15

“HOLD FAST THE REMAINING LAND”

THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FIGHT BACK

With the hectic events of 1 April—the shattering of the 3rd Airborne Brigade’s defensive line at the M’Drak Pass, the appearance of North Vietnamese tanks at the town of Ninh Hoa, and the news that Phu’s headquarters had fled Nha Trang—South Vietnamese control along the central coast disintegrated. Chaos, spreading like a plague borne by thousands of fleeing civilians and retreating ARVN troops, quickly reached south to Cam Ranh Bay and nearby villages and towns. By late afternoon on that day, only the sleepy town of Phan Rang, the next major city south on Route 1, remained largely free of panic. Phan Rang was the capital of Ninh Thuan province, and is located fifty miles southwest of Nha Trang,

That would not remain true for long, however. After returning from Pham Van Phu’s mid-morning meeting in Nha Trang—his last meeting as commander of II Corps—Air Force Brigadier General Pham Ngoc Sang, commander of the 6th Air Division, faced a rapidly deteriorating situation at his headquarters at Thanh Son airbase outside Phan Rang.¹ Crowds of civilians and soldiers had forced their way onto the airfield, looking for a plane ride to Saigon. To add to the confusion, following orders from VNAF headquarters in Saigon, the Air Force units at Nha Trang had hastily abandoned the city that afternoon and withdrawn to Thanh Son. Instead of conducting an organized departure, the VNAF crews had grabbed their families and ferried them to Thanh Son, stranding everyone else. Sang now had most of two air divisions—the 2nd and the 6th—crowded onto the airbase.

As night fell on 1 April, the situation confronting Sang was grim. He later wrote: “the base was very empty because a large number of the RF soldiers guarding the perimeter of the airbase had deserted. On the base itself a number of young soldiers were firing their guns wildly out of ignorance and fear. In the city . . . the population was in a state of shock and confusion. Convoys of military and civilian vehicles crammed with people jammed Routes 1 and 11 as they drove south, fleeing the enemy.”² The men of his 6th Air Division were frightened and worried. To prevent further disruption, Sang ordered the gates closed and the base sealed to entry. There were simply too few men to guard the massive airbase—built for American jet aircraft, Thanh Son airfield formed a square, roughly three miles in each dimension. However, like a gift from the heavens, late that night Lieutenant Colonel Le Van Phat, together with his 3rd Airborne Brigade headquarters and a portion of one battalion, arrived at the base entrance on trucks and requested permission to enter. Sang checked with VNAF headquarters in Saigon, which swiftly granted authorization. Sang asked Phat to have his troops assist in base security and clear away some local guerrillas who had crept close to the airfield.

Phat’s arrival, while solving the security problem at Thanh Son, did nothing to stem the bedlam. Early in the morning of 2 April, Air Force Brigadier General Nguyen Van Luong, commander of the 2nd Air Division, departed the Phan Rang airbase in his C-47 for the Tan Son Nhut airbase in Saigon. As soon as Luong left, the helicopters and airplanes from his 2nd Air Division that had fled Nha Trang to Thanh Son quickly followed, setting off a frenzied exodus. One of Sang’s senior officers remembered it later: “The sight of aircraft flooding out onto the runway and competing with one another in a race to take off turned Thanh Son Air Base, which had been peaceful, into a place of total chaos. Thousands of soldiers and their families, who were waiting for evacuation at the control tower, suddenly panicked, and all semblance of order collapsed. Every time an aircraft arrived, everyone surged toward it, fighting to get on board. The MPs and the control-tower personnel were helpless, especially since the crowds of soldiers included men with weapons that began firing indiscriminately.”³

In the midst of this bedlam, fortune again smiled on Brigadier General Sang. The Australian government had responded to South Vietnam’s pleas for humanitarian assistance with its massive refugee problem by sending several C-130 military transport planes to assist in the evacuation. The first one arrived at Tan Son Nhut on the morning of 31 March, with its initial mission to help move civilians out of Thanh Son. The Australian C-130 flew to the airfield on 1 April, but because of the chaotic conditions resulting from the arrival of the airplanes and helicopters from Nha Trang, it was unable to land. It returned to Tan Son Nhut. A second C-130 arrived in Saigon later that same day, and another attempt was made with both planes on 2 April.

At first the flights went smoothly, but turmoil soon broke out again. According to an Australian historian, “In the course of making five or six flights that day, the two aircraft became caught up in the pandemonium associated with the evacuation of the city in the face of the expected enemy onslaught. At one stage a C-130 was mobbed by refugees and ARVN personnel who panicked when four rockets landed about 400 [yards] away, prompting a soldier to fire warning shots into the air. Unfortunately this man was standing under the aircraft’s elevator at the time, and several rounds holed the aircraft’s tail. . . . Later . . . on the last flight of the day, [the plane was] blocked by two fuel tankers while the control tower sought some assurances that [the planes] would be returning. Although he knew this would not be the case, only after [the pilot] said they would be back were the tankers driven aside to let him take off. In the course of this day’s operations some 1,500–1,800 refugees were taken out to Can Tho.”⁴ Given the chaos, the Australians decided to halt the emergency flights.

Meanwhile, in addition to the hundreds of civilians mobbing the airbase, thousands of other people escaping south on Route 1 were now engulfing Phan Rang. Worse, the ARVN deserters from I Corps who had arrived on the ships docking at Cam Ranh Bay, plus the remnants of some II Corps units, had formed a convoy and were streaming down Route 1, looting as they went. Unable to cope with the armed rioters, and fearing the imminent arrival of PAVN tanks, the Ninh Thuan province chief fled Phan Rang on 2 April, along with most of the local police, provincial administrators, and RF troops. Only a Catholic priest in the small village of Ho Diem on Route 1 east of Phan Rang, who also commanded the local Self-Defense Force, held his position and prevented local guerrillas from entering Phan Rang. After the province chief deserted, communication with Saigon was lost. The communication breakdown and the hurried departure of the 2nd Air Division from Nha Trang led to speculation in U.S. intelligence circles that the VNAF had abandoned the Thanh Son airbase, and that Phan Rang had fallen to the Communist advance.

In reality, Sang’s airmen and Phat’s troopers were still holding fast. On 3 April, communications between Saigon and Phan Rang were re-established. Phat was ordered by the Airborne Division headquarters in Saigon to remain and defend the airbase. That morning he sent his brigade reconnaissance company out to recapture the nearby high ground from local guerrillas. Although his men accomplished this mission, Phat soon realized that his battered unit would be unable to completely control the large base and secure the perimeter. Phat recommended to Sang that he ask for another Airborne unit as reinforcements. He did, and the JGS quickly granted the request. Later that afternoon, fresh troops from the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Airborne Brigade, were flown in. Phat immediately positioned them in the hills surrounding the base. The Airborne reinforcements steadied the morale of the civilians and Air Force personnel. By late afternoon, with most of the refugees cleared from Thanh Son, and the Airborne in complete control of the airfield, base functions returned to normal.

As calm slowly returned to Thanh Son, more help came, this time from the sea. On 3 April, four U.S. Navy ships arrived off the coast of Vietnam. As they held position in the waters off Phan Rang, the cargo ship U.S.S. Durham was sent in to investigate. Dozens of small boats loaded with refugees quickly surrounded the American vessel. Over the next two days, the Durham picked up almost 3,500 Vietnamese refugees. Alerted to the Americans’ presence, Sang dispatched the commander of his helicopter wing, Lieutenant Colonel Le Van But, out to talk with them. Lieutenant Colonel But relayed two questions from Sang: Would the Americans provide naval gunfire support to the South Vietnamese defenders, and would they help with the evacuation? After a half-hour meeting, Lieutenant Colonel But left the ship, deeply discouraged by the American response. While the U.S. ships would assist any refugees, there would be no military assistance from South Vietnam’s former ally.

That same afternoon, Sang flew to Phan Thiet to meet with III Corps Commander Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Toan. Toan was carrying orders from General Vien. Effective 4 April, the two remaining II Corps provinces under South Vietnamese control, Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan, would be incorporated into III Corps. Vien was sending reconnaissance teams from the Strategic Technical Directorate to the northeast and northwest of Phan Rang to determine the current location of the Communist forces. Following Thieu’s orders for no further retreats, Phan Rang would be held.⁵ Sang was designated the officer responsible for the defense of the city. He and his Air Force technicians and pilots had suddenly become South Vietnam’s front line.

CLOSING THE CIRCLE

As the 10th Division swept unopposed into Cam Ranh, COSVN ordered MR-6 to destroy any remaining South Vietnamese RF outposts along Route 11 on the western flanks of Phan Rang, and to move swiftly to occupy all land right up to the very gates of the provincial capital. It was a tough task; the only Communist forces in the area were small bands of local guerrillas. Still, between 1 and 5 April almost all of the hamlets along Route 11 were captured. Further, the critical district town of Du Long, located near the important Du Long Pass on Route 1 between Cam Ranh and Phan Rang, was abandoned by South Vietnamese Regional Forces. Guerrillas moved in quickly and took over the district capital.

Ninh Thuan was a small province (it was dissolved after the war), 220 miles northeast of Saigon, with a population of more than 300,000. About 17,000 of those were ethnic Chams, an ancient people who had once ruled all of central Vietnam. The rest were Vietnamese and a mix of other ethnic groups. The terrain is mostly mountainous. Phan Rang is located in the southern portion of a narrow valley bordered by mountain ranges on the west, the north, and the northeast. The valley begins at the Du Long Pass, nine miles east of Phan Rang; Route 1 runs through the Du Long Pass to Phan Rang. The Thanh Son airbase is three miles north of Phan Rang along Route 11. The villages of Ba Rau and Ba Thap are located on Route 1 midway between Phan Rang and Du Long. Phan Rang has two ports: Tan Thanh and Ninh Chu.

While Communist local forces were seizing villages around Phan Rang, MR-6 was preparing a second and even more ambitious plan. After capturing Dalat, the 812th Regiment sent two infantry companies to Phan Rang to support the local forces there, but the rest of the regiment moved toward Binh Thuan province to attack Phan Thiet, the next provincial capital south of Phan Rang on Route 1. Sending the 812th toward Phan Thiet instead of Phan Rang was a cunning move. If the 812th succeeded in capturing Phan Thiet, it would cut off any ARVN forces retreating from Phan Rang, forming a pocket from which the only escape would be by sea or by air. If this strike was coordinated with an all-out push from the 10th Division, Phan Rang and Phan Thiet would fall easily to the Communist troops.

However, while this was a good plan on paper, the 812th Regiment was too far away and too immobile to strike Phan Thiet in a reasonable amount of time. Further, the 10th Division was exhausted after nearly a month of heavy fighting. Elements of the division were strung out along Route 1 from Ninh Hoa to Cam Ranh. They had fought two ARVN infantry regiments, the 21st Ranger Group, the 3rd Airborne Brigade, seven RF battalions, and two armored troops. They had captured Duc Lap, Phuoc An, Khanh Duong, Ninh Hoa, Nha Trang, and the critical military port of Cam Ranh Bay. During March, few Communist units fought as long or as effectively as the 10th Division. Recognizing its achievements, Van Tien Dung sent a telegram to the 10th praising its efforts. He wrote: “The . . . 10th Division made a significant contribution to the victory of the Central Highlands Campaign and helped to change the very character of the war in a short period of time.”⁶ However, the 10th needed time to assert control over the newly liberated territory. Given the situation, on 4 April the division was ordered to halt and secure Cam Ranh.

Although the local guerrillas had captured numerous villages and had walked into the critical Du Long district capital without opposition during the first week in April, the 10th Division’s halt gave ARVN some badly needed breathing room. Brigadier General Sang’s stand, the arrival of the Airborne, and the enemy’s delay—all provided a little time for the South Vietnamese to recover.

On 4 April—the day Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan provinces were incorporated into III Corps—Lieutenant General Nguyen Vinh Nghi, the former IV Corps commander, arrived to take over the Phan Rang front from Brigadier General Sang. Most accounts indicate that Nghi volunteered for this assignment. Why he wanted this almost impossible job is open to speculation, but he was probably attempting to redeem his reputation, having been sacked for corruption on 30 October 1974. Nghi supposedly brought with him Thieu’s personal promise that two divisions would be assigned to defend Phan Rang. Thieu hoped that the troops recovered from I Corps could be formed into cohesive units and sent to stabilize the front.

That a senior officer like Nghi believed this pipe-dream is indeed strange. In any case, the only troops Nghi brought with him were a few staff officers to form a III Corps Forward Headquarters. He set up his command post at Thanh Son airbase, and his staff quickly established communications with the III Corps Headquarters in Bien Hoa. After Sang briefed him on the situation, Nghi outlined his operational plan. Once the promised reinforcements arrived, Nghi would retake Du Long and anchor his main defensive line on the Du Long Pass. Here Route 1 runs between narrow mountain cliffs, and as such the pass offered the primary defensive position between Cam Ranh and Phan Rang. Nghi would create a secondary blocking position on Route 1 at the villages of Ba Rau and Ba Thap. Nghi also wanted to re-establish the defenses along Route 11 in order to halt Communist incursions and protect the western and southern approaches to the airbase. Unfortunately, Nghi would need a sizable number of troops to accomplish this, and all he had was the remnants of Lieutenant Colonel Phat’s brigade and the newly arrived 3rd Airborne Battalion. Despite Thieu’s promise, what Nghi would eventually obtain was far less than two divisions.

One potential source of manpower was the Airborne units that had retreated into the hills around the M’Drak Pass. On 2 April, shortly after helping to stabilize the airbase, Phat appealed to Sang for assistance in rescuing his stranded men. Sang agreed, and he sent Lieutenant Colonel Le Van But and Phat’s deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Tran Dang Khoi, to fly out and examine the situation. Cut off and without resupply, the 5th Battalion, plus portions of the 2nd and 6th Battalions, had followed Phat’s orders and assembled on the hilltops near the pass. Some troops had been captured on 1 April, including the 6th Battalion commander, but almost six hundred soldiers had escaped. Now the tough Airborne troops were patiently awaiting rescue. On the eastern end of the pass, while a few 2nd Battalion soldiers had escaped to Phan Rang, another two hundred hardy survivors remained trapped. Luckily, the Communists had ignored them.

Circling over the pass, Khoi made radio contact with the units. The 2nd Battalion commander, Major Tran Cong Hanh, had taken a separate helicopter to search for his missing troops. After examining the situation, Lieutenant Colonel But quickly realized that his two squadrons of Huey transport helicopters were not enough. Plus, an operation of this size would require meticulous planning to prevent a disaster in case of panic or an enemy attack. Ticking off the mission requirements in his mind, But realized he would have to secure a landing zone to defend against a possible attack, load the troops as quickly as possible, and then return to Thanh Son without running out of fuel. It would be a very close call, since the trip was at the ragged edge of the range of his helicopters. Both But and Khoi returned to Thanh Son to plan the operation with Sang.

After a short briefing, Sang made another urgent call to Saigon for assistance. Within hours, six giant Chinook helicopters, each capable of carrying five or six times as many men as a Huey, were sent from Bien Hoa airbase, twenty miles northeast of Saigon. Sang also had extra fuel flown up in C-130s, since the airbase’s regular source of fuel had been lost with the capture of Cam Ranh. Working fast to come up with a plan before the Communists could react, Sang decided to launch every helicopter he could muster—more than forty Huey transports, twelve helicopter gunships, the six Chinooks, and But’s own command-and-control helicopter—in a daring operation to rescue the Airborne. Two flights of A-37 bombers would provide air cover.

The helicopter armada took off at first light on 3 April and flew straight toward the main body of trapped soldiers. As the helicopters approached the target area, a group of Hueys split off to pick up the scattered 2nd Airborne troops on the eastern end of the pass. Upon reaching the main landing zone, But sent the gunships to search the nearby hills carefully for signs of an enemy ambush. Finding none, he gave the all-clear signal. The six giant Chinooks moved in first. Landing one at a time, they swooped in and dropped their ramps. The Airborne, maintaining the strict discipline for which they were renowned, swiftly loaded. As soon as the Chinooks left, the Hueys began landing. As each helicopter finished loading, it took off and headed straight back to Thanh Son, while the A-37 escorts continued to circle overhead. Within an hour, six hundred men had been evacuated from the main landing zone, while another two hundred were rescued from the 2nd Battalion positions. When the last helicopter had finished loading, Lieutenant Colonel Le Van But pulled pitch and headed back to the airbase. By the time he landed, his fuel warning light was on. Sang’s airmen had completed a daring rescue of eight hundred desperately needed elite ARVN troops without a single enemy shot being fired.⁷

The Airborne were not the only ARVN troops being rescued at that time. Late in the afternoon of 1 April, the LST Danang (HQ-501), carrying what remained of the ARVN 2nd Division, arrived at the port city of Ham Tan in Binh Tuy province, south of Phan Thiet. After being evacuated from Chu Lai to Re Island as I Corps disintegrated, the remnants of the 2nd Division had lost contact with I Corps Headquarters and had been stranded on the island. Fortunately for the troops, one of the Danang’s engines broke down as it was sailing south from I Corps. An alert soldier spotted the ship when it hove to off the island to make repairs. Brigadier General Tran Van Nhut personally flew the last operational 2nd Division helicopter out to the HQ-501. After a short discussion, the LST captain agreed to transport Nhut’s troops to Cam Ranh Bay. En route, Nhut received orders to divert to Ham Tan instead.

Several days after the 2nd Division disembarked, the ragtag convoy of ARVN deserters that had bedeviled Phan Rang on 2 April and Phan Thiet on 3 April arrived at Ham Tan. When the caravan reached the small port city, both Nhut and the province chief went out to meet it. A deal was quickly struck. Nhut told the men that since Route 1 was cut near Xuan Loc, they would be unable to reach Saigon by road. In return for their disarming and handing over all weapons and vehicles, Nhut and the province chief would arrange for sea transportation to Vung Tau, where the men could take a bus to Saigon. Nhut also threatened to shoot any soldiers caught raping or looting.

For Nhut, who had been ordered by the JGS to re-organize his division within one week and prepare for combat, the weapons and vehicles from the convoy were an unexpected windfall. He picked up some APCs, plus several artillery pieces and a large quantity of individual weapons. While the 2nd Division was the only I Corps unit (other than the Marines) that had succeeded in evacuating a portion of its manpower, the division’s infantry regiments were badly under-strength. Lieutenant General Toan transferred two RF battalions from III Corps to replace some of the division’s losses. Toan also sent a few 105-mm howitzers recently arrived from the U.S., but the guns lacked sights and spare parts.

It was all Toan could do. The 2nd Division was in the best shape of the three regular ARVN divisions from I Corps, but that was not saying much. Even with the RF fillers, and scraping together other troops who had made it south, Nhut could field only two battalions per regiment. The troops’ morale had plummeted after the horrors of Chu Lai and having to leave their families behind. With little time to train and rebuild unit cohesion, Nhut knew that the 2nd was an empty shell. He recommended that the division stay in Ham Tan to defend the port, but mainly to recover and regain some semblance of fighting strength. Toan rejected his request. The 2nd was among the few pawns Toan had left, and on 7 April he ordered Nhut to prepare his troops to move north to help defend Phan Rang and Phan Thiet.

TRYING TO STEM THE TIDE

The South Vietnamese had been slow to re-organize their forces that had escaped from I and II Corps, but under the DAO’s prodding they soon began reconstituting units. Other efforts to bolster troop strength were also undertaken. RF soldiers were used to fill out ARVN regiments. Although desertions were heavy, many of the deserters were rounded up, and the net inflow of men was greater than the losses. The process of merging under-strength RF units in IV Corps to form complete units was also quickened. General Vien and other senior officers made pleas to the troops to maintain their fighting spirit. In the command arena, on 3 April Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Minh, former commander of III Corps and now ARVN inspector general, was placed in command of the Capital Military District, replacing Admiral Chung Tan Cang. Cang was put back in charge of the Navy, replacing acting chief Admiral Lam Nguon Tanh.

President Thieu’s decision to reinstall Cang, a staunch supporter, was not made to improve naval efficiency. It was to prevent Nguyen Cao Ky from using the Navy to support a coup. Cang’s first action as Navy commander was to create a new Riverine Task Force, TF 99. Captain Le Huu Dong, who had served previously with Cang on the Delta’s muddy rivers, took command of TF 99. Dong reported directly to Cang, and the TF was deliberately based at Nha Be, close to Saigon. The LST My Tho (HQ-800) was anchored nearby to provide a headquarters for the new task force. Cang formed TF 99 from parts of two existing task forces in the Delta, TF 212 and TF 214.⁸ This decision also had political motivations. Commodores Nghiem Van Phu and Dang Cao Thang commanded TF 212 and 214 respectively, and they were part of the group that in 1963 had kicked Cang out of the Navy. Later, they had supported Ky against Thieu. In order to reduce the forces of his old rivals, Cang took their best units and merged them into the new TF 99. Ostensibly, Cang created TF 99 to protect the Saigon and upper Mekong Rivers from increased sapper interdiction. In reality, the formation of this new unit was to provide a loyal military force on the waterways close to Saigon, and to deny any pretext for TF 212 and 214 to be near the capital. Ironically, this move would pay huge dividends in the fight for the Delta.

On the military front, as the situation stabilized around Phan Rang, Lieutenant General Nghi and Brigadier General Sang went back on the offensive. Although Sang strongly disagreed with the decision that his air division should remain so close to the front lines and subject to Communist shelling, Colonel Le Van Thao’s A-37 wing soon resumed bombing operations. Striking targets in the Cam Ranh Bay area, it flew round-the-clock missions against the advancing PAVN troops. Despite several successes, however, notably against the 10th Division moving on Local Route 450, Thao’s operations were hampered by the lack of ground controllers and by the desire to avoid civilian casualties. His losses were also mounting. One A-37 was shot down when the pilot came in low to bomb a bridge and at the last second noticed that the Communists had tied civilians to it. Pulling up, he swung around to look for another target when an SA-7 team, lying in ambush, hit him with a missile.

Moreover, the aircrews at Phan Rang were attempting to load bombs and refuel the aircraft under difficult conditions. Constant rocket attacks forced technicians to wear flak jackets while struggling to load 250-pound bombs in the tropical heat. Worse was the lack of food and other supplies. With Route 1 cut east of Xuan Loc, supplies were arriving only by air. Often Thao’s pilots, who were flying four sorties per day, would get only one meal. Many were not sleeping because of the constant need for air support, or the simple fear of being left behind if an evacuation suddenly was ordered. The dread of abandonment was so great that some helicopter pilots took to sleeping on cots next to their parked aircraft. Thao’s solution was to rotate half his wing to Saigon each day, both to re-arm and re-fuel, and to catch some sleep and get a meal. In the morning they would fly back to Phan Rang, where Thao would direct them on armed reconnaissance missions along Route 1. However, while his attacks stung the PAVN forces, one A-37 wing alone could not halt the PAVN advance.⁹

On 7 April, Nghi’s promised reinforcements began arriving. The 2nd Airborne Brigade, commanded by Colonel Nguyen Thu Luong, flew into Thanh Son. Luong’s unit was to replace the 3rd Airborne Brigade so it could return to Saigon to regroup.¹⁰ The 2nd Brigade had departed I Corps and arrived at its rear base at Bien Hoa on the afternoon of 21 March and had been placed on full alert. The men were not even allowed to visit their families. This was particularly onerous. As Luong later wrote, “We spent three years straight, from 1972 until 1975, conducting continuous operations in I Corps. Even when the cease-fire agreement was signed in 1973 we still did not get to return to our rear base to rest, regroup, re-equip, and conduct training. Instead we were sent out to the farthest front-line positions and assigned to defend hill positions along the Annamite Mountain Chain. . . . The days when the weather was sunny and dry were not so bad, but the days when . . . [there was] a cold drizzle falling through a north wind were particularly miserable. Stationed atop high hills and mountains, living in tents made from our own ponchos . . . cold and wet, we had difficulty cooking anything, and always we were face to face with the enemy. . . . One thoughtless moment could cost a man his life [from] enemy mines, booby-traps, and mortar shells, because the enemy never respected the cease-fire agreement.”¹¹

Colonel Luong arrived at Thanh Son on the first plane. The rest of the 2nd Airborne Brigade, including the 7th and 11th Battalions, an artillery battalion, and support and logistics units, were transported from Bien Hoa to Thanh Son by C-130. The airlift was completed at 2:00 A.M. on 8 April. Luong immediately went to see Lieutenant General Nghi, who provided him his new missions: conduct operations to recapture lost territory, and defend Phan Rang and Thanh Son. Luong would be allowed to retain the 5th Battalion, 3rd Brigade, for five more days. While the situation had stabilized, the outlook was still critical. Guerrillas were holding the Du Long Pass and the important villages of Ba Thap and Ba Rau on Route 1. They had also crept back close to the airbase perimeter.

Colonel Luong immediately formulated an operation to accomplish the missions Nghi had given him. While the 5th Airborne Battalion would continue to guard the base and assist in clearing Route 11, the 3rd Battalion would clear Route 1 and recapture Ba Rau and Ba Thap. Once that was accomplished, Luong would leapfrog his 11th Battalion over the 3rd Battalion in a helicopter assault to attack Du Long town, and then recapture Du Long Pass.

Wasting no time, early in the morning of 8 April, Colonel Luong executed his plan with precision. Communist local forces were pushed back on all fronts. After the 3rd Battalion recaptured Ba Rau, Luong then air-assaulted the 11th Battalion into Du Long and the high ground. His troops quickly recaptured the town. Much to their surprise, they snared a small PAVN truck convoy. The drivers told the Airborne that their commanders had informed them that Phan Rang was already captured. The Red Berets had just proven them wrong.

“THE DECISIVE BATTLE HAS NOW BEGUN”

While the Airborne troops were busy recapturing territory near Phan Rang, PAVN’s attention was focused elsewhere. The General Staff had no intention of allowing ARVN any breathing room, but, as we have seen, there had been a major difference of opinion over how to proceed next. Many of Hanoi’s military and political leaders (Tra, Le Duc Tho, Le Duan, and Giap) wanted to strike Saigon quickly, while Dung wanted to secure I and II Corps, mass the PAVN forces, and then attack the capital in one overwhelming strike. Despite Dung’s disagreement, the sudden victories over I and II Corps persuaded his Politburo colleagues to move against Saigon immediately instead of waiting to mass their forces. The hope that a strong push from Tra’s B-2 Front might topple Thieu proved irresistible.

But how best to accomplish that mission? Giap recognized that ARVN “still worked stubbornly to establish a defense line from Phan Rang south to keep our armed forces at arm’s length. [ARVN] hoped to block and push back our attacks in order to hang on until the rainy season.”¹² Giap feared that if the South Vietnamese could hold on, the Americans might increase aid, or any number of other scenarios might occur to deny a complete victory. That is why at the 31 March Politburo meeting, Giap recommendedimmediately sending the entire People’s Army south. He also suggested that Tra launch attacks against Saigon from multiple directions. When ARVN panicked, Giap said, sapper and commando forces already infiltrated into Saigon would launch a “mass uprising” in coordination with the PAVN assault. If the Communists’ plan succeeded, Saigon would be overwhelmed by a combination of external main-force blows and internal uprisings long before the other three North Vietnamese corps arrived. It was a risky move. Attacking Saigon when the ARVN forces were reeling might be a killer blow, but if they stood their ground, Giap risked a major defeat. Moreover, that might provide the South Vietnamese a badly needed morale boost, or convince the U.S. that South Vietnam was still salvageable.

Tra also advocated a sudden push. Regardless of the facts on the ground, he had been wedded to this strategy for too long to turn back now. Immediately after receiving Le Duan’s 29 March message, and without waiting for specific attack guidance, Tra traveled in a jeep from COSVN to meet 4th Corps Commander Hoang Cam at a secret location near the Dong Nai River. He arrived late at night on 31 March. By mid-afternoon on 1 April, Cam, his deputy, Bui Cat Vu, and the 341st Division commander, Tran Van Tran, had also arrived. The next day, Tra began the meeting by explaining to the others the overall situation in South Vietnam. He then got to the heart of the matter: he had received authorization from the Politburo to take the initiative and not wait for reinforcements.¹³

Tra then outlined the new attack plan. His main attack on Saigon would be from the east and the south. Hoang Cam was given the mission of destroying the ARVN 18th Division at Xuan Loc and taking the town, and then capturing the Bien Hoa airbase on the outskirts of Saigon.¹⁴ The 6th Division would be attached to the 4th Corps, giving Cam three divisions—the 6th, the 7th, and the 341st. Cam asked Tra to delay the assault until 9 April to give him time to plan and adjust his forces. Tra agreed.

South of Saigon, Tra’s initial plan called for units of the 303rd and 5th Divisions to capture Moc Hoa, the capital of Kien Tuong province in the Plain of Reeds, and destroy the ARVN 9th Division. This was a continuation of the earlier border-clearing mission conducted by the 303rd Division, and was designed to turn the Plain of Reeds into an operational base for Group 232. Once this base area was established, the 5th Division could use the local roads to move heavy equipment from its Cambodian border bases to cut Route 4 and destroy the ARVN 7th Division. To reinforce the attack from the south, Tra recalled the 271B Regiment from Quang Duc and began trucking it toward the Delta. Tra hoped that if his forces were able to destroy these three ARVN divisions, “the puppet army and regime would vacillate and become chaotic and not be able to defend Saigon effectively, or else there would be an important political upheaval within the ranks of the puppets [a coup], or between the puppets and the Americans, in which case we would immediately . . . attack . . . in order to liberate all of the B-2 theater.”¹⁵

Tra departed on the afternoon of 3 April and returned to COSVN headquarters in the early hours of 4 April to meet Dung, who had arrived the day before. One can only speculate as to what Tra must have felt seeing Dung, although he claims that when they met, they “happily embraced.”

Regardless of the appearance of his rival, Tra’s earlier reading of the Politburo tea leaves was correct. When he returned to his headquarters, Le Duan’s 31 March message ordering him to create a new action plan in B-2 awaited him. As usual, Giap had also sent a follow-up message on 1 April, outlining his concept for the attack on Saigon:

Just as the Politburo says, our revolutionary war in South Vietnam is now entering a period of growth by leaps and bounds. At present we already have sufficient forces and capabilities to achieve complete victory in a much shorter time than we had initially projected. The decisive issue is that we must seize our opportunity in a timely fashion. . . . we must try to begin a massive assault on Saigon by mid-April. If we can meet that time schedule it will be to our maximum advantage and will ensure our most resounding victory. We can no longer surprise the enemy with regards to the direction of our main attack. The enemy knows that we must attack Saigon, but he believes it will take us one or two months to prepare such an attack. For this reason, at present the achievement of surprise is now a question of timing. On the one hand we must move forces rapidly, speedily, while on the other we must immediately use the forces we have on hand to take timely action, without waiting to concentrate all of our forces. . . . That is the meaning of the Politburo’s declaration that the decisive battle of Saigon has now begun. . . . With regards to the two basic formulas for action: the first being a long-term siege to create the conditions for us to finally attack and overrun the target; and the second being a daring, immediate attack . . . we should now select the second formula. This means we should act in a truly rapid and daring manner, while at the same time making preparations so that, under certain conditions, we can switch to Formula One and still achieve final victory within a short period of time. . . . Using the forces you currently possess, you need to take quick action to exploit every opportunity the enemy’s terror and confusion may present to you. . . . We now must count time in days.¹⁶

Giap’s message laid out in unequivocal terms his desire to strike at Saigon now. He and Le Duan anticipated that, as in Danang, South Vietnamese forces near Saigon would collapse and PAVN troops would easily enter the city. Only Van Tien Dung remained cautious, believing that the conditions were not yet right for such a risky venture.

After reviewing Tra’s plan, Giap accepted most of it, but he canceled the 5th Division’s attack at Moc Hoa. Instead he ordered Tra to use the 5th Division to cut Route 4 south of Saigon and seize the towns of Tan An, the capital of Long An province, and Thu Thua, a village north of Tan An. The 303rd would launch secondary attacks near Moc Hoa to assist the 5th Division. Because of the failure to take Route 4 in March, this time Giap choose the attack location, a point where he thought the ARVN defenses were weakest. He selected a section of Route 4 in Long An that was defended solely by Regional Forces. The South Vietnamese had only three RF battalions shielding the road and the various canals. The closest South Vietnamese regulars were the 12th Regiment, 7th Division, miles away in Dinh Tuong province. However, the RF did have some help. Five ARVN artillery bases offered fire support, river patrol boats supplied security along the waterways, and VNAF aircraft from Can Tho, south of the Mekong River, provided air cover for the Route 4 corridor.

For Giap, the decision to bypass Moc Hoa and attack Route 4 directly was another gamble. The 5th Division had only just finished rebuilding after its losses in December 1974, and MR-8 forces had attacked a stretch of Route 4 south of Long An in March without success, mainly because of the excellent performance of the ARVN 7th Division. Still, both Tra and Giap desperately wanted to seize the Route 4 corridor in Long An for a variety of reasons. Doing so would disrupt food supplies to Saigon, and would block ARVN from falling back into a Delta enclave. Most important, it would create another “liberated zone” for staging troops and equipment to provide a second attack prong from the south.

After Tra’s earlier exultation over Hanoi’s newfound acceptance of his strategy, he claims that, when he received the changed orders, he spent a “sleepless night” worrying how his forces could move their heavy equipment through the marshy Delta.¹⁷ Without capturing Moc Hoa and the nearby roads, his new corps, Group 232, would have to launch its assault against Saigon from the southwest across the marshy Vam Co Dong River, a very difficult mission. The river was two to three hundred yards wide, and both banks were mostly swamp covered with thick vegetation. Group 232’s heavy equipment would be forced onto tiny Route 10, which would also mean rebuilding a destroyed bridge and traversing another swamp, this one two miles wide. If the VNAF caught the Communist troops on the road, they would be slaughtered.

Tra was particularly worried that airpower could turn the tide against him if the South Vietnamese chose to stand and fight. Therefore, his plan had another key element: interdict the South Vietnamese airfields, especially the major airbases at Bien Hoa and Can Tho. Tra sent one 130-mm battery to reinforce the efforts of the sappers who were responsible for shelling Bien Hoa. However, captured documents alerted the South Vietnamese to this strategy, and ARVN sweep operations prevented the sappers from achieving their goals.¹⁸

Although Giap had approved Tra’s plan, with the modifications noted above, when Dung arrived at COSVN headquarters, he immediately began analyzing it. While Dung realized he knew little about the B-2 area, he had no enthusiasm for Tra’s strategy, but realized there was little he could do to change it now. Dung was lower in the Politburo than Pham Hung, who had worked with Tra in formulating the strategy. With Giap and Le Duan backing Hung’s and Tra’s plan to use the B-2 forces to launch an early attack, Dung was boxed in. However, after “three days of quite detailed reports by the regional staff on all aspects of the situation in Saigon,” Dung now had “a firmer basis for discussing plans for the general offensive.”¹⁹

The arrival of Le Duc Tho at COSVN changed everything for Dung, because Tho was carrying instructions that provided Dung the clout he needed. On 7 April Tho held a conference and announced the formation of a new campaign headquarters to oversee the attack on Saigon. Dung was given overall command of the final offensive, a decision, according to Tra, that “everyone supported.”²⁰ Tra and Le Duc Anh would command the forces on the western approaches, while Le Trong Tan would command the two corps on the eastern approaches. Pham Hung would act as political commissar.

According to Giap, at the conference Le Ngoc Hien, the General Staff’s chief of operations, presented the General Staff’s campaign battle plan. Hien had based the plan on Giap’s guidance in his 1 April cable. The plan was divided into two phases. The first phase, which would begin on 8 April, involved attacks “to strategically cut off . . . and surround the enemy . . . and attack [Saigon’s] outskirts and eight separate targets within the city in preparation for the general offensive. If the situation was favorable and the enemy began to disintegrate, a deep penetration strike would be launched immediately, in coordination with mass uprisings designed to capture the city.”²¹ Phase Two, which was projected to begin between 15 and 20 April, would involve an assault on Saigon from five separate directions. “If the [ARVN] 18th Division could be destroyed and if we were able to cut off and isolate Saigon, we would shake the very foundations of enemy power and new opportunities would then present themselves. If the enemy pulled back and tightened his defenses, we would prepare additional forces to reinforce our attack [switch to Formula One], but we still would have to complete the capture of the city during the month of April.”

Although the COSVN conference unanimously approved the plan, Dung remained convinced that B-2 was not strong enough to succeed in its new mission, and that the North Vietnamese needed to wait until all their forces were together to make one massive assault. He was worried that the ARVN troops would fall back into Saigon, where costly, destructive, and protracted house-to-house fighting would be required to defeat them. Since the first attack was scheduled for the next day, Dung was forced to accept Tra’s approach. However, he made sure the Politburo was aware of his views. He sent a cable to Hanoi recommending that the Politburo and the Central Military Affairs Committee rapidly move reinforcements to the B-2 Front.

After studying Dung’s cable, the Politburo seemed to back away from its exhortations of 29 March. No doubt the euphoria stemming from the resounding victories in I Corps had slowly been replaced by the realization that it would take time for the forces already speeding south to assemble within striking distance of Saigon. On 9 April Le Duan sent a cable to Pham Hung and Le Duc Tho: “I just received [Dung’s] cable . . . this morning. After discussions with [Giap] and the comrades at the General Staff, I believe that you all need to wait to prepare for a few more days and for the bulk of 3rd and 1st Corps (including both infantry and heavy weapons and technical equipment) to arrive before beginning the [main] assault. From now until the big attack begins, the western and southwestern wings . . . should step up [their] operations to cut Route 4 to force the enemy to disperse his forces to deal with our attacks in order to cause additional disruption and fear within the enemy’s ranks and make it difficult for him to guess our campaign plans. At the same time, you should also order the urban commando teams to infiltrate into the city. The other sectors should also take appropriate actions to support the big attack. You need to ensure that once the attack is launched, you attack hard, continuously, and repeatedly until complete victory is achieved. . . . That is the basic plan and the plan most certain of victory. . . . I also agree with your projection that we need to make preparations to deal with the possibility that the fighting may become long and protracted, for a certain period of time at least.”²²

Le Duan was too late. Tra’s troops had already opened fire.

STANDING FIRM IN THE DELTA

Shortly after Tra received the new orders from Giap, he sent the 5th Division toward Long An province. After three days of tramping across canals and dusty paddy, the regiment reached an assembly area near Tan An, the provincial capital. A second regiment was sent to attack Thu Thua, north of Tan An. A third was held in reserve near Tan An. This section of Route 4 was squeezed between the Vam Co Dong (Eastern Vam Co) and Vam Co Tay (Western Vam Co) Rivers. A network of lateral canals cut across the land. If PAVN forces succeeded in capturing Tan An plus the bridges on Route 4 over the two Vam Co Rivers, they would sever Saigon from the Delta and prove difficult to dislodge.

To support the main attacks at Xuan Loc and along Route 4, at dawn on 7 April, the 303rd Division launched a series of diversionary raids near Moc Hoa, but it had minimal impact. In III Corps, sappers shelled Bien Hoa airbase with 122-mm rockets on 8 April, again doing little damage. In Tay Ninh, PAVN forces attacked Brigadier General Tran Quang Khoi’s 3rd Armored Cavalry Brigade, but to no avail. Despite Tra’s convictions that any attack would cause a South Vietnamese collapse, ARVN easily repulsed these surprisingly weak attacks.

After finally reaching their positions, early on 9 April the two 5th Division regiments attacked the Long An RF forces guarding Thu Thua and Tan An. Another PAVN element set up a roadblock on Route 4 near the Long An/Dinh Tuong provincial border to block ARVN 7th Division reinforcements coming from the south. The first objective at Tan An was to secure the airfield and then sweep into the city. As dawn broke, a long line of Communist infantry surged forward and captured a small section of the airbase, but stiff resistance from the local RF prevented further losses. Caught out in the flat Delta terrain and unable to advance, the exposed troops were soon forced by artillery fire to retreat. The RF counterattacked, and by mid-afternoon the Communists had been badly beaten, leaving one hundred dead on the battlefield.

The ARVN 7th Division quickly responded to the attack. Reinforced by the division’s M-113 squadron and reconnaissance company, the 12th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Dang Phuong Thanh, immediately moved from its position further south in Dinh Tuong province to support Tan An. Crossing a corps boundary was a rare occurrence, but according to the 7th Division’s chief of staff, “Since Long An was closer to the 7th Division . . . than to [Long An’s] parent III Corps headquarters, we had prior permission to coordinate and provide necessary support to that province.”²³

After clearing out the roadblock on Route 4, the 12th Regiment continued moving north and caught the PAVN 5th Division from behind. Over the course of the next four days, ARVN fought a series of battles with two regiments of the 5th, completely shattering one of them. Communist losses were high: four to five hundred killed, along with thirty men and numerous weapons captured. The PAVN soldiers were mainly teenagers recently infiltrated into South Vietnam. Scared, unfamiliar with the terrain, and poorly trained, they took a beating at the hands of the Long An RF and regular ARVN forces. But the victory was not without cost. The 12th lost thirty-seven killed and ninety wounded.²⁴

The results were the same in Thu Thua. Only local Popular Forces guarded this important town. Thinking it would be an easy target, the Communists had sent only a small sapper unit for the initial attack. The sappers moved in before dawn, infiltrating through the local market and trying to overrun the district headquarters with a quick raid. They timed their attack to avoid the Long An province riverboat company, which normally did not return from night patrol until after sunrise. Unfortunately for them, this morning the boats had returned early. Catching the sappers out in the open, the heavy fire from the ships decimated them. A few managed to penetrate into the town, but they were driven out by local police. After the battle, the Long An province chief reinforced Thu Thua with two RF battalions.

The next day, the district chief ordered the boats to hide in a nearby small canal, while he used the RF to search for the Communist troops. As the RF swept across the dry fields, suddenly they came under intense fire from a large number of Communist forces. The 5th Division’s reserve regiment had been committed. The RF retreated to a canal bank, but they were pinned down and faced destruction. The district chief quickly counterpunched with the hidden boats:

After powerful barrages of heavy weapons, Communist forces began their assault. The [North Vietnamese] swarmed out in a black cloud all across the entire field in front of me [in] a human-wave attack. . . . When I gave the order, our navy boats . . . surged forward to enter the fray. My orders were very clear: “Move up and down the river, firing all the time.” Six river patrol boats gave us eighteen heavy machine guns, each of which could fire 350 rounds per minute. The boats had plenty of ammunition. Six landing craft with eighteen machine guns and firing almost 6,000 rounds every minute sailed in a column up the river firing their weapons. The river assault company commander received clear orders that if any boat was sunk by an enemy B-40 rocket it was to be abandoned. No boat was to stop to try to save it. Every boat was to continue firing until the enemy assault was repelled. The enemy troops charged excitedly forward to what they thought was victory, when suddenly they came under heavy fire from the river patrol squadron, cutting them down in droves. The Communists reacted quickly, firing B-40 and B-41 rockets and all types of mortars that exploded in the river, sending columns of water into the air which then fell back down like rain. Luckily the riverboats were moving, so not one vessel was hit and the boats were able to stop this massive assault. The boats created a curtain of fire. . . . The enemy survivors, and there were not many, pulled back a long distance. They were unable to recover the bodies of their comrades, who lay covering an entire large, open field.²⁵

The attack cost PAVN dearly. The DAO reported that 122 North Vietnamese were killed. But the Communists did not retreat. They began attacking the small PF outposts surrounding the district seat, while using artillery to soften up the town’s defenses. Despite the determined stand by the Long An RF/PF, the PAVN ring slowly tightened around Thu Thua.

PAVN also planned major attacks to seize Can Tho, the capital of the lower Delta and the IV Corps Headquarters, but ARVN intelligence discovered these plans. On 1 April, IV Corps intelligence intercepted a radio message that the Communists intended to launch an offensive that month. The next day, ARVN further learned that a local-force regiment had been assigned to operate with the three regiments of the PAVN 4th Division to attack Can Tho and capture the city. Soon thereafter, ARVN detected the division moving from the U Minh Forest. Another COSVN message was intercepted ordering MR-9 to launch the attack no later than 8 April.

On the basis of this information, ARVN IV Corps Commander Major General Nguyen Khoa Nam ordered the 21st Infantry Division, then conducting an operation along the edge of the U Minh Forest, to immediately pull back and defend the city. The 21st had three infantry regiments; the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd. It also had the 9th Armored Squadron, made up entirely of M-113 APCs. Nam reinforced the division with the 11th Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, and the newly formed 63rd Infantry Regiment, a unit that had been created out of an An Giang province RF group. All nearby corps and territorial artillery was organized into a fire-support network to directly assist the 21st.

Colonel Mach Van Truong commanded the 21st. One of the original cadres who formed the unit in 1959, Truong had commanded a regiment of the ARVN 5th Division at An Loc in 1972, and most recently had been Long Khanh province chief. He was close to Major General Le Van Hung, who had been the 5th Division commander at An Loc. Truong assumed command of the 21st in October 1974 when Hung became the deputy corps commander.

To block the enemy attack, Truong positioned his 32nd Infantry Regiment and the attached 63rd and 11th Infantry Regiments, together with RF territorial forces, in defensive fortifications along the highway into Can Tho, which the Communists called the Arc Road. He kept a second regiment in reserve, and combined his 9th Armored Cavalry Squadron and the 33rd Infantry Regiment into a new Task Force 933. He stationed TF 933 outside his defensive positions as a mobile force that could attack the enemy’s rear and block reinforcements from entering the area from the outside. According to Truong, “On the night of 8 April, the [PAVN] 4th Division reached the Arc Road and secretly crossed the river (they had to swim across the river individually, so they were only able to bring light equipment with them). They attacked just before dawn. Our units fought back ferociously from our heavily fortified positions, and pre-arranged artillery barrages blocked [the PAVN] attacks. Then helicopter gunships and Air Force fighters from the Tra Noc and Binh Thuy Airfields flew in to bomb and strafe the area. On the outer perimeter, to the enemy’s rear, TF 933 sealed off the rear to block any reinforcements. The enemy dug in and fought for the entire day under continuous fire from our aircraft and artillery. . . . They suffered very heavy losses. On 10 April, the 4th Corps G-2 [intelligence] Office intercepted secret messages from COSVN Headquarters and MR-9 ordering the 4th Division to pull back.”²⁶

The stiff ARVN defense cost the Communists over four hundred men killed and wounded. From their perspective, “the act of sending a large force of troops through the Arc Road line and then withdrawing them back again had an effect on the fighting strength of the troops . . . enemy artillery positions shelled 4th Division’s regiments continuously. Our ammunition stocks were low and we were unable to suppress the enemy artillery fire (at this point the Region’s ammunition stockpile totaled only ten tons of ammunition of all types). On 15 April, the . . . Military Region Party Committee met to assess the situation. They concluded . . . that the enemy was determined to hold Can Tho [and] it was not yet possible to coordinate the attack . . . with the attack to capture Saigon . . . on 18 April, [MR-9] received an order from COSVN [to stop attacking until 26 April].”²⁷

In response to the 4th and 5th Divisions’ setbacks, MR-8 forces launched attacks to draw ARVN units away from Route 4. On 13 April two PAVN 8th Division regiments and two Long An local-force battalions attacked Tan Tru, an important district town east of Tan An where the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong Rivers converge. For four days the valiant PF, backed by numerous VNAF strikes and reinforcements from one Long An RF battalion, fought off the Communists. To assist the PF, Lieutenant General Toan ordered recently arrived elements of the ARVN 22nd Division to help defend Tan Tru. Although the 22nd was a shadow of its former self, one of its newly reconstituted regiments quickly pushed the PAVN forces back. After failing to seize any territory in Long An, the 8th Division abandoned its efforts and turned north, reaching an assembly area near Saigon on 25 April.

Despite the serious defeats suffered by PAVN, the fighting for Route 4 was not over. To help ARVN forces in the Delta, Admiral Cang ordered TF 99 to sail south and maintain control of the upper Delta’s waterways. On 16 April Captain Dong led his assembled task force toward Long An province. His vessels helped turn back the Communists at Tan Tru, but their greatest victory came the next day. Sailing up the Vam Co Tay River toward the Thu Thua canal, TF 99 stumbled onto a large Communist unit bathing in the river. Dong’s ships immediately attacked. Machine-gun fire spurted from the decks, sweeping the river, but the Communist troops on the banks quickly returned fire. Rocket-propelled grenades and mortar rounds began hitting the water. Then Dong unleashed two flame-thrower boats, called Zippos. Spewing fire, the two boats incinerated dozens of North Vietnamese troops. The surviving enemy soldiers fled in panic, leaving dozens of burned and blackened bodies floating in the water. For the next week, Dong’s forces fought every day, severely restricting the Communists’ supply efforts, and preventing them from easily moving troops along the numerous waterways. After the repeated beatings, PAVN decided to halt operations in IV Corps until the main Saigon offensive. Tra’s design for cutting off Saigon from the south had failed miserably. ARVN had held the Mekong Delta.

After the disastrous losses for the South Vietnamese in I and II Corps, which had lowered morale throughout the country, ARVN commanders in the Delta had spent time calming the fears of their troops. Consequently, the South Vietnamese at all levels put up tough resistance. The relative weakness of the Communist units in the region also contributed to the results. But more important was a serious mistake on Tra’s part. Recognizing the importance of the Route 4 corridor through Dinh Tuong and Long An provinces, he had used the 8th Division to make attacks in March, and then the 5th Division to make similar attacks in April. If he had launched a simultaneous attack with both divisions in the two provinces, and had concurrently swung the 4th Division into action near Can Tho, ARVN would have been hard pressed. Tra’s piecemeal attacks gave ARVN time to recover, steady its nerves, and shift forces to defeat the attacks.

Although ARVN had again performed well in the Delta, the overall situation remained bleak. The DAO stated: “In sum, RVNAF has weathered week without conceding major territorial losses or sustaining critical defeats. . . . [However], it may well be confronted with even more critical battles to preserve security along Route 4, hold . . . Can Tho and cripple [PAVN main-force] units. RVNAF must accomplish this without taking high casualties. In its current state of overextension, decisive defeat of even one ARVN regiment would . . . have dangerous ramifications.”²⁸ Despite Tra’s tactical error, his attacks continued to accomplish one feat: hopes that the South Vietnamese could either retreat into a Delta redoubt or send a division north to help III Corps were fast fading.

GETTING READY TO ATTACK

In Phan Rang, with the completion of the successful Airborne attacks, the situation was now completely stabilized. The ARVN Central Logistics Command established an ammunition and fuel-supply point at Phan Thiet. The Ninh Thuan province chief, who had fled to Phan Thiet on 2 April with the flood of civilians pouring down Route 1, returned to the province on 7 April with a number of his administrators. His return was not voluntary: Lieutenant General Nghi had sent a cable to the Binh Thuan province chief, ordering him to find his wayward counterpart and send him back immediately. With no enemy pressure, the reassuring presence of the elite Airborne, and Thieu’s promise of fresh troops still dancing in his head, Nghi began to seriously consider the possibility of retaking Cam Ranh and perhaps Nha Trang. However, ARVN radio-intercept operators, including ones on an EC-47 aircraft, had begun picking up a large volume of Communist chatter. Although this signaled a potential massing of PAVN forces, Nghi still believed that he could recapture the two cities. He became even more excited when he learned that the PAVN 10th Division had left Cam Ranh. Retreating ARVN soldiers who managed to slip through the lines also provided intelligence on enemy dispositions at Cam Ranh, leading Nghi to believe that the area was lightly held, which it currently was.

Unfortunately for Nghi, he had no inkling that the massive Coastal Column was pouring down Route 1 toward his forces. To make matters worse, on 9 April, after two days of heavy fighting, the PAVN 812th Regiment and a local-force sapper battalion seized Thien Giao, a district town only ten miles from Phan Thiet. MR-6’s plan was slowly coming to fruition, and Phan Rang was becoming an isolated outpost.

While PAVN’s battlefield momentum had slowed, the 968th Division reached Ninh Hoa on 6 April and moved in to secure Cam Ranh and Nha Trang after the 10th Division’s departure. Units of the 3rd (Sao Vang) Division followed hot on the heels of the 968th. After sending an advance party ahead to coordinate the road movement and arrange for fuel and food, the 3rd departed Binh Dinh on 8 April and arrived north of Phan Rang on 11 April.

On 12 April Le Trong Tan and the Coastal Column headquarters reached the assembly area, a small village near Cam Ranh Bay. The day before, the General Staff had sent Tan a cable informing him that ARVN was strengthening Phan Rang’s defenses. North Vietnamese spies were continuing to supply timely intelligence on ARVN plans. Tan was given the option of bypassing Phan Rang if he felt it would be too difficult to conquer. Shortly after Tan arrived at the assembly area, he held a meeting with the various commanders. Local forces would play a crucial role as guides if Tan decided to attack, since none of the Coastal Column forces had any knowledge of the terrain. Initially, there was some discussion as to whether it would be quicker to bypass Phan Rang. In the light of the pummeling the 10th Division had taken from the VNAF, however, Tan decided it was important to move against Thanh Son airbase. Moreover, Tan’s supply situation was excellent. His troops had captured two thousand tons of rice and over four thousand tons of gasoline and oil at Nha Trang. The movement south had been relatively easy. With no logistical limitations, and his units advancing steadily, Tan felt no need to bypass the pesky ARVN at Phan Rang. He ordered the 3rd Division to attack along Route 1 and capture the Du Long Pass and Phan Rang. A secondary but still important attack would be made by the B-3 Front’s 25th Regiment, now under the operational control of the 3rd Division, to capture Thanh Son. Tan gave the 3rd Division one day to prepare. Given the division’s lack of familiarity with the terrain (when it departed Binh Dinh, it did not have a single map of the Phan Rang area, and it was issued only one small general map when it arrived at the assembly area), and since it had just finished a long road march, the division commander requested and was granted a one-day extension.

Following Tan’s orders, the 3rd decided to send two spearheads along Route 1. One battalion would strike Du Long, while another would swing behind the pass and attack Ba Rau, the village halfway between Du Long and Phan Rang. The division staff knew this second approach would be difficult, but they believed that if they could take Ba Rau, Du Long’s defenses would crumble. Another regiment would punch toward the sea and follow the coast to cut off escape in that direction. The 25th Regiment, reinforced with light artillery and a battery of anti-aircraft guns, would attack the airbase. Another regiment would be held in reserve. The attack would begin at dawn on 14 April. The 3rd Division’s mission was clear: “Destroy all enemy forces in Phan Rang, liberate all of Ninh Thuan province, confiscate all technical support facilities, especially air force equipment, and be prepared to continue to advance to the south.”²⁹

Unaware of the gathering enemy, on 12 April Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Toan informed Nghi that the 2nd Airborne Brigade would be withdrawn back to Saigon the next day. The 5th Airborne Battalion, 3rd Brigade, had already left Phan Rang the day before. The 31st Ranger Group, which had recently fought at Chon Thanh and was now recuperating at the major ARVN supply depot at Long Binh near Saigon, and the 2nd Infantry Division, with two reconstituted regiments, a few APCs, and an artillery battery, would replace the Airborne troops. Although Nghi protested, the III Corps commander was adamant. After sending the 1st Airborne Brigade to Xuan Loc, Toan needed to restore his reserves around Saigon. As Toan later told the author, “Saigon was more important than Phan Rang.”

At 6:00 A.M. on 13 April, the 31st Ranger Group, with its three battalions and assorted support units, assembled at Bien Hoa airbase for transportation to Phan Rang. By 4:00 P.M., the group’s transfer was complete. The 2nd Division, consisting of the 4th and 5th Regiments (the 6th Regiment and one artillery battery had moved to Phan Thiet on 12 April to assist in the defense of that city), also began moving to Phan Rang. On 13 April the 4th Regiment arrived by truck, with the 5th Regiment arriving the next day. The 5th was Nhut’s weakest unit: it consisted of a Long An RF battalion and a second battalion of men scraped together from various 2nd Division and other units. The division headquarters arrived on the morning of 15 April.

Toan’s moves could not have come at a worse time. Switching units on the front lines is tricky, especially under pressure. The replacements need a period of time to acquaint themselves with the terrain and the enemy situation. Support units like artillery and logistics also require time to organize. While airpower was plentiful, if PAVN began shelling the airbase, that support would quickly disappear. Artillery was in short supply, as were sighting mechanisms, ammunition, and spare parts. Radios were few, and most other stocks were low as well.

After meeting with Nghi and Sang, the Ranger Group commander, Colonel Nguyen Van Biet, sent the 31st Ranger Battalion to replace the 11th Airborne Battalion at the Du Long Pass. The 11th Battalion commander and one infantry company withdrew to Thanh Son, while the other three companies took up defensive positions on hilltops along Route 1 just north of Phan Rang. They would move to Thanh Son the next morning and then fly back to Bien Hoa. Another Ranger battalion would be sent to replace the 3rd Airborne Battalion at Ba Rau. Colonel Biet held his last battalion at the airport in reserve. The 4th Regiment, 2nd Division, would guard Route 11. When the 5th Regiment arrived, it would also remain near the airbase.

Coordinating his departure with the arrival of the Ranger elements, Colonel Luong moved the 7th Battalion and most of his headquarters out on the same planes that flew in the Rangers. The 3rd and 11th Battalions would depart on 14 April, completing the withdrawal of the Airborne except for the artillery, which would stay an extra day.

Major Nguyen Van Tu’s 31st Ranger Battalion arrived at the Du Long Pass around 6:00 P.M. on 13 April. After an orientation and examination of the Airborne defensive works, Tu completed the replacement around 10:00 P.M. While it was relatively quiet on South Vietnam’s front line, Tu was deeply worried. The only troops close by were some RF in Du Long town who had just returned after earlier fleeing in panic. When Tu asked Colonel Biet about fire support, Biet reassured him that even though artillery was not available, there was abundant airpower. However, lack of artillery and reinforcements was not Tu’s only worry. His unit was badly under-strength. Around two hundred men, less than half the unit’s authorized strength, had made muster at Bien Hoa that morning. While absent ARVN soldiers typically filtered in several days after the start of an operation, Tu had no idea how they would reach distant Phan Rang.

As Tu surveyed the hills, he pondered his two-fold mission: to hold the line at the Du Long Pass, and to act as a traffic checkpoint on Route 1. He was to monitor civilians traveling south, as enemy commandos often disguised themselves as local peasants. Any soldiers were to be grabbed and sent to the rear for use in forming new units. As Nguyen Van Tu, a soldier since 1963, went to sleep under Vietnam’s stars, it would be one of the last peaceful nights he would know for many years.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR PHAN RANG

At 5:30 A.M. on 14 April, Communist artillery shells began exploding on various positions near Du Long, Ba Rau, and smaller villages along Route 1. For an hour PAVN rained hot steel on the Rangers’ bunkers at Du Long Pass and the Airborne’s at Ba Rau. At 6:30A.M. several tanks and waves of infantry tried to punch through Major Tu’s lines, but the Rangers held them off. Two A-37s appeared overhead thirty minutes later. As the jets dove in to strike the attackers, their bombs fell short and hit a Ranger position, wounding a dozen of Tu’s men. Despite the friendly fire and the heavy attacks, the Rangers held.

Unable to break through on Route 1, the North Vietnamese cut through the hills, bypassing the Ranger positions, and attacked Du Long town. After a short fight, the RF forces crumbled and the town was captured. Although Tu was still holding, he was now outflanked. He called Colonel Biet for orders and was told to maintain his position, as reinforcements from the 52nd Ranger Battalion were on the way. Although the troops of the 52nd rushed forward, they were pinned down by the second 3rd Division column and were unable to advance any further. At 4:00 P.M., Colonel Biet ordered Tu to retreat, telling him to get his men back to the airport.

Tu decided to infiltrate his men in small groups through the Communist lines. After issuing orders and directions to his remaining men, Tu began moving with his headquarters staff. As he scrambled down a hill, he suddenly saw a T-54 swing its turret around and point the long barrel of the main gun at his group. Shouting for the others to run, Tu dashed down the hill, trying to draw the tank’s attention away from his men. It worked. The T-54 fired a round at him, which exploded nearby. He fell to the ground, dazed. Noticing wetness running down his backside and right leg, Tu suddenly felt fear, wondering how badly he had been wounded. Reaching carefully around behind him, he put his hand on his wet fatigue pants. Much to his relief, he discovered that a shell fragment had hit and broken his canteen, splashing water on his legs. Getting up, Tu continued moving, and by the next morning, he and most of his battalion staff had made it to the airbase. However, only eighty of his soldiers escaped. The Du Long Pass, regarded as the key to ARVN’s ability to defend Phan Rang, had fallen.

While artillery bombarded the 31st Rangers’ positions, elements of the PAVN 25th Regiment began moving toward Thanh Son. Helicopter patrols soon spotted a large number of men camouflaged with leaves and branches heading toward the airbase. Lieutenant Colonel But’s gunships tried to hold them off, but they penetrated the airbase and rushed toward the hangar area. Lieutenant General Nghi immediately ordered Colonel Luong to lead the portion of the 11th Airborne currently waiting near the runway for their ride back to Saigon to stop the attackers. Luong protested, telling Nghi that responsibility for the defense of Thanh Son had been turned over to the 2nd Division. Nghi insisted, and Luong reluctantly obeyed.

Luong requested that four armored personnel carriers that were parked on the airfield be placed under his command to support the attack. Nghi granted this request. Fortunately, the combined fire support provided by the APCs and armed helicopters was extremely effective in stopping the advancing PAVN troops. As the Airborne pushed outside the airbase, the fighting became fierce. The 11th Battalion commander noted: “Just after the troops moved beyond the perimeter fence enemy forces began firing heavily. One M-113 was hit by a B-40 rocket and burst into flames. The two airborne companies launched an all-out assault, while armed helicopters . . . from the airfield strafed the enemy force that was trying to surround the two airborne companies. Flights of A-37s bombed enemy mortar positions in the foothills next to the airfield. Communist forces popped all different colors of smoke to try to trick and confuse the bombers. The airborne troopers fought a close-quarters battle using grenades and bayonets. The heroic assault by 11th Airborne Battalion inflicted heavy losses on the enemy force . . . leaving behind more than one hundred bodies. . . . Our side suffered six soldiers killed or wounded and one M-113 destroyed.”³⁰

After defeating the attack by the 25th Regiment, Luong attempted to convince Nghi that the situation was calm. He took Nghi and Sang on a jeep ride to visit Ba Rau. When they returned, a cable was waiting informing Nghi that the newly appointed Defense Minister, Tran Van Don, accompanied by Lieutenant General Toan, would arrive on 15 April for a visit. Nghi requested that Luong stay another night so that Luong could personally take Don and Toan on a tour of the area. Grumbling, Luong agreed. The day before, Don had issued an appeal to “see to it that every inch of land is safeguarded, as we are determined to hold fast the remaining land.”³¹

As night fell on 14 April, the ARVN forces had managed to hold off the 3rd Division’s attacks. The North Vietnamese had grabbed Du Long town and the pass, and the high ground near Ba Rau, but they had failed to penetrate much further down Route 1. The Communist commanders decided to send an additional battalion to reinforce the 25th Regiment, move their artillery closer to the front lines, and resume their attacks and seize Ba Rau the next day.

At dawn on 15 April, PAVN artillery resumed its heavy shelling, this time concentrating its fire on Ba Rau and the nearby smaller hamlet of Kien Kien, held by the 3rd Airborne Battalion. The 3rd Battalion’s commander, Major La Qui Trang, had three companies positioned on the high ground west of Route 1, and his headquarters and another company east of the road at Kien Kien. Two companies from the 11th Battalion supported him, plus elements of the 52nd Rangers. After another massive artillery barrage lasting an hour, PAVN attacked. Trang’s companies on the west side of the road soon found themselves in dire straits. They held out for several hours against the numerically superior PAVN troops, but the artillery and the constant attacks wore them down. At noon, Trang radioed Luong, asking to retreat. Luong granted permission, and Trang ordered his men on the west to disperse and infiltrate back to Thanh Son. He pulled his remaining troops onto high ground east of Route 1, and called in air strikes that destroyed the bridge on Route 1 at Kien Kien. The PAVN troops were forced to halt their advance while their engineers built a bypass. Another day had passed. Although the North Vietnamese were slowly gaining territory, at this rate it would take them a week to reach the provincial capital. Such a delay threatened the Coastal Column’s ability to reach Saigon in time to participate in the attack. New measures were called for, and Nguyen Huu An’s recent Soviet training would now pay huge dividends.