THE GHOST FRONT DECEMBER 1044

GLOSSARY

AA	Anti Aircraft.
AAA AW BN (SP)	Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion. (Self-Propelled)
AB DIV	Airborne Division. (12,979 men) Made up of three Parachute Infantry Regiments and one GliderInfantry Regiment.
AFAB	Armored Field Artillery Battalion. Made up of 18 M7 self propelled 105mm Howitzers
AIB	Armored Infantry Battalion. (Fully mechanised infantry carried in half-tracks)
AT	Anti-tank.
BN	Battalion. Approx 871 men
BAZOOKA	American hand held anti-tank Rocket.
CCA
CCB
CCR
CP	Command Post
CO	Company. Approx 193 men
DIV	Division. Approx 14,253 with 2,012 vehicles.
ENG	Combat Engineer Battalion (Approx 647 men)
FAB	Field Artillery Battalion (Approx 500 men split into 3 batteries.
GI	Government Issue. Anything Issued to the American Soldier, Including himself.
GIR	Glider Infantry Regiment Approx 2,980 men
GMC	General Motors Corporation 6×6 utility truck and was the workhorse of the US Army.
G3	Corps and Divisional Operations Officer.
HALF-TRACK	An armored personnel carrier. M2/M3 were the basic carriers. The M16 was based on the M3 and mounted four .50 machine guns.
INF	Infantry.
KAMPFGRUPPE	German Combat Group of variable sizes.
LUFTWAFFE	German Airforce.
PANZER	German for Armour. Eg tank. Panzergrenadiers = Armoured Infantry.
PANZER MKIV	Panzer Mark IV tank. Standard German tank with 75mm gun.
PANZERFAUST	German hand held Anti tank weapon.
PIR	Parachute Infantry Regiment (Approx 2,370 men)
POW	Prisoner of War
REGT	Regiment
SHERMAN	Standard medium American Tank. Used by every Allied Nation. Crew of five, with a max Speed of 24 – 29 mph. There were many different variants, but most were armed with either a 75mm or 76mm gun.
STUART
	American light tank. Crew of four. Max speed 36 mph. Armed with a 37mm gun and 2 .30 cal machine guns.
S2	Intelligence Officer of Regiment or lower
S3	Operations Officer of Regiment or lower.
TD	Tank Destroyer. (Either the self-Propelled type, as in the M10 mounting a 3 inch gun, or the M18 armed with a 76mm gun. Also there was a towed type, a 3 inch field gun, drawn by a vehicle.
TF	Task Force
TIGER	German tank. Mounting a 88mm gun. Weighing 56 tons it was an awesome predator.
T/SGT	Technical Sergeant. A rank in the US Army. ‘T’denotes a qualified skill e.g radio operator, etc.
USAAF	United States Army Air Force.
VGD	Volksgrenadier Division. Came into being late in the war. Made up of fillers from the Navy /Air-Force and mixed with regular Army. (Even so, some proved to be effective fighting units).
NEBELWERFER	German multi-barrelled mortar.
88	German 88mm gun. Much feared by the Allies. It was mounted on Tiger Tanks, or as a field piece In either the ground or anti-Aircraft role.

CHAPTER ONE

HITLER’S PLAN

In the Wolfsschanze (Wolf’s Lair), Hitlers headquarters at Rastenburg, situated in a forest in East Prussia, the daily conference was filled with an air of doom and gloom. That Saturday, 16 September 1944, it was reported that the Allies had gained a toe hold on German soil. The once all-victorious German fighting machine had been pushed back to its homeland. On the Eastern Front the Russian summer offensive had reached the borders of East Prussia. The losses in manpower and materials had been colossal.

The conference had adjourned when Hitler called his four highest military advisers into another room. First in, was Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Supreme Commander of all German Armies, closely followed by, General Alfred Jodl, chief of the German Operations Staff, Heinz Guderian, the famous tank commander now Commander of the Eastern Front, and General Kreipe, representing an absent Air Marshal Goring, head of the Luftwaffe (German airforce).

The German plan.

Alfred Jodl went on to tell Hitler about the steadily mounting Allied divisions that were now knocking on Germany’s door. Obviously none of these subjects pleased the Führer. Suddenly, Hitler interrupted Jodl, pointed to the laid out map before him and said ‘I have just made a momentous decision. I shall go over to the counter-attack, here out of the Ardennes, with the objective – Antwerp.’

The room was shocked into silence. Had the bomb attack back in July finally taken its toll? Hitler had been left both emotionally and physically injured after the assassination attempt on his life. A bomb had been planted in a room during one of his meetings, but he had escaped serious injury.

Hitler’s enthusiasm reminded his staff of the heady Blitzkrieg days of 1940. He went on to rightly surmise that the Allied supply lines were stretched to the limit, and that the steam had finally run out of the lightning pursuit to the German border. His plan was simple, he would attack out of the Ardennes, known to his intelligence services as a soft spot, and drive for the recently captured port of Antwerp, thus forming a wedge, between the forces of the United States and the British and Canadian armies fighting in the north, thus splitting the Allies in half. He knew that the two sides opposing him were prone to disagreement and that the alliance was considered to be shaky. Driving a wedge might well cause the Anglo/American team to fall out. Then Hitler could sue for peace under his own terms and turn his full attention to what he considered to be the greater threat – the Russians.

Hitler’s plan was to strike at a vulnerable section of the Allied Front. American GIs of the 28th DIV queue at the rest centre in Clervaux unaware of the pending onslaught.

To the men present, this was the old Hitler again, full of energy and new ideas. The attack was provisionally set for 1 November 1944. The officers present were then sworn to secrecy with threats to their own, and their family’s lives.

On 25 September, Jodl was ordered by Hitler to start making the necessary plans for the new counter-attack. Field Marshall Keitel was given the task of organizing the fuel and ammunition that would be needed, and to report when it could be expected to be ready. General Rudolf Gercke, Chief of Transportation, was brought into the plan. Hitler ordered the formation of a new army especially for the attack; it was to be named the Sixth Panzer Army. He entrusted his great friend, General Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich to be its commander. All its armoured divisions were to be made up of Waffen SS.

Generaloberst Alfred Jodl.

Even though the Allied airforce was bombing the industrial heart of Germany round the clock, actual wartime production was reaching an all time high. Manpower for the coming offensive was to be a problem, but was soon overcome when the enlisting age was changed to between sixteen and sixty. Originally it had been eighteen and fifty. Both civilian and military offices were combed of non-important administrative personnel, and finally redundant sailors and airmen who had neither ships nor aircraft were thrown into the army to form the new divisions so badly needed. Hitler called them Volksgrenadiers (People’s Infantry).

Badge of the 77th Regiment, 26th Volksgrenadiers, with Köln Cathedral as emblem.

These new divisions would be smaller than the usual complement for Wehrmacht divisions, but to make up for this, more men would be armed with automatic weapons and Panzerfausts, (hand held, rocket firing antitank weapon). The Panther and Tiger tanks that were rolling off the assembly lines were given straight to the new Panzer Brigades being formed.

The Allies had air superiority, which worried the generals, but Hitler’s answer was that the offensive would take place in either November or December when the usual bad weather would ground the dreaded Allied fighter-bombers.

The coming attack would be led by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, who had been out of favour with the Führer due to the failure of the German forces in repelling the Allied invasion. However, Hitler realized Rundstedt would be good for the job and would perhaps revive the flagging German Army.

Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt.

By early October General Gercke was well ahead of his schedule; Rhine bridges were reinforced to carry the new seventy-ton King Tiger; ferries were adapted to carry locomotives and tanks; rail tracks were laid across some road bridges; makeshift bridging spans were constructed and hidden along the eastern banks in case the permanent bridges were bombed.

New Tiger IIs (Königstiger) being reviewed prior to the German offensive in the West.

On 11 October Jodl went back to Hitler and submitted his plan which he code-named CHRISTROSE. Three armies totalling twelve panzer and eighteen infantry divisions would advance on a broad front, crossing the River Meuse by the second day and reaching Antwerp after one week. Hitler sent him away to do some fine tuning.

The following day Keitel released a message to all commanders on the Western Front, knowing full well that it would be intercepted by the Allies, to the effect that no counteroffensive was possible and that all forces must be deployed for imminent defence of the Fatherland. This, it was hoped by the German High Command, would explain to Allied Intelligence why there was a build up of forces and a flurry of activity behind the German line.

Jodl returned to Hitler with the revised plan on 21 October and Hitler was delighted, giving it his seal of approval. He renamed the planned operation WACHT AM RHEIN (Watch on the Rhine). A code name that would suggest a defensive plan.

That same day Hitler summoned to the Wolfsschanze, SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny, a giant of a man with blond hair, who like Hitler was Austrian. In 1943 Skorzeny had rescued the Italian Dictator, Mussolini, from the Allies. More recently he had led a raid on the seat of the Hungarian Government in Budapest kidnapping the Hungarian leader’s son to stop that nation’s defection from the Axis forces.

Hitler listened intently to Skorzeny’s accounts, and then went on to tell him the details of WACHT AM RHEIN. Skorzeny was to form a special brigade of German troops that could converse in English and would be wearing and using captured American equipment. The brigade was to go ahead of the attacking armies, and capture key bridges over the Meuse River. The brigade, operating in small units, would ultimately create havoc behind the American lines. Hitler added ‘I know you will do your best’ and promoted him then and there to Obersturmbannführer (Lieutenant Colonel).

SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny.

Hardly had Skorzeny set about forming the special unit titled, ‘Panzer Brigade 150’ when he came across a circular which compromised the secret operation. Keitel had signed, and by so doing, authorized the document which asked for volunteers, who could speak English, for a special mission and that successful applicants would join a new unit under the command of Skorzeny. Further, that all captured American equipment was to be handed in. He was furious and quite rightly surmised that this order was bound to fall into the hands of the Allies. But in case Hitler himself found out about this breech of secrecy, Skorzeny was ordered to go on with his part of the plan.

Jodl, Hitler and Keitel the three men who devised and planned Operation WACHT AM RHEIN.

On 22 October, Hitler finally decided to tell Rundstedt and also Field Marshal Walter Model, Commander of Army Group B, whose actual troops would carry the offensive.

Their Chief of Staffs were called to the Wolfsschanze. Representing Rundstedt’s was Lieutenant General Siegfried Westphal, and attending for Model was Lieutenant General Hans Krebs. Both men were flabbergasted when the outlines of the plan was presented to them. Hitler went on to promise them 1,500 planes, which would be on hand for the attack. Keitel explained that sufficient ammunition and gasoline would be made available. Westphal and Krebs rushed back to their respective headquarters to inform their Field Marshals of the plan.

Rundstedt called it ‘A stroke of genius’ but thought it a little ambitious with what was on hand. Model, as blunt as ever, reacted by saying ‘This plan hasn’t got a damned leg to stand on.’ Both began work on a version of their own, ones that were on a smaller scale, with the idea of destroying the American divisions around the Aachen area. The plans were submitted to Hitler who immediately threw them out; his original idea was to stand. In the meantime the offensive was postponed, even the ambitious Hitler realized, he had not given himself enough time to gather his forces together.

Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model.

Huge deception plans were initiated, forces were built up in front of the Aachen area to suggest a huge defensive operation to try and prevent the Americans crossing the Rhine from there. In the meantime, where massive forces were assembling in the Ardennes, the front went silent. Trains were used at night to bring up the mass of troops, vehicles and supplies needed. All these were hidden in the dense forests just east of the front lines. Supply problems prompted Hitler to cancel the operation several more times, although he was not unduly worried as even worse weather was predicted for mid December. Finally, 16 December was to be the day, Zero Hour was fixed for 0530.

Obergruppenführer Josef ‘Sep’ Dietrich.

Generalleutnant Hasso von Manteuffel.

Final plans were worked out, the main attack, would be carried by Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army. This would break through the northern sector of the Ardennes, head northwest, cross the Meuse River and drive all out for Antwerp. Immediately south of the Sixth, Lieutenant General Hasso von Manteuffel with his Fifth Panzer Army was to surround the Schnee Eifel, a prominent height salient occupied by the US 106th Infantry Division and capture the town of St Vith. Also in his assigned area he was to capture the other important town of Bastogne. After which the Fifth would head for Brussels and then Antwerp protecting Dietrich’s left flank. Meanwhile Lieutenant General Erich Brandenberger’s Seventh Army was to protect the flank of the other two from possible American interventions from the south.

Generalleutnant Erich Brandenberger.

This particular area of the Ardennes had been carefully selected, because, it was known to be thinly defended. The American troops there were either new to combat or were sent to this ‘quiet area’ to rest and train replacements after a mauling elsewhere. The heavily wooded terrain made it ideal to conceal large amounts of men and their equipment, and along with this, the Germans knew just about every position and bunker, for they themselves had been in exactly the same positions three months before.

Generaloberst Walter Krüger.

Manteuffel set to work organizing his Fifth Panzer Army. He understood armoured warfare very well, he had been an officer in the pre-war panzer troops. His bravery and leadership in Russia and North Africa had seen him climb the ladder of military success from divisional commander straight to an army command.

His plan was for Generaloberst Walter Krüger’s LVIII Panzer Corps to cross the Our River either side of Ouren, attack towards Houffalize and form a bridgehead over the Meuse River in the vicinity of Namur.

To General der Panzertruppen Heinrich Freiherr von Lüttwitz and his XLVII Corps he gave orders that he was to cross the Our at Dasburg and Gemund, head west through Clervaux and capture the all-important road centre of Bastogne, then ‘drive like hell’ for the Meuse, crossing south of Namur.

General Heinrich von Lüttwitz.

XLVII Corps was comprised of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, 2nd Panzer Division and the Panzer Lehr Division. The 26th Volksgrenadier Division (VGD) had been fighting constantly on the Russian Front since 1941. It was brought back and made up to strength with replacements mostly from the navy. Commanded by Generalmajor Heinz Kokott, the Division consisted of the 78th Regiment, 77th Regiment and the 39th Fusilier Regiment and was garrisoning a section of the West Wall immediately opposite the US 28th Division.

Generalmajor Kokott.

The 2nd Panzer Division, under Colonel Meinrad von Lauchert, was a crack unit that had been fighting all the way back from Normandy. It had suffered heavily and what was left of it was made good with quality troops from Austria. It was issued with the modern Panther tank, which had a new revolutionary infrared sight fitted.

General Meinrad von Lauchert.

Panzer Lehr Division, under Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein, had been involved in heavy fighting with Patton’s US 3rd Army in the Saar region and it too had suffered badly. It never did get up to full strength again. To make up this loss two battalions of tank destroyers and an assault gun brigade were given to Panzer Lehr prior to the attack.

The latest equipment was issued to Panzer Lehr’s reconnaissance battalion, which, along with the reconnaissance battalion of the 26th VGD would spearhead the attack.

Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein.

To further strengthen XLVII Corps, Manteuffel gave Lüttwitz the 15th Volks Werfer Brigade, the 766th Volks Artillery Corps, the 600th Army Engineer Battalion and the 182nd Flak Regiment. Coupled with this all three divisions were reinforced with additional self-propelled assault guns. Also two 60-ton bridges were earmarked for the Corps to enable its heavy Panthers to ford the rivers.

Although air support was promised both Kokott and Lüttwitz were sceptical, as they had been let down too many times in the past and so were just glad of impending bad weather and night time operations. They were also reassured by the vast amount of flak guns that were being made available for the coming attack.

If all went well the 26th VGD would force a crossing of the Our and Clerf Rivers on the left of the Corps and hold the area open for the armour of 2nd Panzer Division. Panzer Lehr Division would follow and overtake the infantry division in the race for Bastogne. When Bastogne was reached the infantry of the 26th VGD would occupy the town and provide cover on the left flank while the panzers crossed the Meuse River.

The crossing point on the river Our of the 26th Volksgrenadier Division.

The bridge across the River Our at Gemünd today.

By 11 December the build up was complete, the German rail network (Reichsbahn) had worked miracles in getting everything and everybody to where they were supposed to be. Hitler moved his headquarters to a bunker complex at Wiesental. Just two kilometres to the south was the castle of Ziegenberg, at Bad Nauheim, which was the headquarters of Oberkommando West.

On 13 December the last of the reports came in to Hitler’s headquarters: Keitel reported that petrol was on hand, each tank would have enough to travel about ninety to one hundred miles; eight days’ worth of ammunition was at the front with another eight days’ supply held in reserve; the Luftwaffe had over 300 aircraft ready, many of which were the new Messerschmitt 262 jets.

The following night the armies moved their attacking forces up to within three miles of the front line. To muffle out the sound to the unsuspecting Americans, planes flew up and down the front and straw was strewn across roads to dampen the noise of tracks and wheels

During the night of 15 December Lüttwitz moved his assault divisions up to their start lines. The 26th VGD were already in position, as its 78th Regiment had been defending that particular sector of the West Wall. It had outposts across the River Our, which Kokott had manned at night. This night he sent the whole regiment across. To the Americans high on Skyline Drive nothing would seem unusual about the movement below them. Gradually, an increasing number of Volksgrenadiers were put across the river by inflatable rubber boats until most of the division was within a few minutes’ walk from one of the Americans’ Outposts.

Kokott’s initial plan for the 26th VGD was for its 77th Regiment to form on the right near Hosingen with the 39th slightly to it’s left and rear. The 77th would cut round north of Hosingen and dash straight for the River Clerf bridges at Drauffelt. The 39th would cut across country and seize the road junction and bridges at Wilwerwiltz on the Clerf. These objectives were to be secured by nightfall on the 16th.

Unteroffizier Ludwig Lindemann was serving in the command position of Kompanietruppenführer [Company/Troop Leader] with the 10th Kompanie, 77th Infanterie Regiment.

‘Our unit was stationed in Übereisenbach and our Kompaniegefechtstab [Company Command HQ] was in the first bunker on the right hand side of the street above the Theis Inn. Our officer, Leutnant Gerlach, three runners and I, as Kompanietruppenführer, lived in the bunker. To begin with life on the frontier was peaceful and apart from patrol activity, terrain reconnaissance and the training of the men in new infantry weapons nothing much was happening. Supply line for the 10th Companie, IR 77, was based on a farm back in Karlshausen under the command of Hauptfeldwebel[Quartermaster], Karl Hans, who was an extremely popular non-commissioned officer.

Unteroffizier Ludwig Lindemann.

‘At a battalion briefing at the beginning of December we were informed that on the 16th of that month we would be the lead unit in a big westerly offensive involving a great number of divisions. Our main goal was to be Bastogne in Belgium. We belonged to the 5th Panzer Army and our Divisional Commander was Generalmajor Kokott.

‘Patrols had scouted out and established the final assembly areas for the coming attack. The previous month, November, a raiding patrol from our company had been ordered to enter the enemy lines in an attempt to capture prisoners. Leutnant Gerlach, Obergefreiter Erwin Blankenberg, who was our dispatch rider, and eight men were to set off at midnight and patrol in the vicinity of Putscheid in Luxembourg.

‘The men formed up on the street which led north to the village of Putscheid. After passing through the woods separating the American and German positions they proceeded slowly and carefully into Putscheid itself, using the buildings on the lefthand side of the road for cover. Blankenberg, was leading, closely followed by two grenadiers, and behind them was Leutnant Gerlach and the rest of the patrol. When they were just past the first houses a machine gun opened up on them. Immediately Blankenberg dropped with two shots in the head. One of the two with him went to drag him to cover but saw that he was dead and himself became wounded. Leutnant Gerlach had been caught in the same burst of fire, taking hits in the chest, and was also killed. The remaining members of the raiding patrol, amongst them two wounded, beat a retreat to the north-west and cover.

Piles of artillery munitions being stocked for the coming battle.

‘In the morning they arrived at Company HQ and reported the outcome of the raid. This I immediately passed onto Battalion HQ. The Company was now without a commissioned officer, therefore I assumed command as Kompanietruppenführer, until a replacement arrived. If my memory serves me right the new officer was called Bremke. He had no combat experience.

‘At midnight on 15 December 1944, it began. Moving off in squads we reached the River Our which marked the frontier boundary. Then, as quietly as we could, we doubled up the bank of the river in a northerly direction. We crossed the Our on a narrow plank and came to our assigned assembly point – we were probably below Hosingen. It was 3 am by the time we started regrouping and we were all frozen. The platoons and squads were assigned to their sectors in readiness for the coming attack. It wasn’t permitted to smoke in case the enemy saw the glare of the cigarette. We could only move about carefully and talk in whispers. We had no idea of the whereabouts of the American outpost positions. We later learned that there were no frontline positions in that particular area where we attacked. As far as one could observe it was still peaceful all along the front.’

Immediately in front of the 26th VGD was the 110th Regiment of the US 28th Infantry Division. This American division was in the sector for a rest and to absorb replacements after a gruelling fight in the Hurtgen Forest. A rest centre had been set up in Clervaux where men came from the division on three day visits. Bathing facilities and clean uniforms were available. The GIs could take in a movie, drink beer, even though it was on the weak side, and get coffee and doughnuts from the American Red Cross. Here also, set in the Hotel Claravallis was the Command Post of the 110th Regiment. Its commander was Colonel Hurley Fuller.

Colonel Hurley Fuller.

The 110th Regt was in the centre of the Division with its two sister regiments either side, the 112th Regt to the north and the 109th Regt to the south. Of the 100th’s three battalions only the 1st and 3rd battalions were actually in the line, the 2nd Battalion was in the rear, in the village of Donnange, and was marked as divisional reserve.

The Hotel Claravallis in Clervaux. This served as the Command Post for the 28th Division’s 110th Regiment.

Vehicles of Panzer Lehr Division on the move in December 1944.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions had no way of making a continuous defence line in their nine to ten mile front. Instead they defended villages in about rifle company strength. These villages were situated on a ridge line, between the Our and Clerf Rivers along which runs a north-south road connecting St Vith with Diekirch. This road became known to the Americans as ‘Skyline Drive’. The roads and villages were between one and a half to two miles from the River Our.

Outposts were set up between the ridge and the river, but were only manned during daylight hours. At night German and American patrols stalked each other – that’s if they ever made contact in the vast wooded area. In this sector, there were four roads that ran from the German border (The Our River), up and over ‘Skyline Drive’ and on into Clervaux. It was at these points where the roads crossed the ridge that the US 110th Regiment concentrated its forces. Only the most northerly road at Marnach was of any real use for it had a good hard surface and ran through Clervaux and on to Bastogne. It was this road that the Germans had decided to use for their main drive, and it would be connected to their own roads on the German side of the border by bridging the river at Dasburg. The other three roads, although inferior, were going to be used by the 26th VGD once the bridge was in at Gemünd.

The engineers in this sector began constructing the bridge during the night, but leading units of 2nd Panzer Division at Dasburg faced a delay. The road leading to the demolished bridge site was blocked by huge iron gates which were a part of the West Wall defences, and nobody could find the keys. They would have to be blown up, but as that would doubtless alert the attention of the Americans, it would have to wait for the opening barrage to commence in order to cover the sound of the demolition explosions.

The clock ticked on – H-Hour approached.

US 28th Infantry Division insignia.