History is not always, at least not exclusively, written by the winners. The dominant image of the Ardennes Battle has largely been formed by what was said by defeated German generals during the years immediately after the war. From there comes the popular conception of the Ardennes Offensive as poorly planned, inadequately prepared and ’doomed to fail’
Through the epithet invented by the Allied press— the ‘Rundstedt Offensive’—the German commander-inchief in the West at the time, von Rundstedt, has more than anyone else, besides Hitler, come to be associated with the failed Ardennes Offensive. However, after the war, von Rundstedt managed to successfully give the image of the Offensive as a desktop product’ that ’no one’ believed in.1 The latter however is not in agreement with what, for instance, the OKW’s secretary, Percy E. Schramm has to say, namely that both von Rundstedt’s and Model’s experienced chiefs of staff, Westphal and Krebs, believed in the attack plan as it was introduced to them by Jodl. After the war, Model’s operations officer, Oberstleutnant Reichhelm, said that he reacted with enthusiasm to the attack plan.
The commander of Heeresgruppe B, Model, died by his own hand in April 1945, and thus could not be interviewed after the war. His biographer Walter Görlitz, however, argues that Model was of the opinion that the goal of Antwerp could have been reached ‘if it would be possible to totally surprise the enemy, and if all the promised units actually would be at hand,’ although he felt that the ‘small solution’ (the envelopment and the destruction of the American troops at Aachen) should be executed first, in order to create the conditions for a further advance to Antwerp.2 As is well known, the commander of the 5. Panzerarmee, von Manteuffel, also advocated the ’small solution,’ but as we also have seen, many of his demandswere met before the attack. Von Manteuffel has not either spoken as categorically as von Rundstedt did after the war regarding the Ardennes Offensive, but he acknowledged that he in December 1944 actually expected to be able to reach the Meuse in four to six days if all went well.3 At one point after the war, he said he still believed that the operation plan had been ’brilliant.’4
Soldiers of a German Volksgrenadier-Division attack in the Ardennes in December 1944. (BArch, Bild 183-2005-0509-500/Langl)
In his famous study Panzer Battles, Generalmajor Friedrich von Mellenthin—who served in the headquarters of the 9. Panzer-Division during the Ardennes Battle, shortly afterward to be placed as von Manteuffel’s chief of staff—describes the Ardennes Offensive as ’the last great achievement of the German General Staff, a stroke in the finest traditions of Gneisenau, Moltke, and Schlieffen.’5 He also expressed the opinion that historiography has not given those responsible for the detailed staff work associated with Operation ’Wacht am Rhein/Herbstnebel’ the appreciation they deserve.6
That a basically beaten Germany, bombed into ruins, in the sixth year of the war, only a couple months after some of the greatest military defeats ever dealt to German troops, managed to raise this substantial offensive force, testifies to a masterful preparation work. Although the opposite has been argued, the Germans moved forward sufficient amounts of both fuel and ammunition for this great offensive. The entire buildup of forces, in a situation where the enemy dominated the air, occupies a special position in the history of warfare. The fact that the Germans, in addition to all of this, managed to take their enemy with such total surprise, bears witness, as we have seen, more of skill and discipline on the German side than of the mistakes of the Allies. After the war, Model’s operations officer, Reichhelm, wrote, ’The assembly, despite several small mistakes which could be equalized, was accomplished without friction. With regard to the high degree of secrecy, the endless terrain obstacles (especially for the armored units) and the abundance of untrained troops, this was a considerable attainment.’7
A Sturmgeschütz III of the Waffen-SS in the Ardennes in December 1944. (BArch, Bild 183-2005-0509-500/Pospesch)
Friedrich von Mellenthin notes that ’the Wehrmacht achieved a surprise every bit as staggering as the one in the same area in May 1940,’ and opines that ’under normal conditions of war and with reasonable equality of force’ the Germans would have ’won a great victory.’8
The choice of both opponent—the Western Allies, who were militarily weaker than the Red Army—and the front section to be attacked, the Ardennes, the weakest Allied point, was an expression of classical military theory. The basic idea, to amass a force as great as possible for a last-ditch attack against the enemy’s weakest spot in an effort to reverse the fortunes of war, descended directly from military theorist Clausewitz.
Furthermore, the Germans concentrated their most advanced weaponry to the Ardennes Offensive and to its support—the heavy Königstiger tanks, the Sturmgewehr 44 assault rifle, the Me 262 and Ar 234 jet aircraft, the V 1 and V 2 flying bombs, the V 3 ’super gun,’ and the Seehund electric-powered submarine. The Allies had nothing equivalent to these weapons, many of which were put into combat for the first time right in and for the Ardennes Offensive. On top of that, the German leadership—at all levels—brought about a pure miracle with their soldiers’ motivation to keep fighting. Only a few months after the collapse of the Western Front in August-September 1944, one of the officers of the 2. Panzer-Division noted that morale among the German troops who stood in readiness to attack in the West was even ’better than at the beginning of the war.’9
While several accounts tend to emphasize the 6. SS-Panzerarmee in the portrayal of the German side of the Ardennes Offensive, Friedrich von Mellenthin highlights the 5. Panzerarmee when he discusses this Offensive in his famous Panzer Battles: ’The preparations of Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army had been extraordinarily thorough. His troops were brilliantly commanded and their morale could not have been higher. Sweeping through the utterly bewildered Americans, his spearheads made rapid progress along the difficult roads of the Ardennes and by 20 December had taken Houffalize and then went on thrusting towards the Meuse crossing at Dinant.’10 The 5. Panzerarmee indeed deserves attention for its great successes, but even more so, for some reason the 7. Armee’s performance during Operation ’Herbstnebel’ has largely been neglected in historiography. Under the leadership of General Erich Brandenberger, German 7. Armee created the conditions for the 5. Panzerarmee’s advance past Bastogne and toward the Meuse by covering the panzer army’s southern flank. Thereafter, although almost devoid of armor, Brandenberger’s Army prevented Patton’s Third U.S. Army from breaking through and cutting off the 5. Panzerarmee, which saved Model’s Heeresgruppe B from a total disaster, at least for the time being.
On the American side, the picture is more complex. In essence, the Allied military leadership actually acted better during the German offensive’s initial phase than later on, when the Allies themselves were on the offensive. Eisenhower’s and Bradley’s swift decisions to regroup the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions, and the 7th Armored Division to the Ardennes Front resulted in decisive German difficulties in bringing forward supplies to the offensive, since the communications hub of Sankt Vith could be held during the Ardennes Offensive’s first six days, while the even more important hub Bastogne could be held throughout the battle. Similarly, Montgomery’s efforts on the northern flank during the days before Christmas 1944 were absolutely crucial.
But even if the initial German advance was slowed through the dogged resistance offered by the American first-line soldiers during the first two days, coupled with the Allied generals’ rapid deployment of units to the Ardennes Front, the German upper hand was strengthened from day to day during the offensive’s first six or seven days. However, this only applies with the exception of the 6. SS Panzerarmee, which put itself in great difficulties from the third day of the attack, when one of its two oversized SS panzer divisions rushed over River Amblève at Stavelot without properly securing the river crossing, while the other SS panzer division ran headlong in among the buildings in the heavily defended ’twin villages’ Rocherath-Krinkelt nearly twenty miles further back.
Without doubt, Sepp Dietrich’s 6. SS-Panzerarmee was the Ardennes Offensive’s Achilles heel, at least with regard to the ground units. Interrogated by U.S. intelligence officers shortly after the war, Generalmajor Siegfried Westphal, Generalleutnant Bodo Zimmermann, and Oberst Zolling—chief of Staff, operations officer, and intelligence officer respectively of von Rundstedt’s OB West headquarters during the Ardennes Battle—were in total agreement in their harsh review of the 6. SS-Panzerarmee. They pointed out ’a tactical incompetency of the command of 6 Panzer Army, from the top to the lowest unit’ as well as an ’insufficient flexibility of the SS units, although these were far better equipped in personnel and materiel than the Army divisions,’ as some of the main reasons that the Ardennes Offensive was not even more successful.11 They argued that the 6. SS-Panzerarmee was ‘not capable of moving large units quickly and without friction, or to transfer them, not to speak of employing them tactically correctly,’ and they continued, ’From this incapacity resulted in the impossibility of transferring strong units of 6 Panzer Army to the south. For the same reason, it was not successful in dissolving the tactical encirclement of our own troops.’12
Friedrich von Mellenthin held the view that it was ’a great misfortune that Hitler placed his Schwerpunkt with the S.S. army,’ whose commander ’had no real understanding of armored warfare ’13 According to Percy E. Schramm, it was purely political reasons that gave Sepp Dietrich and his SS units the lead role in the Ardennes Offensive.14
’If Manteuffel had been adequately supported from the north, it is difficult to say how far the American position would have deteriorated,’ wrote von Mellenthin, and added laconically, ’but Sixth S.S. Panzer Army did notget on so well.’15
Certainly, the 6. SS-Panzerarmee faced highly skilled American unit commanders—not least the commanders of the V Corps and the 2nd Infantry Division, generals Gerow and Robertson—but the SS Army’s numerical superiority was overwhelming: Initially, Sepp Dietrich’s forces had four times as many soldiers, and commanded more than ten times more, and moreover qualitatively superior, tanks than what the Americans had in the first line. The German failure on this front section is quite remarkable and can probably be primarily explained by the SS panzer army’s tactical failings ’from the top to the lowest unit,’ as expressed by Westphal et al.
That the 6. SS-Panzerarmee’s subordinate units on top of this generally were less trained than those of the 5. Panzerarmee, was admitted by Sepp Dietrich after the war.16 Generalmajor Carl Wagener, chief of staff in the 5. Panzerarmee, wrote, ’The insufficient training condition of the SS organizations, especially among their commanders and subordinate commanders, was also to blame for the failure. [The 6. SS-Panzerarmee’s] motorized units, having no driving technique and no road discipline, were soon standing hopelessly wedged into four columns beside each other on those roads selected for advance, but still blocked by the enemy. It did not help them any to force their way into the sector of the Fifth Panzer Armee and thus clog the northern roads.’17
Despite the almost total failure of the 6. SS-Panzerarmee, the less strong 5. Panzerarmee, supported by the 7. Armee in the south, still came quite close to crossing the Meuse. As we have seen, the Battle of the Meuse was decided by a very narrow margin. At the turn of 1944/1945, two American divisions—the 28th and 106th Infantry divisions—had been almost obliterated. Several armored divisions in the 12th Army Group also had been severely mauled. Two of Bradley’s eight armored divisions—the 3rd and the 7th—were in such bad shape that they had to be pulled out of battle and regrouped to the rear area. A further armored division, the 9th, was essentially neutralized: Its Combat Command Reserve was practically wiped out, Combat Command B was out of action to replenish its losses, and Combat Command A was next in line to be taken out of action because of heavy losses. Another two armored divisions, the 4th and the 10th, had been badly decimated and no longer functioned as full-strength divisions. Hence, on New Year’s Day 1945, Bradley had no more than four armored divisions worthy of the name—the 2nd, the 5th, the 6th, and the newly arrived 11th Armored Division. Otherwise, the 12th Army Group had to rely on a number of armored battalions, distributed among the various infantry divisions. On 30 December, these had a total of 646 serviceable Sherman tanks (not including 105mm howitzer Shermans).18
In spite of the severe setbacks suffered by the I. SS-Panzerkorps at Rocherath-Krinkelt, Dömane Bütgenbach, and La Gleize, and by the 2. Panzer Division at Celles, Heeresgruppe B was far from finished at the turn of 1944/1945. At that time, Model still had about 1,000 tanks and tank destroyers in the first line, of which about half were in serviceable condition.19 Had the transportation of spare parts and other supplies to the front not been hindered by the Allied aviation, the number of serviceable vehicles would of course have been higher.
According to the original German plan, a third attack wave would at this stage have been deployed against the Meuse and Antwerp. This third wave included five panzer or panzer grenadier divisions (the 11. and 21. Panzer divisions, the 10. SS-Panzer-Division, the 25. Panzergrenadier-Division, and the 17. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division).20 At the end of 1944, these mustered a combined strength of about 450 tanks and tank destroyers, of which about two-thirds, or around 300, were immediately serviceable. Had the Allies not been able to launch their massive air operation against the German supply lines on 23-25 December 1944, von Rundstedt and Model would in principle have been in position to launch around 1,500 tanks and tank destroyers, of which perhaps 1,000 could have been immediately deployable, in a third attack wave against the Meuse and Antwerp at the shift of the year 1944/1945.
This would have forced the Americans to bring back the worn armor units that had been taken out of combat, and to regroup to the Ardennes from both the Ninth Army in the north and the Third Army in the south. In all, on 30 December 1944, Bradley’s 12th Army Group was able to muster 1,990 Sherman tanks (including 1,780 serviceable—not including 105mm howitzer Shermans), plus around 1,300 tank destroyers.21 It is of course difficult to say what the outcome would have been of such a huge clash between these armored forces, if the Americans would have lacked their vital air support, but the fact that the Germans between 16 and 31 December 1944 knocked out at least 600 Shermans and around 100 tank destroyers against own losses of 222 tanks and 100 tank destroyers, might give a hint.
With a better trained Wehrmacht force under a more professional command instead of the 6. SS-Panzerarmee, it hardly is far-fetched to imagine that the Germans would have been able to push the Americans another twenty miles back. U.S. historian Danny S. Parker, who has made several high-profile studies of the Battle of the Bulge, provides an interesting and often overlooked perspective on the dramatic reversal of the situation that in turn could have resulted:
Had the German advance reached the Liège-Namur area, severe disruption of the flow of U.S. supply to the First Army would have resulted. Moreover, the magnitude of the Allied supply in this area and the fact that it had been stockpiled by rail over a period of weeks made total evacuation impossible. Thus, the advance of the German forces to the Meuse River line in the north posed a grave danger to the Allied forces.22
A U.S. Army Report established that such a scenario ’would have seriously disrupted all U.S. supply operations north of the Ardennes and jeopardized supply and support of the U.S. First and Ninth armies to an extent which, if continued, would have seriously affected their combat effectiveness.’ 23 In these circumstances it would have been the Americans rather than the Germans who would have had problems in employing their entire tank strength. To develop this to a counterfactual balance of different scenarios is not the purpose of the present work, but it can be stated that ’Operation Wacht am Rhein / Herbstnebel’ perhaps was not as ’doomed in advance’ as has been claimed.
Hugh M. Cole’s voluminous work, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, published by the U.S. Army Military History Department, can almost be regarded as the U.S. Army’s ’official’ compilation of the Ardennes Battle. Its conclusions are that the German offensive failed due to the followingfactors: 24
1. The initial American defense had been more tenacious than anticipated; complete and rapid rupture of the defensive positions had not been achieved.
2. Tactical support and logistic transport had not kept pace with the advance of the combat formations.
3. Close operational control and fluidity of movement for the mass of maneuver required free use of the road net in the salient. This had been denied the attacker, most notably at Bastogne and Sankt Vith but at other points as well.
4. The flanks of the salient had not been brought forward to keep pace with the drive in the center; the shoulders of the salient had jammed.
5. The operational build-up of the forces in the salient had taken place so slowly as to deny real depth to the attack.
6. The tactical reaction of the American forces and their commitment of reserves had been more rapid than anticipated.
It is indeed surprising to find that Cole and other U.S. Army historians are limited to those factors. Even though American resistance initially was far stronger than the Germans had anticipated, the southern half of the German attack front forced all American units except the 101st Airborne Division into a hasty retreat between the second and sixth day of the attack. Supplies to the 5. Panzerarmee’s lead units lagged precariously behind for a couple of days, but with the fall of Sankt Vith, this was overcome on 21 December. The 6. SS-Panzerarmee’s inability to establish itself as far west as the 5. Panzerarmee certainly reduced the German offensive power, but the fact that the 7. Armee also was unable keep pace with the 5. Panzerarmee was mainly due to a factor that Cole does not mention—the Allied air strikes against the German traffic routes. On the whole, the weakness on the German flanks was of much greater significance to the failure of the offensive than the factors indicated by Cole as more important. Furthermore, the German forces launched in the first assault wave had never been intended to cross the Meuse and continue on towards Antwerp on their own; other rested units stood ready to be employed, but neither this, nor the reason why these were deployed only in limited scope, is discussed by Cole. The factor placed in the last place by Cole, the rapid commitment of new U.S. forces to the Ardennes, should actually have been placed first in the order of priority among the factors he mentioned.
From his horizon, SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Otto Weidinger, a regimental commander in German 2. SS-Panzer-Division during the Ardennes Battle, saw the failure of the offensive as due to the following reasons: 1. Inadequate troop training, lack of equipment and lack of fuel maintenance on the German side; 2. deficiencies in the battle command on the German side; 3. the lack of German air support; 4. the material superiority of the Allies; 5. the German leadership’s failure to believe in the possibility of a success.25
Even if the Germans would have had ever so well-trained troops, however, there would be nothing they could have done against the Allied air superiority when the weather cleared on 23 December. It is highly noteworthy that Cole does not even mention this by far most important—and decisive—factor in the failure of the German offensive. The massive Allied air strikes against especially the road network in the German rear area began at the same moment as the Germans started to employ their second assault wave. Among the units in the second assault wave, only the 3. Panzergrenadier-Division was able to reach the first line (at Elsenborn ridge on the 6. SS-Panzerarmee’s northern flank) without delay. But it was initially unable to achieve much due to the I. SS-Panzerkorps’ failure, which gave the Americans the opportunity to strengthen their defensive positions at the Elsenborn ridge, particularly in artillery. Moreover, the division lacked the necessary, and planned, armored support from the 12. SS-Panzer-Division, which by then had been temporarily neutralized. The deployment of the other divisions in the second assault wave was severely delayed, with crucial implications for the future course of the offensive, due to the following reasons:
9. SS-Panzer-Division, delayed due to disorder in the traffic in the SS rear area, then held up by Allied air attacks
2. SS-Panzer-Division, delayed due to disorder in the traffic in the SS rear area, then held up by Allied air attacks
9. Panzer-Division, delayed through Allied air attacks 15. Panzergrenadier-Division, delayed through Allied air attacks
Führer Grenadier Brigade, delayed through Allied air attacks
79. Volksgrenadier-Division, delayed through Allied air attacks
9. Volksgrenadier-Division, delayed through Allied air attacks
The Allied air supremacy played a crucial role during the Ardennes Battle in the winter of 1944/1945. These two German Flakpanzer IV Wirbelwind (‘Whirlwind) anti-aircraft gun tanks, each armed with four 20mm cannon, were knocked out in an air attack in Houffalize, according to the American photo caption.(NARA, 559 69 A.C. via Peter Björk)
The U.S. Army was, unlike the German, fully motorized, and possessed a large number of transport vehicles. In addition, the Americans gave proof of a much greater logistical ability in bringing forward large amounts of vehicles on the often small and cramped roads in the Ardennes. In this picture, two American vehicle columns pass each other in the Ardennes. (NARA, 111-SC-199339)
The completely overwhelming Allied air power simply made it impossible for von Rundstedt to deploy his third assault wave. (Instead, he used the majority of these units in the improvised operation ’Nordwind’ further south, which may be regarded as perhaps the most rational move in the current situation.)
To the first wave’s units, which were at the front, the Allied air superiority brought insurmountable problems. The destruction of the 2. Panzer-Division’s lead unit at Celles, the 116. Panzer-Division’s weakness at Verdenne, and the 2. SS-Panzer-Division’s inability to advance further from Manhay and Grandmenil—all these crucial shortcomings of the German offensive during the Christmas period in 1944 were primarily due to the effect of Allied air power. As far as German 7. Armee is concerned, the Führer Grenadier Brigade’s armor might well have been able to tip the scale to the German advantage in defensive battles against U.S. 4th Armored Division at the same time, had it not been for American air attacks that prevented the Germans from bringing forward this élite brigade in time.
The Allied air superiority also secured the extensive regrouping of Allied forces, which also was a key to the final outcome of the battle. Although Cole does not mention the effect of Allied air power when he lines up the factors that are said to have explained the failure of the German offensive, he touches on it implicitly when he discusses the Allied regroupings:
Not only did the American divisions have a very large number of vehicles and trailers organic to the unit, but the number of line of communications trucks and trains available in the forward area was enormous. Perhaps even more important, the movement of American ground transport was unaffected by harassment and attack from the air. The First Army moved more than 48,000 vehicles to the battle zone during the period 17-26 December, and the XII Corps used only two roads to move 11,000 vehicles in four days over a distance of 100 miles. In contrast to the bitter German experience, the American tactical and supply moves seldom were beset by road stoppages and traffic jams, except, of course, in the initial hours of the German penetration. Although it is manifestly true that the Germans made good intelligence usage of the American radio traffic control net, this was balanced by the speed and certainty with which American transport moved.26
While the Allies also were able to secure a flow of spare parts and replacements for their losses, the Germans were forced to adapt to a situation where the roads in the rear area were largely blocked to traffic in daylight. General Horst Stumpff, inspector of the armored troops in the German replacement army, describes one of the consequences that this had:
’Another great difficulty was the lack of spare parts. This, of course, had been a problem for us for some time, but it became extremely acute during the Ardennes Offensive. At one time, we did get reserves of new tanks, but rather than use gasoline to run them to the front, we disassembled these tanks and used the spare parts to repair the tanks then in echelon repair. […] The number of new tanks sent up was very small.’27
The operations officer of Heeresgruppe B, Oberstleutnant Günther Reichhelm, categorically claims that ’the attack of the Army Group was crippled because of the enemy air superiority.’28 This is an opinion shared by many. For example Generalleutnant Karl Thoholte, artillery advisor to Generalfeldmarschall Model in Heeresgruppe B, also believes that ’the enemy air force brought about the decision to our disfavor.’29
Historian Danny S. Parker shares that view. ’The use of Allied air power against the German Ardennes Offensive was historic,’ he wrote. ’Never before had air power blunted an enemy’s surprise counter-offensive from the sky.’30 Thus he joins to the conclusion previously drawn by Friedrich von Mellenthin in Panzer Battles: ’The Ardennes battle drives home the lesson that a large-scale offensive by massed armor has no hope of success against an enemy who enjoys supreme command of the air.’31
In all the Allied air forces carried out 63,741 combat sorties in the West between 16 December 1944 and 16 January 1945, which cost them a loss of 647 aircraft.32 Up until 31 January 1945, this aviation claimed the destruction of 11,378 motor transport vehicles, 1,161 tanks and other armored vehicles, 472 artillery positions, 507 rail engines, 6,266 rail cars, and 36 bridges.33 Although these claims were found to be markedly exaggerated, it is beyond doubt that air power was the most important single element of the Allied victory in the Ardennes Battle.
The Luftwaffe’s fighter units in the West proved to be hopelessly inferior in aerial combat with the Allied air armadas—which with the experience of the preceding months kept in mind, hardly could have come as a surprise to the German high command. Operation ’Bodenplatte’ on New Year’s Day 1945 indeed was a serious—and not entirely unsuccessful—attempt to reduce the threat from the air against the German ground forces. But alongside Hitler’s decision to assign the main thrust of the offensive to the SS divisions under Sepp Dietrich’s command, the Luftwaffe’s weakness during the Ardennes Offensive must be regarded as one of the gravest faults of the German preparations for Operation ’Herbstnebel.’
While the ground forces of Heeresgruppe B were strengthened at the expense of the Eastern Front during the build-up phase for ’Herbstnebel,’ the large quality gap between German air units on the Western Front and the Eastern Front remained. After two years of murderous war of attrition against large formations of American heavy bombers, most of the Luftwaffe veterans in the West had been lost. The gaps created by high losses were filled by young, hastily trained pilot recruits who barely stood any chance against the far better trained Allied airmen.
On the Eastern Front things were quite different. There, the Germans had a concentration of arguably the most experienced combat pilots of the entire war. These were seasoned veterans such as fighter pilot Erich Hartmann (who ended the war with 352 air victories) and attack and dive-bomber pilot Hans-Ulrich Rudel, who conducted 2,500 combat missions, during which he is reported to have destroyed 519 tanks and 800 other combat vehicles. In fact, the Luftwaffe units on the Eastern Front may be regarded as pure élite units, where at least half of the aviators were far superior to even the best Allied pilots in terms of combat experience. One of these Eastern Front pilot veterans, Alfred Grislawski, told the author how he experienced the air combats against the Americans and the British over Normandy: ’I felt that I was so totally superior to them that I could predict exactly what their next maneuver would be.’34
To not transfer this élite to the Western Front to support ’Herbstnebel’ was a departure from the Clausewitzian principle of pulling together all the best forces for one last desperate attempt to turn around the fortunes of war. If that would have taken place, there are strong indications that the concentration of fighter pilot veterans from the Eastern Front—along with the best of the ‘Western’ units—really would have been able to attain the necessary air superiority over the battlefield and rear areas. Indeed, experience also tells us that it would have been much harder to defeat the U.S. strategic 8th Air Force, which (as did happen during the first days of January 1945) could have been employed against the German transport axes in the place of a neutralized tactical aviation. But at the same time, the roles in the Ardennes could have become reversed as compared to what actually happened in 1944, if the Eastern Front’s force of 650 German ground-attack aircraft had been deployed against the Allied traffic routes in the Ardennes. Without doubt, the deployment in the Ardennes of the élite aviation from the Eastern Front would have had a significant impact on the battle on the ground.
The Ardennes Battle is surrounded by many myths and misunderstandings. Perhaps the most common one is that the entire offensive was based on the premise that the Germans would capture Allied fuel supplies, since the required quantities of fuel were supposed to have been lacking. The German front troops in the Ardennes indeed suffered from fuel shortages—they suffered from a growing shortage of most types of maintenance—but this had other causes. While fuel shortages meant that the troops in the front line were unable use many of their tanks, the 10. SS-Panzer-Division in reserve position in the area west of Bonn had a fuel supply of eight consumption units. ’Quite obviously,’ Cole’s study establishes, ’the German problem had been transport rather than an overall shortage of fuel.’35
It is frequently argued that von Rundstedt on 25 December 1944, under the impact of the devastating Allied air strikes against German supply lines, recommended the suspension of the entire offensive. But the fact that he simultaneously ordered an offensive in Alsace— operation ’Nordwind,’ with the explicit purpose of creating conditions for the resumption of the Ardennes Offensive— suggests that he might not have intended to definitively cancel ’Herbstnebel.’36 What is more, Percy E. Schramm, responsible for the war diary of the German Armed Forces High Command, was able to show that von Rundstedt at a conference with Hitler and Generaloberst Jodl on 26 December was of the opinion that ’the planned thrust from the Ardennes over the Meuse could still be regarded as practical.’37 On that same day von Rundstedt issued orders to ’increase the attack capacity of the spearhead [of Heeresgruppe B].’38
These three soldiers from a German Volksgrenadier-Divi-sion are greeted with hot drinks after the retreat back to Germany from the Ardennes in late January 1945. (BArch, Bild 183-J28548/Henisch)
But would—as was claimed after the war by Rudolf Freiherr von Gersdorff, former chief of staff of German 7. Armee39—a general retreat back to the West Wall at Christmas 1944 have been beneficial for the Germans? It is doubtful that such a thing would have restricted either the German or the Allied losses, since the Allies in such a scenario were likely to have quickly followed up with a powerful counter-offensive—there really is nothing that speaks to the contrary. Had the Germans retreated at that stage, the Allies would moreover have been able to strike anywhere along the long front line, but as long as the Bulge in the Ardennes was held, it compelled the Allies to concentrate their efforts there, which allowed the Germans to economize their much more limited forces.
Another common perception of the Ardennes Battle in the winter of 1944/1945—particularly on the American side—is that the British field marshal Montgomery overall had a negative influence on the battle, that Montgomery delayed the Allied victory by his ’excessive caution.’ But Montgomery’s personal contribution was crucial to save the entire northern central section of the Ardennes front—the Sankt Vith and River Salm areas— from a complete collapse during the days before Christmas 1944. According to Brigadier General Robert Hasbrouck, one of the most important American unit commanders in that battle, ’if it had not been for Montgomery, the First U.S. Army, and especially the troops in the Sankt Vith salient, would have ended up in a debacle that would have gone down in history.’40 It is also argued that Montgomery unnecessarily delayed the Allied victory by his failure to immediately launch his counter-attack when the German advance had been halted. As we have seen, however, despite a considerable mobilization of forces, the Allies were only with the greatest difficulty, and at the cost of heavy losses, able to advance, fitfully and slowly, when Montgomery on 3 January 1945 unleashed his counter-offensive. Had the attack commenced nine days earlier, as some on the Allied side wished, the units under Montgomery’s command would not have been as strong, and the German units they encountered not as worn down by the incessant Allied air and artillery bombardment.
One of many thousand of young men who died in the Ardennes Battle. 23-year-old Leutnant Hans-Joachim Giffey of German 406. Volksartilleriekorps was hit by shrapnel in the leg on the offensive’s second day. When he arrived at the hospital he was already dead. (Peter Figur)
On the whole, the Americans performed better during their defensive phase of the Ardennes Battle than when they later were on the offensive. The Third Army’s offensive that began on 22 December, can hardly be described as particularly brilliant. The fact that the weakly equipped German 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division for several days managed to hold back the 4th Armored Division— considered one of the U.S. Army’s best units—must be regarded as one of the German Army’s most outstanding achievements in the Ardennes Battle. This, combined with the remarkable restraint of the two U.S. Infantry divisions inching to the right of the 4th Armored Division, resulted in the failure of Patton’s aim to seal off the 5. Panzerarmee west of Bastogne.
The setbacks for U.S. 11th Armored Division— which had to be taken out of action after a few days of operations west of Bastogne—and the halting of the 35th Infantry Division during the last days of the year, were important links in the chain of failures for Patton’s offensive that culminated with the 6th Armored Division getting overthrown by von Manteuffel’s counter-offensive east of Bastogne on 4 January 1945. On the Ardennes Front’s opposite flank, an increasingly furious Major General Ridgway saw his XVIII Airborne Corps fail to complete a pincer operation, which in regard to the balance of forces probably ought to have succeeded. Meanwhile, the Germans gave ample proof of skills in leading the battle and husbanding their limited resources that aroused envy in the Allied camp.
The decisive strike against the German military power in the Ardennes finally was dealt not by the Western Allies, but by the Soviet Union. When the obviously far more powerful Red Army struck on 12 January 1945, causing the German Eastern Front to collapse, this immediately had serious consequences in the Ardennes. The first effect was that large parts of the forces deployed in the Ardennes— including most of the aviation and 800 tanks—were transferred to the Eastern Front.41 Then it was not long until the embattled German morale finally broke down entirely. With this, the decisive factor that had enabled the Germans to hold back the numerically superior Allied forces for so long, vanished.
Overall, the almost seven-week Ardennes Battle gives evidence that the German Army indeed was more effective in combat than the U.S. Army. This also can be observed through the survey conducted by American military historian Trevor N. Dupuy. ’Time after time during the Battle of the Bulge,’ wrote Dupuy, ’German soldiers outfought their American opponents. […] The Germans were better, at least during the first days of the battle and, on balance, in most instances for the entire campaign. […] In close-fought battles they usually inflicted casualties on the Americans at a rate greater than the Americans inflicted casualties on them.’42
Of course, the Germans were no ’supermen’— moreover, they were worse fed and generally more exhausted than their American opponents—but they usually were better trained, had a military doctrine more suited to the realities of battle, and they actually often were more motivated than the Americans. In addition to that, the German organization was better suited for the battlefield’s realities than the American; the different ways to take care of recruits alone could play a crucial role. While German first-line units immediately integrated an entire, cohesive group of recruits and allowed them to merge with the front unit so that the newcomers immediately became able to be effective in combat, American recruits arrived as perplexed and anonymous individuals who quite frequently were left to their own fate, and consequently had a very limited combat value during their first period at the front (which they often did not survive).
Furthermore, the German equipment in many cases was superior to that of their opponent. With their Sturmgewehr assault rifles, a small group of German soldiers often was able to outperform a much larger U.S. infantry unit in firepower. In the case of tanks, the quality gap was even greater, which naturally had repercussions on the morale of both sides. In a final summary of the Battle of the Bulge, the veterans of U.S. 3rd Armored Division’s memorial book pointed out that they ’had seen too often the result when a Sherman and a Panther tank slugged it out muzzle to muzzle. Unless it could catch the enemy at a disadvantage, the Sherman usually lost and was left wrecked and burning.’43
Aside from the American artillery with its TOT volleys and POZIT air burst shells, there was nothing the German soldiers in the Ardennes feared more than the Allied aviation. Just a single Piper artillery observation aircraft or a small group of Thunderbolt fighter-bombers circling in the air would often suffice to silence all German artillery in an entire section for fear of being bombed or subjected to a well-aimed artillery fussilade. Emerging fighter-bombers often made terrified German tank crews abandon their vehicles and hurl themselves to cover in the nearest ditch. This was not entirely unjustified; according to a 6. SS-Panzerarmee report, it had been shown that a single direct hit by a British Typhoon fighter-bomber’s rocket-projectile could suffice to completely destroy a Panther tank.44 Although the accuracy of these RPs was poor, the German tank crews were quite unwilling to take any risks. The 250lb HE bombs that U.S. fighter-bombers used also had shown their ability to overturn a tank, and the American napalm bombs were especially feared.
An additional dimension of the Ardennes Battle was the hardship during the harsh winter climate. Many of the American troops still had their summer boots in the Ardennes. Soldiers with frostbite were given alcohol to drink to ease the pain—which of course exacerbated the problems. During the Ardennes Battle, the U.S. Army evacuated 15,000 men with frostbite. When Americans in these circumstances captured German soldiers dressed in U.S. items of equipment, they must be forgiven if it was hard for them to imagine that the German equipment gave an even worse protection against the cold.
To the U.S. Army, the Ardennes Battle was the bloodiest it ever fought in World War II. Unfortunately, it has proved difficult to determine the exact losses for either side. The most common official U.S. figure for personnel losses in the Ardennes Battle between 16 December 1944 and 28 January 1945 is 80,987 men, broken down as follows:
However, during the war, Major General Franklin A. Kibler, operations officer of the 12th Army Group, recorded combat losses of 81,810 men (killed, wounded and missing) of the 12th Army Group between 22 December 1944 and 14 January 1945 alone. The study made by the research group around Trevor N. Dupuy nevertheless considered that most of these figures are too high. Dupuy et al gives the U.S. personnel losses in the Ardennes Battle up to 16 January 1945 as 62,439 men, divided as follows:
According to these sources, the U.S. losses in killed was higher—calculated as an average per day—during the Allied offensive phase in January 1945 than in the defensive phase in December 1944 (which makes it even more remarkable that the January battles are relatively neglected in previous historiography).
But there are several problems with the figures above. It is indeed strange to find that the Germans counted 24,000 American prisoners of war in the Ardennes Offensive until the end of 1944, while various U.S. sources give the number of missing and captured soldiers during the same period as anything between roughly 17,000 and 19, 000.47
Recent data from the U.S. Department of Defense list 89,500 men (19,000 killed, 47,500 wounded, and 23,000 missing) as lost in the Ardennes Battle—thus significantly differing from the figures above. An official report from the United States Department of the Army indicates even higher American losses in the Ardennes—19,246 killed, 62,489 wounded, and 26,612 captured or missing, giving a total of 108,347. This agrees fairly well with the German registration of a total of 26,430 captured Allied soldiers during the Ardennes Battle between 16 December 1944 and 25 January 1945.48 According to a summary made after the war, 28,178 men of the U.S. Army were captured in the European theater of war in December 1944 and January 1945, but this number also included shot down airmen.49
However, it is undisputed that because of the Ardennes Battle, the months of December 1944 and January 1945 came to surpass all other months concerning U.S. losses during the fighting in Europe in World War II.50
To the American losses should be added the British and Canadian casualties in the Ardennes—200 killed, 969 wounded, and 239 missing, in all 1,408 men.51 Although different figures are given in different sources, the numbers vary between 1,400 and 1,500.
The German loss statistics for the Ardennes Battle between December 1944 and late January 1945 are not more clear than those on the American side: They range from at most 120,000 and, according to recent German research, 68,000 casualties.52 The research group around Trevor N. Dupuy indicates the German personnel losses in the Ardennes Battle up to 16 January 1945 as 65,685 men, divided as follows:53
German historian Hermann Jung specifies losses by army throughout the period 16 December 1944 to late January 1945:54
Private Frank Kelly, an MP in the 4th Armored Division, leads off a column of German prisoners of war captured in the Bastogne area while U.S. soldiers in a half-track pass by (NARA, 111-198450/Gilbert)
According to a summary made by the German Armed Forces High Command, the Germans sustained the following losses on the entire Western Front during the period 16 December 1944 - 25 January 1945:55
Killed 12,652
Missing 30,582
Wounded 38,600
In total 81,834
It can be assumed that both sides sustained similarly high casualties in the Ardennes Battle. A comparison of the table immediately above and the tables of the American losses further above, indicates that each side sustained higher losses—as an average per day—when it was on the offensive: The Germans in December 1944 and the Americans in January 1945.
The dominant cause of casualties on both sides proved to be artillery fire, which was the rule during World War II. The proportion of casualties caused by artillery fire was higher on the German side. For example, 86 percent of 9. Volksgrenadier-Division’s casualties during the Ardennes Battle were inflicted by American artillery fire.56 In Führer Begleit Brigade the corresponding share was 60 to 70 percent.57 On the American side, a compilation shows that 60 percent of the losses in the Third Army in December 1944 were due to German artillery fire, mortar fire, or mines.58 This difference between the two sides is explained not only by the superior U.S. artillery, but also by the Allied air supremacy. Thereby, the Allies were able not only to provide their artillery with fire-control from artillery observation aircraft, but also, to a large extent, to prevent the German artillery from fighting the American artillery. Generalleutnant Thoholte, artillery advisor to Generalfeldmarschall Model in Heeresgruppe B, stated that ’this had such a serious effect that it was impossible to keep the enemy heavy guns down.’59
In addition to that, Allied air attacks were responsible for a not insignificant share of the German losses—15 to 20 percent in the Führer Begleit Brigade.60 While gunshot wounds accounted for 25 percent of the losses in U.S. Third Army, only 10-20 percent of the German losses were caused by gunshot wounds. Hence, in close combat the American losses surpassed the German in the ratio of 1.5 to 1.
An interesting relationship that emerges from the statistics is that the number of wounded was significantly higher as a percentage of the total number of killed and wounded on the American side (82 percent) than in the German Army (69 percent, according to Dupuy et al), indicating that the Americans were better equipped to care for their wounded, while a larger proportion of German soldiers died from their injuries. Dupuy’s numbers also suggest that the German difficulties in taking care of their wounded increased as the battle progressed (the share of wounded among all casualties dropped from 75 percent in December to 63 percent in January), which can be assumed to be the effect of not least the air attacks against the German lines of communication.
On both sides several units were almost completely worn down when the Battle was over. The commander of the 2nd Battalion of U.S. 82nd Airborne Division’s 325th Glider Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Major, noted in a report, ’The Battalion left Sisonne, France, on 18 December 1944 with 685 effectives, and received 150 replacements during the action. On 4 February 1945, the Battalion strength was 221 effectives.’ 61 On the German side, 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division lost half its original strength in four weeks, 8,334 men.
In terms of materiel losses, the Germans reported that they destroyed 1,742 Allied tanks and anti-tank guns and captured another 91 in the Ardennes between 16 December 1944 and 25 January 1945.62 As we saw earlier, the U.S. losses in armored vehicles in the Ardennes in December 1944 probably amounted to around 600 Sherman, 200 light tanks (mainly M5 Stuart), 100 tank destroyers and 400 M8 and M20 armored cars. According to estimates made by Richard C. Anderson, First U.S. Army lost 152 Shermans between 29 December and 28 January.63According to George Patton, Third U.S. Army’s medium tank losses during the Ardennes Battle between 23 December 1944 and 29 January 1945 amounted to 264 Shermans.64 Since 130 of the latter occurred in December 1944, total U.S. losses in Sherman tanks in the Ardennes in January 1945 can be estimated at about 270.
Richard C. Anderson has calculated the U.S. losses in light tanks at 134 for the period 20 November - 20 December 1944, 208 for the period 20 December - 20 January 1945, and 93 between 20 January and 20 February 1945, in all then 435. Regarding other American tanks, Anderson gives the following numbers:
After the battle, the Americans have started to salvage some of the destroyed equipment. Among the rows of knocked out Sherman tanks is a German Jagdpanzer IV. (NARA, SC 197793/T/4 Merge)
Thus, it can be calculated that the Americans lost up to 2,000 armored vehicles during the Ardennes Battle—about 1,200 tanks (up to 900 Sherman and more than 300 light tanks), 150 tank destroyers, 450 armored cars and 150 self-propelled guns. These figures are remarkably close to the German figures for American losses in armored vehicles during the Ardennes Battle, 1,833.
In several cases, American armored divisions were inflicted absolutely disastrous losses. U.S. 7th Armored Division, for instance, lost 103 tanks (72 Shermans and 31 Stuarts) between 17 and 30 December 1944 alone.65 The 11th Armored Division lost 86 tanks (54 Shermans and 32 Stuarts) in no more than a couple weeks of fighting between late December 1944 and early January 1945.66 The 3rd Armoured Division was even more roughly handled, losing 163 tanks (125 Shermans and 38 Stuarts) in the month between 16 December 1944 and 16 January 1945.67
The German battle losses in AFVs were significantly lower. According to Swiss military historian Eddy Bauer the Germans lost 324 tanks in combat in the Ardennes.68 Between 16 December 1944 and 15 January 1945 the panzer units in the Ardennes Battle recorded the loss of 196 Panther tanks: 69
As we have seen before, the relations between the number of Panzer IV losses and Panther losses in December 1944 were in the ratio of 1 to 2, and Tiger losses to Panther losses were 1 to 10. This therefore appears to confirm Bauer’s figures. To these figures should be added an estimated 150 assault guns and tank destroyers lost in combat during the Ardennes Battle.
However, the total number of German AFVs lost in the Ardennes was significantly higher. In the area recaptured by U.S. VIII Corps after the Ardennes Battle, 322 destroyed or abandoned German tanks were found.70 All in all, the Germans employed over 1,800 tanks and tank destroyers/assault guns in the Ardennes Battle (including 340 replacements for losses). About 800 were transferred to the Eastern Front in January 1945.71 The panzer units that took part in the Ardennes Battle and were not transferred to the Eastern Front, mustered a total of 250 tanks (151 Panthers and 62 Panzer IVs) and 137 tank destroyers/ assault guns, in all just under 400, on 5 February 1945.72 This indicates that a total of nearly 600 tanks and tank destroyers/assault guns were lost in the Ardennes. The Dupuy Institute has arrived at a number of between 527 and 554:73
16-20 Tigers
191-194 Panthers
141-158 Panzer IVs
179-182 tank destroyers/assault guns
According to Ralf Tiemann’s estimates of German material losses in the Ardennes, a total of 550 tanks and tank destroyers/assault guns, and 5,000 other vehicles were lost.74 The difference between combat losses and the total number of AFV losses is explained through the fact that a number of vehicles had to be abandoned because of fuel shortage during the German retreat in January 1945. However, the proportion of abandoned vehicles appears to have been greatly exaggerated in some German accounts. Hence, for instance von Manteuffel wrote, ’The fact that we were compelled to blow up such a large number of tanks during the retreat in January 1945, was mainly due to the fact that we had too few recovery vehicles, which in turn was caused by fuel shortages. I seem to remember that the number of tanks that we lost because of this lack of recovery vehicles was five times higher than the number we lost in battle’75 A closer study of the German armor losses in the Ardennes reveals that there could hardly have been more than one hundred tanks and tank destroyers/assault guns that were left behind in this manner when the Germans finally withdrew from the Ardennes. It should be added, however, that even among the nearly 500 tanks and tank destroyers/assault guns lost by the Germans until mid-January, 1945, a number had to be abandoned and destroyed by their own crews for various reasons.
According to German records, 1,742 Allied tanks and tank destroyers were destroyed in the Ardennes between 16 December 1944 and 25 January 1945. This image shows destroyed and captured American combat vehicles at Poteau on 18 December 1944. (NARA, III-SC-198251)
Nevertheless, in pure armor battles, the Germans outperformed their American opponents completely. The 2. SS-Panzer-Division was reported to have knocked out 224 American tanks against own losses of 28 Panthers and 34 Panzer IVs.76 Even this ratio of 3.6 to 1 was inferior to the results of many of the Wehrmacht panzer divisions. The 5. Panzerarmee’s XLVII. Panzerkorps had a ratio of eight to ten destroyed U.S. tanks or tank destroyers for each own loss. An even better result was recorded by the Führer Begleit Brigade, which claimed to have destroyed 178 American tanks in the Ardennes.77 The Brigade’s own losses amounted to 10 to 12 tanks to enemy AT gun or tank fire, and another five to land mines.78 Overall this means that Oberst Remer’s brigade on average was able to knock out around fifteen U.S. tanks for each loss of its own. Stürmgeschutz-Brigade 244, which supported the 18. Volksgrenadier-Division, probably had an unsurpassed ratio during the Ardennes Battle, destroying 54 American tanks against an own loss of no more than two StuG IIIs.79
An Allied investigation in February 1945 of 75 destroyed or abandoned German tanks or tank destroyers/assault guns in the Ardennes, showed that these were lost due to the following reasons:80
Of the 37 combat vehicles above which undoubtedly were lost in combat, 27 thus were destroyed by fire from AT guns or tanks, four by artillery fire, and six by air attacks. This suggests that the Allied aviation may have destroyed as many as eighty to ninety German tanks and tank destroyers/assault guns during the Ardennes Battle. However, this material probably has an overrepresentation of AFVs knocked out by air attacks, since the examination was carried out within an area of six to fourteen square miles around tanks or tank destroyers/assault guns claimed to be knocked out by the aviation. However, the Allied air forces in all probability caused even greater losses than indicated above, since German fighting vehicles frequently were abandoned by their crews because of air attacks, whereafter the stationary vehicles could be fairly easily knocked out by ground fire.
In hindsight, the Germans might have had the possibility— albeit small—to actually reach Antwerp in the winter of 1944/1945. The basic conditions for this to be attained, however, had been that instead of Sepp Dietrich’s 6. SS-Panzerarmee, there had been better trained Wehrmacht soldiers under a more qualified command, and that the air force that supported the attack had been of higher quality. In any case, the so-called ’small solution’ probably would have been possible to carry out with success. Hence, in military terms, operation ’Herbstnebel’ was not as unrealistic as so often is claimed.
But the whole venture’s rasion d’être either was political—to shock the population of the Western countries and render it impossible for their governments to continue the war—or to gain so much time that the German ’wonder weapons’ could be deployed on a larger scale. In both respects, the plan was unrealistic. The idea that one of the Western Allied countries in early 1945 could have been compelled to withdraw from the war can not be considered as anything but the Nazi dictator’s desperate wishful thinking. As is evidenced by circumstances, the German industry stood in front of its complete collapse at the turn of 1944/1945, and it entirely lacked the capacity to produce the required quantities of new submarines, jet planes, and V 2 rockets.
A military critique of ’Herbstnebel’ could also be that even if the Germans could have succeeded in reaching Antwerp, their protracted southern flank would have been beset by Patton’s powerful Third Army, and perhaps also by further Allied forces. Owing to the need to detail German units against this threat against the flanks, it is doubtful that the desired annihilation of the Allied armies thus encircled east of Antwerp could have been realized.
Still, the Germans were quite successful in many respects. Above all, the fact that they managed to catch their opponent with such a total surprise at dawn on 16 December 1944 must be emphasized; this is the single most important factor to the actually remarkably great German successes at this late stage of the war. The Ardennes Battle during the first days of the German offensive was the last major tactical defeat dealt to the Allied forces in World War II.
Despite efforts to clean up the battlefield, the Ardennes remained filled with
But even if all circumstances had been as the Germans wished, the Ardennes Offensive would not have had a chance to turn the fortunes of war to Hitler’s advantage. However, it could have overthrown the entire Allied strategy. The result in this case could have been that the Red Army would meet the Western Allied armies on the Rhine in the summer of 1945 instead of—as turned out to be the case—at the Elbe, two hundred miles farther to the east, in late April 1945. Had the war lasted a few weeks more than that, our history books would probably have mentioned the names of two German cities instead of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Even though the Ardennes Offensive failed to reach its goal, and instead ended in a German tactical defeat, it may be regarded as a German strategic success insofar as it caused a delay in the Allied offensive plans. In addition to the actual respite of five or six weeks that the Germans gained on the Western Front through the attack on 16 December 1944, and then by holding out for so long in the conquered area, the initial German victories had a psychological impact that made the Western Allied supreme command more hesitant and cautious. The mere decision to halt U.S. First and Third armies in the Ardennes in early February 1945, delayed the Allied advance into Germany by at least a month.
When the Ardennes Offensive was initiated, the distance to the German capital Berlin was the same from the Western and the Eastern fronts. In the end, the most significant effect of operation ’Herbstnebel,’ perhaps was that the Red Army came to conquer Berlin, while the American troops met the Russians seventy-five miles farther to the west. In the end, the Soviet Union became the real victor of the Ardennes Offensive.
destroyed military equipment long after the war ended. In this picture, probably taken in the summer of 1945, we can see a destroyed Sherman, and in the background a Panther with its turret blown off. (National Museum of Military history, Diekirch)