Part I
1
The military literature available to men of the Middle Ages was dominated by and, consequently, hugely dependent upon two classical texts, the Strategemata of Frontinus, compiled late in the first century, and the De re militari of Vegetius, written probably in the late fourth or early fifth century. Of these, the more significant was the work of Vegetius, whose influence developed steadily (and not always in a narrow military direction) as time progressed. That, however, is no reason for failing to acknowledge Frontinus, the importance of whose work Vegetius himself recognised in fulsome terms1 and which was to bequeath the medieval world a rich seam of exempla from which to mine information and ideas regarding military practice in the classical past which might be useful to later generations.
1 Vegetius, De re militari (hereafter DRM), II, 3.
The career of Sextus Julius Frontinus (c. AD 35–103) was one of public service, both civil and military. The holder of high office in Rome under a number of emperors, he also served in the army in Germany and in Britain, where he was governor from c. AD 76 to 78. His practical experience as Rome’s water commissioner was reflected in his De aquis urbis Romae, which describes the system of aqueducts bringing water to the city. Written some years earlier was a work on military science, now lost, to which the Strategemata, composed after AD 84, provided the evidence of stratagems taken from ‘utraque lingua’, ‘both languages’, Greek as well as Latin. It is this work whose fortune and significance this essay will attempt to trace.2
2 Ivli Frontini Strategemata, ed. R. I. Ireland (Leipzig, 1990). Both Frontinus’ works are available in English translation in a single volume: Frontinus, The Stratagems and the Aqueducts of Rome, trans. C. E. Bennett (Cambridge, MA, and London, 1969). Both texts in a single manuscript may be found in Paris, BnF., nouv. acq. lat. 626.
In an introductory statement, Frontinus told his readers how it came into being. He had, he explained, already written a work on military science (res militaris), reducing its practices to a system. However, he felt the need to provide a complementary work which would supply examples of the teachings and recommendations to which he had given prominence in his lost work. The title was to be a Greek one, ‘a collection of examples of wisdom and foresight’ to inspire commanders and to show them that, if modelled on those offered, their own stratagems were likely to be effective. Encouraged by a desire to save the time of busy men and at the same time underlining the utilitarian nature of the text, he was setting out a series of situations providing real-life historical situations taken from the writings of past authors, among whom Caesar and Livy stand out.
With Frontinus, the reader constantly faces the problem of how to get the better of the enemy who seldom appears to be far away. This creates a certain tension in the reader’s mind, which is preoccupied by one fundamental question: how, with minimum risk and danger, to emerge victorious from any encounter with the enemy. The successful commander is kept informed and up to date through the use of spies (a theme which will reoccur regularly in the pages which follow), for it is important to be as well informed as possible about the enemy’s plans, movements, numbers and capabilities. Foreknowledge gives a commander a hidden hold over his rival: he can use it, for example, in a surprise attack which catches the enemy unprepared; the state of unreadiness is the one which every commander must do his utmost to avoid falling into. Likewise, emphasis is placed upon the need to take full advantage of any mistake made by the enemy: the Latin word occasio, which we can translate as ‘opportunity’, sums up the need for the leaders of men to be ready to take advantage of any mistake made by the enemy which can lead to one side acquiring an advantage, whether physical or psychological, over the other. The reader of these texts will be impressed by the emphasis which each places upon human reaction to a given situation, and how fear can so easily take over as the guiding influence towards determining which emerges the victor from a meeting between rival armies or forces.
Intended, in its author’s view, to complement his own analysis of ways of getting the better of opponents, Frontinus’ Strategemata consists of some 581 short descriptions of military events or episodes, most only a few lines long. Set out under broad headings in four books and referred to, perhaps significantly, as ‘exempla’ in both Oxford, Lincoln College, lat. 100,3 and in Lambeth Palace, 752, or as ‘Dicta ad exempla ducum in bello’ in Vatican Library, Pal. Lat. 1571, together they illustrate points made in his earlier work, so teaching by way of historical example why successes (and, in some cases, failures) occurred. The importance of this approach lay in the author’s confidence that war was a science which could be reduced to sets of general principles to guide and help commanders as they prepared to confront the enemy, either in open battle or at a siege. It reflected a not unreasonable view that the recollection of a past event (the recalling of a stratagem involving deceit, for example) could inspire a general to emulate it in the likelihood that, successful once, it might be so again. Such an understanding of the value of studying past events and the application of the messages which they conveyed led men to study accounts of wars which would provide the answers to recurring military problems. In brief, history had much to teach the contemporary world. The vehicle for the transmission of that knowledge or experience was the written word which, in due course, assumed something akin to an authoritative influence upon the subject.4
3 ‘De exemplis rei militaris’. The work was also given titles such as De re militari, De instructione bellorum, Liber artis militaris and Rei militaris strategematicon.4 On this subject, see Vegetius, DRM, I, 8.
Without an associated text, however, the impact of the Strategemata was greatly diminished. As Frontinus had been at pains to point out, it was not in itself a work of original thought but a large collection of excerpts recalling past experience, diligently drawn up under practical headings, to bolster a work now lost. While the Strategemata offered evidence of Frontinus’ sound military sense, of his reading of certain authors, of his ability to put together a dossier, and of his appreciation of how descriptions of past events might be used to encourage those in similar situations in the future, these characteristics alone did not convey bestseller status. Its chance of becoming a useful compendium lay in forming an association with another work to replace the one lost. Only thus could this collection of pièces justificatives acquire the authority it needed to become, in any real sense, a valuable tool.
In due course, this necessary association was to occur. When, some four centuries later, Vegetius – like Frontinus a state servant but, unlike him, never a soldier – came to write his De re militari, he breathed new life into many of the aspects of the fighting of war to which Frontinus had already given prominence. Placing himself firmly in a long tradition of military writers, going back to the Greeks and including Cato the Censor, Cornelius Celsus and Frontinus, Vegetius underlined themes to which Frontinus had given prominence. These included the importance of proper preparation and planning, and the emphasis to be placed upon defeating the enemy not through the weight of numbers but by outwitting him by gaining access to his plans and being ready to use deceit. Stress was also placed upon the need to maintain the morale of the fighting man, and on the important role which the general had in maintaining it. In short, much of what Frontinus had written, which Vegetius was to pick up from him and others who had contributed to the literary expression of the Roman military tradition, was centred upon the need for a thoughtful and human approach to conflict, involving real leadership. The general who planned and anticipated was more likely to leave the battlefield the victor than he who failed in these respects.
Time was needed for such ideas to take root in a changing world, but it is likely that they influenced the emperor Maurice when he compiled his Strategikon in the sixth or early seventh century. It is probable, too, that readers in the West eventually came to regard the Strategemata as the text which should be partnered with the De re militari of Vegetius. If the Strategemata was a reflection of what Frontinus had taught in his lost work, then it is likely that the two writers and their texts had much in common in their approach to war. With the principles set out by Vegetius, men could turn to Frontinus for the evidence, drawn from the historians, reflecting human experience (which made the evidence all the more credible) in support of Vegetian teaching. Moreover, the respect given to one text descended from the ancient world was likely to be increased if its proposals were associated with and supported by another from the same era. Together they offered the distilled wisdom of the ancient world on military matters. In the eyes of many medieval readers, the works of Frontinus and Vegetius were complementary, each benefiting from its association with the other.
Of 120 or so more or less complete manuscripts of the Strategemata (the oldest and best being London, BL, Harley 2666, probably copied in eastern France about 840), one-third or so were to be linked physically to the De re militari. Evidence suggests that, by early in the second millennium, men were already associating one with the other. Gotha, Forschungsbibliothek, 101 shows how the two texts had already been brought together as early as the ninth century. Later, in both Oxford, Lincoln College, lat. 1005 and Escorial, O, iii, 9, one text followed the other without a break, while in Lambeth Palace, 752, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Auct. F. 3, 1, Vatican Library, Urb. Lat. 1221, Vat. lat. 7227, and Paris, BnF, lat. 7243, both texts were copied by the same scribe. In its own way, each manuscript suggests how the two works were seen as united in their content in the mind of the scribe and/or his patron.
5 Probably copied at Malmesbury Abbey, and corrected in the hand of William of Malmesbury.
Whether single-text or linked to the De re militari, copies of the Strategemata increased considerably in the fourteenth century and even more markedly in the fifteenth century, which witnessed the copying of some two-thirds of extant manuscripts. A consideration of origins indicates that, as in the case of the De re militari, such copies came predominantly from Italy; the evidence is particularly striking when one considers the number of manuscripts containing the works of both Vegetius and Frontinus copied in Italy at this time. Artistic and other evidence indicates that some emanated from the court of the kingdom of Naples, where interest in the military texts was encouraged during the reign of king Alfonso V in the middle years of the fifteenth century.
It would be useful to know more about those who owned copies of the Strategemata. We know of a small number of names, including those of eminent churchmen, while Federigo da Montefeltro (duke of Urbino), the condottiere Antonio (count of Marsciano), and Mathias Corvinus (king of Hungary) were among the few military personnel known to have possessed a copy.6 What seems evident is that these were largely owned by those who were not, in any real sense of the term, military men. Granted the date of the work’s flowering, it is likely that its popularity depended more upon the broader growth of interest in things Roman (and Greek) rather than in military affairs in particular. Of its very nature, the Strategemata opened up for its readers many opportunities to learn something of the nature of classical letters and history, and was popular for that reason, too.
6 Vatican Library, Urb. lat. 1221. According to Galeoto, king Mathias would refer to the works of Frontinus and Vegetius when discussing Roman military practice: ‘Tunc rex Mathias hilari vultu inquit. … Artes enim bellicae machinamentaque et tormentorum vis magna tunc claruerunt, ut in Frontino Vegetioque aliisque plurimis luce clarius inspicitur’ (Galeotus Martius Narnensis, De egregie, sapienter, iocose dicti ac factis regis Mathiae ad ducem Johannem ejus filium liber, ed. L. Juhász (Leipzig, 1934), cap. X. 9. I thank Janos Bak for this reference.
What approaches to the fighting of war did Frontinus and Vegetius share? On a fundamental principle they were in general agreement: conflicts should not be resolved by force alone but by subtlety and exercise of the mind.7 War was certainly not an activity to be rushed into or taken lightly, but should be pondered and reflected upon in advance of any meeting of armies. Just as the general must take particular care to keep his plans concealed from the enemy, so, too, he should take active steps to discover the enemy’s intentions and act accordingly.8 Spies feature in both texts, where their use was often noted by medieval readers. Frontinus commented that envoys were sometimes spies in disguise.9 The use of espionage could be justified at a further, deeper level, fundamental to an understanding of Frontinus’ text as well as to that of Vegetius. The securing of information, preferably without the enemy’s knowledge, conferred an immediate benefit upon the person acquiring that information, enabling him to look ahead and plan in advance. For instance, Frontinus noted the advantage to be gained by the general who dictated the time and place of battle; this was a prime example of the seizing of initiative of which Vegetius would later express approval.10 Again, the emphasis placed on the ambush by Frontinus was seized upon by Vegetius,11 as was the use of the surprise attack advocated by both writers to gain a physical and, not least, a moral advantage or initiative, boosting the confidence of one side while undermining that of the other.12 Taking advantage of opportunity (occasio) would be a recurring theme in Vegetius’ work13 and probably had an influence upon how parts of the Strategemata were appreciated by readers in later ages.
7 ‘Prudentia magis imperatoris timenda erit quam potencia’ (marginalia in Vatican Library, Reg. lat. 812, fol. 1.8 Strat[egemata], I, i and ii, DRM, III, 6, 8, 10, 22.9 In the Middle Ages, ambassadors were sometimes treated with great suspicion, their official functions being regarded as cover for less honourable activities. See Alban and Allmand, ‘Spies and Spying’, infra, pp. 187–210. (currently).10 Strat. II, i and ii; DRM, III, 13.11 Strat. I, vi; II, v; DRM, III, 8, 10, 22, 25.12 Strat. III, i; DRM, III, 6, 26.13 DRM, III, 6, 8, 10, 26.
The significance of morale in time of conflict formed a recurring theme in the Strategemata, one to be recognised and developed by Vegetius, who would emphasise that the successful general should neither ignore nor forget human factors in war. Since ambushes and surprise attacks created fear and anxiety among those against whom they were directed, the use of deception, strongly advocated by Frontinus and later by Vegetius, was also intended to play upon human reactions to uncertain and dangerous situations. With the specific intention of targeting morale, Frontinus advocated the use of deceit to increase the fears of a besieged garrison or population and so force surrender. Likewise, it never did for those besieged to reveal their weaknesses, such as lack of food, water, manpower or weapons, to those attacking them, for fear of the moral or practical advantage it might give away. Knowledge of this kind should be concealed to convey the impression of an abundance of what was actually in short supply.14
14 Strat. I, vii; III, xv.
Frontinus devoted considerable space to the matter of discipline, the Roman military virtue so greatly admired by men in the Middle Ages.15 This subject was to be seen in the context of the soldier as a human being, affected by battle, subject to both fear and over-confidence. In this situation, discipline should be the instrument used to counter panic, both physical and moral. It was necessary to deal firmly with disgruntled or mutinying soldiers, as they could have an adverse effect upon discipline in the ranks.16 For much the same reason, an unbridled enthusiasm for battle should be checked, particularly, as Vegetius would write, among the new recruits of little experience: ‘inexpertis enim dulcis est pugna’.17 In other circumstances, however, it would be necessary to encourage enthusiasm for battle, perhaps to counter the fears of soldiers worried by adverse omens.18 Equally, however, it had to be remembered that the opposing army, too, was made up of men who suffered from emotions fuelled by fear and the excitement of conflict. Frontinus emphasised what could be gained by creating panic among them, perhaps by means of a trap or other unexpected attack.19 He warned, too, against trying to prevent those desperately trying to save their skins in the moment of defeat from escaping. In such situations, he argued – in a message not lost on Vegetius – that as men fight to the death, having nothing to lose but their lives, they often seek to take as many of their opponents as possible with them.20 It was in the moment of victory that the battle could be lost.
15 Strat. IV, i and ii.16 Strat. I, ix; DRM, III, 4.17 DRM, III, 12.18 Strat. I, xi and xii; DRM, III, 9.19 Strat. II, iv; III, ix.20 Strat. II, vi; IV, vii; DRM, III, 21.
Both the Strategemata and the De re militari approached the problems of how best to secure victory through the eyes of the general. In both works his role was seen as crucial. Frontinus’ general was at the centre of operations, planning strategies and devising stratagems. It was he who was responsible for maintaining the necessary discipline and order required to make victory possible, he who issued orders, and he whose task it was to raise and maintain the morale of his soldiers as they prepared to do battle. Like his soldiers, the general was a man of flesh and blood, but one who understood the strengths and weaknesses of others. For this, as episodes in the Strategemata make clear, he won their respect. Above all, he was a man who thought a situation through. Citing Cicero, a reader of one Neapolitan manuscript wrote late in the fifteenth century: ‘Neque enim viribus aut velocitatibus aut celeritate corporis res magne geruntur, sed consilio et auctoritate’.21 It was the triumph of mind over body.
21 Vatican Library, Reg. lat, 812, fol. 115v.
What the Strategemata and the De re militari shared went beyond the points just mentioned. Significant issues raised by Frontinus in Book I of the Strategemata are to be found, clearly reflected, in Vegetius’ work. Considering the situation leading up to battle, both writers stressed the importance of foreknowledge and foresight. The need to be ready and sufficiently adaptable, through training, to take advantage of situations as they developed was a message common to both texts, as was the spirit of enterprise which, encouraged by the general’s eloquence, created enthusiasm for battle. In Book II the emphasis placed upon controlling the conditions of battle to suit oneself (in effect fighting on one’s own terms) and upon the use of surprise to create panic or unease among the enemy (underlining yet again the great importance of morale in war), was also given prominence by Vegetius, as was advice on the delicate matter of how to carry out a successful retreat.22 When dealing with sieges in Book III, Frontinus had emphasised the need to compel a besieged garrison to surrender without recourse to a destructive attack, a message taken up later by Vegetius. Victory won with the minimum cost of life or effort was a victory deservedly won.
22 DRM, III, 22.
What can be learned from the manuscripts and, in particular, from their marginalia, about the thoughts and responses of readers regarding the content of the Strategemata? Neither a handbook on war nor a work of discussion on the subject, but a collection of useful but non-essential material drawn up to support the arguments presented in a text now lost, and so impossible to examine or appreciate, the Strategemata was a difficult work to which to react. Thus, while Vegetius’ De re militari was a text to whose ideas many readers could and did respond, as they might in conversation, with marginal comments, it was less easy to react in the same way to a brief episode, brought together with others, in support or illustration of a view or judgement which could no longer be critically examined. The evidence of Vatican Library, Borg. lat. 411 makes the point well: the part of the manuscript containing Frontinus has few comments, while that including Vegetius is generously endowed with them.
Few pre-thirteenth-century manuscripts bear evidence upon which we can rely, but from those copied from that time onwards we may gain an impression (no more than that) of which parts of the Strategemata created the most interest among readers willing to write on the folios of their manuscripts. From such evidence it is clear that deception, broadly understood and interpreted, was regarded as an important instrument of war. The need to conceal plans which lay behind the story regarding Metellus Pius – who, when asked what he was planning for the coming day, replied that if his tunic could tell, he would burn it23 – was clearly understood by a number of readers, as was the need to obtain information of the enemy’s intentions, thereby enabling the general to act with foreknowledge and flexibility, and to avoid the dangers of a trap.24 Equally, it was necessary to take active steps to conceal an army’s weaknesses from both the enemy (in particular) and from one’s own side, so that no advantage, practical or moral, might accrue to the enemy.25 All this constitutes evidence of medieval readers’ willingness to appreciate the value of the ruse in the achievement of a military end.
23 Strat. I, ii, 1.24 Strat. I, i and ii.25 Strat. I, vii; III, xv.
Readers of Book II, concerned with the battle itself, were principally interested in three chapters. Episodes marked in chapter 1 reflect keen appreciation of the benefit to be gained from being able to decide the moment at which a battle should begin, perhaps by catching the enemy unprepared or unawares, this being part of the process of seizing the initiative and using it to advantage. Likewise, the same effect – and more – might be achieved through the use of the ambush, encouraged in a lengthy chapter which created considerable interest among many readers, not least because of the role to be played by concealment, already noted in Book I, which it emphasised.26 The need to maintain good morale through firm action by the general was also noted.27 The text underlined that determination could be regarded as a quality to be demonstrated in plenty by those engaged in battle.
26 Strat. II, v.27 Strat. II, viii.
If manuscripts of the Strategemata have their own tale to tell about the perceived importance of certain chapters or episodes, so, too, do collections of excerpts, a genre popular in the Middle Ages. Among the early creators of this form was Sedulius Scotus, whose ninth-century century Collectaneum miscellaneum, later copied, included excerpts from the works of both Frontinus and Vegetius.28 While other collections are known only in single copies, others still are found, widely dispersed geographically, in multitude copies, which reflect interest in their contents.29 In no case are we told, nor is it possible to guess, what inspired the selection of particular episodes. Was the choice made by a military person or someone with at least some knowledge of or interest in military affairs or developments? Or was he not qualified to read the significance (for his own day) of what Frontinus had proposed centuries earlier, making his choice according to other factors, perhaps literary or historical? Yet, however the choices were made, the fact remains that the evidence of the marginalia broadly agrees with that of the collections of excerpts regarding the relative significance of different sections of the Strategemata. This suggests that the basic recommendations made by Frontinus had been accepted by the majority of readers, whether military or not, centuries after his time.
28 Kues, St. Nikolaus-Hospital, Ms. 52. See Sedulii Scotti, Collectaneum miscellaneum, ed. D. Simpson, Corpus Christianorum, continuatio medievalis 67 (Turnhout, 1988), p. 390.29 See, e.g., Vatican Library, Pal. lat. 1571; Erfurt, Stadt-und Regionalbibliothek, 4o 393; Foligno, Bibl. L. Jacobilli, 468 (C.VI.13). See also E. Pellegrin, Les manuscrits classiques latins de la Bibliothèque Vaticane (Paris, 1975–), III, 229.
How far was the text seen as having relevance beyond its own time, as many readers considered Vegetius’ work to have?30 The appropriateness of the Strategemata to later days was underlined by one manuscript in which a reader commented that in the year 1476 king Ferdinand had acted in Spain just as Marcus Porcius Cato, ‘the Censor’, had done earlier in heading off a revolt.31 It is evident, too, that some readers saw, in this text, a way of entering into the life of the past. The history of Rome, as the presence of Eutropius’ work, bound with that of Frontinus, strongly suggests, was a subject of abiding interest.32 Many of the marginalia indicate the recognition by readers of the names of famous historical figures (Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar and others), or of the authors of the episodes collected by Frontinus.33 Other readers were interested in unfamiliar words and terms of the language of the past, occasionally illustrated with a small drawing in the margin.34 While primarily intended as a means of informing readers about past military affairs, the wider human experience reflected in the Strategemata could not be ignored. We should not be surprised, therefore, to find among the owners of manuscripts members of the clergy and, in particular, of the mendicant orders, who will have liked to possess a source of episodes emphasising such moral virtues as courage, honesty and perseverance, which could be turned to good purpose in their sermons.35
30 ‘Attualizzazione’ may be the best word to describe it.31 Vatican Library, Chigi, H VII 246, fol. 3.32 The combination of the Strategemata and the Breviarum of the fourth-century writer, Eutropius, in Gotha, Forschungsbibliothek, 1, 101, as found again in Oxford, Lincoln College, lat. 100 (along with Vegetius, all three in the same hand; in Paris, BnF. lat. 7240, probably copied in the late eleventh or early twelfth century, and in London, BL, Harley 2729. Paris, BnF, lat. 5802 contains the text of Frontinus, with works by Suetonius, Florus, Eutropius, and Caesar, all historians.33 See Cambridge, Trinity College, O. 3. 28.34 See, e.g., Oxford, Bodleian Library, Auct. F. 3. 1; Valladolid, Univ., 384; Vatican Library, Chigi H VII 246 fol. 39 (for the drawing).35 The Strategemata could be found in the libraries of the Austin Friars in York, and of the Carmelites and Dominicans in London in the late Middle Ages. An indication of how this text was regarded is seen in the fact that the Austin Friars classified it under ‘Philosophia’ (The Friars’ Libraries, ed. K. W. Humphreys (London, 1990), pp. 72, 186, 203). Its resemblance to the ‘Summa’ form cannot be ignored. Two manuscripts, Paris, BnF, lat. 7389, and Prague, National Library, 1643 (VIII. H. 25) have tables, presumably to facilitate rapid reference and use.
One of those who read Frontinus and left traces of his thoughts and reactions to posterity was Francesco Petrarch, who owned a composite text, which included the works of both Frontinus and Vegetius.36 It becomes evident that his interest in reading Frontinus was mainly to identify those, notably Livy and Pliny, from whose works, which he duly recognised, the episodes in the Strategemata had been selected. That, rather than the moral or military lesson to be learnt, appears to have been Petrarch’s chief interest in the text. It was in the episode taken from Valerius Maximus that he noted the story about Metellus Pius cited above. His comments upon particular practices advocated by Frontinus were few. Nevertheless, he appreciated the sagacitas of Scipio in using spies to discover the size of an enemy fortification before attacking it, and he noted the wisdom of Caesar’s policy, when leading an army of veterans, always to oppose in battle an enemy whose army was known to consist only of raw recruits. To these episodes, however, Petrarch had little to add. He had learned much more from his reading of Vegetius’s De re militari.37
36 Vatican Library, Vat. lat. 2193.37 See C. Tristano, ‘Le postille del Petrarca nel Vaticano lat. 2193 (Apuleio, Frontino, Vegezio, Palladio)’, Italia Medioevale e Umanistica, 17 (1974), 365–468, especially 441–444.
It has been suggested that when Oxford, Lincoln College, lat. 100 was copied at Malmesbury under the direction of the great chronicler, William, the exemplar may have been obtained from Canterbury.38 We know that John of Salisbury, who once lived and worked at Canterbury, made use of the works of both Frontinus and Vegetius in writing his political treatise, the Policraticus, completed in 1159. When, in Book VI, Salisbury discussed the contribution of legitimate, organised force to the well-being of society, he referred many times to the De re militari in support of his argument. In his view force, controlled by the ruler, was a means to an important end, and those who exercised it properly for the common good were worthy of praise and respect.
38 J. Martin, ‘John of Salisbury’s Manuscripts of Frontinus and Gellius’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 40 (1977), 4–5, 17.
However, having cited Vegetius on more than sixty occasions, Salisbury also quoted examples from the Strategemata,39 referring to Frontinus by name on several of them. What, we may ask, did he find in the text to support his argument? A glance at the episodes cited shows that almost all were taken from Book IV of the Strategemata, being regarded by Frontinus as ‘illustrations of military science in general rather than of stratagems’, even, indeed, as ‘supplementary material’.40 It was these which Salisbury distributed, unevenly, into nine separate chapters of the Policraticus, the majority of them in Book VI.
39 Ibid, p. 21, table 1.40 Strat. IV, proem.
It is significant that, in keeping with the character of the work he was writing, Salisbury was less intent upon illustrating stratagems than upon underlining some of military science’s general principles. From ‘De disciplina’ he emphasised the importance of order and control within the army, while those listed under ‘De effectu disciplinae’ confirmed the importance of discipline in time of war. Important, too, and clearly linked to discipline, were the episodes selected from the section ‘De continentia’, concerned with the restraint and moderation which should be a mark of those serving in the army. Both episodes included by Frontinus in the short section ‘De justitia’ were included by Salisbury, as were a number of those brought together under ‘De constantia’, on determination to achieve victory, even against the odds. The chapter ‘De affectu et moderatione’ yielded a story regarding Alexander the Great’s humane attitude towards and clear regard for his soldiers, while Salisbury’s choice of episodes from Frontinus’ concluding chapter, ‘De variis consiliis’ again shows the importance he attached to attitudes of moderation in military affairs.41
41 The titles in this paragraph are those of the chapter headings (I–VII) of Book IV of the Strategemata.
Even a cursory glance at this list of themes compels the reader to recognise how much it had in common with the principles of waging war (the res militaris) established by Vegetius. It is significant that Salisbury praised Vegetius for treating the art of military affairs ‘elegantly and diligently’, adding ‘although he only briefly touches on examples’.42 It was in recognition of that fact that Salisbury, while using the De re militari to provide him with fundamental principles regarding the use of military power as a force for stability in society, felt compelled to draw upon the Strategemata to illustrate those principles. We have here clear literary evidence, taken from the time of the twelfth-century revival of interest in classical culture, of the link between the texts of Frontinus and Vegetius as seen by a major thinker and writer of the period, who appreciated what each text had to offer him. A curious reversal of roles thus occurred: Frontinus, to whose work Vegetius had once expressed his indebtedness, was being accorded second position in a new duo of military texts.
42 Policraticus, VI, 19. I have used the translation of C. J. Nederman (Cambridge, 1990), p. 124.
Yet the rising status of the Strategemata may be judged by the number of works, political as well as more strictly military, in which it appeared as a companion to others. In the second quarter of the fourteenth century, for instance, a unique composite volume, probably North Italian and intended to promote the crusade, was created from the texts of Frontinus and Vegetius, to which were added the Terrae Sanctae recuperatio of the Franciscan, Fidenzio da Padova, and an allegorical text on the war of the spirit, De re bellica spirituali, of Bartolomeo da Urbino.43 This format, consisting of a number of works pivoting around a central theme (war) was becoming normal, even fashionable.
43 Paris, BnF, lat. 7242.
It is evident that, by the second half of the fifteenth century, the format had become increasingly popular. Paris, Mazarine, 3732, is an example of it. It consists of two pairs of works, one the Strategemata and the De re militari, copied by the same hand probably in the early fifteenth century, the other, including a translation of Aelian’s De instruendis aciebus, made from the Greek by Theodore Gaza at the behest of Alfonso of Naples in the middle years of the century, and the short De re militari of ‘Modestus’, both the work of another scribe.44 The evidence of this collection, assembled to meet the growing fashion, strongly suggests that the future of the Strategemata would develop as one classical authority among others brought together and housed under a single cover. The same thinking probably lay behind the creation, in 1435, of a collection of seven works, some (all with the word ‘Bellum’ in their titles) either by or involving Julius Caesar (whose popularity as a writer of history had been on the rise since the early thirteenth century), the others being the texts of Frontinus and Vegetius, once again clearly copied as a pair.45 The process would reach its logical conclusion with the bringing together of the texts of Vegetius, Frontinus, ‘Modestus’, and Aelian in an edition printed by Eucharius Silber in Rome in 1487 and reprinted a number of times in the next few years. The first steps towards making available the collected works of the ‘Veteres scriptores de re militari’ in the age of printing had been taken.
44 Wroclaw, Bibl. Uniwersytecka, R. 10, is an Italian manuscript, consisting of the works of Aelian, Vegetius and Frontinus.45 Paris, BnF, lat. 6106.
It may have been one of these editions which came into the hands of Machiavelli and influenced the way he approached both military and, ultimately, political decision-making. Frontinus had not only presented examples from the past; he had done so in such a way as to emphasise ‘different circumstances under which opposite courses of action [might be] employed’. His aim was to set the general thinking by offering not a single solution to a problem but rather a number of possibilities, leaving it to him to make the choice according to circumstances which could never be fully predicted. From this stemmed the need for the general to be well informed, and for the emphasis placed upon espionage to be translated into reality. Reliable knowledge lay behind all decisions resulting in successful conclusions. Nor was that knowledge to be curtailed by moral factors. The likelihood, or not, of it leading to victory was the only principle by which it should be judged.46
46 N. Wood, ‘Frontinus as a Possible Source for Machiavelli’s Method’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 28 (1967), 243–248.
The contribution of the Strategemata to medieval, particularly late medieval, thinking about war may also be judged by consideration of a further factor: translation. There survive to this day manuscripts of vernacular versions in five languages, three (Castilian, Catalan and Aragonese) from Spain and one each from France and Italy.47 Why, one may ask, translate the Strategemata? To this question a number of answers may be suggested. By the time that Pedro IV, ‘the Ceremonious’, of Aragon commissioned the Catalan translation from Jaume Domenec early in 1369 (1370) the De re militari of Vegetius had already been translated into French, Italian and Catalan. In the light of the close association of these two works, where Vegetius led, was it not reasonable that Frontinus should follow? Moreover, the royal patron was regularly involved in war, so that a text, in particular a classical text, on the subject would not go amiss, particularly in the light of a secular readership now becoming both broader and numerically more significant. There was, it has been argued, a desire to make more readily available texts concerned with both technical matters and war. Since it described la ciencia de la cavalleria, the Strategemata supplied both, in particular the second, of these needs. As the marginalia of the Latin texts indicate, the secular readership favoured works of historical and moral character; even short excerpts of that genre satisfied a need. Such ‘exemplary’ literature, already popular among the clergy, was gaining followers among secular readers, too.48
47 Madrid, BN, 9253, 9608 and 10204 (Castilian); 6293 (Catalan); 10198 (Aragonese); Paris, BnF, fr.1233–35, 24257; Geneva, Bibl. Publique et Universitaire, fr. 171; Den Haag, Konink. Bibl., 73 J 22; Turin, Arch. di Stato, Jb VI 21 (French): see also references in notes 49, 50 and 55 below; Rome, Accademia dei Lincei e Corsiniana, 43 E 41 (Ross.188) (Italian).48 L. Badia, ‘Fronti i Vegeci, Mestres de Cavalleria en Català als Segles XIV i XV’, Boletin de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona, 39 (1983–84), 191–215.
Some years later, probably about 1425, the work was translated into French by Jean de Rouvroy, for the benefit the young king, Charles VII. The fact that royalty, and warring royalty, in two kingdoms inspired the translations suggests that Frontinus was thought to have written things useful enough for his text to be made available to those responsible for organising the armies of the aspiring monarchies.49 Nor should we fail to notice the significance of the presence of ‘aucuns notables extraitz du livre de Vegece qu’il fist pour l’enseignement des princes et des gentilz homes en la science des armes et de chevalerie’ which follow, written by the same hand and in the same format, in at least one manuscript. Significantly, even in translation, the link with Vegetius was not lost.50
49 Jean Gerson recommended that the dauphin’s reading should include the works of Frontinus, Vegetius and, significantly, Valerius Maximus (Jean Gerson, Oeuvres complètes. II. L’Oeuvre épistolaire (Paris, 1960), p. 213).50 London, BL, Add. MS. 12028, fols. 173–185v. There are some eighty-seven excerpts in this collection. See also Add. MS. 18179.
The French translation, surviving today in more than a dozen manuscripts, is particularly interesting. Introduced in the translator’s preface as the ‘livre des cautelles et subtilitez servans au fait des armes et de chevallerie’, the text was placed in the context envisaged for it, that of presenting beaux faitz for emulation. While thus appearing to give it greater moral than practical value, the translator emphasised the text’s ability to teach what was useful (bien convenable) for those, princes et grans seigneurs, responsible for leading men to war. In a passage strongly reminiscent of Vegetius’ De re militari in which he underlined the essence of the work, Rouvroy emphasised that planning was more effective than numbers, and that small forces often overcame larger ones. Finding it hard to translate some passages de mot à mot, he announced his intention of adopting the practice of an early translator, St Jerome, who, when in difficulty, had preferred to give the reader simply the sense of the original.51 Furthermore, he added examples to those provided by Frontinus. In so doing, by intruding himself into the text, Rouvroy was doing more than might be strictly expected of him as a translator, by underlining how far the episodes chosen by Frontinus, augmented by his own, could be useful to those exercising command in his own day (perhaps in the war being waged against the English?). For him, at least, the Strategemata was a work with contemporary relevance.
51 Several manuscripts of the French translation (e.g., London, BL, Add. MS. 12028 and Paris, Arsenal, 2693) include a glossary explaining unfamiliar or technical terms.
A consideration of the illustrative material found in manuscripts of the work enable us to appreciate more fully how it was regarded and understood, particularly in the last two centuries of the Middle Ages, the period when manuscripts were sometimes enhanced with the addition of illustrative matter. What were the intentions of patrons or artists in adding this to the text? It has been pointed out that the illustrations were, generally speaking, ‘non-technical’ in nature;52 they do not add that kind of dimension to the written word, although cannon and town walls with gun ports are depicted. What, then, could illustration do to the text? It might embellish it visually, making it more attractive to the eye. More importantly, however, it could emphasise the significance of part of the text, either by developing or by summarising particular points visually. Illumination, therefore, was a way of enhancing the text and, perhaps, part of its message, by drawing the attention of the reader to something which the patron or the artist felt to be in need of particular emphasis. The subject had to be dealt with delicately. Was a scene from Greek or Roman history (the Strategemata abounded in these) to be depicted as part of the ‘past’ or of the ‘present’? This meant asking how soldiers should be presented? What should they be wearing? What arms should they be carrying? What sort of fortifications could be depicted? By and large, scenes were shown in the ‘modern’ idiom. Although Frontinus’ text was essentially Roman, it could not be regarded simply as an historic one; it had to have meaning and relevance to the ‘modern’ reader.
52 P. Porter, ‘The Ways of War in Medieval Manuscript Illumination: Tracing and Assessing the Evidence’, Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France, ed. M. Strickland (Stamford, 1998), p. 104.
Such a process, ‘making the past present’ by creating ‘visual translation’,53 emphasised both the continuity and the relevance of a variety of military practices described by Frontinus. It also helped to underline the perceived importance of parts of his message by amplifying them through illustration, hence enhancing their authority. Nine leaves of a text of the Strategemata, written and illuminated in Italy in the late fourteenth century, show how this could be done. All that survives54 of a once sizeable manuscript includes large coloured drawings below the text on every folio. Vigorous in style, these relate to certain episodes in the Strategemata (II, iii, iv and v). They are to be considered with care, since they are not simply descriptions of scenes but often reflect the moral of the episode which they illustrate, such as creating panic among the enemy or setting up ambushes to discomfort him.55 In the last, it was the purpose of the illustration to convey the results of various forms of deceit, of which the dramatic outcome of the ambush was one. It is only by putting the text and the picture together that the reader can properly appreciate how closely the two are related, and how they were intended to enhance each other.
53 I have appropriated the terms from A. D. Hedeman, ‘Making the Past Present. Visual Translation in Jean Lebegue’s Twin Manuscripts of Sallust’, Patrons, Artists and Workshops. Books and Book Production in Paris circa 1400, ed. G. Croenen and P. Ainsworth (Louvain, 2006), pp. 173–196.54 London, BL, Add. MS. 44985. See E. G. Millar, ‘Leaves from an Illuminated Manuscript of Frontinus’, The British Museum Quarterly, 12 (1937–38), 8–9, and plate 9; Armies, Chivalry and Warfare, ed. Strickland, plate 25.55 Strat. II, iv and v.
Other manuscripts convey other messages. One such,56 with fifty or more illuminations, places considerable emphasis on deception, ruses and ambushes. The copy of the French translation, probably the one presented to Charles VII, shows, among others, a full folio scene of an emperor riding a white horse (a symbol of sovereignty) to meet a delegation coming towards him from besieged fortifications. Is the story depicted as simple as it looks? Do the illuminations carry an additional, contemporary message? Is this not the successful king, Charles VII, leader of a newly united society (represented by SPQR on banners), engaged in the process of unification of the country under his legitimate rule, here seen accepting the return of wayward populations who had hitherto acknowledged the de facto reality of English rule? Are we not intended to witness the role envisaged for the army, led by the king (as foreseen by Vegetius) in the fulfilment of the process of uniting French society after years of division? In this case the main message, conveyed in the illustrative material, is surely a political one. Following on Vegetius’ coat-tails, Frontinus’ ideas were coming to be seen as having other than simply military implications.
56 Brussels, Bibl. Royale Albert Ier, 10475. See F. Lyna, Les principaux manuscrits à peintures de la Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique (Brussels, 1989), pp. 417–418.
Finally, a scene in another manuscript57 shows a knight in armour sitting on a bench, reading a book. ‘Incongruous’, one is tempted to say! But the reader soon recognises that it represents a general learning from a text such as the Strategemata. Here he is seen, immersing himself in a work of the Greco-Roman tradition which conveys the benefits of military experience through the written word. Frontinus and, after him, Vegetius, both emphasised the importance of that tradition. By the end of the Middle Ages, collections such as those of the ‘Veteres scriptores de re militari’ had demonstrated that it was alive and well.
57 Paris, BnF, fr. 1234, fo. 3v.
From its conception, the Strategemata was a secondary but very far from second-rate text. We know why its creator brought it into being: to support what we may only suppose he had written in his main work, sadly lost. In it Frontinus appears as a man who was not prepared to dictate to generals. His work appealed because, while working within a certain framework, he offered not one but sometimes several practical courses of action for consideration by the general, either as he sat quietly on his bench reading, or as he faced the enemy in front of him.
Essentially a collection of episodes with a right to stand on its own, the Strategemata was a work which had much to teach regarding the experiences of military leaders and their armies at war, however distant the past described in the episodes so might be. None the less, it required association with another, more theoretical, work to allow its particular characteristics to become fully apparent. Both as a statement of certain principles to be observed in time of conflict, and as a guide to the general facing particular situations which might occur at any time or place, it possessed positive value particularly if read alongside the De re militari of Vegetius, the work which, in a real sense, it came to complement. In this respect, the number of manuscripts containing the works of both Frontinus and Vegetius, many copied (as we have noticed) by a single scribe as if to underline their mutual dependence, is telling evidence of the interest in, and the perceived value of, these linked texts. The logical development was the printing of ever larger collections, embracing yet other authors, which occurred in the last years of the fifteenth century.58 The influence of Frontinus and others making up the body of ‘veteres scriptores de re militari’, was very much alive, and would continue to be felt for years to come.
58 The Strategicus of Onasander, written half a century before the Strategemata, and translated into Latin by Nicolaus Sagundinus, was added to the next edition of Silber’s collection of ‘veteres scriptores’, printed in Rome in 1494.