CHAPTER 5
"During our rapid advance, the Americans scarcely offered any opposition. On the contrary, I must say today that during the entire war I rarely saw soldiers in such a confused state, leaving their gear and equipment behind or throwing it away undamaged. "Major Goswin Wahl, commander of Fa llschirmjager-Regiment 13 in December 1944.1
THE FIRST DAY—ACROSS THE RIVER!
River Sûre runs from the hills around seven miles southwest of Bastogne. From the west to the east, it cuts through northern Luxembourg. At Wallendorf on the border between Luxembourg and Germany, it flows together with River Our, coming from the north. Thence, the Sûre—or Sauer as the Germans call it—bends towards the southeast, marking the border between Luxembourg and Germany along some thirty miles. This is where the front line ran in mid-December 1944. On the evening before 16 December 1944, the southernmost army in Operation ’Herbstnebel’— General Erich Brandenberger’s 7. Armee—was deployed on both sides of the place where the Our confluxes with the Sûre/ Sauer. The task assigned to this the weakest among the three armies in the German Ardennes offensive—it neither had any armor in the first line, nor the same amount of artillery as the other two armies—was to cover the 5. Panzerarmee’s southern flank against Lieutenant General George Patton’s powerful Third Army in the south. Brandenberger only had slightly above 47,000 first-line troops, supported by less than fifty assault guns/tank destroyers.2
The strongest corps in the 7. Armee was the LXXXV. Armeekorps under General Baptist Kniess on the northern flank. This corps consisted of two divisions, the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division and the 352. Volksgrenadier-Division, which together disposed over 24,000 troops supported by forty-four assault guns/tank destroyers. Kniess nevertheless enjoyed an almost three-fold numerical superiority against his enemy, for the Americans had deployed not much more than a single infantry regiment, the 109th of the 28th Infantry Division, in this sector. This regiment also had suffered terrible losses—a devastating 44 percent of its total force—during the fighting in the Hürtgen Forest in October and November 1944, and on 18 November it had been brought to this part of central eastern Luxembourg because it was regarded as so calm; the idea was to allow the 109th Infantry Regiment to rest and recuperate here.3
With 34-year-old Lieutenant Colonel James E. Rudder, the 109th received one of the U.S. Army’s most daring mid-level commanders on 8 December 1944. He had previously commanded a Ranger battalion which distinguished itself particularly well during the invasion of Normandy. At the end of World War II, Rudder was one of the highest decorated American servicemen. His awards included the Distinguished Service Cross, the second highest U.S. award for gallantry in combat, and the Belgian Ordre de Léopold. Like the adjacent regiment to the north, the 110th, Rudder’s regiment had in December 1944 been upgraded to a regimental combat team (109th RCT), and therefore had an assigned strength of 4,985 men (instead of an American infantry regiment’s normal assigned strength of 3,257), heavily supported by artillery and armor, as well as engineer and signal units.4
The 28th ‘Keystone Division’ was a veteran unit that had been in action on the Western Front since July 1944. That was one of the reasons why this division was assigned to such a broad section on this so-called ‘Ghost front’—around 25 miles wide. The divisional commander, 51-year-old Major General Norman ‘Dutch’ Cota, also was a veteran. He had served as the chief of staff in the 1st Infantry Division during the landing in Algeria in November 1942 (Operation ‘Torch’). Later on, he took part in the planning of the Normandy invasion, and on 6 June 1944 he was the first Allied general to set foot on the landing beaches. Cota commanded the 28th Infantry Division since August 1944, and hence he knew his men quite well. Furthermore, the unit had served in this section of the Ardennes for four weeks, so the men were well acquainted with the area. Cota felt confident when he assigned the front along River Our between Stolzembourg in the north and the Our’s confluence with River Sûre in the south—a five mile-wide section—to Rudder’s reinforced regiment. Farther to the north stood his division’s 110th Regimental Combat Team under Colonel Hurley Fuller, and even elements of this regiment would be drawn into combat against German 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division.
The terrain in the area where the 7. Armee was supposed to advance really can be described as the emblem of the Ardennes—deep woods of foliferous trees in a landscape dramatically intersected with hills and valleys with sharp quarry rocks, steep mountain walls, and rivers coiling through deep ravines, surrounded on both sides by huge, forested hills. This was a terrain definitely not suited for a fast armored advance.
Just like the 5. Panzerarmee farther to the north, the LXXXV. Armeekorps opened its offensive silently, with assault troops crossing the river in rubber boats early on 16 December. Covered by the darkness and the fog, this was accomplished without the Americans noticing anything.
Particularly good progress was made by the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division, which was employed next to the 5. Panzerarmee’s southern flank. German 7. Armee’s chief of staff, Oberst Rudolf Freiherr von Gersdorff, described the men in this division as ‘young and fresh,’ who despite an inadequate military training displayed ‘generally high combat spirits.’ In his opinion, the divisonal commander, Oberst Heilmann, was ‘excellent.’5 Heilmann himself agreed that his troops, most of whom were younger than 20 years of age, were ‘highly motivated, but with an inadequate infantry training.’ However, he was quite critical of the officers; he felt that ‘the majority’ of the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division’s officers—who came straight from flying units—were ‘unwilling to their new use as infantry, spoilt and weakened through their previous life on airfields and the like.’6But he made one exception for the commander of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 15, Oberstleutnant Kurt Gröschke, who was one of the German Paratroop Force’s most experienced unit commanders, with combat experience since 1940. According to Heilmann’s judgement, the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division’s best sub-units were Gröschke’s regiment, Fallschirm-Pionier-Bataillon 5, and Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 11.7 However, as we shall see, other elements of this division also performed quite well during the coming fighting, and many of the officers would surpass Heilmann’s expectations.
Oberst Ludwig Sebastian Heilmann, commander of the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division during the Ardennes Offensive. Heilmann was one of the most capable German officers in the Ardennes Offensive. He had been awarded with the Knight’s Cross for his paratroop battalion’s accomplishments during the conquest of Crete in May 1941. Following the Allied landings in Sicily in July 1943, Heilmann’s paratroop regiment was airdropped in the Catania Plains to relieve an enveloped German troop force. This operation was a total success, and for this Heilmann was awarded with the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross. In May 1944, Heilmann received the Swords to the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves, which only sixty-six other German soldiers held at that time—this for his feats during the Battle of Monte Cassino. The picture was taken when Heilmann with the rank of a Major was awarded the Knight’s Cross in June 1941. Heilmann died in 1959, at the age of only 56. (BArch, Bild 146-1973-005-06) -
Between 0430 and 0500 hrs on 16 December, the assault companies of Fallschirmjäger regiments 14 and 15 crossed the Our at Stolzembourg—three miles to the south of Obereisenbach, where the engineers of Panzer Lehr would construct a bridge later in the day—and at Roth, four miles further downstream (to the south). This was accomplished according to plan, without their enemy detecting anything.8 At Roth, the engineers of Fallschirm-Pionier-Bataillon 5 also crossed the river, followed by Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 13. The pioneer battalion’s main task was to construct bridges for the division’s assault guns and artillery, but its 4. Kompanie under Fahnenjunker-Oberfeldwebel Hans Prigge was assigned with a special task—to seize the town of Vianden, fifteen hundred yards upstream from Roth, where there was a partly demolished stone bridge across the river.9 This task was successfully completed; soldiers in the American platoon that held a checkpoint beneath the medieval castle in the small town were taken by surprise, and all of them were killed or captured.10
At 0530 hrs, the 7. Armee’s artillery opened fire. The shelling was particularly heavy in the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division’s section, where half of the Army’s more than four hundred artillery pieces and Nebelwerfer were deployed. ’ Astonishingly,’ said Fahnenjunker Ulrich Krüger from Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 15, ’we met with no resistance on our advance. Random harassing fire from medium-caliber artillery fell on the area, but it did not bother us or cause us any losses.’11
Without being detected by the Americans until after several hours, Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 14 surged forward in the seam between U.S. 109th and 110th Regimental Combat Teams, and soon was ordered to support the 5. Panzerarmee’s 26. Volksgrenadier-Division in the fight for Weiler and Hoscheid, two and four miles respectively west of Stolzembourg. On the paratroop division’s southern flank, Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 15 made a rapid advance across the hilly terrain west of Roth. The small village of Walsdorf, two miles to the west of River Our, was found to be unoccupied by the Americans. After another mile or so of arduous march across the broken terrain, the paratroopers reached the so-called ’Skyline Drive,’ the highway that runs from the north to the south parallel to River Our. Through this thrust, the paratroopers, in collaboration with the 352. Volksgrenadier-Division’s Grenadier-Regiment 915, managed to cut off the troops of’E’ Company, 2nd Battalion, 109th Regimental Combat Team, at Fouhren (Fuhren), a mile southeast of Walsdorf. From positions on the hills to the east of Fouhren, surrounded by open fields, the Americans could observe and lead their artillery against the German river crossing at Roth, only a mile farther down to the east. Hence, this section was one of the prime targets for both the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division and the 352. Volksgrenadier-Division on the first day of the attack.
Equipped with Sturmgewehr 44 assault rifles, troops of the 352. Volksgrenadier-Division advance through a deciduous forest in eastern Luxembourg. (BArch, Bild 183-1985-0104-501/Lange)
The 352. Volksgrenadier-Division under Generalmajor Erich Schmidt consisted of over 10,000 men, and was characterized by Oberst von Gersdorff as ’a good division.’12 This division’s northernmost regiment, Grenadier-Regiment 915 under the command of Oberstleutnant Johannes Drawe, hardly met any resistance as it crossed the Our south of Roth in the morning on 16 December. These German troops then made it through the valley south of Roth, towards Fouhren. Right here, a more than mile-wide gap yawned between the positions of 2nd and 3rd battalions of U.S. 109th Regimental Combat Team, so the Germans could continue forward without incidents. But while these soldiers were marching towards the west, the night sky suddenly lit up by explosions in the south, and a heavy artillery rumble told them that everything was not as well with Grenadier-Regiment 916 on the division’s southern flank.
Grenadier-Regiment 916 actually also managed to avoid detection by the Americans as its troops crossed River Our, and they set about to march towards the west to establish a defensive screen west of Gentingen, two miles south of Roth, where engineer troops began to construct a bridge. But as they came out on the open fields less than a mile west of the river, they were observed by a U.S. force that radioed in artillery. U.S. 107th and 108th Field Artillery Battalions were positioned on the hills north of Diekirch, three miles farther south.13 From these positions they opened up a devastating fire against Grenadier-Regiment 916 and Gentingen. This not only halted Grenadier-Regiment 916, which was dealt bloody losses, but also stopped the construction of the bridge at Gentingen. Because of that, the 352. Volksgrenadier-Division’s tank destroyers could not be brought across the river to support the infantry.
Another good three miles downstream (to the south, or rather southeast), River Sûre/Sauer was crossed by German 276. Volksgrenadier-Division. This was the northernmost division of the LXXX. Armeekorps, the German offensive’s southernmost attack force. The LXXX. Armeekorps, under General Franz Beyer, consisted of two divisions and was assigned a fifteen-mile wide front along the Sûre’s/Sauer’s river bend northwest of the city of Trier. With only just over nine thousand men, the 276. Volksgrenadier-Division was one of the weakest German divisions in the offensive. It had been formed just recently, and the troops consisted mainly of recruits whose training standards Oberst von Gersdorff characterized as inadequate.14 The division, however, was commanded by the highly experienced Generalmajor Kurt Möhring, who had been awarded with the Knight’s Cross for his exploits during the Battle of Kursk on the Eastern Front in 1943. As judged by the Americans, based on POW interrogations, the combat spirits of this division were quite high.15
The 276. Volksgrenadier-Division was pitted against an opponent worthy of respect—Combat Command A of U.S. 9th Armored Division. Despite the rugged terrain, the Americans had chosen to position an armored regiment here. As we have previously seen (Chapter 4), the three combat commands of Major General John W. Leonard’s fresh 9th Armored Division were divided between three different sections. Here in the south were the Divisional Headquarters and Combat Command A, under Colonel Thomas J. Harrold, each with a tank battalion, an armored infantry battalion, and an artillery battalion, plus an antitank company and various support units. But Möhring’s troops saw nothing of this considerable force as they under the cover of darkness and fog at dawn on 16 December put their inflatable rafts and improvised ferries into the cold river. In fact, at this time, the U.S. armored regiment only had the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion in the front line, which was so thinly held that the Germans were able to establish a beach head without the Americans noticing anything. But Möhring confined his attack to the seizure of the first village, Bigelbach, located on the narrow lowlands to the west of the river. Here— at the foot of high, forested mountains, intersected by sharp cliffs and steep ravines— his troops went into position for the remainder of the first day, to the Army commander Brandenberger’s dismay.
The second division of the LXXX. Armeekorps, the 212. Volksgrenadier-Division, was just about the opposite to the 276. Volksgrenadier-Division—it certainly also was relatively newly formed, but had amassed a good deal of combat experience during several weeks of first-line service at the West Wall. ’Good division with good fighting spirit and command,’ was Oberst von Gersdorff’s review.16 Its eleven thousand soldiers mainly came from Bavaria, and many of them were only 17 years old. The divisional commander, Generalleutnant Franz Sensfuss, also was an experienced officer who had been awarded with the Knight’s Cross during the fighting on the Eastern Front.
The 212. Volksgrenadier-Division crossed the Sûre/Sauer with Grenadier-Regiment 423 on the northern and Grenadier-Regiment 320 on the southern flank.17 ’It was easy to cross and to reach the highland,’ Sensfuss reported.18 Here, too, the Germans initially managed to get through undetected, covered as they were by the morning mist. But the cooperation between the two divisions of the LXXX. Armeekorps was hampered by the Schwarze Ernz (Ernz Noire) river, which runs down from the heights ten miles farther south and joins the Sûre/Sauer southwest of Bollendorf. High forested mountains rise almost vertically from the deep river gorge of the Schwarze Ernz, and both sides of the river are dominated by the extremely rugged terrain that compelled Möhring to halt his Division at Bigelbach, three miles northwest of the confluence between the Schwarze Ernz and the Sûre/Sauer. On their eastern side of the Schwarze Ernz however, the men of the 212. Volksgrenadier-Division met with some good success. The American regiment assigned to hold this sector—the 4th Infantry Division’s 12th Infantry Regiment—soon found that it had one company each encircled at Echternach, Lauterborn, Osweiler, and Dickweiler, at a distance of up to two miles from the Sûre/Sauer.
U.S. artillery however managed to prevent the 212. Volksgrenadier-Division from constructing bridges across the river. Within a short time, the Americans also despatched the 70th Tank Battalion with forty Shermans and seventeen Stuart tanks for a counter-attack, which succeeded in relieving all of the encircled U.S. units except the company in Echternach.19 This armored thrust also put a resolute end to the 212. Volksgrenadier-Division’s advance. Moreover, additional U.S. reinforcements were on their way. On the very next day, Patton, the Third Army’s commander, ordered the 10th Armored Division’s Combat Command A and Combat Command Reserve northwards to block German LXXX. Armeekorps.
It might seem ironical that Patton made this quick and powerful draw against the weakest among the corps in the German offensive. The LXXX. Armeekorps lacked both armor and anti-tank guns, and it only had the four StuG IIIs that had been assigned to the 212. Volksgrenadier-Division.20The artillery, in all one hundred and ninety pieces, consisted of a hodgepodge of German guns and howitzers, captured Soviet and French weapons, and even a few old pieces used in the Imperial Austrian army during World War One.21 The weakness of the corps, however, was to some extent relative to its fairly limited task—to seize the heights on the wesern side of River Sûre/Sauer to ensure that U.S. artillery would not interfere with the German transport of supplies across the southernmost reaches of the river. The task of this German corps really was of a defensive nature. But to the Americans, it was vital to make Sûre that the connections between their First and Third armies were not severed, hence the strong effort against German LXXX. Armeekorps.
On the German side, however, the 7. Armee placed the emphasis on General Kniess’ LXXXV. Armeekorps on the northern flank, where some spectacular success was achieved.
THE PARATROOPERS ADVANCE WESTWARDS
On 17 December, the Americans counter-attacked with both the 9th Armored Division and the 109th RCT. But unlike the counter-attack against the 212. Volksgrenadier-Division on the previous day, all of these attempts were stymied. A force from the 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and 811th Tank Destroyer Battalion was ambushed and forced to retreat under heavy fire from Panzerfausts, leaving several burning tanks behind. The American troops had no idea that there were any enemy soldiers in that area.
What had happened was that Generalmajor Kurt Möhring—who had been reproached by German 7. Armee’s C-in-C, Brandenberger, for halting his 276. Volksgrenadier-Division at Bigelbach on the first day of the attack—had taken advantage of the previous night’s darkness, to circumvent the American positions through the dense forests. With the American force that was supposed to deliver the counter-attack pushed back, U.S. 60th Armored Infantry Battalion’s headquarters in Beaufort was overrun and captured. Suddenly the whole American battalion found itself surrounded!
The German Jagdpanzer 38 (t) Hetzer tank destroyer was built on the chassis of the Czech-made tank LT-38, and had been provided with better armor and a Pak 39 L/48, 75mm anti-tank gun. The Hetzer first entered service in July 1944 ami became one of the most common late-war German tank destroyers. (Marion Schaaf - MNHM Diekirch)
The counter-attack launched by Lieutenant Colonel Rudder, commanding the 109th Regimental Combat Team, at dawn on 17 December to relieve ’E’ Company of his 2nd Battalion at Fouhren, fared no better. All that Rudder was able to assemble for this operation were two companies of the 2nd Battalion and a tank company. On the day before, he had disposed the 707th Tank Battalion, but because of the crisis for the two other regiments of the 28th Infantry Division farther to the north—the 110th and the 112th—the divisional commander Cota had ordered all the armored battalion’s companies but ‘C’ Company northwards, as we have seen in the previous chapter.
This relatively weak force was repulsed by German II. Bataillon/ Grenadier-Regiment 915, plus a replacement battalion from Grenadier-Regiment 914 and III. Bataillon of German Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 15, using Panzerfausts with good results. In connection with this fight, the paratroopers also managed to capture the artillery positions at Bastendorf, southwest of Fouhren, from where the Americans had inflicted such severe losses on Grenadier-Regiment 916 on the first day of the attack. Here, German Grenadier-Regiment 915’s commander, Oberstleutnant Drawe, was badly wounded, but the artillery fire against the river banks was stopped. Thus, over the course of 17 December, the Germans could complete the bridge at Gentingen, and before sunset the fourteen Hetzer tank destroyers of the 352. Panzerjäger-Abteilung were across on the other side of the river.22
The tank destroyer Jagdpanzer 38 (t) Hetzer basically was a modified Czech-made LT-38 tank without a turret, equipped with a stronger armor protection, and—above all—the powerful 75mm Pak 39 L/48 antitank gun, which could knock out a Sherman frontally at a distance of up to 2,000 yards. The three Hetzers that showed up at Fouhren obviously frightened the Americans so much that they reported them as ’Tiger tanks.’23 This decided the outcome of the battle for this little village. The American relief force was driven back with bloody losses, and inside the village, the remaining thirty-five American soldiers of ’E’ Company took cover in a large building. The Germans called in the 352. Pionier-Bataillon, which used flamethrowers to drive the surviving Americans out of the building. One of these, Bill Alexander, tells the story:
Sergeant Martin Slota and I, who were down in the root cellar, threw our rifles out into the fire and came upstairs. I think we were the last of E Company or of the 2nd Bn to come out of that house. The men were crying or cursing as they came out. We were taken shortly after that across the Our river—there was a bridge at Roth—and were eventually moved to Bitburg. The German soldiers who captured us, were of a paratroop unit. They treated us well. I remember one of them searching me, put his hand in my pocket and I said, ’Cigarettes’ ’Ah, Zigaretten,’ he said and made a motion for me to take them out and I thought that this was my last draw. I handed them to him and he said, ’ja Zigaretten,’ and put them back.24
The section where this fighting took place is surrounded by rivers on three sides—the Our in the east, and the Sûre both in the west and the south. Thereby, the Germans had to make it across more rivers. While elements of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 15 still were fighting at Fouhren, the regimental commander, Oberstleutnant Gröschke, ordered his 5. Kompanie towards the Sûre’s western branch. Over the course of the day, this company managed to seize the bridge at Goebelsmühle, six miles west of Fouhren, through a magnificent coup. Thus, the way to the west lay open.
At dawn on 18 December, the 352. Volksgrenadier-Divisionߣs Grenadier-Regiment 916 attacked Bettendorf on the Sûre’s southern branch under the cover of a smoke screen, and forced U.S. 109th Regimental Combat Team’s 3rd Battalion to withdraw to Diekirch, two miles to the west. Meanwhile, the American regiment’s 2nd Battalion retreated from the heights in the north down towards the same town. Farther to the south, on the other side of this branch of the Sûre, U.S. 9th Armored Divisionߣs Combat Command A meanwhile renewed its attempts to relieve the surrounded 60th Armored Infantry Battalion, but again this was stymied by German 276. Volksgrenadier-Division. ’There appeared to be a Panzerfaust behind every tree,’ wrote Charles B. MacDonald. ‘In what seemed to be only minutes, the Panzerfausts knocked out a light tank and six Shermans. The commander of the leading medium tank company, Captain Arthur J. Banford, Jr., his own tank shot from under him, ordered withdrawal.’25
The troops of U.S. 60th Armored Infantry Battalion had no option but to attempt a break-out. In absolutely chaotic scenes, around 350 men managed to slip back to their own main line, while all of the remainder were killed or captured.26 However, the Germans also took some heavy casualties. Among those killed on 18 December was the C.O. of the 276. Volksgrenadier-Division, Generalmajor Möhring.
This was just as far as the LXXX. Armeekorps would get, no more than three to six miles into Luxembourg. On 18 December, the U.S. forces which stood against German 7. Armee’s southern flank received a significant reinforcement through the arrival of 10th Armored Divisionߣs Combat Command A and Combat Command Reserve. Together with Combat Command A, 9th Armored Division, these merged into the so-called Combat Command X. Next day, German LXXX. Armeekorps was compelled to revert to the defensive, at most six miles from its jump-off positions. A final success could be netted on 20 December, when the last American recistance in Echternach was broken. ’The neighboring division paused even on the first day,’ lamented the commander of the 212. Volksgrenadier-Division, Generalleutnant Sensfuss. ’Further success was denied because the neighbors failed.’27
The 7. Armee was far more successful on the northern flank—and this also was what the Germans had expected. On 17 December, engineer troops had constructed a bridge across the Our, allowing Fallschirm-Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 11 to cross over with its thirty StuG III assault guns, a most welcome support to the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division.28 After Hoscheid had been taken—at the seam between the 7. Armee and the 5. Panzerarmee—the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division was ordered to leave the 5. Panzerarmee’s operational area and continue due west according to the original plan. The paratroopers rapidly made it across River Clerve and advanced towards the town of Wiltz, which readily could be surrounded.
By now, the C.O. of the 28th Infantry Division, Major General Cota, could see the outlines of a total disaster for his division. Indeed, his 112th Infantry Regiment still held out in the Sankt Vith area far to the north, but his 110th Regimental Combat Team had disintegrated into scattered and demoralized groups of soldiers that withdrew westwards in more or less disorder. The 109th Regimental Combat Team appeared to be about to suffer the same fate. In order to save what could be saved of his division, Cota issued an order on 18 December to pull back what remained of the 109th to the northwest, to Bastogne. But the regimental commander, the ’fighter’ Rudder, opposed this, and he managed to get his way.29
However, not much was left of the 109th Regimental Combat Team either. The remains of its main force were pushed back to the southwest. In Diekirch, a small town twelve miles southeast of Wiltz, Rudder decided to make an effort to halt the German attack. But this was a hopeless venture. On 18 December, German 352. Volksgrenadier-Division took up positions on the hills north of Diekirch and started shelling the small town, which is wedged in the river gorge of the Sûre’s southern arm. It was a pure trap. A hellish fire from artillery and Nebelwerfer rockets inflicted terrible losses on the American troops. When it was rumoured that the Americans were preparing to abandon the town, panic broke out among the four thousand residents. Many of them had participated in the liberation of their town in September 1944, and now they feared German reprisals. Thousands of people streamed out of the town, blocking the road from Diekirch that winds up to the mountains south of the Sûre. Thus, U.S. Combat Command X was unable to get through to support Rudder’s troops.
On 19 December, the soldiers of the 352. Volksgrenadier-Division came down the hill to attack the town itself. The assault was led by the divisional commander Generalmajor Schmidt personally—with the result that he himself was badly wounded. By that time, a couple of hundred exhausted troops was all that remained of the 109th Regimental Combat Team in Diekirch, and now even Rudder realized that the game was over. At eight in the evening on 19 December he called Cota and informed him that his regiment ’could fight it out’ if necessary, but that ’that would be the end.’30He was given a free hand, and during the following night the Americans left Diekirch.
After the retreat from Diekirch, the 109th Regimental Combat Team was more or less finished as a fighting force, so Rudder had no choice but to to disengage the remainder of his unit from the enemy as quickly as possible. The 352. Volksgrenadier-Division’s gray-clad soldiers triumphantly marched into Diekirch. Advancing between burning and ruined houses in the otherwise picturesque little town on the morning of 20 December, they marveled at how eerily deserted everything was; nearly all of the residents had fled.
With the 109th Regimental Combat Team virtually wiped out, what was left of the 110th Regimental Combat Team was cut to pieces by German 5. Panzerarmee in cooperation with Oberst Heilmann’s German paratroop division. On the evening of 19 December, the 1. Kompanie of Fallschirm-Pionier-Bataillon 5 under Leutnant Walter Sander overpowered U.S. 687th Field Artillery Battalion at the main road junction three miles southwest of Wiltz. While the American artillerymen took refuge in the neighboring Café Schumann, a whole column of U.S. combat vehicles suddenly appeared with their headlamps on. These carried two hundred men of Major Harold F. Milton’s 3rd Battalion, 110th Regimental Combat Team. This was the remains of the gallant battalion that by clinging on to Hosingen and Consthum for two days had delayed the Panzer Lehr Division’s advance in a most decisive manner—thus saving Bastogne. After this epic battle, the Americans withdrew to Wiltz, and managed to get out of there before this town was surrounded, and now they came along the road to Bastogne—not knowing that the Germans had reached that far west.
Café Schumann still remains at the famous road intersection Schumann’s Eck. (Photo: The author)
The town of Wiltz, photo from the winter of 1944/1945. (NARAl111-SC-199378/Zinni)
The engines screamed as the heavy lorries slowly worked their way up the icy hill on the lowest gear, towards the crossroads. Leutnant Sander’s stunned men paused for a moment, but then a Panzerfaust set a half-track vehicle burning, and another one knocked out a tank farther back in the column. 31 Major Milton’s men hastily abandoned their vehicles and jumped headlong straight into the darkness. They tumbled down the slope into the beech forest, and before they got to their feet, they had been overpowered by the paratroopers and surrendered. According to Horst Lange, one of the participating German paratroopers, the Americans lost between six and eight tanks in this ambush.
Meanwhile, the artillerymen in Café Schumann were left with no option. One of them, Sergeant Gene Fleury, remembers how the brazen paratroopers yelled at them from the darkness outside: ’No more zig-zig [sex] in Paris!’32
The Americans decided to surrender, and shivering with fear they went out through the front door where they were apprehended by the Fallschirmjäger, who were described by Private First Class Ervin McFarland as ’wild and very young, no doubt teenagers.’33 Sergeant Austin remembers that ‘they slapped and banged you around, stripped you down, took your watch, took your wallet, pen knives, and even made me take off my shoes.’34 Then the small group of paratroopers brought their several hundred prisoners and a large number of captured vehicles and artillery pieces to the east. Two months later, Leutnant Sander was awarded with the Knight’s Cross.
On 20 December, Oberst Heilmann ordered most of his 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division to continue westward over Doncols, four miles west of Wiltz, and on through the forests and fields in the area south of Bastogne, with Sibret and Vaux-les-Rosières, southwest of Bastogne as their goal. The distance to Sibret was almost ten miles, and Vaux-les-Rosières was located another five miles to the southwest. Furthermore, the area that the paratroopers would have to pass hardly had any roads leading from the east to the west. But Heilmann felt that he had to take advantage of the opportunity that had emerged when the 109th Regimental Combat Team was neutralized, while other U.S. forces east of Bastogne were in a state of utter confusion. U.S. 101st Airborne Division just had arrived at Bastogne, but if Heilmann’s division quickly managed to reach Sibret and Vaux-les-Rosières, all roads to Bastogne would be blocked for additional U.S. reinforcements.
Only one of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 14’s battalions and two of Fallschirm-Pionier Bataillon 5’s companies were left behind to take care of Wiltz.35 This actually proved to be quite sufficient. Inside the surrounded town, morale among the U.S. troops crumbled. Just like farther to the north, where the 106th Infantry Division succumbed, these Americans had no idea of just how small the German forces that surrounded them were. Instead of launching a counter-attack, the troops in Wiltz were ordered to attempt a break-out by ’infiltration’ of the German-controlled area. Technical Sergeant Harvey H. Hamann recounts:
We got orders on the night of the 19th to evacuate to a small town on the other side of Bastogne. The 44th Engineer Combat Battalion was spearheading the evacuation along with a few tanks and half tracks of the 707th Tank Battalion. We ran through three road blocks and were stopped at the fourth. By that time we had about 75 to 100 wounded and I don’t know how many killed. The captain of the engineers decided to surrender the convoy with the wounded and the rest of us took off in groups of three and four’s. The little group I was with didn’t make out so well. On the morning of the 22nd I was by myself with a lot of Jerries looking at me. I went into a deserted farmhouse and in about ten minutes the Jerries moved in following my footsteps in the snow. That changed my status to POW.36
American soldiers passing a jeep that has just been hit by German mortars. (NARA, SC 198550/T/5 Albert J. Gedicks)
Other American soldiers inside Wiltz simply refused to obey orders and just waited for an opportunity to surrender, as Captain Benedict B. Kimmelman, a U.S. military judge, recalls. He told a group of soldiers that they had been ordered to evacuate the town, but the reaction he received was not what he had expected: ’None of the soldiers got to his feet. They were through with the war, ready to be taken prisoner. I bent down to shake hands and say good-bye. I felt no obligation to order or persuade them—infantrymen who had been in the line for days on end, over many months, and now had decided “no more”I stumbled on to a little group of soldiers huddled in a heap, too demoralized to fire their weapons. Half-hallucinating and in a burst of crazy humor, I asked one man with the shakes, whom I recognized, if he was taking his rifle apart to clean it.’37
Captain Kimmelman was one of the military judges who just a month earlier had sentenced a deserter from the 28th Infantry Division, Private Eddie Slovik, to death. The verdict was confirmed by the divisional commander Cota on 27 November 1944, and on 21 January 1945, Slovik was executed by a firing squad. During World War II, nearly 50,000 American soldiers deserted from the armed forces,38 but—probably under the impact of the widespread collapse of morale during the Ardennes Offensive—Slovik became the only one who actually was executed. By that time, Kimmelman was in German captivity.
An M3 half-track vehicle cautiously passes an intersection where a Sherman tank is burning after taking a hit in the rear. The tank commander’s dead body is seen in the turret hatch. (NARA, SC 196909T/4 Clifford O. Bell)
In addition to one thousand prisoners of war, the German paratroopers captured twenty-five Sherman tanks and numerous other military vehicles in Wiltz. Meanwhile, the paratroop division’s main force advanced towards the west at a breath-taking speed. After the war, Major Goswin Wahl, deputy commander of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 13, wrote:
During our rapid advance, the Americans scarcely offered any opposition. On the contrary, I must say today that I rarely saw soldiers during the entire war in such a confused state, leaving their gear and equipment behind or throwing it away unharmed. In the first couple of days, almost 1,000 soldiers were captured in the regiment’s sector. I am still surprised to this day that our attempted offensive was not suspected by the other side. The main reason may be a lack of air reconnaissance, caused by a zone of bad weather that remained over us. Naturally, it was comparatively simple for us to capture large quantities of equipment, food and vehicles, especially jeeps and the like, with this mass flight of Americans in our sector.39
Over the course of 20 December, the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division cut off the N 4, one of the two highways leading to Bastogne from the south, and in the evening it reached Sibret at N 85, the next highway to Bastogne from the south. At this place, where Major General Cota had brought his 28th Infantry Division headquarters from Wiltz, the Americans managed to halt the Germans, at least temporarily. While the German paratroopers went into position outside the town, Major General Cota was seen running around in the streets of the small town in the search for cooks, truck drivers and other other non-combat troops to organize into Sibret’s defense.
During the following night, the German paratroopers at Sibret were joined by elements of the reconnaissance battalions of the 26. Volksgrenadier-Division and Panzer Lehr Division, and, shortly thereafter also by the 26. Volksgrenadier-Division’s Füsilier-Grenadier-Regiment 39. When these forces attacked on the next day, the Americans had to budge. Cota managed to get away and set up his headquarters in Vaux-les-Rosières, further down the N 85. On 21 December, the Germans advanced to Libramont, fifteen miles southwest of Bastogne.
In the meantime, Oberst Heilmann sent Fallschirm-Pionier-Bataillon 5 marching south to cover the southeastern flank.40 On the evening of 21 December, the 7. kompanie of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 15 took Martelange, where the N 4 crossed River Sûre, twelve miles south of Bastogne. Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 14, ’hitch-hiking’ with the vehicles of the 26. Volksgrenadier-Division’s motorized reconnaissance battalion, meanwhile pursued Major General Cota, drove him out of Vaux-les-Rosières too, and forced the 28th Infantry Division to transfer its headquarters to Neufchâteu, even farther south—where Major General Middleton had arrived with the headquarters of U.S. VIII Corps on the previous day. Only there was the headquarters of the 28th Infantry Division able to disengage from the enemy.41
In the evening of 21 December, Brandenberger’s 7. Armee had occupied a large area extending from the border between Germany and Luxembourg at Echternach in the east, and northwestwards through Luxembourg, all the way to Libramont in Belgium—nearly forty miles to the west of the Army’s point of departure five days earlier. The defenders of Bastogne thus were cut off to the south by an up to twelve-mile-wide wedge.
The chief of staff of German 7. Armee, Oberst von Gersdorff, held the soldiers of the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division in high regard, describing them as ‘young, healthy men’ with a generally high morale.’ He characterized the divisional commander, Oberst Heilmann, as ‘excellent.’ The division would not make von Gersdorff disappointed. Hardly any of the German divisions that participated in Ardennes Offensive performed as well as the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division, which against own losses of only 50 killed, during the offensive’s first five days played a vital role in the neutralization of U.S. 28th Infantry Division. This picture shows two of the unit’s paratroopers who help each other to paint their steel helmets and their other equipment white after the snow has begun to cover the ground in the Ardennes. (BArch, Bild 183-2005-0519-500)
During a week-long onslaught, General Kniess’ LXXXV. Armeekorps—and in particular Heilmann’s paratroop division—had practically wiped out all U.S. forces in the whole area southeast, southwest, and south of Bastogne. The main opponent of the German Army Corps, 109th Regimental Combat Team, had been dealt a terrible bloodletting—according to official figures, its losses amounted to 3,381 men, of whom 2,498 were captured or missing.42 The 110th Regimental Combat Team, the next regiment of ’Dutch’ Cota’s 28th Infantry Division, was in no better shape, having lost 139 men killed, 333 wounded, and 2,148 captured or missing in the space of only a few days.43 The 28th Infantry Division in fact had been so severely mauled that Eisenhower had no choice but to withdraw the division from combat—and this in the midst of the worst Allied crisis in Europe since the fall of France in 1940! In fact, the 28th Infantry Division would not return to first-line service until February 1945.
A further indication of the German paratroop division’s success was that its own losses during the first five days of the Ardennes Offensive were limited to only fifty killed.44 Hardly surprising, Oberst Werner Bodenstein, chief of staff in German LIII. Armeekorps, found the fighting spirits in the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division to be sky high when he arrived to inspect the unit on 22 December.45 On the same day, the paratroop division’s commander, Ludwig Heilmann, was promoted to Generalmajor.
In view of its limited resources, the accomplishments of General Erich Brandenberger’s 7. Armee were quite astounding. On 21 December, its most advanced unit, the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division, stood in front of a huge area—in the south and in the west—that had been more or less cleared of troops from U.S. First Army, which was tasked to hold this section. To Brandenberger, it appeared as though nothing remained but to bring up the second attack wave to continue the offensive westwards. On 22 December, the 7. Armee’s reserve, LIII. Armeekorps, was set in motion towards the front lines in the west. This new and fresh corps included the armored elite unit Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade,* mustering seventy-eight serviceable tanks and tank destroyers.46
While the 5. Panzerarmee was preparing for the final assault across River Meuse, the 7. Armee seemed to be holding the southern flank secured.
* Not to be confused with Föhrer Begleit Brigade, which was employed in the Sankt Vith sector.