10
The Anglo-French peace convention of 1439 is not as well-known as it deserves to be. It is recognised as a failure, and is all too easily overshadowed by the famous congress of Arras of 1435 and the negotiations of 1444 which led to a truce and the marriage of Henry VI to Margaret of Anjou. Few events of outstanding importance are associated with the late 1430s and early 1440s; they form an almost anonymous period. Yet they were fateful years for the English occupation of France, since they witnessed a general swing in favour of French arms as well as several attempts to bring the war to an end by means of negotiation. War and diplomacy, it may be said, form the basis of any study of Anglo-French relations at this period.
It was the duchy of Burgundy which, both as participant and mediator, stepped in to help heal the age-old breach between England and France. The treaty of Arras, however, had turned the English against the Burgundians, who were seen as traitors for having abandoned the English alliance for the friendship of France. The siege of Calais of 1436 had given Humphrey of Gloucester the opportunity to avenge himself on those who had humiliated him years previously. His expedition to relieve Calais was successful, and his army did much material harm in Flanders. On 8 September 1436 trade between England and the Flemish towns had been officially halted.1
1 T. Rymer, Foedera (The Hague, 1740), x, pp. 654–655.
Gloucester’s raid and the cutting of economic ties between the two countries soon had an effect, Flemish public opinion demanding the re-establishment of commercial relations with England.2 Parallel with this demand came the renewal of diplomatic activity between England and France, activity which had never really been brought to a halt but which, from 1437 onwards received a new lease of life. To the Burgundians it seemed that, given an opportunity to bring the three parties England, France and Burgundy together, a peace treaty between England and France might be negotiated with Burgundian mediation, and the desired mercantile treaty involving England and Flanders might be agreed upon. It was towards these two desirable ends that the negotiators of all three sides worked in 1437 and 1438.3
2 E. Varenbergh, Histoire des relations diplomatiques entre le Comté de Flanndre et Angleterre au moyen age (Brussels, 1874), pp. 515–517; E. Scott and L. Gilliodts-Van Severen, Le Cotton Manuscrit Galba B I (Brussels, 1896), p. 440, n. 1; See also J. G. Dickinson, The Congress of Arras 1435 (Oxford, 1955), p. 55: ‘One has the impression that the duke never for long neglected popular feelings in his foreign policy’.3 At Rouen, on 27 April 1438, ‘fust faicte procession generale pour la paix’ (Rouen, Archives départementales de la Seine-Maritime, G.39). The diplomatic activity of the period is treated in G. du Fresne de Beaucourt, Histoire de Charles VII (6 vols, Paris, 1881–90), iii, pp. 101–104; G. A. Knowlson, Jean V, duc de Bretagne, et l’Angleterre (Cambridge and Rennes, 1964), pp. 163–167; J. S. Roskell, ‘Sir John Popham, Knight-banneret of Charlford, Speaker-elect in the Parliament of 1449–50’, Proceedings of the Hampshire Field Club and Archaeological Society, xxi (1958), 38–52.
The process of re-establishing relations between England and Burgundy was already under way by the early months of 1438. In March, safe-conducts were issued to two Burgundian envoys coming to England, and in May Gloucester and the privy council received Hugues de Lannoy and Henri de Utenhove, the latter returning to England in August.4 This initiative had the desired effect, and the English committed themselves to further negotiations with Burgundy, cardinal Beaufort, archbishop Kemp and others being granted powers to treat on 23 November. The object of these negotiations was undoubtedly the resumption of Anglo-Burgundian trade, but the wider issue of a general peace was not far from the envoys’ minds.5 When the ambassadors met Isabella, duchess of Burgundy, near Calais in January 1439,6 there were also present representatives of the French king who put forward requests for the freeing of the duke of Orléans, an English prisoner since the day of Agincourt. It becomes clear from this that, although no agreement could be reached at the time, future negotiations between England and Burgundy might be used as opportunities to heal, with Burgundian help, the long-standing Anglo-French quarrel.
4 PPC, ed. N. H. Nicolas, v, p. 95; Beaucourt, Charles VII, p. 102; B. de Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, le bon seigneur de Santes (Brussels, 1957), pp. 124–127 and app., p. xlvii.5 Rymer, Foedera, x, pp. 713–714.6 The meeting took place ‘sur le grant chemin de Calais a Gravelingues’ (Paris, BnF, n.a.f. 6215, fo. 93v. See also La Chronique d’Enguerrand de Monstrelet, ed. L. Douët d’Arcq (6 vols, Paris, SHF, 1857–62), v, pp. 352–353.
While carrying out a rapprochement with Burgundy, England had also been attempting negotiations with Valois France. In March 1438 Sir John Popham sailed for France where he spent the summer negotiating with the duke of Brittany, the bastard of Orléans, and the French envoys.7 The French pursued a policy of procrastination, it being to their advantage to waste time while the military situation worked in their favour. The negotiations came to nothing, but French insistence must have impressed upon the English the necessity of allowing the captive duke of Orléans to take part in any future meetings. Peace through intransigence could not be achieved: but a willingness to make concessions might lead to something.
7 Roskell, ‘Sir John Popham’, p. 47.
Certainly in the early months of 1439 the prospects of peace looked more hopeful. The English preoccupations indicate that the meeting between Beaufort and Isabella was intended to re-establish friendly, political and commercial relations between England and the Burgundian Low Countries, but its main purpose, as the presence of the French envoys, the evidence of Monstrelet and the communiqué later issued by Isabella in the form of letters patent all show, was to see whether the parties concerned were anxious for a larger, more formal and perhaps more decisive meeting to take place.8 Agreement sufficient to justify a full-scale convention was reached, and on 8 February 1439 the duchess was able to announce that a peace convention was soon to be called at Calais or elsewhere to which she hoped the French and English kings would send notable embassies. In the meantime, in an attempt to achieve a more cordial negotiating atmosphere, she wished both the Burgundians and the English to respect each other’s territories and to agree to a total abstention from war.9 On 4 March Henry VI announced that he had chosen Calais as the place for the convention, that he would send an impressive embassy there, and that the duke of Orléans would accompany it.10 Once the French king, Charles VII, had agreed to this, the stage seemed set for an international meeting of some importance.11
8 Rymer, Foedera, x, pp. 713–716; Chronique de Monstrelet, v, pp. 352–353; TNA (formerly PRO), E.30/448.9 TNA, E 30/448.10 Rymer, Foedera, x, pp. 718–719.11 For the correspondence regarding the preparations, see BnF, n.a.f. 6215, fos. 93v–9. Owing to the procrastinations of the French, the entire future of the negotiations was in danger in May 1439, Henry VI informing the duchess Isabella that ‘plusieurs de notre sang et linage et de nostre grant conseil’ wished to see the delay as an excuse for cancelling the meeting (fo. 98v).
The convention has aroused little interest among historians. Only a few pages of du Fresne de Beaucourt’s massive study of the reign of Charles VII are devoted to it, and Vallet de Viriville dismissed it in a few lines. Nor have English writers appeared any more interested, which is surprising in view of the fact that the eyewitness account of the negotiations, written by Thomas Bekynton, has been readily available for over a century. The identification of a shorter but nonetheless highly revealing French account of the same events may justify an examination of the proceedings at Oye in the summer of 1439.12
12 The original, ‘Treslado en frances del tdo de francia e de yngleterra’, occupies folios 488–498v of Ms K. 1711 preserved at the Archivo General de Simancas, Spain. Brought to Paris by the Napoleonic army, it was kept at the Archives Nationales, Paris, under the same shelfmark until 1941 when, along with the manuscripts K. 1385–1710, it was restored to Spain, a microfilm (of poor quality) being kept in Paris. The manuscript will be referred to as ‘K.1711’.
While never having formed the basis for a proper study of the events which it describes, Thomas Bekynton’s protocol is nonetheless well-known, having been cited on many occasions, notably by Dr Dickinson in her study on the Congress of Arras.13 Its value as an eyewitness account of the negotiations is considerable, for it not only describes events but also incorporates original documents, such as instructions given to ambassadors it prejudices, too, are straightforward: it simply assumes that the English cause is a just one. While it is a partisan document, it has been accepted as accurate evidence of the English attitude towards the issue of a peace settlement and the negotiations which were intended to lead to it. Its greatest value as an historical document is the simple fact that it enables us to relive the atmosphere and the progress of a late medieval peace convention. Were it not that so much is now known about the day-to-day events of the Congress of Arras, its importance would be even greater, for it provides us with significant evidence concerning the processes of diplomacy which cannot be derived from much stark archival material.
13 Dickinson, Congress of Arras, passim. I have followed Dr. Dickinson in her use of the term ‘protocol’ to describe both the English and French accounts of these events. Bekynton’s protocol is printed in PPC, v, pp. 334–407.
The protocol, couched in a formal Latin well in keeping with Bekynton’s humanistic tastes, covers the period from 26 June, at about which time the main English negotiating party arrived at Calais, to 10 October, when the ambassadors reported to the king at Kennington. From it we learn of the important but unobtrusive part played by Bekynton and his fellow lawyers in the diplomatic interchanges; the document’s main drawback is that it follows the person of Bekynton too closely, and hence does not allow us to accompany the party of ambassadors sent back to England to seek fresh instructions in August 1439. Instead, we are given an account of how Bekynton spent his time in and around Calais, awaiting the renewal of the negotiations. One would give much for a detailed account of the meetings between the duke of Gloucester and the returning ambassadors. Bekynton does not provide it; the future, perhaps, may still do so.
The French protocol, written in the vernacular, is of considerable importance, since it supplies a deficiency from which the student of the congress of Arras suffers, the lack of a record of the proceedings as seen from the French side.14 The advantage of observing the same events from opposing points of view is clear. It corrects much of the lack of balance which a single account, however objective, may all too easily convey. Two accounts will lay emphasis on varying aspects or details of the same event: the outlook of the writers can be totally opposed, each one representing a very different attitude to the proceedings. Details such as this make both a synthesis and a comparison of the two texts interesting and valuable.
14 Dickinson, Congress of Arras, p. 155.
The French protocol tells us many things which cannot be gleaned from other sources. Since the writer was almost certainly a member of the French embassy, we are admitted into the deliberations of that body in much the same way as in the English protocol. We note, too, as in Bekynton’s journal how, neither side was willing to take any really worthwhile initiatives in negotiation and how, as at Arras and on other occasions, each embassy, by asserting that right was on its side, tried to lay the blame for the failure of the convention upon the other. Such overall impressions are inescapable, especially after reading the French protocol, which is valuable for the details which it presents on other matters. It is from this account, which covers the period 4 June to 29 July, that we learn of the close diplomatic links forged between the French ambassadors and the Burgundians who attended the convention, and how such links led to consultations between the two groups. From it, too, we derive much of our knowledge concerning the activities of the ambassadors sent by the council of Basel, activities which took place before the arrival of Bekynton and the main English embassy, and which they could only have heard about through the English advance party. The French evidence may help us to justify the suspicion with which the English treated the conciliar embassy which, it appears, made every attempt to foster good relations between itself and the ambassadors of Valois France.
The French would have had every reason for accepting Calais, or a place nearby, as a suitable rendezvous for a convention.15 Soon after the congress of Arras a marriage project had been mooted between Charles of Charolais, heir to the duchy of Burgundy, and a daughter of Charles VII. In 1438 the idea was taken up seriously as a means of uniting France and Burgundy more closely, and in the summer of that year negotiations had taken place, the matter of a peace settlement with England also coming under discussion. In September a marriage contract between Charolais and Catherine, then only six or seven years old, was signed.
15 They had originally suggested Rouen, Touques, Mantes, Vernon, or Gisors, but the English wanted Cherbourg or somewhere around Calais ‘sur le pale’ (BnF, n.a.f. 6215, fos. 93v–94, 102v).
On 7 April 1439 Charles VII issued a proclamation to those ambassadors who were to represent him at the peace convention.16 The first name was that of the duke of Burgundy who, however, was to play only a very indirect part in the negotiations. The leading nobleman was Louis, count of Vendôme, but the leader of the embassy was in practice to be the highly experienced Regnault de Chartres, chancellor of France and archbishop of Reims. They were to be assisted by Jean de Harcourt, archbishop of Narbonne; Jean, bastard of Orléans (Dunois); Adam de Cambrai, president of the parlement; Jacques de Chatillon, lord of Dampierre; Ragnault Girard, lord of Bazoges; Robert Maillière, maitre des comptes; and André de Boeuf, a royal secretary. In addition Jean Tudert, bishop-elect of Chalons, was empowered to lend them assistance. As it turned out, the French eventually chose to remove the names of the duke of Burgundy and Adam de Cambrai from the list and that of Tudert was officially added with English agreement.17 The embassy was smaller than the one sent to Arras, but a number of its members were well experienced in negotiation, especially with England and Burgundy: Regnault de Chartres had several times been concerned with English embassies, while Louis de Bourbon had served at Arras, as had Jean Tudert and Robert Maillière.18 In addition the bastard of Orléans, Regnault Girard and Robert Maillière had all had more recent experience of negotiating with England.19 It was probably the best embassy the French king could have assembled at this time.
16 PPC, v, pp. 346–349. The text is in French. A copy is to be found in Bodleian Library, Oxford, Ms Bodley 885, fos. 78–79 v.l.17 K. 1711, fo. 491v. The evidence shows that the embassy which came to negotiate with the English was not that which it had originally been intended to send. See BnF, n.a.f. 6215, fos. 96v–97v, 99–100v.18 Dickinson, Congress of Arras, p. 5.19 Ibid, pp. 7–9.
It was in the company of some of these ambassadors that the young princess travelled from Tours, by way of Reims, to Cambrai and then to St. Omer, where, in June, her marriage to Charles of Charolais took place, amid much celebration.20 The festivities were put to good use by both the Burgundians and the French; it is clear from the French protocol that the two weeks or so between the arrival of the French at St. Omer and that of the main English party at Calais was spent cementing the political alliance and preparing for the forthcoming convention. The royal marriage, therefore, provided an opportunity for the French and Burgundians to prepare a united front, and it does much to account for some French actions at the convention itself.
20 Lille, Archives départementales du Nord, B.3404/115331; Jean de Waurin, Recueil des croniques et anciiennes istories de la Grant Bretaigne, a present nommé Engleterre 1431–47, ed. W and E. L. P. Hardy (London, RS, 1864–91), iv, pp. 260–262; Beaucourt, Charles, VII, pp. 105–106.
Although there is no account of the Burgundians presenting procurations, there is the evidence of Waurin, of both the protocols and of other records that certain Burgundians played a conspicuous part in the Anglo-French negotiations, while acting as assistants and advisers to the duchess Isabella. The duke of Burgundy himself, although named as a member of the French delegation, wisely took no part in the proceedings, although evidence shows that he was not far away, at St. Omer and elsewhere, for most of the summer months. His own direct representative was his wife, Isabella to whom he had delegated the double task of making peace between England and France, and of ensuring the renewal of Anglo-Burgundian commercial relations. The duchess had with her Nicolas Rolin, the Burgundian chancellor; Jean Chevrot, bishop of Tournai, a man who acted as Rolin’s understudy21 and who had in the past received benefices in Normandy from the English; Hugues de Lannoy, the leading Burgundian diplomat of the day and another beneficiary of English munificence;22 and the lord of Crevecoeur. Waurin also lists Pierre Boutin, Philippe de Namterre and ‘several others’ whose names he does not give.23
21 In December 1436 he had been described as ‘conseiller en chief du conseil de mondit-seigneur en labsence de Monseigneur son chancellier’ (Arch. Nord, B 1966, fo. 188).22 C. Potvin, ‘Hugues de Lannoy, 1384–1456’, Compte-rendu des séances de la Commission royale d’histoire, 4e série, vi (1879), 117. See also Lannoy, Hugues de Lannoy, ch. iv, and appendices on pp. xx, xxxiii and xxxvi. ‘Lannoy demeura toute sa vie champion de l’alliance anglaise’ (p. 124).23 Waurin, iv, pp. 263–264. Most of those named had been at the congress at Arras (1435).
It was the English embassy, however, which by its size, personnel and accumulated experience was the most impressive of all. As at Arras, it attempted to put into practice the claim to the French throne by including two groups of ambassadors, sixteen from England (as opposed to twelve in 1435) and four from Normandy (five in 1435).24 The embassy thus appears to have been slightly larger than the one which refused the French terms at Arras. Its diplomatic experience was certainly considerable: eight members had been present at Arras; well over half had, at one time or another, negotiated with the Valois, and of those who had not, most had served in a military capacity in France. It was, too, a well-balanced embassy according to the practice of the day, for it comprised one archbishop, three bishops and an abbot, four noblemen, as many knights and lawyers, in addition to a leading royal secretary. Henry VI was indeed fulfilling his promise of sending a worthy delegation.
24 Dickinson, Congress of Arras, p. 25 et seq.
A look at the political experience and affiliations of members of the embassy may help to indicate what attitude its members may have held towards the idea of peace either on English terms or, what was more important in the actual circumstances of French military successes, on French terms. What, too, would be its attitude to French demands for the release of the duke of Orléans? Beaufort, it is clear, was now committed to peace, not peace on any terms, but one which might nonetheless entail sacrifices of principle on the part of the English. Kemp, the leader of the official embassy, was probably similarly minded. The bishops and churchmen, some of them lawyers, may also have hoped for peace.25 On the other hand to noblemen and knights such as Henry Bourchier, who held land in Normandy and had served there under the duke of York, as to Sir Walter Hunger-ford, renowned soldier and landowner in Normandy, ‘the diplomacy of defeat and withdrawal can hardly have been congenial’.26 Men such as these may not have relished the abandonment of a policy which was attributable to Henry V, for which they had fought fiercely and from which, so they might think, they still had much to gain.27 The embassy, therefore, was well balanced to represent every point of view. It must be stressed, however, that its leaders, Beaufort and Kemp, favoured peace, and that an influential group, the lawyers, probably favoured it, too. Much of this must remain hypothetical: neither protocol tells us what were the personal opinions of members of the English embassy, although Bekynton hinted that the French thought that, in private, the English might profess opinions other than those they were bound to defend publicly in their capacity as royal ambassadors.
25 An early eighteenth-century writer put it thus: ‘the Council being full of Clergymen, War was a thing out of their way’ (Anglia Regia, p. 265).26 J. S. Roskell, The Commons and their Speakers in English Parliaments, 1376–1523 (Manchester, 1965), p. 358.27 Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France, ed. J. Stevenson (London, RS, 1861–64), ii, pp. 575–585.
By 8 May 1439 the English were making arrangements for sending the embassy, payment being authorised for at least fourteen envoys.28 A week later Sir John Popham and Dr Stephen Wilson left London for Calais, there to meet the members of the French advance party, and to arrange with them the details of the convention.29 Some days later permission was granted to Beaufort and Kemp to take gold vessels and other goods to Calais in spite of the regulations laid down by statute.30
28 TNA, E.404/55/267–70, 272, 274, 276–281; E.28/60/66.29 TNA, E.364/73/1v. The advance party was to consist of Sir John Sutton, Sir John Popham and Stephen Wilton, but in fact Sutton never attended the negotiations. Their instructions ordered them to meet French officials in Calais and to make contact with the duchess Isabella. They were to arrange a suitable place for the convention, a place which must not be too far from Calais (in view of Beaufort’s age) and yet near the sea, so that it could be readily accessible. They were also to make arrangements for lodging the embassy, and to see that necessary security precautions were taken to protect those taking part. Finally, they were to inform the French that they would have easy access to Charles, duke of Orléans, prisoner of the English. (BnF, n.a.f. 6215, fos. 102v–104v).30 TNA., E.28/60/35; E. 28/61/3, 18, 19.
At about this moment the council in London learned that Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, the royal lieutenant in Normandy, had died on 30 April. Not only did the question of a suitable successor have to be resolved, but the whole of English policy had, in view of the lieutenant’s death and the peace convention which was soon to take place, to be reconsidered. By 22 May a delegation from Rouen, composed of Pierre Cauchon, bishop of Lisieux, Jean de Rinel,31 royal secretary, Sir William Oldhall, Sir John Montgomery and Jean de Denys was already in London. On that day the king, meeting the council at which Gloucester, Beaufort, Kemp and several others were present, appointed a commission to rule Normandy until a successor to Warwick be found, an appointment which, presumably, would have to wait the outcome of the pending negotiations.32 The following day, 23 May, witnessed the official appointment of the English embassy which was to be led by John Kemp, archbishop of York, and John, duke of Norfolk. With them were to go Pierre Cauchon; Thomas Brouns, bishop of Norwich; Thomas Rudborne, bishop of St Davids; Humphrey Stafford, earl of Buckingham; John de Vere, earl of Oxford; Henry, lord Bourchier; Gilles de Duremont, abbot of Fecamp; Sir Walter Hungerford; Nicholas Bildeston, DCL, dean of Salisbury; Sir John Stourton; Sir John Sutton; Sir John Popham; Robert Whityngham, treasurer of Calais; Thomas Bekynton, DCL; Guillaume Erard, DTh doctor of theology, canon of Rouen; Stephen Wilton DCL; William Sprever, DCL; and Jean de Rinel.33
31 For Cauchon and Rinel, see BnF, Ms fr, 20884/72, 73.32 A copy of the commission is in BL, Add MS 11542, fos, 78–78v. Those others known to have been at the council on that day were Bishop John Stafford, the earls of Salisbury and Suffolk, Ralph Lord Cromwell, William Lindwood and Sir John Stourton (TNA, E28/60/53).33 Of these, Sutton never attended: Guillaume Erard was dead by June; and the abbot of Fécamp did not arrive at the convention until 14 July (PPC, v, p. 364; BnF, ms. Fr 26066/3815. The importance of appointing a large embassy was thus amply borne out.
The ambassadors were given a procuration to present to the French. It included twenty names; of these, nine were to form a quorum which was to be composed of Kemp and four representatives from each of the king’s English and French territories. The tone of the document was uncompromising. Charles VII was referred to as ‘Charles of Valois, our adversary’, the aim of the English ambassadors being to seek and demand that the said adversary return to the English what he held contrary to God and justice. There was no suspicion in the document of any desire to reach a compromise: the English had right and justice on their side, the French hardly a leg to stand on. The English had simply to demand what they knew to be theirs. The spirit of arrogance, reflected in the wording, was plain for all to see.34
34 The original procuration (PPC, v, p. xlvii, n. 1, from TNA, C.76/121, m. 6) shows the influence of Humfrey of Gloucester. It omits the name of three Frenchmen (Cauchon, Duremont and Erard). This is probably a clerical error, as their names would be included on mm. 5 and 10. Owing to the lack of Lancastrian/French ambassadors at the convention, the clause concerning the quorum was later modified.
Two days later, on 25 May, special powers were granted to Cardinal Beau-fort.35 He was allowed ‘plenam potestatem et mandatum speciale’ to treat with the French envoys concerning the English title to the crown and kingdom of France, together with all other rights which the French might be withholding. Once a final peace had been made, Beaufort was to receive the homage and fealty of those choosing to inhabit territories which might come under English control.
35 Rymer, Foedera, x, pp. 732–733.
Two factors in this document call for comment. The first is the contrast in tone between this and the procuration given to the main body of ambassadors two days previously; Beaufort’s procuration embodied a willingness to negotiate if, as it seems he thought would happen, the French refused to treat with those bearing the truculent procuration mentioned above.36 The second factor to be noticed is that Beaufort’s powers were very considerable – because they were vague. From the dating of the document it may be supposed that Beaufort sought and obtained special powers from the king in council, powers which in effect made him the chief English ambassador because he was not handicapped by being tied down to specific terms. His procuration spelt out hope, and is indicative of his realisation that compromise was necessary, and that the English, if armed only with a procuration of 23 May, were destined to failure.
36 It is possible that Gloucester was not in the council on 25 May. He is not mentioned in two conciliar warrants (TNA, E 28/60/67/80).
More hopeful was the future of Anglo-Burgundian commercial relations which both parties wished to restore to normal. The resumption of trade with England was undoubtedly a strong motive in getting Burgundy to act as mediator between England and France, and the convention was to be used as yet another opportunity of achieving the renewal of commercial intercourse. Although the French protocol does not raise the matter, and Bekynton shows that it was of secondary importance in contrast with the all-important one of peace, the English had nonetheless appointed an embassy to discuss trade with Flanders and Brabant on the same day as the main embassy to the peace convention. The members of this embassy were to be John Kemp, Thomas Rudborne, Thomas Brouns, Nicholas Bildeston, Sir John Popham, Stephen Wilton, William Sprever, and Richard Whityngham, all members of the larger embassy.37
37 Archives du Nord, B. 572/15729.
On 21 May the ambassadors had been issued with instructions for the negotiations with the French.38 They were at first to demand that the Valois should not prevent Henry VI from enjoying to the full his rights and claims to the French crown and French territory. That such a claim would be admitted was pure wishful thinking, and this contingency was tacitly admitted by the issue of further instructions. The ambassadors were to build up an impression of English strength by claiming that victories showed which side God favoured, and by reminding the French of the existence of the treaty of Troyes. As a consent concession, Henry VI would be willing to grant his uncle of France lands beyond the Loire to the value of 20,000 livres a year, ‘to be holde of the Kyng, asyn the Ryght of his said Coroune of Fraunce’.39 In the unlikely event of such offers being accepted, Beaufort, acting as a churchman, was then to appeal for an ending of hostilities which, during the past hundred years, had done so much harm and had cost so much blood. Peoples, he was to claim, were not born to fulfil the ambitions of their princes who were, instead, to rule for the good of their people: there was nothing in the law of God which required France to have but one king: history showed that in the past she had had more than one.40 Instead of fighting, kings should desire peace, so necessary for the good of men’s souls, but peace could only be achieved by honest negotiation. The alternative – one which the English probably hardly envisaged – was peace achieved by the subjection of one country by the other.
38 Rymer, Foedera, x, pp. 724–728; PPC, v, pp. 354–362.39 PPC, v, p. 355.40 ‘The solution of despair’ (Dickinson, Congress of Arras, p. 145).
A consideration of the instructions so far cited, and of those which followed, cast some light on the attitude of the English side. Not unnaturally they tried to negotiate from strength, but their attempt to do so was doomed; in the light of recent setbacks it was of little value resting on the laurels of victories won years, maybe decades, earlier, nor was it any use claiming the French crown by virtue of the treaty of Troyes, which the Valois refused to recognise. It was condescending and unrealistic to show willingness to grant the territories of Languedoc to the Valois when most of those territories were already in Valois hands, and had been for time immemorial.41 Such instructions, cast in the same spirit as the procuration of 23 May, bear the influence of Gloucester and his supporters who were anxious for war in the pursuance of the aggressive policies of Edward III and Henry V. The peaceful influence of Beaufort, on the other hand, may be detected in the attack upon the selfish aims of rulers who employ their subjects for their personal ends. This was not simply the attitude of Beaufort the churchman, but also that of Beaufort the opponent of Gloucester, the chief expert exponent of a military policy. There appears to be here, as in the reference to Beaufort as the man ‘to whom the King hath opened and declared al his intent in this matter’, in addition to the background to the cardinal’s special proclamation, a suggestion that, in spite of the uncompromising attitude struck at the beginning of the instructions, the prevailing mood may have been veering towards a compromise peace or at least a long truce. In support of this view it should be remembered that it was Beaufort, not Gloucester, who went to the convention and that, given a fair chance, Beaufort might have obtained reasonable terms from the French.
41 Both sides would only give up what they did not hold, and by making this concession hoped to win what the other held (PPC, v, p. lxxii).
Although negotiations did not begin until early in July, the English advance party left London in the middle of May. It was not, however, until 7 June that they met their French opposite numbers who were already in close touch with the duke and duchess of Burgundy at St. Omer. There, in the presence of the duke and Hugues de Lannoy, the French and English discussed and agreed matters of safe-conducts, sureties and the place of the convention.42
42 K.1711, fos, 489–489v. Their letter of credence, made out in the names of Sutton, Popham and Wilton, and addressed to the duchess Isabella, is in BnF, n.a.f. 6215, fo. 102.
By about the middle of June a number of English ambassadors, bringing with them a considerable following in addition to the large quantities of gold and silver plate necessary to make a favourable impression, had arrived at Calais where they were to stay.43 With them, in the personal custody of his keeper, Sir John Stourton, came Charles, duke of Orléans.44 Within a few days a small Franco-Burgundian party had been allowed to visit Calais in order to see him and he appears to have influenced the decision not to begin negotiations until Beaufort should arrive,45 since it was not expedient to treat of peace except in the presence of the cardinal and the duchess Isabella. In the meantime arrangements were made through the person of Garter King of Arms for the exchange of general and individual safe-contacts; some were to be valid until 1 October, indicating that the possibility of a long meeting was envisaged.46
43 See TNA, E.404/55/301; E.404/56/251; and n. 30, above.44 Stourton had no previous diplomatic experience. He was present principally as keeper of the duke of Orléans, over whom he had been given charge on 9 July 1438. On 8 May 1439 they travelled ‘unto the seewarde, and soo unto oure towne of Caleis’, whence they returned on 13 Oct. Stourton kept charge of his prisoner until the following February (Letters and Papers, I, pp. 432–434).45 Beaufort arrived at Calais on 26 June (PPC, v, p. 335; K.1711, fo. 490).46 K.1711, fo. 489v.
The procedure at Oye was very different to that followed at Arras four years earlier. On that occasion the negotiations between England and France had been conducted before two mediators, Cardinal Albergati representing the pope, and the cardinal of Cyprus, representing the council of Basel, the negotiators never meeting face-to-face. The two cardinals had been instructed to mediate, not to judge, and were thus obliged to practise complete impartiality, since it was their task to convey the offers of each side to the other in as unprejudiced a manner as possible.47 This way of proceeding bore little relation to the procedure adopted at Oye, where the papacy took no direct part, and the embassy representing the council of Basel, although present for much of the convention’s duration, was refused any part in the negotiations.48 English suspicion of anything that smacked of conciliar intervention (they blamed the council’s envoys for their diplomatic failure at Arras) was sure to prevent that.49 Nor does the reported presence of envoys of the count of Armagnac, who came supposedly to help mediate between England and France, appear to have had any bearing upon events.50 The negotiations, therefore, owed nothing to ‘neutral’ mediators. Instead, three persons, all committed to one or other of the parties, were concerned in the delicate task of achieving peace. The most important of these was the duchess of Burgundy who, at the instigation of the duke, had taken the initiative in bringing the parties together.51 At Arras the duke had himself been constantly involved in the negotiations, while the duchess ‘appears to have been … a spectator’:52 at Oye, on the other hand, their roles were reversed (the Brut alleged that, after 1435, the English would never deal directly with the perfidious duke)53 and far from the duke being his own ambassador, the duchess took over the role from him. At the same time, as she herself explained, she was acting as a French mediator.54 She was certainly no neutral: nor, indeed, was Beaufort, and both were to act as unofficial ambassadors for their respective side. Yet the duchess’s undoubted ability, her recent experience of English diplomats, her close family connections with the house of Lancaster, the esteem in which she was held by the English,55 the mutual affection (witnessed by both protocols) between herself and her co-mediator, Beaufort, who was her uncle, all these helped towards making her a good intermediary and a forceful advocate of compromise.
47 Dickinson, Congress of Arras, p. 118 et seq.48 See the brief account of the conciliar embassy’s activities in A. Zellfelder, England und das Basler Konzil (Berlin, 1913), pp. 217–220.49 A. N. E. D. Schofield, ‘England, the Pope and the Council of Basel, 1435–49’, Church History, xxxiii (1964), 268. The same article, with minor corrections, was reprinted in Reunion, vi, no. 62 (1965), 19.50 PPC, v, p. 345. For their similar lack of success at Arras, see Dickinson, Congress of Arras, pp. 12–13.51 For the duchess Isabella, see C. Looten, ‘Isabelle de Portugal, duchesse de Bourgogne et comtesse de Flandre (1397–1471)’ (Revue de littérature comparée, xviii (1938), 5–22.52 Dickinson, Congress of Arras, p. 66, n. 4.53 The Brut, ed. F. W. D. Brie (EETS, cxxxi, cxxxxvi, 1906–08), ii, 506. When Hugues de Lannoy and Henri de Utenhove came to take diplomatic soundings in England early in 1438, their safe-conduct stated that they were travelling to England for the good of their souls and other reasons (‘… ob salutem animarum suarum ac alias causas’). This legal fiction lends support to the statement of the chronicle (Lannoy, p. 124, and app. p. xlvii).54 TNA, C.76/122, m. 31.55 She had made a favourable impression upon the English in 1435 (Dickinson, Congress of Arras, p. 125, n. 4).
The acceptance of Beaufort as a mediator is clearly indicated in both protocols. Having already won the respect of the French and Burgundians in previous negotiations,56 he represented the tradition of the high ecclesiastic acting as mediator. Yet his presence at Oye was also the direct outcome of his position as the most important member of the English council. Like the duchess Isabella he was both mediator and royal ambassador, holding yet greater authority to deal with certain basic aspects of the negotiations then had the official English ambassadors themselves.57
56 Ibid, p. 34, n. 1. He was considered to be ‘mediateur de ceste paix de la part dangleterre pareillement que le sont lesdiz monseigneur dorleans [et] madame de Bourgogne pour la part de france’ (BnF, n.a.f. 6215, fo. 70).57 L. B. Radford, Henry Beaufort (1908), p. 256.
This may indicate that the possibility of bargaining outside the main convention had been foreseen, and the protocols suggest that this indeed happened. Unlike at Arras, the mediators and both embassies might all meet at once, so that all had an equal chance of hearing offers and counteroffers. But in spite of this, much negotiation went on outside the convention tent: in these consultations held between Beaufort and the English ambassador on the one hand and the duchess and the French and Burgundian envoys on the other, the two mediators played an important part. Each knew well how far the instructions of his own side would allow him to go: questions concerning peace offers could be conveyed by Beaufort to the French ambassadors by way of the duchess, and by her through Beaufort to the English embassy without the need for many formal meetings. Hence both Beau-fort and the duchess kept in very close touch with the envoys of their own side, consulted with them frequently, discussed often late into the night terms offered by the other embassy, and planned tactics with them, besides acting as general go-betweens for each side. As far as the English were concerned this was natural enough for, in 1439, Beaufort was, after the king, although not heir to the throne, at least the leading man in the kingdom, and it was he who planned and initiated the council’s peace policy. Close consultation between him and the official English ambassadors was only to be expected. What seems certain is that Beaufort and the duchess played a far more active part in these negotiations than either had done at Arras.58 In the instructions given to the English ambassadors Beaufort was described as a ‘Mediatour and Sterer to the Peas’. The word ‘sterer’ is important, as it appears to indicate that at Oye Beaufort acted not only as a mediator but, in effect, as an ambassador as well.59
58 Beaufort, it will be recalled, had been given very extensive powers to negotiate. See above, n. 34.59 Rymer, Foedera, x, p. 724.
The role of Charles, duke of Orléans, is less easy to assess. To the French he was the man most likely to help achieve peace on their terms, a man whose name had long been associated with attempts at peace-making. His captivity in England had given him an unrivalled experience of English affairs and of the men who controlled them; the French had always been anxious that he should play an active part in any peace negotiations. As a man of great moral and political stature, he was in an unusually favourable position, so they thought, to help his country obtain satisfactory terms.
To certain Englishmen, and notably to the duke of Gloucester, Orléans’s very prestige in France might be dangerous. It would be as well to remind the French that, since Orléans was an English prisoner, they intended, as in 1435, to keep him at Calais where his influence would be considerably lessened, while at the same time permitting the French to visit and consult with him in private, should they so wish. To other Englishmen, among whom Beaufort may probably be numbered, it seemed that greater advantage should be taken of Orléans’s presence at Calais to achieve an understanding with the French, who plainly considered the duke to be a mediator in the same sense as were the duchess Isabella and Beaufort himself. The situation had changed since 1435, and it was no longer sufficient merely to allow Orléans to be in the locality where the negotiations were to take place. Late in January 1439 Beaufort had written to the French to inform them that he favoured Calais as a meeting place. One reason for this choice, he informed them, was that ‘audit lieu de Calais pourra ledit adversaire envoyer devers luy [i.e., Orléans] audit Calais pour le voir et visiter et advoir son bon advis et conseil sur les matieres dessusdites’.60 In May he had followed up this reasoning: the English advance party was instructed to inform the French that they might have easy access to the duke of Orléans, ‘afi de venir plus tost a la coclusion dela matiere par son moien…’.61
60 BnF, n.a.f. 6215, fo. 94v.61 Ibid, fo. 103v. The italics are mine.
In other words, Orléans was not to be merely a pawn in the proceedings but a player as well. The English procuration, once the convention had begun was altered and the duke’s release became a matter for negotiation. The obstinate idea that Orléans freedom would place English security in jeopardy was quietly put aside, and the duke was twice given a chance of making concrete proposals when the talks were threatened by deadlock, although his captors would probably not have agreed officially with the duchess Isabella that, along with her, he was one of the ‘mediateurs dicelle paix pour la partie de France’.62 Perhaps the most accurate way of describing his position vis-à-vis the negotiators is to see him as a second string in the English bow: he was not allowed to take part in the proceedings at first,63 but once a critical stage had been reached, appeals were made to him and he played a major role in forming proposals upon which the negotiations were ultimately to stand or fall. This is what Beaufort probably foresaw: his attempts to bring Orléans into the talks constituted the most constructive move made by the English during the time of the negotiations. That it failed was not Beaufort’s fault.
62 TNA, C/76/122, m. 31. By 12 October, however, the English were willing to grant him that title.63 Bekyngton reported that Orléans was much angered at not being allowed to take part, telling Stourton that without him the others would do nothing ‘nisi verberare ventum’ (PPC, v, p. 341).
It therefore becomes clear that Orléans was to the French what Beaufort himself was to the English, a man to be consulted by his own side at every stage, and who might ultimately be relied upon to produce a working solution to the problems of how to achieve peace. It is also clear that the procedure was very different from that followed at Arras. This was in part owing to the fact that, unlike at Arras, the embassies could meet face-to-face not only for purposes of bargaining but on more social occasions as well. The need to keep them apart by the device of employing neutral mediators did not arise, so that both Beaufort and Orléans and, to a lesser extent, the duchess Isabella, acted both as mediators and as chief ‘consultants’ to their respective embassies.
The scene of the convention which was to take place at Oye, some seven miles east of Calais, was described by Bekynton.64 All the ostentation of medieval diplomacy was there:65 the large convention tent, richly hung, with its dais for the mediators and the seats for the two groups of ambassadors, who sat opposite each another: the accommodation for the cooks and soldiers (some 260 Englishmen came for the opening meeting): and the smaller tents in which the chief negotiators, in addition to the two mediators, might carry out their consultations and offer each other entertainment.66 It was in this formal atmosphere, for all its pageantry not entirely free of suspicion, that the business of negotiating peace, which each side professed ardently to desire, began.
64 Ibid, v, pp. 341–342.65 Monstrelet stressed the great pomp and riches of the English (Chronique, v, pp. 403–404).66 PPC, v, pp. 341–342. The duchess Isabella had tapestries sent specially from Arras (Arch. Nord, B. 1967/57908).
Ardour expressed in words was one thing; ardour as manifested in action was another. From the beginning, as Bekynton hinted, the English suspected that the French wished to set a limit to the length of the convention, thereby reducing its chances of success. The English, on the other hand, whether by intent or not, provoked the French to protest on several counts. They were annoyed that the English seemed unwilling to allow Orléans to participate directly in the negotiations. The English procurations, they claimed, were unfriendly, and their tone calculated to provoke. Why, they asked, when previous practice had been for the English to write ‘our adverse of France’ did they now turn to the insulting formula of ‘Charles of Valois’ when referring to the French king?67 Why did they make extravagant claims to the crown and kingdom of France as if they held them of right? Surely, too, the English should have authority to negotiate a general peace, not simply a truce and, what was deemed most important from the French point of view, how was it that no mention was made of the duke of Orléans? The French professed to be much angered by the English documents: they must produce better evidence of their intention to make peace before the French would enter into negotiations with them.68
67 PPC, v, p. xlvii, n. 1.68 Both sides had been guilty of such wrangling in 1435 (Dickinson, Congress of Arras, pp. 133–134).
After so inauspicious a beginning it required all Beaufort’s tact to satisfy the French and obtain the necessary concessions from the English who, in their turn claimed that the French procuration, especially the clause concerning the quorum, was obscure. Later in the day the French sent the bishop of Tournai to Beaufort who promised to speak to the English ambassadors about their powers and to get new ones if possible.69 It was only after much wrangling and justification in the presence of Beaufort and Isabella, and after close inspection of the proposed alteration by the lawyers of the English delegation, that a new clause, enabling the English to negotiate the release of the duke of Orléans, was added. Beaufort personally guaranteed the ratification of this clause, and for the moment French honour was satisfied.70
69 K. 1711, fo. 491v; PPC, v, pp. 343–344.70 K. 1711, fo. 492; PPC, v, pp. 344–346. See J. G. Dickinson, ‘“Blanks” and “Blank” Charters in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries’, I, lxvi (1951), pp. 375–387, particularly 382–383.
A consideration of the original and the new English procuration shows that more than the addition of a clause concerning the negotiation of the release of the duke of Orléans was made. The second document was much longer than the first. It noted that negotiations had already taken place earlier in the year at Calais, thereby achieving a useful sense of continuity: the title of ‘Charles of Valois’ was replaced by the phrase ‘our adversary of France’: and some of the more virulent claims to the French crown were omitted (if one is to believe Bekynton, this was done at the suggestion of the duchess Isabella):71 and the release of the royal prisoner, Charles of Orléans, could now be negotiated. The procuration, backdated to 23 May, the date of the original, bears the influence of Beaufort. It is possible to see in it not only an attempt to come to terms with the French – and, in particular, with the duchess Isabella – but also the logical result of the granting of wide and vague powers to Beaufort on 25 May. There is evidence here, one may suggest, of Beaufort being willing to pursue a policy of reasonable concession which his own powers alone enabled him to do. His task was to pour oil upon troubled diplomatic waters and the new procuration was his own contribution towards establishing the calm necessary for the successful outcome of the negotiations. The ambassadors’ instructions, however, remained unchanged. In tone they were more uncompromising than the new procuration which they were intended to support, but it was nevertheless in accordance with those instructions that the ambassadors were still committed to negotiate.
71 PPC, v, pp. 343–344.
The next plenary session was held on 10 July, and was the occasion of further outcries. It fell to archbishop Kemp, as the leader of the official English embassy, to make the opening oration, which he did, as Bekynton stressed, in elegant Latin.72 The words of Christ to St Bridget, ‘If the kings of England and France desire peace, I shall give it to them’, were appropriate on this occasion.73 Peace and justice being sisters, the one implied the other, and peace could only be achieved through justice which, in this case, meant that the king of France should allow the king of England full and true possession of his French lands. The English king, Kemp declared, recognised no overlord: his French possessions were held from God, and from Him alone. English successes, he concluded, had shown which side divine justice favoured.74 Such a declaration declared little of the spirit of compromise in the English attitude. Replying in French, the archbishop of Reims proved equally stubborn. In his view there was no sense or purpose in debating who was the rightful king of France, namely his own master, Charles VII the proper descendant of previous kings who, it had to be pointed out, was now more frequently successful in battle than was the English king. Moving on to the offensive he asserted that the English had acknowledged the legal right of French kings to the crown when they had released King John as well as by the homage given to Philip VI by Edward III for the duchy of Gascony and the county of Ponthieu. It was the English who had waged war unjustly, and it was from them restitution had been demanded. It was now up to the English, he felt, to make further overtures of peace.75
72 Ibid, p. 352. The French protocol (fo. 492) says that the archbishop of Reims spoke before him.73 The English liked to cite the saint’s sayings (Dickinson, Congress of Arras, p. 145 and n. 2).74 K.1711, fo. 492; PPC, v, p. 352. This view, expressed by ambassadors and chroniclers alike, had already been put forward in 1435 (Dickinson, Congress of Arras, p. 145 and n. 2).75 K.1711, fo. 492v. On the procedure of offer and counter-offer, see Dickinson, Congress of Arras, p. 136 et seq.
Kemp at once reiterated that the war and the prophecy of St Bridget supported the English claim, as did the treaty of Troyes, sealed between Charles VI and Henry V. To this the archbishop of Reims replied ‘bien et solennelment’ that if the English had had their victories, so had the French, and since many Englishmen had died to no purpose, such French victories were a declaration of divine justice.76 As for the alleged prophecy of St. Bridget, it was no true prophecy, since it had not been approved by the Church. He himself could cite the testimony of a holy hermit, John, who had spoken of the chastisement of the kingdom of France by the English who would, however, eventually be driven out. He finished by claiming that the general peace treaty of Troyes, having been sealed during Charles VI’s madness, and without the presence and consent of the dauphin, was invalid, and had been condemned by the legates of the council of Basel. Only by a marriage between the hermit and St. Bridget, Beaufort is alleged to have said in one of those rare flashes of humour which have come down to us, could peace be properly achieved.77
76 K. 1711, fo. 492v.77 ‘Et lors monditseigneur le cardinal dist que ce seroit ung bon marriage dudit hermite et de sainte Brigide’ (Ibid).
In spite of their lack of success, the negotiators continued to wrangle. The English, having had an opportunity of deliberating in private, put forward the second article in their instructions. Out of reverence for God, Kemp said, and taking into consideration the close family ties that existed between the French and English kings, the English would be willing to leave to the man whom the French called their king that part of the kingdom which lay beyond the Loire, except for the duchy of Guyenne, the county of Poitou and such lands as belonged to the kings of England before they had the right to the crown of France.78 Such terms were unacceptable to the French who foresaw with hostility a possible division of land within the kingdom. There could be no peace, the archbishop of Reims replied, unless the English king were to renounce all pretensions to the crown, kingdom and arms of France. Further, any lands which might be granted to the English king must be held in faith and homage, in recognition of French sovereignty, like those granted to the peres of France, a step which would first entail the session to the French king of all lands held in France. If the English were to accept these conditions and show good faith by releasing the duke of Orléans then the French would allow the English king to keep those lands which he now held in Guyenne (was their extent not considerable?) subject to the conditions of tenure stated above. Such terms were at once rejected by the English and, since it was now late, the ambassadors agreed to part, having arranged to meet again three days later.79
78 For the offers made by the English in 1435, see Dickinson, Congress of Arras, p. 148.79 K. 1711, fos. 493–493v; PPC, v, pp. 353–354.
The prospects of reaching a lasting settlement seemed slight, and it may have been the unpromising nature of the situation which brought about the next move. On 18 May the council of Basel had appointed four envoys to travel to the Marches of Calais to assist in the peace-making.80 French protocol states that they arrived, probably at St. Omer, on 24 June, when they presented letters to the duke of Burgundy and announced that they had come to help achieve peace. They had been politely received, but little enthusiasm had been shown for their mission, and they do not feature again in the French protocol.81 Bekynton does not mention them at this time (since he himself had not yet arrived), but he records their visit to Calais, the English centre, on 11 July. Four days later, in the Great Hall at Calais, Beau-fort and the other English envoys gave audience to the chief conciliar envoy, the bishop of Vich, who spoke of the joys of peace among brothers. The English were to reply on the morrow. In the meantime Bekynton reported, the legate spoke to the duke of Orléans in the hall of the Staple where, according to some witnesses, he uttered words prejudicial to the English, citing the text ‘Estote fortes in bello et pugnate cum serpente’.82
80 Geneva, Bibliothèque publique et universitaire, MS. Lat. 27, nos. 57–59 (original Bulls); Concilium Basiliense, ed. J. Haller, etc., vi. I (Basel, 1925), pp. 427–428; Monumenta Conciliorum Generalium (3 vols, Vienna, 1857–86), iii, p. 270.81 K. 1711, fo. 490.82 PPC, v, pp. 363–364. The evidence contained in K.1711, fo. 490 seems to indicate that the conciliar embassy favoured the French.
Such language was hardly calculated to win the confidence of the English ambassadors. When Kemp met the legate on the following day, he stressed how much his king desired peace, and he thanked the council and the legate (much as the French had done) for working towards that end. However Kemp did not fail to make England’s attitude towards the council perfectly clear: he and his fellow ambassadors were quite satisfied with the services of the two mediators (their instructions permitted the English to treat only with them) and they were all mindful that peace would have been made at Arras in 1435 had the council fathers been fair. He ended by begging them to avoid all extreme measures and hence all risk of schism within the Church.
To this the legate replied by justifying the council’s attempts at peace-making, saying that he regretted the criticism of the council’s role at Arras. He then attacked the papacy, a speech which drew forth a defence of the pope from Kemp.83 Little more is known concerning the part played by the conciliar delegation at the convention: the hostility of England to the council, fanned by the efforts of Piero da Monte, the papal envoy in England who wrote to Beaufort and Bildeston at Calais exhorting them to have nothing to do with the representatives of the council, probably put an end to any hopes the conciliar delegation may have had of influencing events and bringing them to a satisfactory conclusion.84 With no support from the French and Burgundians, and almost open hostility from the English, the fathers could claim no credit for any successes which might be achieved.
83 PPC, v, pp. 364–365. The Council of Basel had deposed the pope on 25 June.84 J. Haller, Piero da Monte (Rome, 1941), pp. 105–113. Da Monte’s relief at the failure of the conciliar mission was intense. For the delegation’s return to Basel, see Concilium Basiliense, vI, i, pp. 618, 724.
In the meantime both the French and English envoys had been trying to find a way of reconciling what was rapidly becoming the irreconcilable. On 11 July Isabella summoned the French ambassadors to inform them that she had learned from Beaufort that the English would not accept permanent peace without sovereignty (resort) but that they might be willing to make a truce. The following day the French met and rejected the proposal: a truce would only prolong the war: it would give the English time to reinforce their precarious military position: and, perhaps most important of all, a truce involved no recognition of French sovereignty, whereas a final peace must do so. Later that day Garter King of Arms went to the French camp to announce that on the following day the duke of Orléans would be brought out of Calais so that the French could meet him.85 The English fearing to return home empty-handed, were now willing that the duke should use his influence to help achieve peace.
85 K. 1711, fo. 404v; PPC, v, p. 363.
On the morning of 13 July the duchess Isabella met the duke of Orléans in a special tent which had been set up two bow shots distance from the walls of Calais. Together they had a long discussion about peace, afterwards entering into consultation with Beaufort and both groups of ambassadors. Later the duchess questioned Orléans before the envoys, asking him whether he desired peace. ‘Yes’, he replied, ‘even if I have to die for it’, an expression which gave Isabella the opportunity of voicing her determination to obtain what all desired.86
86 PPC, v, p. 363–364.
Early the following morning the duchess’s secretary, Gerard, arrived at Calais to inform Beaufort that his mistress, on her return the previous evening, had heard that the duke of Burgundy was ill at St. Omer, and that she had immediately hurried to see him. She asked that the next meeting be postponed until the following Thursday, 16 July, to which the English agreed.87 Both the protocols give the duke’s illness as the reason for the duchess’s sudden departure; there is no reason to doubt the truth of this statement.88 None the less the illness was a timely one, for it enabled the duchess to consult her husband about the slow progress of the negotiations, and especially about his interview, the previous day, with the duke of Orléans. It is possible to detect the influence of this visit, and of the consultations which must have taken place, upon the events of the next few days, and especially on the close cooperation between the French ambassadors and the ducal councillors to which the French protocol is a witness.
87 K.1711, fo. 494v; PPC, v, p. 364.88 Ibid, The statement is corroborated by the duchess’s accounts (Arch. Nord, B.3404/115455–7). The Duke was soon again ‘en bon point’.
The next meeting was not, in fact, held until 18 July, one having been postponed on account of the unwarranted fear of the English that the French were preparing to attack them.89 The importance of the incident, reported in both protocols, each of which attempted to lay responsibility for the misunderstanding upon the other party, lies in its evidence of the lack of trust which existed at the negotiations. The elaborate precautions taken to ensure that no heavily armed men should come to the convention, the incident just cited, which caused the English to fear for their safety, the continuation of the war between England and France, and the French successes of the summer of 1439 all militated against a spirit of compromise. To the French it seemed that success in battle could help reduce English resistance to their demands: to the English such successes, when added to their suspicions of French motives in the negotiations, gave birth to the conviction that the French did not want a final peace. The achievement of a truce, which would probably be of greater advantage than peace to the English, now became part of their policy.90
89 K.1711, fo. 495; PPC, v, pp. 365–366. In order that no rumours might spread to England to disturb the country (and to turn it against the French) Beaufort stopped all traffic going to England until the truth of the incident had been properly ascertained.90 For English proposals in 1435 that a truce be signed, and French opposition to the idea, see Dickinson, Congress of Arras, pp. 131, 147.
From the French point of view it became important that demands for a truce be resisted. On 18 July Beaufort and the duchess Isabella met together to discuss means of reconciling the two sides after which each reported to their respective ambassadors, Beaufort telling the English that prospects of peace were remote, Isabella informing the French that Beaufort had made even a truce on French terms seem unlikely.91 The stumbling-blocks were the title to the kingdom and crown of France which the French wanted announced but which the English were unwilling to yield; the matter of homage, the English insisting that they held France directly from God; and the restoration of lords and others, including clergy who had fled before the English to their lands and benefices in English-controlled territories, a restoration to which the English were implacably opposed. Beaufort reported that Isabella had proposed a solution, the first genuine concession on the French side, whereby for a period of thirty, twenty or fifteen years Henry VI would cease to style himself king of France in letters and documents, and Charles VII would not demand homage from the English king. Hostilities would cease, but if Henry VI wished at any time to revert to his former practice he could do so after giving one year’s formal notice, and the war would begin anew.92 This was a reasonable move on the part of the French. It was also a clever one, for it placed the onus of the choice between war and peace squarely upon the shoulders of the English king and his advisers. Beaufort not unnaturally asked for time to consider the proposal.
91 K.1711, fos. 495–495v; PPC, v, p. 366.92 PPC, v, p. 366–367.
Before doing so, however, Beaufort sent to Isabella to ask for her proposals in writing. At this point, the French protocol relates, the French ambassadors and those Burgundian councillors present met together to discuss the reply to the English request. It was decided to forward to the English certain opinions on the matter of peace formulated by the chancellor of Burgundy which the bearer, the bishop of Tournai was to claim had been put forward by Isabella and her counsel alone, although in fact the whole French embassy had had a say in the forming of them.93
93 K. 1711, fo. 495v. This is a clear example of the undoubted value of the French protocol. See Arch. Nord, B.3404/115458: ‘Samedi xviii jour de juillet lan mil CCCC xxxix, Madame la duchesse de Bourgogne et de Brabant, Mesdamoiselles d’Estampes et de Cleves, et les ambaxadeurs de France, disner aux champs ou lon fait la convencion, Madite dame et mesdites damoiselles, souper et couchier a Gravelinghes. Aux despens de Monseigneur le duc’.
The deception did not pass unnoticed in the English camp. Beaufort soon remarked that the written terms differed considerably from those put forward to him verbally by Isabella that very morning, terms which he had plainly thought had grown out of the conversations between Isabella and the duke of Orléans outside Calais earlier in the week. Bekynton described the written terms as being ‘full of wormwood and snares’, and Beaufort informed Orléans of the changes.94 A little later, when Beaufort met Isabella and the bishop of Tournai, he told them that the conditions of the written proposals, which included the release of the duke of Orléans, could not be fulfilled. On being reminded that the French had come to negotiate a peace, not a truce, Beaufort replied that a truce was best for all, including (and here he made an appeal to Burgundian self-interest) to Burgundy itself. Isabella retorted that the French wanted peace and that their terms were the best. At this point, with confidence shaken even further, the meeting was adjourned for a few days.95
94 PPC, v, p. 367.95 K.1711, fos. 495v–96.
Beaufort’s confrontation of the duke of Orléans with the written conditions (probably altered without Orléans’s knowledge) and Bekynton’s description of the terms as drawn up by Orléans and Isabella suggests that the English acted in good faith. It comes as no surprise that they should have been shocked by the written proposals.96 Although the English king was to be granted certain lands in France, he was to renounce all his claims to the French kingdom and the crown and abandon all his conquests. Further, any territory left him would be held in homage of the French king, and all lords, secular and ecclesiastical, were to be restored to their properties. Finally, the duke of Orléans was to be liberated without the payment of a ransom.
96 PPC, v, pp. 367–369. The text is in French.
The proposals formed by the Francophile chancellor of Burgundy, Nicolas Rolin, and approved by the French ambassadors, gave little scope for compromise. The only concession to the English view, one already made verbally by Isabella, was a willingness to consider a truce, under stringent conditions, for a period of up to thirty years, at the end of which, if war were resumed those living in territories ceded to the English would be free to break their oath and return to the allegiance of the French crown. However, should the English so wish it, a perpetual peace could be signed at the expiration of the truce. Again, the onus of acceptance was placed upon English shoulders.97
97 Dr Dickinson (Congress of Arras, pp. 139–140) wrote of an accepted practice that offers, once made in writing and refused, were deemed null and void. The French may have put forward these proposals in the sure knowledge that they would not be accepted. It is possible that they, like many Englishmen of the day, did not desire peace at this time, although the evidence printed by J. Garillot, (Les États Généraux de 1439 (Nancy, 1947), pp. 13–15, suggests that the French may have been considering the surrender of some territory in order to bring about a permanent peace.
To such conditions the English replied with a strong protest, as uncompromising as the French offer had been.98 The ambassadors, it stated, would do nothing prejudicial to the rights of the king, nor would they retreat in any way from their previous demands, as they could not negotiate any lessening of his rights or claims.99 If the king were to be content not to claim all his rights, he would only do this for the honour of God, the achievement of peace, the stabilising of the Church and the ending of slaughter among Christians. Behind this pious facade the English were safeguarding the future, for were military defeat to come their way, such a statement reserved their right to put forward their claims again at a more favourable moment.
98 PPC, v, pp. 369–370.99 A somewhat similar argument had been put forward in 1435 (Dickinson, Congress of Arras, pp. 131–132).
This meeting marks a change in the aims of the negotiators. In future they were to be less concerned with general questions of sovereignty and more anxious to achieve a limited settlement. Each side had rejected the overall claims of the other with the result that the English, seeing that this form of sterile bargaining would achieve no positive results, set out to win what they could of French territory. It was a change from the general to the particular. They now sought control of those lands which had belonged to the king’s ancestors before any claim to the French throne had been advanced, namely the territories which had not in the past been held by the French crown, and to which the English had a natural right by the due process of heredity. In addition, they wished to keep control of the town of Calais, the county of Guisnes and all other territories ceded to the English crown by the treaty of Brétigny, all these to be held freely from God alone, as the king of England recognised no mortal superior. If asked to define these lands the English ambassadors were to reply that they included the duchy of Normandy with the homage of Brittany and Flanders, Anjou, Maine, Gascony and Touraine, the counties of Toulouse, Picardy and Ponthieu, the town of Montreuil, the castles of Beaufort and Nogent, and others besides. Neither so vaguely worded a list nor the repeated offer of all territories beyond the Loire, except what the English now held in Gascony, was likely to meet with the approval of the French, who replied that the English proposal neither satisfied them nor offered a way towards peace. As a token concession the French were willing to offer the two Norman bailliages of Caen and Coutances, but the English spurned the offer as ridiculous.100
100 K. 1711, fos. 496v–497; PPC, v, p. 373.
At this critical juncture Nicolas Rolin, speaking for the duchess Isabella who fully appreciated the difficulties of both sides, put forward a plan in writing upon which the English were asked to comment. Bekynton described the proposal as being mere ‘nudam formam’, and the English found themselves unable to answer so unspecific a formula. At this point the duchess burst into tears, ‘nescio an ire vel pietatis’. Bekynton commented, asking that the English envoys should give their private opinions concerning her proposals. Perhaps suspecting possible trick-ery they refused to do so, but Beaufort showed his willingness to cooperate by promising to put the case for and against her proposals (which he hoped would be enlarged upon, especially as regards the proposals about lands) before the royal council. He asked for time, about three weeks, to seek a reply from England.101
101 PPC, v, pp. 373–374.
In this increasingly desperate atmosphere the convention dragged on. The English, with the help of the lawyers on their embassy, drew up a full list of territories which they wished to claim under the terms of the treaty of Brétigny: these included Normandy, Brittany, Flanders, Gascony, Poitou, Maine, Anjou and others.102 At the same time counter-offers were called for from the French, but it was reported, through the duke of Orléans, that they were threatening to leave. Beaufort hurriedly sent to Isabella to ask her to persuade the French not to do so, since this would break up the convention when some good might still come of it. He himself drew up a long agenda for the next meeting so that the French would have no reasonable excuse for departing.
102 This was in accordance with the second item of the English instructions.
On 27 July Beaufort, Isabella and the ambassadors all met, a number of private discussions taking place. Little was achieved, as the French would only offer the two Norman bailliages and the Gascon territories. Beaufort, however, persuaded them to agree to produce their demands and offers in writing, at the same time pointing out that a break of up to six weeks was required for consultations with his king. Clearly Beaufort wished to see what reaction there would be in England to the French offers (the duke of Gloucester would be almost certain to oppose them): the English ambassadors had also to obtain new powers to treat, as they themselves had claimed that theirs were no longer sufficient. A visit to London was daily becoming more and more necessary.
Much patient work would be necessary to save the convention, as Beaufort reported to the English ambassadors after his talks. In the circumstances it was again decided to call upon the duke of Orléans to seek his aid towards achieving a solution. On 29 July Isabella and the French ambassadors arrived at Calais to see the duke who spoke privately with Isabella for a while. Beaufort was later called in and it was agreed that a document should be drawn up, in the name of Orléans and the duchess Isabella, which each side would take home in order to take part in consultations and receive further instructions.103
103 K. 1711, fos. 498–498v; PPC, v, pp. 375–377. The dates do not quite agree.
On 30 July a Franco-Burgundian delegation came to Calais bringing with it the text of the offer, agreement being reached that some French should remain at St. Omer, and some English at Calais, while each delegation sent certain of its members home for consultations. In the meantime Beaufort and the duke of Orléans were to remain at Calais. On the following morning the text was presented to Beaufort: it was quickly perused and, with general agreement, a clause stipulating that a year’s notice be given before the renewal of hostilities was added. In order that those returning to London might take with them considered views on the matters discussed, the English ambassadors were asked to present their opinions in writing. Six of the ambassadors, Kemp, Stafford, Hungerford, Popham, Wilton and Rinel were chosen to go to England. On 5 August, bearing the new offer with them,104 they set sail. By 8 August they had reached London.
104 At least three copies of these proposals have survived: (i) Lambeth Palace Library, MS. 506, fos. 46–50: (ii) BnF, n.a.f. 6215, fos. 68–70v; (iii) BnF, n.a.f. 6524, fos. 148–452. See also PPC, v, pp. 378–382.
A memorandum in French informs us of the arguments which could be put before the English council.105 Those who favoured acceptance of the French concessions and the proposal for a thirty-year truce could argue that the English territories in France were poor and deserted, and that the burden of paying for the war would fall increasingly upon the English. Were they willing to bear this burden? The French, it could be pointed out, were winning with little effort and cost, since English armies were badly looked after, being led by lazy captains whose main concern was their own profit. Moreover, the French populations were turning against the English, and trade was coming to a halt. In short, did the results justify the great expense of the war? It was the argument of realism.
105 BnF, n.a.f. 6215, fos. 75v–80.
The counter argument, set out at great length, saw the problem through different eyes. To accept the French terms was to act contrary to the king’s honour and that of his house, since he had been crowned king of France in Paris, and withdrawal would mean that his French subjects had successfully disobeyed him. To abandon the royal title for the sake of a truce would be folly, for the king would not be able to exercise his royal rights in France again without a title, and the French could all too easily drive him out (the implication being that this would be for evermore) when a suitable opportunity occurred. As for the duke of Orléans, he should be made to buy his freedom dearly, since he was close in line of succession to the throne of France. The question of restitution, too, posed grave problems. Restored clergy would use their great influence over the people to turn them against the English, and they should therefore not be allowed to return. And what of the secular possessors of lands in Normandy? While it might be possible, for the honour of the crown of France, to restore to their titulars the duchy of Alencon, the counties of Harcourt, Eu, Tancarville, Maine, Perche, Anjou, Mortain, Longueville and other lands which were part of the domain, it was impossible to dispossess the large number of English and loyal Norman holders of ‘fiez nobles’ (for none could doubt that acceptance of the terms would lead to their dispossession in practice) without devising some method of compensation. While dispossessed clergy could be compensated with the first benefices to fall vacant, the problem of what to do with secular landowners was far more difficult. In any scheme of compensation to be devised, the French must be made to pay a goodly share. Finally, should Normandy be surrendered if it risked losing its sovereign courts? The appeal to self-interest is evident throughout the argument.
The proposals were unlikely to find acceptance. Although the English were to be allowed all that they held in Guyenne, as well as the whole duchy of Normandy (except for the Mont St. Michel and the homage of the duchy of Brittany), in addition to the towns and castles of Calais and Guisnes which they had long held, they were unlikely to agree to the abandonment by Henry VI of the French royal arms and title. The arguments against allowing Orléans his freedom, and permitting all persons to return freely to their lands and benefices (proposals which made nonsense of the conquest), were based upon a strong emotional appeal to the successful days of the reign of Henry V and to his orders given on his deathbed. Try as the French might to allay English fears by the inclusion of a clause stipulating that any strategic spot in which the French king’s lands might be put under the charge of an English captain if the place in any way threatened English security, they were unlikely to win over the English council to the terms of a truce which involved the peopling of the duchy of Normandy, while still nominally English, by persons whose loyalty really belonged to the Valois king.
There appears to be no record of what transpired when the small group reported back to the council: the French protocol had ceased to record events on 29 July, and Bekynton, remaining at Calais, did not report the proceedings in England.106 The materials contained in Gloucester’s protest against the release of the duke of Orléans, together with the council’s reply, both of which probably date from the early months of 1440, may yield some clue.107 Although Beaufort was not present, his chief diplomatic lieutenant was there. Kemp, so Gloucester narrates – and although his account is hostile there is no reason to doubt its authenticity – strove to the limits to persuade the king to abstain from using the French royal title, to which Gloucester objected strongly, saying that he would sooner die than agree to it. Gloucester, too, was to object violently to the release of the duke of Orléans, which he described as an even greater mistake than the holding of the peace convention itself, for the struggle between the Burgundian and Orléanist factions in France would divide that country for ever, whereas the return of Orléans could well unite them, much to the disadvantage of England.
106 Piero da Monte, who had spoken to Kemp by 11 Aug. Haller (p. 113, n. 2) described the Italian’s version of these events as ‘volkommen unwahr’.107 Letters and Papers, ii, pp. 440–460.
In spite of Kemp’s desire for peace and compromise he was unable to make any headway against Gloucester’s stubbornness. During the recess the town of Meaux, not far from Paris, had been captured by Richemont, a double blow for the peace party as it removed from its hands a valuable negotiating counter as well as helping to convince its opponents, led by Gloucester, that the French were not sincere in their desire for peace.108 It would seem, therefore, that in Beaufort’s absence there was nothing that Kemp could do towards making the young king, only fairly recently come of age, amenable to their proposals.
108 PPC, v, pp. 384, 397; A. Bossuat, Perrinet Gressart et François de Surienne, agents de l’Angleterre (Paris, 1936), pp. 270–271.
On 9 September those who had been to London returned to Calais109 and joined those of the embassy, including Beaufort and Bekynton, who had remained behind.110 To Beaufort they handed over the new instructions which had been given, instructions which were unlikely, as they stood, to further the cause of peace.111 The king, it was stated, saw as ‘right unreasonable’ the proposals concerning the non-use of the royal title of France, the restitution of benefices and possession, and the release of the duke of Orléans. In the cause of peace England would be satisfied with Normandy (including the Mont St. Michel), the duchy of Guyenne, the towns of Calais and Guisnes, and the other territories offered, but these could not be held of the French king, for the English king was always to retain his title to the crown of France. Particularly troublesome were the legal and practical implications of restitution. It seems more than probable that the king was under pressure not to yield on this point from persons who, standing to suffer considerable personal losses, could point to the lessening of prestige which the crown would sustain if, by withdrawal, the whole Lancastrian involvement in France were to be undermined. On one point alone was there some spirit of compromise: the king was willing to allow Orléans his freedom for a while to help bring about peace, but only under heavy guarantees.112
109 They had left London about 10 days previously (TNA, E 1010/323/9, E 364/73/1, 9). They were probably held up waiting for their instructions which were dated at Langley on 30 August (PPC, v, p. 391).110 For Bekynton’s description of events in and around Calais at this time see PPC v. 384–388 and Official Correspondence of Thomas Bekynton, ed. G. Williams (RS, 1872), i, pp. 103–104.111 PPC, v, pp. 388–391.112 See the copy of the English ‘responsio’ to the French officers now in BnF, n.a.f. 6215 fos. 70v–73v. The proposals were refused on several grounds; (i) they denied the principles behind the war waged by the king and his predecessors; (ii) the English could not give up the towns they held outside Normandy, Guyenne and Calais; (iii) to restore clergy and laymen to their Norman possessions would be against all justice, for these men were rebels and the present owners would inevitably lose all; (iv) the duke of Orléans ought to pay a ransom of up to £100,000 sterling.
In Bekynton’s protocol these instructions were followed by a memorandum in which were listed twelve reasons for not agreeing to the French proposals.113 The first six concerned the effects of a truce upon the king’s title and jurisdiction in France. Acceptance of the proposals would put the just cause behind the wars into doubt, as the Lancastrian title to France would be denied:114 but as the title ‘king of France’ belonged to the king as a person, as well as to the crown, the two could not be considered separately. A physical withdrawal from France and a formal renunciation of the French royal title would mean that England lost all rights of jurisdiction in France, for the claim to authority implied a title. Loss of title, too, would imply that English rule had been tyrannous, not to say illegal, and the English king would lose the use of the title at the Roman curia, before general councils and elsewhere. Thus both moral and practical implications argued against renunciation.
113 PPC, v, pp. 391–395. They bear a close resemblance to the reason set out in the ‘responsio’ described in the note above. Bodley MS 885, fos. 96–97.114 This was Sir John Fastolf’s view (Letters and Papers, ii, p. 576).
The remaining objections concerned the implications as they affected others. It would be a near impossible task to restore lands and benefices in Normandy to those now living outside the king’s obedience, and to admit rebels (the English persisted in regarding those Normans who had supported the Valois cause as rebels) would be politically dangerous to English rule. Besides, it would be acting against both human and divine law to deprive Englishmen of what was legally theirs in France and Normandy. For what would be the value of grants made by letters patent? What would happen to men who had spent their lives in the royal service, and who had nothing to live by except their French lands? While the possibility of compensation was admitted – only to be hastily branded as too costly – it was claimed that the abandonment of the lands given to the English would cause men to leave the royal service as men without hope, and that such men would be unwilling to serve the crown again in the future.
The English rejection of all chance of compromise must have disappointed, if not surprised, Beaufort. Certainly he must have been embarrassed by the decision,115 but as mediator he had to accept whatever instructions were given to the official English embassy. However, if he could avoid having to give a formal reply to the French, Beaufort could leave the door ajar for further negotiation which, he doubtless hoped, might one day take place. In this respect the French played into his hands. On 11 September, the last day agreed upon for a reunion between the two embassies, the English ambassadors rode off early to the meeting place only to be informed that the French had not been seen at Gravelines, their base, since 30 July. For the English, the opportunity of practising moral righteousness was too good to be missed. The ambassadors heard Kemp read out a written protest against the French (prepared in advance?) before several notaries public who were required to make authenticated copies. This done, and with the French placed firmly in the wrong, the English returned to Calais.116
115 Bekynton recalls how much the duchess Isabella wished the convention to continue (PPC, v, pp. 397–399).116 Ibid, pp. 395–396.
The French appeared to have no desire to continue the negotiations. They probably realised that a negative reply to their proposals would be forthcoming, and there seemed little point in returning to Oye.117 The excuse that the terms had to be put before a meeting of the princes of the blood, a meeting which could not take place before 25 September,118 was perhaps but a sham to cover up an unwillingness to prolong the negotiations. Nor were the English, now morally indignant, any readier to continue. An enemy guilty of military provocation such as the capture of Meaux, and who offered no more than he had done at Arras four summers previously, was not open to honest dealing.119 Blind to its own likeness, the English war party used such arguments to bring proceedings to a close. Others, like Beaufort, may have hoped that something could still be achieved in the future. At present it was better to wait. Any one of these reasons was sufficient to send the English ambassadors back to London – empty-handed.
117 Ibid, p. lxxviii.118 Ibid, pp. 396, 403. On 25 August, Charles Vll wrote to the citizens of Reims mentioning the convention, but stating that he could make no decision on the proposals put forward by the duke of Orléans and the duchess Isabella without consultation. They were ordered to send representatives to Paris for 25 September to give advice. A meeting actually took place at Orléans on that day, but since an insufficient number of persons were present, they were told to reassemble at Bourges on 15 February 1440 (Beaucourt, iii. 526–528). It is difficult to judge whether the king was procrastinating deliberately or not.119 PPC, v, pp. 398–399.
But not quite so. The conference was, in fact, to end on the happier note of a mercantile truce with Flanders. On 18 September three Burgundian envoys arrived at Calais to begin negotiations.120 The work lasted some ten days: it cannot have been difficult, although the lawyers of the English embassy were kept busy discussing and checking clauses (the truce was based on one of the time of Henry IV) and the Burgundians were obliged to travel to St. Omer to consult their duke and duchess whose agreement, however, was soon obtained. On 29 September the truce was finally sealed.121
120 Ibid, pp. 400–405.121 Ibid, p. 405. See Arch. Nord, B 572/15729.
The truce, which was to take effect on 1 November (except for a clause on fishing rights which was to come into effect one month earlier) concerned trade, fishing and maritime affairs between England, Ireland and Calais on the one hand, and Flanders, Brabant and the town of Malines on the other. The sea routes between Calais, Brabant and Flanders were to be open to all trades (wool and leather been specifically mentioned) except war weapons, and merchants who were subjects of the duke of Burgundy were to be free to come and stay in England. Regulations about customs were fixed, it being agreed that no taxes were to be levied on the cargoes of ships forced into port by storm or enemies.122
122 Rymer, Foedera, x, pp. 736–737. In February 1440 an extension of this truce, to include the people of Normandy, Aquitane and the Marches of Calais, was negotiated (Ibid, p. 761).
Within a few days the English ambassadors had left Calais and had sailed back to England. In small groups they made their way to London to wait upon the king, who returned to the capital on 9 October. On the following day, in the presence of the chancellor and the ambassadors, but with Gloucester notably absent, Kemp gave an account of the mission, presenting the chancellor with a copy of the refutation made to the peace proposals. The embassy was at an end.123 The ambassadors had secured the renewal of trading relations and an unofficial peace between England and the territories of the duchy Burgundy, but they had failed in what was avowedly their principal aim, the achievement of peace with France. Yet, within two days the embassy reporting back to the king at Kennington, it was announced that the proposal, made jointly on 15 September by Beaufort, the duchess Isabella and the duke of Orléans, that another conference should take place on or before 1 May 1440, had been accepted by the king.124 Further, on 25 October, the duke informed his friends in France that he was to be temporarily released to go to France to help make peace and conclude arrangements for the payment of his ransom.125
123 PPC, v, pp. 405–407.124 TNA, C 76/122 m. 31.125 P. Champion, Vie de Charles d’Orléans 1394–1465 (Paris, 1911), p. 297; TNA, E 30/462.
The events surrounding the release of Orléans, which was finally negotiated on 2 July 1440 and ratified by the French on 16 August, have been described before, and being but a postscript to the negotiations of 1439, need not be told again.126 Their importance lies not so much in the fact that a captivity of twenty-five years was brought to an end but rather in that Orléans’ release, engineered by Beaufort, showed that the cardinal was now convinced of the necessity of making peace, which could the more easily be achieved by granting Orléans his freedom. Unlike Gloucester, Beaufort had no fears that, once released, Orléans would prove to be England’s worst enemy. Nor did he believe any longer that the duke was a diplomatic pawn of much value. Unlike Gloucester, who ‘knew no difference between concession and dishonour’,127 he had appreciated the true significance of the convention and of the military setbacks which England was suffering at the time.
126 Champion, ch. xi.127 PPC, v, p. 1xxviii.
Gloucester, on the other hand, blind to events and misled by his false convictions, insisted that England should remain true to the last wishes of his brother, Henry V.128 To him, the release of Orléans was tantamount to treason; in the Parliament of 1439–40 he protested against what he had heard that Beaufort was planning to do.129 Early in 1440 he issued a protest accusing Beaufort and Kemp, both of them cardinals, of pursuing a misguided policy,130 and after Easter in the same year he protested yet again against the release of Orléans.131 In both these documents he showed how he felt Orléans to be plotting against England and how his conversations with the French and Burgundians at Oye and, finally, his release, would contribute to the downfall of English power in France. The spirit of Gloucester’s appeals is clearly discernible, too, in the second article brought against the duke of Suffolk in 1450: he had, it was said, helped the French by accepting money from Orléans to secure his release, and by urging him to persuade Charles VII to rise against the English and the lands which they controlled in France.132
128 Elizabeth M. Burney, ‘The English Rule of Normandy, 1435–50’, pp. 168–169. This unpublished Oxford B. Litt. Thesis (1958) is cited by kind permission of the author.129 The Chronicles of London, ed. C. L. Kingsford (Oxford, 1905), p. 153.130 Letters and Papers, ii, pp. 440–451.131 Rymer, Foedera, x, pp. 764–767.132 Rotuli Parliamentorum, v, pp. 177–178.
If the events of the summer of 1439 help to illuminate Gloucester’s thinking, they help perhaps even more towards an understanding of Beaufort’s actions as the leader of the peace party. McFarlane argued that the cause of peace was already gaining ground before 1435, provided that no sacrifice of territory or national pride was involved.133 England, and Gloucester, had won military success too easily, and this had led to a determination to concede nothing and to denounce all concessions as treasonable. It was this attitude which led to the English refusal of the proposals made at Oye, and it was against such a rigid and obstinate stand that the chancellor, John Stafford, spoke at the beginning of the 1439 Parliament.134
133 K. B. McFarlane, ‘England: The Lancastrian Kings, 1399–1461’, in Cambridge Medieval History, viii, p. 398.134 Rot. Parl., v, p. 3. See E. F. Jacob, ‘Archbishop John Stafford’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., vii (1962), 11–12.
On this occasion Stafford was expressing not his own opinion but that of the council, with Beaufort at its head. A few months later that same council issued a reply to Gloucester’s protest on the betrayal of English interests.135 It underlined the urgent need for peace. The king, it was stated, having heard reports given to him by those sent on the embassy, was sure that the French would be willing to make peace, but only if the duke of Orléans were included in the treaty. Hence he must be released, for by agreeing to give the duke his freedom, the English could oblige the French to lower their terms, and Orléans could work actively in the cause of peace.
135 Letters and Papers, ii, pp. 451–460.
These were broad and important issues. What had the convention at Oye done to bring about peace? If it had failed to achieve a cessation in hostilities it had nonetheless served to convince Beaufort, Kemp and others not only that peace was necessary but that it was possible, too. Although the French were confident and riding on the wave of military success, they had gone further than the English in offering concessions which might have led to peace. Once the stumbling block of the English claim to the French crown had been put aside, albeit temporarily, three main issues remained: the matter of homage and fealty, upon which the French were adamant;136 the practical issue of lands, upon which they showed themselves to be at least accommodating; and the release of Orléans, without which no peace could be said to be final. The English refused to accept the principle of homage; their king held from God alone. Over the matter of lands and territories to be held by them in the future, they tried to achieve by diplomacy what the force of arms had failed to achieve and, in so doing, they risked losing all. Nor would they, for the moment, release Orléans without ransom. It was in this atmosphere that the convention had come to an end.
136 E. F. Jacob, The Fifteenth Century (Oxford, 1961), p. 467.
If the prospect of peace had been growing for some years, and particularly so since the real advent to power of the Beaufort following in 1437, then that prospect suffered a setback with the issue of the ambassadors’ original procuration and its accompanying instructions. Indeed, the influence of Gloucester and the supporters of a truculent policy towards France may not have been so inconsiderable even in the spring of 1439 as has sometimes been made out.
However, change was coming about, and the turning point was reached with the convention at Oye. The events of that summer certainly witnessed Gloucester’s last successful attempt to influence relations with France and his old enemy, Burgundy. The Beaufort party now took over the direction of foreign policy: events are a witness to this change. Beaufort’s procuration, vague and wide in its extent and powers, marked the real beginning: to have entered into the spirit of the ambassadors’ original procuration would have destroyed any hope and confidence which had been built up between England and Burgundy earlier in the year. With the decision, guaranteed by Beaufort himself, to moderate the ambassadors’ procuration, and to make the release of Orléans a negotiable issue, the English advanced one step towards a compromise.
Beaufort and the ambassadors were, however, greatly hampered by their instructions. It is clear that, since these remained unchanged and corresponded more in tone to the original proclamation than to the amended one, the ambassadors were obliged to negotiate at a considerable disadvantage. To the French, the English attitude, instead of reflecting the way of compromise, appeared in fact to harden, although the French probably suspected that the official English view was not shared by all the ambassadors as private individuals. The French must have realised that Beaufort, at any rate, was willing to make concessions in order to achieve some positive results. Hence his decision to allow Orléans to meet the duchess Isabella and the French ambassadors: on 12 July, so that the ways of peace ‘per eum induci possent’: and, again, on 27 July (when the negotiations had almost broken down) ‘ut per ejus mediacionem res ad ulteriora progrederentur’.137
137 PPC, v, pp. 363, 376. The italics are mine.
It is therefore arguable that, in spite of an English reluctance to consider Orléans as an official negotiator, the ambassadors under Beaufort’s leadership were beginning to realise that he must be brought into the negotiations at Oye, and to any other meetings that might take place in future. The absence of Beaufort and many privy councillors at Calais138 enabled Gloucester to reject the offers in August (in spite of Kemp’s pleadings) but once they had returned in October, their influence over the king became once again paramount. Their acceptance of Orléans as a mediator (a big step forward) enable the council to decide, only a few days after reporting to the king, that negotiations with France would be renewed, and that the duke would be given temporary freedom to work in the cause of peace. From this it was but a short step to his actual release in 1440, a decision which caused Gloucester to attack Beaufort and Kemp as the betrayers of English interests. The Gordian knot had been cut, however, and this was to influence English diplomacy towards France for some time to come.
138 Ibid, p. xxxiii.
The events of 1439 marked, therefore, not only the realisation by both Beaufort and the royal council that peace was to England’s interest, but also the first definite steps towards its implementation. The change was a move from a senseless and stubborn assertion of rights, which could not be maintained, to some form of compromise and conciliation, culminating in the Truce of Tours (1444) and a royal marriage.139 This was not to be peace at any price, but peace negotiated from strength. For this reason it was not long before the council appointed Richard, duke of York, as the king’s lieutenant in Normandy, for York already had some solid military achievements to his credit. A strong military hand could provide firm backing for the newly aligned diplomacy. Otherwise, if nothing were done, the gradual French advance would not be checked, and all would have been in vain.
139 Jacob, Fifteenth Century, p. 468. The question of a royal marriage had been mentioned, but very half-heartedly, in the English instructions. Significantly, unlike at Arras, it did not come up as a point of discussion between the ambassadors.