Chapter Three
After Mussolini’s declaration of war on 10 June 1940 it seemed certain that he would strike eastward from the port of Bardia and Fort Capuzzo in Libya with the intention of seizing the strategically vital railhead 50 miles away at Mersa Matruh in Egypt. His Fifth Army, equivalent to nine divisions, was stationed in Tripolitania (western Libya) and initially guarded the French Tunisian border, but after the fall of France and the formation of the pro-German Vichy government Tunisia no longer posed any threat, although Mussolini soon came to fear the Free French in Equatorial Africa. His Tenth Army in Cyrenaica (eastern Libya), consisting of five divisions, was bolstered with four divisions from the Fifth Army in June 1940, bringing Mussolini’s forces facing Egypt up to about 250,000 men.
General d’Armata Berti’s Tenth Army was scheduled to move against Sollum, Halfaya Pass and Sidi Barrani in August with 21 Corps, consisting of three divisions supported by the Libyan divisions and the Motorised Maletti Group. The attack, though, never took place and in Tripoli Marshal Maresciallo Graziani, the Italian Commander-in-Chief North Africa, came under increasing pressure from an exasperated Mussolini who had hoped to emulate Hitler’s Blitzkrieg across France.
Graziani was finally forced to launch his attack the following month. Ironically, those divisions with desert experience were in Albania preparing for Mussolini’s foolhardy invasion of Greece. Graziani massed six divisions, with Libyan troops spearheading General Annabale Bergonzoli’s 23 Corps supported by the Maletti Group, which was to act as flank guard. The offensive commenced on 13 September 1940 with Graziani commanding the operation from way back at Tobruk, using inadequate radio communication.
Bergonzoli’s ‘Blitzkrieg’ advanced 65 miles into Egypt before his men dug in at Sidi Barrani and refused to go any further for lack of armour and artillery. Back in London Churchill and his generals were able to heave a sigh of relief; clearly Mussolini was living up to his reputation for bluff and bluster. The British Western Desert Force was given a valuable breathing space – and a clear indication of the poor standard of Italian leadership.
Some 36,000 men under General Wavell launched a counter-raid that soon developed into a full offensive. The Italians, outmatched and poorly motivated, initially did not know how to conduct armoured warfare against the British. Slowly their performance improved but they had to learn the hard way and then it was largely too late.
At Alam Nibeiwa on 9 December 1940 General Pietro Maletti’s artillery continued to fire ineffectively until overrun by British tanks, while at Sidi Barrani and Bardia the British armour caused widespread panic. All the M11/39s were taken by surprise and were destroyed without a fight by the advancing Matildas at Nibeiwa. General Richard O’Connor slipped behind the Italians and their defences simply collapsed.
The 4th Indian Division recorded that at Nibeiwa,
Frightened, dazed or desperate Italians erupted from tents and slit trenches, some to surrender supinely, others to leap gallantly into battle, hurling grenades or blazing machine-guns in futile belabour of the impregnable intruders … General Maletti, the Italian commander, sprang from his dug-out, machine-gun in hand. He fell from an answering burst; his son beside him was struck down and captured.
The Italians valiantly resisted for another two-and-a-half hours and one British tank crewman was struck by their courage: ‘The Italians may have been a push-over afterwards, but they fought like hell at Nibeiwa.’
O’Connor and Wavell launched their counter-stroke, Operation Compass, on 9 December 1940, employing the virtually impregnable Matilda infantry tank to roll the Italians completely out of Egypt. In just three days they captured 38,000 Italian and Libyan troops, 73 tanks, 1,000 vehicles and 237 guns. Bardia fell to the British on 3 January 1941, yielding another 40,000 Italian troops; likewise Tobruk fell on the 22nd and gave up 27,000 prisoners, 90 tanks, 200 vehicles and 200 guns of various calibres.
Following his defeat General Graziani, full of doom and gloom, wrote to his wife, ‘One cannot break steel armour with finger nails alone.’ He considered withdrawing on Tripoli but Mussolini would have none of it, raging, ‘This man has lost his mind or at least his senses. Here is another man with whom I cannot get angry, because I despise him.’ Mussolini’s remaining forces were dramatically cut off at Beda Fomm in early February 1941. General Guiseppe Tellera, Commander-in-Chief of the Tenth Army, lost 21,000 men. O’Connor sent Wavell a message that summed up the end of Mussolini’s aspirations in North Africa; it simply read ‘Fox killed in the open.’
Trooper ‘Topper’ Brown of the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment was in the thick of it: ‘Practically all morning we never stopped firing, at wagon-loads of infantry or tanks. I haven’t a clue how many enemy I killed, but it must have run into hundreds. We definitely had a score of twenty M13s at the end of the day …’ He took out the last M13 with his final two rounds: ‘We had started out with 112 rounds of 2-pounder, 97 in the racks and 15 extra. Hughes had let us get down to the last two … so you can understand the amount of firing I had done.’
General Valentino Babini’s armoured brigade had only a few days to become familiar with the newly arrived replacement M13/40 tanks. Again these were too lightly armoured and lacked radios. Over a hundred were found around Beda Fomm, some burnt out but many simply abandoned by inexperienced crews. ‘You were too soon, that is all,’ said General Bergonzoli, when questioned by his British captors about his army’s performance. ‘But we gave battle at once … And always, here as everywhere else, we were grossly outnumbered. So when our second attack was unable to prevail we had no choice but to make an honourable surrender.’
The King’s Royal Rifles passed through the scene of destruction:
After we had gone a few miles south … we came upon the scene … an imposing mess of shattered Italian tanks, abandoned guns and derelict lorries. There was the familiar sight of hordes of prisoners being rounded up; processions of staff cars, containing General Bergonzoli and his entourage, passed up the road towards Benghazi.
Wavell understandably was full of praise for his troops’ efforts: ‘The Army of the Nile, as our Prime Minister has called us, has in two months advanced over 400 miles, has destroyed the large army that had gathered to invade Egypt, taking some 125,000 prisoners and well over 1,000 guns besides innumerable quantities of weapons and material of all kinds. These achievements will always be remembered.’
In Britain the newspapers triumphantly ran with the headline ‘Wavell’s Wave Sweeps over Libya.’
By now Mussolini’s forces were in complete disarray. Hitler’s Blitzkrieg by proxy in North Africa had ended as a complete and utter shambles, leaving Churchill occupying half of Libya. In total Mussolini’s Tenth Army had lost 130,000 prisoners, almost 500 tanks and thousands of wheeled vehicles. The Italian Army was left reeling and Mussolini was furious that his military might had been squandered.
O’Connor was understandably disappointed that he was not allowed to have a go at capturing Tripoli. When asked if he could have taken it, he responded,
I think we could have done so at once, or fairly shortly after, before the Luftwaffe came into the picture. Of course, the question of supplies would have been difficult. But this would have been greatly eased by the Italian rations, which we could have picked up at Sirte and Tripoli. Like the rest of the campaign it would have been a risk, but I think personally not a dangerous one.
O’Connor’s dramatic victory at Beda Fomm was the defining moment of the first round of the war in North Africa. ‘Thus ended’, said Churchill, ‘Mussolini’s dream of an African Empire to be built by conquest and colonised in the spirit of ancient Rome.’
Mussolini in benevolent mood. It seemed certain that the Italian Tenth Army would invade Egypt in the summer of 1941 with the intention of seizing the railhead at Mersa Matruh. However, Mussolini was soon frustrated by the cautiousness of his generals. (Author’s Collection)
The painting on this barrack block in Libya shows how Italy under Mussolini saw its position in the Mediterranean – as one of dominance. (L.J. Alexander/Corporal Eric Evans RASC)
‘A British dugout near Mersa’ says the caption to this photograph, but it isn’t clear whether it means the forward advance base of Mersa Matruh or Mersa el Brega in Libya. Unfortunately for the British there was a 25-mile gap in the road between Alexandria and Mersa Matruh, and the railway was only a single line. (L.J. Alexander/Corporal Eric Evans RASC)
The Italian Army’s Blitzkrieg got as far as Sidi Barrani in Egypt. They made a fatal mistake in their dispositions south of the town in the Enba Gap, a 20-mile unprotected stretch of desert lying between the fortified Italian camps of Nibeiwa and Rabia. It was here that Wavell and O’Connor would strike. (L.J. Alexander/Corporal Eric Evans RASC)
The M11s were too few in number to have any great impact on the battle and their thin, riveted armour easily fell prey to British tanks when it went up against them. Not surprisingly, the few that survived the fighting were quickly withdrawn from service. (Author’s Collection)
Too little, too late – a brand-new M13/40 tank being unloaded in Libya. Luckily for the British tanks, the Babini Armoured Brigade (which was potentially stronger than the 7th Armoured Division) acted defensively rather than offensively. These tanks were rushed into combat, giving the crews little time to familiarise themselves with them, and the M13s’ lack of radios greatly hampered unit coordination. (Author’s Collection)
Heavy Italian artillery, such as these ancient 150mm guns, was soon abandoned in the face of British counter-attack. (L.J. Alexander/Corporal Eric Evans RASC)
British carriers and Mk VIB light tanks moving up: the rapidity of the Western Desert Force’s advance astonished everyone. In places, such as Nibeiwa, the Italians fought bravely until they were overrun by British tanks, but afterwards they just seemed to give up. (Author’s Collection)
British Cruiser tanks such as these A9s were adequate for fighting the Italian Army but were clearly outclassed by the time the Afrika Korps arrived in Libya. The A9’s main armament was a 2-pounder gun, though a few were armed with 3.7-inch howitzers for the close-support role. The A9 had the distinction of being the first British tank to have a power-operated turret and an auxiliary engine. However, it proved too slow and too lightly armoured to be a successful design. (Author’s Collection)
Sollum, Bardia, Tobruk and Derna: milestones along the route of the victorious Eighth Army. Here British infantry are ‘debussing’ in Bardia. This Libyan port changed hands numerous times during the North African campaign, but was first captured by the British from the Italians on 3 January 1941. (Author’s Collection)
A desert dug-out near Bardia; according to the notice, it is under the new management of Young & Jackson’s. Mussolini lost 40,000 men at Bardia and another 27,000 at Tobruk. (L.J. Alexander/Corporal Eric Evans RASC)
The lumbering Matilda II provided a nasty shock for the Italians as its frontal armour could withstand every Italian gun in service, leaving flight or surrender as the only options. When Rommel arrived in North Africa the following year he made sure that his troops were equipped to deal with the troublesome Matilda II. (Author’s Collection)
A British Army column stops for a breather. The speed with which the Italian Army collapsed took both O’Connor and Wavell by surprise. O’Connor was all for pressing on to Tripoli but Churchill insisted on helping the Greeks, which diverted resources. (L.J. Alexander/Corporal Eric Evans RASC)
An Italian L3 lies abandoned by the Mediterranean Sea without a mark on it. Some L3s were modified to carry a 20mm anti-tank rifle instead of the standard machine-guns and these also saw service in North Africa. Designated the L3cc (‘controcarro’ or antitank), examples were captured outside Bardia in 1941. Similarly a number of L3s were converted to the flamethrower role. (Author’s Collection)
Italian 75mm artillery strewn across the desert after the capture of Bardia by British forces. The Italians lost not only large numbers of men but also vast quantities of equipment. (Author’s Collection)
This Italian gunner probably lost his life or was captured during the rout of the Italian Army in Egypt and Cyrenaica. (L.J. Alexander/Corporal Eric Evans RASC)
British officers examine abandoned M13/40 tanks in the Benghazi area. Judging by the tanks’ condition and position, they had broken down rather than been knocked out. Over a hundred of these tanks were found around Beda Fomm, some burnt out, but most simply abandoned. (Author’s Collection)
During the early operations over Libya the Fiat CR.42 Falco (Falcon) fighter enjoyed a slight edge over the RAF’s fighters, but as British forces built up the aircraft was restricted largely to ground-support activities along with the older CR.32. The CR.42 was the most numerous fighter possessed by the Regia Aeronautica in North Africa. The Italian G.50 was not a great success. The Macchi Saetta and Folgore were an improvement, but were still no match for Allied fighters. Throughout the 1940–41 campaign more Italian aircraft were destroyed on the ground than in aerial combat. (L.J. Alexander/Corporal Eric Evans RASC)
A British soldier stands guard over the smouldering remains of what looks to be either an Italian Fiat G.50 or a Saetta fighter aircraft. (Author’s Collection)
Corporal Ronald Hunnisett poses in front of a captured Italian Spa TL37 4x4 light truck. This variant is the AS37 or Autocarro Sahariano; other versions included the long-range desert reconnaissance vehicle known as the AS43 Camionetta Desertica. (Steve Hunnisett/Corporal Ron Hunnisett RA)
Another abandoned M13/40. The tanks captured at Beda Fomm were found to have come from the Ariete and Centauro Armoured Regiments. These units had been forced to send many of their tanks to replace the catastrophic losses of earlier in the campaign. The 2nd Royal Tank Regiment made short work of them. (Author’s Collection)
British troops gathered under a road sign marking all the major battle sites in North Africa. (Author’s Collection)
February 1941 brought a dispiriting end to Mussolini’s dream of driving on Cairo and Suez. The Italian Army never really recovered from its humiliating defeat of late 1940/early 1941. (Author’s Collection)