in Sichuan. See WW 2004:4, 56 and 57, for illustrations.)

9 Even the expansive Cambridge History of Ancient China avoids the issue by merely dealing with the artifacts themselves and commencing its account with the Anyang period. Although, as shown by numerous articles in Early China and the Journal of East Asian Archaeology, interest in the Shang has burgeoned in recent decades, apart from Robert Thorp’s China in the Early Bronze Age: Shang Civilization, the main Western-language books on the Shang remain three works from the early 1980s: Studies of Shang Archeology, The Origins of Chinese Civilization, and the comprehensive but increasingly outdated Archeology of Ancient China.

10 For an analysis of the “Yin Pen-chi” see Ch’ü Wan-li, 1965, 87-118.

11 For a recent example, see Wang Chen-chung, HCCHS 2005:1, 3-6, 64.

12 Certain references to Yin in later, supposedly transmitted works nevertheless have prompted considerable discussion of this topic as well. (For typical analyses see Chang Fu-hsiang, HCCHS 2001:5, 57-60; Lien Shao-ming, HCCHS 2000:1, 27-31; and Ch’en Chieh, HCCHS 2001:4, 46-53.)

13 In contrast, based on the name “Yin” another interesting variant concludes that the Shang originated in the upper Huai River area before moving to Yen-shih. (See Ching San-lin, HCCHS 1986:5, 37-46.)

14 How the final location of a remnant people whose destiny was dictated by their conquerors can be interpreted as evidence for the dynasty’s founding site is puzzling in the extreme.

15 K. C. Chang’s section on the Shang in his Archaeology of Ancient China and overview in Shang Civilization, 335-355, extensively discuss these and similar issues. Based on the coinciding number of fourteen rulers in the Hsia and predynastic Shang and their lengthy period of intermixed dwelling in the east, in 1936 Ch’en Meng-chia (Ku-shih-pien, Vol. 7B, 330-333) concluded that the Hsia and Shang were members of the same tsu (clan). However, acrimonious disagreement marks discussions of predynastic Shang culture. (For example, see Li Wei-ming, KKWW 2000:3, 51-55, and STWMYC, 208-213; Yang Sheng-nan, HYCLC, 1996, 143-148; Tu Chinp’eng, HYCLC, 1996, 160-164; Chang Kuo-shuo, STWMYC, 280-285; Tsou Heng, HSCLWC (reprint of 1993), 221-226; and Tuan Hung-chen, STWMYC, 213-222.)

16 A particularly useful article by Ch’en Ch’ang-yüan, LSYC 1987:1, 136-144, summarizes the various views. However, for representative theories and opinions see Han K’ang-hsin and P’an Ch’i-feng, LSYC 1980:2, 89-98; Wang Yü-che, LSYC 1984:1, 61-77; Ching San-lin, HCCHS 1986:5, 37-46; Kan Chih-keng et al., LSYC 1985:5, 21-34; and Yen Wen-ming, SCKKLC, 227-247. Cheng Hui-sheng, 1998, 33-34, suggests the name may have been derived from an unusual height where the clan initially dwelled. Chang Ts’ui-lien, KKWW 2001:2, 36-47, argues that the Shang emerged out of the Hsia-ch’i-yüan because the Shang-ch’iu area was already inhabited by the Yüeh-shih prior to the appearance of Shang/Erh-li-kang culture and that Yüeh-shih (or Tung Yi) didn’t evolve into Erh-li-kang. Others, noting the presence of numerous Yi and Yüeh cultural elements, have concluded that the Shang may have been an amalgamation of cultures and clans. For example, based on an early Shang site just west of Hsing-t’ai-shih in southern Hebei, Chia Chin-piao KK 2005:2, 71-78, believes that the early Shang benefited from a multiplicity of cultural influences and Hsia-ch’i-yüan can’t be the sole defining representation.

17 K. C. Chang, Archaeology of Ancient China, 326-329; Chang Ch’ang-shou and Chang Kuang-chih, KK 1997:4, 24-31.

18 See Ch’en Ch’ang-yüan’s summary, LSYC 1987:1, 136-144.

19 See, for example, Liu Hsü, HCCHS 1989:7, 21-26, and Cheng Shao-tsung, STWMYC, 423-428.

20 For example, Ch’en Ch’ang-yüan and Ch’en Lung-wen, HCCHS 2004:4, 15-27, argue that the Shang originated in the middle southern part of Shanxi, then moved eastward, evolving into the Chang-ho manifestation before secondarily developing as Hui-wei. (There was a basic shift from mid-Hebei to southern Hebei and settlement along the Chang River.) T’ang therefore should be identified with Yüan-ch’ü in Shanxi.

21 K. C. Chang advanced this idea; for a more recent analysis see Chang Wei-lien, HCCHS 2006:4, 23-32. (For further information on pre-Shang climate and crops, especially the Tawen-k’ou to Yüeh-shih cultures in Shandong’s Shu river valley, see Ch’i Wu-yün, KK 2006:12, 78-84.)

22 A number of articles have discussed the effects of climate change in the late Neolithic, Lungshan, Erh-li-t’ou, and even Shang eras. Commencing about 3000 BCE, the average temperature apparently dropped about 3 degrees C from the climatic maximum, rainfall amounts decreased, herbs and grasses proliferated, woodlands and marshes shrank, and small-animal wildlife populations diminished (making it necessary to raise more animals), all of which could have prompted Hsia aggressiveness even though they are noted for battling floods, not drought. (See, for example, An-hui-sheng WWKK YCS, KK 1992:3, 253-262; Yüan Ching, KKHP 1999:1, 1-22; Sung Yü-ch’in et al., KK 2002:12, 75-79; and Wang Wei, KK 2004:1, 67-77.)

23 Ancient China developed an extensive psychology of ch’i (spirit or the will to fight), and the early military classics include important passages on stimulating and manipulating it. For example, in a purported historical overview the Ssu-ma Fa (“Obligations of the Son of Heaven”) notes that “Shang rulers swore their oaths outside the gate to the encampment for they wanted the people to first fix their intentions and await the conflict.” Further discussion of the concept and psychology of ch’i may be found in Sawyer, “Martial Qi in China: Courage and Spirit in Thought and Military Practice.”

24 See “Shang Shu” in M. Loewe, ed., Early Chinese Texts, M. Loewe, 378.

25 Note that Karlgren, “Glosses on the Book of Documents,” 172-174, interprets the lines as Hsia complaints that T’ang is reciting to rationalize the attack on Chieh. However, since T’ang justifies the assault in the next paragraph as a response to their complaints and answers the even more pointed question as to Chieh’s impact on them, the translation follows the common understanding that the words were uttered by the Shang populace. (The Shih Chi’s “Yin Pen-chi” integrates the oath into its explanation of King T’ang’s actions.)

26 Irrespective of whether the historical sequences are realistic or inspiring leaders necessary, the Chou conquest of the Shang so closely replicated the Shang’s overthrow of the Hsia that the authenticity of the account and achievements of the key actors have long been derisively dismissed by cynics.

27 “Chung Hui chih Kao,” Shang Shu (Shang-shu Chu-shu chi Pu-cheng, 8:14b). Being from the so-called old text materials, this section probably dates to the fourth century CE, just like the “T’ang Kao” that follows it. (See Loewe, Early Chinese Texts, 377-383.)

28 “Chung Hui,” Shang-shu Chu-shu chi Pu-cheng, 8:15a.

29 The best account remains Sun Sen’s Hsia Shang Shih-kao, 1987, 303-319, but similar versions are found in the massive Chung-kuo Li-tai Chan-cheng-shih, Vol. 1, 45-54, as well as overviews by historians such as Wang Yü-hsin, HCCHS 2007:5, 14-20.

30 Historians such as Sun Sen, 303-304, believe that the Shang actually moved south, closer to the Hsia, to position themselves to launch an attack that would require less than a full day’s march. However, they presuppose the Hsia either sanctioned or lacked the might to oppose such a move. (Although there is great disagreement over the site’s identity, most accounts emphasize that the Shang sought a remote, isolated location [presumably east of the T’ai-hang Mountains] in order to avoid the Hsia’s perversity and allow their incipient power to grow unobserved.)

31 See, for example, Hsü Chao-feng, KKWW 1999:3, 43-48.

32 Yi Yin’s life and career continue to prompt articles that employ a broad range of traditional and oracular sources. One of the most extensive is Cheng Hui-sheng’s “Yi Yin Lun” (1998, 184- 208), which points out that Yi was especially mentioned as a recipient for sacrifices after Wu Ting’s reign, had exalted status comparable to all the ancestors apart from the Shang’s progenitor, and was apparently viewed as chief of the officials. (For inscriptional examples, see HJ27656, HJ27653, HJ27655, HJ30451, HJ27661, HJ27057, HJ26955, and HJ507.) Based on a detailed examination of numerous traditional sources conjoined with materials winnowed from the oracle bones, Cheng affirms the traditional (rather romanticized) view that Yi was originally an orphan of low, even slave status who derived his name from the Yi River, where he had been found, and was brought up by a kitchen helper. Because all the other Shang administrators were members of the nobility, he then reaches the novel conclusion that Yi was the first professional bureaucrat (207-208).

33 Mencius, VA7.

34 Hsü Chao-feng and Yang Yüan, KKWW 2008:5, 28.

35 According to the “Hsia Pen-chi,” Chieh later expressed regret at failing to execute him.

36 Hsü Chao-feng and Yang Yüan, KKWW 2008:5, 28.

37 The parents of the slain youth, rather than all the common people slain by the earl’s troops. However, it may also be understood as “ordinary men and women.”

38 Mencius, IIIB5.

39 It is also emphasized in the late Warring States Six Secret Teachings and Three Strategies of Huang-shih Kung.

40 “Employing Spies,” Art of War.

41 The preface to the “T’ang Shih” spuriously attributed to Confucius summarizes Yi Yin’s role simply as having “acted as a minister in T’ang’s attack on Chieh.” (Since his purported actions are fully analyzed in Sawyer, Tao of Spycraft, only a few key points need be noted here.)

42 “Shen-ta Lan,” Lü-shih Ch’un-ch’iu. (Note that Chieh’s fate is rather different in this account.)

43 “Ch’üan Mou.”

44 The relationship between the Hsia and the Nine Yi seems to have fluctuated over the Hsia’s existence but generally to have been nonantagonistic despite the Hsia’s early conquest of the San Miao.

CHAPTER 7

1 The location of Po, the reputed first capital and residence of King T’ang prior to the conquest, is particularly disputed, with claims even being made that it was located in the mountains. (See Ch’en Li-chu, HCCHS 2004:4, 28-37, who believes Po continued on as the permanent ritual center.)

2 These topics are all well covered in the chapters on the Shang in The Cambridge History of Ancient China, K. C. Chang’s volumes on Shang China, and innumerable articles published over the past several decades. Without doubt the Shang was agriculturally based; many inscriptions inquire about the harvest, opening lands, and other productive concerns (Chang Ping-ch’üan, BIHP 42:2 [1970], 267-336).

3 For site analyses, see Yüan Kuang-k’uo and Ch’in Hsiao-li, KKHP 2000:4, 501-536, and Ch’eng Feng, HCCHS 2004:2, 24-26, 35. The sudden intrusion of Shang (Erh-li-kang) cultural elements with the erection of the walls around the end of the third or beginning of the fourth Erh-li-t’ou period is interpreted as evidence of Hsia elements having been forcibly displaced. Whether this was just prior to, or coincident with, their final conquest of the Hsia might be questioned. However, to the extent that dating presently allows, the bastion well fits a probable sequence of Shang expansion.

Ke-chia-chuang in southern Hebei west of Hsing-t’ai-shih, at a vital crossroads, is another culturally complex preconquest site. Initially occupied around Erh-li-t’ou’s late second or early third phase, it shows the forceful intrusion of lower Erh-li-kang culture at the interstice between third and fourth Erh-li-t’ou or just about the time the Shang moved to vanquish the Hsia. (For a preliminary report see Chia Chin-piao et al., KK 2005:2, 71-78.)

4 Lengths average some 280 meters, remnant widths 4 to 8 meters except on the south, where a 14-meter-wide section is visible. The western and northern segments still retain a height of 2 to 3 meters.

5 See Ch’eng Feng, HCCHS 2004:2, 24-26. However, this sort of explanation is not fully convincing because capital expenditures had already been made and threats were arising from this quarter.

6 The following are informative: Wang Hsüeh-jung, KK 1996:5, 51-60; Tung Ch’i, KKWW 1996:1, 27-31; Chang Kuo-shuo, KKWW 1996:1, 31-38; Tu Chin-p’eng et al., KK 1998:6, 9-13, 38; SHYCS Honan Ti-erh Kung-tso-tui, KK 1998:6, 1-8; An Chin-huai, HCCHS, 1993:11, 332- 338; An Chin-huai and Yang Yü-pin, KK 1998:6, 14-19; Fang Yu-sheng, KKWW, 1999:3, 39-42; Chao Chih-ch’üan, HCCHS 2000:1, 18-27; Tu Chin-p’eng, HCCHS 1999:5, 38-40, and WW 2005:6, 62-71; Tu Chin-p’eng and Wang Hsüeh-jung, KK 2004:12, 3-12; and SHYCS Honan Ti-erh Kung-tso-tui, KK 2006:6, 13-31 and 32-42.

7 Tsou Heng has long argued that Yen-shih is the detached T’ung palace to which T’ai Chia was exiled. (See HSCLWC, 120-122, 123-158, and 166-168, as well as JEAA 1, nos. 1-4 [1999]: 195-205.)

8 Residual markings show the framing boards ranged in height from 0.3 to 0.7 meter and each ascending layer was set in about 10 cm. In addition, there is a massive inner waist wall, with a slight 15 degree pitch that extends some 13 meters to the interior from a point about 0.7 meter high up on the core wall. Moreover, the walls were not only constructed on an excavated foundation ditch with an unusual profile (because the terrain to the interior is approximately 1 meter higher than the exterior), but also extend out onto unprepared ground. (This may be partly the result of excavating the soil for the raised interior platform from the immediate vicinity of the core wall, thereby leveling the ground between the wall and the moat.) The foundation ditch has an average top opening of 18.6 meters, and both sides slant inward toward the bottom.

9 See, for example, Wang Hsüeh-jung’s lengthy analysis of textual materials coupled with his own on-site investigations, KK 1996:5, 51-60.

10 Exact dimensions are reported as 233 meters for the western wall, 230 for the eastern, 213 for the southern, and a surprisingly short, presumably northern wall remnant of 176 meters.

11 Yen-shih and the later capital of Huan-pei are seen as evidencing a transition to the regularized layout of capitals described in the K’ao-kung Chi: three concentric segmented rectangles all demarked by walls of various solidity, arrayed along the same axis, that functioned as the royal quarters, inner city, and outer city. (For a typical discussion see Li Tzu-chih, KKWW 2004:4, 33-42, or Liu Ch’ing-chu, KKHP 2006:3, 296-297. However, Liu doesn’t see the city as being fully developed until the imperial age.)

12 SHYCS Honan Ti-erh Kung-tso-tui, KK 2006:6, 13-31. Artificial pools with outflow ditches for irrigation or water supply have been found in the palace complexes of both Yen-shih and Cheng-chou and may have been a regular feature of Shang city construction (Tu Chin-p’eng, KK 2006:11, 55-65).

13 This is the view of analysts such as Chang Kuo-shuo, who emphasize the austere character and martial aspects of this first capital. (See also Chao Chih-ch’uan, KKWW 2000:3, 28-32.)

14 An observation made by many, including Li Tzu-chih, KKWW 2002:6, 43-50.

15 However, as the number of radiocarbon-dated artifacts increases, several other dates, generally centering on 1600 to 1525 BCE, have been suggested as critical to determining the actual age of the site’s walls. For example, An Chin-huai and Yang Yü-pin, 15-18, cite 3395 and 3380 BP, which, when calibrated, give 3650 and 3630 BP (± 125-130 years) respectively. (An and Yang point out that all the artifacts come from Erh-li-t’ou’s first three phases, that the walls and building foundations are therefore earlier than lower Erh-li-kang, and therefore, at the latest, they date from the fourth phase. Moreover, since Cheng-chou’s walls are built over a lower Erh-li-kang layer, they must postdate Yen-shih.) Separately, Yang Yü-pin, KK 2004:9, 87- 92, ascribes radiocarbon dates of 1610-1560 BCE to Yen-shih and 1509-1465 to Cheng-chou. Tung Ch’i, KKWW 1996:1, 30, believes the walls all date to the lower Erh-li-kang period, 1600 BCE or later, and Chang Kuo-shuo, KKWW 1996:1, 34, also argues that the walls at both Yen-shih and Cheng-chou were in existence during the lower Erh-li-kang. Assuming a core date of 3570 BP for Cheng-chou and about 3650 BP for the palace foundations at Yen-shih, An and Yang note a difference of about eighty years. (The most detailed analysis to date is provided by Chang Hsüeh-lien et al., KK 2007:8, 74-89. Other useful articles include Kao Wei et al., KK 1998:10, 66-79, and Ch’en Hsü, HSLWC [reprint of 1985], 119-128.) Despite these potentially significant quibbles, given the radiocarbon deviation allowance being at least a century, ascribing a very early sixteenth-century date to Yen-shih is certainly justified.

16 For example, see Wang Hsüeh-jung, KK 1996.5: 58-59; Tung Ch’i, KKWW 1996:1, 30- 31, who believes the walls date from 1600 BCE or slightly later; and An Chin-huai and Yang Yü-pin, 6 (1998): 16-18. Tu Chin-p’eng, KK 2005:4, 69-77, makes the interesting point that there is no real evidence that T’ang conquered Hsia from Po and then returned to Po. (See also Liu Hsü, HYCLC, 1996, 38-41; Ch’en Hsü, HSLWC, 119-128; and Kao Wei et al., KK 1998:10, 66-79.)

17 See Chang Kuo-shuo, KKWW 1996:1, 36-37.

18 Cheng-chou has been the subject of many reports of varying quality and argumentative character, including An Chin-huai, WW 1961:5, 73-80; An Chih-min, KK 1961:8, 448-450; Liu Ch’i-yi, WW 1961:10, 39-40; Honan-sheng Po-wu-kuan, WW 1977:1, 21-31; Cheng-chou-shih Wen-wu Kung-tso-tui, KKHP 1996:1, 111-42; Chang Kuo-shuo, KKWW 1996:1, 31-38; Fang Yu-sheng, KKWW 1999:3, 39-42; An Chin-huai, HCCHS 1993:11, 32-38; Chang Wei-hua, HCCHS 1993:11, 48-56; Hsü Chao-feng, KKWW, 1999:3, 43-48; An Chin-huai, 1986, 15-48; and Louisa G. F. Huber, EC 13 (1988): 46-77.

19 Tsou Heng and Ch’en Hsü have both been strong proponents of the Po identification. (See HSCLWC, 97-100, 101-106, 117-119, and 173-188; and HSLWC, 8-15, 23-35, 36-44, 45- 54, 64-72, 73-84, 85-95, 96-103, 104-110, and 115-118 respectively.)

20 This is An Chin-huai and Yang Yü-pin’s conclusion based on radiocarbon dates of 1650 or 1630 for Yen-shih’s walls and roughly 1570 BCE for Cheng-chou. In addition (following others before them, including An Chin-huai’s 1993 article on Cheng-chou), they note that Yen-shih’s walls are no later than Erh-li-t’ou fourth period and pre-Erh-li-kang lower cultural layers, whereas the walls at Cheng-chou are built over an Erh-li-kang lower culture foundation. Chao Chihch’üan, KK 2003:9, 85-92, while identifying Po with Yen-shih and concluding that it demarks Hsia and Shang interaction in this area, observes that the main features of the palaces and walls show a Yen-shih to Cheng-chou sequence but that the artifacts tend to be opposite.

21 Tsou Heng envisions its construction and occupation as having been contemporary with Yen-shih despite radiocarbon dates cited by others to the contrary. (For example, see HSCLWC, 97-106 and 117-119.)

22 Chang Kuo-shuo, KKWW 1996:1, 35-36, argues that Po was not the name of a single site but a general term for the early Shang capitals and that both Cheng-chou and Yen-shih were necessary to control the Hsia, thus relegating Yen-shih to a sort of secondary status. Li Min, HCCHS 1996:2, 44-46, identifies it with Ao and (contrary to most views that it was fully abandoned) believes that it continued to serve as a military bastion during the Anyang period. (See also Chu Yen-min, STWMYC, 296-299.)

23 An Chin-huai (1986, 43) and others see the location of bronze-casting workshops outside the city as evidence that slaveholders dwelled within the walls, slaves outside them.

24 Chang Kuo-shuo, KKWW 1996:1, 36. An Chin-huai and Fang Yu-sheng, KKWW 1999:3, 39-42, claim that the bronzes discovered in three large hoards at Cheng-chou are evidence of a sophisticated stage of Shang culture; therefore Cheng-chou must be Chung Ting’s capital of Ao. (Fang cites the Ku-pen Bamboo Annals entry: “After Chung Ting ascended the throne, he moved the capital from Po to Ao in his inaugural year [and] conducted a punitive expedition against the Lan Yi.”) Conversely, scholars such as Chang Wei-hua, HCCHS 1993:11, 56, believe that Cheng-chou’s development, wealth, and extensiveness argue against it having been so early a capital.

25 The best descriptions of the walls remain those of the Honan Provincial Museum, WW 1977:1, and An Chin-huai’s “The Shang City at Cheng-chou,” 22-26.

26 Ch’ü Ying-chieh, 2003, 42-44.

27 Ho-nan-sheng WWKKYCS, KK 2000:2, 40-60, and KK 2004:3, 40-50; Yüan Kuang-k’uo and Tseng Hsiao-min, KK 2004:3, 59-67.

28 Chang Kuo-shuo, KKWW 1996:1, 37.

29 Chang Kuo-shuo, KKWW 1996:1, 37.

30 For comparative dates and Cheng-chou’s occupation before the conquest, see Yüan Kuangk’uo and Hou Yi, WW 2007:12, 73-76, and Chang Hsüeh-lien and Ch’iu Shih-hua, KK 2006:2, 81-89.

31 For dissenting views, see Chang Wei-hua, HCCHS 1993:11, 49-55, and Hsü Chao-feng, KKWW 1999:3, 43-48. Chang concludes that King T’ang built Yen-shih immediately after the conquest but only dwelled there briefly because five years of drought—Heaven’s punishment for overthrowing the legitimate ruling house—immediately ensued, forcing the Shang to precipitously move eastward. Hsü, however, stresses that Cheng-chou was needed to dominate the east.

32 P’ang Ming-chüan, KK 2008:2, 55-63.

33 For a representative analysis that synthesizes the archaeological discoveries at Erh-li-t’ou with traditional historical accounts, see Chao Chih-ch’üan, KKWW 1999:2, 23-29.

34 Lower Ch’i-tan Shang culture, which predates Erh-li-kang, was primarily centered in the Chi-pei, Yü-nan, and Yü-tung areas (Chao Chih-ch’üan, KKWW 1999:2, 24, and KKWW 2000:3, 28-32).

35 For example, see Chao Chih-ch’üan, KKWW 2001:4, 36-40.

36 Li Liu and Hung Xu, Antiquity 81 (2007): 886-901, or WW 2008:1, 43-52. Liu and Xu emphasize the essential continuity in bronzes between ELT and ELK and date Yen-shih to 1600- 1400 BCE, the initial construction having occurred during Erh-li-t’ou’s fourth phase.

37 Although it evolved out of Henan Lungshan culture, the Hsia’s immediate precursor was Hsin-chai-ch’i culture.

38 Despite the newly mandated chronology, numerous Erh-li-t’ou alternatives have been offered, including by T’ien Ch’ang-wu, HCCHS 1987:12, 12-16, who concluded that Erh-li-t’ou’s four cultural stages each lasted about a century and that the Shang conquered the Hsia in the midst of the third period, somewhat after 1700 BCE, earlier than most analysts.

39 In addition to Chao Chih-ch’uan, KKWW 2000:3, 28-32, see Yang Yü-pin, KK 2004:9, 87- 92, who concludes that Yen-shih was unquestionably Po.

40 Chao Chih-ch’uan, KKWW 2000:3, 26.

41 Shang technologies and craft techniques tended to disperse outward, but local cultural elements often constituted the core content. Interaction with the Yi resulted in numerous shared cultural elements and practices, whatever the direction of transmission.

42 For example, see the extensive discussion in The Cambridge History of Ancient China, 124ff., for a comprehensive reflection of the revised view of Chinese history and culture that has evolved over the past few decades, displacing the former belief that so-called high civilizations define the benchmarks and comparatively determine progress toward some extrapolated ideal.

43 Jui Kuo-yao and Shen Yüeh-ming, KK 1992:11, 1039-1044.

44 For an example of a subordinate state that sent in tribute, could be deputed on warfare tasks, and whose rulers may have been related to the king’s clan by marriage, see Wang Yungp’o, HCCHS 1992:4, 31-40. Many clans and proto-state names are known only from emblems and characters on bronze vessels. (For a concise enumeration of the latter, see Liu Chao-ying and P’ei Shu-lan, STWMYC, 365-372.)

45 For the origins of the plastrons employed in Shang divination, see Sung Chen-hao, STWMYC, 392-398.

46 Yang Sheng-nan, CKSYC 1991:4, 47-59, believes that the king had ultimate control over land allotments and rescissions and that grants were even made to other clans and proto-states outside Shang bounds (constituting a sort of de facto recognition for the purpose of symbolic integration).

47 Wang Kuan-ying, LSYC 1984:5, 80-99. It appears that the Shang was not a centralized state that systematically awarded fiefs but instead the most powerful group among a number of entities characterized by varying degrees of strength and independence. (For example, see Li Sheng, Chung-kuo Pien-chiang Shih-ti Yen-chiu 2006:9, 1-8; for a recent overview see Li Hsüeh-shan, HCCHS 2005:1, 29-34, who concludes that some thirty-six states concentrated in central Henan, southern central Shanxi, and around the capital had a close relationship with the Shang without ever being formally enfeoffed, and that they formed a defensive bulwark late in the dynasty that effectively blunted encroachments from the northwest.)

48 The core domain was apparently more heterogeneous than traditionally believed; evidence of non-clan names and even foreign peoples, including Chiang, Chi, Yün, Jen, and Ch’ang, has been uncovered. (See Ch’en Chieh, HCCHS 2003:2, 15-22. Evidence for the Ch’ang clan is seen in an opulent tomb; see SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 2004:1, 7-19.)

49 For recent overviews see Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS, 1993:10, 29-40; T’ang Chi-ken, KKHP 1999:4, 393-420; and Pei-ching Ta-hsüeh K’ao-ku-hsi, KK 2005:6, 17-31.

50 See Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS, 1993:10, 29-40, and Sung Hsin-ch’ao, CKSYC, 1991:1, 53-63.

51 Lei Kuang-shan, KKWW 2000:2, 28-34; Chang T’ien-en, KK 2001:9, 13-21; and Li Hai-jung, KKWW 2000:2, 35-47. As Li’s analysis shows, Kuan-chung was an extremely complex area that integrated multiple influences from the Shang, Shu, and northern steppes with numerous local factors. (For example, Cheng-chia-pao had better metallurgy and eventually absorbed the nearby Liu-chia before their amalgamated indigenous culture displaced the Shang during the fourth phase of Yin-hsü.)

52 Sung Hsin-ch’ao, CKSYC 1991:1, 53-63. For example, a dagger-axe with the name of a powerful group apparently closely related to the royal clan, noted in oracular inscriptions such as HJ33002 as having been dispatched in a military command capacity and also found on bronze vessels, has been recovered at an apparent Shaanxi outpost (Chang Mao-jung, KKWW 1997:4, 38-41, 49).

53 Chang T’ien-en, KK 2001:9, 13-21.

54 T’ang Chi-ken, KKHP 1999:4, 393-420; Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS, 1993:10, 29-40.

55 Sung Hsin-ch’ao, CKSYC, 1991:1, 53-63; Liu Shih-o and Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS 1991:10, 15-19. A strongly fortified Shang citadel, it also had smelting and pottery production facilities. (There is some disagreement as to the date of its loss to the Shang, with Liu and Yüeh arguing that it was the stronghold of the state of Sui, a staunch Shang supporter known to have been vanquished by the Chou prior to their conquest of the Shang.)

56 Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS, 1993:10, 29-40.

57 For an explication of the site’s martial aspects and their implications (which are generally followed here), see Wang Jui, KK 1998:8, 81-91. Additional analysis may be found in Ts’ao Ping-wu, KK 1997:12, 85-89, and Wang Yüeh-ch’ien and T’ung Wei-hua, KK 2005:11, 3-17. Radiocarbon dates for the initial site of as early as 2000 BCE, clearly pre-Shang, have been reported. In addition to being a military bastion, it appears to have been the center of the later state of Yüan (Tsou Heng, HSCLWC, undated, 204-218).

58 See Wang Jui, KK 1998:8, 90.

59 See Wang Jui, KK 1998:8, 89-90, and Ts’ao Ping-wu, WW 1997: 12, 85-88. Although ancient copper mines have been discovered in the general region, the site lacks any evidence of a direct relationship, and during the period of Shang fluorescence the most important deposits were located in the south. (See Wang Jui, 90, and Wang Yüeh-ch’ien, KK 2005:11, 16.) However, salt was crucial to every dynasty, and the Yün-ch’eng basin around Yüan-ch’ü was one of the chief sources in antiquity, the salt recovered from the nearby salt lakes being shipped down to Cheng-chou. (It has been suggested that Yüan-ch’ü was T’ang’s early capital of Po, even though radiocarbon dating precludes this possibility, and that it was the center of the enemy state known as Yüan in Wu Ting’s time and thereafter. However, though geographically possible, the recovered artifacts predate Wu Ting’s reign and indicate that it was a purely Shang enclave, uncontaminated by the intrusion of other cultural elements.)

60 Ch’en Hsüeh-hsiang and Chin Han-p’o, KK 2007:5, 84-85.

61 Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS, 1993:10, 29-40. (Dates cited for late T’ai-hsi center on 1300 BCE or a century before Wu Ting’s reign, but some artifacts corresponding to early Yin-hsü manifestations have also been recovered.)

62 Ho-pei-sheng WWYCS, KK 2007:11, 26-35.

63 Sung Hsin-ch’ao CKSYC 1991:1, 55.

64 Sung Hsin-ch’ao, 55. As attested by the character “ya” on the various grave goods, tomb number 1 clearly belonged to a Shang commander, probably a member of the royal clan (Ch’en Hsüeh-hsiang and Chin Han-p’o, KK 2007:5, 87).

65 Chiang Kang, KKWW 2008:1, 35-46, but especially 44-45. Initial site reports indicate that Wang-chia-shan consisted of a three-tiered, triangular earthen platform with dimensions of 80 by 180 meters.

66 Sung Hsin-ch’ao, CKSYC, 1991:1, 53-63.

67 The site reportedly shows the extent of Shang power over distant cultures. (A useful early report is Hu-pei-sheng Po-wu-kuan, WW 1976:2, 5-15, and Chiang Kang has examined some of the military aspects in KKWW 2008:1, 35-46, but the most comprehensive evaluation to date is the extensively illustrated P’an-lung-ch’eng Ch’ing-t’ung Wen-hua. Brief evaluations are also found in Cambridge History of Ancient China, 168-171, and State Formation in Early China, 75-78. Li Chien-min [KK 2001:5, 60-69] believes that Pan-lung-ch’eng was the capital of the Shang enfeoffed southern state of Ching-Ch’u [64], though this seems unlikely in view of the absence of feudal enfeoffments and subsequent Shang campaigns to the south.)

68 In contrast to the bronzes, the strong indigenous character of the ceramics has been interpreted as indicating the relatively sudden imposition of an external cultural type. (Ceramics are generally held to express local factors, bronze stylistic influences imposed by—or copied from—occupying powers. Although the 159 bronze objects consisting of ritual cauldrons, weapons, and a few tools were locally produced rather than imported [Nan P’u-heng et al., WW 2008:8, 77-82] and include a few distinctive types, they are virtually identical to lower Erh-li-kang Cheng-chou artifacts.) However, contrary to recent interpretations that emphasize resource acquisition, Chiang Kang, 2008:1, 46-48, doesn’t believe P’an-lung-ch’eng was engaged in mineral activities prior to the Shang.

69 For a reconstruction of ancient transport routes, the distribution of natural resources in the P’an-lung-ch’eng area, and a discussion of the importance of tribute and redistribution in the Shang’s ritually based monopolization of authority, see State Formation in Early China. (Apparently there were three water routes and one land road for forwarding minerals to the capital, all controllable from P’an-lung-ch’eng. See Chiang Kang, KKWW 2008:1, 44.)

70 Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS 1993:10, 34-37, argues for it having been a Shang enclave.

71 Important reports include T’ang Lan, WW 1975:7, 72-76; Chiang-hsi-sheng Po-wu-kuan, WW 7 (1975): 51-71; and Chan K’ai-sun, KK 1 (1995): 36, 63-74. It is also briefly discussed in K. C. Chang’s The Archaeology of Ancient China, 389-394, and by Robert Bagley in the Cambridge History of Ancient China, 171-175.

72 K. C. Chang, The Archaeology of Ancient China, 389.

73 “Sun-tzu Wu Ch’i Lieh-chuan,” Shih Chi. As T’ang Lan points out (1975:7, 73), a slightly expanded, possibly original version is found in “Wei Ts’e” in the Chan Kuo-ts’e, which states that “relying on the terrain’s difficulty, they did not practice good government.”

74 For site reports see SHYCS, KKHP 1983:1, 55-92, and Tung-hsia-feng K’ao-ku-tui, KK 1980:2, 97-107.

CHAPTER 8

1 T’ang Chi-ken, KKHP 1999:4, 410-413. Although cut off from direct contact with the Shang, rather than displacing Shang material culture the local resurgence was based on it.

2 See Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS 1993:10, 29-40.

3 It has also been suggested that the Hsia populace had been fully integrated, even assimilated, making the citadel’s abandonment possible. See Ts’ao Ping-wu, KK 1997:12, 86-87.

4 Other sequences substitute Pi and Po. Significant discrepancies in Warring States accounts have long prompted rather futile attempts to match them to likely sites. (For convenient summaries see Wang Li-chih, KKWW 2003:4, 41-42, or Wang Chen-chung, KKWW 2006:1, 44-49.)

5 According to the Ku-pen Bamboo Annals.

6 For reports and discussion see Ch’en Hsü’s five HSLWC articles, 137-144, 145-154, 155- 158, 159-162, and 163-170; Ch’en’s KKWW 1 (2000): 33-38; and Fang Yu-sheng, KKWW 2000:1, 39-41.

7 Ch’en Hsü, KKWW 2000:1 36-37. Tsou Heng, KKWW 1998:4, 24-27, believes that Hsiaoshuang-ch’iao was the site of Chung Ting’s capital of Ao, Cheng-chou having been abandoned, whereas Fang Yu-sheng, HCCHS 1998:1, 58-63, KKWW 2000:1, 39-41, and KK 2002:8, 81-86, has repeatedly argued that Cheng-chou continued to flourish in the Pai-chia-chuang phase as the capital known as Ao and dismisses Hsiao-shuang-ch’iao as a secondary ritual center.

8 Tsou Heng, KKWW 1998:4, 26; Ch’en Hsü, HSWHLC, 161-162, and KKWW 2000:1, 36-37.

9 Ch’en Hsü, HSWHLC, 163-170, and KKWW 2000:1, 36-37.

10 For an overview of their relationship during the Yen-shih/Cheng-chou period, see Ch’en Hsü, HSLWC, 104-110. Considerably earlier than most archaeologists, Ch’en discerns a shift from a strong intermixing of Yüeh-shih elements prior to Cheng-chou to their virtual elimination post-Cheng-chou, not just in central China, but also in Shangdong, coincident with the Pai-chia-chuang phase of Shang culture.

11 Chia Chin-piao et al., KK 2005:2, 71-78; Chin Wen-sheng, STWMYC, 133-136; and Tsou Heng, STWMYC, 42-44. All the cultural elements clearly postdate ELK Pai-chia-chuang but are equally pre-Yin-hsü.

12 For a site report, see Tung-hsien-hsien K’ao-ku-tui, KK 2003:11, 27-40.

13 For a site report and analysis, see Ho Kuang-yüeh, CKKTS, 1995:5, 32-36.

14 For example, based on a comparative reading of the Bamboo Annals, Shih Chi, and other early writings, Ch’ao Fu-lin concluded that the clause indicating that “the Shang did not move their capital thereafter” is erroneous and that the Shih Chi is correct in stating that in P’an Keng’s time their capital was north of the river and that he crossed to the south and again dwelt in “Ch’eng T’ang’s old dwelling,” in other words the old Po capital at Cheng-chou. He further believes some collateral activity occurred at Yin-hsü prior to Wu Ting’s ascension. (See CKSYC 1989:1, 57-67, and for further discussion Yen Yi-p’ing, 1989, Vol. 2, 157-173.)

15 Even this claim does not go unchallenged. Apart from the question of whether the storage pits simply haven’t been discovered, the reclassification of certain diviner group inscriptions has resulted in a few being attributed to the three reigns immediately preceding Wu Ting. (See Yang Pao-ch’eng, KK 2000:4, 74-80, and Ts’ao Ting-yün, HCCHS 2007:5, 21-29.)

16 For a basic site report, see SHYCS An-yang Kung-tsuo-tui, KK 2003:5, 3-16.

17 For example, Chu Kuang-hua, KKWW 2006:2, 31-35.

18 Wang Chen-chung, KKWW 2006:1, 48.

19 As suggested by Chu Kuang-hua, KKWW 2006:2, 31-35. (An alternative explanation—that Huan-pei may have been Yen and P’an Keng then simply moved across the river—seems not to have arisen.) Various dates have been suggested for the move to Anyang, such as Hsü Po-hung’s rather early 1350 BCE. (See HCCHS 1998:4, 29-36. Note that Hsü dates the Chou conquest to about 1075 BCE.) However, the Xia Shang Zhou Chronology Project has proposed a date of 1298 BCE, with Wu Ting’s ascension then occurring in 1251 BCE. The question is not independent of Cheng-chou’s abandonment.

20 Li Chi has recounted the myriad problems that beset early excavation work at Anyang in his classic Anyang. Apart from the numerous site reports and the fundamental information contained in Cambridge History of Ancient China, Chang Kwang-chih’s discussion in Shang Civilization , 69-135, and An Chin-huai’s “The Shang City at Cheng-chou and Related Problems” retain value. Chu Yen-min (1999) provides an extensive survey and analysis, but see also Shih Chang-ju, KKHP 2 (1947): 1-81.

21 For some evidence of the earlier occupation, see Liu Yi-man, STWMYC, 148-161.

22 Li Min, LSYC 1991:1, 111-120, believes the old capital suffered some sort of disaster, probably flooding, but that conditions there had also been exacerbated by environmental degradation. In contrast, the fertilization practices adopted at Yin-hsü preserved the environment by disposing of human and animal waste. However, for another view see Yang Hsi-chang and T’ang Chi-ken, STWMYC, 248-256.

23 For an overview, see Chu Yen-min, 1999, 100-114. No doubt under the influence of Confucianism, later ages envisioned the shift to Anyang as a manifestation of P’an’s quest to return the people to Virtue, an imaginative view clearly reflected in the Shang Shu.

24 See, for example, Tung Ch’i, WW 2006:6, 56-60, 87. Generally speaking, as indicated by discussions in Mencius, Kuan-tzu, and other pre-Han writings, every significant city was expected to have inner and outer walls, known as ch’eng and kuo, as well as moats and segregated quarters. (For a brief overview see Liu Ch’ing-chu, WW 1998:3, 49-57.)

25 Liu Ch’ing-chu, KKHP 2006:3, 283, and others believe the moat, in conjunction with the rivers, furnished adequate perimeter protection. However, Li Min, LSYC 1991:1, thinks the moat was intended to reduce the Huan River’s level during floods, thereby sparing Anyang. A small interior ditch apparently intended to protect a sacrificial area, datable to the third phase of Yin-hsü, has also been found at Anyang. Only about 30 to 35 meters in length, it has a maximum width of 2.9 meters and a depth of nearly a meter, but considerably less in some sections. Hardly an effective deterrent, it probably served more as a marker. (See Yin-hsü Hsiao-min-t’un K’ao-ku-tui, KK 2007:1, 37-40.)

26 As argued, for example, by Chang Kuo-shuo, KKWW 2000:1, 42-45.

27 For a complete translation of the Wu-tzu, the book attributed to Wu Ch’i, see Sawyer, Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. This passage appears in Wu Ch’i’s biography in the Shih Chi.

28 For a complete translation, see Crump, Chan-kuo Ts’e, 374.

29 “Responding to Change,” Wu-tzu, attributed to Wu Ch’i.

30 “Military Combat.”

31 “Maneuvering the Army.”

32 “Configurations of Terrain.”

33 Sun Pin, “Male and Female Cities.” (For a complete translation and discussion of the various configurations, see Sawyer, Sun Pin Military Methods.)

34 Yin Chün-k’o, 1994, 114ff.; Li Min, HCCHS 1988:4, 41-48; and Chu Chen, HCCHS 1989:8, 3-10.

35 Something might perhaps be learned from the movement of the Japanese capital from Nara to Kyoto and then the subsequent power shift to Edo where compulsory, burdensome attendance at the shogun’s court proved a significant factor in eroding vassal independence and power.

36 Ch’iao Teng-yün and Chang Yüan, STWMYC, 162-174.

37 Both Li Min HCCHS 1988:4, 46-48, and Chu Chen, HCCHS 1989:8, 7-10, discuss the generally neglected subject of Chao-ko.

38 Despite various claims that writing’s incipient origins can be discerned in Yangshao cultural manifestations such as Ta-wen-k’ou or Pan-p’o, the evidence cited consists mostly of individual symbols that may represent the earliest form of written expression or may simply be clan markers or totemistic symbols. (See, for example, Chang Mao-jung, 2002, 20-23, or Chiang Lin-ch’ang, HCCHS 2006:4 for more recent summaries of the manifestations and interpretations.)

39 For further discussion, see David Keightley, Sources of Shang History, 134-146.

40 This exploration of Shang martial activities is heavily indebted to numerous pioneering examinations of oracular inscriptions by Chinese, Japanese, and Western scholars, such as Kuo Mo-jo, Tung Tso-pin, Ch’en Meng-chia, Li Hsüeh-ch’in, Wang Kuo-wei, Shima Kunio, Chang Ping-hsüeh-ping, David Keightley, and Edward L. Shaughnessy. In addition to Tung Tso-pin’s chronologies, our discussion of Shang dynasty martial activities is primarily based on the following important studies: Wang Yü-hsin, “Wu-Ting-ch’i Chan-cheng Pu-ts’u Fen-ch’i te Ch’angshih”; Fan Yü-chou, “Yin-tai Wu Ting Shih-ch’i te Chan-cheng” and “Military Campaign Inscriptions from YH127”; Ch’en Meng-chia, “Wu Ting Shih-tai te Tuo-fang,” “Wu-Ting-hou te Tuo-fang,” and “Yi-Hsin shih-tai Suo-cheng te Jen-fang, Yü-fang”; Lin Hsiao-an, “Yin Wu Ting Ch’en-shu Cheng-fa yü Hsing-chi K’ao”; P’eng Yü-shang, Yin-hsü Chia-ku Tuan-tai; and others as individually noted. All these studies, although founded on the same collections of oracle bones (including those in Chia-ku-wen Ho-chi, hereafter abbreviated as HJ), tend to selectively emphasize certain aspects of Shang martial activity, resulting in slightly different depictions and divergent conclusions. Citations will indicate which view is being followed, while inscription numbers will signify materials either abstracted from the above because of their particular relevance or developed in the course of our study.

41 Claims have been made that anywhere from 90 significant cities or states to a maximum of 800 place-names (cited by Li Hsüeh-ch’in, HCCHS 2005:5, 3-7) can be identified.

42 For an early report on two bronze Yin-hsü foundries, see SHYCS, Yin-hsü Fa-chüeh Pao-kao 1958-1961.

43 The ratio of prisoners to casualties is sometimes astounding. For example, according to Hsü-ts’un hsia 915, in a campaign against the Wei, twenty-four prisoners and a clan leader (who was later sacrificed) were captured, but an astonishing 1,570 were slain. Various weapons and other items were also seized, including two chariots. (For an analysis of this inscription see Wang Yü-hsin, CKSYC 1980:1, 106.)

CHAPTER 9

1 Among many, see Chang P’ei-yü, KKWW 1999:4, 62-65. The dates 1239-1181 and 1250- 1192 BCE are based on eclipse calculations; the PRC dating project has stipulated 1250-1192; and Cambridge History of Ancient China begins its chronology with an end date of 1189 (1198- 1181 is clearly too short for his many accomplishments). Many of the warfare inscriptions are found among HJ 6057-7771.

2 The nature of these entities—extended clans, tribes, chiefdoms, or proto-states—remains unclear. (For a characterization see T’ung Chu-ch’en, KK 1991:11, 1003-1018, 1031; for a survey of the peripheral proto-states see Lu Lien-ch’eng, CKKTS 1995:4,30-56.)

3 This is the scheme adopted by historians such as Meng Shih-k’ai, Lin Hsiao-an, Fan Yü-chou, and P’eng Yü-shang. It should be differentiated from Tung Tso-pin’s five-era periodization of Anyang oracle bones, whether as originally formulated or subsequently modified, and Wang Yü-hsin’s somewhat nebulous two-part division. (For a discussion of periodization see Keightley, Sources of Shang History, 91-100.)

4 Ch’en Hsü, HSLWC, 246.

5 The “rabbit” rather than “earth” people, who were a major threat in the second period.

6 Apart from those noted in the discussion below, see Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 201.

7 According to Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 297-298.

8 Ch’en Meng-chia, 296-297. (For relevant inscriptions, see Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 333.)

9 For inscriptions (including HJ6993 and HJ6991) see Lin Hsiao-an, 229, and Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 196.

10 For inscriptions (including Hsü Ts’un 1, 609, and HJ6983), see Chang Ping-ch’üan, 491, or Lin Hsiao-an, 230.

11 Yi 4693.

12 For a study of the concept of space in the Shang, see David N. Keightley, The Ancestral Landscape.

13 Accounts of the campaign may be found in Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 186-191; Luo K’un’s Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih-shih, 1991, 173-177; Liu Yü-t’ang, HCCHS 2001:4, 59-60; and Liu Huan, CKSYC 2002:4, 3-9, with additional references to the “south” listed in Chang Ping-ch’üan, 316. As usual, readings and interpretations vary, and the pronunciation of the proto-states is highly tentative.

14 The formation of alliances is implied by oracular references to the nan pang fang or “southern allied states” (Chia 2902, HJ20576), and this repression of the rebellious generally derived from Shih Ching commentators (Ch’en Hsü, HSWHLC, 243).

15 “Li shih yü nan” (duo 2.62), meaning “to take responsibility/handle affairs in the south,” is understood as evidence that the king personally supervised the campaign, perhaps even the battle action. He also performed prognostications en route and in the south. Ch’üeh’s participation shows the conflict cannot have been too early in the king’s first period, because he was originally an enemy who subsequently became a trusted ally.

16 HJ5504.

17 HJ20576, possibly HJ19946.

18 Not the same state as the “Ghost” state.

19 HJ19946 and HJ20576 convey a sense of urgency because the king is inquiring whether his generals will suffer harm while repeatedly asking if they will receive blessings for the effort—in other words, if the time is right for an action that the king has already decided upon.

20 HJ6667.

21 The severity of his illness so perturbed the king that he felt compelled to offer sacrifice for his recovery.

22 According to Liu Huan, CKSYC 2002:4, 8. (Liu, 6-7, generally derives more sweeping conclusions than other analysts, including that the king retained extensive control over his field troops and engaged in public relations or propaganda pronouncements.)

23 See P’eng Ming-han, CKSYC 1995:3, 101-108. (P’eng suggests that there were two Hu peoples, the Hu in the main Shang domain and a separate Hu-fang, but fails to substantiate his claim.)

24 The term t’u (seen in HJ6667) is generally understood as meaning something like “punitively attack” but might merely signify going out to resist them or manifest awesome power. (The Chü is a tributary of the Han River.)

25 P’eng Ming-han understands these three as “war spirits,” but they need not be so.

26 As claimed by P’eng Ming-han, CKSYC 1995:3, 101.

27 Although massive battles would not be unknown, Chinese military writers noted that the later (horse-mounted) steppe peoples avoided fixed confrontations. However, it would be erroneous to project similar combat tendencies back onto the essentially sedentary steppe peoples of the Shang period.

28 Our account basically follows Fan Yü-chou’s dating and campaign chronology, 1991, 205- 207. (Lin Hsiao-an, 236-239, dates it to Wu Ting’s first period and Wang Yü-hsin also places it early.) Early Hsüan participation in Shang theocracy argues for the correctness of Fan’s dating. (See also P’eng Yü-shang, 1994, 97-103, who similarly assigns it to the king’s middle period.) The Hsüan were apparently located to the west of the Shang; Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 276, suggests they may have dwelled in Kuei-fang territory.

29 HJ9705. Reconstructions of the campaign may be found in Fan Yü-chou, Vol. 3, 205-206, and BSOAS 539; Lin Hsiao-an, 236-238; and Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih, 165-166.

30 Ping-pien 307.

31 HJ6937. The problem raised by Lin having damaged the Hsüan in the seventh month (requiring that the Hsüan and T’an be contiguous states) can be resolved if these are inquiries, not necessarily events, and he may have been sent against the Hsüan rather than the T’an, or the reverse.

32 See HJ6924-6939.

33 Ping-pien 249, cited by Fan Yü-chou, BSOAS, 539.

34 Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 205, argues that Ping-pien 307, which asks whether the king should attack the T’an in the sixth month or go west, shows that the T’an were located in the west. However, the inscription seems to be posing paired alternatives: Should the king campaign in the east, attacking the T’an, or devote his efforts to resolving problems in the west?

35 HJ6942, querying whether the T’an will harm the Ts’ao.

36 For this view see Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih, 165-166.

37 Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988 298, 276. (Ch’en Meng-chia provides a useful iteration of the main commanders on 275-276, but for a summary of the most important inscriptions see Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 492; Lin Hsiao-an, 236-239; and Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 155-158.)

38 Lin Hsiao-an, 237, interprets the simultaneous incursions of the T’an, Hsüan, and Jung as evidence of deliberate, coordinated action.

39 Ping 306; Lin Hsiao-an, 237.

40 See, for example, HJ6958, which asks whether Ch’üeh will “pummel” the Hsüan.

41 HJ6946.

42 HJ6959; Yi 4380, 4919, 5163, and 5193.

43 Yi 4693.

44 For example, see HJ9947, HJ6939, HJ6947, HJ6948, HJ6952, HJ6954, HJ6958, HJ6959, HJ20383.

45 Attested by HJ20393.

46 HJ6205, HJ6567, HJ6240; Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 205 and 207; Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 157. The Hsüan are recorded as frequently sending in scapula for divination, once in the staggering amount of 1,000. (See Fan, 205-206.)

47 Reconstructions are provided by Edward L. Shaughnessy in “Micro-periodization,” 58- 82, and Fan Yü-chou in “Military Campaign Inscriptions,” 1989, 535-48, and Yin-tai Wu Ting, 1991, 202-205. Several inquiries fortuitously include confirmation of the results. (Inscription summaries will also be found in Chang Ping-ch’üan, 491-492, and Ch’en Meng-chia, 287-288. Also see page 72 and note 28 of “Micro-periodization” for Shaughnessy’s determination of the campaign date as 1211-1210 BCE.) Significant differences exist between Shaughnessy’s reconstruction (which is essentially followed here, apart from transcribing the state name as P’ei instead of Pu), based on the adroit employment of an intercalary month, and that offered by Fan Yü-chou in his two articles (1989 and 2006). In fact, the divergences illustrate the difficulty of assembling highly disparate pronouncements into a coherent patchwork of probable events.

48 A crucial issue is whether “Fou” should be understood as the name of another state or the head of the Chi-fang, as only Shaughnessy (“Micro-periodization,” 76, note 14) concludes. In contrast, Ch’en Meng-chia, Fan Yü-chou (204-205), and others assume Fou was a second state located in the same general western vicinity. (Shaughnessy argues that the actions being performed by Fou—visiting the king, hunting, and dying—could only pertain to an individual, but they could simply be a personified way of referring to the head of the clan or state, like Ch’üeh, Chih, or Hsüan. However, evidence for the correctness of his view may be seen in the virtual impossibility that every inscription in which “Chi-fang Fou” appears would have required identical actions by commanders against two discrete enemies irrespective of their proximity. In addition, it is highly unlikely that two proto-states would have simultaneously undertaken the construction of defensive fortifications despite having come under Shang onslaughts.)

49 See HJ6834a, a well-known inscription related to inquires about the advisability of attacking P’ei and the Chi-fang as well. As noted by Fan Yü-chou, Ping-pien 558 and 1, asking about the prospects for (imminent) conquest, corroborate Hsi’s likely defeat.

50 See BSOAS, 1989 537.

51 HJ6577 questions whether Prince Shang will capture the Chi-fang; Ping-pien 1 (HJ6834) inquires whether Ch’üeh, the tuo ch’en, or the shih will capture or conquer Fou; and several other inscriptions such as Ping-pien 171 and HJ6934 show the Shang intended to severely damage or destroy them.

52 HJ13514a. Shaughnessy, “Micro-periodization,” 66, translates as “Crack-making on [hsin]-mao (day 28), K’o divining: ‘We ought not ?? Chi-fang Fou’s building a wall, for Prince Shang will harm (him).’ Fourth month.”

53 See HJ6573; Ping-pien 302.

54 According to the Shih Ching, “Yin Wu,” Mao #305. Being employed by the Shang to refer to any of the external, mainly steppe peoples who were characterized by distinctive cultural practices and presumably spoke different languages, the term ch’iang also has a broader meaning and somewhat derogatory connotations.

55 Meng Shih-k’ai, 1986, 206-207; Ch’en Meng-chia, 281. (Ch’en notes that most of the battles with the Shang occurred in Chin-nan and Ho-nei, around the T’ai-hang Mountains.)

56 Lin Hsiao-an, 241, 260.

57 For a typical expression of this less than universally accepted view, see Wang Shen-hsing, 1992, 116-117. The relationship of the Hsia populace to later steppe groups, including the Ch’iang and Hsiung-nü, has long been a subject of debate. (For example, see Hsü Chung-shu, LSYC 1983:1, 60-61.)

58 Meng Shih-k’ai, 1986, 207-208. (For an enumeration of relevant inscriptions, see Ch’en Meng-chia, 279-281.) Twelve of the fifteen ways employed by the Shang to slay sacrificial victims were used against the Ch’iang (Wang Shen-hsing, 125-130). Liu Feng-hua, KKWW 2007:4, 22- 26, notes that T’un-nan refers to beheading forty Ch’iang prisoners, showing that they were slain with impunity.

59 See, among many, Ch’en Meng-chia, 279-281; Meng Shih-k’ai, 207; and Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 170 and 173. Ch’iang were captured in military expeditions and as an aspect of hunting expeditions, as well as while simply attending to pasturing and farming, and even forwarded to the Shang by others.

60 For a general discussion see Luo K’un, 1991, 405-426.

61 As exemplified by Chiang T’ai Kung, the legendary Chou tactician and commander. It would be frequently claimed that the Chiang were descended from Yen Ti, the Red Emperor.

62 For further discussion, see Ch’en Meng-chia, 282.

63 Wang Shen-hsing (1992, 133-140) notes that they frequently proved troublesome prisoners, rebelling, fleeing, and resisting recapture.

64 See Lin Hsiao-an, 241-242, and Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 191-193, as well as such inscriptions as Ts’ui 1300, HJ6600, HJ6601, HJ6603, HJ6604, HJ6978, and finally HJ6599, which shows that they were perceived as dangerous. (HJ6492 indicates Kuang took fifty prisoners, hardly a large number considering the apparent scope of the conflict, but not insignificant.)

65 Per Lin Hsiao-an’s chronology, 258-261. (Lin also asserts, perhaps dubiously, that Lung-fang forces that had just been vanquished by the Shang also participated as battlefield allies.)

66 The inscriptions for the various Ch’iang campaigns are summarized by Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 170-171; Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 207-209; Liu Hsiao-an, 258-261; Ch’en Meng-chia, 276-279; and Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 492. Despite frequent references to the Ch’iang in Wu Ting’s period, Luo K’un believes they were neither a significant threat nor a major warfare objective in his era, though the capture of “barbarian” prisoners was important. (Luo K’un, 1991, 405- 426, and Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih, 185-187. Luo bases his view on distinguishing between the specific tribe or proto-state called Ch’iang and the broad use of the term to designate any of several steppe peoples.) However, the fact that a total of some 2,000 victims were ritually slain according to several inquiries preserved on just one bone would certainly seem to argue for large-scale, frequent warfare and against Luo’s assertion.

67 K’u 130, sometimes misstated as 310. However, there is considerable disagreement whether this badly corrupted inscription discusses a force targeting the Ch’iang (since “ch’iang” is interpolated) or the T’u-fang. (See, for example, Luo K’un, 186.) Lin Hsiao-an, 259-260, argues (albeit from somewhat later materials) that military organization and prerogatives at the time would have precluded Fu Hao from commanding such a large force. Nevertheless, since Fu Hao did exercise power in such important court functions as sacrifice and prognostication, commanding in the king’s stead would not have been beyond the realm of possibility.

68 P’eng Yü-shang, 1994, 145. (Luo, 412, denies that Fu Hao campaigned against the Ch’iang.)

69 Lin Hsiao-an, 260-261. (See especially HJ6630 and HJ6636.)

70 Lin Hsiao-an, 261.

71 Whether this conflict falls at the end of Wu Ting’s middle period or the beginning of his third is somewhat nebulous. Fan Yü-chou, dissatisfied with Tung Tso-pin’s pioneering work (which assigns the campaign to the third month of Wu Ting’s twenty-ninth year), has provided a brief revamped calendar for the clash with the Hsia-wei in Yin-tai Wu-Ting Shih-ch’i te Chan-cheng , 1991, 213-214, grouping it with other conflicts in the final period. However, in his “Military Campaign Inscriptions from YH127,” 539, Fan views it as a late middle period clash because it is the last campaign attested by inscriptions found in pit YH127. In contrast, Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 150, ascribes it to the first half of Wu Ting’s reign and Lin Hsiao-an, 251-253, to the middle period. Overall, although there were clashes early on, the main conflict seems to have unfolded during the final years of the middle period.

72 HJ6477a (Ping-pien 311), for example, preserves simultaneous queries whether the king should attack the Pa-fang with Hsi or the Hsia-wei with Wang Ch’eng. HJ6413 similarly shows campaigns being contemplated against the T’u-fang, Hsia-wei, Lung-fang, and others. HJ6417 records consecutive queries about the Hsia-wei and T’u-fang. (See also Wang Yü-hsin, 149-152, and Lin Hsiao-an, 252-253.)

73 HJ6525.

74 HJ6523, Hsü 137.1.

75 HJ6496. Also note Ping-pien 24 and Ching 1266.

76 Attested by HJ6477, HJ6487, HJ6496, and others.

77 HJ6530a, Ho 151.

78 HJ6487.

79 Chang Ping-ch’üan, citing Chin 25, 1988, 489.

80 Yi 6382.

81 HJ6527.

82 See, for example, HJ6451, HJ6459, and HJ6480.

83 See Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 149-152.

84 Lin Hsiao-an, 257.

85 It is thought that the Lung were one of the ancestors of the powerful Hsiung-nu, who were active in the late Warring States and early Han. (See, for example, Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 283.)

86 HJ6476, Yi 5340. (Convenient listings of Lung campaign inscriptions may be found in Ch’en Meng-chia, 283; Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 316-317 and 489-490; Lin Hsiao-an, 257-258; and Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 164-165.) As apportioned by Fan Yü-chou (230), the commissioning of a few early period generals argues for relatively early clashes, but the first appearance of Fu Ching in a command role implies that they date to Wu Ting’s late middle period or later.

87 HJ6587, HJ6590.

88 Yi 5340.

89 HJ6585/Hsü 4.26.3 (targeting the Lung and Ch’iang), HJ6584 (targeting the Lung and an unknown enemy but presumably the Ch’iang).

90 HJ6633, HJ6593, HJ6594, HJ6636.

91 HJ6584, HJ6585, HJ6633; T’ieh 105.3; Shih 5.5.

92 According to Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 212, evidence that they were about to be defeated is seen in HJ6630, HJ6631, HJ6632, HJ6634, HJ6635, HJ6636, and HJ6638, as well as Ching-jen 343, Yi 462, and Ts’un 2.302. In addition, HJ6587 and H6590 inquire whether Shih Pan will “seize” the Lung.

93 HJ8593.

94 HJ6664b.

95 Ho 626 and 630; Nei-pien 49, 52, and 132.

96 HJ6630, HJ6631.

97 The problem of relative dating is particularly visible in determining the date of the T’u-fang campaign. Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 147, who simply divides Wu Ting’s reign into two periods, places it toward the end of the first part, but others who employ a tri-partite division (such as Lin Hsiao-an, 262-263) assign it to late in the middle period. (Tung Tso-pin’s reconstruction in his Yin-li P’u has it commencing in the king’s twenty-eighth year, though its accuracy has been questioned by Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 214, and others.)

98 Discussions of critical inscriptions are found in Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 272-273; Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 492-493; Lin Hsiao-an, 261-266; Wang Yü-hsin, 145-147; Fan Yü-chou, 214- 219; P’eng Yü-shang, 143-145; and Hu Hou-hsüan, HCCHS 1991:2, 13-20.

99 See Lin Hsiao-an (265), who cites this estimate of marching time from Kuo Mo-juo. (Kuo apparently concluded the T’u-fang were therefore located about 1,000 li from the Shang center, but in contrast to the maximum average sustained rate of 25 li known from historical records, his estimate was based on an impossible daily march of 80 li.) Others, such as P’eng Yü-shang, 144, conclude that the T’u-fang were located to the northwest or west of the Shang and actually quite close, which would agree with twelve days’ march at 25 li per day, or only 300 li in total. Although most historians and maps have traditionally placed them to the north, Chao Ch’eng, 2000, 4, locates the T’u-fang east of the Kung-fang, who were active in northern Shaanxi; Hu Hou-hsüan would add southern Inner Mongolia to the T’u-fang’s domain, requiring the main Shang campaigns against them to proceed northwest.

100 Whether the T’u-fang were direct descendants of the Hsia has long attracted considerable speculation, most of it based on detailed but highly imaginative interpretations of vestiges perceived in traditional historical writings. (For example, see Hu Hou-hsüan, HCCHS 1991:2, 13-20.)

101 See, for example, HJ6381, HJ649, HJ6440, and various inscriptions appealing to the spirits for aid against them, including HJ6384, HJ6385, HJ6386, HJ6388, and HJ39879.

102 Several different terms are used for the Shang response, ranging from “attack” to “destroy.” See Hu Hou-hsüan, HCCHS 1991:2, 16-17, for an enumerative listing.

103 P’eng Yü-shang, 144, and Hu Hou-hsüan, 16-17. For examples, see HJ6087, HJ6354, HJ6389, HJ6391, HJ6392, HJ6393, HJ6396, HJ6400, and HJ39880.

104 For example, see HJ5412, HJ6087, K’u 237.

105 HJ6452.

106 HJ39889.

107 For example, HJ6401, HJ6402, HJ6403, HJ6415, HJ6416, HJ6417, HJ6419, HJ6420, HJ6421, HJ39885, HJ39887, HJ39888, and HJ6438 (with the San-tsu).

108 In addition to the levies listed in the discussion, undated strips—which may well be redundant—at least twice list call-ups of 3,000 men. (See HJ6438, HJ6407, and HJ6410.) HJ6409 records a levy of 5,000 men to “cheng” (rectify) the T’u-fang.

109 Based on his analysis of traditional sources, Ch’en Meng-chia, 198, 272-273, concludes that all the campaign inscriptions date to Wu Ting’s reign and that he successfully extirpated them.

110 This reconstructed chronology is based on Lin Hsiao-an, 261-266, and Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 214-219, slightly modified by recourse to the original inscriptions. Though essentially agreeing on the course of the campaign, Lin and Fan disagree on the years of some strips, somewhat altering the sequence of events. (For the major inscriptions see Hu Hou-hsüan, HCCHS 1991:2, 13-20.)

111 HJ6413, Hsü 3.8.9 (which makes no mention of conscription. Wai 314 also dates to the eleventh month.) Numerous strips inquiring about undertaking actions against the Hsia-wei and T’u-fang or against the T’u-fang and Kung-fang show their simultaneous nature. (See HJ6413, HJ6427, and HJ39884).

112 HJ6438.

113 HJ6452, assuming it doesn’t belong to the subsequent year. (See also HJ6541 per Fan Yü-chou; Lin Hsiao-an, 226; and Hou-hsia 37.6.)

114 HJ6409, per Fan Yü-chou. (Lin Hsiao-an, 264, dates this inscription to the succeeding year.)

115 HJ6420, per Fan Yü-chou. See also HJ6417a, HJ6087, and Wang Yü-hsin’s account, 1991, 146-147. (Lin Hsiao-an notes HJ6354 indicates the king mounted an attack in the fourth month, but there is no mention of Chih Kuo.)

116 HJ6385a.

117 HJ6412, HJ6417. (However, Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 149, attributes HJ6412 to the first part of Wu Ting’s reign.) See also HJ6087, HJ6416.

118 HJ6414.

119 Lin 2.7.9 per Lin Hsiao-an.

120 HJ6439 per Fan Yü-chou.

121 HJ6057. Note that his report uses the term cheng, translated as “punitive attack,” even though it supposedly never was employed to refer to attacks mounted by “barbarians,” only the Shang (and later states) going forth to punitively attack or “rectify” offenders. (Additional counterexamples, such as HJ20440 and HJ20441, are easily found.)

122 HJ6057a. See also HJ6354 for a similar report. According to the Yin-li P’u, this was in Wu Ting’s twenty-ninth year.

123 Hou-shang 31.6, per Lin Hsiao-an.

124 HJ6057.

125 HJ6087.

126 HJ6454; Hou-hsia 37.6. See also Lin Hsiao-an, 266.

127 Hu Hou-hsüan, HCCHS 1991:2, 19.

128 According to Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 350.

129 According to Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 209, based on Kuei 2.15.18.

130 See Ch’ien-pien, 4.46.4, for reports of Ma-fang activities; also Ping-pien 114 (first month), Ching 1681, Yi 5408, and HJ6664 (eleventh month) for whether they will receive blessings. (Relevant inscriptions are noted by Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 165; Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 283-284; and Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 492.)

131 Respectively Ping-pien 301 and Chia 1, per Ch’en Meng-chia.

132 For inscriptions see Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 489, and Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 210-212.

133 Artifacts suggesting that the Shang conducted campaigns against Pa or Shu have also been found in P’eng-chu-hsien in Sichuan. (Ch’en Hsü, 2000, 242-243.) After the Chou conquest of the Shang, Pa groups apparently came up the Han River and were enfeoffed with the state of Yü in Shaanxi as a reward for participating in the coalition action against the Shang. (See Pao-chi-shih Yen-chiu-hui, WW 2007:8, 28-47.)

134 HJ6461, Nei-pien 267.

135 HJ6468 (as sometimes interpreted).

136 HJ6473; Nei-pien 25, 26, 32, 34; Yi 3787.

137 Nei-pien 313.

138 Nei-pien 159 and 311.

139 HJ8411.

140 Yi 2213; Yi 8171.

CHAPTER 10

1 Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 227. However, see Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 270-272.

2 Convenient summaries of key inscriptions and discussions of their unfolding relationship are found in Ch’en Meng-chia, 270-272; Fan Yü-chou, 226-228; Lin Hsiao-an, 234-235; and Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 168-170. A brief account will also be found in Luo Kun’s Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih, 180-181.

3 Attested by HJ6773, HJ6783, HJ6788, and HJ6790.

4 See, for example, Yi 2287 and Yi 2347 (inquiring about the fate of the Shang army under the li, later known as “lictors”).

5 Chia 3066.

6 HJ6689 through HJ6696 and HJ6724.

7 Hsü 6.9.6 (pummel the Chien).

8 Hsü 5.8.1, Ching 3, Ching 5.

9 HJ6783, HJ6786, HJ6788, and HJ6790.

10 HJ6759, HJ6761. (Somewhat inexplicably, the Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih compilers, 181, take the character yü, normally understood as “to mount a defense” or “defend against,” as indicating some sort of mop-up effort subsequent to victory.)

11 HJ6754, Hsü 5.28.2, Hsü 6.21.11, Yi 2287, Yi 7764.

12 HJ6702, Ch’ien 6.3.54, HJ6704a, all dating to the same year, according to Fan Yü-chou (1991, 227). (Many other strips [HJ6689-HJ6724], some dating to the fourth month, also speak about great Fang uprisings.)

13 HJ6782, HJ6466, and HJ6781 respectively. (See also HJ6778 and HJ6784.)

14 HJ6737, HJ6733, and others.

15 Hsi 386.

16 Or at least was in danger of it. (HJ6771a, Yi 2287, Yi 7764.)

17 HJ6754.

18 Chia 243 records the king ordering K’eng to pursue the Fang, implying they had been vanquished and were in retreat.

19 HJ6768, HJ6769.

20 Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 273-274.

21 See, for example, Lin Hsiao-an’s citations, 273-275, as well as those in Ch’en Meng-chia, 273. Relevant inscriptions include HJ6057, HJ6063, HJ6069, HJ6079, HJ6178, HJ6347, and HJ6359.

22 For example, HJ6057.

23 Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 160, citing HJ6087a. (See also Wang, 147.)

24 For example, see HJ6354a, HJ6209, HJ6404a, as well as the inscriptions cited by P’eng Yü-shang, 140-142, who emphasizes the king’s active role. Alone among historians, P’eng (153) ascribes the conflict to Wu Ting’s middle period. The absence of any reference to Fu Hao, except to call upon her for protection, suggests she had already died, and Wang Yü-hsin (148) employs her demise, as attested by sacrifices being offered to her, as one of his defining chronological points (though he also seems to simultaneously hold a slightly contradictory view [163]). Lin Hsiao-an (273) concurs that she was deceased and had become the recipient of prayers for the campaign’s success.

25 As Lin Hsiao-an notes, 265.

26 In addition to the selected oracle references provided for each commander in the list that follows, see Ch’en Meng-chia, 273-274.

27 See HJ6344 and HJ8991.

28 See HJ6297, HJ6299, and HJ24145.

29 HJ6083. (Wang apparently was not involved in the final stages of the conflict [Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 162].)

30 HJ6135, HJ6161. (Chih Kuo seems to have concentrated on the T’u-fang.)

31 Kuei 2.8.12.

32 HJ6178, Yi 51 (further confirming the formidable nature of the Kung threat).

33 HJ6376.

34 HJ6371.

35 HJ6196.

36 HJ6209.

37 HJ6072.

38 HJ5785, HJ6209, HJ6272, HJ6335, and Ch’ien 6.58.4. See also Lin Hsiao-an, 276-277.

39 Ch’ien 4.31.3.

40 See Fan Yü-chou, 221-222.

41 Both Tung Tso-pin and Fan Yü-Chou (who essentially rejects Tung’s reconstruction) have offered chronologies. (See Fan Yü-chou, 217-224; his criticism of Tung, not unlike that raised by Ch’en Meng-chia, appears on 214. [Tung charts a 4.5-year campaign stretching from the seventh month of Wu Ting’s twenty-eighth year through the twelfth month of his thirty-second year.]) For further discussion of the Kung campaign, see Lin Hsiao-an, 264-265 and 272-279; Wang Yü-hsin, 146-148 and 160-164; and P’eng Yü-sheng, 138. (P’eng also provides an interesting campaign route for the king’s final effort on 198-199.)

42 HJ6063a.

43 Ch’ien 5.13.5.

44 Ching 1229, HJ6112.

45 HJ6057, HJ6060. (See also HJ6354.) Numerous scapulae record both T’u-fang and Kung-fang aggressiveness together with actions being undertaken or contemplated against them. Their physical presence on a single prognosticatory medium, whether scapula or plastron, is of course evidence that they occurred concurrently or within a few days. See, for example, HJ6087.

46 HJ6057a.

47 See Fan Yü-chou, 222, and Hsia Shang Hsi Chou Chün-shih Shih, 181-182.

48 See Fan Yü-chou, 219, for numerous references.

49 See Fan Yü-chou, 219-220. (Other, undated inscriptions show the king seeking spiritual aid through sacrifices and prayer, while HJ6347 suggests that these efforts began as early as the seventh month.)

50 HJ6732. Note that HJ6371 queries whether the Kung would destroy Yüeh in the tenth month.

51 Chin 522, but see HJ6063a for a report of a Kung incursion.

52 See Fan Yü-chou, 221; HJ6316; and HJ6317.

53 Chin 525, Ch’ien 6.30.12.

54 HJ6292. Although undated, HJ24145 indicates that Ch’in was on the verge of destroying them.

55 Lu 637.

56 For a basic discussion of the Kuei-fang and their location, see Ch’en Meng-chia, 274-275, and Wang Kuo-wei, “Kuei-fang, K’un-yi, Hsien-yün K’ao.” Chao Ch’eng, 2000, 4, believes they inhabited middle Shanxi and western Shanxi.

57 The former is the third line of the sixty-third hexagram entitled “Already Completed” (in the sense of “having passed over,” as in fording a river), and the latter the fourth line of the sixty-fourth and last hexagram, “Not Yet Completed.”

58 Luo K’un, 1983, 82-87. (Yi 865 provides evidence the Kuei were employed against the Ch’iang.) Luo (90-97) successfully deflects any suggestions that some of the strips show the Kuei in an aggressive role. (Ch’en Meng-chia also provides several relevant strips, 1988, 274.)

59 Luo K’un, 85-86.

60 For example, see Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 224, following Li Hsüeh-ch’in.

61 This is essentially Tung Tso-pin’s conclusion (“Lun Kung-fang chi Kuei-fang,” Yin-li P’u, 9:39a-40b). Note that the Kuei are also called the “Chiu Hou” in the Shih Chi and other texts.

62 Wang Kuo-wei’s “Kuei-fang, K’un-yi, Hsien-yün K’ao” briefly discusses how names and terms vary over time, being their own nominatives and also having Chinese appendages, so that one tribe can come to be referred to by different names. (See also Luo K’un, 1983, 102ff.; Hsü Chung-shu, BIHP 7:2 [1936], 138; and E. G. Pulleyblank, “The Chinese and Their Neighbors.”)

63 Luo K’un, 1983, 87ff.

64 Luo K’un, 1983, 99-101.

65 Hsü Chung-shu, BIHP 7:2 (1936), 138.

66 Hsü Chung-shu, 139-140. Hsü notes this clash cannot date to King Wen’s time because the Chou had already become too formidable to fear the Kuei. (Hsü’s account, dating from the early days of oracle bone studies, never mentions any inscriptions or identifies the Kuei-fang with the Kung.)

67 Luo K’un, 1983, 99-103, citing Hsü’s earlier article, also bases his analysis on the premise that two different events are being discussed.

68 For the full explanation with Wang Pi’s underlying interpretation, see Luo K’un, 100ff.

69 Luo K’un, 100, also correctly points out that “three” and “nine” function as indefinitely large numbers in ancient Chinese thought; therefore, the actual conflict may not have raged for as long as three years. (However, he fails to note that three and nine are also poignant numbers in Yi Chingcontemplations, heavily weighted with dynamic implications and metaphysical connotations.)

70 “And then went on to Ching” is sometimes, but incorrectly, read in conjunction with this line. (Hsü, BIHP 7:2 [1936]: 139, sees the latter part as additional grounds for doubting the text’s authenticity.)

71 Luo K’un, 1983, 99; Hsü Chung-shu, 139. (Luo points out that the early commentators realized that the term “Kuei-fang” simply referred to peoples populating “distant quarters.”) Note that Tung Tso-pin dates the Kung-fang conflict to Wu Ting’s twenty-ninth year.

72 For example, Chang Ping-ch’üan classifies the Chou among those on good terms with the Shang during the first two periods at Anyang (encompassing the reigns of Wu Ting and his immediate successors), as well as the fourth period of Wu Yi and Wen Ting, but also notes animosity between them in this same fourth period to which, rather than Wu Ting’s era, he ascribes the conflict discussed in the text immediately below. (See Chang, 350, 496, and 512.) Hu Hou-hsüan, Chia-ku T’an-shih-lu, 366, similarly sees significant conflict in the fourth period, whereas Chung Po-sheng, 1991, 95-156, views their relations as interactions between the two poles of a duality.

73 Chang Ping-ch’üan, 432-433. (Inscriptions referring to a Fu Chou include Yi-pien 8894 and HJ22264.)

74 See Ts’ao Ting-yün and Liu Yi-man, KK 2005:9, 60-63, who stress that these inscriptions date to the period when Chou was still at Pin, explaining the unusual reference to “Chung Chou.”

75 Ten shells are noted on Yi-pien 5452, another shell on Ping-pien 274.5. Yang K’uan, 1999, 36-37, views the forwarding of women as a deliberate effort at subversion, but the choice was probably less insidious even though there apparently were historical antecedents.

76 Examples of solicitous inquiry include Chia-pien 436, HJ6782 (referring to whether the Fang would “tun” the Chou), and T’ieh 26.1 (whether the Kuan would harm them). In aggregate the king was interested in such developments, though perhaps only because any reduction in potential threats might be welcome. However, he might equally have ordered an assault and been wondering about the results. For example, Lin Hsiao-an (272) interprets HJ6825 as a solicitous inquiry, but Fan Yü-chou (1991, 224) sees the Ch’üan, a satellite of the Shang, acting on the latter’s behalf (as on another occasion) and the inquiry being directed to the question of their probable success in harming the Chou. (Some disagreement has plagued the transcription of state names in these inscriptions.)

77 For example, see T’ieh 128.2 and Ch’ien 6.63.1. (Both ming [mandate] and ling [order] appear in the inscriptions.)

78 See Lin Hsiao-an, 246. Examples of the Chou mounting a strike on behalf of the Shang are Yi-pien 7312 and Ping-pien 289, where they seem to be acting as a vanguard for the Ch’üan, who must have reverted to submissive status. (For additional evidence of the Chou acting as a battlefield ally see David N. Keightley, EC 5 [1979-1980]: 25-34, where he notes inscriptions that he translates as “Order Chou to follow Yung’s foot,” “Order Chou to lead the (to-) tzu-tsu (?) and raid,” as well as indirect charges that someone should “order Chou” to do something.)

79 Most analysts, including Lin Hsiao-an, 272, and Fan Yü-chou, 224, date the clash with the Chou to late in Wu Ting’s era, but a few, such as P’eng Yü-shang (1994, 153), attribute it to the middle part based on various queries belonging to the Pin diviner group. (Key inscriptions for the conflict are reprised in Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 291-292, 492; Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 321, 435, 492; Fan Yü-chou, 224-225; Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 166ff.; and P’eng Yü-shang, 150-151.)

80 HJ6825 per Fan Yü-chou, 224. Based on numerous inscriptions in which various forces p’u the Chou, Ch’en Meng-chia (291-292) claims that the character “p’u,” which apparently signifies a sudden, vehement strike as in HJ6812, appears in oracle bone inscriptions only in reference to the Chou. Although he doesn’t draw any particular conclusion from this, it implies that they were targeted with particular ferocity even though other enemies suffered more horrendous fates. However, others have transcribed this character as k’ou, meaning to plunder or invade, a somewhat less severe term, though other strong characters such as shun, tun, and tsai are also found in the inscriptions.

81 HJ6812, HJ6813.

82 HJ6812 cheng, and also HJ6813, HJ6814, HJ6815, and Hsü 984.

83 HJ6824.

84 See Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 225; HJ6816, HJ6817, HJ6818, HJ6819, HJ6821, HJ6822, and HJ6825. The tuo yin were also dispatched on one occasion.

85 Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 169, cites HJ6782 (which preserves an inquiry about the Fang “severely assaulting” [shun] the Chou) as typical of Shang regal concern over the fate of its allies and evidence that the Chou had been subdued early in the last part of Wu Ting’s reign. However, being fragmentary, it may simply be another example of the king inquiring about the prospective success of a commander dispatched to inflict just such damage.

86 However, based on attributing several inscriptions to the reigns of Wu Yi and Wen Ting, Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 496, concludes that the Chou was among the states attacked in the relatively active fourth period. This would require ascribing many of the inscriptions already noted to this period.

87 Divination strips supposedly attributable to their stay at Pin have recently been discovered. See Hu Ch’ien-ying, KK 2005:6, 74-86.

88 Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 166; Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 225.

89 See Fan Yü-chou, 225, based on Yang Shu-ta. However, Mencius merely mentions the Ti, so any identification of them as the Ch’üan, however well constructed, is speculative.

90 Yang K’uan, Hsi-Chou Shih, 38-40, may well be correct in concluding that this conflict represents another, distinctive event that unfolded when Shang central authority broke down under Wu Yi’s dissolute and repressive rule (as indicated in the more nebulous “Hsi-Ch’iangch’uan” in the Hou-Han-shu), but it seems unlikely that the same sequence of attacks would have been repeated. Rather, attributing the event to Wu Yi’s reign is more likely to be erroneous. Conversely, assuming the events occurred late in Wu Ting’s reign raises questions about the length of various Chou reigns and whether the period between Chou Tan-fu’s action and the conquest of the Shang would not become too long. (For additional discussion see The Cambridge History of Ancient China, 299-307, and Yang K’uan, Hsi-Chou Shih, 35-45.)

91 See Yen Yi-p’ing, 1980, 159-185, and Luo Hsi-chang and Wang-Chün-hsien, WW 1987:2, 17-26.

92 For a discussion of Shang hunting in the Chou and Chou rulers offering sacrifice to Shang ancestors, see Shaan-hsi Chou-yüan K’ao-ku-tui, WW 1979:10, 38-43, and WW 1981:9, 1-7.

93 In addition to the campaigns discussed in our text, the following inscriptions suggest Wu Ting’s scope of activity: HJ6404a (against the Kung); HJ6354a (against the T’u-fang); HJ6417a (with Chih Kuo); HJ6427 (Hsia-wei, T’u-fang); HJ6413 (with Wang Ch’eng); HJ6480; HJ6457 (with Chih Kuo or Hou Kao); HJ6476a (against the Yi, with Chih Kuo against the Pa and Wang Ch’eng against the Hsia-wei); HJ6477a with Hsing against the Pa, or Wang Ch’eng against the Hsia-wei; HJ6482a (with Wang Ch’eng contra the Hsia-wei); HJ6530a (accompanied by the Hsing-fang against Hsia-wei); HJ6542, HJ6543, HJ6552, HJ6553; HJ32a (accompanied by Wang Ch’eng against Hsia-wei, Chih Kuo against the Pa); HJ6607 (against the Ch’ing); Kuei 2.15.18 (against the Ma-fang); K’u 1094 (against Chi-fang and others); Ching 1266 (against Lung and Pa). However, further study is required to determine what motivated him to personally participate rather than depute another commander.

94 As their fates are never specified, they may have been wounded in battle, killed, or simply grown too old to take the field, not to mention fallen out of favor with the king for unrecorded battlefield failures or other reasons, such as becoming too powerful.

95 Lin Hsiao-an, 243.

96 HJ6931.

97 HJ6947a (pursue them), HJ6948, HJ6952 (capture them), HJ6953 (seize them), HJ6954, HJ6958 (pummel them), HJ6959 (capture them), HJ20384, Ping-pien 119, Ping-pien 249, and Ping-pien 304. Conversely, inquiries about him being endangered by the Hsüan include HJ20383 and HJ20393.

98 HJ6946.

99 See Lin Hsiao-an, 229.

100 Ping-pien 119.

101 Ts’ui 1167 and Chia 2326.

102 HJ6571, HJ6573 (with Prince Shang), HJ13514, and Ping-pien 302. (Assuming Fou is the chief of the Chi-fang, HJ6834 inquires whether he will capture Fou and HJ6989 whether Fou will harm Ch’üeh.)

103 HJ6931 and Kuei 2.15.11. (See Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 205.)

104 Ping-pien 119.

105 HJ53 (whether he will conquer them).

106 HJ6964, HJ6965, Yi 5317. See also Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 210.

107 HJ6983, HJ6984.

108 HJ6983 (attacks Yüeh and others), Yi 4693 (damages Yüeh). See also Lin Hsiao-an, 230.

109 HJ6931.

110 For example, see HJ6946, HJ6947, HJ6948, HJ6949, HJ6959, HJ6962, HJ6979, HJ6980, HJ6985, HJ6986, HJ6987, HJ20576 (in danger), Chia 2902 (the southern campaign), Ping-pien 117, and K’u 546.

111 Chia 2902.

112 Attested by HJ6946. (See Lin Hsiao-an, 232.)

113 HJ4122, HJ4123, HJ4124, HJ6949, HJ32843, HJ32839, and HJ6577 are among the many that inquire if he will suffer misfortune or not. (Others are particularly seen in campaigns against strong enemies.)

114 Lin Hsiao-an, 229. (There is considerable disagreement on how to transcribe and pronounce the second character in his name.)

115 For example, see HJ6087 (with the king), HJ6401 (with the king), HJ6402 (with the king), HJ6404 (with the king), HJ6417a (with the king), HJ6438, HJ6452, and HJ39853 (with the king).

116 For example, see HJ32a, HJ6135, HJ6476 (with the king), and HJ6480 (with Fu Hao).

117 For example, Ch’ien 6.60.6, HJ6087 (with the king), HJ6416 (with the king), and HJ6384.

118 HJ22a (with the king), HJ6413, HJ6476, and HJ6482 to HJ6486.

119 For example, HJ6135, Tun-nan 81 (with the king), HJ32 (with the king), HJ6476 (with the king), and HJ6583 to HJ6486 (with the king).

120 HJ6480 (with Fu Hao), HJ6461 (with the king), and HJ6476 (with the king).

121 HJ6937 (with the king).

122 Examples of accompanying Fu Hao are HJ6947 and HJ22948; others for the king are HJ6473, HJ7504, HJ33074, and HJ33105 to HJ33108.

123 HJ32 (with the king), HJ326 (with the king), HJ6413 (with the king), HJ6476 (with the king), HJ6477a (with the king), HJ6480, HJ6482 to HJ6486 (with the king), HJ6489 to HJ6493 (with the king), HJ6496, HJ6525, HJ6521, HJ6542 (with officials). Presumably he led his own forces, so the question of his actual role arises, just as with Chih Kuo.

124 HJ6667.

125 For example, HJ6083 (with the king) and HJ6148.

126 For example, HJ6583 and HJ33112.

127 Karlgren, GSR, 1087a, actually pronounced chou but generally referred to as “fu” because of the later character for woman/wife, “fu,” which has the additional component of woman, with which it is commonly identified.

128 For a study of the function and significance of the “fu” in the Shang, see Chang Cheng-lang, 1986, 103-119; Chao Ch’eng, 2000, 136-156; and Chang Ping-chüan, BIHP 50:1 (1979), 194-199.

129 See Chang Cheng-lang, 1986, 103-119. Also note, for example, HJ924.

130 For example, Fu Ching (HJ6347).

131 Such as Fu Ching, who attacked the Lung (HJ6584, HJ28).

132 HJ6648, HJ6826, HJ18911, and HJ21653 provide examples of them being ordered out or back from external areas. HJ7006 specifically inquires about the prospects for mounting a successful defense.

133 For example, HJ5495.

134 See Chao Ch’eng, 2000, 143.

135 For example, see HJ7006.

136 Space precludes further discussion of the tomb’s contents, but for a summary see The Cambridge History of Ancient China, 194-202, or Thorp, China in the Early Bronze Age, 195ff.

137 Although Shima Kunio provided the first comprehensive collection in his Inkyo Bokuji Sorui (139-141), the best compilation remains Yen Yi-p’ing, “Fu Hao Lieh-chuan.” Other important discussions include Wang Yü-hsin et al., “Shih-lun Yin-hsü Wu-hao-mu te ‘Fu Hao’”; Cheng Hui-sheng, “Kuan-yü Fu Hao te Shen-shih Wen-t’i”; Cheng Chen-hsiang, “A Study of the Bronzes with the ‘Ssu T’u Mu’ Inscriptions Excavated from the Fu Hao Tomb”; Noel Barnard, “A New Approach to the Study of Clan-sign Inscriptions of the Shang”; Chang Ping-ch’üan, “A Brief Description of the Fu Hao Oracle Bone Inscriptions”; and Ts’ao Ting-yün, “Yin-hsü Fu Hao Mu Ming-wen-chung Jen-wu Kuan-hsi Tsung-k’ao.” Yen classifies her as a true “ch’i nü jen” or unorthodox woman, finds it odd that Ssu-ma Ch’ien failed to include her among his exemplary women, and believes that it was through her military achievements that she advanced from the status of an ordinary consort to be one of three prominent wives.

138 Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 148. Yen Yi-p’ing believes she lived until Tsu Keng’s reign, while Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, who examines the question of other “Fu Hao” inscriptions and the meaning of fu, concludes that the only Fu Hao was the one active in Wu Ting’s reign.

139 It is therefore argued that she should be known as Fu Tzu, just as the other fu such as Fu Ching are designated by coupling fu, not necessarily meaning “wife,” and clan names, such as Ching. (See Chang Cheng-lang, “A Brief Discussion of Fu Tzu.”) Chang Ping-ch’üan, 129- 130, notes other examples of endogenous clan marriage.

140 Yen Yi-p’ing, 1981, 5. For example, HJ6948 inquires about the auspiciousness of her pregnancy and confirms that she gave birth to a daughter. (See also Wang Yü-hsin et al., KKHP 1977:2, 10-17.)

141 See Ts’ang 204.3, Hsü 3.1.2 (while on campaign), and Yen Yi-p’ing, 1981, 5-12. Inquiries about the auspiciousness of her coming from and going to external regions are also seen, such as in the series HJ2642, HJ2643, and HJ2645. These coincidentally show that her power is clearly derived, since she can still be ordered about.

142 HJ2638, HJ2672.

143 HJ17380, Ts’ang 113.4.

144 See Yen Yi-p’ing, 1981, 18-25, and Wang Yü-hsin et al., KKHP 1977:2, 7-10.

145 See, for example, Yi 7782 and Yen Yi-p’ing, 27. Several other fu are recorded as having forwarded important materials for divination. (See Chao Ch’eng-chu, 2000, 140-142; for the importance of these turtle shells as tribute in general, see Yeh Hsiang-k’ui and Liu Yi-man, KK 2001:8, 85-92.)

146 Yen Yi-p’ing, 31-32, based on ts’ang 244.1.

147 Following the interpretation of ts’ung as “to be accompanied by” rather than “accompanied,” as in “the king was accompanied by Chih Kuo in an attack on the T’u-fang,” even though in later Chinese it would normally be read “the king accompanied Chih Kuo in an attack on the T’u-fang.” Although this reasonably presumes that the king would never assume a subordinate role in the field, questions remain.

148 Most analysts stress that she does not appear in the campaigns attributed to the final period, and Wang Yü-hsin even uses her absence as one of his defining chronological criteria. However, Yen Yi-p’ing (1981, 35) believes that in at least one case she attacked the Kung-fang and T’u-fang in a campaign that can be dated to between Wu Ting’s twenty-eighth and thirty-second years according to Ch’an T’ang’s Yin-li P’u.

149 See, for example, HJ6412, K’u 237, and Yen Yi-p’ing’s enumeration, 32-36.

150 Note HJ6478, HJ6479, and HJ6480.

151 HJ6459. See also HJ6480 (against the Hu, a Yi component) and Hsü 4.30.1

152 K’u 310. See also Wang Yü-hsin et al., KKHP 1977:2, 2-4.

153 Yen Yi-p’ing, 34-35, notes several inscriptions (such as HJ7283) that order her to first arrange troops for actions against the Lung.

154 For example, HJ6568a enigmatically states, “Fu Hao deputes [shih] men to [pound] Mei.” (A convenient summary of Fu Hao’s campaigns may be found in Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 149- 152.)

155 HJ7283, HJ6347, and Ying 150 cheng.

156 HJ6480.

157 See HJ2658.

158 Fu Ching, for example, is noted in HJ8035 as offering the military sacrifice before a battle, a role thereafter reserved to men, and in HJ6584 and HJ6585 specifically ordered to inflict heavy damage upon the Lung.

CHAPTER 11

1 Although Chou charges of excessive inebriation were apparently not unfounded, and the Shang had specialized vessels for imbibing alcoholic beverages, much of Shang drinking was associated with feasting, sacrifices, and the ancestral cult (Christopher Fung, JEAA 2:1-2 [2000], 67-92).

2 Sung Hsin-ch’ao, CKSYC 1991:1, 53-63, and Fang Hui, KK 2004:4, 53-67.

3 For example, the predynastic Shang shared certain divinatory practices with the Tung Yi and apparently adopted the practice of prognostication with turtle plastrons from them.

4 The Chü, who seem to have been located in the Shandong area, were a powerful aristocratic family in the Shang and early Chou. Inscriptions (HJ6341) indicate Chü was ordered to instruct 300 archers and campaigned against the Kung-fang (Ho Ching-ch’eng, KK 2008:11, 54-70).

5 Kao Kuang-jen, KKHP 2000:2, 183-198.

6 For example, see HJ6457, HJ6459, HJ6461, HJ6834, and HJ7084.

7 According to the Tung Yi chronicles in the late Hou Han-shu.

8 Kao Kuang-jen, KKHP 2000:2, 183.

9 For a site report see Han Wei-lung and Chang Chih-ch’ing, KK 2000:9, 24-29.

10 Kao Kuang-jen, KKHP 2000:2, 190-191.

11 Kao Kuang-jen, KKHP 2000:2, 183-198.

12 Ch’en Hsüeh-hsiang and Chin Han-p’o, KK 2007:5, 86-87; Ch’en Ch’ao-yün, HCCHS 2006:2, 3-8.

13 Kao Kuang-jen, KKHP 2000:2, 184-187.

14 For a seminal study of steppe/ sedentary interaction in the first millennium BCE, see Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies.

15 Although the climate had been cooling and drying since 3000 BCE, conditions fluctuated during the Shang. From King T’ang to Chung Ting was cooler and drier; from Chung Ting to Wu Ting the temperature rose slightly and rainfall increased, revitalizing the marshes; but from his reign onward the temperature and rainfall both decreased, resulting in some drying out, harsher conditions, less vegetation, and fewer animals. (Wei Chi-yin, KKWW 2007:6, 44-50. However, as previously noted, it has also been suggested that Wu Ting’s reign was actually parched, thereby accounting for his numerous queries about prospects for rainfall.)

16 Luo K’un, 1998, 173. The presence of chariots outside the Shang should be noted.

17 HJ27998.

18 HJ27976.

19 For inscriptions see Chang Ping-chüan, 1988, 496; Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 279, and Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih, 187ff.

20 Such as HJ27973.

21 Understanding chih chung as “call up and put in order” rather than “suffer loss” or “harm.” (See, for example, HJ27974, HJ27975, and HJ2972.)

22 See, for example, HJ26887, HJ26896, HJ27978, and HJ27979.

23 For an overview of these border clashes see Lin Huan, HCCHS 2003:3, 57-63.

24 See Yang Sheng-nan, 1982, 359-367, and our discussion in the section on military structure and organization.

25 According to the third-century Hou Han Shu chapter “Hsi Ch’iang.”

26 Lin Huan, HCCHS 2003:3, 57-63.

27 Oracular inscriptions speak about the five clan troops pursuing and rectifying them. (See Chang Ping-ch’üan, 496.)

28 HJ33049, HJ33050.

29 HJ33059, HJ33060.

30 HJ33039, HJ33040. (Sui is also pronounced Hui by some writers.)

31 See Luo K’un, 1998, 191; HJ27970 and HJ27997.

32 See Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 799ff.

33 HJ33019.

34 HJ33213.

35 The account reprised here is based on Luo K’un, 1998, 192ff. The king’s concern can be seen in his reports to the ancestors, including HJ33032, HJ33033, HJ33015, and HJ33016.

36 HJ33034-HJ33036.

37 HJ33058. (Not, of course, the Chih Kuo of Wu Ting’s era.)

38 HJ31973-HJ31977.

39 HJ33028, HJ33029.

40 HJ33017 and HJ32815, respectively.

41 HJ33031.

42 HJ31978. (Commentators understand the term yü as meaning something like “clear out” [or even “extirpate”], but it could simply mean undertaking a prolonged, active defense against them.)

43 HJ33026.

44 See Yang Sheng-nan, 1982, 359-360. Yang transcribes the character as Shao rather than Li, whereas Ch’en Meng-chia (1988, 287ff., followed here) understands it as Li.

45 Based on assigning a number of “nameless” diviner inscriptions to Wen Ting’s reign, Li Hsüeh-ch’in, CHSYC 2006:4, 3-7, described a campaign against the Yi capital near Lin-po in Shandong that he attributed to Wen Ting’s era. However, in a 2008 reconsideration, CHSYC 2008:1, 15-20, Li concluded that despite the generally accepted convention that nameless inscriptions do not appear post-Wen Ting (and apparently in rejection of his earlier thought that the dates simply do not cohere), they stem from Emperor Hsin’s reign and provide crucial battle information for the lengthy campaign reconstructed for Hsin’s tenth year (but we have assigned them to Emperor Yi’s era in the discussion that follows based on the views of other analysts).

46 Although disagreement continues about their timing and other aspects, it is generally accepted that at least two major expeditionary campaigns were mounted against the Yi during the last two reigns. (For example, see Hsü Chi, STWMYC, 266-268, or Luan Feng-shih, STWMYC, 270-279.)

47 For relevant inscriptions see Tung Tso-pin’s “Ti Hsin Jih-p’u”; Ch’en Meng-chia’s reconstruction of the campaign, “Yi Hsin Shih-tai Suo-cheng te Jen-fang, Yü-fang,” 301-310; or the account provided in Luo K’un, 1998, 195-202, where the campaign objective is uniformly transcribed as the Yi-fang rather than the Jen-fang. Ch’en includes a useful map of the probable route of march that depicts a fairly efficient campaign with limited maneuvering after crossing the Huai, but Tung Tso-pin envisions a rather extensive upward loop prior to the final southern thrust across the Huai River and extensive movement thereafter. (Shima Kunio’s reconstruction is also more conservative.)

Ch’en proposed his version as a corrective to Tung Tso-pin’s calendar, which he viewed as a meritorious but flawed effort. In addition, he attributes the campaign to Emperor Yi’s reign—a view that has garnered general acceptance as evidenced by its adoption in Luo K’un’s Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih—whereas Tung placed it in Emperor Hsin’s era and dates the final query to the seventh month. However, Yen Yi-p’ing, 1989, 317-321, has contributed an overview of the variations in which he concludes that Tung’s reconstruction is reliable and the purported variations essentially congruent.

48 Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 308.

49 See Li Hsüeh-ch’in, CHSYC 2006:4, 3-7, and CHSYC 2008:1, 15-20. (Li’s reconstruction is, however, not without possible problems, such as essentially requiring the campaign to be limited to the Shandong area, around the Hua and Wei rivers, based on his reading of the character for Huai.)

50 Luo K’un, 1998, 200-202. (The mere coincidence of the campaign dates, which are repeatedly attributed to the tenth and fifteenth years, is indicative of fundamental problems.)

51 For a reconstruction of the campaign, see Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih, 202-204, or Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 309-310.

52 Yen Yi-p’ing, 1989, 321, claims that three campaigns were mounted against the Jen-fang in Hsin’s tenth, fifteenth, and twenty-fifth years. Among many, Chang Ping-ch’üan (1988, 433), asserts that the Shang didn’t fall because of licentiousness but because Shang military activities in the east wasted its strength, thereby allowing the Chou, which had grown powerful in the neglected west, to easily conquer them. However, for a contrary view, see Kao Kuang-jen, KKHP 2000:2, 183-198.

53 Tso Chuan, Chao Kung fourth and eleventh years. The term translated as “martial convocation” is sou, which means “to search for” or “to gather / assemble,” but also came to designate the annual Chou assembly of forces for the spring hunt, itself an opportunity for military training.

54 However, Ch’en Meng-chia explicitly denies it is the campaign noted late in his reign (1988, 304) or the one noted in bronze inscriptions dating to the emperor’s fifteenth year. (The other possibility is the campaign assigned here to Yi’s tenth and eleventh years but instead attributed to Hsin.)

55 Wang Yü-hsin, HCCHS 2007:5, 14-20.

56 The identification of the Yi with Yüeh-shih culture in this period—the late Hsia or nineteenth to seventeenth centuries BCE and thereafter—is almost universally accepted. (For example, see Yen Wen-ming, SCKKLC, 306-318; Yen Wen-ming, WW 1989:9, 1-12; and Wang Chen-chung, HCCHS 1988:6, 15-26.) The Shang also incorporated bronze decorative elements from the earlier Liang-chu culture (3200-2100 BCE). (See Jui Kuo-yao and Shen Yüeh-ming, KK 1992:11, 1039-1044.)

57 Chang Kuo-shuo, HCCHS 2002:4, 8-14, and Chu Chün-hsiao and Li Ch’ing-lin, KKHP 2007:3, 295-312, who conclude from an analysis of the ordinary utensils and ceramic vessels from the fourth period at Erh-li-t’ou that the Tung Yi and Shang must have been close allies.

58 Wang Chen-chung, HCCHS 1988:6, 15-26.

59 Fang Yu-sheng, HCCHS 1992:9, 18-20; Tung Ch’i, HYCLC, 1996, 46-53; Sung Yü-ch’in and Li Ya-tung, HYCLC, 1996, 54-59.

60 Ch’en Ch’ao-yün, HCCHS 2006:2, 3-8.

61 For analyses see Yen Wen-ming, WW 1989:9, 1-12, and HCCHS 2002:4, 3-8 and 8-14.

62 Chu Chi-p’ing, KK 2008:3, 53-61.

63 See Hsü 3.13.1 and Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 282.

64 See Ch’en Meng-chia, 299.

65 See Ch’en Meng-chia, 298, for inscriptions.

CHAPTER 12

1 Chang Chung-p’ei, WW 2000:9, 55-63.

2 For an enumeration see Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 432-433. (The Shang apparently used marriage relations to cement alliances or emphasize the subjugated status of external clans, but their demand for eligible women may also have caused antagonism and resentment.)

3 For a discussion of these “ journeys” see Liu Huan, KK 2005:11, 58-62, and Li Shih-lung, HCCHS 2002:1, 34-40.

4 Most of the inscriptions can be understood in terms of Wu Ting’s efforts to impose order (Liu Huan, CKSYC 1995:4, 93-98). However, David Nivison, EC 4 (1977-1978): 52-55, has suggested that the character read as “making a tour of inspection” or “conducting a campaign of rectification” is Te, Virtue, and rather than military force refers to making a prominent display of Te (which might be defined as theocratic power) to other peoples. (Nevertheless, note that captives were sometimes taken.)

5 Chao Shih-ch’ao, CKKTS 1995:9, 6-18.

6 According to “Wu Yi,” Shang Shu. Inscriptions related to the hunt continue throughout the Shang and Wu Yi and Wen Ting frequently held them, but they are especially found in Wu Ting’s era, another indication of his active lifestyle and warrior values. (See Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 475-487, for relevant inscriptions and a review of earlier findings by Tung Tso-pin and Shima Kunio. See also Meng Shih-k’ai, LSYC 1990:4, 95-104.)

7 Ch’eng Feng, HCCHS 2004:2, 25-26.

8 From Kings Ping Hsin to Wen Ting the term sheng t’ien, which has been interpreted as inspecting (sheng) the (military activities) of the hunt (t’ien), frequently appears (Meng Shih-k’ai, LSYC 1990:4, 101-103).

9 Suggested by Meng Shih-k’ai, 103-104.

10 For example, Chia-pien 3939 records an attack on Yü-fang, 3940, one on the Jen-fang.

11 Meng Shih-k’ai, LSYC 1990:4, 98.

12 Nei-pien 284.

13 Nei-pien 104.

14 Nei-pien 433.

15 For the masks interred with military figures, see Ch’ai Shao-ming, KK 1992:12, 1111- 1120.

16 For example, the tomb of a high-ranking military commander dated to the third period at Yin-hsü contains a remarkable number of weapons. Of 394 objects, 288 are bronze, the majority being weapons, including three yüeh (axes) and 118 ko (dagger-axes). There are also four jade yüeh and 902 arrowheads (Yang Hsi-chang and Liu Yi-man, KK 1991:5, 390-391). Even victims of the Chou conquest, despite being quickly interred near Anyang, were accompanied by ritual bronze objects. (Tu Chin-p’eng, KK 2007:6, 76-89).

17 Ch’en Ch’ao-yün, HCCHS 2004:6, 30-36.

18 Ch’en Ch’ao-yün, 30-36, especially 35.

19 For example, see Lei Yüan-sheng and Chi Te-yüan’s historical overview, CKSYC 1993:4, 3-19; Li Hsin-ta, Wu-kuan Chih-tu; or Wang Kuei-min, LSYC 1986:4, 107-119.

20 Even the Ssu-ma Fa envisioned the civil and martial having been strictly segregated in earlier times: “In antiquity the form and spirit governing civilian affairs would not be found in the military realm; those appropriate to the military realm would not be found in the civilian sphere. Thus virtue and righteousness did not transgress inappropriate realms” (“Obligations of the Son of Heaven”).

21 See, for example, Yang Sheng-nan, CKSYC 1991:4, 47-59. Visibly granting rewards would become a much-practiced means of stimulating martial effort. (For example, see “Stimulating the Officers” in the Wu-tzu.)

22 “Obligations of the Son of Heaven.”

23 The Greek attitude, especially unwillingness to act in the face of bad omens and prior to the receipt of favorable oracles, is clearly seen throughout Xenophon, to the point that Xenophon refused to allow the starving troops to search for provisions for several days.

24 Liu Yi-man, KK 2002:3, 70-72, has suggested that military command and the accompanying titles were hereditarily associated with various clans; certain inscriptions and excavation results appear to at least partially confirm his view. For example, a prominent Chü clan ancestor performed important military functions in Wu Ting’s era, was deputed to pursue the Kung-fang (HJ6341) and others, and was ordered to instruct 300 archers (HJ5772). (See Ho Ching-ch’eng, KK 2008:11, 62; for an example of a commander from a clan related by marriage, see Wang Yung-p’o, HCCHS 1992:4, 31-40.)

25 “P’an Keng, Hsia.” To the extent that the Shang Shu preserves any vestiges of Shang military organization, greater accuracy might be expected for later titles.

26 One sequence shows the Shang receiving intelligence of a Kung-fang incursion, reporting it to the ancestors, holding a meeting, and then appointing Chih Yu as the campaign commander in the temple. (See Li Hsin-ta, Wu-kuan Chih-tu, 21-22.)

27 “Appointing the General,” which follows two other chapters on the requisite characteristics for generals, an important topic in Warring States military writings. (Essentially the same ceremony is preserved in the “Ping Lüeh” section of the eclectic Huai-nan-tzu.) From the Shang onward, if not earlier, the ancestral temple was the site for undertaking military assessments, any decision to engage in military activities being reached before the ancestors.

28 Wang Kuei-min, LSYC 1986:4, 107-119.

29 For a list see Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 439-440. Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 508-517, has collated numerous inscriptions with military titles; a (somewhat unsatisfactory) overview may also be found in the volumes of Chung-kuo Chün-shih Chih-tu-shih.

30 The Hsia reputedly had an officer in charge of the arrows and quivers, so the fu might well have undertaken some sort of responsibility as an armorer for the archers. However, a later term for “bow case,” t’ao, eventually came to designate “secret plans” as in the Liu-t’ao or Six Secret Teachings, and to the extent that tactics were formulated, may have already referred to a planning officer. (In addition to fu and tuo fu, fu appears in conjunction with ya, “commander,” being generally interpreted as referring to two officials but also possibly to the commander of fu. The tuo fu is recorded as being assigned defensive responsibilities.)

31 Ch’en Meng-chia’s brief overview (1988, 509-511) lists the relevant inscriptions.

32 However, Ko Sheng-hua, HCCHS 1992:11, 13-18, and others believe the Shang’s administrative structure included the post of ssu-ma, which was responsible not only for the proto-bureaucracy that oversaw military affairs and impositions, but also for the population registers and control of the general populace, making the administrator a sort of minister of state security. Beneath the ssu-ma would have been the tuo ma and the ya and ta (or great) ya, with the ya actually being subordinate to the tuo ma.

Ch’en Meng-chia (508) interprets the term tuo ma ya as tuo ma and tuo ya, many ma and many commanders, but it seems more likely that an even higher rank, the tuo-ma-ya or commander of the horse commanders, existed. If so, it would be a good candidate for evolving into the ssu-ma of late times. (Ch’en interprets tuo ma as the ma shih or horse commander, from which ssu-ma evolved.) It also seems that some clauses with tuo ma ya might be understood as the tuo ma being ordered to take command, ya indicating an action rather than a title. (A minor complicating factor is that officials with the surname of Ma—for example, men from the Ma-fang—also had military roles.)

33 For a summary of relevant inscriptions see Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 514.

34 Meng Shih-k’ai, LSYC 1990:4, 103-104.

35 For discussion and extensive inscriptional examples, see Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 511-514.

36 See Ch’en Meng-chia, 511-512. Ch’en stresses that “tuo she wei” should be understood as “tuo she, tou wei” or two separate officials, but in many cases it appears that the tuo she is being ordered to exercise a protective function, “wei” (similar to the use of “shu”), rather than two officials being jointly tasked with some effort. (Tuo she can also mean the “many archers” [that is, all the archers], especially in a battlefield context.)

37 See Hu Hou-hsüan and Hu Chen-yü, 2003, 107-115. (The character for shih, with a person signifier on the left, would subsequently mean “ambassador.”)

38 Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 516. (Relevant inscriptions will be found on 515-517.)

39 Hsiao Nan, Ku-wen-tzu Yen-chiu, 1981, 130, claims they always commanded the chung when they were called to action.

40 See Hsiao Nan, 124, or Li Hsüeh-ch’in, CHSYC 2006:4, 3-7, citing T’un-nan 2320.

41 See Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 517, who classifies the yin under internal or nei-fu officials.

42 Ch’ien-pien 7.1.4. Chao Kuang-hsien, HCCHS 1986:2, 30, believes each tsu was led by a yin.

43 Ch’ien-pien 5.8.2.

44 See Chu Yen-min, CKSYC, 2005:3, 3-13. Throughout history the right flank has tended to be stronger because piercing and crushing weapons are invariably wielded by the right arm.

45 HJ33006 and Ts’ui 597.

46 Contrary to Yang Sheng-nan, 1982, 358. (His discussion of shih will be found on pages 341-362.)

47 For an overview, see Chin Hsiang-heng’s classic Ts’ung Chia-ku Pu-ts’u Yen-chiu Yin Shang Chün-lü-chung chih Wang-tsu San-hang San-shih, 1974, 10-16.

48 Numerous strips such as HJ36450, HJ36454, HJ34715, HJ34716, HJ34718, HJ41748, and HJ41750 inquire about the army not being startled or disturbed during the night.

49 Li Hsin-ta, Wu-kuan Chih-tu, 1997, 20; Yang Sheng-nan, 1982, 362, attributes the inscription to their reigns, but others (rather unsatisfactorily) claim it dates to Wu Ting’s era. Chin Hsiang-heng, 1974, 15-16, claims that the Shang never exceeded three armies; Hsiao Nan, 1981, 124, 128, concludes that the army didn’t really attain its final form until Wen Ting’s era; Chao Kuang-hsien, HCCHS 1986:2, 31, believes that this represents the first creation of the shih and that the shih displaced the clan forces.

50 For example, Hsiao Nan (124) confidently ascribes the strip creating the three armies to Wen Ting’s era.

51 Chao Kuang-hsien, HCCHS 1986:2, 32, asserts that Wu Ting only had a central army.

52 Liu Chao, 1989, 70-72. Note should be taken of Liu Chao’s characterization of the Shang army as largely an imperial bodyguard or defensive force closely tied to the king and his assertion that armies associated with cities performed protective functions, especially at night. However, he also notes that the army occasionally acted as a forward campaign force, something like the elite hu-pen (“tiger warriors”) of later fame. (Somewhat surprisingly, Liu also cites examples of reconnaissance activity [HJ5605] that would seem to have been intended to initiate so-called meeting engagements.) In his understanding the army was limited to a (paltry) 100 men, and three components—left, right, and center—were fielded.

53 For example, see Li Hsin-ta, 1997, 20. Hsiao Nan (1981, 128-129) argues for 10,000.

54 Throughout subsequent history Chinese military units were generally organized in multiples of five, ranging from a squad of five through an army of 12,500. However, there were exceptions when a decade-based structure prevailed and a chariot-centered squad of fifteen may have served as a fundamental building block. The Shang seems to have intermixed units based on three and ten, making the reconstruction of the contingents problematic. For example, in an army consisting of 3,000 troops, each of the three component lü should number 1,000 men. However, apportioning the 1,000 among three ta hang results in the odd number of 333 each, further segmentation yielding the unlikely number of 111 for the hang. Although not impossible if the officers or chariot components somehow account for the odd eleven, these figures blatantly contradict the envisioned ideal of 100. Similarly, if the shih came to number 10,000 at the end of the dynasty, a lü would have to be 3,333. Reconstructing upward rather than downward doesn’t really resolve the problem. For example, if the hang is 100 and ta hang 300, then three ta hang comprise a lü of 900 and three lü an army of only 2,700, far short of the normal levy of 3,000. The problem becomes even more complex if the army were already chariot based, despite the appeal that assigning a ten-man squad to each chariot might have. Three hundred chariots would result in an army of 3,000, but require ignoring the 900 members manning the chariot.

55 Discussions of the lü maybe found in Chin Hsiang-heng, 1974, 6-8, and Hsiao Nan, 1981, 125-128. The “10,000-man levy” derives from a variant reading of a famous Fu Hao/Ch’iang battle inscription, but according to the Chou Li’s reconstruction (as apportioned under the “Hsiao Ssu-t’u”) and the number specified by the Shuo Wen, it would have been 500 in the Chou. However, Hsiao Nan sets it at 1,000.

56 Hsiao Nan, 130.

57 T’un-nan 2350.

58 Li Hsin-ta, Wu-kuan Chih-tu.

59 Not everyone agrees that the king’s lü constituted the middle or that the “right lu” occurs in the inscriptions. (See, for example, Chin Hsiang-heng, 1974, 7-8.)

60 See Liu Chao, 1989, 74.

61 Liu Chao, 75ff.

62 Chao Kuang-hsien (31) claims that the three shih displaced the tsu on the battlefield.

63 According to the Tso Chuan, Ting Kung fourth year, the Shang consisted of six or seven clans.

64 See Chin Hsiang-heng, 1974, 2ff.

65 Shen Ch’ang-yün, HCCHS 1998:4, 23-28, believes this even happened with the various clan forces, including the king’s.

66 This exercise in hypocrisy is recorded in the Tso Chuan, Hsi Kung twenty-eighth year.

67 Note Chin Hsiang-heng’s commentary, 1974, 9. (Chin never hazards an estimate of unit size.)

68 As will be discussed in the section on horses, chariots, and cavalry, there is some controversy over whether the term ma (horse), generally understood as chariot, doesn’t actually refer to the cavalry, with the chariots already being subsumed within the articulated structure.

69 For a convenient summary of relevant inscriptions, see Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 512-513.

70 “The Questions of King Wei.”

CHAPTER 13

1 Fu Hao’s exact role is also questioned: Did she simply represent the king in some ritual fashion, direct the battle, or even participate in some physical way, ranging from acting as an archer to wielding a shock weapon? (See, for example, Wang Hsiao-wei, ed., Ping-yi Chih-tu, 1997, 39-40.)

2 Other clans apart from the Shang royal tzu clan and even some foreign peoples such as the Chiang, Chi, Yün, and Jen inhabited the core domain and could be called upon for military personnel (Ch’en Chieh, HCCHS 2003:2, 15-22).

3 Somewhat surprisingly, arguments to the contrary have begun to appear even in PRC publications. For an example based on a revised reading of the “P’an Keng” section in the Shang Shu, see Yü Fu-chih, HCCHS 1993:9, 49-55. (See also Li Ch’an, HCCHS 1998:2, 19-24.)

4 For example, in a much-cited appendix to his unpublished PhD dissertation, David Keightley concluded that the Shang did not depend on slaves for productivity.

5 Two useful overviews in the acrimonious debate over the status of the chung are Wang Kuei-min, CKSYC 1990:1, 102-114, and Yang Sheng-nan, 1991, 303-352. David Keightley concluded that there is no evidence for the chung having been slaves. (Cambridge History of Ancient China, 285-286.) Kung Wei-tuan, HCCHS 1986:11, 41-47, among others, concurs.

6 For example, see Ch’ao Fu-lin, CKSYC 2001:4, 3-4.

7 Robin Yates, JEAA 3, nos. 1-2 (2002): 283-331, notes that slaves originated as military captives whose deaths had been temporarily remitted and who had thus become nonpersons.

8 However, Kung Wei-tuan claims that they were not sacrificed (HCCHS 11 [1986]: 41-47).

9 Oracular inquiries about the possibility of them “being lost” (sang) have been interpreted in two ways, querying whether they had deserted or had perished. (For an example of the latter see Liu Feng-hua, KKWW 2007:4, 22-26.) They are noted among the king’s prognostications about distant agricultural activities, hunting exercises, and military expeditions. (The chaos marking the latter two certainly would have provided ample opportunity to escape.) However, because the chung mobilized for these activities seem to have enjoyed a particularly close relationship with the king and the inquiries are far too frequent, this interpretation seems less likely. Furthermore, in the context of the Shang’s draconian punishment system, the possibility of successfully escaping may well be doubted. (It should also be noted that there are inquiries regarding the pursuit of defectors or others who betrayed the king, including men of high rank.)

10 Small numbers were employed in farming in Wu Ting’s era, only rarely in the hunt or military activities except against a couple of fang-kuo. (Ch’ao Fu-lin, CKSYC 2001:4, 3-12.)

11 For an expression of this view see Hsiao Nan, 1981, 129-130.

12 See, for example, The Cambridge History of Ancient China, 282-283.

13 However, Ch’ao Fu-lin holds the unusual view that the chung were basically members of the royal lineage who undertook various tasks and could even participate in the king’s sacrifices, whereas the jen were primarily people from other areas (including prisoners) or under the control of other lords. This would account for their greater mobilization in Wu Ting’s military campaigns (CKSYC 2001:4, 8-10).

14 At least this is Ch’ao Fu-lin’s interpretation (CKSYC 2001:4, 3-12).

15 Ch’ao Fu-lin, 11. Ch’ao believes they formed the basis for the unit known as the jung.

16 Chung Po-sheng, 1991, 104-116; Wen Shao-feng and Yüan T’ing-tung, 1983, 286-298. Chung (116) claims that the use of ts’e or bound reports (of bamboo strips) shows it was well established.

17 This trepidation would cohere with Chang Tsung-tung’s in MS 37 (1986-1987): 5-8 that Wu Ting was paranoid.

18 Claims that horses were already being ridden in the Shang have been advanced by Chang Shih-ju and others, including (for the dedicated purpose of forwarding intelligence to the capital) Wen Shao-feng, Yüan T’ing-tung, and Chung Po-sheng.

19 Wen Shao-feng and Yüan T’ing-tung, Yin-hsü Pu-ts’u Yen-chiu, 1983, 292.

20 Wen Shao-feng and Yüan T’ing-tung, Yin-hsü Pu-ts’u Yen-chiu, 289-292. The king queried whether he would receive urgent warning by signal drums on more than one occasion.

21 For a discussion see Wen Shao-feng and Yüan T’ing-tung, 286-288. Not all the examples they cite seem to fall into this category, some still perhaps being more correctly interpreted as the king posing (saying) a question as traditionally understood, but certainly those recorded as “lai yüeh”—“come to report” or “incoming report”—do.

22 For a discussion of this paradox see Ralph Sawyer, Sino-Platonic Papers 157 (2005).

23 For examples see Wen Shao-feng and Yüan T’ing-tung, 1983, 292-297.

24 For example, as already noted in the era summaries, Ping-pien 311 preserves apparently simultaneous queries about whether the king should attack the Pa-fang with Hsi or the Hsia-wei with Wang Ch’eng.

25 In HJ6543 and HJ6544 the king seems to be querying which of two alternatives will receive blessings, while HJ6959 preserves two separate inquiries on the same day in which Ch’üeh and Ching are to attack different enemies.

26 For example, HJ6475, whether Chih Kuo or Hou Kao should accompany the king in attacking the Yi, and HJ6477 cheng, where the king inquires about having Hsi (?) accompany him in an attack on the Pa or Wang Ch’eng in an attack on the Hsia-wei.

27 For example, HJ7504, choosing between two commanders.

28 For inscriptions, including HJ6476 cheng, see Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 151.

29 For inscriptions, including HJ6480, see Wang Yü-hsin, 150.

30 The classic formulation appears in “Vacuity and Substance” in the Art of War, but Wu-tzu and Sun Pin subsequently elaborated the concept.

31 Luo K’un, 1998, 172, based on HJ6480, and Han Feng, 1982.

32 Numerous examples are seen in Wu Ting’s period, including HJ27972 and HJ6981. (It should be noted that the character is sometimes understood as meaning “victory.”)

33 Ching 2.

34 Seen in HJ6667.

35 For example, Yi 916 has the king ordering a commander named Mao to slaughter the Wei-fang.

36 For example, HJ5805. T’un-nan 2328, as interpreted by Li Hsüeh-ch’in (CKSYC 2006:4, 3-7), indicates that the right and left lü were to observe the enemy prior to undertaking a probing attack.

37 This is implied by HJ7888.

38 HJ35345, as cited and interpreted by Li Hsüeh-ch’in, CKSYC 2006:4, 3-7.

39 With an early form of the character wei (without the border enclosure) being employed. (For a brief discussion, see Chin Hsiang-heng’s famous “San-hang San-shih,” 8-9; for examples of two and even three Kung-fang armies surrounding the Shang in Wu Ting’s era, see “San-hang San-shih,” 15.)

40 “Planning Offensives.”

41 Chao Kuang-hsien, HCCHS 1986:2, 30, notes that the various units underwent constant training under officers such as the Yin, She, and Shih.

42 For a brief examination see Han Chiang-su, CKSYC 2008:1, 37-38.

43 Li Hsin-ta, Wu-kuan Chih-tu, 1997, 21, believes that Wu Ting particularly valued warriors who had undergone training and assigned positions to them.

44 “Five Instructions.”

45 For example, HJ5772. (For further discussion see Ho Ching-ch’eng, KK 2008:11, 54-70, and the archery discussion that follows.)

46 Even Sun-tzu, who stressed the need for training, never discussed the means or measures, and the classic military writings, apart from the Six Secret Teachings and Wei Liao-tzu, barely mention the subject. (On night exercises [based on T’un-nan 383], see Meng Shih-k’ai, LSYC 1990:4, 103.)

47 For an example see Shang Ch’ing-fu, HCCHS 1999:6, 5-15. According to the Mo-tzu (“Ming Kuei”), King T’ang employed the “bird deployment and geese formation” to attack the Hsia, a description interpreted as evidence of a core force with two flanks. Although such projections back into the mists of antiquity are unfounded, not to mention inconsistent with the fundamental nature of society at the time, it should still be remembered that if more than a few men are mobilized, some sort of basic formation or form of deployment, whether circular or square, line or block, is inherently advantageous.

CHAPTER 14

1 More than a dozen stones, including limestone, quartz, sandstone, and jade, were employed for edged weapons in the Hsia and Shang. (For examples recovered from Anyang, see Li Chi, BIHP 23 (1952): 523-526 and 534-535. Wang Chi-huai discusses an early axe fabrication site in KKWW 2000:6, 36-41.)

2 Note that in making a distinction between metalworking (defined as limited-scale hammering, forging, etc.) and metal production, Ursula Franklin (“On Bronze and Other Metals in Early China,” 279-296), among others, has emphasized the importance of scale in metallurgy’s role in civilization.

3 See, for example, Yen Wen-ming, 1989, 110-112. In Yünnan, a region of vast copper resources, stone weapons continued to be employed during the early Bronze Age even after primitive axe shapes had appeared, forging and molding were being practiced, and basic alloys were already known. (Yün-nan-sheng Po-wu-kuan, KK 1995:9, 775-787.)

4 Cheng Te-k’un, the chief proponent for indigenous development in his books and articles such as “Metallurgy in Shang China,” was seconded by Noel Barnard in an important early review that still retains currency. (In “Review of Prehistoric China, Shang China, China,” Barnard argues that piece-mold casting techniques were almost unique to China as metals were worked in the West; smithy practices were few; the lost wax process that predominated in the West did not appear until the end of the Warring States period; binary and then ternary alloys were employed early on; and there is essential continuity with the ceramic tradition. In contrast, An Chih-min, KK 1993:12, 1110-1119, has speculated that ancient trade routes could have played an important but unspecified role. For further discussion see Shang Chih-t’an, WW 1990:9, 48- 55; Li Shui-ch’eng, KKHP 2005:3, 239-278; and Ch’en Hsü, HSLWC, 171-175.)

It has also long been held that bronze molding techniques evolved to allow the casting of metallic versions of ceramic precursors and that this continuity from ceramic to bronze realizations provides substantial evidence of the indigenous development of metallurgy in China, particularly in the absence of hammering and other smithy techniques. However, a dissenting voice has been raised by John La Plante, EC 13 (1988): 247-273, who claims Chinese molding techniques evolved to facilitate the production of vessels originally fabricated by the hammering and joining of sheet metal.

Finally, it was originally believed (and is still sometimes claimed) that Shang bronze casting relied on the lost wax method, but more recent evidence has clearly shown that it didn’t appear until sometime in the Warring States period. Furthermore, in his classic article “Yin-tai T’ungch’i,” Ch’en Meng-chia (KKHP 1954:7, 36-41) provided an analysis of the evolution of Shang molding techniques that effectively argued that they never employed the lost wax process. His viewpoint was seconded a decade later by Noel Barnard in “Review of Prehistoric China, Shang China, China” and more recently updated by T’an Te-jui, KKHP 1999:2, 211-250, who similarly concluded that the lost wax process didn’t evolve until well into the Warring States period. The process was also employed in later times out on the periphery of Chinese civilization. (For example, see Chiang Yü, KK 2008:6, 85-90.)

5 For a discussion of these differences, see Miyake Toshihiko, KK 2005:5, 73-88. Metallurgical traditions also evolved in peripheral cultures such as Hsia-chia-tien in Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, and northern Hebei (1700-1200 BCE); Yüeh-shih (1600-1300); and of course San-hsing-tui, whose technological advances and stylistic elements were the result of complex interactions with the core cultural area coupled with indigenous cultural factors and ore characteristics. (For an analysis of metal developments in Hungshan culture in the northeast that date to about 3000 BCE, see Chu Yung-kang, KKHP 1998:2, 133-152.)

6 For example, in the middle Neolithic some areas seem to have specialized in the production of stone implements despite lacking immediately available resources. (For an example, see Li Hsin-wei, KK 2008:6, 58-68.)

7 In recent years several excavations have been carried out at ancient mining sites, leading to a new appreciation not only of their extensiveness and sophistication, but also of the widely varying ore profile. (For example, see Mei Chien-chün et al., KK 2005:4, 78 ff.) Wu Ju-tso, CKKTS 1995:8, 12-20, notes that copper is found naturally intermixed with zinc or lead at numerous small mines around places like Chiao-chou, Kao-mi, An-ch’iu, and Ch’ang-le. Tuan Yü, WW 1996:3, 36-47, describes the low level of tin used in Pa/Shu ritual vessels in comparison with the Shang.

8 An interesting example of a late Shang and early Chou culture that clearly de-emphasized warfare (as evidenced by tools and hunting implements rather than ritual vessels and weapons predominating) is seen on Yü-huan Island, located 1,000 meters off the Zhejiang coast. (See T’ai-chou-shih Wen-kuan-hui, KK 1996:5, 14-20.) The intervening sea not only physically isolated them but also provided a formidable geostrategic barrier.

9 For example, the analysis of bronze containers from a fourth period Shang tomb (1046 BCE) shows that a high proportion of lead (24-27 percent, in comparison with 55-65 percent copper and only 4-6 percent tin) was employed to allow easier casting of more complex shapes (Chao Ch’un-yen et al., WW 2008:1, 92-94).

10 For reports on the phenomenon (but little speculation on the causes), see Kuo Yen-li, KKWW 2006:6, 66-73; Tuan Yü, CKKTS 1994:1, 63-70; and Liu Yi-man, KKHP 1995:4, 395- 412. Liu claims that the trend to high-lead-content funerary items and even the use of ceramic versions, reflecting a diminishment in respect for the spirits, is mirrored in a similar shift from sacrificing a large number of victims, up to 1,000 at one time (together with 1,000 cattle and 500 sheep) under Wu Ting to lower amounts under K’ang Ting (200 human victims, 100 cattle, and 100 sheep) and eventually a maximum of 30 human victims under Ti Hsin. (Other explanations are of course possible, including economizing on resources.) More broadly, Yang Chü-hua, HCCHS 1999:4, 28-43, envisions a total reorientation in values, with the Shang esteeming spirits, the Chou valuing ritual, and the Warring States seeing a new human orientation that allowed bronze artifacts to become commodities.

11 Chiu Shih-ching, CKSYC 1992:4, 3-10.

12 Tuan Yü, HCCHS 2008:6, 3-9. For a general discussion of the techniques at Anyang, see Liu Yü et al., KK 2008:12, 80-90.

13 For reports see SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KKHP 2006:3, 351-384; Yin-hsü Hsiao-mint’un K’ao-ku-tui, KK 2007:1, 14-25; Wang Hsüeh-jung and Ho Yü-ling, KK 2007:1, 54-63; and Li Yung-ti et al., KK 2007:3, 52-63.

14 For some of these discoveries see P’eng Ming-han, HCCHS 1996:2, 47-52; Chan K’ai-sun and Liu Lin, WW 1995:7, 18, 27-32; and, for a general discussion, Ch’en Liang-tso, HHYC 2:1 (1984): 135-166 and 2:2 (1984): 363-402.

15 For a discussion of this question see Yen Wen-ming, SCYC 1984:1, 35-44.

16 Huang Sheng-chang, KKHP 1996:2, 143-164.

17 For example, T’ang Yün-ming claims that China was already producing wrought iron in the early Shang. (See WW 1975:3, 57-59, and for further discussion Hsia Mai-ling, HCCHS 1986:6, 68-72. For the history of iron in China, see Donald Wagner, Ferrous Metallurgy, or his earlier Iron and Steel in China.)

18 See note 7.

19 In addition to any specific references, the discussion that follows is primarily based on Li Shui-ch’eng, KKHP 2005:3, 239-278; Pei-ching Kang-t’ieh Hsüeh-yüan Yeh-chin Shih-tsu, KKHP 1981:3, 287-302; Yen Wen-ming, SCYC 1984:1, 35-44; and An Chih-min, KK 1993:12, 1110- 1119.

20 Pei-ching Kang-t’ieh Hsüeh-yüan Yeh-chin Shih-tsu, KKHP 1981:3, 287-302. To date, the most complete overviews of techniques and products are Lu Ti-min and Wang Ta-yeh, 1998, and Hua Chüeh-ming’s massive and highly technical Chung-kuo Ku-tai Chin-shu Chi-shu, 1999.

21 Shao Wangping, JEAA 2, nos. 1-2 (2000): 195-226.

22 Yen Wen-ming, SCYC 1984:1, 35-44, and WW 1990:12, 21-26.

23 Li Hsüeh-ch’in, CKKTS 1995:12, 6-12, and An Chih-min, KK 1993:12, 1110-1119.

24 Yen Wen-ming, WW 1990:12, 26.

25 Pei-ching Kang-t’ieh Hsüeh-yüan Yeh-chin Shih-tsu, KKHP 1981:3, 287-302.

26 This was pointed out by Sun Shuyun and Han Rubin, EC 9-10 (1983-1985): 260-289.

27 Sun Shu-yün and Han Ju-pin, WW 1997:7, 75-84; Li Hsüeh-ch’in, CKKTS 1995:12, 6-12; and Chang Chih-heng, 1996, 109-112.

28 Sun Shu-yün and Han Ju-pin, WW 1997:7, 75-84; An Chih-min, KKHP 1981:3, 269-285; An Chih-min, KK 1993:12, 1113. (Ch’i-chia culture is more broadly dated as 2200 to 1600 BCE.)

29 Li Shui-ch’eng, 251-254; An Chih-min, KKHP 1981:3, 269-285; An Chih-min, KK 1996:12, 70-78; and Kung Kuo-ch’iang, KK 1997:9, 7-20. (Arsenic alloys are also known in nearby Russia.)

30 Li Shui-ch’eng, 244-245.

31 For critical reports on which this discussion is based, see Sun Shu-yün and Han Ju-pin, WW 1997:7, 75-84; Li Shui-ch’eng, 241-245; and Sun Shu-yün and Han Ju-pin, WW 1997:7, 75-84.

32 Li Shui-ch’eng and Shui T’ao, WW 2000:3, 36-44; Sun Shu-yün et al., WW 2003:8, 86- 96; and Li Shui-ch’eng, KKHP 2005:3, 239-278. Copper/arsenic alloys similarly characterize ten of the eleven items found at Tung-hui-shan even though they date to about 1770 BCE. (See Kan-su-sheng Wen-wu K’ao-ku Yen-chiu-suo, KK 1995:12, 1055-1063. Some were forged, some heat treated or cold quenched after forging.)

33 Li Shui-ch’eng, 256-257.

34 Li Shui-ch’eng, 263; Li Hsüeh-ch’in, CKKTS 1995:12, 6-12. Wang Hsün, KKWW 1997:3, 61-68, has suggested that the growing Shang threat prompted the Hsia to develop better bronze weapons.

35 Chin Cheng-yao, WW 2000:1, 56-64, 69. Recognition of lead’s properties apparently came last. (Chin also notes a shift in sourcing to Shandong late in the era. Although recognizing that Seima-Turbino and Andronovo developments may have been transmitted through ongoing trade, Chin still argues for radical differentiation.)

36 Sun Shu-yün and Han Ju-pin, WW 1997:7, 75-84.

37 Chin Cheng-yao et al., KK 1994:8, 744-747, 735.

38 Ching Cheng-yao et al., WW 2004:7, 76-88.

39 For Yünnan see Li Shao-ts’en, KKWW 2002:2, 61-67; for the middle Yangtze, Liu Shih-chung et al., KKWW 1994:1, 82-88; for the lower Yangtze, Liu Shih-chung and Lu Pen-shan, KKHP 1998:4, 465-496 and illustrations (discussing a mine that was operated continuously from the middle of the Shang to around the start of the Warring States period); and for Gansu, see Sun Shu-yün and Han Ju-pin, WW 1997:7, 75-84.

40 See note 7.

41 Lu Pen-shan and Liu Shih-chung, WW 1997:3, 33-38.

42 These are the estimates for the mines at Wan-nan down in southern Anhui, where copper, iron, sulfur, and gold are all found. (See Ch’in Ying et al., WW 2002:5, 78-82.) According to Liu Shih-chung et al., KKWW 1994:1, 82-88, the middle and the lower Yangtze were prolific production areas that fed smelters located at Anyang and Wu-ch’eng. The extant slag heap around T’unglü-shan amounts to 40,000 tons, and 80,000 tons have been found in the middle Yangtze area.

43 In addition to references in the discussion about the dagger-axe that follows, see Chao Ch’un-yen et al., WW 2008:1, 92-94.

CHAPTER 15

1 “Agricultural Implements,” Liu T’ao.

2 For significant issues related to bronze artifacts, see An Zhimin, EC 8 (1982-1983): 53-75.

3 For example, numerous specimens of every known dagger-axe style have been recovered from the Anyang area, ranging from tabbed to socketed, from heavily used weapons to funerary replicas (ming ch’i). (For one instance see SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KKHP 1994:4, 471- 497.)

4 An example of a highly unusual weapon is the “wavy” blade sword recovered at Chin-sha, which has six to seven “waves” or bulges along the blade’s tapered portion and was produced in both bonze and spectacularly colored jade versions. (For illustrations see pages 13 and 31 of Ch’eng-tu-shih Wen-wu K’ao-ku Yen-chiu-suo, WW 2004:4.)

5 T’ung Chao, Hou-ch’in Chih-tu, 1997, 32, notes that bone arrowheads still comprised the majority at the start of the Western Chou and were only gradually displaced by bronze. The stones employed to fabricate Shang weapons include slate, diabase, limestone, quartzite, phylite, sandstone, and jade, with diabase and limestone especially employed for axes and slate for knives.

6 Hayashi Minao’s 1972 landmark treatment—Chugoku In-shu Jidai no Buki—though it includes considerable material of great importance and frames the discussion, is increasingly outdated. Very little material has been included in the ancient volume of the voluminous Chung-kuo Chan-shih T’ung-lan, and the important Chung-kuo Ku-tai Ping-ch’i T’u-chi, though extensively illustrated and the only comprehensive overview, provides minimal analytical explanation.

7 Other remnants are found in traditional Chinese opera, but they are deliberately stylized and exaggerated. Over the past three decades numerous experiments conducted with replica weapons and experienced martial artists in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, and Japan suggest that traditional weapons had many limitations and that highly particularized fighting methods had to be scrupulously observed.

8 Traditional martial arts teach the importance of agility and the need to maintain balance in maneuver. Although not applicable to every design, the fundamental principle often cited through the ages is that weapons essentially function as extensions of the human body and therefore must be used in accord with the principles governing all human movement if they are to be successfully and easily handled. Unusual, jerky, or unbalanced movements, although certainly surprising and sometimes effective, generally expose the warrior to danger and death.

9 For one of the few articles that notes both dimensions and weights, see P’ang Wen-lung, KKWW 1994:3, 28-40, 56. For example, one late Shang straight socket fu measuring 13 cm. in length and 6.5 cm. in width weighed 600 grams. Two other rectangular examples from the middle Shang (with somewhat indented middle portions and splayed blade tips) are 13 cm. long, 5 cm wide, and weigh 500 grams, and 13 cm. long, 4 cm. wide, but weigh only 300 grams. Two tabbed ch’i similarly dating to the middle Shang are recorded as 16.3 cm. long, 5.5 cm. wide, and 300 grams in weight, and 17.5 cm. long, 7.4 cm. wide at the top of the blade, with a 3.8-cm.-long tab, and a weight of 400 grams. (The former is rectangular with a fairly wide tab, somewhat rounded blade, and slight indentation along the blade’s length, while the latter is marked by a somewhat hourglass shape, the blade being the same width at the top and bottom.)

Another flanged yüeh dating to the Shang with a somewhat hourglass-shaped blade, two binding slots, and a hole in the tab, with dimensions of 17.6 cm. by 8.8 cm. and thickness of 0.6 m, weighs only 350 grams. (See Fan Chün-ch’eng, KKWW 1995:5, 91.)

10 Surprisingly, Ch’ien Yao-p’eng, KKHP 2009.1: 1-34, has recently claimed that the axe was the most effective weapon in ancient China.

11 Fighters always had to be aware of potential defects and avoid movements that might fatally damage the weapon (such as directly striking a hard surface) when stone was the primary material.

12 For example, a primitive-looking, rectangular specimen with an iron blade that simply tapers upward to a tab area defined by two prominent protruding flanges has, as already noted, given rise to claims that China had commenced making iron and steel by the early Shang. However, other analysts have concluded that the high nickel content suggests a meteoric origination. (For a report, originally written in 1975 but one of many that failed to be brought out because of the Cultural Revolution, see Chang Hsien-te and Chang Hsien-lu, WW 1990:7, 66-71.) For another assertion that China was already producing wrought iron by the early Shang, see T’ang Yün-ming, WW 3 (1975): 57-59; for the history of ferrous metals in China see Donald Wagner, 1996 and 2008.

13 Numerous examples from Anyang have been documented and their composition analyzed by Li Chi in his now classic article, “Yin-hsü Yu-jen Shih-ch’i T’u-shuo,” 1952. Additional examples continued to be recovered; for example, see SHYCS, Yin-hsü Fa-chüeh Pao-kao, 1958-1961, 171- 173. (For an example of a site with stone fu intermixed with advanced bronze arrowheads, see Ho-pei-sheng Wen-wu Yen-chiu-suo, KK 1999:7, 1-7.)

14 However, Ch’en Hsü has concluded that it was primarily a symbol of authority rather than an actual weapon or executioner’s axe. (See HSLWC, 233-239.)

15 A study of the weapons found in the four periods of Yin-hsü concluded that commanders always had yüeh, ko, spears, and arrowheads in large numbers, sometimes hundreds, but no other ranks possessed them. Although (as would be expected given disparities in rank) the quality, size, and number varied, sometimes two or three up to a dozen were recovered from a single interment. (See Liu Yi-man, KK 2002:3, especially 66-70.)

16 “Yin Pen-chi.”

17 “Chou Pen-chi.”

18 Kuo Yü, “Lu Yü, Shang.”

19 Inscribed yüeh recovered from Su-fu-t’un (which has been tentatively identified as the site of the former state of P’u-ku made famous by the Shang conquest) indicate that a “commander Ch’ou” (Ya Ch’ou) governed as ruler of P’u-ku (Ch’en Hsüeh-hsiang and Chin Han-p’o, KK 2007:5, 87).

20 SHYCS Ho-nan Yi-tui, KK 1992:10, 865-874. Some fifty-one fu were recovered. (For additional examples of early forms see Chang Chen-hung, WW 1993:9, 32-39, especially the illustrations on 38.) Hsing-lung-wa cultural sites in Inner Mongolia have yielded comparable artifacts. (For example, see Nei-Meng-ku Tzu-chih-ch’ü WWKK YCS, KK 1993:7, 577-586.)

21 For examples see SHYCS Hu-pei Kung-tso-tui, KK 1991:6, 481-494. All the fu recovered, though comparatively primitive, rough, and small, were well-used tools. Two sizes reported for fu without lashing holes are 6.1 cm. high, 4.9 cm. wide, and 1.6 cm. thick, and 10.2 by 7.3 cm., 3.5 cm. thick. Somewhat more developed styles, almost indistinguishable from the yüeh recovered at the site but in a narrower rectangular shape marked by a large binding hole, include specimens with dimensions of 15.8 by 10 cm. and 1.0 cm. thick; 13 by 8.6, 0.9 cm. thick; and 13.7 by 7.6, 1.3 cm. thick.

22 Although Li Chi’s article notes the dimensions and material composition of numerous stone fu, some examples that were recovered from sites discussed below in conjunction with the more martially focused yüeh might be cited. A stone fu found at the Lung-nan site dating to about 3300 BCE is basically rectangular, has a large hole in the upper quarter, tapers gradually outward, and has a slight curvature to the blade (Kao Meng-ho, KK 1 [2000]: 58).

At San-hsing-ts’un twenty-one fu were found, mostly double-edged and heavily used, in four distinct styles. (See Chiang-su-sheng San-hsing-ts’un Lien-ho K’ao-ku-tui, WW 2004:2, 10 and the diagrams on 18). Typical dimensions are about 15 cm. long by 8 to 9 cm. wide; all the specimens have a fairly large hole; one style is a clearly tapered but somewhat bulgy rectangular with a large tapered hole; another rectangular design is marked by essentially square tops and blades.

At the Liang-chu site northwest of T’ai-hu the well-used stone fu has a somewhat rounded top, expanding downward taper, and curved blade with total dimensions of 10.4 long, 5 cm. wide at the top and 7.4 at the edge, and a thickness of 1.6 cm. (Chiang-su Kao-ch’eng-tun Lien-ho K’ao-ku-tui, WW 2001:5, 4-21.) The fu found at the Liang-chu site near Shanghai include one with double tapered edge, slightly rounded top and blade, a large hole, and dimensions of 12 cm. long, 14 cm. wide, and 0.8 cm. thick; 16.8 cm. long, 11.2 cm. wide, 0.85 cm. thick; and two very rounded specimens that splay outward near the blade edge with dimensions of 11.8 cm long and 9.7 cm. wide, another 13 cm. long, 7.3 cm. wide, and 0.6 cm. thick (Shanghai Po-wu-kuan K’ao-ku Yen-chiu-pu, KK 2002:10, 49-63).

Twenty-nine marble, stone, and jade yüeh of various sizes have been recovered at Lin-fen in Shanxi that supposedly date to the era of Yao and Shun (2600-2400 BCE). (See Shan-hsi-sheng Lin-fen Hsing-shu Wen-hua-chü, KKHP 1999:4, 470-472, including illustrations on 471 and some appended photos.) Mostly elongated, more like fu than the broad yüeh of later times, they were produced by grinding rather than flaking and are therefore generally well defined and polished. They all have single moderate lashing holes and a few are exceptionally thin. Some of the sizes listed (length by width by thickness, in centimeters) include 11 x 5 x 0.8; 13 x 7 x 1.3; 15 x 6.2 x 0.6; 12.4 x 6.6 x 0.8; 8.4 x 5.6 x 0.5; 21.7 x 8 x 0.8; 15.4 x 4.9 x 0.8; 12.4 x 4.3 x 0.9; 17.3 x 4.8 x 0.7; 16.7 x 7.4 x 1.2; 25.3 x 12.6 x 1.2; and an astonishingly thin 8.6 x 7.2 x 0.4.

Finally, the fu and yüeh recovered from a Fujian site are basically similar in style, the fu simply being somewhat more rectangular. All have a slight outward taper, have a moderate-size hole in the blade, and show slight rounding of the blade near the edge. Two typical sizes are 10 cm long, 5.6 to 6.0 cm. wide, and 0.9 cm. thick and a very small 4.6 cm. high, 2.8 to 3.2 cm. wide, and 0.5 cm. thick (Fu-chien-sheng Po-wu-kuan, KKHP 1996:2, 165-197).

23 Wang Tsung-yao, KK 1992:7, 663-665. Generally smooth, they reportedly do not show any signs of use and range in thickness from a useless 0.5 cm. to 1.0 cm. thick. Examples include the largest, with dimensions of 15.5 cm. high, 17.2 expanding to 19.4 cm. wide, and 0.8 cm. thick with a large hole in the upper blade, and the smallest, at 11 cm. high, 9.2 to 9.5 cm. wide, and 0.7 cm. thick. The more rectangular style includes one of 15.7 by 9 cm. wide and 0.8 cm. thick with a 3 cm. hole, while a third style with pinched waist and curved blade includes specimens of 22 cm. high, 14.8 to 17.8 cm. wide, and 0.8 cm. thick; 18 cm. high, 13.5 to 17.5 cm. wide, and 1 cm. thick; and 16.8 by 15 to 16 cm. wide, and 0.5 cm. in thickness.

24 See the example described in Fan Chün-ch’eng, KKWW 1995:5, 91.

25 See SHYCS Hu-pei Kung-tso-tui, KK 1991:6, 481-494. (The stone yüeh are described on 484-486.) Although the width increases down the body to the blade edge, the yüeh recovered here are fairly rectangular. The blades are slightly rounded and have large holes in the upper third (though one has two such holes slightly off-center, perhaps an experiment or mistake). One is 16.7 cm. high by 12.5 cm. wide and 0.9 cm. thick; the second 12.9 cm. high, 10.3 cm. wide, and 0.8 cm. thick; the third, 17.9 cm. high, 13.6 cm. wide, and 0.9 cm. thick with two holes.

26 Su-chou Po-wu-kuan and Ch’ang-shu Po-wu-kuan, WW 1999:7, 16-30 (description 23- 24, diagrams 26, photos 27). Although a corrected radiocarbon date of 5885 BP was obtained, the authors note that classic Liang-chu culture is said by others to be centered about 5,000 BP or 3,000 BCE.

27 All the yüeh were secured by a large lashing hole in the upper third of the blade; most show a slight divergence from purely symmetrical shapes; a few are tapered, one sort of rounded on the top and bottom while others are just slightly rounded at the top, have a slight indentation, and widen a little, with the blades marked by various degrees of curvature. Typical sizes include 13.8 cm. high by 10.4 cm. wide, widening to 11.6 cm. but only 0.5 cm. thick; 12.6 by 9.2 to 11.2 cm. wide, 0.9 cm. thick; 13.6 cm. high, 13-14 cm. wide, and 0.9 cm. thick; 11.4 by 10.4 to 11.2 cm., but only 0.6 cm. thick; and a somewhat larger specimen, 15.6 cm. high by 10 to 11 cm. wide and 1.5 cm thick.

28 Chiang-su-sheng San-hsing-ts’un Lien-ho K’ao-ku-tui, WW 2004:2, 4-26. Ten stone yüeh are discussed on 8-9; photos with a reconstructed handle appear on 12, diagrams on 17.

29 The jade specimen, which has dimensions of about 12.2 cm. high by 10 cm. wide and a thickness of 1.4 cm., is essentially an oval with a flattened top and one large lashing hole. The stone variants have been divided into two types differentiated by the degree of rectangularity. The example with the cap, shaft filial, and short 53 cm. handle has dimensions of 13.2 by 10.2 by 1.8 cm.; a second example runs 12.4 by 9.4 cm. wide and 1.9 cm thick; and a third, which is thinner at 0.75 cm., is 10.5 by a relatively narrow 5 cm. wide. The second type, said to be squarer and generally marked by a larger hole in the blade, includes one with 45 cm. shaft remnants and dimensions of 11.2 by 11 cm. and a thickness of 1.2 cm., and another of 14.8 by 12.7 and 1.25 cm. thick, which mounted a cap above the blade of 12.3 cm.

30 Chiang-su Kao-ch’eng-tun Lien-ho K’ao-ku-tui, WW 2001:5, 4-21.

31 The stone versions appear in two styles: one gradually tapers down toward the shaft, is slightly rounded at top, has a large hole in the upper portion, is somewhat rough where the shaft would be affixed, and is unsharpened. Sizes include 14.3 cm. high, 9.9 widening to 12.4 cm. at the blade, and 0.65 cm thick, and 15.2 cm. high, 14 to 15.7 cm. wide, and a thickness of 0.6 cm. The second style, which has a slightly pinched middle blade, includes examples of 14.6 cm. high, 9.3 to 13.5 cm. wide, 1.0 cm. thick, and 14 cm. high, 9.4 to 11.4 cm. wide, and 1.2 cm. thick; and a variant form that is rougher and thinner, 11.8 cm. high and 11.3 to 13 cm. wide. (See Chiang-su Kao-ch’eng-tun 15-16 for details.) The jade yüeh (described on 16, 18, and 19) basically exhibit a gradual taper in the blade and have large holes near the top. Examples include 16.2 cm. high, 8.2 to 10.5 cm. wide; 15.2 cm. high, 9.4 to 11.5 cm. wide, and 0.6 cm. thick; and 14.8 cm. high and 9.8 to 11.7 cm. wide.

32 Liao-ning-sheng WWKK YCS, WW 2008:10, 15-33. (A photo will be found on 25, and a dimensional sketch on 29.)

33 Fu-chien-sheng Po-wu-kuan, KKHP 1996:2, 165-197. The fu and yüeh recovered from the site are basically similar in style, the fu simply being somewhat more rectangular. Both types display a slight outward taper, rounding of the blade, and moderate-size holes. Typical dimensions for the yüeh are 11 by 5.6 to 8.0 cm., 0.8 cm. thick, and 12.6 by 9.2 to 9.9 cm., roughly 0.9 cm. thick.

34 Shanghai Po-wu-kuan K’ao-ku Yen-chiu-pu, KK 2002:10, 49-63 plus six pages of photos. A radiocarbon date of 1690 BCE ± 150 has been reported.

35 Although the grave’s occupants have been termed “ordinary people,” they may have been reburials necessitated by warfare and the accompanying items reportedly show considerable quality and polish. The five yüeh basically fall into relatively square and rectangular versions. An example of the former has dimensions of 20.8 cm. high by 18.1 cm. wide and 0.85 cm. thick; two of the latter are 23.8 cm. high by 15.2 cm. wide and a very thin 0.55 cm. thick, and 24 cm. high by 16.0 cm. wide and 0.8 cm. thick.

36 The only significant overview article has been Yang Hsi-chang and Yang Pao-ch’eng, “Shang-tai te Ch’ing-t’ung Yüeh,” 1986. (Hiyashi Minao’s discussion, 132-166, though raising useful issues, has unfortunately become outdated.)

37 Based on specimens recovered prior to 1985, Yang and Yang identified five types in their article “Shang-tai te Ch’ing-t’ung Yüeh”: laddered (tapered), square, rectangular, pinched waist, and tongue. (For type examples see 129 and 132. New discoveries from Erh-li-kang and Erh-lit’ou sites have disproven a few conclusions about origination and evolution that need not be discussed here.)

38 SHYCS Erh-li-t’ou Kung-tso-tui, KK 2002:11, 31-34.

39 Two socketed fu (described as tools) were also recovered. (Sizes and descriptions for the yüeh are based on photographs and dimensions given in Li T’ao-yüan et al., P’an-lung-ch’eng Ch’ing-t’ung Wen-hua, 2002, 48, 49, 128, 129, and Hu-pei-sheng Po-wu-kuan, WW 1976:2, 26- 41.)

40 A number of fu and unusual yüeh dating to this period have been found at the famous site of Lao-niu-p’o. One in the classic tab style is decorated with three large downward-pointing triangles and t’ao-t’ie patterns on the upper blade and tab. Overall dimensions are 23 cm. high and 17.2 cm. wide, while the tab is 7.6 cm. long by 7 cm. wide. The blade’s thickness tapers down somewhat in the tab, but overall averages an immense 2 cm., allowing for the decorative aspects. The blade was secured by lashings running through two binding slots and a hole in the tab. Another intriguing variant is 19 cm. high and 9.2 cm. wide and has a 7 cm. centered tab with a width of 5 cm. and an odd triangular slot. The usual two binding slots appear on the blade’s shoulders, the edge is highly rounded (suggesting it may be a ch’i), and three stick figures with smiling heads provide unique decoration. Five fu ranging from 12 to 16 cm. in length were also recovered. (For the excavation report see Hsi-pei Ta-hsüeh Li-shih-hsi K’ao-ku Chuan-yeh, WW 1988:6, 1-27. The yüeh are described on 9-11.)

Another example from this period recovered in Shandong is also in the classic tab style but decorated by a rather simpler abstract motif on the upper portion of the blade and also the back portion of the tab. (The tab is slightly offset from center and the blade is not symmetrical.) Incorporating the usual two lashing slots and a singe tab hole, the blade is 15.8 cm. high and 9.5 cm. wide, tapering to 8.7 cm., while the tab is 6 cm. long by 4.7 cm. wide. However, being only 0.4 cm. thick, it must have been a purely symbolic weapon (Shan-tung Ta-hsüeh Li-shih-hsi and Hsü Chi, WW 1995:6, 86-87).

41 Sung Hsin-ch’ao, CKSYC 1991:1, 55.

42 For a discussion of the tiger motif see Shih Ching-Sung, KK 1998:3, 56-63.

43 Sizes taken from Yang Hsi-chang and Yang Pao-ch’eng, 1986, 130 and 132. The dimensions vary slightly in other reports.

44 For the report, already noted in the context of commanders having yüeh included in their tombs, see SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 2004:1, 7-19.

45 For example, a yüeh marked by a somewhat indented blade shape, fairly wide tab, and comparatively simple abstract decorative patterns dating to the late Shang—possibly Hsin’s reign—is only 0.4 cm. thick. (See An-yang Wen-wu Kung-tso-tui, KK 1991:10 906.) Recovered with various ritual bronzes from a commander’s grave, it has dimensions of 17 by 13.4 cm. by at the blade (but only 9.9 cm. at the shoulders) and a tab of 6.5 by 4.7 cm. Although there is a slight upper flange extension, no binding slots have been included. (Wooden handle remnants are, however, noticeable.)

46 A yüeh found at Anyang that dates to the fourth period has three triangular shapes on the blade similar to the one noted as being found earlier but a t’ao-t’ie motif in the upper portion of the blade. (See illustration 884 in SHYCS An-yang-tui, “1991-nien An-yang Hou-kang Yin-mu te Fa-chüeh,” 1993:10, 880-903.)

47 For example, an odd-shaped yüeh found at Kuo-chia-chuang at Yin-hsü has two lashing holes near the top of the blade, a tab offset to one side, and a very asymmetrical cutting edge. (See SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1998:10, 44-45.) An elaborately decorated, somewhat asymmetrical yüeh marked by a tab offset from center with a single lashing hole, slots in the upper blade, and dimensions of 22.4 by 16.8 cm. wide maximum (but 13.6 cm. at the top), and a tab 7 cm. long by 7.6 cm. wide, dating to the late second period at Yin-hsü, has been recovered at Ta-ssu-k’ung (SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1992:6, 513).

48 Chang Wen-li and Lin Yün, KK 2004:5, 65-73. Though incorporating indigenous motifs, the fu and yüeh recovered in the Ch’un-hua district of Shaanxi also reflect Ch’ing-hai, Central Asian, and Shang influences, resulting in highly localized versions that in turn reportedly spread northward and eastward. Socketed versions predominate in the northwest, with socket mounting being employed for both the unusual semicircular blade depicted and simple versions that look like hatchets. (These sockets are often tapered along the length and slightly oval, no doubt requiring considerable effort to achieve a tight fit.) However, more traditional versions that employ straight, centered tabs were also found in three variants, including a tongue-shaped version with pinched sides marked by a very large hole in the center. Most of these have two binding slots at the top and a hole in the tab for lashing. One specimen dated to about the Yin-hsü third period is decorated with an abstract motif that resembles a series of bent cotter pins that are said to have originated in Ch’ing-hai.

49 For the example, see Wang Yung-kang et al., KKWW 2007:3, 11-22. This moderately sized yüeh measures 21.5 cm. high by 12.8 cm. wide and was mounted with a narrow 7.2 cm.-long tab. Apart from the sheep’s heads protruding at the top of the slightly nonsymmetrical blade, the axe has flanges on both edges, a binding hole in the tab, additional t’ao-t’ieh decorations on both the blade and tab, and a 1.5-cm.-wide raised perimeter on the blade itself, thickening the profile. The blade’s two faces are identical, ensuring that its awesomeness would still be projected no matter how they were viewed.

CHAPTER 16

1 In pre-imperial times numerous materials were employed to produce knives, even bamboo, which can produce a highly lethal edge if properly prepared.

2 A few exceptions in stone and bronze have been recovered. For example, the weapon set found in the grave of a foreign nobleman that dates to Yin-hsü’s second period includes a surprisingly long knife of 32.7 cm. It has a straight tab continuous with the upper edge; the blade turns upward near the point; the front and rear portions are wider than the middle, ranging from 5 to 8.2 cm.; the top is thicker than the edge; and it weighs 335 grams. (See An-yang-shih WWKK YCS, KK 2008:8, 28-29.) A bronze knife recovered from Hsiao-t’un is 27.3 cm. long and 3.2 cm. wide (Shih Chang-ju, BIHP 40 [1969]: 660). Finally, a particularly long tao with a turned-up edge almost like seen on elf shoes, a decorated band near the top, a straight bottom edge, a blunt back with a short tab at the top and “Ya Ch’ang” on it, 44.4 cm. long (and thus somewhat functional), and a width of about 5.6 cm. has been recovered from “Ya Ch’ang’s” tomb. (See SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 2004:1, 14.)

3 For a concise overview see Liu Yi-man, KK 1993:2, 150-166.

4 The numerous knives and daggers found in China’s peripheral cultures, particularly the Northern complex, have prompted several studies that, though in part charting their evolution, lie outside the scope of Ancient Chinese Warfare, as does the more comprehensive question of the nature and degree of influence from more distant steppe and Eurasian cultures with bronze precursors, including Sintashta-Petrova.

5 Based on early discoveries (BIHP 22 [1950]: 19-79) and references in the Shang Shu, Shih Chang-ju concluded that weapons were normally grouped into functional sets. Therefore, after exchanging archery fire at a distance and employing spears at intermediate range, knives were supposedly used (76). Apart from being completely unrealistic—the possibility of anyone still standing after engaging with spears (or dagger-axes) being minuscule—a sample of six sets is too limited to justify such sweeping conclusions. In fact, Ch’en Meng-chia, KKHP 1954.7: 15- 59, has challenged the conclusion that the knives were weapons for close combat, notes that they are found with whetstones in sets for maintaining shafted weapons, and cites evidence from other areas where they are found in combination with an axe (ch’i) rather than in elaborate sets (52). His analysis of about 100 knives from Yin-hsü (43-57) not only criticizes Li Chi’s earlier classifications but also finds that most were tools shaped to specific purposes such as woodworking, kitchen work, and separating hides (46-47). Nevertheless, he terms one category of longer variants that range from 27.5 to 52 cm. a “chin” (the basic axe radical). Designed for horizontal mounting along a handle, until being enlarged and mounted horizontally on or atop a long shaft, such as the later Kuan Tao, it could only have been used for executions. (Executions and combat require significantly different modes of action.)

6 Shih Chang-ju (74-76) believes that the knives were hierarchically differentiated by weight and decorative motif, with the horse head being the most prestigious, the ox next, and finally the ram. (The weights range from 382 grams down through 379, 301, 137, 131, and finally an ultralight 62.) Five of the six curve downward; those with animal heads are wider and have a flange, though one has two rings. The knives were carried in two different types of sheaths, with the fancier one being hung from a jade ring.

7 Several early stories are preserved in the Wu-Yüeh Ch’un-ch’iu and Yüeh Chüeh-shu. A certain mystique came to be associated with the dagger, the preferred weapon of notable assassins.

8 “Waging War.”

9 For example see Chou Wei, 1988, 88-98; Yang Hung, 1985, 126.

10 Yang Hung, 1985, 125-26.

11 See Chang Kwang-chih, 1980, 45, and 1982, 13.

12 The development of longer daggers in Wu and Yüeh, where watery terrain precluded the extensive use of chariots, is often, though without justification, cited as evidence that chariot warfare and swords were somehow mutually exclusive. (Similarly, Chiang Chang-hua, KK 1996:9, 78-80, who believes that swords are indigenous, thinks they first evolved in Shu because of Sichuan’s wetness.)

13 Whatever the ratio per chariot may have been—10, 25, 72, 75, or even 100 to 1—foot soldiers always comprised the majority of warriors.

14 See Max Loehr’s classic article, “The Earliest Chinese Swords,” 132-142.

15 See, for example, Chou Wei, 1981, 112-116. (Early dagger-axes, spearheads, and daggers are so similar in appearance as to be virtually interchangeable.)

16 See Yang Hung, 1985, 129.

17 Swords would eventually become too long and unwieldy for the battlefield, as the example of the King of Ch’in being unable to draw his weapon when attacked by the famous assassin Ching K’o shows. For personal defense in normal situations, daggers of moderate length were always more effective.

18 Hayashi Minao, 1972, 199-236, and Chou Wei, 1988, 109-157. Although still the most extensive treatment, Minao’s work suffers from being based on materials published prior to 1970; therefore, the only Western Chou “sword” he considers comes from Chang-chia-p’o in Ch’angan. Moreover, he rarely provides actual measurements, only figures with rough proportions. Fortunately, a number of articles have studied the dagger’s complex history in considerable detail, including Yang Hung, 1985, 115-130; T’ung En-cheng, KK 1977: 2, 35-55; Lin Shou-chin, KKHP 1962:2, 75-84 and WW 1963:11, 50-55; Hsiao Meng-lung, KKWW 1996:6, 14-27; Sung Chih-min, KK 1997:12, 50-58; Chung Shao-yi, KK 1994:4, 358-362; Chu Yung-kang, WW 1992:12, 65-72; Ho Kang, KK 1991:3, 252-263; Li Po-ch’ien, WW 1982:1, 44-48; Ch’en P’ing, KK 1995:4, 361-375; Chang T’ien-en, WW 1993:10, 20-27, and KK 1995:9, 841-853; and Kuo Pao-chün, KK 1961:2, 114-115. (Essential illustrations may also be found in the Chung-kuo Ku-tai Ping-ch’i T’u-chi.)

19 This may be seen from the mix of older and newer weapons found in many graves across the ages. Han tombs even include both bronze and iron swords, even though only the latter may have been used in actual combat. (For one example, see Chung Shao-yi, KK 1994:4, 359.)

20 This sort of knowledge apparently died out after the Han, by which time the tao had replaced the sword as a military weapon and even ceremonial versions had been largely replaced by wooden ones (Chung Shao-yi, KK 1994:4, 358-362).

21 One Spring and Autumn burial contains a 50 cm. bronze sword and a long spear with a handle of 120 cm. and a 26.8 cm. head (Ch’ing-yang-hsien Wen-wu Kuan-li-suo, KK 1998:2, 18-24).

22 Considerable insight can be gleaned from modern techniques, even though the latter cannot be simply projected backward. For example, depending on the fighting style, there are several methods for grasping the handle, but it is unlikely that the ancients ever held the blade horizontally or laid back against the wrist and forearm, both of which dramatically alter the type of movements that prove effective.

23 In connection with Pa and Shu see T’ung En-cheng, KK 1977: 2, 40, and for a recent report of a similar double scabbard recovered in Inner Mongolia, Hsiang Ch’un-sung and Li Yi, WW 1995:5. (Daggers from the latter site, which dates to the late Western Chou or early Ch’un Ch’iu, are fairly lengthy, roughly 40 cm., and have blades at least twice the length of the hilt.)

24 Chung Shao-yi, KKHP 1992:2, 130-131. (For representative examples see Chung-kuo Ku-tai Ping-ch’i T’u-chi, 13.)

25 Chung Shao-yi, KKHP 1992:2, 130-131.

26 For example, see Max Loehr, 1948, 132-142, and Lin Yün, 1986, 237-273.

27 Prominent archaeologists who have argued for, or simply asserted, indigenous origins include Lin Shou-chin and T’ung En-cheng. (See Lin Shou-chin, KKHP 1962:2, 75-84, and WW 1963:11, 50-55, and T’ung En-cheng, KK 1977: 2, 35-55.)

28 However, Chai Te-fang, KKHP 1988:3, 277-299, divides the north into three regions.

29 For a representative view, see Lin Yün, 1986, 237-241. For a study of the complex interactions marking the northern zone and northern China during the Shang and early Chou (including the effects visible in knives, daggers, and other bronze artifacts), see Yang Chien-hua, KKHP 2002:2, 157-174. The northwest also served as a conduit for Eurasian styles and developments.

30 Significant reports include Chu Yung-kang, WW 1992:12; Pei-ching-shih Wen-wu Kuan-li-ch’u, KK 1976:4, 251-253; Wu En, KKWW 2003:1, 21-30; and Chai Te-fang, KKHP 1988:3, 277-299.

31 Important articles on these daggers and their evolution include Chin Feng-yi, Pt. 1, KKHP 1982:4, 387-426, and Pt. 2, KKHP 1983:1, 39-54, as well as WW 1989:11, 24-35; Lin Yün, KKHP 1980:2, 139-161; Wang Ssu-chou, KK 1998:2, 53-63; Liao-ning-sheng Hsi-feng-hsien Wen-wu-kuan-li-suo, 1995:2, 118-123; Chao Chen-sheng and Chi Lan, KK 1994:11, 1047-1049; Tung Hsin-lin, KKHP 2000:1, 1-30; Chung Shao-yi, KKHP 1992:2, 129-145; Wang Ch’eng, KK 1996:9, 94 (which shows that these styles were sometimes found as far west as Inner Mongolia); and Chai Te-fang, 1988.3: 280-285. Guo Da-shu, 1995, 182-205, includes a well-illustrated examination of knives, daggers, and axes, especially those with ring-type handles. (Not all Liaoning swords are so distinctive. For example, a damaged stone “sword” dating to about 2500 BCE, about 20 cm. long, was probably a thrusting weapon because it is distinguished by a rhomboidal cross-section and sharpened edges and tip. See Hsü Yü-lin and Yang Yung-fang, KK 1992:5, 395.)

32 Chin Feng-yi, WW 1989:11, 24-35. However, Wang Ssu-chou, KK 1998:2, 53-63, dates their inception to the late Shang or early Western Chou.

33 Chin Feng-yi, WW 1989:11, 24-27, and KKHP 1983:1, 46-48; Wang Ssu-chou, KK 1998:2, 53-63; and Chao Chen-sheng and Chi Lan, KK 1994:11, 1047-1049.

34 Fan Chün-ch’eng, KKWW 1995:5, 91. Even discounting the surpassingly long handle of 23 cm., the blade is still remarkably long for the Shang. However, the dating is dubious.

35 Ma Hsi-lun and Kung Fan-kang, WW 1989:11, 95-96. It has been termed the first Shang bronze sword discovered in this area.

36 Yang Hung, “Chien ho Tao,” 116; SHYCS, “Feng-hsi Fa-chüeh Pao-kao,” WW 1963. (Other daggers from the Beijing area are even shorter, at 17.5 cm.)

37 Based on calibrating the original radiocarbon dating of 1120 RC ± 90. (See Lin Shou-chin, 1962.2: 80-81. Lin thus significantly revises an original date of late Western Chou, as seen in Pei-ching-shih Wen-wu Kuan-li-ch’u, KK 1976:4, 251-253.) Two rather poor-quality bronze daggers with slightly raised spines about 21 cm. in length, tentatively dated to the mid- or late Shang, have also been found at Ch’eng-tu Shih-erh-ch’iao (Chiang Chang-hua, KK 1996:9, 78-79).

CHAPTER 17

1 The combination of the characters for shield and dagger-axe, kan and ko, would eventually become a common term meaning “warfare.”

2 The Shuo-wen Chieh-tzu and its greatly expanded variant the Shuo-wen Chieh-tzu Ku-lin long provided the classic interpretations, but the discovery of oracular inscriptions produced an entirely new genre of literature in which interpretations of seemingly incomprehensible characters have been advanced and heatedly debated by Kuo Mo-juo, T’ang Lan, Yen Yi-p’ing, and others.

3 The idea entailed by this pronouncement (and accompanying, fabricated dialogue) probably dates to the middle Warring States period, if not later, when the Tso Chuan was compiled. For example, in “Benevolence the Foundation” the Ssu-ma Fa states: “Authority comes from warfare, not from harmony among men. For this reason if one must kill men to give peace to the people, then killing is permissible. If one must attack a state out of love for their people, then attacking it is permissible. If one must stop war with war, although it is war it is permissible.”

4 Tso Chuan, Hsüan Kung, twelfth year.

5 Examples of stone and other dagger-axes may be conveniently found in the chapter on Shang weapons in Chung-kuo Ku-tai Ping-ch’i T’u-chi. The authors postulate (on 12) that the first stone ko appeared in Guangdong and may have originated as an agricultural implement.

6 For a succinct example of the process and complexity of mutual interaction in China’s western area, see Liu Chün-she, KKWW 1994:4, 48-59. Oddities and variations have also been recovered, including one with a stone blade but bronze haft. (See Li Chi, KKHP 4 [1949]: 40- 42.) Examples from the late Shang recently discovered in Shaanxi that strongly reflect the process of cultural interaction (with the Northern complex) include one ko with a single slot in the middle of the blade, a definite upward tilt, partial downward blade extension, flange extending both up and down, and a tab positioned to extend straight back at the top. A full crescent blade with three binding holes was also found at the site. (See Wang Yung-kang et al., KKWW 2007:3, 11-22 plus back interior cover.)

7 Recently, analysts such as Ching Chung-wei, KK 2008:5, 78-87, have begun to study the major types in order to understand the process of localized variation and stylistic evolution. Although their conclusions are highly useful, many of the detailed changes did not impact the nature of the weapon or its utilization and, insofar as they would require extensive digressions to reproduce, are not included here. (Key reports for the Shang include Li Chi’s well-illustrated classic article, BIHP 22 [1950]: 1-17, and his KKHP 4 [1949]: 38-51; Sun Hua, JEAA5 [2006]: 306-311; and Ching Chung-wei, KK 2008:5, 78-87. However, hundreds of individual reports with only one or two examples that were evaluated for size, evolution, and materials are too numerous to list.)

8 Although every style of ko has been recovered at Anyang, replica weapons or ming ch’i rapidly multiplied in the last two periods. (For example, see SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KKHP 1994:4, 471-497. For an analysis of the increasing lead content and its effects, see Chao Ch’un-yen et al., WW 2008:1, 92-94.)

9 Liu Yi-man, KK 2002:3, 70; SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1991:5, 390-391.

10 Liu Yi-man, KK 2002:3, 63-75. Spears tended to proliferate at the very end of the Shang and sometimes exceeded the dagger-axes found in a single grave or locality, but overall the ko dominates. (For example, the tomb of a high-ranking Ma-wei nobleman in the Anyang area contains thirty ko and thirty-eight spears [SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1996:2, 17-35].)

11 For example, the tomb of the progenitor of the Ch’ang clan, an obvious military commander (SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 2004:1, 7-19).

12 A certain amount of circularity marks these determinations, because rank and prestige are decided by the presence of such weapons, as well as ritual vessels and other minor factors.

13 Yang Hung, “Chan-ch’e yü Ch’e-chan Erh-lun,” HCCHS 2000:5, 8.

14 See Huang Jan-wei, 1995, 188-190. Ko were sometimes given in combination with other weapons, including kan (a staff, but generally interpreted as a shield), yüeh, and bows and arrows.

15 Bernhard Karlgren made this point long ago in BMFEA 17 (1945): 101-144. Fu and yüeh both predate the ko.

16 Note that Shen Jung claims that rectangular openings were first seen at Yin-hsü, yet the tabs had long grown too large for simple push-through mounting (Shen Jung, KK 1992:1, 70).

17 Shih Chang-ju, BIHP 22 (1950): 59-65, rather imaginatively calculated a probable length of 1.128 m. by analyzing the characters that appear in the oracle inscriptions. However, remnants recorded in numerous archaeological reports suggest a shorter length of 0.85 to 1.0 meter was common. (For example, even though the blade lengths differ slightly, being 23 and 26 cm., at an early Western Chou chariot site the length for each of a matched pair was 82.5 cm. The shafts expand somewhat toward the butt; the upper 55.5 cm. are wrapped with black lacquered thread but the lower 27 cm. of the wooden shafts are just lacquered red [SHYCS Feng-hsi Fa-chüeh-tui, KK 1990:6, 504-510].)

18 Among many, see Ma Hsi-lun, WW 1995:7, 72-73; Shen Jung, KK 1992:1, 70-71; Li Chien-min, KK 2001:5, 62-64; and Ching Chung-wei, KK 2008:5, 79.

19 For examples, see Li Chi, KKHP 4 (1949): 38-40.

20 Three rather blunt ko styles have been recovered from the early dynastic Shang site of Lao-niu-p’o: basically straight ko with slightly curved blades, models with curved handles and elaborate patterns on the tab, and a socketed version. (Liu Shih-o, WW 1988:6, 1-22, WW 1988:6, 23-27. See also Kuo Pao-chün, KK 1961:2, 111-118.)

21 Socketed weapons have long been primarily associated with the so-called Northern complex; however, due to the discovery of certain indigenous examples, this identification needs to be reexamined.

22 A recently excavated Anyang tomb that dates to Wu Ting’s era contains good examples of socketed, curved, straight-tabbed, and even triangular ko. (See An-yang-shih WWKK YCS, KK 2008:8, 22-33.) Moreover, even the excavations of the late 1950s turned up socketed, straight-tabbed, and curved-tab bronze ko, as well as a couple of crescent-shaped blades. (See SHYCS Pien-chi, Yin-hsü Fa-chüeh Pao-kao, 1958-1961, 245-249. The ko and other weapons recovered were apparently produced in a specialized foundry.) Finally, one early version found in Fu Hao’s tomb lacks vertical flanges but displays a slight downward turn in the blade’s lower edge, even though the top edge and the top of the tab are essentially continuous.

23 Although Kuo Pao-chün early on claimed that the socketed version never achieved a high percentage in the Shang and rapidly diminished in the Western Chou, most of the 118 ko recovered from the tomb of a high-ranking Shang commander dating to the third period of Yin-hsü are socketed. (See SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1991:5, 390-391.) Separately, the 71 ko found in the tomb of an obvious military commander, perhaps the progenitor of the Ch’ang clan, dated to late in the second period at Yin-hsü, include variants with the full crescent elongation, simple straight-tab versions with rhomboidal blades, curved-tab models, and socketed versions. Lengths average 25 to 26 cm., with the curved tabs being slightly longer at 28.5 cm. (See SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 2004:1, 14-16.)

24 A socketed ko with a stubby profile and short, crescent-style elongation has been recovered from remains dating to Yin-hsü’s third period. (See Yin-hsü Hsiao-min-t’un K’ao-ku-tui, KK 2007:1, 41.) Ten of the thirty ko recovered from the tomb of the Ma-wei nobleman previously noted, dating to the fourth period at Yin-hsü, are crescent shaped with sockets that have an average blade length of 24 to 25 cm., an 8 cm. curved portion, and the usual 1:4 ratio of tab to blade. One with slots in the crescent still had leather binding remnants (SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 2004:1, 14-16).

25 Li Chi, KKHP 4 (1949): 42-44; Kuo Pao-chün, KK 1961:2, 111; Ching Chung-wei, KK 2008:5, 78, 82. For examples see Ch’eng Yung-chien, WW 2009:2, 81-82 (two late Shang curved-tab variants and one straight tab), and illustrations 123 to 144 in Karlgren, BMFEA 17 (1945).

26 For the motif of tigers eating people, see Shih Ching-Sung, KK 1998:3, 56-63. As already discussed, the Hu people, with whom this motif is closely associated, were targeted by Wu Ting’s campaigns, and an axe head found in Fu Hao’s tomb, presumably imported from the south, depicts two tigers jumping at a man’s stylized head.

27 The surprising effects of symmetrically weighted and balanced weapons have recently been the subject of Western technological articles. (For example, see Ronald Jager, Technology and Culture 4 [1999]: 833-860, particularly the discussion of balance on 838-840.) Although Shang dynasty ko never achieved true balance, some of the dynamic advantages (such as less tendency to rotate while being swung through an arc) should have been realized to some degree.

28 For a set of illustrations see Ching Chung-wei, KK 2008:5, 79-82.

29 This was first discussed by Li Chi in his classic article, BIHP 22 (1950): 1-17.

30 For some interesting examples from widely scattered sites, see (for Shandong) Ma Hsi-lun, WW 1995:7, 72-73; (for Anhui) Yang Te-piao, WW 1992:5, 92-93; and (from Wu Ting’s era in Henan), Ning Ching-t’ung, WW 1993:6, 61-64. Several ko about 27 to 28 cm. in length recovered from P’an-lung-ch’eng show the degree to which ko in the Erh-li-kang had already evolved. Three have rhomboidal blades with straight tabs and slight downward curves, projecting flanges, and single tab holes; another has a straight tab but no curve in the blade; one 27 cm. long has a curved handle with a very open stylized motif, a short tab 4.8 cm. long and a blade about 4 cm. wide; two others, 26.8 and 29.2 cm. long, have hooked tabs with decorative designs, flanges, and rhomboidal blades. Finally, two termed k’uei, one 29.8 cm. and the other 28.4, though more triangular, are not really fat and bulgy; however, they have no flanges, just reduced tabs with binding holes and the usual lashing holes on the upper portion of the blade. (See Li T’ao-yüan, Pan-lung-ch’eng Ch’ing-t’ung Wen-hua, 2002, 130-135.)

31 For an example of a 45-degree blade from the Western Chou, see Pei-ching-shih Wen-wu Kuan-li-ch’u, KK 1976:4, 252.

32 See the references in note 23.

33 Although many articles include a few speculative statements, the classic discussion of dagger-axe fighting techniques remains Shen Jung’s KK 1992:1, 69-75. Though fully cognizant of his analysis, our conclusions are based primarily on experiments with replica weapons employed by experienced martial artists.

34 Wen Kung, eleventh year.

35 For example, see Yang Po-chün, Ch’un-ch’iu Tso-chuan-chu, 1990, Vol. 2, 582, or Chung Shao-yi, WW 1995:11, 55-56, who believes it was a cross-shaped ko. (It is possible to punctuate the sentence somewhat differently and read it as “struck his throat and used a ko to slay him.”)

36 See Ronan O’Flaherty, Antiquity 81 (2007): 425-426.

37 Terming it a “k’uei” or “chü” based on later texts describing ritual weapons, although said to be incorrect, is common. (See Shen Jung, WW 1993:3, 78-84.)

38 Ch’eng-ku has been identified with the Pa culture (Huang Shang-ming, KKWW 2002:5, 40-45).

39 Shen Jung, WW 1993:3, 78-84; Chang Wen-hsiang, KKWW 1996:2, 44-49; Li Hsüehch’in and Ai Lan, WW 1991:1, 20-25. However, Sun Hua, JEAA 5 (2006): 310, asserts that the k’uei-style ko originated in Sichuan rather than Ch’eng-ku. In contradiction, Li Chien-min, KK 2001:5, 60-61, sees the basic type originating in the Hsia but being modified at Hsin-kan. Chen Fangmei also regards the leaf-shaped ko at Hsin-kan as a distinctive type. (For context, see also Zhang Changshou, JEAA 2, nos. 1-2 [2000]: 251-272.) For an example of a very simple k’uei with a long tab and a single hole, 18 cm. long by 7 cm. wide, that dates approximately to Wu Ting’s era, see Ning Ching-t’ung, WW 1993:6, 61-64.

40 See Shen Jung, WW 1993:3, 78-84. (Ch’eng-ku has an early crescent-shaped ko with four lashing holes.)

41 For an example with this exact size from Ch’eng-ku, see Kou Pao-p’ing, KK 1996:5, 50. Unlike the original form, there tends to be much less variation in size and extremely long versions are rare, no doubt because of the large amount of copper required and the greater weight.

42 Recent experiments to determine the lethalness of the much-maligned Irish halberd—a piercing rather than crushing weapon—conducted on sheep heads led to the conclusion that the “thought alone” assessments that had disparaged it as a clumsy, ineffective, or perhaps purely symbolic or ritual weapon due to weak hafting, blade fragility, and other factors were wrong. It was further determined that the somewhat rounded tip (similar to the relatively blunt-shaped triangular ko) provided strength on impact, was designed to strike bone rather than muscle, and easily penetrated the skull. (See Ronan O’Flaherty, Antiquity 81 [2007]: 423-434.)

43 Shen Jung, WW 1993:3, 80-82.

44 The character, which is said not to have existed prior to the Eastern Chou, was written in several ways during the Warring States period, including with ko on the right and a chariot pennant on the left (as discovered on the two famous chi bearing Shang Yang’s and Lü Pu-wei’s names), but always included the ko. (See Chung Shao-yi, WW 1995:11, 58.)

As Yang Hung pointed out in his “Chung-kuo Ku-tai te Chi,” prior to the discovery of actual specimens, the K’ao-kung Chi’s discussion of the chi’s design prompted some strange misconceptions. Only a few other dedicated articles have pondered the chi to date, including three classics: Ma Heng, “Ko Chi chih Yen-chiu,” 1929.5: 745-753; Kuo Muo-jo, “Shuo Chi,” 1931 (1954 reprint), 172-186; and Kuo Pao-chün, BIHP 5.3 (1935); Chung Shao-yi’s recent study, WW 1995:11, 54- 60, provides a useful review of the literature and changing opinions about its design, nature, and nomenclature.

45 P’eng Shih-fan and Yang Jih-hsin, WW 1993:7, 14, note that the so-called hooked chi (called a k’uei by Tsou Hung), which combines a tao with a ko rather than a spear (seen in a singular example from Pao-chi Yü-ch’üan), is not Shang in origin. It should be remembered that (at least in contemporary martial arts practice) Chinese spears are not just employed for thrusting, but are also frequently used in a slashing and cutting mode.

46 The earliest example has been found at Kao-ch’eng T’ai-hsi in Hebei. (See Ho-pei-sheng Po-wu-kuan, WW 1974:8.) The discovery was quite fortuitous because the warrior’s body had a socketed bronze ko on his right side and the combined dagger-axe/spear on his left. In the absence of shaft remnants or impressions, the discovery of the two parts would normally not have led to the conclusion that they comprised parts of a combined weapon. (Yang Hung [157] remarks that the ko’s shaft was 87 cm. but the chi’s only 64. However, the addition of the spearhead would result in an equivalent weapon length.)

47 Chung Shao-yi, WW 1995:11, 54-60, especially 55-56, asserts that the chi that resulted from extending the top portion of the ko blade upward in a curve, producing a point, was a distinctively Western Chou weapon that proliferated in the Kuan-chung and central plains areas in the early and middle periods and disappeared in the Spring and Autumn. Moreover, according to evidence found at Liu-li-ho, it should be called a ko and therefore named a “cross-shaped ko” to distinguish it from the latter unitary chi of Spring and Autumn invention.

48 Li Chi, BIHP 22 (1950): 15. Kuo Muo-jo, “Shuo Chi,” 179, 182, once claimed that the ko had been discontinued by the Han, only chi with one or two heads being employed.

49 Yang Hung, “Chung-kuo Ku-tai te Chi,” 161; Kuo Muo-jo, “Shuo Chi,” 177.

50 For further information on the multiple-ko variant of the chi, see Sun Chi, WW 1980:12, 83-85, and Chung Shao-yi, WW 1995:11, 59. Considerable controversy exists over the exact term for these multiple-ko weapons and whether they require a spear point to be termed a “chi” or not, with claims for the latter being based on the discovery of thirty chi at Tseng Hou-yi. (See, for example, Chung Shao-yi, 60, or T’an Wei-ssu, Tseng Hou-yi Mu, 2001, especially 52-56.)

51 Sun Chi, WW 1980:12, 84.

52 Chung Shao-yi, WW 1995:11, 59 and Sun Chi, 84.

53 In numerous experiments conducted with replicas, the short Shang-style chi was felt to be awkward in either of its modes. Effectively exploiting this dual capability requires learning new rotational hand and arm movements, as well as developing the ability to deliver a thrust with the hand turned to disadvantageous positions of lower leverage. (Longer two-handed Spring and Autumn versions do not suffer from this defect because short arc attacks no longer exist, only long-range hooking, piercing, or thrusting movements.) Moreover, the fighter must essentially precommit to either a slicing or thrusting attack because the two possibilities do not equally present themselves in combat situations.

CHAPTER 18

1 Twentieth-century military experience in Southeast Asia attests to the lethality of sharpened sticks—essentially mini-spears—concealed in rice paddies and jungle underbrush. Guerilla actions also involved employing roughly fashioned spears against a variety of forces, and sharply cut bamboo culms continue to be used in street melees and against the police, causing frequent deaths and numerous wounds.

2 Claims that their numbers decreased in the Western Chou with the ascension of chariot combat are common. (For example, see Shen Jung, KKHP 1998:4, 456-458.) However, Western battle experience contradicts arguments for the spear’s inapplicability that tend to be made with reference to the effective hooking power of the crescent-shaped ko. (Because they are used by thrusting rather than swinging, it can equally be argued that they would be more effective against horses—the usual target—and chariot riders, especially in the congested confusion of a melee when the chariots would have virtually been brought to a halt.) Moreover, in comparison with the masses of fighters clogging the battlefield, even the largest chariot force represented only a fraction of the total combatants.

3 As discussed below, the p’i featured a cast bronze spearhead with a tab that was inserted into a shaft until socket mounting was adopted late in the Spring and Autumn period.

4 Chung-kuo Ku-tai Ping-ch’i T’u-chi, 26 (based on traditional explanations).

5 Hayashi Miano, Chugoku Inshu Jidai no Buki, 1972, 99.

6 Shen Jung, KKHP 1998:4, 452.

7 Li Chien-min, KK 2001:5, 68, notes a somewhat abstract, elongated type found at Sanchia-chuang east that has been attributed to Yin-hsü’s first period.

8 This unusually long, basically rhomboidal stone spear has a willowy blade that merges into a somewhat rectangular lower (shaft) portion. Dated to about 1000 BCE, it is the largest ritual weapon found in China, the next being an unimaginably oversized stone ko of 1.0 m. Fabricated from one piece of smoothly worked sandstone, it has a total length of 120.8 cm. apportioned as a head section of 48.8 cm. and a shaft of 72 cm.; a maximum blade width of 6 cm.; and a very moderate thickness about of 1.2 cm. (Wang Ssu-chou, KK 2006:2, 95-96).

9 Short protrusions that lie in the same dimension as the blade just below, separated by a slight gap, almost like a detached flange, appear on the two pi specimens from P’an-lungch’eng (shown in P’an-lung-ch’eng Wen-hua, 138). However, rather than having lashing holes, the ends are unexpectedly solid. One has a length of 24 cm., the other 23. (P’i are rarely discussed in archaeological reports, and there seems to be some disagreement over their defining characteristics. Comments in P’an-lung-ch’eng Wen-hua distinguish it from the mao solely by the crosslike protrusions and solid shaft, requiring insertion into the shaft rather than mounting over the handle. However, weapons identified as p’i that were commonly employed in the Warring States tended to have socket-mounted, elongated, willow-like blades and lengths up to 1.62 m., and some from Ch’in Shih-huang’s tomb with a pike- or javelin-like appearance exceed 3.5 m., including their bronze heads of 35-36 cm. None of these later variants have a crosspiece, only a sort of rim at the base. The p’i reportedly died out as a battlefield weapon after the Western Han.)

10 Li Chi’s “Yin-hsü Yu-jen Shih-ch’i T’u-shuo” (BIHP 23b [1952]) does not show any spears.

11 For example, while Shen Jung sees a major northern contribution, Li Chien-min KK 2001:5, 65, claims the Shang spear is simply an amalgamation of the southern model plus a few Shang elements.

12 Even though Hayashi Minao’s comments are not without value, two seminal studies have appeared in the last decade: Shen Jung, KK 1998:4, 447-464, which contains an evolutionary chart that may be overly systematic, and Li Chien-min, KK 2001:5, with a discussion of spears on 65-68.

13 Descriptions of the three will be found in Ho-pei-sheng Po-wu-kuan, WW 1976:2, 33; the clearest photographs appear in P’an-lung-ch’eng Ch’ing-t’ung Wen-hua, 136 and 137.

14 Based on binding being the most common method for securing axe and dagger-axe heads, Shen Jung, KKHP 1998:4, 458-460, concluded that the ring holes were simply employed for lashing. (When pegging subsequently dominates, the ears will be employed for pennants and streamers.)

15 Of the two with “ears,” the one with the less pronounced rim is 23.6 cm. long, slightly oval, and has a significantly raised spine that extends right to the tip; the other is slightly shorter at 20.2 cm. The third, with upwardly oriented triangles molded onto the shaft, is 22 cm. long with a blade to socket ratio of 2:1; has an essentially rectangular spine with a somewhat rhomboidal cast that runs down most of the length; and includes two protruding upward-hooked flanges at the base which, in a sword, would be intended to stop enemy blades from sliding down onto the warrior’s hand.

16 One example discovered in Hubei that lacks ears is particularly interesting because the blade’s multihued patina suggests it underwent some form of secondary heat treating. Extremely basic in design, it has a long shaft with a small symmetrical leaf blade, relatively rounded core with raised spine, and slightly raised smaller leaf section on the blades that serves for the relatively simple t’ao-t’ieh decorative pattern that is repeated on the lower mounting portion. The length is 28.7 cm., blade width 7 cm., socket diameter 3.4 cm., and weight 0.55 kg. (See Ho Nu, WW 1994:9, 90 and 91.)

17 Li Chien-min, KK 2001:5, 65-68. Although the specimens clearly reflect the southern spear tradition, local elements loom large, the strongest influence perhaps being from Wuch’eng. (The spearheads at Wu-ch’eng and Hsin-kan are said to date to approximately the second period at Yin-hsü.) Twenty-seven can be broken down into subtypes depending on the relative length of the shaft and blade, although they range from 11.8 to a maximum of 30.5 cm., as one cluster falls around 15 cm., another 24-25 cm. The ones with ears are generally short to moderate in length, those without ears often very elongated. Many have blood grooves, some have decorations, and at least one widens out, then the blade edges continue in a sort of indentation down to the rim, as in the late Shang. Although not called p’i, two variants have crosspieces with holes in the ends rather than ears. No weights are given. (For further discussion of the merged influences seen at Hsin-kan, see Chan K’ai-sun, CKKTS 1994:5, 34-40.)

18 Li Chien-min, 67.

19 The integrated view has been particularly espoused by Shen Jung, KKHP 1998.4: 452, whereas Liu Yi-man, KK 2002:3, 65, and Li Chien-min (65) assert that the Shang spear is derived from southern precursors. Others, while generally accepting the latter viewpoint, see indigenous Shang stone and bone spears as having exerted a residual effect.

20 For example, three spears dating to the fourth period at Yin-hsü that have somewhat pudgy but moderately long triangular blades and a gradually expanding rhomboidal shaft with pronounced ears lack pegging holes and should therefore be considered purely southern-style embodiments. (For a report see SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1993:10, 884.)

21 For examples that date to the fourth period at Yin-hsü, see Yin-hsü Hsiao-min-t’un K’aoku-tui, “Ho-nan An-yang-shih Hsiao-min-t’un Shang-tai Mu-tsang 2003-2004-nien Fa-chüeh Chien-pao,” KK 2007:1, 32, which depicts two stretched rhomboidal spearheads that are vividly decorated with facelike deigns on the very base and upwardly pointing triangles along the spine. (The shaft openings are somewhat distorted circles.) Comparable in size, one is 25 cm. long with a maximum 5.8 cm.-wide upper blade, the other 26.3 cm. with an identical 5.8 cm. width.

22 Li Chien-min, KK 2001:5, 65-68. Spears recovered from Commander Ch’ang’s tomb include southern specimens with ears; a roughly circular spine; but short, stubby, flat leaf blades about 24 cm. in length, and variants with rhomboidal spines and blades with extended lower edges that reach down to the ear holes before cutting sharply inward; they are slightly longer at around 28 cm. (See KK 2004:1, 16.)

23 Hayashi Minao, 1992, 97, and Liu Yi-man, KK 2002:3, 65, claim that the character mao does not appear in the oracular inscriptions. However, Karlgren (KGSR1109) interprets the character as a kind of lance and provides a Yin dynasty bone version whose existence, if attested, would contradict assertions of nonexistence.

24 Two spears were among the weapons recently found in a set apparently belonging to a foreign nobleman who had settled in the Anyang area. The leaf-type blades are short but marked by a smooth curve at bottom, while the shafts, which have “ears” on the bottom, are comparatively longer. In one the socket opening is relatively circular, in the other slightly oval. The lengths are given as 21.3 and 21.6 cm., with outer socket diameters of about 3.5 and 3.6 cm. Only one weight is given, 295 grams (An-yang-shih WWKK YCS, KK 2008:8, 22-33). The one found together with a yüeh at Ta-ssu-k’ung is marked by t’ao-t’ieh decorations at the bottom, protruding ears, a fairly long but narrow blade that quickly curves inward, and a length of 22.2 cm. (SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1992:6, 513-514).

25 Yen Yi-p’ing, 1983, 7-10. Tomb 1004 at Hou-chia-chuang contains a significant quantity of armor, shields, and helmets. Some of the short shafts of the 370 upper-layer bronze spears show red coloring.

26 The spears can be divided into two types: a short, stubby, leaf-shaped blade with a roughly circular spine and separate ears at bottom about 23-24 cm. in length, and a longer, flat, leaf-type blade whose edges extend down to the ear holes before cutting inward, has a rhomboidal spine, and averages about 28 cm. in length (SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 2004:1, 16-17).

27 The spears can again be divided into two styles. The first has a rather broad blade that curves somewhat inward before flaring outward again on the lower third of the shaft, has two lashing holes in the blade itself, and has a pronounced oval socket/spine that extends halfway up to the tip. In the second the blade suddenly flares out then cuts inward, turning slightly upward ; shafts are generally rhomboidal or extended ovals, but there are no ears or lashing holes (SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1996:2, 380-381).

28 Few articles have pondered the earliest forms of Chinese armor: Yang Hung’s “Chung-kuo Ku-tai te Chia Chou” and “Chung-kuo Ku-tai te Chia Chou te Hsin Fa-hsien ho Yu-kuan Wen-t’i” and Albert E. Dien’s “A Study of Early Chinese Armor.” The Chung-kuo Ku-tai Ping-ch’i T’u-chiprovides essential illustrations, while an odd, highly colorful reconstruction of a Shang warrior’s garb may be found in Chung-kuo Ku-tai Chün-jung Fu-shih, 1. (However, it should be noted that the colors on some recently excavated late Warring States tomb figures are quite vibrant, indicating that the Chinese martial realm did not confine itself to somber embellishments.)

29 Yang Hung, 1985, 3; Yen Yi-p’ing, “Yin Shang Ping-chih,” 1983, 3.

30 For an oversized illustration that is also reproduced in the Chung-kuo Ku-tai Ping-ch’i T’u-chi , 39, see Yen Yi-p’ing, 3.

31 The arrangement of the shields is shown on Yen Yi-p’ing’s “Yin Shang Ping-chih,” 1983, 4.

32 For a depiction see Chung-kuo Ku-tai Ping-ch’i T’u-chi, 39. An additional shield in dark red lacquer has been found in Shandong at T’eng-chou Ch’ien-chang. (See Yang Hung, HCCHS 2000:5, 8.)

33 About 80 cm. high, it was 65 cm. wide at the top but tapered outward to 70 cm. at the bottom and therefore did not form a perfect rectangle. Shih Chang-ju’s famous reconstruction of this shield, BIHP 22 (1950): 65-69, upon which all discussion to date has been based, is also cited by Yen Yi-p’ing, 7, and included in the Chung-kuo Ku-tai Ping-ch’i T’u-chi, 38.

34 The only large catch yet discovered has been at Hou-chia-chuang’s M1004, where 141 helmets in seven discernible styles were recovered. (Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to these helmets subsequent to the initial report, but for a brief discussion see “Chung-kuo Ku-tai te Chia Chou,” 8-9, and Chung-kuo Tu-tai Ping-ch’i T’u-chi, 39-41, for photos.) Though none have been found at P’an-lung-ch’eng, a similar helmet with an even more exaggerated appearance has been recovered at Hsin-kan. (See P’eng Shih-fan and Yang Jih-hsin, WW 1993:7, 11 plus a separate photo. Yen Yi-p’ing also provides an illustration of a helmet from M 1004 in his “Yin Shang Ping-chih,” 8. The Chung-kuo Ku-tai Chün-jung Fu-shih shows a short version on page 1 and other Shang helmets on page 2.)

35 Even though China has a lengthy tradition of employing masks in theater and street display, bronze face masks seem to have been extremely rare in antiquity, as well as virtually unknown in pre-imperial written materials. (The Chung-kuo Ku-tai Ping-ch’i T’u-chi [38] has a photo of a round bronze plate in the shape of a human face with large eye holes that was intended as a shield decoration, and a picture of a rare bronze face mask similarly characterized by large eyeholes appears on 41.)

CHAPTER 19

1 Various dates have been given for the earliest Chinese arrowhead discovered at Shuo-hsien in Shanxi, including Yang Hung’s 28,945 BP (1985, 190, based on Chia Lan-p’o KKHP 1972:1, 39-58) and subsequent radiocarbon dating (SHYCS Yen-shih, KK 1997:3).

2 Two important reports among the many that have described ancient finds are Wang Chien et al., KKHP, 1978:3, which discusses black flint arrowheads from a site dated roughly to 23,900- 16,400 BP, and Hsi K’o-ting, KK 1994:8, 702-709, which reports on a Paleolithic site dated to 18,000-12,000 BP.

3 For example, see K.C. Chang, Archaeology of Ancient China, 93, for a summary of P’ei-li-kang sites dating to about 6,500 to 5,000 BCE where, despite extensive agricultural development and the raising of domesticated animals, bone arrowheads and spearheads show that hunting was still important.

4 One Ma-chia-pang site in northern Zhejiang dated to 5,000 BCE contains seven wooden arrowheads as well as others fabricated from bone and antlers (Chang, Archaeology of Ancient China, 201).

5 Rather than a surpassing effort to save civilization from some sort of environmental disaster, this legend is interpreted as a vestigial memory of the Yi people having vanquished nine enemy tribes. (The character for Yi depicts a man bearing a bow on his back, suggesting that they were particularly distinguished for their archery skills.)

6 See, for example, Jim Bradbury, The Medieval Archer, especially chapters 1 and 9.

7 “Chou Pen-chi,” Shih Chi. He similarly shot Chou’s two concubines with three arrows each.

8 See Yang K’uan, Hsi Chou Shih, 1999, 701-704.

9 “She Yi,” Li Chi, translated by James Legge, 448, used here because of the sonorous quality of his translations of the ritual writings. (A late Warring States compilation, the Li Chi heavily reflects Confucian theory and idealizations. Although an unreliable guide to historical practice, the contents reveal archery’s deep psycho-emotional importance.)

10 Li Hsüeh-ch’in, WW 1998:11, 67-70. (Others attribute the vessel to King Mu’s reign.)

11 Huang Jan-wei, 1995, 189-191. Although generally awarded in combination, bows and arrows were also granted separately.

12 Tso Chuan, Duke Wen, fourth year.

13 Tso Chuan, Duke Hsiang, eighth year.

14 Tso Chuan, Duke Ting, eighth year.

15 Tso Chuan, Duke Chao, first year.

16 Tso Chuan, Duke Chao, twenty-fifth year.

17 The issue, first raised by Kelly DeVries (1997, 454-470), prompted a rebuttal by Cliff Rogers (1998, 233-242), who cited extensive evidence of knights and other armored soldiers having been slain by arrows in the medieval period. (For further discussion of the bow’s efficacy see, for example, Jim Bradbury, The Medieval Archer, and Robert Drews, The Coming of the Greeks, especially 113-129.)

18 If 8 inches are taken as the equivalent of one Chou foot, based on the average bow size of 6 feet 3 Chou inches (per the K’ao-kung Chi), the range (computed at 50 modern inches for a bow) would have been slightly less than 210 feet. In comparison, the great archery competition at Sanjusangendo in Kyoto took place on the great wooden temple’s verandah over a total distance of some 375 feet. Because the overhanging roof precluded arcing the shot more than about 15 degrees, great initial velocity and thus a very powerful bow were required. However, because the archers shot all day and the victor’s hits numbered in the thousands, it was also a test of endurance.

19 At 50 paces the large center square probably reached one chang or 10 Chinese feet per side or roughly 80 inches. (Based on a range of fifty bow lengths and a bow length of 6 feet, Steele, Yi Li, 120, concludes the range was 300 Chou feet and the complete target an enormous 40 Chou feet in width. Some commentators, including the compilers of the K’ao-kung Chi, believe the target’s shape approximated that of a man with his arms and feet stretched out and was therefore 8 feet at the top and 6 feet at the bottom, but this seems unlikely in a strongly Confucianized ritual competition.)

20 “What can kill men beyond a hundred paces are bows and arrows.” (“Discussion of Regulations,” in the Wei Liao-tzu, a Warring States work.) Throughout Chinese history bows with a maximum effective range of just 100 paces were considered inferior. (Note “Ch’i-hsieh” in the Wu-pei Chih.)

21 See Wang Ching-fu, K’ung Meng Yüeh-k’an 23: 4 (1984): 56.

22 In another display of power and accuracy, while hunting the king killed a “rhinocerous”—probably some sort of wild buffalo—that attacked his chariot with one shot (“Ch’i-yü, 1,” Kuo-yü).

23 Duke Ai, second year.

24 Duke Ch’eng, sixteenth year.

25 The archer had even had a prophetic dream about the incident and his own dire fate. Eye wounds seem to have been fairly common. (See, for example, Tso Chuan, Duke Chao, fifth year.)

26 Duke Hsüan, fourth year.

27 Duke Ch’eng, sixteenth year. (Although the incident may be a later fabrication inserted by antiwar editors during the Tso Chuan’s compilation, it may well reflect prebattle bow tests. It is also recounted in the Lieh-nü Chuan, showing that it struck the imagination.)

28 Duke Hsiang, eighteenth year.

29 Duke Ai, fourth year.

30 For example, see Duke Chao, twenty-eighth year, and Duke Ai, sixteenth year.

31 For example, in the “Hsi Chou” section of the Chan-kuo Ts’e it is pointed out to an archer who successively hit a willow leaf at a hundred paces that his achievement stems from combining strength and concentration, so if either fails his accomplishments will be dashed. (This insight would subsequently be adapted as a Taoist-flavored persuasion on true skill and not being skillful.)

32 Noticeable in the “Ch’i-yü” section of the Chan-kuo Ts’e.

33 Consecutive queries during Wu Ting’s era ask whether an ancestor of the Chü clan or if another man named Pi should be ordered to instruct 300 archers (HJ5772; for further discussion see Ho Ching-ch’eng, KK 2008:11, 54-70).

34 “Determining Rank.”

35 “Encouraging the Army,” Liu-t’ao.

36 “Tactical Balance of Power in Defense,” Wei Liao-tzu.

37 “Controlling the Army.”

38 “Martial Cavalry Warriors,” Liu-t’ao.

39 “Preparation of Strategic Power,” Sun Pin Military Methods. When China developed the crossbow in the Warring States period, it immediately gained a decided, if temporary, advantage in range over mounted steppe peoples even though the crossbow had a much slower rate of fire.

40 The most important include Shih Chang-ju’s pioneering reconstruction of Shang bows and arrows in “Hsiao-tun Yin-tai te Ch’eng-t’ao Ping-ch’i”; Yang Hung’s “Kung ho Nu” (1985), especially 190-206; and Military Technology: Missiles and Sieges, 101-119. Unfortunately, dramatically in contrast to the masterful section on the crossbow, the discussion is surprisingly cursory.

41 The K’ao-kung Chi, an enigmatic work filled with archaic terms but often cited in technological histories and increasingly deemed well founded and informative (Kao Chih-hsi, WW 1964:6, 44), is thought to be a second-century BCE compilation. (Although it concisely ponders the issues and techniques of bow and arrow making, as a seventeenth-century BCE effort the T’ien-kung K’ai-wu is of limited use for the Shang.) A number of Western works on traditional bow and arrow making are also useful, including Flemming Arlune’s Bow Builder’s Book and Tim Baker’s Traditional Bowyer’s Bible.

42 See Shih Chang-ju, BIHP 22 (1950): 33-35. (Shih’s analysis of the characters for bow and shooting, his reconstruction of the bow’s shape and dimensions, and other fundamental conclusions have become so generally accepted that their tentative basis has largely been forgotten.)

43 Shih Chang-ju, 35.

44 Shih Chang-ju, 35. Based on proportions shown in oracular and bronze inscriptions, Shih Chang-ju reached this conclusion in his 1950 article. Nevertheless, K’ao-kung Chi materials apparently confirm his conclusions, however imaginatively based, and early Western bows had similar dimensions.

45 Shih Chang-ju, 35.

46 “Ta Lüeh,” Hsün-tzu.

47 Commenting on these bows, the Chih notes that although the names might have been different, the bows were actually the same.

48 These gradations refer to martial capabilities rather than rank.

49 “Ch’i-hsieh, 1,” Chih.

50 See, for example, Yang Hung’s overview in “Kung ho Nu,” 1985, 203-206.

51 Translation of these wood species follows Military Technology, 110.

52 China has well over 200 species of bamboo, ranging from 6-inch grasses to monstrous eighty-foot culms with 8-inch diameters, many of which provide materials suitable for applications as diverse as weaving and timbering. Larger species such as Meng-chung can be split into resilient laminates nearly 0.5 inch thick and 1.5 inches wide that have high tensile strength and well resist fracturing and chipping. (The World War II production facilities at Ch’eng-tu were still using bamboo cores for their compound bows.)

53 As pointed out in Military Technology, 111-112.

54 The T’ian-kung K’ai-wu similarly emphasizes seasonality in making bows and weapons.

55 The relative strength and flex of the arms had to be adjusted. (However, it is said that the upper limb of a bow should be slightly stronger than the lower one so that it will lift the arrow upon release. [See Alrune, “Bows and Arrows 6000 Years Ago,” 18, or Jorge Zschieschang, “A Simple Bow,” 39-45.])

56 Alrune, Bow Builder’s Book, 18; Zschieschang, 39-45.

57 A scientific study of the tensile and sheering strength of the various materials in archery application, as well as the impact of seasonal specificity, is still awaited.

58 T’an Tan-chiung’s study, BIHP 23 (1951): 199-243, of essentially the last traditional bow shop in 1942, preserves valuable information on how the materials were selected, processed, and assembled. It also describes the steps involved in arrow fabrication and adds a short note on shooting techniques, numerous useful diagrams, and a table of terminology. Traditional European bow makers similarly advise cutting the timber between late November and mid February, even coordinating with the waning phases of the moon when “the wood is drier and more resistant” (Konrad Vögele, “Woods for Bow Building,” 102). Natural drying can take up to three years, showing that early Chinese methods were neither extreme nor unfounded.

59 “Ch’i-hsieh, 1,” Wu-pei Chih.

60 The episode is found in the records for both Chao and Wei in the Chan-kuo Ts’e, as well as in various forms in the Shih Chi (“Han, Chao, and Wei Shih-chia”), the Huai-nan Tzu (“Chien Hsün”), Shuo Yüan (“Ch’üan Mou”), and other parts of the Han Fei-tzu (“Shuo Lin, Shang” and “Nan San”). However, the two main versions appear in the Chan-kuo Ts’e, right at the beginning of the “Ch’ao Ts’e,” and in the Han Fei-tzu as part of the “Shih Kuo” or “Ten Excesses” chapter. It ranks among the most famous Warring States stories, well-known throughout the centuries, and has been translated by Burton Watson (“The Ten Faults,” Han Fei-tzu Basic Writings, 56- 62) and J. I. Crump (Chan-kuo Ts’e, #229 and #230, 278-283.)

61 Jürgen Junkmanns, “Prehistoric Arrows,” 58.

62 For a useful discussion of parameters and practice, see Wulf Hein, “Shaft Material: Wayfaringtree Viburnum,” 75-80.

63 Although cracking and crazing are less of a problem for small-diameter bamboos that can be employed as simple shafts, drying methods for bamboo tend to be relatively complex and time-consuming. The high sugar content attracts insects and sustains bacterial growth, while the culms have a tendency to split if the moisture content is reduced too quickly, particularly in the timber bamboos.

64 Shih Chang-ju, BIHP 22 (1950): 45.

65 Calculated by Shih Chang-ju and reported in his “Hsiao-t’un Yin-tai te Ch’eng-t’ao Pingch’i.” Early Western arrows were frequently this length and had a maximum diameter of about 0.9 cm.

66 For a discussion see Flemming Alrune, “Bows and Arrows 6000 Years Ago,” 30-32.

67 According to the T’ien-kung K’ai-wu, the best feathers come from eagles, next hawks, lesser owls, wild geese, and swans. Because southern birds were not considered as powerful as northern ones, it was believed that southern arrows would not fly as true as northern variants.

68 To date the key article has been Yang Hung, “Kung ho Nu,” 1985, 190-232, to which may be added Chang Hung-yen, KK 1998:3, 41-55, 75. Illustrations of the major types may be found in the Chung-kuo Ku-tai Ping-ch’i T’u-chi, Ch’en Hsü and Yang Hsin-p’ing, 2000, 218-232, and the articles noted below.

69 See Li Shui-ch’eng, KKHP 2005:3, 260. However, the late Hsia and the Shang were considerably warmer, possibly comparable to Hang-chou today, an area where bamboo proliferates.

70 Just 2.8 cm. long and dated to 28,845 BP, as already noted the earliest arrowhead yet found was discovered at Shuo-hsien in Shanxi (Yang Hung, “Kung ho Nu,” 190).

71 See “Kung ho Nu,” 193, reporting a find at Shanxi Ch’in-shui Hsia-ch’uan whose artifacts date to between 23,900 and 16,400 BP. Nine of the thirteen arrowheads have a sort of elongated oval shape; the remainder have the classic triangular profile and sharply tapered bottom edges for inserting into split shafts, a clear advance over earlier forms. However, the number of arrowheads, 13 out of 1,800 recovered objects, is statistically insignificant.

72 For example, for the Paleolithic see T’ao Fu-hai, KK 1991:1, 1-7, or Chang Hung-yen, KK 1998:3, 41-55, 75. (For the production of flint arrowheads, see Hein, “Arrowheads of Flint,” 81-95.)

73 Yang Hung, “Kung ho Nu,” 192. For a report on the earliest bone arrowhead yet recovered (dating to the Paleolithic, 18,000-12,000 BCE) see Hsi K’o-ting, KK 1994:8, 702-709. Every variety of bone ranging from large animal to human was employed.

74 Yang Hung, “Kung ho Nu,” 196, notes that a bone arrowhead discovered at Jiangsu P’eihsien Ta-tun-tzu dating to roughly 4500 BCE had penetrated 2.7 cm. into the victim’s thigh bone.

75 For example, most of the arrowheads cited by Chang Hung-ch’an, KK 1998:3, 41-55, 75, dating to the eighth and seventh millennia BP from the Liaoning area are small and triangular; relatively few elongated variants are included. (However, others from Hsin-leh in Liaoning that date to 7300-6800 BP, half of which were produced by grinding, are quite elongated.) Samples from a Hung-shan site dated to 5485 BP continue to be small triangles, though some show a slight upward turn in the inner middle at the bottom.

Most of the well-made arrowheads recovered from Hai-la-erh-shih in Inner Mongolia dating to 6000-5500 BP have a slightly elongated triangular shape and are relatively flat with slightly raised spines. Fabricated by pressure flaking, chipping, and polishing, they continued to be only 4.1 to 4.5 cm. long by 1.2 to 1.3 cm. wide. (See SHY Nei-Meng-ku Kung-tso-tui, KK 2001:5, 3-17.)

76 For example, artifacts from Ta-wen-k’ou culture located in Shandong, roughly dated as 3835 to 2240 BCE, include all three. (See Yang Hung, “Kung ho Nu,” 193.)

77 Yang Hung (193) believes it would have increased the arrow’s power.

78 “Kung ho Nu,” 193, and visible in numerous other reports. However, this is a somewhat unexpected result since stone, unlike bone and shell, is impervious to decay.

79 Examples discovered in Ta-wen-k’ou culture out in Shandong (dating to about 3000-2500 BCE) are noted in Shan-tung-sheng WWKK YCS, KK 2000:10, 38-39. Well-formed bone arrowheads characterized by good consistent angles have also been recovered from Han-tan. (See Ho-pei-sheng Wen-hua-chü Wen-wu Kung-tso-tui, KK 1961:4, 197-202.)

80 For a few examples see Shan-tung-sheng WWKK YCS, KK 2000:10, 27; Fu-chien-sheng Po-wu-kuan, KKHP 1996:2, 182-183.

81 For example, as late Liang-chu was transitioning to Kuang-fu-lin around 2000 BCE or slightly later, their stone arrowheads increasingly assumed a somewhat lengthened triangular shape with a t’ing that is formed simply by curving in and extending downward rather than being clearly circular or rhomboidal. Kuang-fu-lin variants then increase in length and include a few very elongated specimens. Average lengths vary from about 4.8 to 5.5 cm.; not all of them include a t’ing. (For artifacts see Shang-hai Po-wu-kuan KK YCS, KK 2008:8, especially 9-10 and 18-19.)

82 Useful reports include Pen-hsi-shih Po-wu-kuan, KK 1992:6, 506, whose specimens range from 4.7 to 6.3 cm. in length, including t’ing of a very short 0.7 to 2.0 cm. and body widths of nearly 2 cm., with some even narrower variants; Liao-ning-sheng WWKK YCS et al., KK 1992:2, 107-121, dated to about 3000 to 2500 BCE, whose 4 to 5 cm. stone specimens are primarily noteworthy for their upward curving and thickness reduction in the bottom portion (for insertion into the shaft); Hsü Yü-lin and Yang Yung-fang, KK 1992:5, 389-398, whose 144 stone arrowheads, produced by grinding, assume a variety of shapes (illustrated on 396), including somewhat more elongated forms, but are mostly triangular with blunt bases, some of which show some upward indentation; Chang Shao-ch’ing and Hsü Chih-kuo, KK 1992:1, 1-10, reporting on the earlier Hung-shan culture in which the t’ing is yet to appear, including some unusual examples with thicker blade edges that taper to give the appearance of double diamonds stuck together, and a number that display upward indentation or notching.

83 Claims that bronze increased an arrow’s killing power lack experimental substantiation. Moreover, although they were subject to breakage and chipping and possibly encountered greater penetration resistance due to surface roughness, flint, shell, and materials such as obsidian could be sharpened to a razorlike edge. The Shang, which could have equipped its warriors entirely with bronze arrowheads, still employed large numbers of stone and bone versions.

84 Liu Yi-man, KK 2002:3, 64-65, notes that although some are found in Fu Hao’s tomb, 906 grouped into 15 bundles have been discovered at Kuo-chia-chuang, a site generally dated to the third period.

85 Li Chi’s report, BIHP 23 (1952): 523-619, includes a few primitive-looking, triangular stone arrowheads with short stubs (on 616), which are characterized by a flat profile rather than the pronounced rhomboidal shape seen in Lungshan manifestations. (See also Li Chi, KKHP 4 [1949]: 54-58.)

86 For examples dating to the mid- to late Yin-hsü taken from among twenty-six specimens that can be described as fairly stubby but elongated triangles with somewhat rhomboidal heads, short projecting downward points, and slightly tapered t’ing that come directly down, see SHYCS, ed., Yin-hsü Fa-chüeh Pao-kao, 1987, 168-171. (Typical sizes are 5.1 to 6.2 cm. long, including a t’ing of 2.2 to 3.5 cm., and a relatively narrow body width of 1.8 to 2.3 cm.) Additional examples dating to late Yin-hsü appear in SHY An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1991:2, 134. (Typical length is 7 cm.)

87 Examples of these basic styles may be found in the Chung-kuo Ku-tai Ping-ch’i T’u-chi, 36, as well as numerous articles published over the years, including SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1991:2, 134 (for twenty-two arrowheads in the basic style, with an average 6.2 cm. for the stubbier form); Fu-chien-sheng Po-wu-kuan, KKHP 1996:2,183; and SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1991:2, 134 (elongated triangles dating to late Yin-hsü with long but close reverse points, t’ing that taper down slightly, sharply defined blades, and an average length of about 6 cm.).

88 For clear examples taken from among twenty-seven specimens that display a visible rhomboidal core, staggered kuan, and then circular t’ing, see SHYCS, Yin-hsü Fa-chüeh Pao-kao, 1987, 168-171. Sizes range from 5.4 cm. long, including a 2.1 cm. t’ing and width of 2.0 cm., to 6.1 cm. long, including a 3 cm. t’ing and width of 1.7 cm. (For additional examples about 6.2 cm. long dating to late Yin-hsü, see SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1991:2, 134.)

89 Shih Chang-ju describes two bundles of ten bronze arrowheads each in BIHP 40 (1969): 659. In one they average a fairly uniform 7.4 cm. long, but in the other bundle they vary from 6.9 to 7.9 cm. Another fifty of highly uniform shape that were found piled together at Ta-ssu-k’ung average 7 to 7.5 cm. in length and about 3.8 cm. wide. However, the only difference is in the length of the t’ing, not the shape or size of the body itself (SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1992:6, 514).

90 For brief studies of shooting with cords, see Shih Yen, KKWW 2007:2, 38-41, or Hsü Chung-shu, BIHP 4:4 (1934): 433-435.

CHAPTER 20

1 T’ai-p’ing Yü-lan, chüan 772. (Hsüan refers to a curved pole, Yüan a double pole.) His name is also said to have been derived from his birthplace, Hsüan-yüan-ch’iu.

2 T’ai-p’ing Yü-lan, chüan 772. Commentaries to the Chou Li claim that Kai was the first to harness oxen to vehicles.

3 For a brief summary of legendary views, see Ku Chieh-kang and Yang Hsiang-k’uei, 1937, 39-41.

4 Kuan-tzu, “Hsing Shih,” dated to the late third century BCE.

5 Kuan-tzu, “Hsing Shih Chieh,” reportedly composed about the first century BCE.

6 “Hsiao Ch’eng.”

7 For example, Hu-pei-sheng Wen-wu KK YCS et al., KK 2000:8, 55-64. Remnants of seven different-sized chariots, harnessing both two and four horses, were found in this mid- to late Warring States Ch’u tomb. (Although changes in the various components, reinforcements against wear, improvements in stability, and efforts to reduce vibration in the Chou have significant implications for the chariot’s capability, they fall beyond the compass of this volume. Only fundamental aspects necessary for understanding the chariot’s employment in battle during the Shang can be pondered here.)

8 See, for example, E. L. Shaughnessy, “Historical Perspectives,” 217, and for H. G. Creel’s doubts about barbarians employing chariots, see his (somewhat outdated) Origins of Statecraft in China, 266.

9 HJ36481f.

10 For a report see SHYCS Shandong Kung-tso-tui, KK 2000:7, 13-28. The chariot had two horses; unusually large wheels about 1.6 m. in diameter; an axle length of 3.09 m.; and a wellpreserved rectangular box (slightly rounded on the left front) about 0.34 m. high, 1.17 m. wide at the front, 1.34 m. wide at the back where there was a narrow opening, and a depth of 1.02 m. The sacrificial victim was accompanied by a bronze ko, some arrowheads, and two horses. (Whether the remains belong to an independent state, as suggested, or a Shang outpost in a subjugated state, as well as whether the chariot was imported or locally constructed, are still unanswered questions.)

11 Sun Pin (“Eight Formations”) cited this number, and it is frequently mentioned in other Warring States texts. However, 10,000 was often simply used to indicate an indefinite, large number or myriad.

12 Tso Chuan, Chao Kung, thirteenth year. If 10 men accompanied each chariot, the infantry component would have amounted to 40,000; if 25, it soars to an astonishing 100,000, exactly the number Sun-tzu speaks about.

13 The evolution of siege warfare would see the introduction of several wheeled devices, some simply large crossbows mounted on chariots, others innovative combinations of rams, ladders, and similar equipment that merely employed wheels to facilitate their movement. (Two chapters in the Liu-t’ao, “The Army’s Equipment” and “Planning for the Army,” describe several types of specialized Warring States vehicles, including chariots.) Having been displaced, according to “Occupying Enemy Territory,” ordinary chariots and the cavalry were “kept at a distance when attacking cities and besieging towns.”

14 Whether these wagons were horse or oxen powered (as generally claimed) remains unknown. However, the existence of oxen-pulled wagons is generally assumed in several traditional writings, and a ta ch’e is sometimes mentioned (equally without substantiation) as having been employed in the Shang. Wang Hai-ch’eng, Ou-ya Hsüeh-k’an 3 (2002): 41, has suggested that the narrow-gauge chariots recovered from Shang sites may have been intended for transporting heavy goods. (Wang also notes that a solid-wheeled cart that might also have been adopted in China has been found in Xinjiang.)

15 At the battle of Pi some vehicles called t’un-ch’e, variously glossed as defensive ch’e (chariots) but more likely transport wagons, were pressed into service (Tso Chuan, Duke Hsüan, twelfth year). In 493 BCE, right at the end of the Spring and Autumn, 1,000 cartloads of grain were captured.

16 Our discussion is based on several articles that have appeared over the decades, some somewhat outdated but others current and highly informative, if often argumentative and contradictory: Shih Chang-ju, BIHP 40:1 (1969), 625-668, and BIHP 58:2 (1987): 253-280; Yang Paoch’eng, KK 1984:6, 546-555; Yang Hung, WW 1977:5, 82-90, WW 1984:9, 45-54, and HCCHS 2000:5, 2-18; and Chang Ch’ang-shou and Chang Hsiao-kuang, 1986, 139-162. Others include Kuo Pao-chün, 1997; Hayashi Minao, Toho Gakuho 29 (1959), 155-284; and Kawamata Masanori, “Higashi Ajia no Kodai Sensha to Nishi-Ajia,” Koshi Shunju 4 (1987): 38-58. In English, E. L. Shaughnessy’s seminal “Historical Perspectives on the Introduction of the Chariot into China,” HJAS 48:1 (1988), 189-237, remains fundamental despite further reports from Sintashta-Petrova, but other useful analyses include Lu Liancheng, Antiquity 67 (1993): 824-838; Stuart Piggot, Antiquity 48 (1974): 16-24; and, although somewhat outdated, Joseph Needham, 1965, 73-82 and 246-253. Wang Hai-ch’eng’s expansive “Chung-kuo te Ma-ch’e Ch’i-yüan,” 2002, provides the most comprehensive overview of critical Chinese and Western data to date, as well as highly useful tables and an extensive bibliography.

A very few of the more important chariot excavations over the decades include Ma Te-chih et al., KKHP 9 (1955): 6-67; SHYCS An-yang Fa-chüeh-tui, KK 1977:1, 69-70; SHY An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1972:4, 24-28; SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 1998:10, 48-65; and SHY Shan-tung Kung-tso-tui, KK 2000:7, 3-28.

17 Damage needs to be minimized because roads have enormous military implications and gauge differences frustrate movement. (For a discussion of roads and the effects of load, see M. G. Lay, 1992.)

18 As the K’ao-kung Chi states, “Heaven has its seasons, Earth has its ch’i, materials have their excellence, and labor has its skills. Only when these four are brought together can excellence be produced.” Just as with the bow, wood selection was sensitive to seasonal and local variation.

19 The full range for Shang dynasty wheels appears to be 120 to 156 cm., with several reported in the 145 cm. range. (For a convenient summary see the table compiled by Yang Hung, “Chanch’e yü Ch’e-chan Erh-lun,” HCCHS 2000:5, 5; the earlier table [which does not include Mei-yüan-chuang] in “Yin-tai Ch’e-tzu te Fa-hsien yü Fu-yüan,” 1985, 555, or Lu Liancheng, Antiquity 67 [1993]: 828 and 829.) Yang Hung, “Erh-lun,” HCCHS 2000:5, 5, concludes that the wheels averaged 136.8 cm. in diameter. The chariot discovered at T’eng-chou dating to the interstice between the Shang and Chou already shows slightly larger wheels at roughly 157 to 160 cm. (SHYCS Shan-tung Kung-tso-tui, KK 2000:7, 23). Estimates of horse height, generally thought to be less than 130 cm., vary considerably: Shih Chang-ju, BIHP 40, no. 1 (1969): 665, puts them at only 100 to 115 cm., in which case the wheel rims would have stood well above their bodies, whereas Yang Pao-ch’eng, KK 1984:6, 550, reports a height of 140 to 150 cm. for the horses at M7.

20 See SHYCS An-yang Fa-chüeh-tui, KK 1977:1, 69-70. Yang Hung, “Erh-lun,” HCCHS 2000:5, 5, and others have questioned the number of twenty-six. However, the T’eng-chou chariot has twenty-two spokes.

21 At Ta-ssu-k’ung the diameter runs between 3.0 and 4.5 cm., at Hsiao-min-t’un about 4 cm., but at Mei-yüan-chuang a rather narrow 2 cm.

22 The T’eng-chou spokes are already reduced to about 2.0 to 4.0 cm. in diameter.

23 For example, see Hsiang Kung, thirty-first year, and Ai Kung, fourth year. Moving parts, even from conformable metals like brass, present extremely complex lubrication problems. Among the complications are temperature, viscosity, contamination, oxidation, and uneven wear, all of which produce increased friction and hot spots, leading to distortion, adhesion, and burnout.

24 Shang fabrication techniques remain uncertain. However, even after steaming or heat soaking, wood bending requires considerable force. (“Ch’i Fa” in the Yi Ching shows that the felloes were definitely being bent in the Western Chou, if not earlier.) Moreover, stresses are invariably induced because the wood is compressed on the interior and stretched on the exterior, producing cracks, crazing, and severe fiber separation. Although most wood species can be bent after sufficient conditioning, only a few prove suitable in useful thicknesses and capable of retaining their form without major fissures or fractures.

25 For some examples see Yang Pao-ch’eng, KK 1984:6, 548. The most frequently noted sizes are 7.5 cm. thick by 5.5 cm. wide, 8 by 5 cm., and 8 by 6 cm.

26 Yang Hung, “Erh-lun,” HCCHS 2000:5, 5, gives an average axle estimate of about 300 cm., diameter of 8-10 cm., wheel gauge of about 226 cm., and end caps of 14 cm. (The T’engchou chariot has a 232 cm. gauge.)

27 See Wang Hai-ch’eng, 2002, 25.

28 Sun Chi, KK 1980:5, 448, claims that Shang chariots carried only two men.

29 For a convenient summary of the number of figures per chariot, see the comprehensive tables provided by Wang Hai-ch’eng, 2002, 50-52, which show only three cases of three warriors (for the classic discoveries at Hsiao-t’un), ten with one, and two with two out of a total of thirty-eight entries. (Yang Hung, “Erh-lun,” HCCHS [2000]:5, 4, also includes a brief summary of accompanying warriors.)

30 According to Yang Hung, “Erh-lun,” HCCHS 2000:5, 5. Yang Pao-ch’eng, KK 1984:6, 549, suggests 129-133 cm. by 74 by 45 cm. The compartment at M41 at Mei-yüan-chuang has dimensions of 128 cm. in the front, 144 cm. at the back, a depth of 70 to 75 cm., and a height of 44 cm. (17.32 inches); the southern chariot at M40 is 134 cm. in the front, 146 cm. in the back, and 96 and 82 cm. deep on the sides, with heights of 39 cm. in the front and 50 cm. in the back with an additional crossbar to the front, while the badly damaged northern chariot is 105 cm. wide at the front and 132 cm. at the back with heights of 30 and roughly 40 cm. respectively (“Mei-yüan-chuang,” KK 1998:10, 50 and 57).

31 Shih Chang-ju’s placement of the opening at the front for the chariot at M40 (in “Hsiaot’un Ti-ssu-shih Mu te Cheng-li”) has been rejected by every other analyst, including Yang Paoch’eng (551), who asserts there were not any openings at the front until the late Warring States. (Other aspects of Shih’s reconstruction have also been criticized by, for example, Chang Ch’angshou and Chang Hsiao-kuang, 1986, 155.) However, in a rebuttal Shih has argued that despite most chariots having the opening in the rear, the chariot reconstruction for M40 correctly places it at the front. (See Shih’s “Yin-ch’e Fu-yüan Shuo-ming,” BIHP 58:2, 266-268.) Although a fully open back would facilitate ascending and descending, it would not offer any protection to the highly vulnerable rear.

32 Dowels as thin as 2.5 to 3.0 cm. were occasionally employed for smaller chariots, but Warring States versions sometimes soared over 7 cm. (according to the K’ao-kung Chi), but most were 4 to 5 cm., next in frequency being about 6 cm. (Wang Hai-ch’eng, 2002, 23-25; for an example of 3 cm. see “An-yang Yin-hsü Hsiao-min-t’un te Liang-tso Ch’e-ma-hang,” KK 1971:1, 70).

33 It should be noted that considerable strides have been made in recovery and reconstruction techniques, enabling dimensional estimates that were highly inaccurate or totally impossible a half century ago. Data from the various reports are therefore not uniformly compatible or reliable.

34 “Mei-yüan-chuang,” 64-65.

35 Examples are seen in the reconstructions from M40 at Hsiao-t’un, M40 at Mei-yüan-chuang, and at T’eng-chou. (Note the diagram for the latter, “T’eng-chou-shih,” KK 2000:7, clearly showing a much-reduced chariot compartment depth, implying two occupants rather than three.)

36 “Planning for the State,” Wu-tzu, mentions leather armored chariots with covered wheels and protected hubs. Wang Hai-ch’eng, 2002, 26, believes that the Shang also used walls fabricated from interlaced leather and that leather thongs were employed as upper rails to reduce weight.

37 The large number of bronze fittings (including highly functional axle caps) recovered with every chariot indicates their penchant to decorate every protruding surface. (Of particular interest, the large number of small, somewhat amorphous bronze dragons found at Hsiaot’un’s M40 apparently were arrayed to form a decorative border around the outside edges of the compartment. See Shih Chang-ju, “Hsiao-t’un Ti-ssu-shih Mu te Cheng-li,” 641-643.)

38 Yang Pao-ch’eng, KK 1984:6, 547-548.

39 One of the chariots at M40 also seems to place the axle somewhat to the rear of center.

40 Shih Chang-ju’s original reconstruction of the chariot at Hsiao-t’un’s M40 (663-665) shows them being employed on the axle. However, this aspect was universally rejected because it was generally believed that the “crouching rabbit” was a Chou dynasty innovation. (For example, see Yang Pao-ch’eng, 555.) Chu Ssu-hung and Sung Yüan-ju, KKWW 2002:3, 85, also claim that there is absolutely no evidence for the “fu-t’u” prior to the Chou, and in his subsequent “Yin-ch’e Fu-yüan Shou-ming,” 269, Shih acknowledged his error. However, the chariots recovered from Mei-yüan-chuang, especially from M41 (KKWW 2003:5, 38-41), are said to already employ it, in which case the incipient beginnings can be traced back to innovations at the end of the Shang.

41 For example, at Ta-ssu-k’ung the shaft and axle each have 15 cm.-wide grooves about 6 cm. deep that result in the shaft projecting just 3 cm. above the axle (KK 1974:2, 25).

42 “Mei-yüan-chuang,” KK 1998:10, 41 and 57.

43 See Yang Pao-ch’eng, 549.

44 See, for example, Joseph Needham’s concerns in Physics and Physical Technology: Mechanical Engineering, 303-305.

45 As seen on Ch’in bronze models; however, their use cannot be projected back into the Shang. (For a discussion of harnessing methods see Wang Hai-ch’eng, 2002, 33-37, who concludes that the same yoke saddle method was used in Egypt as in the Shang, or Sun Chi, KK 1980:5, 448-460.)

46 Bridles and harnessing are discussed by Yang Hung in “Erh-lun,” HCCHS 2000:5, 6, and his “Ma-chü te Fa-chan,” WW 1984:9, 45, as well as by Sun Chi.

47 Yang Hung, “Ma-chü te Fa-chan,” 45. Fully formed snaffle bits have been recovered from Han dynasty sites, suggesting that they may have appeared in the late Warring States period. However, a bit formed from two figure-eight pieces is already visible in remains from Mei-yüan-chuang (“Mei-yüan-chuang,” 51-52). For additional discussion also see Wang Hai-ch’eng, 2002, 27-28.

48 Numerous articles and a few books by Stuart Piggot, Robert Drews, and David W. Anthony have discussed, even vehemently argued, the horse and chariot’s history in the West.

49 Four-wheeled war wagons are not unknown, but two-wheeled vehicles induce less drag and are easier to maneuver under identical loads, though they obviously have less carrying capacity.

50 Robert Drews’s theory about the demise of chariot warfare in the West around 1200 BCE, as reprised in his End of the Bronze Age, tends to dominate current reconstructions.

51 For a brief summary of these positions see Wang Hai-ch’eng, 2002, 2-3 and 45-46.

52 Decades ago Hayashi Minao, Toho Gakuho, 225, confidently asserted that the Shang had chariots by 1300 BCE and that they were used in hunting, whereas Edward L. Shaughnessy, HJAS 48, no. 1 (1988): 190, holds that the chariot’s introduction should be dated to 1200 BCE.

53 Based on a detailed reexamination of Chinese and Western artifacts, Wang Hai-ch’eng’s recent overview concludes the chariot was imported from the steppe. However, for an example of the ongoing arguments for indigenous origination, see Wang Hsüeh-jung, 1999, 239-247. (Wang opts for indigenous origination because all the necessary elements—tools, bronze, and technology—were all advancing at the same time, and some archaeological indications of earlier use, such as small hub caps, have been ignored. He also claims that other animals were employed, including sheep and oxen.)

54 See David W. Anthony, The Horse, the Wheel, and Language, 200 ff. (Anthony’s views, being the best substantiated and argued, are adopted herein. However, other theories have been proposed, particularly by Marija Gimbutas.)

55 Anthony, 216-222. In an earlier article Anthony’s conclusions were somewhat more conservative, 3500 to 3000 BCE. (See Anthony and Brown, Antiquity 74 [2000]: 76; see also Anthony and Brown, Antiquity 65 [1991]: 22-38, now outdated.) However, opposing views about the origins of riding range from outright rejection of horses ever being ridden before they were harnessed to chariots to a grudging recognition of the possibility while dismissing any military activity or significance until nearly 1000 BCE. (For one overview, see Robert Drews, Early Riders.)

56 One question that might well arise from this initial use of horses for riding and raiding is why chariots ever developed as a war vehicle, particularly since they seem to have functioned solely as command and archery platforms. Cavalry can also fight dismounted, just as many chariot warriors historically did in the West.

57 Anthony, The Horse, the Wheel, and Language, 66-72.

58 One argument against a steppe origination is the reputedly small size of these chariots, making them unstable at speed and incapable of carrying more than a single warrior. However, Anthony (399-403) points out that numerous javelin points have been found with several chariots that have a gauge of 1.4 to 1.6 m., suggesting the driver-warrior employed a javelin as his primary means of combat.

59 Although many aspects remain nebulous because of the inherent difficulty posed by reconstruction efforts, the priorities of the excavators, and problems of access, enough information is available in secondary publications to tentatively establish the basic features and dimensions.

60 See Li Shui-cheng, 2002, 171-182; Mei Jianjun, 2003, 1-39; and Mei Jianjun, BMFEA 75 (2003): 31-54. See also Stuart Piggott, Antiquity 48 (1974): 16-24.

61 The question of whether key discoveries ranging from metallurgy to stirrups are repeated as an artifact of human experience or, because they are inevitably singular, must be transmitted, underpins any debate on the chariot’s origination in China.

62 For reports see SHYCS Erh-li-t’ou Kung-tso-tui, KK 2004:11, 3-13, and Wang Hsün, KKWW 1997:3, 61-68.

63 For reports see SHYCS Ho-nan Ti-erh Kung-tso-tui, KK 1998:6, 3; Tu Chin-p’eng et al., KK 1998:6, 13-14; and Robin Yates, “The Horse in Early Chinese Military History,” 26-27.

64 Wang Hsüeh-jung, 1999, 239-247, reflecting on the discovery of narrow cart tracks at Yen-shih Shang-ch’eng, notes that they are beneath the inner protective wall; their gauge is 1.2 m.; the ruts are 20 cm. wide but only 3 to 5 cm. deep (implying a brief period of use); and they lie only 20 to 30 cm. from the core wall, so they must have been used to haul soil for it.

65 Feng Hao, KKWW 2003:5, 38-41.

66 For a brief summary of the individual aspects, see Wang Hai-ch’eng, 2002, 7-9. (Wang concludes importation to be fully proven, a conclusion that Yang Hung also came to accept in his “Erh Lun.”)

67 For an early form of this conclusion see Cheng Te-k’un, Archaeology in China: Chou China, 265-272, or Kawamata Masanori, Koshi Shunju 4 (1987): 35-58.

CHAPTER 21

1 Minimal numbers of bones have been discovered at the Yangshao cultural site of Pan-p’o and the Lungshan site of Pao-t’ou Chuan-lung-ts’ang, creating a sort of thread through time. (See Wang Hsün, KKWW 1997:3, 61-68.) The early (Lungshan) Shang site of T’ang-yang Pai-chü also shows evidence of horse raising, as does Ch’eng-tzu-yai. The Anyang area shows a distinct lack of bones except when deliberately interred in graves or horse-and-chariot pits. (See Yüan Ching and T’ang Chi-ken, KK 2000:11, 75-81, who, however, conclude that horses were being imported and rather than eaten, interred with the deceased. Wang Hai-ch’eng, 2002, 38-40 and 47-52, provides a summary of current knowledge.)

2 For example, see Shih Chang-ju, KKHP 2 (1947): 21-22. As already noted, it has been claimed that Shang intelligence efforts relied on mounted riders and that small contingents of “horse” sometimes preceded the army into the field. Although the complete lack of evidence strongly implies that early riding simply did not exist, insofar as the absence of evidence doesn’t prove nonexistence and it seems unlikely that people working closely with horses would not have begun riding, if only for herding, training, and control purposes, dogmatic assertions of impossibility are hardly justified. Moreover, if Anthony’s view that the horse was ridden even before the chariot appeared is correct, this knowledge would certainly have accompanied the chariot’s introduction into China.

3 Wang Yü-hsin, CKSYC 1980:1, 99-108; Liu Yi-man and Ts’ao Ting-yün, HCCHS 2005:5, 24-32. (For examples of horse-focused inquiries see HJ22247 and HJ22347.) The “Hsi-ts’u” in the Yi Ching also suggests horses were classified by their distinctive features, including colors.

4 Wang Yü-hsin, 99-105.

5 Prognosticatory inquiries reflect this importance insofar as humans and oxen were the most likely sacrificial offerings, followed by sheep, pigs, dogs, and finally horses. (Liu and Ts’ao, 29, estimate that queries about oxen or men number somewhere between 300 and 1,000; those for sheep, pigs, or dogs about 100; and only a few refer to horses. However, horses captured from steppe enemies seem to have sometimes been sacrificed. [See Wang Yü-hsin, 106.])

6 Tso Chuan, Chuang Kung, eighteenth year, records that a king gave three horses each to several feudal lords to preserve their loyalty. (Even the refugee Ch’ung Erh was twice given twenty teams of four horses as a hedge against his enmity should he become powerful [Tso Chuan, Hsi Kung, twenty-third year].)

7 Tso Chuan, Hsüan Kung, second year. (He managed to escape when only half had been paid.)

8 Tso Chuan, Hsiang Kung, second year. (Ch’i had mounted a generally successful invasion of Lai.)

9 Found in the Tso Chuan, Kung-yang, and Ku-liang for Hsi Kung’s second year, the episode is reprised in numerous early Warring States and Han texts, including the Han Fei-tzu (“Shih Kuo”), Shuo Yüan, and Ch’un-ch’iu Fan-lu, generally being employed to illustrate shortsightedness. It is also retold in the Chan-kuo Ts’e and Shih Chi; is included in the Thirty-six Strategies; and numbers as one of the important examples of unorthodox techniques in the military writings (such as the Wu-ching Tsung-yao’s “Ch’i Ping”). (For further discussion see Sawyer, The Tao of Deception.)

10 Or, according to the Ku-liang, their teeth had grown longer.

11 Note, for example, “Shan Kuo Kuei,” Kuan-tzu. China’s “horse problem” and its ill-fated attempts to rectify the shortage in later centuries have been extensively discussed in recent articles.

12 Kung-tzu Chia-yü.

13 “Horses’ Hooves,” Chuang-tzu.

14 An incident in the Chan-kuo Ts’e (“Chao,” 4) affirms the general recognition that specialized knowledge is required to select horses, neither a well-known administrator nor one of the king’s concubines being considered capable of buying a horse. This belief is further reflected in two tales about Po Le. In the first, a merchant whose superlative horse had drawn no interest despite having been displayed in the market for three days paid him to simply look at it intently for a few moments and then glance at it over his shoulder as he walked away, manifesting an appearance of interest. Being observed, his behavior increased the horse’s value tenfold (Chan-kuo Ts’e, “Yen,” 2). In the second, Po recognized the great stallion Chi even though he had become decrepit and reduced to hauling salt wagons (Chan-kuo Ts’e, “Ch’u,” 4).

15 See Liu Yi-man and Ts’ao Ting-yün, HCCHS 2005:5, 28; Wang Yü-hsin, CKSYC 1980:1, 101.

16 The last four characters comprise a well-known Chinese aphorism generally translated as “eject the bit and gnaw the reins,” which is generally understood as meaning “the more you force a horse, the more it resists.” Although the dynamic tension of most bridles, coupled with their “oppressive” cheek pieces, makes it difficult to spit out a well-fitted bit, horses reportedly have other ways of shifting it onto their back teeth or chomping down on it, thwarting its effects. (The terms found in this passage have widely differing interpretations; the translation is, at best, an approximation of Chuang-tzu’s intent.)

17 The “Hsing-chün Hsü-chih” section of the Sung dynasty Wu-ching Tsung-yao contains a section on “Selecting Horses” (“Hsüan Ma”) for the cavalry that emphasizes the same ideas of measure and constraint. The text notes that horses are sensitive, riders and horses need to know each other, and training is required; “if the horses and men have not been trained, they cannot engage in battle.” The Wu-tzu states: “Only after the men and horses have become attached to each other can they be employed.” Even the trainer’s suitability was the subject of Shang divinatory inquiry (Wang Yü-hsin, 101).

18 “Hsing Shih” and “Hsing Shih Chieh,” Kuan-tzu.

19 “Hsiao Ch’eng,” Kuan-tzu.

20 “Yen Hui,” Kung-tzu Chia-yü.

21 In 549 BCE, Chin attacked Ch’i, prompting Ch’u to strike Chin’s ally of Cheng in order to draw off the invaders. After both sides had deployed, the Duke of Chin selected two men to ride forth and pique Ch’u. Because they were fighting within Cheng, they in turn asked Cheng to provide a chariot driver (who would be familiar with the terrain). However, being hot tempered, the driver didn’t react well to being forced to wait outside their tent while they ate. Therefore, when they had embarked on their mission and the two were riding in the chariot, nonchalantly playing their instruments, he suddenly rode into the enemy, compelling them to dismount and fight. However, the driver then turned about and started to depart, forcing them to hastily jump on before they cut down their pursuers with arrows. After the mission’s completion they severely berated him because all men in a chariot are supposedly brothers. At the Battle of Ta-chi another experienced warrior, disgruntled that he had been bypassed when the pre-battle feast of lamb had been portioned out, deliberately drove the commander’s chariot into the enemy, resulting in his capture (Tso Chuan, Hsüan Kung 2, 607 BCE). Incidents such as these suggest that penetrating the enemy’s ranks was not a primary chariot function.

22 Tso Chuan, Ch’eng Kung, sixteenth year.

23 Tso Chuan, Hsi Kung, fifteenth year. Although the dialogue is certainly a late reconstruction and may be completely fictional, it doesn’t lessen the validity of the insights or recognition of the need for horses to be well trained prior to combat employment.

24 Not being Spring and Autumn concepts, ch’i and yin are both anachronistic.

25 “Ma Chiang” (“Horse Generals,” synonymous with “cavalry generals”).

26 Tso Chuan, Hsüan Kung, twelfth year.

27 As does Xenophon in The Cavalry Commander.

28 A similar statement (which will be cited below) is found in Sun Pin’s Military Methods.

29 “Obligations of the Son of Heaven.”

30 Wu-tzu 3, “Controlling the Army.”

31 Because the dialogue is prefaced by Marquis Wu asking whether “there are methods for taking care of the chariots and cavalry” and cavalry appears as a referent in the second paragraph, some analysts have dated the work to the late Warring States or early Han. However, most of the contents reflect chariot practices; references to cavalry may simply be later editorial accretions.

32 The Hu-ch’ien Ching includes a chapter titled “Cheng Ma” (“Expeditionary Horses”) that specifies the regulations that should govern the care and use of army horses and emphasizes the need to find grass and water. In addition to citing a number of measures from the Wu-tzu, it discusses several steps for securing the camp, including putting donkeys on the perimeter to thwart raiders.

33 Cited in Wu-pei Chih, chüan 141.

34 For a discussion of the horse’s inherent symbolism and felt power, see Elizabeth A. Lawrence, Hoof beats and Society.

35 Gallic War, Book 4.

36 Tso Chuan, Chao Kung, first year. This episode, historically considered an example of unorthodox innovation, will be more fully reprised in the next section. (For further discussion of the unorthodox aspects, see Sawyer, Tao of Deception.) Somewhat more than two centuries later King Chao Wu-ling’s forceful adoption of barbarian dress to facilitate the cavalry’s development evoked similar opposition.

37 The Ku-chin T’u-shu Chi-ch’eng (chüan 34 of “Shen Yi Tien”) also preserves information on the seasonal horse sacrifice in its section “Ma Shen” (“Horse Spirits”).

38 The selections are taken from “Ma Chan,” which itself contains sections entitled “Horse Divination” (ma chan) from the Sung Shu and “Horse Oddities” (ma yi) collected from the Chou onward.

39 In many cases a single chariot and a pair of horses have been found together, though there are also instances of multiple chariots with correspondingly larger numbers of horses. Whether buried intact or in sections, Shang chariots exist mainly as vestiges, just impressions in the sand. The horses are normally aligned along the shaft and the deceased is sometimes accompanied by dogs or grooms.

40 Ch’ien-pien 2.19.1 refers to 20 pairs, while HJ21777 and HJ11459 each note 50 pairs. According to Li Hsüeh-ch’in, HCCHS 2005:4, 38-40, a Chou fragment has 200 plus 50 for 250 pairs.

41 Based on finds at Hsiao-t’un Kung-tien-ch’ü, M20, Shih Chang-ju concluded that a Shang chariot that employed four horses had been discovered, but his conclusions have generally been challenged and Shih subsequently recanted his conclusion in “Shuo-ming.” However, it continues to be cited as evidence that four-horse chariots existed in the Shang. (Based on the excavation of at least two late tombs in which four horses had been offered in sacrifice, Yang Pao-ch’eng, KK 1984:6, 547, similarly concluded that the Shang started using teams of four. However, in the absence of definitive evidence that the four were actually harnessed together, they might represent two teams of two.)

42 This is the view long held by a number of analysts in varying degree, including Kawamata Masanori, Koshi Shunju 4 (1987): 38-58.

43 Some interments contain astonishing numbers of horses. For example, at Lin-tzu in Shandong, site of the ancient state of Ch’i, one assemblage dating to Duke Chin’s era (547-489 BCE) contains 600 skeletons, of which 228 have been excavated. “Kuei Tu” in the Kuan-tzu speaks of an army of a million men that includes 10,000 chariots and 40,000 horses, clearly a ratio of four horses to one vehicle.

44 For example, although a Kuo noblewoman named Liang Chi was accompanied by nineteen chariots and thirty-eight horses, thus meeting the rule for a single pair, she far exceeded the allowable five chariots and ten horses that her status allowed. Conspicuous consumption became so ostentatious that critics not only decried the trend and abuses of privilege, but also concluded that they indicated character flaws. Even a high polish could indicate weakness of character and presage ill results (Tso Chuan, Hsiang Kung, twenty-eighth year). Similarly, Kuan-tzu (“Li Cheng,” 4) notes that opulent chariots are a sign of misplaced priorities; the Yi Ching’s “Chieh” observes that inappropriately riding in a chariot only attracts robbers.

45 See Chou Hsin-fang, CKSYC 2007:1, 41-57. Chou concludes that privileges were not really systematized until Ch’in Shih-huang’s reign; six were employed by both the king and feudal lords, and the question of the emperor having six stemmed from an ongoing debate between old and new text schools.

46 Tombs from the earls of Wei in the Western Chou at Hsin-ts’un in Chün-hsien have yielded twelve chariots and seventy-two horses—a very early, quite substantial representation of six horses per chariot, including one described as a war chariot. (See Hu-pei-sheng K’ao-ku-suo, KK 2003:7, 51-52.)

CHAPTER 22

1 For representative viewpoints see Ku Chieh-kang and Yang Hsiang-k’uei, 1937, 39-54; E. L. Shaughnessy, “Historical Perspectives,” 199, 213-221; Herrlee G. Creel, 1970; or Hayashi Minao, Toho Gakuho 29 (1959): 278.

2 “Obligations of the Son of Heaven.”

3 See Shaughnessy, “Historical Perspectives,” 220-224.

4 See Shaughnessy, 216. As noted, the term for horses, ma, is generally understood as referring to chariots. Ironically, the inscription refers to the king (rather inauspiciously) falling out of his chariot.

5 “Determining Rank,” Ssu-ma Fa.

6 For example, see “The Army’s Equipment,” Liu-t’ao.

7 “The Army’s Equipment.”

8 “Determining Rank,” Ssu-ma Fa.

9 “Equivalent Forces,” Liu-t’ao.

10 “Equivalent Forces,” Liu-t’ao.

11 “Planning for the Army.”

12 “The Army’s Equipment.”

13 “The Army’s Equipment.”

14 “Equivalent Forces.” The text includes ratios for cavalry as well, noting that when “not engaged in battle one cavalryman is unable to equal one foot soldier” and considers one chariot to be equivalent to ten cavalrymen on easy terrain and six on difficult ground.

15 Questions and Replies.

16 Questions and Replies. This aspect continued to be emphasized in the chariot warfare section of the Ts’ao-lü Ching-lüeh, which quotes Li Ching in this regard.

17 For an overview see “Yung Ch’e” in the Wu-ching Tsung-yao. (Li Ching also discusses this aspect with regard to his own campaign against the Turks.) In “Military Instructions II” the Wei Liao-tzu mentions employing “a wall of chariots to create a solid defense in order to oppress the enemy and stop them” and “‘arraying the chariots’ refers to making the formations tight with the spears deployed to the front and putting blinders on the horses’ eyes.”

18 Wu-ching Tsung-yao, Ch’ien-chi, chüan 4.

19 The Tso Chuan contains accounts (such as Hsiang Kung, eighteenth year) in which ta ch’e (great vehicles) are connected together to block a defile.

20 “Employing Chariots,” Wu-ching Tsung-yao.

21 For an example of four occupants, see Tso Chuan, Chao Kung, twentieth year. At Kuo-chia-chuang only two people were buried with the chariot; many other interments have only one.

22 “Five Instructions,” Military Methods.

23 “Martial Chariot Warriors,” Liu-t’ao. The Chinese foot at the time of the Liu-t’ao’s compilation was about eight inches. (The passage reflects the inception of cavalry.)

24 For an example see Tso Chuan, Hsiang Kung, thirty-first year.

25 Tso Chuan, Ch’eng Kung, second year. Prior to the battle Han dreamt his father told him not to stand to the side.

26 In 251 BCE, Yen, despite being a peripheral state, attacked Chao with 600,000 men and 2,000 chariots, one of the rare instances of a 300:1 ratio.

27 A Tso Chuan passage on Ch’u’s organization (known as the “double battalion of King Chuang”) gave rise to considerable confusion over the centuries and prompted a pointed discussion in the Questions and Replies. (See Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, 331.)

28 “Ta Ch’en.”

29 “Ta Ch’en,” “Hsiao K’uang.”

30 “Sheng Ma.” “Shan Chih Shu” also refers to a chariot having twenty-eight men.

31 “Ta Ch’en.”

32 In his discussion of the Hsin Shu’s chariot methods Li Ching concluded that troops were attached only to the attack chariots.

33 See “The Army’s Equipment,” which allocates fixed numbers of infantry to the roughly 600 specialized chariots integrated into the ideal 10,000-man army.

34 The reconstruction discussed above, advanced by Yen Yi-p’ing, NS 7 (1983): 16-28, is based on extensive reports from Yin-hsü and suggestions made by Shih Chang-ju. (See KKHP 2 [1947]: 1-81, especially 15-24 on chariots, weapons, and personnel, and BIHP 40 [1969:11]: 630-634, as well as Shih’s response to various criticisms, BIHP 58:2 [1987:6]: 273-276.)

35 Shih Chang-ju arbitrarily explained away one potential problem—the apparent existence of two chariots in each of the two graves at the top—by deeming the second one an auxiliary vehicle because it lacked any “occupants.” However, other explanations are possible, including that the fundamental unit should be seven chariots rather than five or that the other two were scout or reconnaissance vehicles.

36 The issue of five—whether the base of five included the respective unit-level leaders or they were additional—plagues historical reconstructions of Chinese military organization. If the rule of five is rigorously carried out, 5 men comprise a squad, 5 squads a company of 25, 5 companies a battalion of 125, 5 battalions a regiment of 625, 5 regiments a shih or army of 3,125, and 5 armies a division or chün of 15,625, numbers that do not cohere with the commonly discussed 2,500 for an army or shih and 12,500 for a division or chün. Moreover, there is always the question whether the officers constitute additional personnel or are to be subsumed within the respective units, posing insurmountable problems at the highest level because squad members suddenly have multiple ranks. (One ad hoc explanation envisions the lower leaders coming from within the unit but the higher ones being additional.)

37 Yen Yi-p’ing, NS 7 (1983): 28.

38 See E. L. Shaughnessy’s comments, HJAS 48, no. 1 (1988): 194-199. Shaughnessy notes that half the graves have been ignored.

39 Tso Chuan, Chao Kung, twenty-first year. According to “Ming Kuei” in the Mo-tzu, King T’ang employed the goose formation when attacking Chieh, the Hsia’s last tyrant.

40 Texts such as the Wei Liao-tzu (“Offices, 1”) state: “The Whirlwind Formation and swift chariots are the means by which to pursue a fleeing enemy.”

41 “Equivalent Forces.” Further discussion of how the vastly increased number of chariots and infantry seen in the Warring States period actually functioned must be deferred. However, larger numbers simply exacerbate problems of coordination and the overall congestion, particularly if the chariots and infantry are not segregated and employed in distinctly different modes.

42 “Ten Questions,” Military Methods.

43 Tso Chuan, Hsi Kung, twenty-eighth year. The Battle of Ch’eng-p’u, included among the examples in the Wu-ching Tsung-yao’s “Ch’üan Ch’i,” has been the subject of innumerable articles over the years and is extensively discussed in the two major Chinese military histories. Further explication in English may also be found in Frank A. Kierman Jr., “Phases and Modes of Combat in Early China.”

44 “Waging War.”

45 “Stimulating the Officers,” Wu-tzu. The passage states: “Marquis Wu assented to his plan, granting him another 500 strong chariots and 3,000 cavalry. They destroyed Ch’in’s 500,000 man army as a result of his policy to encourage the officers.” However, it should be noted that the mention of cavalry, adamantly said not to exist in Wu Ch’i’s era, has raised doubts about the passage’s veracity.

46 For a theoretical example see “Responding to Change” in the Wu-tzu, where 1,000 chariots and 10,000 cavalry are to be divided into five operating groups supported by infantry. Similarly, when encountering the enemy in a confined valley, the chariots are to be divided into operational groups, four of which should conceal themselves on the sides to constrain the enemy’s options and mount ambushes. In “Eight Formations” Sun Pin also stressed dividing the chariots into discrete operational contingents (though without mentioning infantry) and suiting their numbers to the terrain’s characteristics.

47 “When the Three Armies are united as one man they will conquer. There are drums (directing the deployment of ) the flags and pennants; drums for the chariots; drums for the horses (cavalry); drums for the infantry; drums for the different types of troops; drums for the head; and drums for the feet. All seven should be properly prepared and ordered” (“Strict Positions,” Ssu-ma Fa). Sun-tzu also speaks about multiplying the drums to ensure strong control.

CHAPTER 23

1 Herrlee G. Creel, 1970, 262-282, was among the first to question the chariot’s capabilities. Studies of the chariot’s history and impact in the West by noted historians such as John Keegan and others have similarly debated its real combat role.

2 For a discussion of poisoning water supplies in Chinese warfare, see Sawyer, Fire and Water.

3 “Wen” in the Kuan-tzu discusses the importance of enumerating the state’s resources, including the artisans who can be employed on expeditionary campaigns.

4 In addition to various grooms and ordinary stable hands, designated personnel were responsible for lubricating the axles in the Spring and Autumn. (See Tso Chuan, Hsiang Kung, thirty-first year and Ai Kung, third year.) A few oracular inscriptions suggest the Shang experienced some of these problems.

5 Tso Chuan, Ai Kung, second year.

6 Tso Chuan, Hsi Kung, fifteenth year.

7 For example, see the incident preserved in Tso Chuan, Chao Kung, twenty-first year.

8 Tso Chuan, Ch’eng Kung, sixteenth year.

9 “Waging War.” He also states that seven-tenths of the people’s resources will be consumed.

10 “Waging War.”

11 Tso Chuan, Ch’eng Kung, second year.

12 Tso Chuan, Hsiang Kung, twenty-third year.

13 Tso Chuan, Ch’eng Kung, second year.

14 Tso Chuan, Hsüan Kung, twelfth year.

15 “Responding to Change,” Wu-tzu.

16 As recounted in Judges 4 and 5. (Since Barak’s troops came down from the mountain, it wasn’t the hilly terrain that proved inimical, but the rain, noted only in the poeticized account in Judges 5.)

17 “Ten Deployments,” Military Methods.

18 For example, as when the state of Chin attacked Cheng at T’ung-ch’iu in 468 BCE.

19 Ch’eng Kung, sixteenth year. In the incident already discussed in which horses unfamiliar with the terrain were employed, the chariot turned into a mire and was halted. (Tso Chuan, Hsi Kung, fifteeth year.)

20 The identification of terrain-imposed limitations certainly dates back to the Western Chou, but the first articulation is found in the Art of War.

21 “Ti T’u,” presumably a late Warring States chapter.

22 “Hsiao K’uang,” Kuan-tzu.

23 “Ten Questions,” Sun Pin Military Methods.

24 For a brief retelling of the incident, see Sawyer, Tao of Deception, 189-191.

25 Tso Chuan, Ch’eng Kung, seventh year. The Sichuan area similarly lagged behind in their employment. (The Pei-cheng Lü [chüan 7] makes the point that environment shapes natural tendencies and that skills in riding or using boats best derive from familiarity from an early age rather than from instruction. Thus Wu naturally inclined to boats and Chin to cavalry.)

26 “Battle Chariots” states: “The infantry values knowing changes and movement; the chariots value knowing the terrain’s configuration; and the cavalry values knowing the side roads and the Tao of the unorthodox.”

27 “Battle Chariots.”

28 They essentially replicate a series found in the Wu-tzu’s “Responding to Change” in which victory is inevitable. (Generally speaking, the Wu-tzu is less concerned with tactics than with the essential principles governing chariot operations that have already been discussed for the horses, and it is only in the Liu-t’ao that their battlefield exploitation becomes apparent.)

29 Sun Pin, for example, asserted that in a dispersed deployment the “chariots do not race, the infantry does not run” (“Ten Deployments,” Military Methods).

30 If a chariot with wheels about 3 feet in diameter (and therefore with a circumference of nearly 9.5 feet) was moving at the still-significant speed of 5 miles an hour or about 440 feet per minute, the wheel would be turning at about 46 rpm. One revolution per second would have been slow enough for the most unskilled warrior to insert a spear near the outer rim between the spokes. Larger wheels would have been even slower, but higher speeds of 10 mph would still have been feasible.

31 Tso Chuan, Yin Kung, ninth year. Even if a late fabrication, it no doubt reflects concepts common at the time of compilation in the Warring States period.

32 For further discussion see Sawyer, Tao of Deception, 23-24.

33 Tso Chuan, Chao Kung, first year. Li Ching cites this episode as an example of the unorthodox in Questions and Replies. However, Li Ching thought they still represented chariot tactics even though they were deployed as infantrymen. (For further discussion, see Sawyer, Tao of Deception, 38-40.)

34 Duke Ai, second year, records that a battle commander riding in a chariot was brought down by a spear.

35 For example, see Tso Chuan, Chao Kung, twenty-sixth year.

36 For an example, see Tso Chuan, Ai Kung, second year.

37 Tso Chuan, Ch’eng Kung, sixteenth year. Incidents of pursuit and seizure are recorded in Homeric warfare, and several well-publicized experiments with replica chariots in the West have shown that foot soldiers could have easily surrounded and overtaken chariots in the melee’s chaos.

38 “The Infantry in Battle,” Liu-t’ao.

39 T’ai Kung’s assertion attracted T’ang T’ai-tsung’s attention because it contradicted Sun-tzu’s admonitions. (See Book III of Questions and Replies.)

40 Examples are found in the Liu-t’ao chapter “Certain Escape,” including (in “Incendiary Warfare”) employing the chariots to thwart incendiary attacks.

41 For examples, see “Crow and Cloud Formation in the Mountains,” Liu-t’ao.

42 Caltrops, which might be conceived of as primitive land mines, repeatedly proved highly effective in stopping enemy advances and shaping the battlefield. (For examples of the types of caltrops and their modes of use, see “The Infantry in Battle.”)

43 In an odd illustration, Shih Chang-ju, BIHP 40 (1969:11), 666, places the archer on the right side of the chariot. (In the illustration both the chariot’s occupants and the horses are too small in comparison with the diameter of the wheels. However, the occupants are still tightly confined.)

44 For further analysis see Yang Hung’s classic discussion in “Chan-ch’e yü Ch’e-chan.”

45 In the Tso Chuan (Hsiang Kung, twenty-third year) a fighter who asks permission to act as the warrior on the right leaps aboard the chariot and, wielding a “sword” in his right hand, grasps the strap (or possibly the traces holding the outer horses) with his left.

CHAPTER 24

1 See Domicio Proenca Jr. and E. E. Duarte, Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 645- 677. Useful discussions of logistics include Martin Van Crevald, Supplying War; John Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars; and Kenneth Macksey, For Want of a Nail.

2 The classic study is Donald W. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistic of the Macedonian Army.

3 The early sixth-century BCE Chou vessel known as the Tao Ting Ming records men being locally sent out to confiscate rice and millet.

4 “King’s Wings,” Liu-t’ao. This is also the first known description of a general staff.

5 For the nature and history of water denial measures, see Sawyer, Fire and Water.

6 The Art of War mentions thirst and the Ssu-ma Fa includes water among its seven administrative affairs in “Determining Rank.”

7 “Encouraging the Army” in the Six Secret Teachings emphasizes that the true general shares “hunger and satiety with the men.”

8 Studies of ancient Chinese logistics are extremely rare, basically limited to Yang Sheng-nan’s fiscally oriented work, LSYC 1992:5, 81-94, and part of the Hou-ch’in Chih-tu, edited by T’ung Chao (1997).

9 “Waging War.” A chapter titled “Ch’ing-chung Chia” in the Kuan-tzu generally dated to the second century BCE similarly notes that an army of 100,000 chi bearers will exhaust all the firewood and grass for ten li and a single day’s combat will cost 1,000 chin (units of gold).

10 “Employing Spies.” The “Pa Kuan” (“Eight Observations”) section of the Kuan-tzu similarly speaks about the dire impact of having just one-tenth of the populace serve in the military for extended terms.

11 “Waging War.”

12 Under Duke Ai’s second year the Tso Chuan records the capture of an astonishing 1,000 wagons (ch’e) filled with grain that was being transported to another area.

13 “Orders for the Vanguard.”

14 “Nine Terrains,” Art of War.

15 See, among several, T’ung Chao, Hou-ch’in Chih-tu, 25.

16 The Ssu-ma Fa counsels restraint, but “Martial Plans” and “Military Instructions II” in the Wei Liao-tzu also advocate not disturbing the farmers. Probably the earliest prohibition against disturbing farmers and their animals is embedded in the “Fei Shih” section of the Shang Shu.

17 “Controlling the Army,” Wu-tzu.

18 “Crow and Cloud Formation in the Marshes.” “Cavalry in Battle” also refers to the problems posed by an enemy having cut off the supply lines.

19 “Secret Tallies.”

20 “Evaluating the Enemy.” Victory is so certain that divination, then a fundamental prebattle practice, was deemed unnecessary.

21 “Fatal terrain,” a well-developed concept in China’s sophisticated martial psychology, is first articulated in “Nine Terrains” in Art of War, but “Certain Escape” in the Six Secret Teachings advises burning the supply wagons to elicit this sort of unshakable commitment.

22 “Tactical Balance of Power in Attacks,” Wei Liao-tzu.

23 “Tactical Balance of Power in Defense,” Wei Liao-tzu.

24 The Wei Liao-tzu stressed the connection in “Discussion of Regulations.” Shang Yang’s reforms are credited with significantly shaping Ch’in’s martial character.

25 “Maneuvering the Army,” Art of War. The chapter adds: “If they kill their horses and eat the meat, the army lacks grain.” (For a general discussion of assessment and deception in field reconnaissance, see “Field Intelligence” in Sawyer, Tao of Spycraft.)

26 “Military Instructions II,” Wei Liao-tzu.

27 “Military Pronouncements.” The last section parallels a passage in the Kuan-tzu’s “Pa Kuan.”

28 His ingenuity is cited to illustrate the topic of “The Hungry” in the Hundred Unorthodox Strategies.

29 For a brief discussion of the growth of animal husbandry, see Yen Wen-ming, SCKKLC, 351-361.

30 The Art of War admonishes commanders not to target fortified cities for siege or assault.

31 Ch’en Chien-hua, CKSYC 4 (2004): 3-14.

32 For relevant inscriptions see Chin Hsiang-heng, “San-hang San-shih,” 1974, 7-8.

33 “Waging War.” “Pa Kuan” (“Eight Observations”) in the Kuan-tzu notes that having to transport provisions about the countryside due to production and distribution problems will quickly deplete a state’s reserves and ultimately cause famine.

34 See, for example, T’ung Chao, Hou-ch’in Chih-tu, 1997, 23.

35 T’ung Chao, Hou-ch’in Chih-tu, 20-21.

36 T’ung Chao (25) sees them as a sort of early version of the t’un-t’ien system.

37 Unfortunately none of the volumes on China’s transport history, including Wang Chan-yi’s massive Chung-kuo Ku-tai Tao-lu Chiao-t’ung-shih, does more than speculate on the pre-Chou period.

CHAPTER 25

1 Several books have recently tried to debunk the ardently held view of early societies being tranquil and cooperative, untarnished by conflict and warfare.

2 The tendency to idealize prehistoric societies even within the late Neolithic horizon as matriarchal and thus egalitarian can, for example, be seen in Yen Wen-ming’s 1988 article on Pan-p’o. Pan-p’o already shows strong defensive characteristics and evidence of warfare, yet the article asserts production and consumption were undertaken in common and the society was marked by equality.

3 Conflict is thus thought to have beset the central Hua-Hsia and Yi cultures even in the archaic period, reflecting the basic dichotomization of east and west.

4 “Wei 2.” Chan-kuo Ts’e, states that the “Tung Yi populace did not arise.” (For further discussion see Wang Yü-ch’eng, CKSYC 1986:3, 71-84.)

5 To take just one example, P’ei An-p’ing, WW 2007:7, 75-80, 96, traces the origin of (provocatory) privileges and private property to about 4500 BCE, about the time of Ch’eng-t’ou-shan.

6 In addition, as attested by a large number of artifacts but sparse locally available materials, stone weapons production became specialized. (See, for example, Li Hsin-wei, KK 2008:6, 58-68.)

7 T’ai-p’ing Yü-lan, chüan 193.

8 Analysts such as Hsü Hung, STWMYC, 286-295, have recently been scrutinizing the ancient period in an attempt to formulate some defining characteristics for different types of sites.

9 Two examples are the prominent but discontinuous 500-meter-long, 10-meter-wide ditch in the northeastern corner of Erh-li-t’ou and a 110-meter-long, 14-meter-wide remnant just north of the Shang capital of Yen-shih. (For a report on the former, see Hsü Hung et al., KK 2004:11, 23-31; for the latter, see SHYCS Ho-nan Erh-tui, KK 2000:7, 1-12.)

10 “Military Disposition.”

11 Some upon being abandoned, though for unknown reasons.

12 “Shih Chih Chieh,” Yi Chou-shu. This incident makes up a pair with one previously cited from the Yi Chou-shu to illustrate the belief that “one who practices warfare ceaselessly will perish.” An idea that probably originated in the Spring and Autumn period, it is manifestly expressed in the Ssu-ma Fa, which states that “even though a state may be vast, those who love warfare will inevitably perish. Even though calm may prevail under Heaven, those who forget warfare will certainly be endangered.” In “Audience with King Wei” Sun Pin similarly said: “Victory in warfare is the means by which to preserve vanquished states and continue severed generations. Not being victorious in warfare is the means by which to diminish territory and endanger the altars of state. For this reason military affairs must be investigated. Yet one who takes pleasure in the military will perish and one who finds profit in victory will be insulted. The military is not something to take pleasure in, victory not something through which to profit.” The Art of War is of course particularly known for its assertion that “warfare is the greatest affair of state, the Tao to survival or extinction.”

13 “Audience with King Wei.”

14 For productive distribution see Chen Fangmei, JEAA 2, nos. 1-2 (2000): 228. (The Shang’s fundamentally strong martial orientation is well attested by the high proportion of weapons found in the Anyang area.)

15 See Yen Wen-ming, KKWW 1982:2, 38-41, or Shao Wangping, JEAA 2, nos. 1-2 (2000): 199.

16 Western battle scenes from Sumer and Egypt dating to the third millennium BCE are well-known, so finding evidence for warfare in China of comparable age should not be unexpected. Yet it is frequently explained away as post-death treatment of the body or other benign activity, including accidental death or reinterment. Moreover, one of the main problems in discriminating between combat casualties and sacrificial victims is the tendency to presuppose an absence of conflict and view any skeletons showing the effects of deliberately inflicted violence as “sacrificial victims,” as if the sacrificial character somehow obviates the slaying aspect. (For a discussion see Mark Golitko and Lawrence H. Keeley, Antiquity 81 [2007]: 332-342, who emphasize that the presence of fortifications should argue for combat rather than sacrifice.) For the purpose of our investigation we have assumed that conflict has always existed and have interpreted the evidence accordingly rather than dismissing or transmorphing it.

Among the innumerable reports of graves with shattered skeletons, various crushing blows, dismemberment, and other untoward acts committed against the deceased, one puzzling one from Yün-men (radiocarbon dated to 1260 BCE, ± 90 or somewhere around the early Shang when corrected) where 172 stone arrowheads were found is particularly dramatic. Several of the interred had been shot multiple times, two more than ten times, with arrows in their chests, stomachs, and heads, and one woman was bound, suggesting that this was indeed a form of execution or that they had been used for target practice. There is also evidence of turning skulls into vessels and dishonoring the deceased, as well as scalping, in the Lungshan, though the latter has surprisingly not yet been identified as a practice of ancient Chinese warfare. (Scalping has been discussed in two articles: Yen Wen-ming, KKWW 1982:2, 38-41, and Ch’en Hsingts’an, WW 2000:1, 48-55.)

17 Sarah Allen, JAS 66, no. 2 (2007): 461-496, has recently advanced a concept of cultural hegemony derived from the appearance and ascendancy of Erh-li-t’ou culture.

18 A typical overview arguing for multiple origins is Yen Wen-ming, WW 1987:3, 38-50.

19 For examples of this position see Fan Yü-chou, HCCHS 2006:5, 11-15; Hsüeh Jui-che, HCCHS 2006:4, 13-22; and Tai Hsiang-ming, KKHP 1998:4, 389-418.

20 For an overview of the Yi-Luo area’s contribution, see Ch’en Hsing-ts’an et al., KKHP 2003:2, 161-218. Other topographical divisions are possible, including segmentation by river systems. (For example, see Ch’en Hsü, HSLWC [reprint of 1996], 282-292.)

21 According to Ch’en Sheng-po and others, HCCHS 2005:4, 7-8) the lower Yangtze River area was comparatively free of coercion and large-scale warfare.

22 Both Hung-shan and Liang-chu, two cultures that esteemed jade, may have perished because they were subverted by their religious beliefs. (See Li Po-ch’ien, WW 2009:3, 47-56.) More generally, devastating floods may have had an irrecoverable impact. (See Chin Sung-an and Chao Hsin-p’ing, CKKTS 1994:10, 14-20.) The Yüeh-shih lithic industry was more productive and their ceramics were also more advanced (Yen Wen-ming, SCKKLC, 306-318; Feng Chen-kuo, LSYC 1987:3, 54-65).

23 Yen Wen-ming, 312-313, stresses this lack of overarching self-identity in his analysis of the Tung Yi collapse.

24 The question of cultural determinism has recently been discussed by John Keegan, John Lynn, Jeremy Black, and Victor Davis Hanson. It is tempting to speculate on the psychological impact that the “citadel mentality” may have had on the Chinese Tao of warfare from its inception in the ancient period.

25 Yüan Ching, WW 2001:5, 51-57; Liu Chin-hsiang and Tung Hsin-lin, KK 1996:2, 61-64. Rice cultivation commenced in the lower Yangtze around 4000 BCE, presumably after a millennium of gathering naturally occurring variants. Although millet’s deliberate cultivation in the north has been identified with Hsing-lung-wa culture beginning around 6000 BCE and millet penetrated the Yellow river basin around 5500, rice did not become intermixed until about 2500 to 2000. (For an overview see Dorian Q. Fuller et al., Antiquity 81 [2007]: 316-331.) Other archaeologists discern even earlier inception points. (For example, see Yen Wen-ming’s four articles, SCKKLC, 351-361, 362-384, 385-399, and 400-406.)

26 For an excellent example see Yen Wen-ming, SCKKLC, 262-266.

27 Warfare compels people to adapt whatever might be at hand as well as to innovate to meet the challenges. The Shang certainly did not need to employ chariots in warfare because their opponents rarely had any, yet they were willing to risk these high-prestige vehicles in combat.