10

“CHAOS AND DISINTEGRATION”

SURROUNDING SAIGON

While the South Vietnamese positions in the Central Highlands were collapsing, the Communists were attacking in other regions to support the main battlefield. The area around Saigon was especially critical, as the capital was the eventual target. After the long Politburo meeting ended on 6 January, Colonel General Tran Van Tra hurriedly returned to South Vietnam to revise Phase Two of his 1975 dry-season campaign. The Phase One attacks in December 1974–January 1975 had captured Phuoc Long and portions of the Delta. While individually the Communist gains in the early dry-season battles were relatively minor, taken as a whole they constituted a huge blow to the psychologically fragile South Vietnamese.

Another important victory in Tay Ninh soon followed. On 6 January, PAVN seized Ba Den Mountain, a three-thousand-foot conical peak rising from the plain near Tay Ninh City. The high ground dominates the city and provided the RVNAF with an important communication and observation station. Since Tay Ninh province was long considered the main invasion route to Saigon, the mountain’s loss was a serious setback. Worse was the compromise of ARVN codes from the capture of the communication center. As with the stolen ARVN codes in II Corps, the North Vietnamese “were able to utilize the secret codes [cryptological material] we captured there in our battle against the enemy right up until the last day when we won complete victory.”¹

After many long years of war, Tra believed that his time had finally come. He thought that the South Vietnamese were weak, and that the Phuoc Long victory had exposed ARVN’s inability to reinforce remote areas. Even if the South Vietnamese had the reserves to mount relief missions, they no longer had the airlift capacity to move them. RVNAF firepower was also dramatically reduced. Artillery shells were rationed, and PAVN’s multi-layered air defenses were hampering the VNAF’s ability to conduct air strikes. More important, the lack of a U.S response to the fall of Phuoc Long confirmed for the North Vietnamese planners that the American tiger was indeed toothless.

After the Phuoc Long victory, and to the surprise of no one on the PAVN General Staff, Tra once again pleaded for more troops to attack Saigon. For two years he had begged for more divisions, but the General Staff always refused. It did not want to risk the strategic reserves in a large-scale assault against the well-defended city. Tra and Pham Hung had lobbied hard at the October and December 1974 Politburo meetings for additional troops and supplies, but Van Tien Dung had resisted his southern colleagues’demands. Not surprisingly, he preferred to reinforce the Central Highlands attack. But Tra would not be swayed from his dream of leading his troops into Saigon and conquering the South on his own. He sarcastically responded that the assignment of such a large force to the Ban Me Thuot operation would “surely guarantee victory,” impugning the General Staff’s and Dung’s allocation of troops. Overall, Tra believed that the Politburo’s war strategy was too cautious, and that any plan that did not include a bold strike at Saigon was misguided. He believed he could take Saigon now, but he needed three or four more divisions to do it, if only the parsimonious General Staff would provide them.

Soon after the Ban Me Thuot attack plan was finalized, Giap moved to end the bickering between his two ambitious subordinates. While he differed with Tra in terms of timing and the proper use of PAVN resources, he agreed that Saigon should be attacked sooner rather than later. As part of Giap’s 1975 strategy, however, Tra’s first missions were limited. He was to launch large-scale assaults in III Corps simultaneously with the Ban Me Thuot assault, tie down ARVN forces, and create secure base areas close to Saigon. Those bases would be used for an eventual thrust at the South Vietnamese capital.

To help him carry out these new tasks, Giap sent Tra one strategic-reserve unit, the 341st Division. Since this outfit was not earmarked for the Ban Me Thuot attack, Giap was able to appease Tra—and Tra’s powerful mentors, Le Duc Tho and Le Duan—while avoiding any conflict with Dung. On 20 January the 341st Division commander, Senior Colonel Tran Van Tran, received a cable directing him to report immediately to Giap in Hanoi. When Tran arrived on 25 January, Giap’s instructions were simple: Cease training and prepare to move south; complete all arrangements to depart by 10 February; have the first unit moving by 15 February.²

After Phuoc Long fell on 6 January, Pham Hung and Tran Van Tra realized the victory made their earlier plans obsolete. Cabling COSVN from Hanoi, Hung told his staff that “through the progress of Phase One of the dry-season campaign we can see even more clearly the extent of the enemy’s decline on the military, political, and diplomatic fronts, and we can see that the level of victories we have achieved has in many places exceeded the goals that we had set. . . . With respect to the goals for the dry season, we need to readjust them . . . to the actual situation.”³

Leaving Hanoi, Tra arrived back at his headquarters along the Cambodian border in Tay Ninh province on 3 February. He immediately called together his various staffs to modify the Phase Two plan. He devoted particular attention to creating an attack model that would prevent ARVN forces from withdrawing into defensive “enclaves” in the southern half of South Vietnam. In his memoir, Tra repeatedly refers to General Gavin’s enclave design. It worried him and many other senior Communist leaders, since a retreat into well-defended redoubts would indefinitely prolong the war. To prevent this, Tra needed new tactics. He did not want his forces to make frontal assaults, because “it was necessary not to push the enemy back from one line of resistance to another.”⁴ For this reason, Tra took “steps to prevent the enemy from creating solid lines of defense and had gradually eliminated the possibility that they could form an enclave in Saigon . . . by isolating it from the surrounding areas so that [ARVN] forces could not be withdrawn into Saigon . . . [and] so that there could be no reinforcements or way out.”

In essence, Tra wanted to cut Saigon off from the surrounding countryside by blocking the roads in all four directions on the capital’s periphery—far enough away to avoid heavy combat yet still close enough to isolate the city. Although Tra had long planned a five-pronged assault against Saigon, he did not have the combat strength to launch a direct attack. So he had chosen a different path. Commencing in 1974, he sought to soften up Saigon’s outer defenses through a series of battles and his own organizational restructurings. While at times the combat that year had been extremely heavy, his success was limited. He had refrained from committing his entire force to an all-out offensive, reined in by the General Staff, by the disparity of forces, and by his own supply situation. Now with ARVN weakening, Tra tossed away his original dry-season plans in favor of a series of concurrent attacks on the capital’s periphery. If these attacks were successful, he believed, the real battle for Saigon could begin.

In creating his new campaign plan, he adopted the philosophy of the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu. Tra fancied himself a Sun Tzu disciple, and he believed he could achieve his goals by copying Sun Tzu’s tactic of the indirect approach. His main concept was to avoid heavy losses to his main-force units by attacking important district towns guarded by the less effective RF troops, rather than large cities or bases defended by regular ARVN soldiers. He wrote: “we had to flexibly maintain the initiative so that we would not get caught up in a tug of war between ourselves and the enemy,” since he knew that ARVN would defend this area “to the end.” His intent was “to take steps and carry out schemes to disperse the enemy, deceive the enemy and prevent it from discerning our intentions, so we could launch surprise attacks and win certain victories.” Tra wanted to wear down ARVN by “launching surprise attacks . . . in places very advantageous to us without having to clash with the enemy in places vitally important to them, while at the same time deploying our forces so that we could launch an offensive when necessary.” His intent was a vigorous adaptation of a principle the Vietnamese call tao the (“creating a position,” or what U.S. military strategists call “shaping the battlefield”). These maneuvers would set the stage for even larger attacks. The ultimate result for ARVN, he claimed, “would be chaos and disintegration.”⁵

Tra’s new attack strategy for the B-2 Front was both bold and arguably as well-crafted as the Highlands campaign, although in many ways it duplicated the 1968 Tet attack missions. After finalizing the design, in late February Tra called together his military commanders to explain the new mission: They would conduct attacks in sectors surrounding Saigon concurrent with the PAVN strike against Ban Me Thuot. The B-2 plan condensed all the 1975 goals for Phases Two and Three together into a new Phase Two. Tra told his commanders that if Communist forces were victorious in the Central Highlands, the situation could change rapidly, and a strategic opportunity might arise. He wanted to be ready if it did.

If the situation developed more slowly, his secondary objectives would be to link the separate “liberated” areas into contiguous zones, destroy a portion of ARVN’s military manpower, and prepare secure areas for future assaults. Tra’s complex strategy entailed attacks ranging throughout the vast expanse of the B-2 Front, which stretched from the southern rim of the Highlands to the tip of the Delta. The chief blows would be struck by PAVN main-force regulars. In the Communists’ Military Region 8 (the northern Delta), the goal was to isolate Saigon from the rice-rich upper Delta by cutting Route 4 and seizing the surrounding countryside. MR-8’s newly formed 8th Division and the new 303rd Division would create a contiguous liberated zone from southern Tay Ninh and the Angel’s Wing area in Cambodia to the Plain of Reeds in Long An province. Military Region 9 (the southern Delta) would focus on disrupting operations at the large airbase at Can Tho and seizing territory.

Military Region 6, the sparsely populated and long-neglected northern edge of B-2, was also given a significant role in Tra’s new plan. The PAVN strategists wanted MR-6 to destroy all ARVN positions from Binh Tuy province on the coast to Lam Dong and Tuyen Duc provinces in the middle of South Vietnam. For the resource-starved MR-6 commanders, clearing such a large area was problematic at best. Still, they dutifully sent their only main-force unit, the 812th Regiment, to carry out its first Phase Two mission: seize the important rice-growing district of Hoai Duc in the remote northeastern part of Binh Tuy province, the area adjacent to the recently captured Tanh Linh district capital.

The heart of the B-2 Front was MR-7, which covered most of III Corps; it would be the scene of the heaviest fighting. The recently formed PAVN 4th Corps would play the key role in this new offensive. Commanded by Major General Hoang Cam, it comprised the 7th and 9th Divisions, along with supporting armor, artillery, sapper, and rear-service units. Tra decided to split the corps in two, sending the two halves to operate in different sectors. The first sector was northwest of Saigon, in Binh Long, Binh Duong, and Tay Ninh provinces. The 9th Division would handle this area, initially attacking the critical Tri Tam district headquarters near Tay Ninh City. The second area was a large zone northeast of Saigon, from Route 20 north through Lam Dong province to Dalat, and from Long Khanh province along Route 1 into Binh Tuy province. The 7th Division, in coordination with the recently activated 6th Division, was assigned responsibility for the northeastern sector. The 7th would seize Lam Dong and Tuyen Duc provinces, while the 6th would strike in Long Khanh and Binh Tuy provinces. Once the 812th Regiment had captured Hoai Duc, it would turn west to assist the 7th Division.

Another important decision was announced at the late February conference: the formation of a second corps in the B-2 Front. The new corps-level unit was made up of the 5th and 303rd Infantry Divisions, plus supporting combat specialty units. Major General Nguyen Minh Chau initially commanded the new corps, called Group 232.⁶ His mission was to launch an offensive to the south and west of Saigon. The 8th Division would strike in heavily populated Dinh Tuong province in the Delta. The 303rd would attack from the west and destroy the well-entrenched ARVN territorial forces from the Cambodian border east to the Vam Co Dong River. The 5th Division—minus its 3rd Regiment, which was attached to the 303rd for this campaign—would not participate. The 5th had been devastated by heavy losses in the December 1974 attacks and was busy training over a thousand new replacements.

The South Vietnamese, meanwhile, were making moves to shore up their defenses in the critical region around Saigon. After the loss of Phuoc Long, the III Corps commander, Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong, resigned. His replacement, named on 4 February 1975, was Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Toan, the Armor School commandant and former II Corps commander. Toan had been fired for corruption in November 1974 and replaced with Major General Phu. It was rumored in Saigon that, in spite of the corruption charges and other gossip that dogged Toan, Ambassador Martin had strongly recommended him to President Thieu. Whether that was true or not, the appointment was logical, since Toan had developed into one of the better ARVN tacticians.

Born on 6 October 1932 in Thua Thien province, Toan went to school in Hue. In 1951 he joined the Army and attended one of the first classes at Dalat, South Vietnam’s West Point. After his initial training, he went to armor school in France, and he remained an armor officer his entire career. He served mainly in his native I Corps area, and in 1967 he assumed command of the ARVN 2nd Division. Toan’s lifestyle was radically different from the antiseptic revolutionary life led by Tra and his jungle-bound comrades. Toan was a boisterous, heavyset man who enjoyed the perks of high rank. In particular, he had a well-known weakness for wine and women. In early 1972, while still commanding the 2nd Division, he was charged with raping a young girl in the officers’ club, but the charges were dismissed.⁷ Despite the rape charge and a deserved reputation for corruption, he was appointed to the II Corps command in 1972, mainly because of his ability to work well with the U.S. advisors; his career to that point had been largely undistinguished. Nonetheless, he surprised many observers by his tough and determined campaigning during the Easter Offensive. Regardless of his extracurricular activities, by 1974 he had achieved, in the opinion of Colonel Le Gro, “a deserved reputation as a forceful, if not brilliant field commander . . . [who] employed his forces with considerable skill.”⁸

Toan’s military style was the polar opposite of Tra’s. If Tra’s approach in the post-ceasefire period was the crafty maneuver for position, Toan was the poster boy for the American operational method. In II Corps he had constantly moved units to achieve local superiority against PAVN concentrations, and then shifted his units by air to the next hot spot. It was his main tactical principle, one he had honed to great effectiveness in 1973–74, when he rapidly shuttled units about the vast Central Highlands, reacting to one attack after another. Whether he could achieve a similar success in III Corps, given the more powerful PAVN forces and the restrictions on the use of helicopters, was a question no one asked. However, Thieu picked corps commanders on the basis of their loyalty as well as their ability, and there was no questioning Toan’s loyalty to Thieu.

Toan, it turned out, had few qualms about his new assignment, or about whether what had worked so successfully in a different environment in II Corps could be effectively transplanted. Toan was the third III Corps commander in six months, and he instantly recognized the seriousness of the situation. With typical gusto, he set about redeploying his regular units from a static defense. Toan wanted to free his divisions from territorial responsibility in order to regain the full mobility he believed so necessary to successfully defend against an enemy able to mass and achieve numerical superiority. While ARVN divisions since 1970 were no longer responsible for protecting a specific area, after the ceasefire they still had the secondary role of supporting RF forces in securing territory. With the departure of American air support and the aid cutbacks, ARVN mobility had sharply decreased in the last two years, and the divisions once again had assumed more of a fixed posture.

With his reduced resources, Toan had to design a more efficient scheme to protect vital points like Tay Ninh, regain territory recently captured by the enemy, and defend Saigon in the event of a major offensive. While Toan’s options were limited, he quickly sent out new orders: the 25th Division, formerly responsible for defending Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia provinces, would now focus solely on Tay Ninh. The defense of Hau Nghia province was turned over to the RF/PF. Hau Nghia provincial troops had fought extremely well in 1972, and were considered among the best in South Vietnam. The 5th Division would concentrate on the area north of Saigon, the main avenue of attack during the Tet Offensive in 1968. The 18th would deploy one regiment to Xuan Loc and one regiment to Tanh Linh/Hoai Duc, leaving one regiment free for immediate corps reserve. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Brigade was put on permanent alert as a strike force and general corps reserve, ready to “intervene anywhere.”⁹

Toan needed to reconfigure the corps quickly, since U.S. intelligence had picked up ominous indicators of new Communist attacks in March. The Americans’ analysis of Tra’s plan was nearly perfect. Le Gro wrote: “Main force units are continuing preparations for major attacks, with the principal communist concentrations in Tay Ninh and Long Khanh Provinces. In Tay Ninh, the major goal is reportedly to either overrun or isolate Tay Ninh City. Intermediate objectives may be Tri Tam and outlying GVN positions around the provincial capital. A Communist force structure of 10 to 11 regiments, supported by armor and artillery, could be committed. . . . A Communist attack at Tri Tam could result in its loss.”¹⁰

The accuracy of Le Gro’s analysis was even more remarkable given the lengths to which the Communists had gone to hide their plans. At the end of a mid-February COSVN conference, Pham Hung ordered all echelons to carry out this new strategy in the strictest secrecy. Planning was held so tightly that even after attending the conference, the 4th Corps commander was unaware of the full scope of B-2’s strategy. Hoang Cam wrote: “We did not know the date and time of the offensive or the specific supporting sectors because during this period the maintenance of secrecy was of paramount importance.” All Cam knew was that “the operations of 4th Corps were part of a coordinated plan which also involved [all the other regions of South Vietnam]. We knew these operations were part of the 1975 strategic offensive plan approved by the Politburo, [and] the COSVN Military Headquarters had drafted a detailed plan to carry out its portion of the over-all plan in the B-2 theater of operations.”¹¹ In spite of Hung’s admonitions, U.S. intelligence quickly determined most of the likely avenues and locations for attacks.

Using this information, ARVN launched spoiling attacks in each of the divisional sectors in III Corps during the first week of March. Despite these sweep operations, Toan’s realignment of forces, and the outstanding U.S. intelligence analysis, the Communists’ preparations were mostly unaffected. In the sector northwest of Saigon, Hung and Tra’s plans called for twin attacks to cut off and envelop Tay Ninh City. Hoang Cam controlled the northern pincer, while Group 232’s commander, Nguyen Minh Chau, directed operations in the area south of Tay Ninh City. Their deputies would direct the other two fronts, Long Khanh and Dinh Tuong.

In the north, the 9th Division, with its 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Regiments, would seize the district capital of Tri Tam, located on Local Route 239 on the edge of the vast Michelin rubber plantation.¹² It would then clear away RF positions east to the Saigon River. COSVN picked Tri Tam rather than An Loc or Chon Thanh because the town was defended by RF troops, while battle-hardened Ranger units defended the other two locations. COSVN also hoped that the capture of Tri Tam would further isolate An Loc and Chon Thanh, and even lead to their abandonment. The southern PAVN pincer, the 303rd Division, would take the district town of Ben Cau and clear away all South Vietnamese regional outposts from the Cambodian border east to the Vam Co Dong River. Three Tay Ninh province local-force battalions would sever Local Route 22 (the road from Route 1 into Tay Ninh City), to prevent ARVN from using the road either for reinforcements or as an escape route. If successful, the pincers would capture two district seats and a large portion of the province. Tay Ninh City, a place of great symbolic importance to the GVN, would be surrounded.

COSVN had distinct reasons for picking these areas. Tri Tam was an important local road junction near Local Route 22. Whoever held it could block movement from Tay Ninh east into Binh Duong province, or south along the river to the Iron Triangle north of Cu Chi. The smaller town of Ben Cau also occupied an important crossroads. Its location along the only passable roads in the local swampy terrain enabled it to dominate the area. ARVN also realized the importance of these district towns. Although only RF battalions and Popular Force platoons defended Tri Tam and Ben Cau, each had solid fortifications with interlocking fields of fire and multiple defensive layers. Because of its location, Tri Tam had the strongest defenses. Three RF battalions and nine PF platoons defended dozens of outposts and blocking positions along the roads and into the countryside. Overall, both were important South Vietnamese resistance points.

Following Tra’s plan, a powerful force made up of the 9th Division reinforced by the independent 16th Infantry Regiment, several tank companies, two anti-aircraft battalions, and a dozen artillery pieces, including three of the deadly 130-mm guns, soon began gathering north of Tri Tam. On 10 March (concurrent with the first attack on Ban Me Thuot in II Corps), the three Tay Ninh local-force battalions struck the first blow. They launched ground attacks along the length of Local Route 22 from the junction at Go Dau Ha (where Routes 1 and 22 met south of the provincial capital) almost to Tay Ninh City. While the RF repulsed them in most places, the Communists seized a section of the road near the provincial capital and held it for several days.

With the roadblock in place, the next strike was at Tri Tam. At 5:00 A.M. on 11 March, two 9th Division regiments launched the main assault. Although they penetrated the outer defensive lines, the RF troops put up fierce resistance. Despite three tank-led attacks, the RF troops, backed by heavy artillery fire, held their ground. The RF even resorted to flooding the nearby fields to slow the PAVN tanks.

The stiff RF opposition shocked the 9th Division troops, and the PAVN regulars were forced to pull back. The next morning, however, they launched a stronger wave of attacks. According to the 9th Division’s history, “our soldiers fought the enemy for every house and every mound of dirt. The division sent in additional tanks . . . and 85-mm guns forward to provide direct fire support to the infantry. At the same time the division used the attached corps artillery to suppress the fire of the enemy artillery positions. . . . By 9:00 A.M. our troops had captured the communications compound and used explosives to destroy the underground bunker there, the enemy’s final defensive position. . . . The soldiers of 2nd Regiment raised [their] flag over the Tri Tam District Military Headquarters at 9:40 A.M. In the area of the triangular fort, enemy troops supported by armored vehicles and artillery continued to resist. On the morning of 13 March, after receiving additional reinforcements . . . 2nd Regiment launched a new attack that overran . . . [the final] concentration of enemy troops. . . . All enemy troops in the area, more than 2,000 men, were destroyed or dispersed on the spot. We captured 929 prisoners.”¹³

Despite the PAVN boasts, losses on both sides were heavy. The South Vietnamese claimed ten tanks destroyed and hundreds of North Vietnamese soldiers killed and wounded. However, half of the Tri Tam defenders were either killed, captured, or missing. A thousand others managed to escape. Tri Tam was the fifth district capital to fall in the last five days. Located only twenty-seven miles northwest of Saigon, it was also the closest district capital to Saigon that had been lost.

Shortly after the 9th Division made its assault, the 303rd Division also attacked. The 303rd was made up of the 201st, 205th, and 271st Infantry Regiments, and was reinforced by the 3rd Infantry Regiment, 5th Division, an anti-aircraft battalion, and seven captured armored vehicles. Like Tri Tam, however, Ben Cau was no pushover. ARVN had heavily fortified the area, and the flat, open terrain, cut by many canals and streams, greatly assisted the defenders. The Regional Forces stationed at Ben Cau were six hundred strong, while another five hundred men protected the outer perimeter of the town.

At dawn on 12 March, PAVN artillery fired a concentrated barrage at Ben Cau. Communist infantry then surged forward. However, the RF soldiers fought back using close-air and artillery support, and the PAVN troops were unable to penetrate the defenses. The North Vietnamese pulled back to focus their efforts on clearing outlying positions and bringing their 85-mm artillery guns forward to use as direct-fire weapons. By 2:00 P.M., several South Vietnamese PF platoons were forced to retreat, and the noose tightened around Ben Cau. At 5:00 P.M., PAVN artillery let loose with another heavy volley against the village, and the Communist troops once more charged forward. Again they failed to dislodge the valiant RF. Describing the action, the 303rd’s history notes: “The enemy put up an insane resistance. Enemy artillery savagely pounded our troop formations, and infantry launched death-defying counterattacks. When it became completely dark, all elements were forced to temporarily suspend their attacks.”¹⁴ The 303rd’s assaults on 13 March had been stopped in their tracks by effective fire support and the hard-fighting RF.

Faced with these setbacks, on the night of 13 March, the 303rd commander was forced to rethink his strategy: “In all . . . assigned sectors our units captured a number of outposts and killed or captured enemy troops, but they were not able to overrun the main targets. Faced with the realities of this situation, the division command group met with the regimental commanders . . . and decided that each sector would leave behind enough forces to surround and pressure the enemy while the bulk of the division withdrew to the rear to study its experiences and receive replacements and resupply for the next round of combat.”¹⁵

On the morning of 14 March, the 303rd mounted a fourth wave of attacks against Ben Cau and the outposts on Route 1. Superior numbers and firepower finally wore down the beleaguered defenders, and by late afternoon the 303rd controlled Ben Cau. Fighting throughout the night, North Vietnamese troops cleared the last RF outposts in their areas. After three days of brutal fighting, “The division’s mission during the first phase of the campaign was completed. The enemy bases from the western banks of the Vam Co Dong River to the Vietnamese–Cambodian border were crushed. A wide expanse of land from [Tay Ninh] down to the Mekong Delta was liberated.”¹⁶

After analyzing these initial attacks, Lieutenant General Toan concluded that the Communists intended either to take Tay Ninh City or to cut it off by connecting the two pincers at the important road junction of Go Dau Ha and capturing it. Toan was forced to choose one of two options regarding the province: pull the 25th Division, his only regular unit in the immediate area, out of Tay Ninh City in order to launch an attack to recover the lost district positions—thereby leaving the city defenseless and risking its loss—or mass his forces to defend the city.

Toan chose the city. He deployed the 25th’s three infantry regiments, the 46th, 49th, and 50th, around the town. He also assigned a company from the 81st Airborne Rangers to protect the city proper. Yet Toan was not totally boxed in. His earlier shuffling of his units had provided him some flexibility. Nor would he sit idly by and watch PAVN troops destroy two key defensive networks. The fire support provided to the besieged RF at Tri Tam and Ben Cau was, according to DAO reports, massive. During the week from 8 to 14 March, ARVN artillery fired almost 26,000 rounds and the VNAF flew 320 attack sorties in III Corps, losing one A-37 to an SA-7 anti-aircraft missile on 12 March. Besides fire support, Toan also committed his corps reserves to meet the threat to Tay Ninh province. On 11 March, Toan directed the 3rd Armored Cavalry Brigade and the 33rd Ranger Group to shift immediately to Go Dau Ha to hold that important road junction. Toan also assigned one battalion from the 7th Regiment, 5th Division, to the 3rd Armored. Brigadier General Tran Quang Khoi’s combined force of tanks, Rangers, and infantry would counterattack, with the ultimate objective of retaking Tri Tam. Toan also detached the 48th Infantry Regiment from the 18th Division and lifted it by helicopter to Go Dau Ha. Its mission was to clear Route 1 toward Cambodia.

All these maneuvers were typical Toan: he inserted his corps reserve, stripped less heavily engaged units to deal with a sudden threat, and cross-attached units as necessary. While his moves were a decisive response to a multi-division attack on the western flank, they badly weakened eastern III Corps just as the second, perhaps more important phase of the 4th Corps’s attacks was beginning. On the other hand, Toan had few options: the South Vietnamese had virtually no reserves anywhere in the country, and the Tay Ninh area was always viewed as the primary springboard for any major Communist attack on Saigon. Consequently, Toan had decided to use his reserves in the Tay Ninh area and hope for the best in the northeastern sector.

In that sector, Tran Van Tra sought to erode GVN control in Long Khanh province, capture Route 20, and pin down the ARVN 18th Division to prevent its deployment elsewhere in III Corps. His overall goal was to create a “liberated barrier” along the border of II and III Corps. The toughest mission, taking Route 20, fell to the 7th Division. Route 20 ran from Route 1 in Long Khanh province north through Lam Dong province to Dalat. In early February the 7th Division, made up of the 141st, 165th, and 209th Infantry Regiments, was ordered to scout the village of Dinh Quan on Route 20. Dinh Quan was a district capital located fourteen miles northwest of Xuan Loc, and was an important link in the road’s defenses. Once it was taken, the 7th would simultaneously attack in opposite directions along Route 20: to the southwest to seize the critical bridge over the nearby La Nga River, and to the northeast to capture Dalat. Capturing the road would sever the Highlands from central III Corps, just as capturing Ban Me Thuot and Quang Duc would isolate the Highlands from western III Corps.

When the 7th Division attacked Route 20, the 6th Division, now in eastern Long Khanh province, would capture Route 2, a road leading south from Xuan Loc to Route 15, the road to Vung Tau. It would then turn north and attack eastward from Xuan Loc along Route 1 into Binh Tuy province. MR-6’s 812th Regiment would capture Hoai Duc district and finish clearing northeastern Long Khanh and link up with the 6th Division, thereby isolating the coastal provinces from eastern III Corps. With the western, central, and now eastern sections of the border between II Corps and III Corps captured, South Vietnamese forces in II Corps would be blocked from retreating south. The country would be cut in half.

In late February the 7th Division’s unit commanders returned from their reconnaissance of the area. On 5 March Tra’s deputy, the newly promoted Lieutenant General Le Duc Anh, ordered the division to move through the jungle from Phuoc Long toward the ARVN outposts along Route 20, with the overrunning of the district capital, Dinh Quan, to be the key opening battle.¹⁷ Despite the Communists’ efforts to conceal their movements, U.S. and ARVN intelligence again discovered their plans when captured documents and two soldiers from the 7th who defected to ARVN revealed the presence of the reconnaissance team.

Soon after the Tri Tam/Ben Cau attacks, and after learning of the enemy movement toward Dinh Quan, on 16 March Toan ordered Brigadier General Le Minh Dao of the ARVN 18th Division to send two battalions of the 43rd Regiment to defend the town. The 2nd Battalion, 43rd Regiment, arrived in Dinh Quan that day and was deployed northwest of the town. The 1st Battalion and the regimental headquarters deployed to the La Nga Bridge. Dao left the 3rd Battalion near Hoai Duc to assist the RF in that area against the expected attack by the 812th Regiment. Dao’s 52nd Regiment held Xuan Loc and the critical road junction of Routes 1 and 20 northeast of Saigon, called Dau Giay by the Vietnamese. With his 48th Regiment detached to help defend Tay Ninh, Dao was now out of troops, as was the rest of III Corps. The territorial forces stationed on Route 2 south of Xuan Loc and east along Route 1—the targets of the 6th Division and the 812th Regiment—were on their own.

On 6 March the PAVN 7th Division departed Phuoc Long for the long march to Route 20. The Dong Nai River, however, lay between it and the road. With no ford or existing bridge, the division’s engineer battalion worked diligently to build a bridge to allow the troops and heavy equipment to cross. It was a tough assignment. “Countless problems and difficulties were encountered moving . . .across the river, but . . . in just three nights the entire division and its attached elements successfully crossed the Dong Nai and in total secrecy.”¹⁸

The delay in crossing the river, however, disrupted Tra’s plan to hit Tri Tam and Route 20 at the same time. On 12 March PAVN 4th Corps commander Major General Hoang Cam sent a cable to Bui Cat Vu, his deputy who was leading the Route 20 attack, encouraging him to get moving. Although the element of surprise was now lost, after receiving Cam’s message, Bui Cat Vu ordered the 7th Division to attack immediately. Early in the morning of 17 March the 141st Regiment struck Dinh Quan. Savage battles erupted on the ridgeline held by the ARVN 2nd Battalion, 43rd Regiment. After fighting lasting more than twenty-four hours, the PAVN forces finally secured the high ground overlooking the town. The 2nd Battalion retreated south to nearby Tran Mountain and dug in on the high ground near the La Nga River bridge. The 141st Regiment quickly attacked Dinh Quan, and the town fell late on 18 March.

The next target was the La Nga Bridge. The 2nd Battalion was on one side of the river, the 1st Battalion garrisoned the other side. The bridge itself was held by an RF company. But following the original plan, the PAVN forces soon pushed down Route 20. On the morning of 20 March, their commanders threw two fresh battalions from the 209th Regiment against the 2nd Battalion on Tran Mountain. The 141st remained behind at Dinh Quan to recover. The Communist troops charged the 2nd Battalion’s positions several times, but were driven off. On the third assault, the 2nd’s commander, Major Nguyen Huu Che, ordered two 105-mm howitzers loaded up with anti-personnel rounds and fired straight into the massed Communist attackers. The devastating blasts halted that attack.¹⁹

Ignoring their losses, in late afternoon the Communists attacked again. To deal with this new threat, Major Che called in air support. Unfortunately, a VNAF F-5E mistakenly hit the battalion’s position with its bombs, causing many ARVN casualties. After the errant bombing, Che’s hold on the mountain was growing tenuous. In fighting two PAVN regiments for four days, the 2nd Battalion had suffered over eighty casualties. Because of other attacks in Long Khanh province, Brigadier General Dao was unable to reinforce the battalion. With no choice other than to retreat or be over-run, at midnight Dao ordered the battalion to pull back to Xuan Loc. At dawn, the PAVN regiment swept down toward the bridge. Unable to hold off the advancing enemy, the RF commander at the bridge called in an artillery strike directly on his own position next to the bridge abutment. In an effort to prevent PAVN from seizing the bridge, the RF commander had deliberately sacrificed himself. It was in vain. Although the artillery killed a dozen PAVN soldiers, not to mention the valiant RF commander, the bridge still fell to the North Vietnamese. Its flank now unhinged, the 1st Battalion also retreated. The 7th Division had succeeded in its first mission.

Meanwhile, unknown to ARVN, in late February the 341st Division had secretly arrived in the B-2 Front from North Vietnam and was officially assigned to the 4th Corps. On 2 March, after attaching the 273rd Infantry Regiment to the 9th Division, COSVN ordered the 341st Division commander to “Study the Route 20 area from the La Nga Bridge to the Dau Giay intersection and Xuan Loc City. Make all necessary preparations to conduct a large-scale massed battle of annihilation when so ordered.”²⁰ The division commander and his staff officers left to make a personal reconnaissance of this sector. In late March the 4th Corps ordered the 341st Division’s two newly arrived regiments, the 266th and 270th, to take over the Dinh Quan area from the 7th Division. The 270th Regiment was to defend the newly captured territory, while the 266th would attack southwest along Route 20 to seize the next district town, Kiem Tan.

Dao was well aware of the need to prevent the Communists from pushing further down Route 20. On 28 March he sent the 2nd Battalion, 52nd Regiment, to recapture the lost territory. As the battalion slowly moved north, it ran straight into the deploying 270th Regiment. This was the regiment’s first combat action. The battle raged from early in the morning of 29 March to late the next day, but ended in a stalemate.

On Dao’s second front, the PAVN 6th Division timed its road and outpost clearing operation to coincide with the 7th Division’s attack. Between 15 and 18 March, the PAVN soldiers swept north along Route 2. The 6th then struck east of Xuan Loc, overrunning Chua Chan Mountain, the important high ground due east of the town. By 28 March, the 6th controlled a thirty-mile section of Route 1 from Chua Chan into Binh Tuy. The last road artery from Saigon to central Vietnam had been cut, preventing ARVN from using Route 1 to assist II Corps.

A few hours before the 7th’s attack on Dinh Quan, the 812th Regiment opened fire on Dao’s third front, attacking the town of Vo Dac, the Hoai Duc district headquarters. The stalwart RF troops of Vo Dac, who had survived a thirty-day siege during the Phase One attacks, fought off repeated attacks for three days. Becoming impatient with the failure to seize the district headquarters, Tra demanded on the night of 19 March that the 812th immediately finish off the town. In the early-morning hours of 20 March, after a massive preparatory artillery barrage, the 812th Regiment’s assault troops stormed into Vo Dac. After capturing the town, the 812th turned on the last remaining ARVN element in the area, Dao’s 3rd Battalion, 43rd Regiment, which was defending some nearby high ground. After two days of fighting, Dao ordered his battalion to retreat back to Xuan Loc. Shortly thereafter, the 812th linked up with a 6th Division reconnaissance element. The 812th had accomplished its mission, and Hoai Duc was added to the liberated area of Tanh Linh. Although badly behind schedule, the 812th now turned to complete the second part of its mission: helping the 7th Division clear Route 20 and capture the provinces of Lam Dong and Tuyen Duc.

A LONELY RETREAT

Back in II Corps, with Major General Phu’s attention focused on the column of soldiers and civilians retreating down Route 7B, he had ignored the three surviving provinces in the southern Highlands: Quang Duc, Lam Dong, and Tuyen Duc. Although the South Vietnamese had resettled many civilian refugees from Loc Ninh and An Loc in Lam Dong, the three provinces remained isolated and sparsely populated. Only the city of Dalat in Tuyen Duc province held any true significance for the South Vietnamese. It was the home of their National Military Academy and the old summer residence of the emperor and his family. Many of the country’s elite owned vacation residences around the city.

After the PAVN 10th Division’s capture of Duc Lap in northern Quang Duc in early March, the three battalions of the 24th Ranger Group pulled back to defend the southern part of the province, including the district seat of Kien Duc and the capital, Gia Nghia. On 20 March COSVN’s 271B Regiment surrounded the 82nd Ranger Battalion at Kien Duc, preventing the Rangers from retreating.²¹ Shortly thereafter, the 271B left one battalion behind to pin down the Rangers, and then advanced toward Gia Nghia. Two days later the Quang Duc province chief radioed Phu to report that Gia Nghia was under heavy artillery attack, and Communist forces had reached the local airfield. Despite two days of resistance by RF forces, on 24 March the 271B Regiment captured Gia Nghia. The seizure of Quang Duc province secured Dung’s southern flank and prevented any counterattack against Ban Me Thuot from that direction.

Although encircled, the 82nd Rangers refused to surrender. On 21 March, in hand-to-hand combat they fought their way through PAVN lines and linked up with the rest of the Ranger group the next day. But with the fall of Gia Nghia, the 24th Ranger Group was stranded far from the coast, without a means of being resupplied with food, water, or ammunition. Since all II Corps helicopters were tied up helping the retreating column on Route 7B, the group commander was ordered to march his unit southeast through the jungle to Lam Dong province to help friendly units defend the city of Bao Loc. It was a long walk to Bao Loc, yet the Rangers set off. Misfortune struck the next day when a Ranger stepped on a mine, killing him and wounding the group commander. The injured colonel was flown out by helicopter, and the 82nd Battalion commander, Major Vuong Mong Long, took over command of the column.

At the same time as the 24th Rangers began their retreat, the PAVN 7th Division turned its attention to taking Lam Dong province and its two major towns, Bao Loc and the provincial capital, Di Linh. The main attack element, supported by tanks and anti-aircraft artillery, drove straight up Route 20 to attack the cities head on. By 4:00 P.M. on 31 March both towns had been captured, the RF survivors were escaping toward Dalat, and Lam Dong province had fallen. Now Tuyen Duc was only the Highland province that remained under South Vietnamese control.

Surrounded by a sea of red, Dalat had been preparing its defenses for an attack. Major General Lam Quang Tho, the commandant of the Dalat Military Academy, had received orders to command Dalat’s defense. But with the fall of Di Linh, Tho knew he was surrounded. He had only two options: stay and fight, or retreat. Since the Academy’s cadets were desperately needed to recoup the terrible losses the South Vietnamese armed forces had suffered, Tho decided to retreat. After securing Route 11 to the city of Phan Rang, the only road to the coast, the cadets and instructors departed by truck on the night of 31 March. They reached Phan Rang with relative ease on the morning of 1 April and continued on to Binh Tuy province, from which they were airlifted back to Saigon.

However, Tho had left everyone else behind. Shocked by the sudden evacuation of the school, the RF troops crumbled. Monitoring ARVN radio networks, the 812th Regiment learned that Dalat was defenseless, and it moved quickly to occupy the city. It arrived in Dalat on the morning of 3 April and took control of the city. Dalat had fallen without a shot being fired.

The retreating 24th Rangers, however, knew none of this. Cutting through the dense jungle, they stayed alive by ambushing Communist trucks and raiding old guerrilla bases for food and water. The Rangers finally reached the outskirts of Bao Loc on 2 April, but Major Long realized they were too late when he saw “the red flag on the roof of the city hall. We turned north hoping to see a friendly force in Dalat. On 4 April, BBC radio said that Dalat had fallen. . . . On 5 April 1975, I made radio contact with Lieutenant Colonel Loc, who was flying around the Dalat area searching for my force.”²² The 82nd was flown to Phan Thiet and then to Xuan Loc. The other two battalions were picked up over the next couple of days and also taken to Phan Thiet, where they remained to help defend the city. Major Long had led the 24th Ranger Group on a harrowing retreat for almost two weeks, surviving on captured rations and stream water. When he departed Quang Duc, he had 450 men in his 82nd Battalion; only 310 made it to Xuan Loc. But of all the Ranger groups in II Corps, only the 24th survived largely intact.

While Tra’s plans were bearing fruit on the western, northern, and eastern side of Saigon, they were not going smoothly to the south, in the Mekong Delta. After receiving the initial COSVN guidance on targets, MR-8 requested permission to instead concentrate its efforts in only three districts west of My Tho, the Delta’s second-largest city. These three districts had always been hotly contested, mostly because they were heavily populated, were a rich rice-producing region, and controlled a long section of Route 4. The capture of this territory would enable the Communists to directly threaten My Tho. Tra especially wanted to link his troops in this region with the 303rd Division elements advancing south from Hau Nghia province.

As in III Corps, the South Vietnamese in the Mekong Delta knew the Communist forces were coming and strove to disrupt their plans. In early March ARVN communication intercepts located the PAVN 8th Division headquarters approximately five miles northeast of My Tho. The ARVN 7th Division made several sweeps looking for the division headquarters, and uncovered two large ammunition caches. Between the new intelligence, heavy PAVN casualties earlier in the year, and the ammunition loss, Le Gro was convinced that any attacks by “PAVN units would be . . . with inexperienced fillers and with inadequate tactical advantage.”²³

He was right again. While several outposts were lost, the ARVN 7th Division kept the critical Route 4 open and repulsed the attacks by the PAVN 8th Division near My Tho. In spite of these successes, however, ARVN prospects in the Delta looked bleak. According to DAO analysts, “The apparent overall objective during the past week has been to expand and consolidate PAVN terrain holdings, while playing upon scare factor to keep ARVN reaction forces locked into potentially critical trouble spots. They have succeeded somewhat on both counts and have forced RVNAF to utilize its entire monthly allotted air support by the 13th of the month. The IV Corps Commander, Major General Nguyen Khoa Nam, recently stated that Communist forces can replace men and equipment with less trouble than RVNAF, and it is just this factor, among others, that the PAVN will try to exploit. Their ability to continue the deterioration process is underscored by the fact that a respectable [series of attacks] was launched following over three weeks of preemptive RVNAF strikes.”²⁴

While PAVN had made dozens of small but sharp ground attacks all across the Delta, it had not seriously disrupted the ARVN formations or seized any significant territory. It had, however, accomplished the important goal of tying down the three ARVN divisions in the Delta. Any hope of moving units to support III Corps, as had been done with the ARVN 21st Division during the 1972 offensive, was now out of the question, unless the South Vietnamese were willing to cede large tracts of the countryside to the enemy.

KHOI SAVES TAY NINH

While Toan believed the pincers north and south of Tay Ninh City would attempt to link up at Go Dau Ha, the junction of Route 1 and Local Route 22, in fact Tra’s plan called for the bulk of the 303rd Division pincer to turn in the opposite direction, into Hau Nghia province. The division left one regiment to take Go Dau Ha while the rest marched away from the town. Unaware of the PAVN strategy, Brigadier General Tran Quang Khoi stopped his efforts to retake Tri Tam and turned his attention to holding Go Dau Ha. Taking advantage of numerous air strikes, Khoi succeeded in holding the town, although enemy elements came within one mile of it. Believing Khoi had stopped the PAVN assault, Toan then ordered him to use his attached 48th Regiment to recapture Route 1 from Go Dau Ha to Cambodia. Using more air strikes and heavy amounts of artillery, the 48th began slowly advancing against stiff resistance. For the North Vietnamese, a successful move by the 48th along Route 1 would dangerously threaten the rear of the 303rd Division as it continued the attack into Hau Nghia. To prevent this potential disaster, the 303rd Division commander pulled back one of the infantry battalions headed to Hau Nghia to reinforce the regiment trying to block the South Vietnamese advance.

Despite the orders to hold Route 1, PAVN gave ground. In one engagement, most of one company was wiped out. Seeing ARVN forces pushing along Route 1, Tra ordered the PAVN 9th Division to attack on Khoi’s other flank near Tri Tam to force Toan to pull the 48th back to assist the 3rd Armored against this sudden maneuver. On 23 March one regiment from the 9th drove the newly reconstituted 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment, 5th Division (the unit that had been decimated at Phuoc Long), from the town of Truong Mit near Local Route 22, shattering the ARVN battalion in the process. Three-quarters of the unit were killed, wounded, or missing.

Khoi immediately reacted to the loss of Truong Mit by sending two of his brigade’s combined armor and Ranger task forces to retake the town. The 9th Division was pressing south when it ran into the 3rd Armored. A major battle erupted on 24 March. After fierce fighting, Khoi’s tanks and Rangers blasted through the Communist forces and recaptured Truong Mit, killing over one hundred soldiers and capturing many weapons. Still, the 9th Division gambit paid off. Faced with the larger threat at Truong Mit, Khoi pulled the 48th Regiment advancing on Route 1 back to hold Go Dau Ha.

Overall, it was a desperate game Toan and Khoi were playing, with Khoi as fireman, bouncing back and forth between the two flanks within Tay Ninh province, putting out one blaze after another. It was a brilliant orchestration of men and equipment, one that required excellent staff work and logistical planning. But if more units were chewed up as the 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment, had been, Toan would have even fewer options.

Simply put, Toan needed more reserves. Earlier, at the GVN National Security Council meeting on 13 March, President Thieu had given Toan permission to redeploy his Ranger units. III Corps controlled three Ranger groups: the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd. The 33rd was working with the 3rd Armored. The battle-tested 31st Ranger Group was the former 3rd Ranger Group, which had gallantly withstood the hell of An Loc. It currently defended the town of Chon Thanh on Route 13, but it was surrounded by Communist troops and could only be resupplied by air. The nearest ARVN outpost was ten miles south of Chon Thanh. The 32nd, stationed at An Loc, twelve miles north of Chon Thanh on Route 13, was even more isolated. An Loc was the Binh Long province capital and held the III Corps Ranger Command, but the town’s psychological importance was far greater: the heroic defense of An Loc in 1972 had been the most glorious South Vietnamese feat of arms of the war. However, neither An Loc nor Chon Thanh was of any further military value. Each Ranger group had three battalions, and these veteran units were needed to bolster the hard-pressed ARVN defenders closer to Saigon.

Long anticipating another Communist assault on An Loc, the III Corps Ranger commander, Colonel Nguyen Thanh Chuan, had ordered his units to prepare for a long siege. They had stockpiled a ninety-day supply of fuel, food, and ammunition. Colonel Chuan could not imagine abandoning a town that thousands of South Vietnamese soldiers had died to protect. He was stunned, therefore, when the ARVN 5th Division commander, Brigadier General Le Nguyen Vy, arrived by helicopter to deliver the bad news: Lieutenant General Toan had ordered all units to evacuate An Loc. Chuan had five days to prepare to withdraw back to Chon Thanh.

Chuan and many of his Ranger officers were deeply upset at having to abandon An Loc, but they followed orders. Chuan planned a phased evacuation of the city. First, he would lift out his artillery, evacuate the civilians, and burn all supplies and equipment. Once this was accomplished, helicopters would carry out the III Corps Ranger Command, the province headquarters, and one battalion from the 32nd Group. The other two battalions and the regional forces would then march overland and link up with the 31st Ranger Battalion from Chon Thanh, which would be sent to meet them halfway. Secrecy was crucial, for if the enemy got wind of the evacuation and suddenly attacked in the middle of the ARVN withdrawal, it would be disastrous.

Chuan executed the first two parts of his plan without incident. Now his remaining battalions had to walk through a jungle completely controlled by the enemy. The battalions departed at nightfall. In spite of a few small clashes, the Rangers moved swiftly and arrived unscathed in Chon Thanh on 20 March. One reason for their success was that Tra had stripped his regular troops from An Loc to use in Tay Ninh, leaving only local guerrillas to guard Route 13. The successful withdrawal from An Loc caught PAVN napping, and Tra reacted with fury to this major embarrassment. He ordered the 9th Division to eliminate Chon Thanh immediately.

Anticipating the PAVN attack on Chon Thanh, Chuan quickly developed a new defensive system based on his one RF and six Ranger battalions, plus eleven M-41 tanks and artillery. The Rangers had long ago turned Chon Thanh into a fortress. A ditch surrounded the base, and behind the ditch was a wall of sandbags covered with earth six feet high. Firing ports through which tanks and other heavy weapons could fire had been cut in the wall. With two Ranger groups, Chuan believed he could withstand almost any enemy attack. However, as soon as he had completed his plans, Toan told him to release the 32nd Ranger Group so it could be sent to Tay Ninh. Flabbergasted, Chuan begged Toan to allow him to retain at least one battalion, to which Toan agreed. The 32nd Group was soon lifted out, leaving one battalion behind.

The 9th Division sent most of two regiments, supported by local forces and a battalion of tanks, to attack Chon Thanh. There was no time for reconnaissance or probing attacks. Tra wanted immediate results. The plan was simple: a frontal assault by tanks, followed by waves of infantry. At 9:30 A.M. on 24 March, PAVN launched its first attack. Artillery pounded the Rangers’ positions, and then the tanks moved in. The Rangers were waiting for them. Holding their fire until the armor was close, the Rangers cut loose with a ferocious barrage of anti-tank rockets and recoilless-rifle fire. First one, then three, then seven T-54s were burning. As the PAVN infantry tried to move forward, Chuan hammered them with air strikes and artillery. By early afternoon the battle was over. Seven T-54s had been damaged or destroyed, and over a hundred enemy soldiers were dead or wounded. The PAVN 9th Division pulled back to lick its wounds. Many North Vietnamese soldiers had paid for Tra’s impatience with their lives.

Realizing the ARVN forces at Chon Thanh would be a tougher foe than the RF troops they had been fighting, the 4th Corps ordered the 273rd Regiment, 341st Division, which had been holding blocking positions on Route 13 south of Chon Thanh, to send two battalions to join the 9th Division in attacking the town. One battalion was left behind to stop any ARVN reinforcements moving up Route 13. Meanwhile, the 9th Division would make another assault on 27 March. Apparently the PAVN commanders had become over-confident, because they did not change tactics. Again they started with a preparatory barrage and then sent in the tanks and infantry. The results this time were even worse. The PAVN columns were smashed before they even got close. After two attacks, ARVN claimed 240 men killed and eleven T-54s destroyed. Colonel Chuan’s troops had lost less than fifty dead and wounded.

The 9th Division commander now realized that only a larger force could take the town. He ordered his third regiment to disengage from Tay Ninh and move to Chon Thanh. By 30 March, the 9th Division’s three infantry regiments, plus the 273rd Regiment, the remaining tanks, and fifteen heavy artillery pieces, including the three 130-mms, were in position to attack. At dawn on 31 March, the 9th Division commander stood in his command post and gave the order to fire. All hell broke loose as three thousand rounds poured into the Ranger positions. Mortar and artillery shells churned up minefields and smashed bunkers. For over two hours PAVN rained explosives on the surrounded Rangers. Then the attack signal was given. The remaining tanks surged forward, followed by hundreds of North Vietnamese infantrymen attacking from multiple directions. Although heavily outnumbered, the dogged Rangers did not yield. Three times the Communist troops breached the defensive perimeter, but the Rangers, fighting with fierce determination, threw them out. The vastly outnumbered and exhausted Rangers had stopped cold an entire reinforced PAVN division and destroyed even more tanks.

Colonel Chuan’s joy, however, was short-lived. One Ranger officer later wrote that while aerial resupply continued, “the amount of supplies we could bring in steadily decreased in the face of the heavy wall of enemy anti-aircraft fire. The enemy anti-aircraft and the artillery attacks raining down on this tiny district capital seemed to be worse than during the battle of An Loc. With the number of defenders we had, the continual attrition, and no reinforcements coming in . . . the pressure was too great. The enemy was determined to take this tiny district capital to open the road for its advance on. . .Saigon. By the ninth day of the siege there were virtually no more medical evacuation or resupply flights. Helicopters were no longer able to land, even if the pilots were skilled.”²⁵Realizing his predicament, that afternoon, Chuan requested permission to withdraw to Lai Khe. Toan approved the request. Toan believed that the Rangers would soon be overrun anyway, and he desperately needed them for other fronts.

At 10:00 P.M. on 31 March, Colonel Chuan called all the senior Ranger officers together to announce the evacuation. For the Rangers, this second order to retreat was a personal affront to their honor. They had held their ground with enormous courage against a determined foe. To retreat while undefeated was unthinkable. Still, they were soldiers, and soldiers obey orders despite their personal feelings. After quick planning, the exodus took place during the night of 1 April, just as the PAVN forces were massing for another attack the next morning. The VNAF launched a series of heavy bombing raids as a diversion. The Rangers destroyed their remaining tanks and artillery and then infiltrated through the Communist lines. Each of the battalions moved separately, but not without losses. The 52nd Battalion got lost, bumped into an ambush, and took moderate losses. The RF battalion suffered the same fate. Still, while the majority of the 31st Ranger Group retreated in good order and, after refitting, could now be deployed elsewhere, the North Vietnamese had captured all of Binh Long province and had compressed ARVN’s defensive line even closer to Saigon.

AN AMBITIOUS GENERAL

Tra’s Phase Two attacks were now complete. He had accomplished almost everything he had set out to do. After a month of heavy fighting, the Communists had succeeded in “expanding [our] lines of communications so they could be used to move large numbers of troops and large quantities of supplies and technical equipment to the critical battlefield of [Saigon].”²⁶ By concentrating his main-force units on RF troops holding district towns, Tra had taken far lighter losses than he would have if he had sent them against regular ARVN units. Still, Tra was not satisfied. He believed his units “were making slow progress and that our armed forces were not strong enough to fully exploit the situation. [Pham Hung] sent several messages requesting the Politburo to urgently send additional forces.”²⁷ Tra hoped the Politburo would follow the strategy discussed during the planning sessions for the offensive—namely, that if the South Vietnamese forces in II Corps collapsed after the fall of Ban Me Thuot, PAVN units in the Highlands would wheel south to attack Saigon.

Writing after the war, Giap is clear that this was also his preferred strategy. However, he was reluctant to overrule Dung, who had given persuasive reasons for wanting to finish the job in II Corps. Dung also resisted an attempt by Tra to tempt him to move his forces toward Saigon. On 22 March, Tra sent a cable to Dung describing the results of the B-2 Front’s campaign thus far. As Tra later wrote, while he acknowledged that Dalat was within B-2’s area of responsibility, his forces “were small and had to move in close to Saigon and thus could not . . . liberate Tuyen Duc. After the Highlands were liberated our strong forces there could come down to take Dalat, then continue on to [B-2] very conveniently and promptly. Therefore I sent a message to Dung . . . recommending that he send forces down to liberate Dalat because our forces had to advance to Saigon and could not go to Dalat.”²⁸

Dung did not fall for Tra’s trap. On 23 March Tra received a cable from Dung explaining that while Saigon would eventually be attacked, for the moment Dung’s forces would continue toward the coast. Dung said he believed PAVN needed to prepare the battlefield first, i.e., clean out the ARVN forces in II Corps to ensure that his rear was secure. While he refrained from saying so, Dung thought that Tra’s proposal was premature. While ARVN troops in III and IV Corps had been stunned by the Communist advances, “we had not yet scored any earthshaking victories in [the B-2] area, and so the enemy had not yet fallen apart.”²⁹ Whether Dung was stiff-arming his rival or whether he truly believed that PAVN needed to first secure greater victories remains a matter of conjecture.

Tra, of course, disagreed. He writes that he felt disappointed after reading the message. He believed that if the B-3 forces, especially the 10th Division, had moved into western MR-7, he could have taken Saigon earlier. Oddly, while Tra argued with Dung about the turn toward Saigon, at the same time he was rejecting a similar proposal from one of his own commanders. After reviewing the rapidly changing situation, on 19 March Hoang Cam sent an urgent message to Tra. He recommended that instead of sending the 7th Division north to attack Lam Dong, it continue to advance south on Route 20 to take the Dau Giay intersection and Xuan Loc and destroy the ARVN 18th Division. Cam wrote:

The enemy is now changing his strategic disposition of forces, abandoning a number of locations and pulling back to hold Saigon and the coastal lowlands. In this situation, if we can quickly destroy another element of the 18th Division . . .we will create conditions which will enable us to liberate Xuan Loc. . . . Our first step would be to move 7th Division down to . . . destroy 1st Battalion, 43rd Regimental Task Force. . . . When COSVN’s 341st Division arrives, it and 6th Division will liberate [Dau Giay] . . . destroy additional elements of 18th Division, and liberate Xuan Loc. If we delay, the enemy will be able to move elements of his strategic reserves up to reinforce Xuan Loc. In that case we will not only have lost our opportunity, we will also have to leave forces behind to hold [a section of Route 20] and the La Nga Bridge and defend our newly liberated areas. If we expand our attack up to Lam Dong as currently planned, victory will be certain but we will not be able to open fire until 28 March at the earliest. If, on the other hand, we turn around and liberate Route 20 down to Dau Giay the enemy will have no hope of being able to clear the road. In that case Lam Dong will no longer be of any use to them, and they may voluntarily withdraw from Lam Dong as they have from other locations.³⁰

It was a bold move that might have produced spectacular results. If the 7th Division had continued south and if the 6th Division had pinned the bulk of the 18th ARVN at Xuan Loc, only one Airborne brigade would have stood between the 7th Division and Saigon. The sudden appearance of an enemy division on Saigon’s eastern flank might have sparked panic. Tra, however, denied Cam’s request, ordering him to “continue to expand our line of communications to the north in order to create springboard positions for the attack on Saigon in the Route 1 and Route 20 sectors north and east of Saigon.”³¹

Then the situation suddenly changed. On the afternoon of 29 March, Danang fell, and Le Duan decided to gamble. Heady with victory, he sent a message to Pham Hung telling him to go for broke with just his existing forces. In the chaotic situation resulting from the collapse of I Corps, one hard push now might topple Thieu. Le Duan’s message said: “The revolution in the South has entered a stage of development by leaps and bounds. . . . The enemy has suffered extremely heavy and unexpected setbacks [and] is facing the danger of rapid collapse, militarily and politically. I fully agree with you that at this moment we should act with great timeliness, determination, and boldness. . . . While urgently and promptly carrying out the strategic decision that has been made, I want to stress an urgent requirement: immediately fulfill the mission of carrying out a strategic interdiction and encirclement, and cutting off Saigon. As a matter of fact, we can consider that the campaign for the liberation of Saigon has begun.”³²

Tra was jubilant. “[Le Duan’s] message to COSVN affirmed that the situation would develop rapidly, and that it was necessary to step up our attacks and move closer to Saigon. If we won additional victories on the battlefields, Saigon itself might be thrown into chaos.”³³ Finally freed from the General Staff’s restraints, Tra would not wait for Dung or the arrival of any reinforcements from the North. He would conquer Saigon by himself.