Chapter Nine
General Claude Auchinleck replaced General Ritchie in the summer of 1942; soon realising that holding western Egypt was not possible, he prepared a mobile defence in depth between Mersa Matruh and El Alamein. The latter offered the only defensive line in North Africa that cannot be outflanked, due to the 700-ft cliffs of the Qattara Depression just 40 miles to the south, and the Eighth Army fortified this gap. While Rommel was aiming to push his panzers all the way through to Alexandria, Cairo and the Suez Canal, Auchinleck in turn planned to stop him and break through to the west. Rommel was handicapped by a supply line that trailed back as far as Tripoli.
Rommel’s initial capture of Mersa Matruh led to the first Battle of Alamein, though by this stage his armoured forces were reduced to about a dozen tanks. Rommel spent two weeks trying to dislodge the British, who then in turn spent two weeks trying to drive back the Germans. This series of engagements lasted twenty-seven days and commenced on 1 July 1942. The Ruweisat Ridge was the scene of especially heavy fighting. While the New Zealanders and Indians drove the Italians from their positions on 14 July, they bypassed the 8th Panzer Regiment.
The following day there was no sign of the 22nd Armoured Brigade, which was supposed to support the New Zealanders. Predictably the panzers counterattacked, catching the New Zealanders on three sides, and their advance was only checked by the belated appearance of the British tanks. The two sides fought each other to a standstill and the battle had tailed off by 27 July; Axis losses amounted to 22,000 men and 100 tanks, while the British lost 13,000 men and 193 tanks.
Unfortunately Auchinleck’s decision to give ground and his failure to defeat Rommel decisively cost him his job. By this stage the Afrika Korps’ situation was so dire – lacking panzers, exhausted and under-strength – that a British victory was largely assured. Montgomery arrived to take command of the Eighth Army’s gathering strength on 13 August 1942. Despite his enemy’s numerical superiority, Rommel, with typical flair, sought to catch Monty off-balance by attacking first.
Due to refuelling problems and the slowness of the Italian Ariete and Trieste Divisions in getting through the British defences, Rommel was unable to strike Alam Halfa until 31 August. Nonetheless, when his new Panzer Mk IVs with their high-velocity 75mm guns supported by Stuka dive-bombers did attack, they caused heavy losses among the dug-in British Grant tanks. Times had changed, though, and things did not go to plan for Rommel as his attack became bogged down. For the first time the British also had substantial numbers of 6-pounder anti-tank guns. Under attack from the RAF, Rommel’s forces had little choice but to withdraw to their original start line.
Montgomery, never a man to rush headlong into anything, did not give chase, but instead chose to bide his time while gathering even greater strength ready for a decisive knock-out blow. Before Alamein, Montgomery tricked Rommel into believing that he had an extra armoured division by employing a complete divisional HQ (from the 8th Armoured Division) using radio traffic to create the impression that it was controlling the arrival of this new unit. In reality, it had no tanks at all. Montgomery, though, went into battle with a superiority of about 2:1 in troops and 1,100 tanks to Rommel’s 500 (of which 300 were of an inferior type). On top of this, Montgomery had almost 1,000 field guns, 800 6-pounder and 500 2-pounder anti-tank guns. On 23 October 1942 a massive British artillery bombardment heralded the second battle of El Alamein.
Montgomery had finally learned that it was not wise to throw his tanks against Rommel’s gun line so he directed his infantry to first breach the enemy minefields. Once two safe corridors had been secured, he planned to push through the 1st and 10th Armoured Divisions to Tel el Aqqaqir to prepare for an enemy counter-attack. Near the Qattara Depression in the far south the 7th Armoured Division launched a diversionary attack with the intention of pinning down Rommel’s reserves, most notably the 21st Panzer Division. While Monty’s infantry engaged the Axis defences, his armour, despite its overwhelming numbers, was at first unable to break through. The battle turned into a slugging match that Rommel simply could not win.
Rommel could clearly see the writing on the wall for the Axis cause in North Africa. This battle is ‘turning the tide of war in Africa against us,’ Rommel wrote, ‘and, in fact, probably representing the turning point of the whole vast struggle. The conditions under which my gallant troops entered the battle were so disheartening that there was practically no hope of our coming out of it victorious.’
By 26 October Major General R. Brigg’s 1st Armoured Division had reached Kidney Ridge and was threatening to cut the Axis main north–south line of communication along the Rahman Track. The 2nd Rifle Brigade was sent forward to set up Outpost Snipe and came into contact with the 15th Panzer Division and the Italian Littorio Armoured Division. Although only of battalion strength, the 2nd Rifle Brigade fortunately had almost twenty 6-pounder anti-tank guns and was able to drive off the enemy attacks. The 21st Panzer Division then found itself caught between the anti-tank guns and the rest of the 1st Armoured Division. Subsequently the battlefield around the Snipe position was littered with twenty-one panzers, eleven Italian tanks and five tank destroyers; it was also believed that another twenty tanks had been knocked out but recovered by the Axis forces.
On 27 October Montgomery reorganised his forces and despite mounting losses maintained his pressure in the northern sector of the battle. Rommel was in an unenviable position: despite all his skills, by the end of October he knew the British had still not committed the bulk of their 800 tanks, against which he could pit just ninety panzers and 140 Italian tanks. Then, on 1 November, Operation Supercharge finally overwhelmed the exhausted Axis troops.
Rommel’s men suffered the impact of Montgomery’s long-expected major attack that night. South-west of Hill 28 the British broke through the 15th Panzer Division’s front; captured documents showed the Germans were now facing up to 500 tanks, which drove west and overran a unit from the Trieste Armoured Division. To Rommel’s dismay, his observers reported another 400 British tanks waiting east of the minefields. By the evening of 2 November Rommel had just thirty-five serviceable panzers; by the 4th this figure had fallen to just twenty.
Despite the British armour’s breakthrough on the 4th, the Germans were already retiring back towards Libya. The British pursuit was delayed because of Montgomery’s caution, bad weather and fuel shortages. Rommel’s remaining troops – the equivalent of two divisions from his original dozen – rumbled back along the coast road harried by the Desert Air Force as they went. This was no rout, and Rommel turned to fight at every possible defensive position. Montgomery, instead of throwing everything he had at Rommel, kept trying to outflank him and as a result, the retreating Axis forces kept slipping through the net.
Fuel supplies became an increasing problem for Rommel, not only in getting it shipped to Tripoli but also in transporting it to the front. After the defeat at Alamein, the 21st Panzer Division was almost completely immobilised south-west of Quasaba for the want of fuel; only the timely arrival of the Voss Group prevented the division being overrun. Nonetheless the 21st Panzer Division was forced to destroy all but four of its remaining thirty tanks and to withdraw westward in its surviving wheeled transport.
The arrival of the British 6-pounder (57mm) antitank gun in early 1942 provided a much-needed upgrade to the Eighth Army’s anti-tank capabilities. It began to replace the obsolete 2-pounder (40mm) and allowed the 25-pounder field gun to revert to its artillery role. It first saw action at Gazala in May 1942 and subsequently Churchill tanks armed with 6-pounders claimed the first Tiger in Tunisia. This particular gun is under fire to the south of El Alamein. (Author’s Collection)
The American M3 medium tank had a tremendous impact, its firepower and numbers alone giving the Eighth Army some much-needed punch. The Grants were issued to the units of the 7th and 10th Armoured Divisions ready for the Battle of El Alamein. This particular tank is a General Lee undergoing crew training in America; American instructors and mechanics were also sent to Egypt. (US Army/NARA)
A British officer examines a smashed Panzer Mark IV ‘Special’. The internal blast was so great that it has lifted the hull off the chassis; note the distinctive early, single-baffle, globular muzzle-brake on the L/43 gun. During the first Battle of El Alamein the Axis forces lost only half the number of tanks as the British but suffered twice the casualties. (Author’s Collection)
An Axis supply train is strafed by a passing fighter. Initially the Luftwaffe largely dominated the skies over North Africa, but as the Desert Air Force gained experience and built up its strength its support for the ground war became relentless. As a prelude to Montgomery’s offensive, Axis lines of communication, transport and supplies were attacked by fighters and medium bombers. (Author’s Collection)
Montgomery has gone down in history as a rather cautious general. Certainly before El Alamein he ensured that he had enough tanks to deliver a knockout blow. Even then Rommel gave him a run for his money, despite saying he had ‘no hope’ in the face of such numbers. (Author’s Collection)
A troop of welded-hull M4A2 Shermans, having just refuelled, are poised for action. Armed with a 75mm gun, the Sherman first saw action at Alamein and was a reasonable match for the panzers in Egypt and Libya. (Author’s Collection)
A British M3 Grant (distinguishable from the Lee by the lack of a commander’s/machine-gun cupola on the turret) kicks up a dust storm in the Western Desert. The Grant was a welcome replacement for the inadequate British-designed Crusader tank and could not have arrived at a better time. (Author’s Collection)
Although the Crusader III had increased armour and sported the 6-pounder gun, only 144 were built between May and July 1942. While the total output for the Crusader tank was an impressive 5,300 vehicles, German anti-tank guns never had any trouble picking them off in the desert fighting. (Author’s Collection)
A British 4.5-inch field gun shelling enemy positions. This weapon had a good range, but the 5.5-inch gun which was coming into service could fire a shell twice the weight. The heavy British barrage on the night of 23 October 1942 signalled the start of the decisive second Battle of El Alamein. (Author’s Collection)
In the opening stages of the attack, clearing paths through enemy minefields was a vital task if the Eighth Army’s tank losses were to be kept to a minimum. These sappers had one of the most dangerous but essential tasks. (Author’s Collection)
A Sikh from one of the Indian divisions escorts a prisoner of war past a knocked-out Panzer III. Between them is a ‘Jerry’ can; these proved invaluable for carrying both fuel and water – the German design ensured that it did not get crushed (unlike the earlier, thinner, containers). The open landscape behind them shows what good tank country this was. (Author’s Collection)
A disabled Italian M13/40 or M14/41. The sandbags on the front of the hull were supposed to help supplement the tank’s armour. While the M13 corrected many of the M11’s faults, having the commander double-up as the gunner was not a desirable feature. Italian tanks remained under-gunned and under-armoured. (Author’s Collection)
British infantry posing for the camera advance past a burning panzer. By 4 November 1942 Rommel had just twenty tanks left. (Author’s Collection)
Another clearly posed shot portraying Australian infantry advancing through a smokescreen, following up behind the armour. (Author’s Collection)
This familiar photograph shows Montgomery hitching a lift in a Sherman tank during the Battle of El Alamein. On the eve of his offensive he had 285 Shermans, although only 252 were listed on the Eighth Army’s operational order of battle. (NARA)
The dead crew of a knocked-out German 50mm anti-tank gun are searched after their position was captured in the opening stages of the Eighth Army offensive. (Author’s Collection)
Having been driven out of Egypt, Rommel’s troops were forced to abandon much of their heavy equipment, such as this 15cm sFH 13/1 (sf) auf Geschützwagen Lorraine Schlepper (f) self-propelled gun. The object at the back of the hull is the recoil spade designed to brace the vehicle when firing. (Australian Army)
Another self-propelled gun lost by DAK. Sixty-six examples of this type of Czech/Russian hybrid known as the Marder were supplied to Rommel’s troops. (Australian Army)
A captured Büssing Nag half-track prime mover which was used to tow German artillery. (US Signal Corps/NARA)
Once more posing for the camera, British infantry take cover behind the wrecked remains of a lorry during the Alamein battle. By this stage Rommel’s remaining panzers were firmly on the run. (Author’s Collection)
A Crusader III leads a column of Sherman M4A1s and Carriers through a liberated Mersa Matruh following the victory at El Alamein. Axis forces in the town tried to put up a fight but the Eighth Army skirted it and the garrison soon found themselves under attack from the east and the west. A souvenir of the battle in the shape of a German helmet can be seen lying on the hull of the Crusader. (Author’s Collection)
The immediate culmination of Monty’s victory at El Alamein, the Union Jack is once again hoisted over the port of Tobruk. Next stop, Tripoli. (Author’s Collection)
Three British soldiers pose on top of a knocked-out Panzer III Ausf L or M (identifiable by the lack of turret side ports in front of the side hatches). The man in the middle appears to be clasping a tank round. (Steve Hunnisett/Ron Hunnisett RA)
Another knocked-out Panzer III. In the initial stages of the war in North Africa German mechanics were very efficient in retrieving battle casualties. Reporter Alexander Clifford noted, ‘Lame tanks were dragged from the battle while the firing was still on, tended in a mobile workshop almost on the spot, and flung back into the fighting the next day. Our recovery units … simply were not organised like that.’ At El Alamein Rommel lost almost all his panzers. (Steve Hunnisett/Ron Hunnisett RA)
A German officer overseeing a burial detachment. Rommel’s losses were such that there would be no bouncing back, just a long fighting retreat. (Dr Peter Caddick-Adams)
Two German infantrymen take a meal-break in the midday sun. Having lost almost all his armour, Rommel was reliant on stoical infantry such as these men conducting a successful fighting retreat. (Dr Peter Caddick-Adams)