NOTES

INTRODUCTION

  1. Unfortunately, South Vietnamese documentation for the final years of the war remains mostly inaccessible to Western researchers. While materials from the First Republic of President Ngo Dinh Diem are fairly open, Communist officials often refuse access for the later years. Only recently have the Communists officially published some South Vietnamese documents.

  2. Interview with Tran Tien San, former commander, 86th Ranger Battalion, 5 August 2006, Westminster, Calif.

  3. “Le Duc Tho article marks 1975 victory,” FBIS Asia and Pacific, 9 May 1986, K3-4.

  4. A book by Colonel General Hoang Minh Thao about the Ban Me Thuot campaign was published in English in 1979, but it was a hackneyed propaganda screed typical of that era. Several years later, he wrote (in Vietnamese) a more readable memoir, but it remained unknown in the West, although an excellent chapter on Ban Me Thuot was translated and published by the Joint Publication Research Service (JPRS). Colonel General Tran Van Tra’s book on the B-2 Front came out in 1982. His work, also translated into English by the JPRS, was in direct response to Dung’s book. However, its criticism, though muted, of Dung and some Politburo decisions soon caused the authorities to ban its publication. The fourth book, by Senior General Hoang Van Thai, was also translated into English by the JPRS. Thai’s book was written in part to address Tra’s criticism. His is the best of the four.

  5. The author thanks Merle Pribbenow, Robert Destatte, and Ron Ward for the following discussion, which is based upon a lengthy series of email exchanges on this subject.

  6. The People’s Army of Vietnam: The First 55 Years [Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam: 55 Nam] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1999), 195.

CHAPTER 1

  1. Nixon’s “Peace with Honor” speech, 23 January 1973.

  2. Henry A. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 436–437.

  3. Richard M. Nixon, No More Vietnams (New York: Arbor House, 1985), 169.

  4. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 440.

  5. Ibid., 459–460.

  6. “Meeting with Secretary Richardson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Recognition for Returning Prisoners of War,” 15 February 1973, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Gerald R. Ford Library, National Security Advisor Files, Box 1.

  7. Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 757.

  8. R. W. Apple, Jr., “President Warns Hanoi Not to Move Equipment South,” New York Times, 16 March 1973, 1

  9. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 468–469.

10. Interview with Hoang Duc Nha, 4 June 2009, Falls Church, Va.

11. Interview with Nguyen Xuan Tam, 18 October 2008, Springfield, Va.

12. According to the lunar calendar, Thieu was born at the hour, day, month, and year of Ty (the Rat), a rare four-fold confluence that in Vietnamese astrology is considered an extraordinarily good omen. As to whether Thieu used astrologers, former CIA Station Chief Ted Shackley claims that Thieu set the date for Operation Lam Son 719 with his astrologer. See Ted Shackley, with Richard A. Finney, Spymaster: My Life in the CIA (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2005), 244. When the author asked Hoang Duc Nha about this particular incident, he denied it.

13. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 223.

14. Arnold Isaacs, Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), 101–105.

15. “Hanoi Battles Economic Crimes,” Saigon Embassy Airgram A-75, April 1974, Central Policy Files, Record Group (RG) 59, P-Reel 1974, Box 40C, Document P740040-1491, NARA, College Park, Md.

16. Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, and Nguyen Vu Tung and James G. Hershberg, 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977 (Washington, D.C.: Cold War International History Project, The Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998),Working Paper #22, 172.

17. “Aide-Memoir,” 2 April 1973, NARA, Nixon Library, National Security Council (NSC) Files, Country Files, Vietnam, Box 943, Folder 3.

18. Memo from Brent Scowcroft to General John Dunn, “Meeting with Vietnamese at San Clemente,” 4 April 1973, Nixon Library, NSC Country Files, Vietnam, Box 943, Folder 1.

19. Memo, “The President’s Meeting with President Nguyen Van Thieu of the RVN,” 2 April 1973, Nixon Library, HAK Office Files, Vietnam Country Files, Box 103.

20. “Thieu Vows Never to Ask for Troops,” New York Times, 6 April 1973, 1, 4.

21. Paul Quinn-Judge, “Inside Saigon: Eye-Witness Report,” Commonweal, 26 September 1975, 430. Judge, a reporter who was also part of the Quaker American Friends Service Committee, then lists numerous well-known “Third Force” members who turned out to be Communists.

22. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 459–460.

23. Ibid., 352–353.

24. Ibid., 493.

CHAPTER 2

  1. Vo Nguyen Giap, The General Headquarters in the Spring of Brilliant Victory (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2002), 33. It is uncertain whether Giap is referring to Vietnamese, or to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, who recommended that exact course in a meeting with Le Duan. Giap then devotes several pages to GVN ceasefire violations while never acknowledging Communist actions. In fact, he blatantly states that the North Vietnamese “needed to avail ourselves of the temporary suspension of enemy strikes to increase transport operations to the South,” because the enemy could “cause us difficulties by requesting the stationing of international control posts at important communication junctions on the [Ho Chi Minh Trail].” Giap, General Headquarters, 34–35.

  2. Ibid., 37.

  3. Ibid., 40.

  4. Lieutenant General Le Huu Duc, “Developing the Plan to Liberate South Vietnam in Two Years [Xay Dung Ke Hoach Giai Phong Mien Nam Trong Hai Nam],” People’s Army [Quan Doi Nhan Dan], 9 March 2005. Duc was the chief of the General Staff’s Combat Operations Department during the 1975 offensive.

  5. MR-8 was the upper Delta, while MR-9 was the lower Delta. MR-9 was commanded by then Senior Colonel Le Duc Anh, who later became president of Vietnam from 1992 to 1997. His recent memoirs also parrot this story.

  6. Tran Van Tra, History of the Bulwark B-2 Theatre, vol. 5: Concluding the 30-Years War (Arlington, Va.: Joint Publications Research Service Report, JPRS-SEA-82783, 2 February 1983), 33.

  7. Giap, General Headquarters, 51–53.

  8. Ibid.

  9. “Chuong Thien Province—Struggle for Control in the Central Delta,” Saigon Airgram #107, 9 August 1973, NARA, RG 59, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–1973, Box 2808. See also “The Lull in Chuong Thien,” Amembassy Saigon to SecState, Cable #5276, 5 April 1973, NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–1974.http://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-list.jsp?cat=WR28. Unless noted, all subsequent cables are from this group.

10. Le Duc Anh, “The Final Phase of the War,” Vietnam Net, 4 May 2006.

11. Ibid.

12. Tra, Bulwark B-2 Theatre, 57.

13. Giap, General Headquarters, 64.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 69–70. Despite the post-war bitterness between Giap and Le Duan, Giap does not disparage the former General Secretary in his book.

16. James M. Markham, “Vietcong Order Indicates Support for Battle Step-Up,” New York Times, 21 October 1973, 3, quoting the Communist document.

17. Le Duan, Letters to the South [Thu Vao Nam] (Hanoi: Su That Publishing House, 1985), 345–346.

18. “Meeting with Ambassador Graham Martin, 12 July 1973,” NARA, Nixon Library, NSC Files, Vietnam, Box 165, May–September 1973, Folder 2.

19. Interview with Cao Van Vien, 11 November 2001, Reston, Va.

20. DAO Monthly Intelligence Survey and Threat Analysis (MISTA), September 1973, 1, 23.

21. Backchannel message from Martin to Kissinger, Martin #574, 5 January 1974, Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Document, #2305, Gale Publishing, 1996.

CHAPTER 3

  1. Letter from Major General John Murray to Colonel William Le Gro, 3 September 1976. Martin claimed in a cable to Kissinger that he had discussed the situation with Thieu, and that Thieu asked him not to discuss the aid cuts with the JGS or report their talk back to Washington for fear of a leak. Murray believes Martin lied.

  2. Ibid.

  3. Backchannel from Scowcroft to Martin, White House #31452, 29 December 1973.

  4. “To Washington, the Struggle in Vietnam Has Become ‘Their War,’” New York Times, 27 January 1974, 24.

  5. William E. Le Gro, Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1981), 87, quoting the Murray cable. Hoang Van Thai claims that in late September 1974, a spy sent the General Staff a copy of Murray’s briefing slides. See Hoang Van Thai, The Decisive Years: Memoirs of Senior General Hoang Van Thai (Arlington, Va.: Joint Publications Research Service Report, JPRS-SEA-87-084, 23 June 1987), 65. Chapter 6 of this book discusses the spy’s probable identity. Nguyen Tien Hung reprints the slides in his book. See Nguyen Tien Hung and Jerrold L. Schecter, The Palace File (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), 449–451.

  6. Vien interview, 11 November 2001, Reston, Va.

  7. Quotes taken from Thieu’s 6 June speech at the Thu Duc academy.

  8. Backchannel from Major General Murray to Major General Guthrie, 2 August 1974. According to the DAO, the VNAF lost seventy-five aircraft and helicopters from January 1973 to April 1974. None were replaced.

  9. Backchannel from Major General Murray to Brigadier General Hoefling, 11 August 1974.

10. Letter from Murray to Le Gro, 3 September 1976.

11. “Communist Guidance on the ‘New Phase’ of the Revolution in South Vietnam,’” Vietnam Documents and Research Notes #117, U.S. Embassy, Saigon, April 1974, 2.

12. DAO MISTA, March 1974, quoting the Nghi statements. According to the DAO, these remarks had a direct impact on morale among the Southern-born Communists. They interpreted the explanations as sacrificing their interests for Northern reconstruction, and several high-ranking cadres quickly defected.

13. The Diplomatic Struggle as Part of the People’s National Democratic Revolution (1945–1954), vol. 2 [Dau Tranh Ngoai Giao Trong Cach Mang Dan Toc Dan Chu Nhan Dan (1945–1954), Tap Hai] (Hanoi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1976), 228. Dong’s remarks came from a speech reviewing the Geneva Accords.

14. Giap, General Headquarters, 75.

15. During the 21st Plenum, the Politburo authorized the formation of the 1st Corps (called the “Determined to Win” Corps), which came into existence on 23 October 1973. The 2nd Corps was formed on 17 May 1974 by a General Staff directive stemming from the same earlier Politburo decision.

16. Thai, Decisive Years, 38.

17. Ibid., 39.

18. Ibid., 51.

CHAPTER 4

  1. Tran Quang Khoi, “Fighting to the Finish: The Role of South Vietnam’s III Armor Brigade and III Corps Assault Force in the War’s Final Days,” Armor (March/April 1996), 14.

  2. Tra, Bulwark B-2 Theatre, 76.

  3. Ibid., 84. The 6th Division had only two regiments, hence the minus designation.

  4. Hoang Cam served as a battalion commander during the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. In late December 1964, he was sent south to join the B-2 Front. He arrived in South Vietnam in the spring of 1965, and was eventually assigned as the first commander of the 9th Division when it was created on 2 September 1965, the first Communist division formed in South Vietnam. Cam assumed command of the 4th Corps when it was created in July 1974.

  5. Interview with Major General Le Minh Dao, 7 April 2001, East Hartford, Conn. On 23 April 1975, President Tran Van Huong promoted him to major general for his valor at the Xuan Loc battle.

  6. DAO, RVNAF Final Assessment, Jan Thru Apr FY 75 (Washington, D.C.: Department. of the Army, 1975), 5–19.

  7. “On Nixon’s Resignation of the Presidency of the United States, and a Number of Urgent Party Tasks,” Politburo Resolution No. 236-NQ/TW, 13 August 1974, Collected Party Documents, vol. 35, 1974 [Van Kien Dang, Toan, Tap 35, 1974] (National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2004), 116–123.

  8. “FY 75 Defense Assistance to Vietnam,” Amembassy Saigon to SecState, #10622, 13 August 1974.

  9. Ford letter to Thieu, 10 August 1974, as seen in Hung, Palace File, 240.

10. Murray memo on Gayler debriefing, 1, 9.

11. “Military Operations in MR3,” Bien Hoa to Saigon, #541, 21 October 1974.

12. Major General Homer Smith, “End of Tour Report,” 30 May 1975, 5–6.

13. General Cao Van Vien, “Memorandum for the President of the Republic of Vietnam,” backchannel from Murray to Hunt, 16 August 1974, 3.

14. Thieu letter to Ford, 19 September 1974, DDRS, #2825, 1992.

15. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 12 September 1974, NARA, Ford Library, NSC Files, Bi-Partisan Congressional Leadership, Box 5.

16. “Memorandum of Conversation,” 13 September 1974, DDRS, #593, 1993.

17. Thai, Decisive Years, 55.

18. Review of the Resistance War against the Americans to Save the Nation: Victory and Lessons (Internal Distribution Only) [Tong Ket Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc: Thang Loi va Bai Hoc (Luu Hanh Noi Bo)] (Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 1995), 95.

19. Thai, Decisive Years, 57.

20. Merle Pribbenow, “North Vietnam’s Final Offensive: Strategic Endgame Nonpareil,” Parameters, no. 4 (Winter/Spring 2000), 63.

21. “Secret Documents of the CPV on Completing the Liberation of the South, Part 1,” Vietnam Social Sciences, vol. 2, no. 46 (1995), 110–118.

CHAPTER 5

  1. The original 324th Division was disbanded in early 1967, and the regiments became independent. In February 1969, the division was reconstituted, and allied intelligence designated it the 324B Division. However, PAVN did not use this designation for the 324th. The “B” is used when a division “clones” itself. A group of core cadres from the original division remains behind to train a new one, while the original unit sets off for the battlefield. In this case, the 324th was disbanded in early 1967 and then reformed using most of the old divisional elements. Therefore, the author has decided not to use the 324B designation.

  2. Nguyen Duy Hinh, Vietnamization and the Cease-Fire (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1984), 179.

  3. History of the 2nd Corps (1974–1994) [Lich Su Quan Doan 2 (1974–1994)] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1994), 94.

  4. Hoang Dan, Things Accumulated during Two Wars [Nhung Dieu Dong Lai Qua Hai Cuoc Chien Tranh] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2005), 237

  5. Thai, Decisive Years, 63, 66. To be precise, while Thuong Duc was the main battle that convinced the General Staff, it was the culmination of all the battles that raged throughout I and II Corps in the summer and fall of 1974 that helped form this conclusion.

  6. Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, “Significant Events in I Corps from the Ceasefire January 28, 1973, until the Withdrawal from Danang March 30, 1975,” 6 November 1975, General Research Corporation, Interviews and Debriefings of Refugees from Southeast Asia, vol. 1, 24–25. Hereafter Interviews.

  7. Isaacs, Without Honor, 329.

  8. “Cable from the COSVN Party Current Affairs Committee to the Politburo Reporting on the Results of COSVN’s 13th Party Plenum,” Historical Chronicle of the Cochin China Party Committee and the Central Office for South Vietnam, 1954–1975 [Lich Su Bien Nien Xu Uy Nam Bo Va Trung Uong Cuc Mien Nam (1954–1975)] (Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2002), 1027.

  9. Tra, Bulwark B-2 Theatre, 102.

10. Giap, General Headquarters, 131.

11. Tra, Bulwark B-2 Theatre, 107.

12. Ibid., 106.

13. Ibid., 112.

14. Dam Huu Phuoc, “Phuoc Long: The Wound That Never Heals,” Airborne Ranger, no. 3 (2001), 30.

15. Le Gro, Cease-Fire to Capitulation, 137.

16. “US Reaction to North Vietnamese Offensive,” Amembassy Saigon to SecState, #267, 8 January 1975.

17. The WSAG was composed of the national security advisor, the deputy secretaries of state and defense, the chairman of the JCS, and the director of the CIA.

18. Meeting, Washington Special Actions Group, 7 January 1975, 3, 12.

19. “DAO Saigon Monthly Assessment,” 3 January 1975, 3.

20. “Supplemental Aid Request for Vietnam and Cambodia,” Ford Library, NSC Files, MEMCONs, Box 8.

21. “President Ford—After Six Months in Office,” Chicago Tribune, 9 February 1975, B1–B3.

CHAPTER 6

  1. Murray memo on Gayler debriefing.

  2. Maynard Parker, “Vietnam: The War That Won’t End,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 53 (January 1975), 352.

  3. Vien, Final Collapse, 56.

  4. Pham Ba Hoa, A Few Lines of Reminiscence: A Memoir [Doi Dong Ghi Nho: Hoi Ky] (Houston, Tex.: Ngay Nay, 1994), 231.

  5. Philip McCombs, “Thieu: ‘I Won’t Give Up,’” Washington Post, 29 January 1975, 1, 18.

  6. Letter from Thieu to Ford, 25 January 1975, Ford Library, NSC Files, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 12.

  7. “Meeting with President Thieu,” Amembassy Saigon to SecState, #11475, 31 August 1974.

  8. James Markham, “Political Foes Bid Thieu Step Down,” New York Times, 10 February 1975, 11, quoting the speech.

  9. “Three-year aid program for South Vietnam,” 4 March 1975, Ford Library, NSC files, MEMCONs, Box 9.

10. MEMCON, 5 March 1975, Ford Library, NSC Files, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 12.

11. Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 510.

12. Giap, General Headquarters, 150.

13. Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent End, Told by the CIA’s Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1977), 135.

14. In discussions with General Vien and several of his staff members, they resolutely deny that this man had the access he claimed. They do not recall him specifically, but they claim internal security procedures would have prevented such an intelligence coup. At this point, it is impossible to ascertain the truth, but the author has chosen Hanoi’s version of how it obtained such vital intelligence.

15. Thanh Xuan, “Intelligence Warrior H3 Inside the Joint General Staff,” Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 25 April 2005.

16. Ibid.

17. Vo Chi Cong, On the Road of Revolution (A Memoir) [Tren Nhung Chang Duong Cach Mang (Hoi Ky)] (Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2001), 262. Cong was the political officer of the B-1 Front during much of the war. Afterwards he became a Politburo member and, subsequently, president of Vietnam.

18. “Secret Documents of the CPV on Completing the Liberation of the South, Part 2,” Vietnam Social Sciences, vol. 3, no. 47 (1995), 108–117.

19. Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory: An Account of the Liberation of South Vietnam, trans. John Spragens Jr. (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2000), 30.

20. “Comrade Le Duc Tho Discusses a Number of Issues Related to Reviewing the War and Writing Military History,” Military History Magazine [Tap Chi Lich Su Quan Su], Military Institute of Vietnam, vol. 3, no. 27 (1988), 5–6. The author thanks Dr. Nguyen Lien Hang for a copy of this article.

21. For a full discussion of the Giap–Le Duan–Dung clash over the Tet Offensive, see Merle Pribbenow, “General Vo Nguyen Giap and the Mysterious Evolution of the Plan for the 1968 Tet Offensive,” Journal of Vietnamese Studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (Summer 2008).

22. Colonel General Hoang Minh Thao, “Ex-Central Highlands Commander Recounts Buon Ma Thuot Battle,” Quan Doi Nhan Dan (March 1982), translated in JPRS SEA-80692, 13–14.

23. Giap, General Headquarters, 154.

24. Thien’s real name was Phan Dinh Dinh, and he was Le Duc Tho’s brother.

25. Dang Vu Hiep in cooperation with Le Hai Trieu and Ngo Vinh Binh, Highland Memories [Ky Uc Tay Nguyen] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2000), 286.

26. Le Gro diary, January 1975, 9. According the NSA historian Robert Hanyok, “SIGINT indicated that the 316th was being regenerated in North Vietnam. All communications serving the division ceased on 11 February, although references to it receiving supplies continued into March.” See Robert Hanyok, Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945–1975 (Washington, D.C.: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2002), 448, note 71.

27. Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1945–1975, trans. Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002), 363.

28. Thao, “Ex-Central Highlands Commander,” 18–20.

29. Lieutenant General Dam Van Nguy with Le Minh Huy and Duong Duy Ngu, The Farther You Travel [Di Mot Ngay Dang] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1994), 183–184. The title is half of a folk saying, “The farther you travel, the more you learn.”

30. Hiep, Highland Memories, 296.

31. Nguy, The Farther You Travel, 185.

32. Beginning in mid-1972, Brigadier General Phan Dinh Niem, one of the best ARVN division commanders, had rebuilt the 22nd from a unit decimated in the 1972 offensive into one of ARVN’s top outfits. The 22nd’s traditional enemy was the 3rd (Sao Vang [Yellow Star]) Division, and since the end of 1972, the 22nd Division had repeatedly trounced the 3rd Division. Given the large territory it had to cover, the 22nd, like the 1st Division, was a heavy division, with four regiments instead of the usual three. The four regiments were the 40th, 41st, 42nd, and 47th.

33. Nguyen Tu, “Region II Commander Talks to Chinh Luan Correspondent about the Battle of Wits in the Central Highlands,” Chinh Luan, 18 February 1975.

34. Hoang Ngoc Lung, Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1984), 222.

35. Nguyen Khai, March in the Central Highlands: A Report [Thang Ba O Tay Nguyen: Ky Su] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1976), 156. Khai was a North Vietnamese journalist who accompanied PAVN forces during the Central Highlands campaign. He later published a book that included many ARVN documents. In mid-April 1975, Phu and several other senior officers were arrested and charged with dereliction of duty for losing I and II Corps. Each was required to write a statement outlining his actions. Khai reprinted Phu’s, including Thieu’s handwritten comments. When Phu discussed sending reinforcements to Ban Me Thuot after the assault, Thieu wrote: “Prior to the Tet New Year he knew the situation at Ban Me Thuot was serious and planned to move the 23rd Division back. Why didn’t he carry out this plan, leaving us unable to send in reinforcements in time when the enemy attacked?”

36. 968th Division [Su Doan 968] (Quang Tri: The 968th Division and the Quang Tri Province Bureau, 1990), 150.

CHAPTER 7

  1. The 3rd Troop, 8th Cavalry, was scattered throughout Ban Me Thuot guarding various important locations. When the Communists attacked, it was quickly overwhelmed. The commander of the unit was Captain Le Trung Tanh, Brigadier General Tuong’s younger brother.

  2. Thai, Decisive Years, 87.

  3. General Cao Van Vien, “Instructions from the President of the Republic of Vietnam on Present War Policies” (n.d.), reproduced in Khai’s March in the Central Highlands, 89–90.

  4. Hiep, Highland Memories, 302.

  5. The Lowlands Division (Central Highlands Corps), vol. 3 [Su Doan Dong Bang (Binh Doan Tay Nguyen), Tap Ba] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1984), 259. Hereafter 320th Division.

  6. Ban Me Thuot: A Historic Battle [Buon Ma Thuot: Tran Danh Lich Su] (Ban Me Thuot: Darlac Province Party Historical Research Subcommittee, 1990), 46. The book provides the name of the unfortunate officer, Second Lieutenant Bui Ngoc Tham. While participating in the attack against the 53rd Regiment base camp about ten days later, he was blinded in both eyes.

  7. Polgar was born in Hungary, departing that country in 1938 for America. He served in the U.S. Army in military intelligence during World War II, eventually joining the CIA when the agency was born in 1947. He progressed up the ranks, and in 1970 received his first major assignment—CIA station chief in Buenos Aires. In July 1971 he helped foil a hijacking there by an American and his Guatemalan girlfriend. For his actions, he received the State Department’s Award for Valor. Polgar, a short, balding man with a penetrating intellect, was assigned as Saigon station chief in late 1972.

  8. See for example, Kim Willenson, The Bad War: An Oral History of the Vietnam War (New York: NAL Penguin, 1987), 289.

  9. Hanyok, Spartans in Darkness, 432.

10. Interview with Tom Glenn, 25 February 2008, Columbia, Md. See also Hanyok, Spartans in Darkness, 433.

11. Vu Van Mao, “The Battlefield Exploits of Military Intelligence Personnel: The Central Highlands Campaign [Chien Cong cua Nhung Nguoi Linh Quan Bao: Chien Dich Tay Nguyen],” People’s Army [Quan Doi Nhan Dan], #12153, 20 March 1995, and #12154, 21 March 1995.

12. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 52–53.

13. Interview with Colonel Le Cau, 8 June 2002, Philadelphia, Pa. Colonel Cau graduated from the Dalat Military Academy in 1963, and spent the next twelve years defending his country, rising in rank from second lieutenant to colonel. He was wounded three times in battle and earned several of South Vietnam’s highest medals, along with America’s Silver and Bronze Stars.

14. The Yellow Star Division [Su Doan Sao Vang] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1984), 324, 330. Hereafter 3rd Division.

15. Ibid., 327.

16. Moncrieff J. Spear, “The Communist Offensive in Region Two” (n.d.), 2, Folder 1, Box 1, Moncrieff J. Spear Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

17. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 64.

18. 316th Division, vol. 2 [Su Doan 316, Tap II] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1986), 276.

19. 10th Division: Central Highlands Corps [Su Doan 10: Binh Doan Tay Nguyen] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1987), 92–95.

20. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 70.

21. History of the 198th Sapper Group [Lich Su Doan Dac Cong 198] (Hanoi?: Sapper Command, 1991), 54.

22. 10th Division, 100.

23. Hiep, Highland Memories, 310–311.

24. Pham Huan, The Withdrawal from the Central Highlands, 1975 [Cuoc Triet Thoai Cao Nguyen, 1975] (San Jose, Calif.: Self-published, 1987), 50. Pham Huan was a veteran journalist and military officer engaged in writing Phu’s biography while also serving as a member of his staff. Huan was also a member of the editorial staff of Dieu Hau [The Hawk], an ARVN newspaper published in Saigon. He had served in 1973 as a press officer of the Four-Party and the Two-Party Joint Military Commissions. He also served from 1972 to 1975 as chairman of the Vietnam War Correspondents Association. Phu allowed Huan to stay constantly by his side during the climactic days of March 1975. Huan kept a diary of the events in II Corps, and after leaving Vietnam in 1987, he published his diary. His work is an invaluable asset in understanding the sequence of events in II Corps.

25. Nguyen Trong Luat, “Looking Back at the Battle for Ban Me Thuot [Nhin Lai Tran Danh Ban Me Thuot],” World Today [The Gioi Ngay Nay], issue 140 (March and April 1997), 48–59.

26. Huan, Withdrawal from the Central Highlands, 65.

27. Major General Hoang Minh Thao, The Victorious Tay Nguyen Campaign (Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1979), 111. This is Thao’s official history of the campaign, published before his memoir.

CHAPTER 8

  1. Hung, Palace File, 267–268. Hung’s information came from post-war interviews with Thieu, and is the only published explanation by the president regarding his decisions.

  2. There has been speculation in South Vietnamese circles that Thieu ordered the withdrawal to create a crisis that he hoped would spur the U.S. Congress to grant more aid, or even persuade the Americans to re-enter the war. Another theory proclaims that Thieu knew the war was over, and deliberately disorganized ARVN to prevent large-scale battles that would cost thousands of lives. The author believes neither theory has any substance.

  3. Interview of General Cao Van Vien by Neil Sheehan, 26 June 1973, Box 80, Papers of Neil Sheehan, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. The author thanks Dr. Larry Berman for alerting him to the Sheehan collection.

  4. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen, and Brian M. Jenkins, The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders (RAND R-2208-OSD [HIST], December 1978), 180.

  5. Moncrieff Spear, “Comments on the Collapse of the Republic of Vietnam” (n.d.), Folder 01, Box 01, Moncrieff J. Spear Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

  6. Vien, Final Collapse, 84.

  7. General Cao Van Vien, “His Observations of Events Leading to the Collapse of the Republic of Vietnam,” Interviews, vol. 1, 6.

  8. Thomas Ahern, The CIA and the Generals: Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.), 160, fn. 9.

  9. Interview with Nguyen Quang Vinh, 7 October 2010, Dallas, Tex.

10. Hosmer et al., Fall of South Vietnam, 184. Phu told Pham Huan the same thing. Huan, Withdrawal, 150.

11. Edward Haley, Congress and the Fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia (East Brunswick, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1982), 68.

12. “Aid for Vietnam,” SecState to AmConsul Jerusalem, #055010, 12 March 1975.

13. Letter from Martin to Thieu, 14 March 1975, DDRS #3097, 1995.

14. Backchannel message from Lehmann to Martin, Martin #671, DDRS #3335, 1995.

15. Robert Martens, “Interview with Wolfgang J. Lehmann,” The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 9 May 1989, 12.

16. Snepp writes: “a CIA agent on Phu’s staff alerted his local American case officer that a total abandonment of the Highlands was imminent.” Snepp, Decent Interval, 196. In a post-war interview, Ly states: “I told the CIA people . . . that we were withdrawing.” Larry Engelmann, Tears before the Rain: An Oral History of the Fall of South Vietnam(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 229. Ly’s status as a CIA source is revealed officially in Ahern’s The CIA and the Generals, 157–158.

17. Telephone interview with Ngo Le Tinh, 18 June 2007, Katy, Tex.

18. Bao Chan, “The Spy without a Secret Code Number [Nguoi Tinh Bao Khong Mang Bi So],” Lao Dong, 27 April 2006. The article describes how the commander of the 247th RF Battalion, a graduate of the Dalat Military Academy and a former officer of the 23rd Division, had been a Communist agent since 1955.

19. Thai, Decisive Years, 92.

20. Cable #3, Dung to Giap, 11 March 1975, Dung, Great Spring Victory, 78–79.

21. Cable #1 from Giap to Dung, 11 March 1975, Great Spring Victory, 1975: Party Documents [Dai Thang Mua Xuan, 1975: Van Kien Dang] (Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2005), 110–113. The author thanks Ron Ward for obtaining a copy of this critical primary source collection.

22. Giap, General Headquarters, 185.

23. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 83–84.

24. Cable from the Central Military Affairs Committee to Dung, 13 March 1975, A Number of Guidance Documents for the Spring 1975 General Offensive and Uprising and the Ho Chi Minh Campaign [Mot So Van Kien Chi Dao: Tong Tien Cong Va Noi Day Mua Xuan Nam 1975] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2005), 205.

25. Cable #5, from Dung to the Politburo, 14 March 1975, Great Spring Victory, 1975, 128–129.

26. Cable #11, from Giap to Dung, 15 March 1975, Great Spring Victory, 1975, 146–147.

27. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 104. As can be imagined, Dung’s reprimand had an impact. According to the 320th Division history, Tuan was a “mature, calm, unflappable officer”; Tuan’s staff had “never seen the commander as nervous and excited as he was on this occasion.” 320th Division, 275.

CHAPTER 9

  1. Colonel Le Khac Ly, “The Collapse of II Corps and the Final Days in MR-2,” Interviews, vol. 1, 110.

  2. Interview with Earl Thieme, 2 March 2008. The author thanks Mr. Thieme for a copy of both his original message to Spear, dated 15 March, and his 27 March 1975 written description of the events in Pleiku during the withdrawal. There is some dispute over the sequence of events. The CIA representative claims he told Thieme about the evacuation after speaking to Ly, rather than Thieme’s hearing it from Phu. See Ahern, CIA and the Generals, 158–159. In Ly’s interviews after the war, he neglects to mention that Phu also told the Americans to depart, making it seem that only he had done so.

  3. Since Tat spent thirteen years in a Communist prison, he never spoke about his role in the retreat until now. In an interview with the author, Tat wished to correct several statements. First, General Vien wrote in his book that when Phu requested permission at Cam Ranh Bay to promote Tat, Vien said he did not know him. Tat says that he knew Vien well, and charitably excuses Vien’s error as “bad memory.” Ly would later accuse Tat of corruption and cronyism with Phu, and laid much of the blame for the botched retreat on Tat. Dong would also chastise Tat for his actions on 7B. Tat denies the corruption charges, stating that he had avoided corrupt activities for years and left the Special Forces because he no longer wanted to work for the notoriously corrupt Special Forces commander, Brigadier General Doan Van Quang. He strongly disagrees with Dong about Cheo Reo, claiming that Dong was under Phu’s command, not his. Tat says that Phu told Dong to hold open Cheo Reo, while it was Tat’s job to get the Rangers to Tuy Hoa. He is aware of the stories about him, but he had refrained from speaking publicly as he did not want to speak ill of anyone. When South Vietnam surrendered on 30 April 1975, he refused to depart, saying he hated America for deserting his country. Prison changed his mind, and he now lives quietly in Virginia. Author interview, 18 October 2008.

  4. Ha Mai Viet, Steel and Blood: Armor in the Vietnam War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 245.

  5. “Attack on Retreating Enemy Force at Cheo Reo (Central Highlands), 17–25 March 1975 [Tran Tien Cong Dich Rut Chay Tai Cheo Reo (Tay Nguyen), 17–25–3–1975],” in Battles of Vietnamese Artillery during the Wars of Liberation and to Defend the Fatherland, vol. II [Nhung Tran Danh Cua Phao Binh Vietnam Trong Cac Cuoc Chien Tranh Giai Phong Va Bao Ve To Quoc, Tap II] (Hanoi?: Artillery Command, 1990), 157.

  6. The 320th Division established a network of observation posts to monitor enemy forces in the My Thach–Cheo Reo area, and a radio station to relay messages. But the northernmost 320th lookout was twenty-five miles south of the Route 7B turnoff, too far for any observers to have seen the convoy. Dung and other PAVN commentators are unclear about the origins of the convoy report.

  7. Edmund W. Sprague, “Report on Phu Bon Province and Convoy,” 24 March 1975, Folder 1, Box 1, Moncrieff J. Spear Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech. Sprague was a former Special Forces sergeant who spent many years working with the Montagnards. He was the only American in Cheo Reo during this time. Sprague’s report is a devastating condemnation of South Vietnamese military and police behavior in the town. He also provided a detailed interview in 1977 to Gerald Hickey. See Gerald Cannon Hickey, Free in the Forest: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), 289. Sprague’s timeline of events differs somewhat from Vietnamese accounts, mainly regarding units arriving and departing.

  8. Tat grudgingly admits the depredations of his troops, but explains that his Ranger units were about two-thirds Montagnard and about one-third Vietnamese. The officers and sergeants were mostly Vietnamese. He states that the Vietnamese Ranger troops were generally the dregs—deserters who had been caught and shipped to the Highlands or convicts released from jail. Morale was bad, and drug use, mostly pot smoking, was rampant.

  9. Nguyen Tu, “At 8:00 P.M. Sunday Night, Kontum-Pleiku Tragically Evacuated, Leaving behind Columns of Smoke and Areas in Flames,” Chinh Luan, 18 March 1975.

10. Email to the author from Vu Dinh Hieu, former assistant G-3 (operations officer), 22nd Rangers, 24 September 2007. Hieu learned this from Major Nguyen Thanh Van, the commander of the almost stranded battalion. Tat claims that Le Khac Ly was supposed to send trucks to pick up his men, but failed to do so. Tat speculates that instead of driving to Kontum, the truck drivers gathered their families and departed for Cheo Reo.

11. Nguyen Tu, “A Bloody Road for Refugees,” reprinted in The Saigon Post, 24 March 1975, 1, 2. The Saigon Post was an English-language newspaper owned by Ambassador Bui Diem. Tu noted that the Rangers fought all night to allow the refugees to escape through the jungle. Influential people in Saigon begged the VNAF to rescue Tu, and he and a number of other people were picked up on 18 March near Cheo Reo and flown to Tuy Hoa.

12. According to Dong, Ly handed him a note from Phu informing Dong that he was now in charge, and that it was his responsibility to get all heavy equipment back to Nha Trang. Ly then departed in a helicopter. Viet, Steel and Blood, 248. Pham Huan says Phu also spoke directly to Dong on the radio, and issued essentially the same order. Huan,Withdrawal from the Central Highlands, 153. Huan also claims that Tat was told to move on foot with the troops. All other accounts, including one by a Ranger officer who was in Tat’s command vehicle, say Phu definitely ordered Tat into a helicopter. In his various accounts, Ly barely mentions the transfer of command to Dong.

13. “320th Infantry Division’s Pursuit Attack against Enemy Forces on Route 7 at Cheo Reo from 17 to 19 March 1975,” in A Number of Battles Fought by Units of the Central Highlands Corps, vol. III [Mot So Tran Danh cua cac Don Vi thuoc Binh Doan Tay Nguyen, Tap III] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1995), 164.

14. Hiep, Highland Memories, 324.

15. Cable from the Central Military Affairs Committee to Dung, 17 March 1975, Number of Guidance Documents, 208.

16. Thai, Decisive Years, 99.

17. Historical Chronicle of the Central Office for South Vietnam, 1061–1070.

18. Giap, General Headquarters, 210.

19. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 124–125.

20. Hiep, Highland Memories, 326.

21. Cable #38B, from Giap to Dung, Great Spring Victory, 1975, 166–167.

22. “Appraisal of Situation in South Vietnam,” National Intelligence Bulletin, 17 March 1975.

23. Backchannel from Lehmann to Scowcroft, Martin #673, 17 March 1975, DDRS, #2312, 1993.

24. “Approach to Thieu,” SecState to Amembassy Saigon, #062480, 20 March 1975, in U.S. Policy in the Vietnam War, Part II: 1969–1975, ed. Dr. John Prados (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1992), no. 01333. Hereafter, U.S. Policy and the document number.

25. “Approach to Thieu,” Amembassy Saigon to SecState, #3225, 20 March 1975. U.S. Policy, no. 01334.

26. “Situation in South Vietnam,” backchannel message from Smith to Gayler, #122-75, 23 March 1975.

27. Letter from Ford to Thieu, 22 March 1975.

28. Under One Flag: The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam [Chung Mot Bong Co: Mat Tran Dan Toc Giai Phong Mien Nam Viet Nam] (Ho Chi Minh City: National Political Publishing House, 1993), 820. In a 2007 article describing his intelligence accomplishments, De attributes to himself the statements recorded in the Memcon made by Buu and several delegates. He claims that in his “briefing” to Ford he made the military situation seem even worse than it was, and convinced the Americans not to send troops back to Vietnam. However, while the article is accurate in many aspects, De is not recorded in the Memcon as speaking. Manh Viet, “Meeting with a ‘Viet Cong’ Who Once Had a Face-to-Face Meeting with the U.S. President at the Pentagon [Gap Nguoi ‘Viet Cong’ Tung Doi Dien Tong Thong My Tan Lau Nam Goc],” Tien Phong, 14 February 2007.

29. Memcon, 25 March 1975, DDRS #52, 1993.

30. Lam had written a letter to Vice President Rockefeller, and Can to Speaker Albert, in late January, pleading South Vietnam’s case. In addition, on 12 January 1975 twelve Lower House deputies sent an open letter to the U.S. House, and on 4 February forty-one Vietnamese senators sent an open letter to the U.S. Senate begging for aid. It is unknown whether there was any response.

31. “Letter to President Ford from Speaker Can and Senate President Lam,” Amembassy Saigon to SecState, #3472, 25 March 1975.

32. Hung, Palace File, 282–285.

33. Huan, Withdrawal from the Central Highlands, 158.

34. Nguyen Tu, “The Evacuation: Hundreds of People Stuck in Cung Son Turn Their Sun-Burned Faces toward the Sea,” Chinh Luan, 25 March 1975. After being flown to Tuy Hoa, Tu shuttled back and forth to the stalled convoy.

35. “Phu Yen Convoy Reaches Highway 1,” Amembassy Saigon to SecState, #3513, 26 March 1975.

36. North Vietnamese histories assert that in the campaign from Ban Me Thuot to Cheo Reo and along Routes 7B and 21, they lost “868 killed, 2,373 wounded, six captured, and 40 missing,” for a total of 3,887 casualties. 1975 Central Highlands Campaign [Chien Dich Tay Nguyen 1975] (Hanoi?: Military History Sub-Institute of the High-Level Military Studies Institute), 56. It is often impossible to determine the accuracy of the Communists’ casualty figures, since they tend not to list losses by unit or by battle. One only gets a total, and one is expected to either accept it or not. The author has decided to include these figures, but he cautions future historians regarding their validity.

CHAPTER 10

  1. Dinh Phong, “Journalist Tran Bach Dang—A Few Things That I Know about Him [Nha Bao Tran Bach Dang—Doi Dieu Toi Biet Ve Anh],” Vietnamese Journalists Association Magazine, 28 May 2007.

  2. The Lam River Division [Su Doan Song Lam] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1984), 36. The 341st Division was created in late 1972 from various units of MR-4, the region north of the DMZ. It was composed of three infantry regiments, the 266th, 270th, and 273rd, and was conducting troop training in Quang Binh province when Giap summoned the division commander. Hereafter 341st Division.

  3. “Cable from Pham Hung to the COSVN Current Affairs Committee,” Great Spring Victory, 1975, 72.

  4. Tra, Bulwark B-2 Theatre, 96–97.

  5. Ibid., 145.

  6. The 4th Corps was initially called Group 301. While all Western histories, including some Communist ones, claim that Major General Le Duc Anh commanded Group 232, both Tra, Bulwark B-2 Theatre, 146, and Giap, General Headquarters, 192, state that Major General Nguyen Minh Chau was the initial military commander.

  7. To the author, Lieutenant General Toan strongly denied being corrupt, although he did laughingly admit to a “weakness for the ladies.” In answering the corruption charges, Toan challenged that if he was so corrupt in Vietnam, why did he live so poorly in the United States? When other senior Vietnamese officers were queried about Toan’s statement, most remarked that like the vast majority of corrupt officers, Toan had all his money in Vietnam.

  8. Le Gro, Cease-Fire to Capitulation, 55.

  9. Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Toan, “Significant Events in III Corps during the Period of My Command from 10 January 1975 to 28 April 1975,” Interviews, vol. 1, 146.

10. DAO MISTA, “February Threat Assessment,” 10 March 1975, 8–9.

11. Colonel General Hoang Cam and Nhat Tien, The Ten-Thousand-Day Journey: A Memoir [Chang Duong Muoi Nghin Ngay: Hoi Ky] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1995), 401.

12. The 9th Division changed regimental designations so often, even PAVN historians have a hard time keeping them straight. In the official history for the 1975 time frame, they simply refer to them as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Regiments.

13. 9th Division [Su Doan 9] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1990), 274.

14. The 303rd Division [Su Doan 303rd] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1989), 71.

15. Ibid., 73.

16. Ibid., 75.

17. On 21 April 1974, Senior Colonel Le Duc Anh was promoted two ranks to the grade of lieutenant general. The probable rationale for this rare move is that Hanoi wanted Anh to become the deputy commander of the B-2 Front, rewarding him for his earlier disobedience. In a bit of regional bias, they promoted him over both Major Generals Nguyen Minh Chau and Dong Van Cong, his counterparts at the B-2 Front, and the only true southerners in a command position. Tran Van Tra was from central Vietnam.

18. 7th Division: A Record [Su Doan 7: Ky Su] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1986), 271.

19. Telephone interview with Nguyen Huu Che, 22 August 2001, Warren, Mich.

20. 341st Division, 43.

21. 303rd Division, 86. After the attack on Phuoc Long, the original 271st Regiment of the 303rd Division cloned a 271B Regiment, which reported directly to COSVN.

22. Letter to the author from Vuong Mong Long, 25 March 2002, Seattle, Wash.

23. DAO Weekly Report for 8–14 March 1975, 20.

24. DAO Weekly Report for 15–21 March 1975, 35.

25. Nguyen Phan, “From a Bitter Time [Tu Mot Thoi Cay Dang],” Brown Beret [Mu Nau] (1994), 133. Phan was the operations officer of the 30th Ranger Battalion during the siege of Chon Thanh.

26. Cam, A Memoir, 436.

27. Tra, Bulwark B-2 Theatre, 152.

28. Ibid., 149.

29. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 203.

30. 4th Corps, 144. The quotation is from a cable sent at 9:30 A.M. on 19 March by 2nd Forward Headquarters, 301st (the 4th Corps cover designation), to “R” (COSVN cover designation). Given that the message was from Bui Cat Vu’s light HQ, and not the main HQ where Hoang Cam was located, and that Hoang Cam does not mention the message in his memoir but does discuss this strategy when he meets later with Tra, the author suspects it was Bui Cat Vu’s novel, indeed brilliant, idea to strike south on Route 20.

31. Cam, A Memoir, 460.

32. “Documents,” Vietnam Social Sciences, vol. 1–2 (1989), 149, quoting the Le Duan cable.

33. Tra, Bulwark B-2 Theatre, 154.

CHAPTER 11

  1. Nguyen Thanh Tri, “Unforgettable Days [Ngay Thang Khong The Nao Quen],” Song Than [Tidal Wave], 2003, 37.

  2. This is what Truong stated at the time. After the war he told RAND Corporation interviewers that even if the Airborne had not been withdrawn, “he would have required two additional divisions” to hold against the PAVN troops already in I Corps. Hosmer et al., Fall of South Vietnam, 224.

  3. Many analysts erroneously believed then that the 341st first appeared in MR-1 in mid-March 1975, a mistake often continued to this day.

  4. Nguyen Huu An, as told to Nguyen Tu Duong, New Battlefield [Chien Truong Moi] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 2002), 199.

  5. Giap, General Headquarters, 166.

  6. Ibid., 243.

  7. An, New Battlefield, 195.

  8. Lieutenant General Le Tu Dong, as told to Anh Trang, “Major Events during the Fighting in Tri-Thien-Hue,” in Central Vietnam Wins Total Victory: The 1975 Great Spring Victory (Through the Memoirs of Participants) [Mien Trung Toan Thang: Dai Thang Mua Xuan 1975 (Qua Nhung Trang Hoi Uc)] (Hanoi: Encyclopedia Publishing House, 2005), 93. Dong was the commander of the B-4 Front.

  9. Ngo Quang Truong, “Why I Abandoned I Corps,” Doi [Life], October 1982, n.p.

10. Vien, Final Collapse, 57.

11. Snepp, Decent Interval, 156. Snepp’s account of this order seems to mix up the February conversation, which the author believes did take place, with Truong’s March meetings at the Palace.

12. Two close aides to Thieu, who wish to remain anonymous, deny that the president harbored any suspicions of Truong. Truong’s Navy commander, Ho Van Ky Thoai, supports the contention that Truong and Thieu got along. Other well-placed ARVN sources strongly disagree.

13. Hung, Palace File, 269. Hung says no, but Truong’s chief of staff claimed in a RAND interview that the enclave plan was designed to buy time for an eventual counterattack, possibly with American help. That was precisely Thieu’s concept. While Truong could have thought of this himself, one suspects he heard it from Thieu.

14. Ho Van Ky Thoai, Valor in Defeat: A Sailor’s Journey [Can Truong Trong Chien B i: Hanh Trinh Cua Mot Thuy Thu] (Centerville, Va.: Self-published, 2007), 187.

15. An, New Battlefield, 203.

16. From the Central Military Affairs Committee to B-4 Front and the 2nd Corps, in A Number of Guidance Documents, 17 March 1975, 210.

17. Xuan Thieu, North of the Hai Van Pass, Spring 1975: A Report [Bac Hai Van, Xuan 1975: Ky Su] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1977), 140–141.

18. Ibid.

19. Thi, The Twenty-Five-Year Century, 344.

20. Truong, “Why I Abandoned I Corps,” Doi [Life].

21. Vien, Final Collapse, 102.

22. “President Thieu addresses nation on war situation,” Amembassy Saigon to SecState, #3187, 20 March 1975.

23. From J-3, JGS, to I Corps, cable #9428, 20 March 1975, reprinted in Thieu, North of the Hai Van Pass, 159.

24. From I Corps to President Thieu, cable #32, 20 March 1975, reprinted in Thieu, North of the Hai Van Pass, 160.

25. From J-3, JGS, to I Corps, cable #9564, 21 March 1975, reprinted in Thieu, North of the Hai Van Pass, 160.

26. These figures come from both U.S. Embassy and DAO reporting.

27. Battles of Vietnamese Artillery during the Wars of Liberation and to Defend the Fatherland, vol. II [Nhung Tran Danh Cua Phao Binh Vietnam Trong Cac Cuoc Chien Tranh Giai Phong Va Bao Ve To Quoc, Tap II] (Hanoi?: Artillery Command, 1990), 174.

28. Backchannel from Lehmann to Scowcroft, Martin #674, 18 March 1975.

29. “Approach to Thieu,” Amembassy Saigon to SecState, #3225, 20 March 1975, U.S. Policy, no. 01334.

30. Interview with Do Duc Chien, 3 November 2003, Easton, Pa.

31. Thieu, North of the Hai Van Pass, 184–185.

32. 2nd Corps, 171.

33. Ibid.

34. An, New Battlefield, 213.

35. From J-3, JGS, to I Corps, cable #9582, 22 March 1975, reprinted in Thieu, North of the Hai Van Pass, 204.

36. “USSAG Daily Situation Report,” #75-083A, 24 March 1975, Record Group 342, Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations, Series: Mixed Files Relating to Various U.S. Air Force Combat Operations and Other Activities in the Vietnam War Era, 1961–1977, Box 400, NARA, College Park, Md.

37. Cable #38B, from Giap to Dung, 22 March 1975, in Great Spring Victory, 1975, 166–167.

CHAPTER 12

  1. Thieu, North of the Hai Van Pass, 164.

  2. Ibid., 218.

  3. Tri, “Unforgettable Days,” 8.

  4. Books that discuss the fall of Tam Ky claim that a single PT-76 tank drove into the city center, prompting ARVN to flee. The 2nd Division history states that it was two Chinese-made K-63 armored personnel carriers. 2nd Division, vol. 1 [Su Doan 2, Tap 1] (Danang: Danang Publishing House, 1989), 273.

  5. Both Martin and the DAO resurrected the LST issue in mid-October 1974. See “Additional LSTs for VNN,” Amembassy Saigon to SecState, #13322, 17 October 1974. Kissinger at the 24 March 1975 State Department meeting asked Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib what happened to the LSTs “he had approved in January.” Habib replied that Kissinger had approved them, but only on the back burner. Kissinger said no, he meant other items were to be on the back burner, not the LSTs. What bureaucratic foul-up occurred remains unknown.

  6. Vien, Final Collapse, 114–115.

  7. “Vietnam Aid—The Painful Options,” Report of Senator Sam Nunn to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 12 February 1974, 4.

  8. For a more detailed discussion of the evaluation, see Snepp, Decent Interval, 160–162.

  9. “Should Congress Increase Aid to Vietnam?” Congressional Quarterly, 15 February 1975, 343.

10. Bill Williamson, “America and the Debate over Aid to South Vietnam, January to April 1975,” dissertation, University of North Texas (1996), 40.

11. “Meeting at noon, March 24, on Indochina.”

12. Memcon, 25 March 1975, DDRS #152, 1997.

13. Letter from Ford to Thieu, 25 March 1975, DDRS #298, 1994.

14. State Department Press Release #172 for 26 March 1975, dated 14 April 1975, 462.

15. “Comrade Le Duan’s Comments in a Politburo Meeting Held 24 March 1975, after Our Victory at Ban Me Thuot,” A Number of Guidance Documents, 24 March 1975, 214.

16. Giap, General Headquarters, 221.

17. DAO, “RVNAF Final Assessment, Jan Thru Apr FY75,” 15 June 1975, 7-4. HQ stands for Hai quan, the Vietnamese word for Navy, assuming one has the correct tone mark.

18. At the author’s request, Colonel Tri asked both the 8th Marine Battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Dang Hoa, and the 468th Brigade commander, Colonel Ngo Van Dinh, why the 8th did not occupy Vinh Phong. Hoa claims he never received any orders to occupy the mountain, while Dinh states he does not recall much about the events at the Hai Van Pass. Tri speculates that either the order came too late to the 468th Brigade headquarters, or I Corps headquarters canceled the order once it realized that the Navy could not complete a bridge across the inlet’s mouth. Tri suspects that Truong also wanted to begin shifting the Marines to defend Danang.

19. Pham Van Tien, “147th Brigade: From a Tactical Withdrawal in 1975 [Lu Doan 147: Tu Mot Cuoc Di Tan Chien Thuat 1975],” Song Than (1999), 234. Major Tien was the commander of the Marine 5th Battalion.

20. The Hue-Danang Offensive Campaign (Spring 1975) [Chien Dich Hue-Danang (Xuan 1975)] (Hanoi: Military History Institute of Vietnam, 1991), 37.

21. Tran Van Nhut, The Unfinished War: The Memoirs of General Tran Van Nhut (Garden Grove, Calif.: Self-published, 2001), 280.

22. Thoai claims that Truong told him after the war that Truong sent them to the island “because of the situation in Danang, which was packed with evacuees. . . . He felt that it would be difficult for the 2nd Division to fight effectively if it was placed in this situation.” Thoai, Valor in Defeat, 274, fn. 9.

23. Le Thuong, 2nd Infantry Division: The Final Phase of the War, a Memoir [Su Doan 2 Bo Binh: Giai Doan Cuoi Cung cua Cuoc Chien, Hoi Ky] (Los Angeles: Self-published, 2001), 182.

24. Ibid., 183.

25. Captain Pham Manh Khue, “A Day-by-Day Account of the Evacuation of MR-1, MR-2, and MR-3 by Naval Ships,” 4 November 1975, Interviews, vol. 2, 160.

26. “Memorandum No. 013-TT/CD/M, from President Thieu to the Military Region Commanders, Military Service Commanders, Commander of the Capital Special Zone, Division Commanders, Province Chiefs, and Commander of the National Police,” 24 March 1975, reprinted in Khai, March in the Central Highlands, 154.

27. “President Thieu to the Commanders of Military Regions I, II, III, and IV and of the Capital Special Zone,” Cable #015-TT/CD, 25 March 1975, reprinted in Khai, March in the Central Highlands, 155.

28. “President Thieu Directs Cabinet Reshuffle,” Amembassy Saigon to Sec-State, #3471, 25 March 1975.

29. “President Thieu’s Order of the Day,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Far Eastern, 27 March 1975.

30. “Thieu addresses the nation on war situation,” Amembassy Saigon to SecState, #3567, 26 March 1975.

31. “Refugee Evacuation from Danang,” Amembassy Saigon to SecState, #3697, 28 March 1975.

32. “Refugee Evacuation from Danang,” Amembassy Saigon to SecState, #3734, 28 March 1975.

33. “Memcon, Ford, Rockefeller, Kissinger, Scowcroft,” 28 March 1975, U.S. Policy, Part II, #1552.

34. “Memcon, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Sonnenfeldt, Hyland,” 29 March 1975, U.S. Policy, Part II, #1554.

35. Diary of Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, 27 March 1975, 36.

36. An, New Battlefield, 220.

37. Hue-Danang Campaign, 46. PAVN provided loss statistics for the I Corps campaign in this book, but they are so ridiculously low the author declined to include them.

38. Charles Timmes, “Military Operations after the Cease-Fire Agreement, Part II,” Military Review (September 1976), 27.

39. Truong, “Significant Events in I Corps,” Interviews, vol. 1, 26.

40. Dr. Oscar Fitzgerald, “Interview with Commodore Ho Van Ky Thoai,” 20 September 1975, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, 40. The author thanks Dr. Edward Marolda at the Naval Archives for obtaining this interview.

CHAPTER 13

  1. Huan, Withdrawal, 208.

  2. “General Pham Van Phu Announces at the Ca Pass: II Corps will fight to the death on the line it now holds, Martial Law declared throughout MR-2,” Chinh Luan, 1 April 1975, 2.

  3. Giap, General Headquarters, 247.

  4. Cable #75, from Le Duc Tho to Van Tien Dung, 25 March 1975, Great Spring Victory, 1975, 177.

  5. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 135–136.

  6. Ibid., 137.

  7. 320th Division, 306–307.

  8. Giap, General Headquarters, 276.

  9. Thai, Decisive Years, 116.

10. 10th Division, 116.

11. Along Route 21 were three major ARVN training centers: the Duc My Ranger Center, the nearby Artillery Center, and the Lam Son Infantry Center. Also located in the Nha Trang area were the Dong De NCO Academy and the Naval Training Center.

12. Interview with Tran Cong Hanh, 31 July 2002, Maple Grove, Minn.

13. Letter from Le Qui Dau, 7 February 2004, Akron, Ohio.

14. 10th Division, 120.

15. Huan, Withdrawal, 215.

16. “GVN attempts to block PAVN forces directed against Nha Trang city, and current military activities in GVN MR-2,” CIA Intelligence Cable, 31 March 1975, 4–5.

17. Truong, “Why I Abandoned I Corps,” Doi [Life], 23.

18. “RVN Gen Pham Van Phu Comments on Situation in MR II,” FBIS Asia and Pacific, 31 March 1975, L21.

19. Interview with Nguyen Van Dai, commander, Duc My Ranger Center, 12 March 2003, Beaverton, Ore. Dai notes that the column maintained good discipline until it reached Cam Ranh, where his men began experiencing problems due to the local disorder. By the time they reached Phan Rang, half the trainees and cadres had melted away.

20. Huan, Withdrawal, 224.

21. Dr. Oscar Fitzgerald, “Interview with Commodore Hoang Co Minh,” 8 September 1975, Operational Archives, Naval History Division, 100–102. Minh is very vague about the events off Qui Nhon. His interview was not as detailed as others done at the same time with senior VNN officers; plus, he was somewhat anti-American. In the early 1980s, Minh helped form the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, an émigré group dedicated to fostering a guerrilla war to overthrow the Communist government. He was killed in 1987 in Laos while attempting to lead a group of two hundred men into South Vietnam to instigate a rebellion.

22. 3rd Division, 346.

23. Huan, Withdrawal, 222.

24. Nguyen Thieu, “41st Regiment, 22nd Division,” 10. Manuscript written for the author.

25. Binh Dinh: History of the Thirty-Year People’s War (1945–1975) [Binh Dinh: Lich Su Chien Tranh Nhan Dan 30 Nam (1945–1975)] (Binh Dinh: Binh Dinh Province Military Headquarters, 1992), 461–462.

26. Interview with Do Kiem, 29 August 2002, Mandeville, La.

27. Le Quang Oanh, “22nd Division’s Withdrawal from Binh Dinh,” KBC #13 (June 1995), 44.

28. Le Gro, Cease-Fire to Capitulation, 171–172, quoting Smith’s cable.

29. 3rd Division, 356.

30. Major General Bui Cong Ai, “Attack on the City of Tuy Hoa by 320th Division, 1 April 1975,” in A Number of Battles in the Resistance War against the French and the Americans, 1945–1975, vol. I [Mot So Tran Danh Trong Cuoc Khang Chien Chong Phap, Chong My, 1945–1975, Tap I] (Hanoi: Military History Institute of Vietnam, 1991), 186–187. Major General Ai was the 2nd Corps chief of staff in 1975.

31. 10th Division, 121.

32. Huan, Withdrawal, 238.

33. Isaacs, Without Honor, 381. For a more detailed description of the evacuation of the American consulate from Nha Trang, see Snepp, Decent Interval, 263–272, and George R. Dunham and David A. Quinlan, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End, 1973–1975 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 1990), 131–132. 34. Lu Van Thanh,The Inviting Call of Wandering Souls: Memoir of an ARVN Liaison Officer to the United States Forces in Vietnam (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1997), 39, 43.

35. Tran Thi Minh Canh, The Book of Canh: Memoirs of a Vietnamese Woman, Physician, CIA Informant, People’s Salvation Army Commander-in-Chief, and Prisoner of War (Milford, Conn.: Self-published, 1996), 71–72.

36. Ibid., 73–75.

37. Khai, March in the Central Highlands, 160, quoting from Phu’s personal report.

38. Huan, Withdrawal, 243.

39. The separate accounts from Pham Huan and Phu’s main aide, Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Quang Vinh, substantially agree about Phu’s unsuccessful suicide attempt on the hill outside of Phan Thiet. Huan, Withdrawal, 244, and Nguyen Quang Vinh, “Significant Events Concerning Military Region 2 from the Fall of Ban Me Thuot until the Death of General Phu,” Interviews, vol. 3, 101. Phu then returned to Saigon, where two days later he fell gravely ill. Vien ordered him taken to the Cong Hoa Hospital for treatment. After two weeks, Phu was placed under house arrest with a handful of other senior generals, including Lieutenant General Lam Quang Thi, who shared a trailer with Phu at the JGS compound. Thi notes that Phu was severely depressed. Both were released on 25 April 1975.

40. Thai, Decisive Years, 117.

41. George W. Schwarz Jr., April Fools: An American Remembers South Viet-Nam’s Final Days (Baltimore: AmErica House, 2001), 165. Schwarz was an employee of Alaska Barge and Transport, a shipping company contracted by the MSC. The description of the evacuation is drawn from Schwarz’s excellent account of the horrible events at Cam Ranh Bay. The deserters and refugees who boarded the Greenville Victory at Cam Ranh would later commandeer the ship when it arrived at Phu Quoc Island to offload. A Korean LST, the Boo Heung Pioneer (LST-117), also was picking up refugees that night, but from small boats that sailed out to her.

42. 10th Division, 123. While its history claims the division captured Cam Ranh on 3 April, George Schwarz’s account notes that the ships were still loading refugees on 4 April until a PAVN unit appeared on the docks and fired at them. The American ships managed to escape without any damage.

CHAPTER 14

  1. Giap, General Headquarters, 262–263. This slogan became fixed in PAVN mythology as instrumental in achieving victory. In essence, it became the Communists’ formula for the rest of the 1975 offensive, and many of their post-war writings refer to it.

  2. “Documents,” Vietnam Social Sciences, 1–2 (1989), 150–151.

  3. Giap, General Headquarters, 264.

  4. The Determined-to-Win Corps [Binh Doan Quyet Thang] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1988), 53. Hereafter 1st Corps.

  5. Victory in Vietnam, 347–348.

  6. Ibid.

  7. Ibid.

  8. Major General Tran Tho, “In the General Offensive and Uprising of 1975: Some Successful Lessons of the Rear Services Task,” Quan Doi Nhan Dan (October 1976), translated in JPRS #68570, 46–50.

  9. Ibid.

10. While the Communists had vastly improved the transportation corridors south through the sweat of thousands of laborers—some of them unreturned ARVN prisoners—in their post-war writings they rarely mention the assistance of friendly countries. Giap’s memoirs, however, include several comments that reveal such aid. “With help provided by Fidel and our Cuban allies, who had purchased and sent to us a number of specialized construction vehicles from Japan and who had paid to have our technical cadre sent to Japan to study how to use this equipment, our engineer groups and assault youth units set to work building roads,” he writes. “Many new road sections were being built, and on a number of these projects picks and shovels were replaced by the construction machinery purchased for us by Cuba.” Giap, General Headquarters, 174, 187.

11. Pham Cuong, “In the General Offensive and Uprising of 1975: Some Experiences in Assuring the Mobility of the Military Engineer Forces,” Quan Doi Nhan Dan (December 1976), translated in JPRS #69017, 51.

12. Senior Colonel Pham Nien, “Signal Armed Forces,” Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan (April 1976), translated in JPRS #67798, 50–51.

13. History of the People’s Navy of Vietnam [Lich Su Hai Quan Nhan Dan Viet Nam] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1985), 285.

14. The 202nd Brigade [Lu Doan 202] (Hanoi: 1st Corps, 1984), 88.

15. 35th Anniversary of the Ho Chi Minh Trail at Sea and of the Formation of the Navy’s 125th Brigade [35 Nam Duong Ho Chi Minh Tren Bien va Thanh Lap Lu Doan 125 Hai] (Hanoi: Political Department of the Navy, People’s Army Publishing House, 1996), 40.

16. History of the People’s Air Force (1955–1977) [Lich Su Khong Quan Nhan Dan Viet Nam (1955–1977)] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1993), 301.

17. 1st Corps, 89–90.

18. An, New Battlefield, 227. 19. Thai, Decisive Years, 118.

20. Ibid.

21. Giap, General Headquarters, 283.

22. 2nd Corps, 216.

23. Giap, General Headquarters, 285.

24. History of the Annamite Mountain Troops on the Ho Chi Minh Trail [Lich Su Bo Doi Truong Son Duong Ho Chi Minh] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1994), 333.

25. An, New Battlefield, 228–229.

26. 10th Division, 128.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 129–130.

29. An, New Battlefield, 229–230.

30. Giap, General Headquarters, 286. There is a photo of Giap’s order in the book. Giap used a standard form to write the message, and its printed security regulations are interesting: “Secret Outgoing Cable. Deliver personally [by hand]. Do not leave unattended. Do not ask about or reply to this message over the telephone or in clear [unencrypted] radio messages. Do not copy for the file. Do not disseminate to unauthorized personnel. All copies must be returned to the Cryptographic section.”

31. 2nd Corps, 217

32. Senior Colonel Pham Te (pen name: Truong Son), The Most Feverish Years on the Ho Chi Minh Trail [Nhung Nam Thang Soi Dong Nhat Tren Duong Ho Chi Minh] (Ho Chi Minh City: Ho Chi Minh City Publishing House, 1994), 112–113. Senior Colonel Te was one of several deputy chiefs for political affairs of Group 559. After Ban Me Thuot fell, he served as chief of political affairs of a new Group 559 Forward Headquarters in Ban Me Thuot. He was on his way to the new forward command post when this incident occurred. 33. After the war, one of the men arrested, Senator Pham Nam Sach, admitted he was plotting Thieu’s overthrow with a group that included Ky. How deeply Ky was involved is unknown. Sach was released from jail on 27 April, and he and his family were evacuated on the last day. See Everett R. Holles, “New Front Splits Vietnam Refugees,” New York Times, 1 March 1976, 7.

34. Philip McCombs, “Ky Asks Power to Rally Troops,” Washington Post, 29 March 1975, 1, 3.

35. Denis Warner, Certain Victory: How Hanoi Won the War (Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed, Andrews, and McMeel, 1978), 196.

36. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 185.

37. Cable from Polgar to Colby, 31 March 1975, CREST RDP80R01720R000400100014-8.

38. “Assessment of the Military Situation and Prospects for South Vietnam,” Interagency Memorandum, 4 April 1975, CREST RDP80R01720R000400100006-7, 1–2.

39. Snepp, Decent Interval, 386.

40. DAO “March Threat Assessment,” 10 April 1975, 25. This was the first time Ambassador Martin had requested to attach a statement to Le Gro’s monthly intelligence summary. It was also the first time Le Gro had even let him see the MISTA before transmittal.

41. Le Gro, Cease-Fire to Capitulation, 171.

CHAPTER 15

  1. Thanh Son airbase belonged to the 2nd Air Division, but when the 6th Air Division moved its headquarters there on 22 March from Nha Trang, the VNAF re-designated Thanh Son to the 6th. Stationed at Thanh Son was Colonel Le Van Thao’s 92nd Wing, consisting of three A-37 squadrons. Also at Thanh Son but originally from the 6th Division at Pleiku was Lieutenant Colonel Le Van But’s 72nd Wing, which had two Huey squadrons, along with remnants from the Phu Cat airbase and other assorted Air Force units.

  2. Pham Ngoc Sang, “The Battle of Phan Rang: The Recollections of Brigadier General Pham Ngoc Sang,” 10 January 2002. Sang wrote this report for the author to detail the events of the battle. He had been in the first class of South Vietnamese Air Force cadets to attend French flight training. Upon his return to Vietnam, he eventually became President Ngo Dinh Diem’s personal pilot. From 1965 to 1972 he was the chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in the office of the prime minister. In 1974 he was promoted to brigadier general and assumed command of the 6th Air Division. He was captured after the fall of Thanh Son, and spent the next seventeen years in some of toughest prison camps in North Vietnam. He was held in captivity for this extended period because of his uncompromising anti-Communist stance. He was finally released in 1992 while in the hospital for severe bleeding from the colon. His wife, Nguyen Thi Bon, had held the family together and waited for him to return, despite being denied permission to visit him during his first thirteen years in captivity.

  3. Letter from Nguyen Van Thiet to Pham Ngoc Sang, 1 February 2002.

  4. Chris Coulthard-Clark, The RAAF in Vietnam: Australian Air Involvement in the Vietnam War 1962–1975 (Canberra: Paul & Co Pub Consortium, 1995), 323–324.

  5. While most South Vietnamese believe that Thieu ordered the defense of Phan Rang because it was near his birthplace and family gravesites, the Communists instead trumpet the charge that General Weyand “commanded” Thieu to defend this area to prove once again that he was an American “puppet.” In reality, it was a logical defensive position, and was part of the area Thieu intended to keep in a new, truncated South Vietnam.

  6. 10th Division, 125.

  7. Interview with Le Van But, 3 March 2003, Anaheim, Calif.

  8. In October 1973, the different riverine divisions in the Delta were reorganized into Task Fleet 21, which had four Task Forces (TF), 211, 212, 213, and 214. TF 213 was disbanded in 1974 because of U.S. aid cutbacks. The new Task Fleet commander was given full responsibility for naval operations in the Delta.

  9. Interview with Le Van Thao, 5 September 2002, Salt Lake City, Utah. The VNAF intelligence chief, who visited Phan Rang during the final days, said this about Colonel Thao’s performance: “The high spirit that prevailed among the aircrews of the 92nd Wing was largely due to the aggressiveness and courage of their Wing Commander, Colonel Le Van Thao. He would fly his A-37 at night, making radio contact with Phan Rang city, the airborne troops, and the Phan Thiet province chief, reassuring them that air support would be provided as needed.” Colonel Le Minh Hoang, “Observations about the Defense of Phan Rang AB,” Interviews, vol. 3, 107.

10. Airborne Division Commander Brigadier General Le Quang Luong was surprised at this order to swap brigades, and he flew to Phan Rang to meet with Generals Nghi and Sang. He believed it was a mistake to pull the 3rd Brigade out of Phan Rang. A highly decorated combat veteran who had led an Airborne brigade at An Loc, Luong was promoted to division deputy commander during the recapture of Quang Tri and then division commander in December 1972. After the war Luong wrote an article highly critical of Thieu’s piecemealing out of each brigade during the final two months.

11. Colonel Nguyen Thu Luong, “The Battle of Phan Rang (April 1975).” Luong wrote a lengthy paper describing the actions of his unit at Phan Rang, and the author thanks him for sharing it.

12. Giap, General Headquarters, 263.

13. Cam, A Memoir, 405. Cam notes that during Tra’s visit “discussions and exchanges became rather heated.” Cam then rhetorically asks, “Why could not we wait for the General Staff’s Main Force units to arrive to support the attack and ensure victory?” Obviously, Cam was on Dung’s side on this question.

14. It is not clear whether at this meeting the 19 March request to allow the 7th Division to continue attacking south on Route 20 was discussed. Tra never specifically mentions the appeal, but he does spend several paragraphs explaining his rationale for declining to approve the early attack on Xuan Loc. Mainly, he states, it was the lack of artillery ammunition and the need to expand the captured area on Route 20 north toward Dalat. Tra, Bulwark B-2 Theatre, 156. Cam says he thought about bringing the subject up, but decided against it. He believed that as a subordinate receiving new orders from his superior, it would have been improper to question his boss on a matter already long decided. Cam, A Memoir, 406.

15. Tra, Bulwark B-2 Theatre, 154–155.

16. Giap, General Headquarters, 266–267.

17. Tra, Bulwark B-2 Theatre, 156.

18. Another aspect of the plan was the defection of Lieutenant Nguyen Thanh Trung, an F-5E pilot stationed at Bien Hoa airbase. Trung was given orders to defect when possible, since he was needed to train the PAVN Air Force pilots on captured aircraft. Spotting an opportunity, on 8 April, Trung volunteered to replace another pilot who had failed to appear for a mission to attack PAVN forces near Nha Trang. Taking off in his F-5E, he instead swung over Saigon and dropped his payload on Independence Palace. After his bombing run, he flew to Phuoc Binh airbase in Phuoc Long province. Trung’s real name was Dinh Thanh Trung. For an interesting Communist version of Trung’s defection, see Ho Dinh Nhuong, “The Invisible Star of the Milky Way,” Vietnam Courier, January 1976, 16–18.

19. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 201.

20. Tra, Bulwark B-2 Theatre, 156.

21. Giap, General Headquarters, 279–280.

22. “Documents,” 152, and Le Duan, Letters to the South, 404–405. 23. Edward Metzner, Reeducation in Postwar Vietnam: Personal Postscripts to Peace (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 48. Metzner is quoting Colonel Huynh Van Chinh, with whom he had once worked as an advisor. According to the DAO, ARVN anticipated the attacks along Route 4 and temporarily adjusted the corps boundary so that Long An was now part of IV Corps.

24. “South Vietnamese Officer Jubilant over Delta Fight,” New York Times, 14 April 1975, 18. Thanh was promoted to colonel for his regiment’s exploits. He surrendered to Communist forces on 30 April 1975. According to South Vietnamese sources, he was killed after an attempt to escape from prison in September 1976.

25. Dinh Hung Cuong, “The Last Battle [Tran Danh Cuoi Cung],” KBC #25 (1998), 36. Major Cuong was the Thu Thua district chief until he was wounded in action on 13 April 1975.

26. Mach Van Truong, “21st Infantry Division at Can Tho on the Day the Nation Was Lost [Su Doan 21 Bo Binh Tai Can Tho Vao Ngay Tan Mat Nuoc],” The Gioi [The World], #394 (18 April 2003), 16. Colonel Truong was promoted to brigadier general as a result of the impressive defeat of the 4th Division outside Can Tho.

27. Military Region 9: 30 Years of Resistance (1945–1975) [Quan Khu 9: 30 Nam Khang Chien (1945–1975)] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1996), 631–634.

28. DAO Weekly Wrap-up South Vietnam, 5–11 April 1975, 23.

29. 3rd Division, 364.

30. Truong Duong, The Life of a Soldier [Doi Chien Binh] (Westminster, Calif.: Tu Quynh, 1998), 191. Duong, a former Airborne major, interviewed Major Nguyen Van Thanh, 11th Airborne commander, for these details.

31. “Tran Van Don issues appeal,” FBIS Asia and Pacific, 15 April 1975, L9.

CHAPTER 16

  1. History of the Armor Branch, People’s Army of Vietnam 1959–1975 [Lich Su Binh Chung Thiet Giap, Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam 1959–1975] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, 1982), 263.

  2. 2nd Corps, 244.

  3. Pham Ngoc Sang, “The Battle of Phan Rang,” 11.

  4. Letter from Thiet to Sang, 1 February 2002.

  5. An, New Battlefield, 286.

  6. Le Quang Hoa, Steps along the Road of Resistance to the Americans: A Memoir [Nhung Chang Duong Chong My: Hoi Ky] (People’s Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 1982), 228. Nothing was done to restore the city and Thanh Son after the war. According to an ARVN officer who lived in Nha Trang in 1975 and who was later imprisoned nearby, in 1979 he saw “Phan Rang airbase with its empty hangars, heaps of aircraft remains here and there, and the runway covered with holes. Phan Rang [the city] . . . was apparently savaged by the enemy after the so-called normalization of both South and North. . . . My father told me that by the end of 1977 different kinds of government trucks, full of communist cadre and economic agents, would swoop into town . . . for three or four days . . . making lists of items in the shops . . . then they moved everything out.” Thanh, The Inviting Call of Wandering Souls, 135.

  7. 2nd Corps, 251.

  8. Ibid., 252.

  9. History of the Armor Branch, 265.

10. 2nd Corps, 252.

11. Letter to the author from Nguyen Van Loc, 12 February 2002, San Jose, Calif. Loc was hit in the head by a shell fragment, but he managed to escape Vietnam with his ship after the surrender. He later developed Parkinson’s disease, perhaps caused by the brain injury he incurred in Ca Na Bay. He passed away in 2005.

12. Letter to the author from Phan Dinh San, 21 April 2003, Santa Ana, Calif.

13. Nhut, The Unfinished War, 296.

14. Muong Giang, “Regional Force and Popular Force Troops during the Final Days, April 1975, in Binh Thuan [Nguoi Linh Dia Phuong Quang va Nghia Quan Trong Nhung Ngay Hap Hoi Thang 4-75 tai Binh Thuan],” Doan Ket, #168 (January 2004), 58.

15. An, New Battlefield, 242.

CHAPTER 17

  1. 4th Corps, 153.

  2. Cam, A Memoir, 402.

  3. 341st Division, 58–59.

  4. 7th Division, 290.

  5. Interview with Le Minh Dao, 7 April 2001, East Hartford, Conn.

  6. Victory in Vietnam, 407.

  7. Cam, A Memoir, 451.

  8. 341st Division, 70–71.

  9. Vien, The Final Collapse, 132.

10. Phillip Caputo, “S. Viets take Skeleton of City,” Chicago Tribune, 14 April 1975, 3.

11. 341st Division, 63.

12. Cam, A Memoir, 411, fn. 9.

13. Ho Dinh, “The Xuan Loc Front,” 8 May 2001, 2.

14. The 341st Division’s history confirms that the Airborne attack surrounded a battalion of the 7th Division. The history is quite clear that the 341st was ordered to mount an attack to relieve the besieged battalion. 341st Division, 73. The 7th’s history barely mentions this episode, with only one section describing the 8th Battalion’s defense against the Airborne attack. 7th Division, 298.

15. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 176.

16. Tra, Bulwark B-2 Theatre, 170. The 4th Corps’s history provides many reasons for its failure to take the city, conceding that “These were lessons for us on the road to the maturation of 4th Corps as a military unit.” 4th Corps, 158–159.

17. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 167.

18. Tra, Bulwark B-2 Theatre, 170.

19. Ibid., 171.

20. Nicholas C. Proffitt, “Escape from Xuan Loc,” Newsweek, 18 April 1975, 22.

21. For the best description of the journalists’ trip, see David Butler, The Fall of Saigon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 244–250. For six excellent pictures taken that day (although the description of events is completely wrong), see Dirck Halstead, “White Christmas—The Fall of Saigon,”http://digitaljournalist.org/issue0005/ch1.htm.

22. Letter to the author from Pham Van Ban, 14 October 2001.

23. In 1969, U.S. Air Force C-130s began dropping the 15,000-pound bombs in a program called “Commando Vault” to make instant helicopter landing zones for follow-on Army troops. The U.S. offered to arm the Daisy Cutters for the VNAF to drop. The South Vietnamese accepted, and USAF C-130s flew them to Tan Son Nhut, where they were reloaded aboard VNAF C-130s.

24. “VNAF Sorties for 1–19 April in MR-3 and MR-4; BDA for ‘Daisy Cutter’ Strikes,” CIA Intelligence Cable, 22 April 1975, 3–4. The CIA cable states the JGS reported that the VNAF flew 665 sorties in defense of Xuan Loc.

25. Phan Tan My (pseudonym Y. Yen), “The Battle for Horseshoe Hill,” Saigon Post, n.d., 3.

26. Fox Butterfield, “A Captain Tells of Flight from Xuan Loc,” New York Times, 17 April 1975, 20.

27. Telephone interview with Nguyen Ba Manh Hung, 19 July 2001, Garden Grove, Calif.

28. Hua Yen Len, “The Line of Steel,” 6.

29. Ho Dinh, “The Xuan Loc Front,” 10.

30. Snepp, Decent Interval, 416. On 23 April, Agence France-Presse first reported the weapon’s use. See “South Vietnam Uses ‘Asphyxiation’ Bombs against Communist Forces,” FBIS Asia and Pacific, 23 April 1975, L9. Giap claims he learned of the bombing from this article, and then sent a cable to the B-2 Front recommending they attack Tan Son Nhut and other airbases to shut down the VNAF. Giap, General Headquarters, 322. However, who ordered the dropping of the CBU-55, the location and number of bomb(s), and the combat result remain a mystery. According to General Cao Van Vien, only one CBU-55 was ever used. He reports that it was dropped with high accuracy by the C-130 squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mac Huu Loc, on the Forward Headquarters of the 341st Division. Most ARVN and Communist sources, however, refer to bombs. Colonel Hoang Dinh Tho, G-3 of III Corps, described the blast location as along Route 20 south of Kiem Tan. This is partially confirmed by a Nhan Danbroadcast of 25 April, which described the area as “between the provincial capitals of Bien Hoa and Xuan Loc.” See “War Crimes Committee, Lawyers Group Assail[s] use of CBU-55,” FBIS Asia and Pacific, 26 April 1975, L8–9. Nguyen Van Toan also claims two bombs were dropped, and that the decision was his. He indicates that after the Communists bitterly complained about the use of the weapon, the Americans refused to provide any more fuses for the CBUs. Although most ARVN sources agree that the CBU-55 was used against the 341st, typically, the division history neglects to mention this incident. Casualty reports have also varied widely, from several hundred to over one thousand. The author believes only one bomb was dropped, and accepts the much lower casualty figure.

31. “Foreign Ministry, Nhan Dan, condemn use of Asphyxiation Bomb,” FBIS Asia and Pacific, 24 April 1975, K1.

32. Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 253.

33. Backchannel from Martin to Scowcroft, #691, 10 April 1975.

34. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerard R. Ford, 1975, Book I, 470.

35. Ford, A Time to Heal, 255. For the original minutes of this meeting, see DDRS, 1993, #0598.

CHAPTER 18

  1. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 172.

  2. Snepp, Decent Interval, 478, 500. USSAG reports indicate that Group 232 gave the order.

  3. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 204.

  4. Ibid., 206.

  5. Ibid., 211.

  6. Victory in Vietnam, 410.

  7. While Dung describes only five assault directions, actually there was a sixth. Two MR-8 regiments, the 24th and 88th, reinforced with the 271B Regiment, and two Long An local-force battalions moved in from the south.

  8. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 209.

  9. History of the People’s Air Force, 303.

10. History of the Art of Utilizing Air Defense in Combat Campaigns (1945–1975) [Lich Su Nghe Thuat Su Dung Phong Khong Trong Chien Dich 1945–1975] (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 1996), 158.

11. Thai, Decisive Years, 126.

12. Ibid., 137.

13. Dung, Great Spring Victory, 203

14. Anti-Reactionary Forces: Chronology of Events (1954–1975) [Luc Luong Chong Phan Dong Lich Su Bien Nien (1954–1975)] (Hanoi: Public Security Publishing House, 1997), 316–317.

15. Ibid.

16. “Documents,” 155, from the 22 April 1975 cable.

17. Thai, Decisive Years, 136.

18. “Cable from the COSVN Party Current Affairs Committee on Duong Van Minh’s Inauguration as President of the Saigon Puppet Government,” 28 April 1975, Historical Chronicle of the Central Office for South Vietnam, 1087.

19. Pham Cuong, “The Former Saigon Army General Who Did Not Know How to Shoot,” Vietnam Net, 25 April 2005. Cuong then quotes the head of COSVN’s Military Proselytizing section: “Nguyen Huu Hanh was one of the great success stories of COSVN’s Military Proselytizing operations.”

20. Interview with Le Ba Binh, 8 July 2003, Reston, Va.

21. Tran Ngoc, “The Final Battle of ARVN’s 81st Airborne Ranger Group,” Doan Ket, #168 (January 2004), 65.

22. Under One Flag, 810.

23. Ngoc, “The Final Battle of ARVN’s 81st Airborne Ranger Group,” 66.

24. Phan Van Huan et al., “81st Airborne Ranger Group and the Days of April 1975 [LD81/BCND va Nhung Ngay Thang Tu 1975],” Airborne Ranger 3 (2001), 13.

25. Ho De, “The Road into the City Was Not Covered with a Red Carpet,” Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 29 April 2006.

26. Hoang Nhat Linh, “Our Victory Was Quick because Our Predictions Were Accurate,” Nhan Dan, 28 April 2003.

27. History of the Resistance War against the Americans to Save the Nation, 1954–1975, vol. VIII: Total Victory [Lich Su Khang Chien Chong My, Cuu Nuoc 1954–1975, Tap VIII: Toan Thang] (Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2008), 452. The official PAVN military history lists 1,447 killed. Victory in Vietnam, 421.