5.
DESPITE THE DISCOVERY of numerous Lungshan and Erh-li-t’ou sites, the rise of the Hsia—variously labeled China’s earliest “monarchy” and its first slave society—remains an enigma. How one clan group, part of a widely disseminated culture, evolved until it could eclipse other cultures and politically dominate the many clans, tribes, and proto-states about it to a significant extent remains the subject of divisive speculation. A comparative examination of the cultural artifacts so far recovered within the context of China’s traditional historical records suggests that several important military events mark the Hsia’s history: the early subjugation of nearby peoples, especially the San Miao, in protracted conflict; infighting over the royal succession, resulting in a civil war; conflict with the Tung or Eastern Yi and Han Chuo’s subsequent seizure of power; Shao-k’ang’s dramatic restoration of the ruling house following a lengthy period of preparation; inexorable decline through decades of luxuriant peace; and finally immersion into the much-excoriated royal excesses that presumably allowed, as well as supposedly justified, the Shang to overthrow the “tyrannical” and “perverse” Hsia.
Unfortunately, these episodes have to be reconstructed by winnowing out and harmonizing numerous fragmentary glimpses preserved in such traditional records as the Chu-shu Chi-nien (Bamboo Annals), Tso Chuan, and Shih Chi, just as scholars have done over untold centuries. Even though many passages are dubious, others spurious, and some outright forgeries, they retain important secondary value in revealing how China has traditionally understood its history, as well as in grounding concepts that remain an ineradicable part of contemporary general consciousness.
Nevertheless, obviously mythical events such as Yi shooting down nine extra suns and claims that lack any archaeological basis, such as the chariot’s much ballyhooed employment in Hsia warfare, though necessarily noted, must ultimately be rejected. Succinctly stated, combat in this period was conducted by men on foot, in loosely organized forces of limited strength, almost entirely with bows and arrows and crushing weapons such as axes, clubs, dagger-axes, and a few spears (but not swords) primarily fabricated from stone rather than metal.
Contrary to his image as a selfless individual who labored unceasingly on behalf of all the people, destroyed harmful weapons, and tore down his father’s walls to stifle rebellious discontent, Yü also quashed the San Miao and consolidated the clan’s power by reputedly executing the lord of Fang-feng for arriving late at a conclave.1 Moreover, he is traditionally credited with wielding bronze weapons and closely associated with metallurgy in general, the inception of the famous nine great cauldrons (for the Nine Provinces that he supposedly demarked) symbolic of legitimate rule sometimes being attributed to him. However, although metallurgy certainly developed in the Hsia, whether indigenously or through the importation of techniques via the steppe, in his era the nascent capabilities would have been limited to hammering out small knives.2
The Hsia’s conflict with the San Miao, essentially a century-long process even though it is usually identified with Yü’s reign, is well attested by the pattern of recovered artifacts.3 The San Miao were not just defeated but virtually extinguished; the few survivors scattered and their culture in its manifestation as Shih-chia-ho during the era of Yao, Hsun, and Yü in the Tung-t’ing and P’o-yang lake areas simply vanished. Rather than a gradual amalgamation, their definitive ceramic styles and totems were abruptly replaced in the late twenty-third century BCE in southern Hubei and Henan by late Lungshan artifacts. In fact, rather than simple tribal animosity, a quest for material goods, or a concerted effort to seize prisoners to impress as slaves or employ as sacrificial victims, their strongly dissimilar religious practices and totems may have caused their ongoing clash.4Furthermore, unlike the Tung Yi, who displayed an increasing affinity with Hsia culture, after the conquest the fragmented and relatively isolated San Miao groups that survived retained their distinctiveness, 5 another indication of a fundamental clash in customs and views, not to mention political domains.
Animosity had marked relations between the Hsia and San Miao as early as their precursor cultures, late Yangshao and early Lungshan for the nascent Hsia and Ch’ü-chia-ling for the San Miao. The San Miao had been closely allied with the Tung Yi (Eastern Yi) of the Ta-wen-k’o phase, with whom they shared a number of cultural traits, including bird totems, and had cooperated with them in fielding coalition-type forces against late Lungshan antagonists, preventing the latter from dominating either of them.6 It has even been suggested that the San Miao may have originally numbered among the Tung Yi before they were expelled because of their identification with Ch’ih Yu.7 However, Tung Yi culture was itself gradually displaced by, or evolved into, late Shandong Lungshan and thus came to differ significantly from the San Miao’s later manifestation as Shih-chia-ho, inclining the former to identify more with the Hsia even though they had to forcefully oppose Hsia domination attempts. Furthermore, although the Tung Yi no longer supported the San Miao, they remained a significant power throughout the Hsia dynasty, and even the Shang felt compelled not just to neutralize them before attacking Chieh, the last Hsia monarch, but also to gain their support.
Materially and economically, the San Miao and pre-Hsia had also diverged with the passage of time. Perhaps due to their increased mastery of the rivers and early use of irrigation, the pre-Hsia had significantly expanded their agricultural yields over the centuries encompassed by the late Yangshao and third Wang-wan cultural phases, whereas the San Miao reportedly stagnated. This no doubt allowed them to accumulate the surpluses vital to developing specialized industries, diverting men to military activities, and to nurture sufficient royal clan power to dominate their own people, displacing communal or tribal leadership. (As the classic Chinese military writings would subsequently stress, economic prosperity underpins the possibility of military power.) The early Hsia’s increasing dominance from the twenty-third century onward culminated in what has traditionally been encapsulated as Yü’s legendary conquest of the San Miao, even though the scope of his actual achievement may be open to question.8
Proponents of the pedantically held view that the virtuous, if their “Virtue” is sufficiently perfected, will always prevail over the evil and perverse envision Yü’s symbolic conquest of a Miao chieftain as depicted in the Shang Shu as irrefutable proof. Despite being a late fabrication, the importance of the section now titled “Great Yü’s Plans” to political and military thought from the Wei-Chin period onward, particularly the reasons cited to justify the “punitive” attack, cannot be overemphasized:9
Emperor Shun said, “Alas, Yü, only this Miao chieftain refuses to be submissive. Go and mount a campaign of rectification against him.” Yü assembled the many lords and then pronounced his intention to the army: “All you masses in firm and martial array, heed my commands. Irascible is this Miao chieftain. Obfuscated and confused, he is not respectful. Insulting and rude, he takes himself to be sagacious but contravenes the Tao and overthrows Virtue. Superior men remain in the wilds, menial men hold office. The people have abandoned him and will not preserve him. Heaven is sending down calamities. Consequently, in company with you many warriors, in accord with my instructions I will attack him for his offenses. Now if you are united in mind and strength, his conquest will be achieved.”
When the Miao still contravened his mandate after thirty days, Yi Yih advised Yü: “Only Virtue moves Heaven, there is no distance it does not reach. Arrogance brings about loss but humility receives increase. This is the Tao of Heaven. In the early days when Emperor Shun was living at Mount Li,10 he went out into the fields and daily called out and cried before compassionate Heaven, and also to his father and mother, accepting responsibility for all his offenses and taking the guilt for unseen evils upon himself. He then respectfully commenced serving Ku Su, his father, appearing grave and fearful until Ku also was fully in accord with him. Since perfect sincerity moves the spirits, how much more will it affect the Miao chieftain!”
Yü bowed in respect of his superlative words and voiced his assent. He then put the army in order and returned it in proper array.11 Emperor Shun then augmented and bespread his civil Virtue and had dances with shields and feathers performed between the two staircases (in the court). Seventy days later the Miao chieftain came to court.
The idea that cultivating virtue and making a highly visible, righteous display would “magically” affect even a distant Miao chieftain some 2,500 li away would subsequently be much quoted in imperial court discussions and memorials whenever nonmartial courses of action were advocated. However, traditional commentators offer the interesting observation that Shun, despite being venerated as one of antiquity’s paragons, failed to properly balance the requirements of the civil (wen) and martial (wu) when he precipitously deputed Yü on this punitive mission against the Miao without first formally announcing their offenses. Since the practice of the civil required adherence to certain idealized forms of behavior and protocols, his premature employment of conspicuous martial power was doomed from the outset.
Yü’s inability to cow the Miao chieftain into submitting prompted Yi Yih’s recommendation that he rededicate himself to perfecting his sincerity, synonymous with initiating diplomatic measures designed to persuade him to acknowledge the constraints of Hsia political domination. The lack of any reference to combat having arisen suggests that Yü’s efforts consisted of a martial display, nothing more. The elaborate dances performed in Shun’s own court, presumably under his direction rather than Yü’s, have accordingly been interpreted as expressing the emperor’s desire to suppress any tendency toward the martial alone, thereby restoring the balance of wen or the civil (symbolized by the feathers) and wu, here symbolized by a shield rather than an axe, halberd, or bow, the era’s primary weapons. However, irrespective of the validity of these creative interpretations, for historical purposes these passages might simply be seen as a remnant memory, one reflecting the intensity and longevity of the clash between various Miao tribes and the Hsia’s founders.
Mo-tzu, who exploited accounts of these events for his own persuasive purposes, concocted a dramatically enhanced version:
In antiquity, when the San Miao were causing great disorder, Heaven mandated that they be put to death. Strange apparitions of the sun came out at night, it rained blood for three mornings, dragons spawned in the ancestral temple, and dogs cried in the market. Ice formed in the summer, the earth cracked, springs bubbled up, and the five grains were transformed. The people were greatly shaken.
Emperor Kao Yang issued an edict in the Hsüan Palace and Yü, personally bearing the Heavenly jade pendant of authority, mounted a punitive expedition against the Miao. Lightning and thunder suddenly arose, a spirit with a human face and the body of a bird held a jade tablet to repress the Miao’s auspicious power. The Miao forces were thrown into chaos and thereafter fell apart. After Yü conquered the San Miao, he charted the mountains and rivers, discriminated things by upper and lower, and respectfully administered the extremities. Neither spirits nor men contravened his rule, All under Heaven were tranquil. This is the way in which Yü waged his campaign against the Miao.12
Other writings suggest that Yao not only deputed Yü to smite the San Miao but had earlier personally led a punitive expedition against the rebellious San Miao dwelling among the Southern Man, defeating them in a clash on the banks of the Chou River and compelling them to withdraw and change their customs.13 Similarly, the Shang Shu states that Yao “expelled the San Miao out to San-wei,” the latter synonymous with the westernmost point conceivable, one subsequently identified with a location south of the now famous Tunhuang,14 and deputed his son Chu to control the region around Chou-shui.15
Archaeologists have recently suggested that evidence for these earlier clashes with the San Miao may also be seen in the sudden extinction of the Shih-chia-ho variant known as the Ch’ing-long-ch’üan in the region of Yao’s supposed activity, the Tan-chiang and T’ang-pai-ho river basins.16Throughout its area of distribution in the upper and middle Han River, middle and lower Tan-chiang, the T’ang-pai-ho river basin, and upper Huai River area, this phase—considered the northernmost expression of the Shih-chia-ho—was displaced by localized cultures, presumably as a result of Yao’s conquest and ensuing forced emigration. The radiocarbon-based dates obtained for this displacement fall between 2600 and 2150 BCE, roughly in the centuries ascribed to Yao and Yü, suggesting that although the campaign was attributed to Yao, he merely personifies an evolving cultural conflict. Thereafter, Yü’s activities would necessarily have been directed to the south, to the plains of Hsi-hu, the other regions having already been cleared of a tenacious enemy.
According to accounts that contradict the peaceful transfer of authority from Yü to his son Ch’i, the dynasty’s first significant military conflict was actually a battle over succession. In these versions Ch’i eventually vanquishes Yi, a meritorious official who had become famous for his efforts to reduce the people’s misery during Shun’s reign and been personally designated by Yü to succeed him. Ironically (since he similarly embarked on the path of indulgence shortly after securing the throne), Ch’i’s attack was supposedly justified by Yi’s dissolute and negligent behavior. These events apparently engendered the idea that Yü never designated Ch’i as his successor, but instead forced his son to fight for the throne by somehow predestining the conflict, even though the Bamboo Annals note that Yi withdrew to his own state while Ch’i went about convening the lords and was much honored by Ch’i when he finally died in the latter’s sixth year of reign.
Irrespective of its lack of veracity, this account may be understood as symptomatic of unremitting strife within the ruling clan, not to mention among the various extended clans and other tribes or peoples populating the area at the time. Moreover, it apparently presaged centuries of forthcoming strife between the Hsia and eastern powers, since it has been suggested that Duke Yi’s clan originated in the east and was numbered among the Tung Yi.17
The Hsia’s next battle quickly arose when Ch’i, presumably in command of core clan forces, confronted the Yu-hu—theoretically members of Shun’s own clan—because they had either rebelled or simply refused to acknowledge his sovereignty. Hsia forces prevailed (at an engagement made famous by the Shang Shu chapter “The Oath at Kan”) and the Yu-hu submitted:18
You men who have charge of the six affairs, I solemnly proclaim that Yu-hu-shih has forcefully contumed the five elements (phases) and neglectfully abandoned the three (principles of) uprightness.19 Heaven is about to employ force to end his mandate.20 Today I am just respectfully implementing Heaven’s punishment.
If the left does not attack on the left you will disrespect my edict; if the right does not attack on the right, you will disrespect my edict. If you charioteers do not keep your horses under control, you will disrespect my edict.
Those who follow my edict will be rewarded at the ancestral temple; those who do not follow my edict will be exterminated at the altar to earth, and I will extinguish your entire family.
The oath falls within the martial tradition of boldly announcing the enemy’s offenses to justify imminent military action, thereby inciting fervor in the troops. However, it is somewhat at variance with comments in the Ssu-ma Fa: “The rulers of the Hsia dynasty administered their oaths amidst the army for they wanted the people to first complete their thoughts. They rectified their Virtue, never employed the sharp blades of their weapons, and granted rewards but did not impose punishments.”21
It has long been claimed that Ch’i’s oath proves the existence of chariots manned by a driver, an archer, and a shock-weapons bearer at this battle, confirming implications derived from a listing of the ch’e cheng or “chariot commandant” among the Hsia’s officials. Given that Hsi Chung, known to history as Yü’s chariot driver, is credited with inventing the chariot (or at least excelling at constructing chariots), if the oath were at all authentic this would be plausible. However, in the absence of chariot remnants or traces of rotting wood in any excavated late Lungshan, Erh-li-t’ou, or even early Shang site, such claims can only be cast aside as unwarranted.22
According to the Bamboo Annals, Yü had previously faced dissension within his immediate family, being compelled in his eleventh year to banish his youngest son, Wu Kuan (whose name ironically means “martial observations”), to the Hsi Ho (Western Ho) region, an area west of the Yellow River often noted in later history for its natural strategic advantages. Wu Kuan apparently flourished in this conducive area; he revolted four years later and the king, rather than commanding in person, deputed Duke Shou of Ts’ai to lead the punitive expedition that eventually forced Wu Kuan to submit.23
Not unexpectedly, Ch’i’s death precipitated internal chaos. His five sons battled for the throne, and T’ai-k’ang, who eventually succeeded him, apparently followed his dissolute ways. T’ai-k’ang’s excesses in turn provided an opportunity for the Yu-ch’iung of the Eastern Yi, under Hou Yi, to move westward out of the lower Yellow and Huai river valleys, attack the capital, and eventually occupy it. Little is known about the battle, but probably as the result of conflating myth and reality, tradition identifies Hou Yi as a great archer who followed in the footsteps of his ancestors, chief archery officials under Yao and Shun, or as Duke Yi, just noted for his confrontation with Ch’i, who was also credited with shooting down the nine extra suns incinerating the earth, as well as taming the poisonous animals.
Discounting the mythic aspects, Hou Yi’s pronounced skill in archery probably symbolized the Eastern Yi’s greater dependence on hunting and fishing in contrast to the more agriculturally oriented Hsia. Thus the Yu-ch’iung’s deadly proficiency reputedly forced Shao-k’ang’s son Chu, who eventually completed the lineage’s restoration, to fabricate China’s first body armor so as to survive an onslaught of arrows before engaging in close combat. (He is also credited with inventing the spear, a rather startling and unlikely claim given that spears and javelins are normally among the first weapons developed in any culture, but possibly indicative of Chu being the first warrior to bind a bronze, rather than stone, spearhead to a wooden shaft.)
Remarkably, the victorious Huo Yi is also portrayed as having been quickly seduced by royal pleasures and thus lost his own head when Han Chuo, whom he had foolishly entrusted with the actual administration, gradually developed a power base sufficient to usurp the throne:
In antiquity when the Hsia had begun to decline, Huo Yi moved from Hsü to Ch’iung-shih24 after which he displaced the Hsia government by exploiting [the disaffection of] its people. Thereafter, relying upon his skill in archery, he did not attend to the people’s affairs but dissolutely immersed himself in hunting out on the plains. He dismissed [his old meritorious officials] Wu Luo, Po Yin, Hsiung K’un, and Mang Yü, and instead employed Han Chuo.
Han Chuo, the vituperative heir of the Po-ming clan, had been exiled by its leader, the duke of Han. However, Duke Yi of the Yi peoples brought him in, trusted, and employed him as his chief minister. Chuo ingratiated himself in the inner palace and bribed those (in the government) outside it. He kept the people ignorant and manipulated them while encouraging Yi’s indulgence in hunting. He planted his deceptions and evil in order to seize the government, and those both inside and outside all submitted. As Yi still did not awaken, when he was about to return from his hunt, his family troops25 killed, cooked, and fed him to his sons. Since they could not bear to eat him, his sons all died before the gates of Ch’iung. Thereupon (the high official) Mi fled to the Yu-ko people.
Thereafter Chuo had two sons by Yi’s wives, Ao26 and Yi. He relied upon slander and evil, prevarication and artifice, displayed no virtue to the people, and had Ao employ the army to extinguish the Chen-kuan and Chen-hsün (who had earlier provided refuge to Hsiang). He had Ao occupy Kuo and Yi occupy Ko. However, Mi came back from the Yu-ko to assemble the remnants of the Chen tribes, exterminate Chuo, and establish Shao-k’ang as ruler. Shao-k’ang exterminated Ao at Kuo and his son Chu exterminated Yi at Ko. Thereafter the Yu-ch’iung clan vanished.27
The severity and barbarous consequences of Han Chuo’s subversive actions, uncommonly attributed to antique periods, seem to reflect the excesses to which early ethnic or totemic clashes were apparently prone, as well as prefiguring those seen in later millenarian clashes and witnessed in the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, the ready adoption of Yi’s wives, an action symbolic of conquest that is further attested by the birth of two sons, suggests that his policy of currying favor within the inner palace may have penetrated far into Yi’s personal quarters, affecting his consorts as well as the personal retainers who murdered him.
Han Chuo’s attempts to exterminate the royal line’s remnants set the stage for the marvelous tale of Shao-k’ang’s survival, cleverness, and endurance:
In antiquity Ao slew the Chen-kuan and then attacked the Chen-hsün in order to exterminate Emperor Hsiang of the Hsia. The emperor’s pregnant consort Min escaped through a hole in the wall and returned to her clan, the Yu-jen, where she eventually gave birth to Shao-k’ang. Shao-k’ang became chief shepherd among the Yu-jen and, fearing Ao’s capability, made preparations against him. Ao had Chiao search for him, so Shao-k’ang then fled to the Yu-yü where he became chief cook in order to eliminate this threat. The chief of the Yü gave him two of his daughters surnamed Yao as wives and a fortified town at Lun together with one ch’eng of fields and one lü of troops so that he might manifest his Virtue and initiate his plans. He then gathered in the Hsia’s masses, expanded his officials, and deputed Nü Ai to spy on Ao and his youngest son Chu to entice Yi. Subsequently he vanquished Ao and Yi and restored Yü’s heritage.28
Because of the differences in Hsia and Yi customs, the lengthy eightdecade interval during which the Hsia lost much, if not all, control of its territory may also be envisioned as a clash of peoples and cultures. Relations between the Yi tribal groups and the Hsia obviously waxed and waned over the dynasty’s four centuries depending on their relative power, just as those between the Shang and its contemporary states did in the next period. Peace, however coercive, essentially prevailed when the Hsia was strong and the Yi fragmented and thus coerced or forced into submission, but conflict arose when both were strong or the Hsia wavered, allowing incursions and rebellion.
The Yi, also called the Tung Yi and Nine Yi, encompassed nine main tribes reportedly composed of eighty-one clans: the Ch’üan,29 Yu, Fang (Square), Huang (Yellow), Pai (White), Ch’ih (Red), Hsüan (Dark), Feng (Wind), and Yang (Sun). There are also frequent references to the Huai Yi, a term that probably encompassed populations from two or more of the Nine Yi who happened to dwell in the fertile Huai river valley. Although they may have been individually incapable of withstanding Hsia supremacy, when allied they constituted the only power capable of challenging Hsia dominance and, in aggregate, certainly exceeded the Hsia in strength and extent.
Hou Yi, who initiated the revolt, was affiliated with a Yi clan group known as the Yu-ch’iung, and later traditions assert that “four of the Yi rebelled against the Hsia when T’ai-k’ang lost the state.” The Bamboo Annals seemingly confirm this by chronicling three additional encounters during Emperor Hsiang’s tortured reign. In his initial year, despite his much compromised and largely powerless position as a refugee in Shangch’iu (which intermittently served as the site of the incipient Shang state), he still attacked the Huai Yi with the prince of Shang’s support, no doubt to damage Hou Yi’s base of support. Remarkably, the next year he conducted “punitive expeditions” against the Feng Yi and Huang Yi, no doubt to the east and southeast.
Surprisingly, some five years later the Yu Yi visited as submissive guests, apparently signifying their temporary elimination as an immediate threat. However, only after Shao-k’ang’s son Chu conducted major expeditions in his eighth year as far as the Eastern Sea and San-shou did the Nine Yi essentially return to the fold.30 Thereafter, they are not mentioned until the end of the dynasty, when the next-to-last ruler, Emperor Fa, wisely strengthened the capital’s walls after various Yi reportedly came as submissive guests. Finally, in Emperor Chieh’s third year, the Ch’üan Yi entered Ch’i (where the Chou would later originate) and rebelled. However, Mo-tzu, who esteemed the Hsia, notes in addition that Emperor Yü died on the road after mobilizing his forces and venturing east to attack the Nine Yi, suggesting the dynasty commenced and concluded in violent entanglements with the Yi.31
Relative peace punctuated by occasional campaigns against peoples such as the Huai, Ch’üan, Huang, San Shou, and Chiu Yüan, all reportedly members of the Yi, prevailed for some ten generations after Shao-k’ang and Chu restored royal power.32 However, in the Hsia’s final moments Chieh apparently pursued a policy of strong military activity that harmed the people, including a campaign intended to subjugate the recalcitrant Min-shan, a Yi proto-state, which ultimately undermined the state’s ability to defeat foreign incursions as well as further antagonizing the Tung Yi.33Eventually the Shang revolted, destroyed the ruling house, occupied the state, and dispersed the populace, who then may have become the ancestors of the Chou and various steppe peoples, including eventually the Hsiung-nu.34
Shang Shu and Shih Chi chapters describe a Hsia organizational structure that presumably integrated various Hsia peoples and submissive entities, whether tribal groups or proto-states, in a series of expanding rectangles within which the acknowledged degree of submission correspondingly declined.35 Naturally this schematized characterization has long been justifiably disparaged as a late, highly idealized portrait, just as the conflicts already discussed would require. However, it certainly expresses the underlying reality that those entities closest to the royal capital, whether clan members or subordinate proto-states, formally enfeoffed or not, would have been the most susceptible to military coercion.
Hsia power projection capabilities would have correspondingly decreased with increasing distance from the core, inevitably allowing greater independence and self-assertion. Moreover, because the degree of dominance, though not presently ascertainable, would have depended on factors such as accessibility and logistical support, it could not have been uniform even throughout the generally acknowledged realm of maximum influence in the Yi and Luo river area or the irregular projections out to the west and down to Pan-lung-ch’eng.
The territory within the immediate vicinity of the capital, said to have encompassed 500 li in all directions, forming a square 1,000 li on each edge, was probably under the king’s direct control, since it is termed tien and was primarily responsible for providing the foodstuffs.36 The next 500 li, depicted as the region of the feudal lords, has been traditionally understood as including the ministerial families within the first hundred, key Hsia supporters in the next hundred, and some larger states with their capitals in the remaining 300 li.
The martial purposes of the next or third region, theoretically running from 1,000 to 1,500 li out, merit note. Divided into just two zones, the first 300 li were conceived as a transitional zone, the last civilized bulwark against the uncultured challenges threatening from without, where wen should be emphasized. The remaining 200 li in this schema were to be devoted to “flourishing martial values (wu) and defensive activities” and must have comprised a border that differentiated Hsia terrain from hostile peoples in the two outermost regions designated as “yao-fu” and “huang-fu,” meaning something like “essential submission” and “barren submission,” or more realistically “barely submitting” and “the wilds,” respectively.
Particularly interesting within the context of Hsia-Yi conflict is the demarcation of the first 300 li of the yao-fu as the Yi’s abode, thereby locating them within a ring 1,500 to 1,800 li from the Hsia capital. The outer 200 li of this fourth region were reserved for exiles, but the wastes of the immediately outer region, the first 300 li of the fifth region or huang-fu, were supposedly populated by the very uncivilized Man barbarians. The most distant 200 li were then designated as a repository for serious offenders banished beyond the pale of all society, whether Hsia or foreign. Although this highly idealized delineation reflects later conceptualizations of harmonized order, it not only informed the traditional understanding of Hsia political organization, but was also an often advocated theoretical model for Imperial China’s foreign relations from the Han onward.37
It has long been asserted that the incipient origins of many bureaucratic organs can be traced back to the Hsia and that a sort of proto-bureaucracy is already discernible.38 Although important individuals could simply have been deputed to undertake specific responsibilities as needed, administering the realm would no doubt have required minimally defined bureaucratic positions with at least rudimentary authority. The early rulers presumably established a limited but basically effective core of officials under their direct control, a sort of working staff, with responsibility for crucial activities being broadly construed. Titles such as ssu t’u (“minister of agriculture”) and “chief archer” then presumably evolved from repeatedly assigned tasks.
The Li Chi, a late Warring States ritual text, claims that the Hsia had a hundred officials (pai-kuan), obviously a nominal figure for a group of proto-officials whose responsibilities were probably not sharply differentiated. Among those identified are the ssu fu (“four supporters”), liu ch’ing (“six ministers”), ssu cheng (“four rectifiers”), ssu t’u (“minister for labor”), and t’a-shih, a functionary who supported, advised, and supposedly criticized the ruler.39 The Hsia also reputedly had an official to oversee the chariots, a post initially held by Hsi Chung, but the absence of any evidence for chariots, carts, or even simple wagons makes its existence highly unlikely. Finally, the chou shih (who clearly was not a military functionary despite the implications of the term shih, which eventually came to signify “commander” or “general”) was responsible for the segmented administrative area known as a chou.
It has generally been claimed that the Hsia and its immediate predecessors were predominantly civil-oriented societies whose members acted as warriors whenever necessary, but reverted to their roles as farmers or artisans with the conflict’s termination.40 Insofar as this interpretation is based on the absence of symbols of power and martial achievement in graves from the period, any sudden efflorescence of weapons, especially when coupled with clear evidence of violence such as crushing blows and arrowheads embedded in bones, must mark a transition to esteeming military prowess. These indicators began to appear in the mid- to late Lungshan, great axes symbolic of both punitive and military power suddenly being found in ever-increasing numbers.
Assuming power at the end of the Lungshan, the Hsia may be expected to have confronted a variety of martial challenges on an irregular basis. If it was ruled by a chieftain and the ruler’s clan dominated, the extended tribe would have been compelled to participate in combat.41 According to later historical reports, disgruntled clans occasionally defected and even mounted physical challenges to the leadership, compounding the martial challenges. Rather than being philosopher kings in a peaceful land, Hsia rulers almost certainly relied on charisma, personal prowess, clan connections, and martial skill to prosper amid tribal infighting and external challenges. Even though most military historians confidently assert that the Hsia did not maintain a standing army,42 it would be highly unlikely for the ruler not to have been protected by a body of men with pronounced martial abilities who would form the core of any broader combat effort. However, the degree to which the martial dominated the civil remains unknown, though suggestions that the Hsia emerged because it embraced warrior culture seem more likely to accurately characterize the historical situation.
Whatever the size and organization of the Hsia’s military forces, some sort of training in the era’s weapons and coordinated action would have been required to field an effective contingent composed of highly individualistic warriors. Although hunting provided an opportunity to practice group action, and weapons training probably was undertaken within the family as part of normal upbringing, it has been suggested that the Hsia established organized schools (hsiao) dedicated to archery instruction, initiating an institution that would continue into the Shang (with the hsü) and Chou (with the hsiang).43 Even though archery may not have been any more difficult to master than effectively wielding a dagger-axe, this thrust would accord with traditional China’s esteem for archery’s complexity. These early “schools” or training academies need not have been particularly formalized to have played a significant role, one perhaps understandable in the context of the traditional view that they initiated education in China.
If the proto-bureaucracy cannot be known, the primarily ad hoc military structure is even more uncertain. However, it is generally believed that all administrative positions, whether preassigned or delegated in exigencies, were dual in nature: anyone participating in clan power, already being a person of significance, would be expected to perform military functions. The initial words of the “Pronouncement at Kan”—“you men who have charge of the six affairs”—have prompted claims that the Hsia already had six armies because the term translated as “six affairs” is understood by commentators as “six armies.” However, this interpretation lacks justification, and even if they existed, probably being responsible for the six main administrative affairs of government, they would have simply been co-opted to act as field officers or commanders.
Ch’i’s harangue also indicates the existence of left and right forces: “If the left does not attack on the left you will disrespect my edict; if the right does not attack on the right, you will disrespect my edict.” Despite assertions to the contrary, rather than evidence for well-formed, integrated units such as regiments or armies, this more likely indicates an operational segmentation into left and right flanks. However, the edict certainly shows a presumption of the power to enforce military discipline and a willingness to execute the disobedient in untold numbers.
One other early passage has given rise to claims that the Hsia already had a structured military organization. The famous Tso Chuan account previously cited contains a frequently noted sentence indicating that the chief of the Yu-yü gave Shao-k’ang two of his daughters as wives, a town at Lun, one ch’eng of land, and one lü (regiment) from the masses. Depending on how the original text is construed, lü is understood as referring to a military unit that (according to very unreliable statements in the Chou Li) traditionally numbered 500 men. However, even if the Hsia’s military organization were founded upon the pyramid of fives frequently adopted in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, given the smaller population base and more limited resources, the lü may have only amounted to 125 men. Moreover, if based on the decade system as subsequently employed by several peripheral states during the Chou’s decline, it may have been a mere 100 men, the equivalent of a Warring States company, particularly if the squad/platoon/company structure had not yet evolved and it was a clan-based aggregation. However, this sentence is frequently cited as evidence that non-clan military forces already existed whose members were presumably drawn from the farmers or other workers who could be summoned for military service as necessary.44