Commanders
General Holland Smith
General Smith, or ‘Howling Mad’ as he was known, was Commander of the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, in December 1941 and responsible for training several divisions in amphibious landings. He transferred to command the Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, in August 1942. The organisation was later known as V Amphibious Corps and it moved to Pearl Harbor in September 1943 to begin planning for the Gilberts campaign. Smith was still in command when it was renamed Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in August 1944.
Major General Harry Schmidt
Schmidt was Assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps from January 1942 to August 1943. He then commanded 4th Marine Division during the capture of Roi-Namur in the Battle of Kwajalein and in the invasion of Saipan. In July 1944, he took command of V Amphibious Corps and led it through the invasion and capture of Tinian Island.
General Tadamichi Kuribayashi
In December 1941, Kuribayashi was appointed Chief of Staff of the Japanese 23rd Army in time for the invasion of Hong Kong. He was promoted to lieutenant general as commander of the 2nd Imperial Guards Division, a training division, in 1943. On 27 May 1944, he transferred to the 109th Division and two weeks later was ordered to defend Iwo Jima in the Bonin Islands chain believing that ‘Japan has started a war with a formidable enemy and we must brace ourselves accordingly.’
Kuribayashi arrived on the island on 19 June 1944, having had an audience with Emperor Hirohito. After surveying the island’s defences he set about planning new ones inland, eventually connecting the 5000 caves with 11 miles of tunnels. He believed that ‘America’s productive powers are beyond our imagination’ and wanted to turn Iwo Jima into a fortress. He realised he could not hold Iwo Jima forever but was prepared to fight a battle of attrition. He expected to die and on 5 September he wrote to his wife: ‘It must be destiny that we as a family must face this. Please accept this and stand tall with the children at your side. I will be with you always.’
US Marines
Weapons
The Marine wore the 1941 pattern utility uniform, a simple loose-cut two-piece uniform made of sage green cotton herringbone twill. It was called either utilities or dungarees but never fatigues, the US Army word for uniform. The jacket had three flapless pockets while the trousers had four; the arrangement depended on which manufacturer made them. The M1 steel helmet was covered with a camouflage cloth which had a reversible brown/green coloration. The later version had slits for foliage, something that was not needed on Iwo Jima. Leggings were worn over the boots but they were often discarded because they could be difficult to put on and were uncomfortable to wear.
A US Marine carried his equipment and personal belongings in a three-part olive drab M-1941 Haversack that could be arranged in five different ways: light marching, marching, field marching, transport and field transport. The upper section carried the rations, poncho and clothes needed in combat while the lower section contained extra shoes and utilities. The exterior of the upper pack had loops and tabs for attaching a bayonet, shovel, extra canteen and first-aid pouch; a bedroll could be folded around the top. The belt suspenders completed the haversack. The harsh Pacific environment quickly faded and then rotted the uniform and equipment.
Officers were issued with either Colt M1911 or M1917 .45 calibre revolvers. The rank and file Marines were armed with the M1 Garand, which had a high rate of fire thanks to its gas operated rotating bolt system. The semi-automatic rifle fired .30–60 Springfield ammunition from the 8-round internal magazine and could also fire fragmentation, anti-tank and smoke grenades using a spigot attachment and special ammunition. The shorter M1 Carbine was issued to officers, NCOs and other specialists who benefited from carrying this shorter, compact weapon; it fired a 7.62mm round from a 15- or 30-round box.
The M1A1/M1928 Thompson submachine gun could fire over 600 .45 ACP rounds a minute from 20- or 30-round stick magazines and they were often issued to scouts, NCOs and patrol leaders. Delays in production meant that only a limited number of M3 submachine guns, or ‘Grease Guns’ were available. Some men were issued with the Winchester M12 Trench Gun, a six-round pump action shot gun for close quarter combat. The MkII Fragmentation grenade and smoke and white phosphorous variants were used in great numbers in the close-quarter fighting, while the Ka-Bar knife could be used in a tight corner.
The M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle, or BAR, had a high rate of fire and the .30 rounds it fired from a round box magazine had a high stopping power. It could be mounted on a bipod for increased accuracy and the trigger man could choose either automatic or semi-automatic fire. The M1917 Browning machine gun was a heavy, tripod-mounted weapon and its four-man crew used it in a semi-static role. It was water cooled and the belt-fed mechanism could fire up 600 .30 rounds a minute. The M1919 Browning Machine Gun was an air-cooled tripod-mounted weapon with a crew of two; it also had a maximum rate of fire of 600 rounds a minute.
The M2-2 flamethrower was an excellent weapon for clearing pillboxes. It could fire a single ten-second burst or five two-second bursts of burning fuel from its two back-pack style canisters. Typically, each squad had one and the while one man operated the trigger, the other operated the valves. The Japanese feared the flamethrower and snipers kept a look out for the distinctive profile of the fuel tanks or for a bright burst of flame so they could engage the team. While there were few Japanese tanks to engage on Iwo Jima, the M1A1 bazooka was another useful weapon for engaging emplacements; it had a two-man crew, one man to fire and one to load.
Kit
The 75mm pack howitzer was a versatile weapon known as the ‘Little Dynamite’, which could be manhandled into areas that heavier artillery could not reach. It could be used to carry out direct firing against bunkers up to a range of around 500 metres or for indirect fire against targets up to 9000 metres away. The Marine division artillery battalions were equipped with the M2A1 (M101A1) 105mm Howitzer, which was capable of firing high explosive rounds to a range of 11,200 metres. The Corps artillery battalions had the M114 155mm Howitzer, capable of firing to a range of 14,600 metres.
The Marine tank battalions were equipped with Sherman M4A3 (medium) tanks armed with the 75mm M3/L40 gun, which could fire armour piercing or high explosive rounds, and one .05 calibre and two .03-6 calibre Browning machine guns. They weighed 30.3 tonnes and had 53mm of armour at the front, 63mm at the side and 40mm at the back; they rarely reached their top speed of 30mph on Iwo Jima. Sherman tanks mounting flamethrowers were particularly effective and burning fuel could be fired approximately 91 metres; each tank carried 300 gallons of fuel, which gave 150 seconds of flames. The tanks’ air intakes and exhausts were modified with chimneys so they could drive off the landing ships and through shallow water onto the beach. M3 Gun Motor Carriages were half tracks, mounting a 75mm gun, and they were used as mobile anti-tank guns to attack emplacements.
Everything had to be brought to Iwo Jima by sea and the huge logistics operation involved a wide range of ships and landing craft. The Landing Ship, Tank (LST) was 106 metres long, 16.8 metres wide and could either carry ten tanks and fifteen vehicles or 160 officers and men; it had a crew of 104. The Landing Ship, Medium (LSM) was 62 metres long, 10 metres wide and could either carry five tanks, six LVTs (amphibious armoured carriers), nine DUKWs (amphibious trucks) or 54 officers and men; it had a crew of 58.
A Landing Ship Tank delivers Sherman tanks to the shore. Some bogged down in the soft sand, a few hit mines and others were hit by Japanese artillery; the few lucky survivors were welcomed by the Marines. The air and exhaust intakes which allowed tanks to beach in shallow water can be seen. (NARA-127-GW-109825)
The Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT(A)-1), was an armoured amphibious vehicle used to ferry men from the Landing Ships to the shore. The ‘amtrack’ as it was widely known was 7.95 metres long, 3.25 metres wide and could carry 18 men or 2000kg of supplies; it had a three man crew. The LVT(A)-4 variant mounted a turret with a 75mm Howitzer. The DUKW was a six-wheeled drive amphibious truck used to ferry artillery from the Landing Ships to the shore. It was widely known as the ‘duck’, and was 9.4 metres long, 2.5 metres wide and could carry 2.3 tonnes or 12 men; it only had one crewman. Once ashore, ammunition and supplies were taken inland by the Clever-Brooks amphibian trailer, which could carry a 3.5-ton load, or the M-29C Light cargo carrier (Weasel), which hauled a half-ton load.
An amtrack crew get their final instructions from one of the control boats supervising 4th Division’s assembly area before heading towards the beach. (NARA-127-GW-110134)
Tactics
The Marines were virtually always on the offensive and the fighting tended to follow a steady pattern. The Japanese would watch and wait in their camouflaged bunkers and caves until the Marines were fixed firmly in their sights. After everyone went to ground, spotters would locate the Japanese position while armoured dozers cut a road forward so the tanks could move into position, guided by the Marines. While the flame tanks sprayed the area with burning liquid, the Shermans fired 75mm rounds and their machine guns at the bunker aperture or cave mouth. Flamethrowers and tank flamethrowers were found to be the best weapons for clearing the Japanese out of their bunkers and caves.
Once the bunker was temporarily silenced, the assault team rushed forward to make sure no one was left alive inside. The Marines could then renew their advance but they had to be wary of Japanese soldiers opening fire from a new, hidden position. Demolition teams had to check the area, searching the caves and pillboxes for signs of life; they rarely saw any. Progress was slow and dangerous and advances were often measured in metres.
The engineers landed alongside the assault troops and they had to carry out a variety of perilous tasks. They had to use flamethrowers and explosives to blast open or seal pillboxes and caves. They also had to probe for mines in the volcanic ash or use explosives to carve routes through the rock for tanks. 5th Engineer Battalion described two methods of advancing through a minefield when tanks were not available:
Mines had to be removed by hand, under fire; or equipment had to be run into the minefield until it was blown up, then removed and the process repeated until a path through the minefield was opened. The former method was slow, tedious, and exposed highly trained specialists to high casualties. The latter method was slow, and costly in armoured dozers and tanks.
The artillery found it difficult to locate and then silence Japanese mortar, artillery and rocket batteries. Corps and division observation and intelligence officers pooled their information with aerial observers for the best results. The Japanese made excellent use of the rough terrain and camouflage to hide their weapons and they held their fire until they would have the maximum impact on the Marines’ advance, usually when they were in an exposed position. The Regimental headquarters then had to quickly establish where the Japanese guns were, either from the men on the ground or from the observer planes circling overhead. The information had to be transmitted to the artillery batteries or fleet ships so that counter battery fire could be arranged as quickly as possible. It meant that the men on the ground often had to wait hours under fire until the Japanese guns were silenced.
An Intelligence Officer with 4th Marine Division makes it clear that combined arms attacks were the only way to advance. He also shows how the Japanese often withdrew to a new position when the Marines were closing in:
Our Battalion CO has coordinated his direct support weapons and delivers a concentration of rockets, mortars and artillery. Our tanks then push in, supported by infantry. When the hot spot is overrun we find a handful of dead Japs and few if any enemy weapons. While this is happening, the enemy has repeated the process and another sector of our advance is engaged in a vicious fire fight, and the cycle continues.
This flamethrower team is making sure that no one is left alive; two men cover the bunker with their rifles while a third squirts burning fuel into the aperture. (NARA-127-GW-111008)
The Japanese were masters of infiltration at night and towards the end of each day every commander had to assess his unit’s progress. If necessary, some were ordered to withdraw to ‘tie in’ their flanks and form a solid defensive front. Marines would dig in for the night, set up their support weapons, establish communications and post lookouts. They would then have to keep watch all night, raising the alarm if anything suspicious was seen.
The Japanese
The Japanese soldier wore the Type 98 pattern yellowish-khaki, or mustard, two part uniform which faded in the tropical climate. He had a wool uniform for winter and a cotton one for summer; he could wear a khaki cotton shirt in warm conditions. The long trousers or pantaloons were secured over the ankle boots with spiral wound woollen puttees and tapes.
Officers had to buy their own uniforms so style and quality varied and colours ranged from tan to dark green. A Type 3 officer’s uniform was introduced in 1943 in various shades of green and it was a cheap cut of material with cuff insignia. Jackets could be worn over a white or light green shirt, and the uniform was completed with a black or green tie.
Most officers and men wore cloth field caps with a leather or cloth peak and they came in various shades of green ranging from grey-green to a dark green. Some wore the Type 92 dome helmet but it was made of poor quality steel and was little use against shrapnel; others wore the Type 92 cork version tropical helmet.
Officers bought their own revolvers and while some had the woefully inadequate old Type 26 double action revolver, some had the newer Type 4 or Type 14 recoil spring action revolvers. The Type 94 was a lightweight recoil operated, locked breech action weapon. Many officers bought Western revolvers due to the unreliability of the Japanese models. Officers were also armed with the Shin Gunto, or New Army Sword, which was both a badge of rank and a weapon.
The Japanese soldier was armed with the Type 99 Short Rifle, a bolt action weapon which fired a 7.7mm Arisaka cartridge from a 5-round internal magazine. The Type 2 rifle grenade launcher was attached to the rifle and a blank cartridge or wooden bullet propelled the 30mm or 40mm rounds. Many soldiers used the Type 99 sniper version to good effect in Iwo Jima’s rough terrain. They also carried the Type 99 hand grenade or the Type 4 Ceramic grenade. The ceramic version had a porcelain or terracotta body and they had been introduced because the Japanese armaments industry could not produce enough steel grenades.
A few soldiers might have been armed with submachine guns but production was limited and few were available. The Type 100/40 could fire 450 8mm Nambu rounds a minute but it had a complicated design and often jammed. The Type 100/44 was a modified version that had resolved many of the problems and it could fire 800 rounds a minute.
The Type 96 light machine gun could fire 700 7.7mm Arisaka rounds a minute. It was an air-cooled, gas-operated machine gun and was fed by a 30-round top mounted curved box magazine. The Type 92 heavy machine gun could fire a 7.7mm round up to 400 rounds a minute but it used a strip cartridge rather than a belt system and had a tendency to jam. This heavy weapon was tripod mounted and the three-man team usually operated it from a fixed position. The lighter Type 1 heavy machine gun had been introduced in 1941 but it too was usually fired from fixed positions.
Japanese soldiers often used the Type 89 grenade launcher and although it was called the knee launcher by the Marines, it was a mortar type weapon with short tube supported on a rod and base. The operator held it against the ground and dropped the grenade down the tube and the timer was designed to explode the grenade above the ground. It was conveniently portable, easily concealed, had a rapid rate of fire and could be fired out of caves or slit trenches. The Type 97 81mm mortar had a range of 2800 metres while the modified Type 99 had the recoil mechanism removed to make it lighter. Type 94 90mm and Type 96 150mm mortars had a range of 4000 metres and both had Type 97 versions, again with the recoil mechanism removed to make them lighter. They were often used in fixed positions on Iwo Jima, as were a range of mortars over 150mm calibre. Although the Japanese Army had a small number of flamethrowers, they were rarely used in the defensive role.
Kit
The Japanese deployed a number of different artillery pieces and while the Type 94 75mm mountain gun could be broken down and carried as a pack artillery piece, the Type 95 75mm Field Gun needed towing. The Type 92 100mm cannon and Type 4 150mm howitzer would have been virtually immobile during the battle. There were a variety of fortress cannons and howitzers deployed in bunkers and fortified caves along the coast, the majority overlooking the landing beaches.
Both the Type 97 Chi-Ha tank armed with a 47mm gun and the Type 95 Ha-Go armed with a 37mm gun, were deployed on Iwo Jima. Both types were small and only had thin armour no more than 25mm thick. They were no match for the Marines’ Shermans and they were often half buried or hidden in gullies in the hope that they could shoot at close range.
The 26th Tank Regiment was sailing from Japan to Iwo Jima in July 1944 when its convoy was intercepted. On 18 July the Nisshu Maru was torpedoed near Chichi Jima by the American submarine, USS Cobia, and while only two of the 600 crew members were drowned, all 28 tanks were lost. It was December before 22 replacement tanks arrived.
Tactics
Japanese tactics changed as the battle progressed. Before the invasion, General Kuribayashi focused his attentions on driving the Marines off the island. Previous experience had shown that the US Navy and Air Force could devastate fortifications along the beach. Instead positions covering the beach would be camouflaged and remain silent until the waves of assault troops were ashore. They would open fire as soon as the Marines moved off the beach.
Japanese tanks were designed to operate in jungle areas and were much smaller and lighter than their American counterparts. This crew had hidden their machine out of sight ready to catch the advancing Marines in the flank. (NARA-127-GW-143230)
While no beach or underwater obstacles were used, the beach area was protected by mines and anti-tank ditches. Dozens of camouflaged bunkers, pill boxes and spider holes, all linked by trenches or tunnels, covered the approach to Airfield 1. Heavier artillery pieces, field guns and mortars were positioned on the slopes of Mount Suribachi and the Quarry, overlooking the flanks of the beach. They could either fire at the troops as they moved inland or at the landing craft while they unloaded troops and equipment along the shoreline. Kuribayashi was hoping that the devastating crossfire from hidden positions would force the Marines to evacuate the beachhead before nightfall.
However, V Amphibious Corps was able to secure a beachhead and force its way inland. They found that the Japanese were dug in everywhere, having spent months building and camouflaging their defensive positions. Each one had been carefully positioned to cover likely avenues of advance and provide interlocking fields of fire.
The Marines needed to use every trick in the book to outwit their cunning enemy. Here they are trying to fool a sniper into giving his position away by raising a helmet on a rifle. (NARA-127-GW-113649)
The Japanese soldiers hid underground during barrages and airstrikes and dragged their support weapons to the surface as soon as they ended, ready to engage the advancing Marines. They wanted to draw the Marines in and engage them in close combat, so that they could not use their heavy support weapons or call down artillery or air strikes. It meant that ground had to be captured in close combat with the aid of tanks, flamethrowers and demolitions. Many Japanese positions only fell after vicious hand-to-hand fighting. When weapons became clogged with volcanic ash soldiers resorted to fighting with rifle butts, knives, hand grenades, picks and entrenching tools.
If the Japanese were trapped, they refused to surrender, choosing to fight to the death or commit suicide. It meant that the Marines suffered heavy casualties in the deadly war of attrition. Often the Japanese soldier would evacuate his position at the last moment, withdrawing along tunnels or caves to a new hiding place. 4th Division’s Intelligence Officer summarised the hit and run tactics used by the Japanese:
The enemy remains below ground in his maze of communicating tunnels throughout our preliminary artillery fires. When the fire ceases he pushes Observation Posts out of entrances not demolished by our fires. Then choosing a suitable exit he moves as many men and weapons to the surface as he can, depending on the cover and concealment of that area, often as close as 75 yards from our front. As our troops advance toward this point he delivers all the fire at his disposal, rifle, machine-gun, and mortar. When he has inflicted sufficient casualties to pin down our advance he then withdraws through his underground tunnels most of his forces, possibly leaving a few machine gunners and mortars.
Sometimes the Marines worked all day long, destroying pillboxes and caves, with hardly a shot being fired; then the Japanese emerged after dark to attack.
To begin with the Japanese artillery and heavy mortars were dug in and camouflaged while their crews selected and calculated the ranges to likely targets. With the Marines controlling the air, it was important only to fire when necessary because a lack of transport meant it was often impossible to move a heavy weapon to a new position. Once a battery position had been spotted, it was targeted until destroyed by air strikes, naval bombardments and artillery fire. The amount of Japanese artillery fire rapidly reduced during the final stages of the battle as the Marines pushed the infantry back, capturing key observation points and battery positions.
The few Japanese tanks on the island were generally kept hidden and deployed in a semi-static role. Once they had stopped an attack, they would move to a new hidden position. Meanwhile, the Japanese soldier had to be proactive to stop tanks getting close to their emplacements, particularly the hated flame tanks. They used antitank mines and ditches to stop tanks or force them to drive in front of an anti-tank position. Close-quarter attack units also crept up on a tank and then jumped out to place charges in its tracks or against weak side or rear armour. The tactic was suicidal but acceptable to the Banzai mentality of the Japanese soldier. These close-quarter attack units were also used to infiltrate the Marine lines so that they could attack command posts, communications installations or artillery positions.