Assessment of the German Soldier in 1943
For the German soldier on the Eastern Front the opening months of 1943 were gloomy. He had fought desperately to maintain cohesion and hold positions that often saw thousands perish. By May 1943 the German forces were holding a battle line more than 1,400 miles in overall length, which had been severely weakened by the overwhelming strength of the Red Army. To make matters worse, during the first half of 1943, many troop units lacked proper replacements to compensate for the large losses sustained. Supplies of equipment and ammunition were also becoming insufficient in some areas of the front. Many soldiers had become aware that if they did not stem the Russian onslaught they would soon find themselves in dire circumstances. As a result, in a number of sectors of the front, soldiers were able to form a realistic assessment of the war situation, and this in turn managed to save the lives of many who might otherwise have died fighting to the last man.
In spite of the adverse situation in which the German soldier was placed during the first half of 1943, many remained steadfast, especially in Army Group Centre, and determined to fight with courage and skill. By June 1943 the German soldier had expended considerable combat efforts lacking sufficient reconnaissance and the necessary support of tanks and heavy weapons to ensure any type of success. The Red Army had constantly outgunned them, and the Luftwaffe air support was almost non-existent in a number of areas of the front. The short summer nights too had caused considerable problems for the men, for they only had a few hours of darkness in which to conceal their night marches and construction of field fortifications. Ultimately, the German soldier in the summer of 1943 was ill prepared to launch a massive offensive in the East, even with the considerable support of the Panzerwaffe. Commanders in the field were fully aware of the significant problems and the difficulties imposed by underequipped soldiers to fight in any large operation. However, in the end they had no other choice than to order their troops to fight with whatever they had at their disposal.
Chapter One
The history of the Battle of Kursk began with the German Army Group Centre during the summer of 1941 when on 22 June, the German Army, 3,000,000 strong, began their greatest attack in military history. In Army Group Centre, under the command of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, 800 Panzers struck across the Russian frontier and within hours the German armoured punch, with brilliant coordination of all arms, had pulverised bewildered Russian formations. With nothing but a string of victories behind them by the end of September 1941, Army Group Centre was regrouped for the final assault on Moscow, known as ‘Operation Typhoon’. At first the drive to Moscow went well, but by early October the weather began to change as cold driving rain fell on the troops. Within hours the Russian countryside had been turned into a quagmire with roads and fields becoming virtually impassable. All roads leading to Moscow had become a boggy swamp. To make matters worse, since ‘Typhoon’ had began, Army Group Centre had lost nearly 35,000 men, excluding the sick and injured; some 240 tanks and heavy artillery pieces; and over 800 other vehicles that had either developed mechanical problems or had been destroyed. Supplies were becoming dangerously low, and fuel and ammunition were hardly adequate to meet the ever-growing demands of the drive to Moscow. Regardless of the dwindling shortages of material, Army Group Centre was ordered to continue its march through the freezing arctic conditions. Despair now gripped the front as battered and exhausted troops froze to death in front of the Russian capital. Its territorial gains that winter were limited to a forty-mile belt at the approach to Moscow.
The failure to capture Moscow had been a complete disaster for Army Group Centre. Its forces had altered out of recognition from those of its victorious summer operations. But during early 1942 the Russian offensive petered out. The temperatures rose and Army Group Centre began to replenish its losses. June 1942 saw the preparation of another German summer offensive. However, instead of attacking Moscow again, Army Group Centre consolidated its positions, while Army Group South advanced to the Caucasus and the Volga. Then, as the battle of Stalingrad raged in the ruins of the city, a major Soviet offensive in the Moscow area was unleashed, code-named ‘Operation Mars’. The objective was to destroy the Rzhev salient.
Already Army Group Centre had heavily fortified the salient with a mass of mine belts, trenches, bunkers, anti-tank guns and machine gun emplacements. A well constructed road network allowed the rapid movement of reinforcements to the area. The Russian offensive failed with heavy casualties. However, three months later in February 1943 the strong lines of defences of Army Group Centre were yet again attacked. The Russians made a co-ordinated assault in the Kursk and northern Army Group Centre areas with the ultimate objective of encircling the Army Group. But yet again the Red Army over estimated the strength and resilience of the German forces in Army Group Centre and eventually the Soviet attacks from Kursk towards Orel failed to make progress. As a result the offensive was called off.
Throughout the first half of 1943 Army Group Centre had more or less maintained the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front, and it was for this prime reason that Hitler was confronted with a tempting strategic opportunity that he was convinced would yield him victory. This victory, he thought, would be undertaken at a place called Kursk, and it would prove to be the last great German offensive on the Eastern Front. The attack would be launched against a huge Russian salient at Kursk measuring some 120 miles wide and 75 miles deep.
At his Eastern Front headquarters, Wolf ‘s Lair, Hitler tried for hours to persuade his commanders that his force could attack from north and south of the salient in a huge pincer movement and encircle the Red Army. In Hitler’s view, the offensive would be the greatest armoured battle ever won on the Eastern Front and would include the bulk of his mighty Panzerwaffe, among them his elite Waffen SS divisions.
However, as usual, Hitler ignored the true capabilities of the Red Army at Kursk. The Soviets not only outnumbered their opponents by approximately 2.5 to 1, they also exceeded the Germans in guns and tanks. Their defences too were manned in special defensive regions and belts, anti-tank strong points, and an extensive network of engineer obstacles. The strength of the Soviet defences at Kursk varied considerably. Where it was expected that the main attacks would take place, Red Army commanders concentrated the largest number of defenders on the narrowest frontages. Unbeknown to the German planners, on the Russian Front at Kursk there were some 870 soldiers, 4.7 tanks, and 19.8 guns and mortars to every mile of defensive front. However, just prior to the German attack, as more intelligence was gathered on the coming battle, this density would increase to more than 4,500 troops, forty-five tanks, and 104.3 guns per mile. On the Voronezh Front, where it was particularly weaker, about 2,500 men, forty-two tanks, and fifty-nine guns and mortars were fielded in every mile of the sector. In total the Voronezh Front contained some 573,195 soldiers, 8,510 guns and mortars, and 1,639 tanks and selfpropelled guns. Both the Central and Voronezh Fronts alone contained more than 1,300,000 men, 19,794 artillery pieces and mortars, 3,489 tanks and self-propelled guns, and some 2,650 aircraft. Behind this fearsome force stood additional troops of the Steppe Front. Although only 295,000 of Steppe Front men, including 900 tanks, would be moved forward during the battle, they had additional resources to commit another 200,000 men and another 600 tanks. The total number of men available in the Red Army at Kursk was 1,910,361, including 5,040 tanks. This was a very impressive array of military might. With such a high concentration of men and weapons, the Red Army undoubtedly had overall superiority and exceeded the Germans in men, tanks and guns.
Despite Hitler’s confidence, many of the German generals were not blind to the difficulties facing them at Kursk. In fact, a number of them were concerned at the enemy’s growing strength. But it was not until they unleashed their forces against the Red Army that even they finally realised how far they had underestimated the grand scale of their enemy’s defences and the massive forces assembled against them.
By June 1943, German plans for the battle at Kursk were finally issued to all the commanders in the field. The code name for the attack was called Operation ‘Citadel’ or ‘Zitadelle’. The plan was for the German forces to smash Red Army formations and leave the road to Moscow open. For this daring offensive, the German force was distributed between the Northern and Southern groups, consisting of a total of twenty-two divisions, six of which were Panzer and five Panzergrenadier. The main attack fell to the 9th Army in the north. There were some 335,000 soldiers, 590 tanks and 424 assault guns. In the south, the Germans fielded a much stronger force and concentrated 349,907 troops, 1,269 tanks and 245 assault guns.
Putting together such a strong force was a great achievement, but the Panzerwaffe of 1943 were unlike those armoured forces that had victoriously steamrolled across western Russia two years earlier. The losses during the previous winter had resulted in the drastic reductions in troop strength. Despite the Panzerwaffe’s impressive array of firepower, this shortage of infantry was to lead to Panzer units being required to take on more ambitious tasks normally preserved for the infantry. To make matters worse the Panzerwaffe were facing an even greater enemy, coupled with almost impregnable defensive belts.
Already, within weeks of the attack, the Russians had constructed more than six major defensive belts, each subdivided into two or even three layers of well-defended strongholds. The first two belts were occupied by forward troops, while units that were held in reserve occupied the third and fourth belts. The last two belts were virtually empty of soldiers and used mainly to accommodate reserves if the need arose. Each belt was a maze of intricate blockhouses and trenches. In some areas of the belt the Russians had emplaced more than 70,000 anti-tank and 64,000 antipersonnel mines.
In front of the Soviet defensive fortress stood the cream of all the German combat formations at Kursk, the premier divisions of the Waffen SS. In Army South these elite soldiers were deployed for action, ready at a moment’s notice to fight their way through the formidable lines of barbed wire entanglements, mine fields and anti-tank guns. Here, the II.SS-Panzerkorps, commanded by SS-Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser, formed part of the 4.Panzerarmee. The corps comprised the three elite Waffen SS divisions, the 1.SS-Panzerdivision ‘Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler’, the 2.SS-Panzerdivision ‘Das Reich’ and the 3.SS-Panzerdivision ‘Totenkopf ‘. These three divisions had a line strength of 390 of the latest tanks and 104 assault guns between them, including forty-two of the Army Group’s Tiger tanks. At their starting positions, the three SS divisions covered a sector that was 12 miles wide. The ‘Totenkopf ‘ occupied the left flank of the advance, the ‘Leibstandarte’ was in the centre and ‘Das Reich’ held the right. It was hoped that these Waffen SS divisions would play a decisive part in the victory at Kursk.
For the next few weeks prior to the battle both the Soviets and their German counter parts were increasingly tense as the offensive ominously approached. Although there was almost a feeling of self doubt within the ranks of the Red Army, especially as no force had ever halted a deliberate Blitzkrieg offensive before, each soldier must have been comforted by the belief in their readiness and the great labyrinth of defensive positions that covered hundreds of square miles in front of their opponents.
During early July 1943, neither side got much rest. Russian soldiers, after months of preparation, were waiting and ready, sitting in their bunkers and numerous other well dug-in positions for the first sign of attack. The final showdown on the Eastern Front was about to begin.
June or July 1943, and German troops are seen relaxing and drinking prior to the Kursk offensive. As the date for the battle approached neither side got much rest. In front of the German positions Russian soldiers, after months of preparation, were waiting and ready, sitting in their bunkers and numerous other well dug-in positions for the first sign of attack.
An 8.14cm GrW34 mortar crew prior to the opening attack in a dugout. A shelter quarter not only protects the weapon from dust and rain, but also helps to camouflage it from aerial surveillance. During the war the mortar had become the standard infantry company support weapon giving the soldier valuable high explosive capability beyond the range of rifles or grenades. Yet one of the major drawbacks was its accuracy. Even with an experienced mortar crew, it generally required ten bombs to achieve a direct hit on one single target.
Wehrmacht and Waffen SS heavy MG34 machine guns fitted on a sustained-fire mount overlooking an enemy position. A well sighted, well hidden and well supplied MG34 could hold up an entire attacking regiment. This machine gun, when perfectly sighted, could inflict heavy losses on an enemy advance. Throughout the summer campaign and indeed for the rest of the war the MG34 had tremendous stopping power against enemy infantry when deployed in the most advantageous defensive positions.
A stationary Sd.Kfz.10 with mounted 2cm Flak gun has halted along a road near to the front in June or July 1943. On the folding sides of the half-track additional magazine for the gun could be carried and the single axle trailer stowing more vital equipment and magazines were normally stowed.
A group of Sturmgeschütz crewmen rest next to a building prior to the battle. They all wear the special field-grey uniform worn by tank destroyers and self propelled assault gun units. Note the crewman standing in the doorway wearing the new form of head-dress known as the Einheitsfeldmutze, which by mid 1943 was becoming universal throughout the German Army.
A column of vehicles comprising of half-tracks and light Horch cross-country cars have halted inside a town on the way to the front lines to prepare for the battle in early July.
Waffen SS soldiers poise prior to the opening attack along the front line. In front of the Soviet defensive fortress at Kursk stood the cream of all the German combat formations. These SS troops wear their familiar SS camouflage smocks. Throughout the Kursk offensive the professionalism and technical ability of the SS was second to none.
From a slit trench soldiers can be seen poised for action. The soldiers are all armed with the Kar 98K carbine boltaction rifle which was the standard issue piece of weaponry supplied to the German Army throughout the war. Note the units commander surveying the terrain ahead with a pair of 6 × 4 field binoculars.
A Pz.Kpfw.V Panther tank onboard a special railway flat car being moved to the front. In June 1943, there were twenty-one Panzer divisions, including four Waffen SS divisions and two Panzergrenadier divisions being prepared for Operation Zitadelle in the Kursk salient. For this massive attack the Panzerwaffe, in early July, were able to muster seventeen divisions and two brigades with no less than 1,715 Panzers and 147 Sturmegeschütz III (Stug) assault guns. Each division averaged some ninety-eight Panzers and self-propelled anti-tank guns. The new Pz.Kpfw.V ‘Panther’ Ausf.A made its debut, despite production problems, which would lead to repeated breakdowns in action.
A light Wehrmacht machine gun crew with their MG34 machine gun on its bipod. The primary gunner was known as the Schütze 1, whilst his team mate, Schütze 2, fed the ammunition belts and saw that the gun remained operational at all times.
A Waffen SS crew have utilised their 8.8cm Flak gun against a ground target during heavy fighting. By 1943 the deadly 8.8cm Flak gun was used extensively against both ground and aerial targets.
A light MG42 machine gun crew out in a field. The train of view for the gunner must have been immense and would have certainly offered a very good opportunity for detecting enemy movement from some distance away.
The crew of a 2cm Flak gun scouring the sky for enemy aircraft. The gun was a very effective weapon and had a fire rate of 120–280 rounds per minute. The weapons fire rate was more than capable of dealing with not only low flying enemy aircraft, but attacking enemy troop concentrations as well.
In a dugout position somewhere on the front line is a 2cm Flak gun. The gun has been elevated skyward in order to protect its position against aerial attack.
On a hillside a Waffen SS soldier can be seen peering through a tripod mounted 6 × 30 Sf.14Z Scherenfernrohr (scissor binoculars). This is more than likely an artillery observation post searching for enemy targets. Each artillery battery had an observation post among the front line positions.
At a command post German officers can be seen surveying the terrain with 6 × 4 field binoculars and a rangefinder. The rangefinder was a piece of state of the art equipment for the time. It took a target’s height and range plus its azimuth and angle of slant to compute its rate of change.
A photograph taken from a bunker close to the front in early July 1943. Advancing in the distance are a group of Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks with a full summer camouflage scheme with intact side skirts (‘Schürtzen’).
Troops pose for the camera in front of their command half-track. A half-track was mainly used to tow various ordnance from one part of the front to another. However, it was also utilised for other tasks such as towing other vehicles that had developed mechanical failure or pulling trailers full of heavy supplies, and carrying soldiers into battle.
Waffen SS troops smile for the camera after evidently catching a local pig from a nearby farm and are obviously taking it back to their unit to cook it. Eating pork and other meat was always welcome relief among the men, especially after enduring many weeks eating army rations.
Waffen SS troops sit in a field, poised to move off into action. Three of the soldiers are signalmen operating a portable radio. This device was the standard radio used at battalion and regimental level. These widely used portable radios were carried by a soldier on a specially designed back-pack frame, and, when connected to each other (upper and lower valves) via special cables, could be used on the march.
A Waffen SS MG34 machine gunner positioned in a dugout in a field. The weapon has the MG34 fifty-round basket drum magazine fitted. Although the MG34 had been supplanted by the faster-firing MG42, it was still considered a very effective weapon and was used extensively in Russia until the end of the war.
A soldier sleeps in front of his half-track vehicle prior to operations at Kursk in early July 1943. The vehicle has been well concealed beneath straw in order to minimise the possible threat of aerial attack.
A motorcycle combination moves along a dirt road following a column of lorries full of supplies and troops, all of which are destined for the front.
A decorated soldier poses for the camera in front of a Marder light tank destroyer. These vehicles served in both the Waffen SS and Wehrmacht divisional anti-tank battalions on the Eastern Front and saw some success at Kursk.
A light MG34 machine gun crew waits on a roadside before resuming their march to the front. The term light and heavy machine guns defined the role and not the weight of the gun. Rifle squads generally had a light machine gun with a bipod, along with one or two spare barrels. A heavy machine gun group, however, had the bipod fitted machine gun, but additionally carried a tripod with optical sight.
A Tiger tank rolls along a road with infantry hitching a lift. The Tiger tank played a significant role on the Eastern Front and at Kursk the tank was distributed among the elite Waffen SS Panzer units where it performed very successfully. However, there were too few to make any significant gains.
The crew pose for the camera with their Pz.Kpfw.IV. Initially the Panzer IV was designed as an infantry support tank, but soon proved to be so diverse and effective that it earned a unique tactical role on the battlefield. The Panzer IV was an ultimate credit to the Panzer divisions it served, and was the only Panzer to stay in production throughout the war.
Waffen SS troops are seen in a dugout position in a field prior to the Kursk offensive. In Army South these elite soldiers were deployed for action, ready at a moment’s notice to fight their way through the formidable lines of barbed wire entanglements, minefields and anti-tank guns.
A crew member with his stationary Sd.Kfz.251 half-track. Despite the Panzerwaffe’s impressive array of firepower, there was a shortage of infantry which consequently led to Panzer units being required to take on more ambitious tasks normally preserved for the infantry.
A group of Wehrmacht soldiers in a dugout. One soldier can be seen armed with a stick grenade. During preparations for the offensive many thousands of these dugouts were constructed, in which the troops lived and slept for a number of days until they were finally ordered to move forward to their jump-off points.
The crew of a Marder III Panzerjäger poses for the camera. The Marder III was the first of a series of improvised light tank hunters, and was built on the chassis of a Pz.Kpfw.38 (t). This particular vehicle is fitted with a captured 7.62cm Russian 36 anti-tank gun.
Officers scan the terrain with their 6 × 30 binoculars whilst standing inside a field in late or early July 1943. Prior to the troops moving off to their jump off assembly points it was imperative that their commanders knew the precise location of their enemy.
A specially adapted flat bed train can be seen loaded with Tiger tanks heading for the front line. A major factor in the success of the Panzer divisions on the Eastern Front was their ability to reach threatened sectors of the front swiftly.
An MG34 mounted on a Dreibein 34 anti-aircraft tripod mount can be seen in a field. A motorcycle combination and a number of Horch cross-country cars can be seen purposely spaced out across the field in order to reduce heavy loss to its column if there was an aerial attack.