2
THE COLLAPSE OF THE ACCORDS
What did the Paris Accords mean to the Politburo in Hanoi? To answer that question, one needs a short primer on Vietnamese Communist doctrine. Their canon emphasized three forms of what it termed “struggle” to achieve victory: military struggle (large-scale offensive attacks), political struggle (local and international propaganda, along with guerrilla warfare and urban unrest), and diplomatic struggle (demanding that the U.S. withdraw, and pushing to form a coalition government). The three forms were a combined “fist” to strike the enemy. Military and political struggle were the two preferred methods, with diplomacy integrated within each scheme. The 1972 offensive was a manifestation of military struggle. Signing the accords indicated a shift to political struggle. How the shift occurred in 1972, who favored which method, and how the emphasis changed back to military struggle in 1973 are difficult questions to answer. But enough is known to sketch an outline.
In mid-October 1972 keen Politburo observers in the West had detected clues in Communist Party publications signaling a strategy change to political struggle and the imminent acceptance of a negotiated settlement. By signing the agreement, Hanoi abandoned its long-standing demand for the removal of Thieu and the formation of a coalition government. The men in the Politburo viewed the settlement as providing three advantages: withdrawal of U.S. forces, an in-place ceasefire that allowed their troops to remain in the South (which legitimized a Communist political presence in South Vietnam), and an opportunity to transform the accords into a political contest. In their minds, that did not mean elections, but a form of power-sharing that the U.S. would force on Thieu’s government. Neither the U.S. nor the South Vietnamese accepted this last point; in fact, they had prolonged the war to prevent an imposed coalition.
In early 1973, signs that the political struggle members continued to hold sway appeared when the Party’s theoretical journal, Hoc Tap, published articles stating that the leadership wanted to increase “socialist construction” on a large scale. Apparently, the 1973 accords had given rise to “rightist” tendencies, a desire for peace before victory. As General Vo Nguyen Giap notes: “Some people thought that the priority then was to preserve peace, achieve national concord, [and] create stability for about five or ten years.”1
After the accords had been signed, Hanoi’s public statements and internal policy documents trumpeted that the Paris treaty was a huge victory, since it compelled America to withdraw. By late March, however, Hanoi was confronted by a major propaganda problem. For years it had bandied the slogan “Americans out, puppets collapse.” With the Americans now gone, and the South Vietnamese showing no signs of disintegration, what strategy should the Politburo adopt to achieve its goal of national reunification?
Hints that the Politburo had chosen to focus on the Northern economy resurrected the old “North versus South” debate among Western analysts. Hanoi watchers had long noted a factional split within the Politburo between those who favored pursuing economic growth in the North, and those who favored major military offensives in the South. At the third National Party Congress, held in September 1960, Ho Chi Minh had brought the debate into the open when he stressed that the nation’s twin goals were to build socialism in the North while fighting for national reunification.
Some analysts attempted to boil down the “North versus South” schism into “hawks versus doves.” That is a misreading of the dispute. It was not an either/or process, but a continuum. The Communists attempted to judge the most appropriate mix of agitation, guerrilla attacks, and main-force warfare for each specific time period. Moving from one method to another simply meant a shift in emphasis. The main argument was over the correct strategy to accomplish reunification at a particular time. All the evidence from Vietnamese post-war memoirs, which are prone to the same bellicose propaganda and vast overstatements typical of wartime Communist historical texts, indicates that the debate was between two groups: those who supported Party General Secretary Le Duan, and those who backed Truong Chinh, the number-two man. After the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1969, the two were often locked in strategy conflicts. Number-three man Pham Van Dong became the “swing” vote, switching between the two sides depending on the situation.
While the disagreement probably originated when Le Duan replaced Truong Chinh as General Secretary in the late 1950s, policy differences were at its heart. The two were far apart not only on military affairs, but on economic matters as well. Le Duan was willing to take risks to win fast (main-force warfare), while Truong Chinh supported a longer-term approach. Le Duan generally was an economic pragmatist, while Truong Chinh followed Marxist dogma and insisted on collectivizing agriculture and building heavy industry.
Chinh’s real name was Dang Xuan Khu. Like many others, upon joining the Party he adopted a nom de guerre, both as a matter of security and reflecting his ascension as a new, socialist man. Chinh wanted to solve the North’s economic problems first. He still wanted victory in the South, but he sought it through guerrilla warfare, political education, and economic persuasion. Hence, he was willing to settle for a slower method of achieving reunification rather than the major military campaigns favored by Le Duan.
Given the two factions, the Politburo pursued both goals—a “guns and butter” program. That was one reason for the continual aid requests by the North Vietnamese to their Communist brethren. To gain that aid, they played heavily on Marxist consciences around the globe by claiming that they alone were fighting imperialism and the capitalist giant. The failure of the “Easter Offensive” in 1972 allowed the faction that wanted a higher emphasis on political struggle and a priority on building the Northern economy to gather sufficient votes to force a policy change. Then, with the extreme damage caused by the “Christmas bombing” and Nixon’s subsequent aid offer, enough Politburo members remained convinced to continue along that path.
Given that they soon changed back to “military struggle,” which ultimately led to victory, it is not surprising that the Communists have written little about the Politburo’s initial post-ceasefire strategy. Giap’s sole insight into early Politburo planning indicates that Hanoi’s immediate post-ceasefire policy goal was to demand the establishment of a new regime in the South—the long-sought coalition government with Communist and “Third Force” representatives—while undermining South Vietnam through propaganda. He also notes that the Politburo called for a rapid build-up of the liberated area, which required a major resupply effort. To achieve these aims, Giap’s first post-ceasefire order was to build a second road inside South Vietnam paralleling the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which ran on the Laotian side of the mountains.
The political-struggle faction continued to hold sway into March 1973. According to Giap, a Central Military Affairs Committee meeting in early March decided that “we needed to closely combine our own military and political struggles with the legal provisions contained in the Paris Agreement. Gradually, we would take the offensive by political means and with the support of the armed forces, and thereby achieve a ceasefire, with peace restored, and advantage gained.”2
Despite the sway of the political-struggle group, those like Le Duan who wanted to win via main-force warfare were not going away quietly. Le Duan, whose true name was Le Van Nhuan, was born in 1907 to a peasant family in Quang Tri province in what would become South Vietnam. He was one of the first members of the Communist Party of Indochina. In late 1946 he was sent to COSVN, eventually rising to the position of Party Secretary. After the 1954 Geneva Agreement, he remained in the South, but in late 1957 he was ordered back to Hanoi. In 1960 he was elected First Secretary of the Party Central Committee. Only Ho Chi Minh ranked higher.
Le Duan’s ascendancy in 1960 coincided with the Politburo’s decision to resume armed conflict in the South. His entire career focused on military struggle for control of the South. He was also a die-hard Marxist, viewing the war in Indochina as the opening blow in a world-wide assault on colonialism that would topple capitalism. He fervently believed in two revolutionary stratagems to achieve his dream of reunification: proselytizing the population to join the revolution, and main-force warfare. Despite the enormous losses inflicted on his army in the failed 1972 offensive, he still judged North Vietnam stronger than its Southern adversary. He stated that the departure of the Americans was “an opportunity it has taken us twenty years to create,” and he was determined not to allow this chance to slip away.
At other crucial junctures in the long war, the men in the Politburo had critically examined the balance of forces between their country and the enemy to determine the proper “struggle” method to achieve national reunification. This time was no different. On 27 March 1973 the Politburo held an expanded meeting (meaning that other high-ranking military and Party leaders were invited to attend), to review the first sixty days of the accords and develop policies toward both the U.S. and South Vietnam. Le Duan opened the session by inciting the other Politburo members, asserting “that the United States had withdrawn its troops but not ended its involvement; the puppets still obdurately tried to sabotage the Agreement.”3 More important, Le Duan pressed the argument that Saigon had refused to form a new government and was massively violating the accords by “nibbling” at Communist-held territory. If Hanoi did not resist, all its previous gains would be lost.
Le Duan’s assertions were false. The accords did not stipulate that a new government would be formed, simply that a council would be created to hold elections for a new government. When the two sides could not agree on who would fulfill the “Third Force” role, Thieu called for direct elections, but the Communists refused to participate. As for the “nibbling” charge, South Vietnamese forces had spent considerable time clearing roadblocks and retaking territory lost when Communist forces launched assaults across the South a few days before the ceasefire. Allowing the North Vietnamese to keep those territorial gains would have badly damaged South Vietnam. Technically Thieu’s forces had broken the ceasefire, but most of their violations stemmed from these counterattacks, although many of his generals continued to press forward after clearing out the initial incursions. To limit Hanoi’s accusations, on 3 March Thieu instructed each of his four corps commanders to reduce air and artillery usage and halt offensive operations. He did permit his commanders to react forcefully to Communist incursions.
Still, for hardened revolutionaries, Le Duan’s plea was hard to ignore, and it appears that this late-March Politburo meeting was the end for the political-struggle faction. Without access to contemporaneous documents it is difficult to determine whether the political-versus-military debate represented a real split in the Politburo, another in a series of strategy disagreements, or a change of tactics until a new direction could be determined. The memoirs of several high-ranking officers hint that a conflict existed, and subtle signs indicate that, to gain consensus, Le Duan may have promised the Chinh faction that rebuilding the Army would not detract from improving the economy. For example, the Central Military Affairs Committee soon added “economic construction” in the North to its portfolio.
In fact, though, the soldiers of the People’s Army were receiving a message very different from “economic construction.” The Communist leadership was desperately trying to rally its troops, as many believed that the war was over and that they could return to their Northern farms. Worse, in Giap’s view, some had reacted passively to ARVN efforts to push into contested areas. To rectify that situation, Giap and several other Central Committee members went on inspection trips to improve spirits. They hewed to the Party line that the Communists were strictly observing the ceasefire, and they castigated the “massive violations” of the South Vietnamese. They had little choice. To justify maintaining a standing army in the South to their own people, and to defend their military actions to the international community, they had to rationalize the failure of the ceasefire. They did it by blaming the South Vietnamese and the Americans. The strategy proved wildly successful.
Hidden behind the protestations that Hanoi was strictly observing the ceasefire was the commencement of military planning to conquer South Vietnam. Like Le Duan, Giap also wanted to return to main-force warfare. He refused to accept that the South Vietnamese, even given their large military, were stronger than his Northern army. After almost thirty years of warfare, all “foreign aggressors” had departed, and for Giap, this now was the “final stage” of the war.
In April 1973 he summoned his top lieutenants to his residence. He formed a top-secret team, named the “Central Cell,” to prepare for another offensive. Given the timing, the formation of the Central Cell was probably approved at the 27 March Politburo meeting. Its purpose was simple: devise a plan to conquer South Vietnam within a two-year period, 1975–76. As one senior general within the cell noted: “From mid-1973 to early 1975, the General Staff concentrated its efforts on three major tasks: (1) Developing a strategic plan and systematically updating and perfecting a basic strategy to completely liberate South Vietnam. (2) Directing combat operations to block, push back, and gradually defeat the enemy’s territorial encroachment and pacification plan. (3) Provide guidance and direction for combat operations to create the necessary battlefield posture, for the preparation of the battlefield, for building forces, for conducting military training, and for sending steadily greater support and supplies to South Vietnam in order to create the necessary strength.”4
Another expanded Politburo meeting was scheduled for late May, and Giap began to prepare. To gain clarity regarding the battlefield situation, between early April and mid-May he held working sessions in Hanoi with his staff and the commanders based in the South. Giap’s key staff officer, Lieutenant General Hoang Van Thai, coordinated many of these sessions. Thai was one of the original thirty-four members of PAVN, and he commanded its first armed propaganda team. From late 1967 to early 1973 he fought in the South as the commander of the B-2 Front, the military region comprising the southern half of South Vietnam. Shortly after the ceasefire, he was recalled to Hanoi. He was the third most powerful officer in the Army, after Giap and General Van Tien Dung, who was a Politburo member and PAVN’s chief of staff.
In preparation for briefing Giap, Thai collected information from PAVN commanders regarding a major victory in the lower Mekong Delta in which they claimed to have stymied an ARVN attempt to conquer Communist-controlled areas in Chuong Thien province. Because of its central location, Chuong Thien, known as the “hub of the Delta,” was the second-most-important province in IV Corps. The main PAVN infiltration route to the lower Delta ran through Chuong Thien. Communist accounts, including the history of Military Region 9 (MR-9, the lower Delta), claim that in early March 1973, PAVN’s intelligence services learned of a secret ARVN operational plan to recapture lost territory in Chuong Thien.5 To stop the South Vietnamese, the Communists moved four regiments into the province. In mid-March the ARVN 21st Division pressed into Chuong Thien, but North Vietnamese stopped them. On 4 April PAVN commanders in the lower Delta reported to Thai in Hanoi that the South Vietnamese had launched a large number of operations. According to these accounts, PAVN forces easily contained the thrusts.
At Giap’s first meeting with his senior commanders, Hoang Van Thai briefed them on these engagements in Chuong Thien. Giap claimed this was proof that PAVN was equal to ARVN. Others were not so sure; they believed the South Vietnamese remained stronger. Colonel General Tran Van Tra, who had replaced Thai as B-2 Front commander, claims that the meetings were contentious, and that the “matter that was discussed most . . . was the question of who was stronger, we or the enemy.”6 Tra states that during the sessions those who believed PAVN were the equal of ARVN succeeded in imposing their viewpoint on those who did not. Thus, as the Politburo gathered on 24 May to review the situation and determine the next steps, Giap entered the meeting determined to push his agenda of militarily conquering the South.
As was customary, Le Duan made the opening speech. Again he claimed that the South Vietnamese, with the full backing of the Americans, were massively violating the Paris Accords. While he continued to call the accords a “great victory,” he insisted that “The revolution must march forward through the path of violence. By doing so, we are sure to win victory.”7 According to Giap’s account, some opposition arose during the meeting. While not disagreeing with Le Duan, Truong Chinh noted that earlier offensives suffered from what he called “limitations” (meaning failure). Moreover, Pham Van Dong stated that while it was correct to “wage parallel military and political struggles, at this time, the military struggle must be the pillar and a support to the political struggle.” After further discussion, Giap provided an overview of the military state of affairs, outlining the situations in the various regions. Since he needed to provide a compelling example to demonstrate PAVN’s superiority, he boasted about its success in Chuong Thien in resisting ARVN efforts. He postulated that the primary reason for the South Vietnamese success in seizing territory was PAVN’s refusal to fight back. In conclusion, Giap offered the following sharp assessment: “If things continue like this, the situation will leave us at a tremendous disadvantage.”8
Despite the apparent doubts by Pham Van Dong and Truong Chinh, under continual prodding from Le Duan and Giap, the Politburo agreed to return to war. Dong and others might have preferred to maintain the current strategy, but they were soon squelched, even though public speeches continued to declare that Hanoi’s priority was economic reconstruction. Moreover, it is well to remember that while the North Vietnamese had secretly decided to launch another offensive, Le Duc Tho was in Paris debating Kissinger on new measures to implement the ceasefire. The Paris Peace Accords were dead, but only the Politburo knew it.
Given the Communist commanders’ claims that they defeated an ARVN offensive to retake Chuong Thien, and Giap’s use of this example to persuade the wavering Politburo members to return to the military struggle, the events in Chuong Thien have profound implications. Did ARVN launch an offensive to retake Communist controlled areas in this province, thus “massively violating” the accords?
The answer is no. The U.S. Consulate in Can Tho claimed it was the Communists who had pushed heavily into Chuong Thien, driving deep into GVN territory. In fact, the ARVN 21st Division was almost stationary in March, conducting few offensive operations. Not until early May did the ARVN IV Corps commander, Lieutenant General Nguyen Vinh Nghi, move two regiments from the 21st Division into Chuong Thien to halt Communist gains. He also began visiting the province daily, and he assigned a new province chief, Colonel Ho Ngoc Can, who had been named ARVN’s “Soldier of the Year” in 1972. In June he replaced the 21st Division’s commander with Brigadier General Le Van Hung. Hung had led the ARVN 5th Division at An Loc during the tough days of 1972. While Hung’s American advisers thought he was a poor officer, he had a good reputation within ARVN. He had served previously with the 21st Division under Nghi and knew the area. Nghi’s last move was to assign an additional eleven Regional Force (RF) battalions from outside the province to help guard Chuong Thien.9
Corroborating the American account, after the war the PAVN commander of MR-9, Senior Colonel (equivalent in rank to brigadier general) Le Duc Anh, admitted that he had flouted orders regarding the ceasefire and continued fighting. Anh wrote that shortly after the accords were signed, he was ordered to de-escalate the fighting. In an unusual departure for the reputedly highly disciplined Communists, he refused. Two months later, he was directed a second time to retreat. He again refused. He believed that the war would persist regardless of the accords, and that following higher-level orders to remain passive would lead to his destruction. When he continued to disobey, COSVN instructed him once more to refrain from aggressive actions and withdraw back to his bases in the impenetrable U Minh Forest for retraining. When Anh did not, he immediately came under heavy criticism. He later wrote: “COSVN sent two more cables demanding that [Military Region 9] recognize the new situation and that we employ new methods. COSVN Military Headquarters sent out a cable criticizing [us] for not implementing COSVN’s policy orders and sent information copies of this cable to all areas of South Vietnam. At that time the general opinion was that we in the lower Mekong Delta were ‘ripping up the Paris Agreement.’ In late May 1973 a conference was held at COSVN Headquarters to review political struggle and military proselytizing operations. The cadre group from the Center [Hanoi] and from COSVN participating in the review loudly criticized Region 9 for not following policy directives issued by higher authority.”10
Not surprisingly, Anh’s unprecedented disobedience threatened his job. Anh writes that one of his subordinates, returning from the May conference at COSVN, reported that “some people have recommended that you be prosecuted because you have not implemented and have sabotaged the Agreement!”11 Yet Anh not only survived, he was eventually promoted. In Giap’s view, Anh’s actions were correct. Anh’s boss, Tran Van Tra, later grudgingly lauded him for engaging in “specific acts [that] were completely contrary to a whole series of policies at that time . . . [his actions were] an incorrect understanding of the Paris Agreement and the new strategic phase. . . . Luckily, that was a distant battlefield, so upper-echelon policies were often slow in reaching it, and the rectification of mistakes was often not prompt.”12
If ARVN’s actions in Chuong Thien as reported by Giap to the Politburo never happened, did Giap deliberately falsify his account to convince the Politburo to change strategy? Or was Anh lying about South Vietnamese efforts in Chuong Thien to justify his disobedience? Either way, the return to war was based on a lie.
Regardless, the Politburo decision to return to war was precisely what Giap sought: “Nobody thought any longer in terms of respites. . . . The combat, we realized, would drag on. Because the enemy carried on with its. . . peace-sabotaging attempts, we had no choice but to defend our revolutionary gains, which we had earned at a great cost of blood.” It was, he felt, “not possible to stop in mid-journey,” and thus, “the situation would pass through a period of instability, and South Vietnam would have both peace and war.”13
To formalize the return to military struggle, Le Duan sought the backing of the Central Committee. The 21st Plenum of the Central Committee was set for late June and would determine Communist strategy in Giap’s “final stage of the war.” Giap again prepared a major presentation. He wanted to impress upon the Central Committee members his belief that because U.S. forces had pulled out, by default PAVN was in its strongest position of the war. Giap invited leaders from the B-2 Front to discuss the defeat of ARVN’s efforts in Chuong Thien. Since the GVN was “massively violating” the ceasefire, Giap wanted to highlight this battle so he could then ascribe PAVN failures in other regions to a lack of resolve, rather than admitting that the enemy was stronger.
As the Plenum began, Le Duan’s opening speech made the same point as before: The South Vietnamese were blatantly violating the Paris Accords. Therefore, “military issues must be raised to the highest level possible. Political strategy must be combined with military strategy.”14 It was his way of telling the Committee members that North Vietnam must return to main-force warfare if it wanted to achieve victory.
Giap and other members of the Central Military Affairs Committee also gave speeches. While Giap was blunt about the various problems still confronting the military, he was resolute in his belief that the South Vietnamese were not invincible. Tra in particular recalls a lengthy discussion over how the PAVN commanders in the northern I Corps area had pulled their forces back to defined zones so their units could be refitted. Tra and the other B-2 Front commanders were adamantly against this, believing that the so-called “leopard spots,” wherein the B-2 Front troops were mixed in among the South Vietnamese, provided them a tremendous advantage.
On 6 July the Central Committee rubber-stamped Le Duan’s proposal that the path in the South was one of “revolutionary violence.” The decision meant that the work of rebuilding PAVN, defending the areas that had been captured in 1972, expanding the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and isolating Saigon diplomatically, while creating unrest among the South Vietnamese military and people, would begin in earnest.
Now Giap had to implement the new strategy, but another internal roadblock surfaced. Le Duan, who was enamored of his own revolutionary military strategy and disdainful of Giap’s generalship, wanted a broad offensive primarily focused on revolutionary uprisings in the cities to liberate the South. Namely, he sought a repeat of the 1968 Tet Offensive. Giap, however, was not going down that path again. He had strongly disagreed with Le Duan about launching the Tet Offensive, and when he lost that battle, he left the country on “medical leave.” When the Central Cell revamped the Strategic Plan to reflect Le Duan’s ideas, Giap quietly asked it to review the final stages of a number of wars, including the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany and the Chinese Communists’ victory in 1949. The historical appraisals provided Giap the ammunition he needed: “I believed that we could not make a general insurrection our first priority. Instead, the essential task was to conduct large attacks to destroy an important segment of the enemy’s army first in order to create conditions that would allow us to attack the cities, the enemy’s primary lairs . . . to secure total victory. I discussed this subject on many occasions with the Party First Secretary. In the end, he agreed.”15
Giap needed new tactics designed to destroy major ARVN units, and he wanted his senior officers to learn the essentials for coordinating and sustaining combined-arms operations: command and control, staff planning, and logistics. These had been the great weaknesses of the 1972 offensive. PAVN needed to become a modern army, and only the Soviets could train it in this type of warfare. After the 21st Plenum, a group of North Vietnamese officers, led by then Senior Colonel Nguyen Huu An, who had commanded the two PAVN regiments at the famous battle of Ia Drang in 1965, traveled to Russia to attend a course on combined-arms operations. It would pay huge dividends during the 1975 fighting.
On 4 October, the Central Committee formally approved the Resolution of the 21st Plenum, more commonly referred to as Resolution 21. This resolution codified the Politburo’s decision regarding a military conquest of the South. The ramifications were immediate. On 20 October, the Provisional Revolutionary Government in the South announced a decision to “fight back . . . in order to defend the liberated zone.”16 In mid-November, Le Duan sent a letter to the Party committees of the Southern military regions providing his personal guidance regarding the meaning of Resolution 21. He wrote: “The situation will develop depending on our actual strength and the manner in which we cope. The first thing we must decide upon is that we can only achieve victory in the South through incessant revolutionary warfare, by violence, while relying on political strength and the armed strength of the people to apply and develop a new factor, a new opportunity, presented by the Paris Agreement. This is the basic spirit of Resolution 21. . . . Almost 20 years of war and the Paris Peace Agreement have presented us with the best opportunity thus far for carrying out the revolution in the entire country, especially regarding the revolution in the South. We must not underestimate the enemy but our position of strength and our victory cannot be reversed.”17
PREPARING FOR RENEWED WAR
For the few American officials remaining in South Vietnam, watching the growing distancing from Vietnam in Congress and in America at large was heart wrenching. Once the U.S. prisoners had returned home, most Americans were very eager to forget the war. The Gallup organization reported in March 1973 that Vietnam was quickly receding as a national issue.
The major remaining American presence in Vietnam was the U.S. Embassy, which soon had a new ambassador. On 17 July 1973, Graham Martin arrived to replace the highly esteemed Ellsworth Bunker. When tapped to be ambassador, Martin only reluctantly agreed. At age sixty, he was contemplating retirement. Born on 22 September 1912 in North Carolina, he had worked for various newspapers before joining the Social Security Board in 1933. In 1941 he entered the Army Air Corps and rose to the rank of colonel. In 1947 he joined the Foreign Service and was posted to Paris for eight years. After Paris, he worked in a series of government positions until chosen in May 1963 as ambassador to Thailand, where he spent four years. Upon his departure from Thailand he was given the State Department’s Distinguished Honor award. In 1969 he was named ambassador to Italy. He expected to retire there, and bought a small Tuscan farm to enjoy his golden years.
Martin was a tough, hard-line anti-Communist. He ran a tight ship, tolerating little dissent, the very qualities that Nixon found so attractive. He was adamant about maintaining the president’s commitments to South Vietnam, and he saw the GVN’s continued existence as a key component of a robust American foreign policy. Before Martin left for his new post, he was summoned to the White House for an audience with Nixon and Kissinger and given his marching orders: “Your primary mission will be to ensure the survival of the GVN. I know you recognize how much is at stake for this country, and I do not underestimate the difficulty of the assignment I am giving you. The ultimate success or failure of our sacrifices for Vietnam will depend in large measure on your skill in dealing with the complex period ahead. There is no more important post and that is why you have been selected. . . . Please convey my best wishes to President Thieu and my solemn assurances of continued U.S. support. We will stand by the commitments made to him in April in San Clemente. . . . We will do all we can to support the GVN during this difficult period. To enhance our chances of Congressional support for adequate economic aid, you should repeat to Thieu the critical importance of maintaining a favorable image in the U.S. and of making every effort to comply with the Agreement.”18
Martin did exactly that, and he fought valiantly for South Vietnam, long after everyone else wanted to forget the war. Even though he claimed to have had an epiphany in December 1974 that South Vietnam would not survive, he stayed and wrestled for more support, not only with the U.S. government bureaucracy but also from other countries. He secretly asked to become Kissinger’s deputy in January 1975, but when he was rejected, he did not resign but stayed and continued to battle.
The South Vietnamese also did not sit idle. South Vietnamese military successes during the 1972 campaign had instilled in the RVNAF a new-found confidence. According to General Cao Van Vien, the commander of all South Vietnamese military forces, “morale in the military was high, and we believed we could defeat any North Vietnamese attack. But we needed U.S. weapons, ammunition, fuel and other supplies. We could not manufacture them ourselves, and without them, we could not survive.”19 Vien added that he believed the South Vietnamese could handle local offensives, but U.S. airpower “was critical in halting any major offensive.”
In early 1973, the RVNAF was given four goals: recover any territory lost during the Communists’ post-ceasefire incursions, finish rebuilding troop units that had suffered high casualties during the 1972 fighting, complete all military modernization projects, and assist the government’s pacification and rural-development plans. The last priority meant fortifying GVN holdings while concurrently pushing into contested areas, a program Saigon called “flooding the territory.” Hanoi described this as “nibbling,” charging that it was a ceasefire violation, which sometimes it was.
The Joint General Staff (JGS) faced a formidable challenge in accomplishing these tasks. All allied troops and U.S. airpower had withdrawn, resulting in the need to defend the country with less than half the previous forces and a fraction of the firepower. Additionally, the 1972 offensive had left Communist units much closer to the major cities than ever before. In II Corps, Kontum was threatened from both the north and the west, while the defensive belt around Saigon had shrunk to thirty miles in some places. The situation was worse in I Corps, with the North Vietnamese for the first time poised near the plains instead of far back in the mountains.
To compensate, during the first half of 1973, the South Vietnamese increased the number of RF battalions from 189 to 339, mainly by merging existing units. The Popular Forces (PF) and local police, which defended the hamlets, were also expanded. A major governmental program began relocating the one million refugees from the 1972 fighting onto abandoned land. With these efforts, control in the provinces increased, at least initially. Many had predicted that Thieu’s government would collapse after the U.S. withdrawal. Instead, after some initial nervousness among GVN officials, the government found an inner strength. Growing in confidence and now out from under the American umbrella—yet still requiring U.S. aid to survive—the South Vietnamese were finally taking control of their own destiny.
Thieu knew his most pressing needs were to jump-start the economy and provide security for the people. The economy had not recovered from the devastating 1972 offensive and the impact of the great reduction in the U.S presence. The country was staggering under the twin blows of serious inflation and increasing unemployment. June 1973 had seen a 19 percent jump in prices, and the price of rice had risen 25 percent since January. Since South Vietnam’s economy was tied to the dollar, it had been particularly hard hit by the dollar’s depreciation and higher world prices. Now it was on the precipice of a depression. Public discontent over the economy was the highest in years, and rising social evils, including alcoholism and drug use, crime, and increased corruption, were attributed to the worsening economy.
Thieu’s hopes for post-war economic growth revolved largely around agriculture, although the discovery of offshore oil deposits would soon dangle the prospect of a much-needed alternative economic engine. Since the Mekong Delta was the country’s breadbasket, the government turned its main attention to expanding rice production and extending control across the Delta. The fertile lowlands became even more critical when rice shortages appeared in South Vietnam in mid-1973. On top of every other economic ill, a combination of rapidly rising prices and unexpected shortages of the country’s most important food staple was a significant threat to South Vietnam’s government and society, second only to the Communists.
Typically a backwater of the war, the Delta suddenly became the military focal point in the summer of 1973 when heavy fighting erupted over the country’s main crop. The northern provinces of South Vietnam had just suffered a horrendous drought that had badly damaged the summer harvest, and the area was desperate to import rice. Contributing to the area’s rice shortage were heavy purchases by Communist supply agents. By paying much higher prices, they bought rice and other commodities to support their military forces. If local farmers refused to sell, they levied a “tax” on them, essentially stealing their food. In the area around Saigon, the North Vietnamese army acquired most of its rice from either the Delta or Cambodia. Given that the Khmer Rouge had ordered no further sales of rice to the North Vietnamese, Delta rice suddenly became hotly contested.
Though the Delta was a difficult command because of its size, high population density, and swampy terrain, ARVN Lieutenant General Nguyen Vinh Nghi ruled a potent military apparatus. Nghi had three divisions: the highly effective 7th Division, which operated in critical Dinh Tuong province in the upper Delta; the efficient 9th Division in the eastern provinces; and the poorly rated 21st Division, which maneuvered from the middle of the Delta to Vietnam’s southern tip. Nghi also had nine Ranger battalions, the 4th Armor Brigade equipped with M-113 armored personnel carriers, and the largest number of Regional and Popular Forces in the country. The Vietnamese Air Force provided air cover from a large jet-capable airport at Can Tho, while the Navy’s riverine force patrolled the myriad rivers and canals.
Nghi was born in October 1932 near Saigon. He graduated in 1952 from the Dalat Military Academy, South Vietnam’s West Point. Highly intelligent and a firm anti-Communist, he had well-known friendships with both Thieu and Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem. He was a better staff officer than combat leader, and in the first part of his career he served mainly on divisional staffs. Despite long-standing and justified accusations of corruption, in June 1968 Nghi was promoted to brigadier general and given command of the 21st Division. Under Nghi’s leadership, the 21st Division’s combat effectiveness slowly sank, but his connections with Thieu and Khiem remained intact. On 3 May 1972 he was given command of IV Corps.
Because of continued PAVN post-ceasefire attacks, including a major assault on the river port of Hong Ngu in early April 1973, Nghi moved to eliminate enemy base areas inside IV Corps. His first target was a key Communist hideout known as the Seven Mountains. Situated along the Cambodian border, the Seven Mountains are a chain of rugged peaks pockmarked with caves that rise out of the flat Delta terrain. Nghi, using both the Rangers and Regional Forces, began a methodical drive to clean out the base. Over a period of several months, the campaign so badly decimated the PAVN 1st Division that the unit was disbanded.
Yet despite this and several other victories, the U.S. Defense Attaché Office (DAO), the residual American military presence in South Vietnam, was growing increasingly concerned. Beginning in April 1973 and continuing until the end, the DAO intelligence chief, Colonel William Le Gro, wrote a monthly summary for U.S. government and military policy-makers. Each report described the previous month’s military events in South Vietnam, and analyzed trends and gave predictions for the future. In September 1973, Le Gro provided his first overall assessment. He bluntly informed Washington: “Hanoi has developed its strongest military position in the history of the war. The objective remains the complete takeover of South Vietnam.”20 Examining Hanoi’s options, he surmised that Soviet and Chinese aid, which seemed more oriented toward economic support than weapons, would be a decisive factor in any major offensive. Even if the North did not receive any new military hardware, Hanoi was lacking only the manpower, especially in III Corps, before it could launch an all-out attack.
More important, according to Le Gro, the constant combat was draining ARVN morale. Like their Northern brethren, many South Vietnamese troops hoped the long war had ended and they could return to their villages. Instead, the fighting dragged on, the economy grew worse, and inflation sapped their meager earnings. Consequently, discipline eroded, looting increased, corruption expanded, and drug addiction climbed. News began to filter into Saigon about RF/PF units reaching accommodations with the Communists, as in, We will stay out of your area if you stay out of ours. Some civilians and soldiers were desperate to earn money and secretly traded with the enemy. Moreover, PAVN had scored a few victories in III and IV Corps, mauling several ARVN battalions in well-planned ambushes.
Although Thieu was aware of the despondency in his lower ranks, the growing military threat precluded any efforts to relieve the stress on his troops. On 31 October he announced on television and radio that he believed the Communists were preparing for another offensive. Within days his prediction was partially borne out when PAVN launched a major attack in Quang Duc province in II Corps. To back up his firm stance, Thieu began relieving commanders. The III Corps commander, Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Minh, was transferred on 27 October to become the commander of the Capital Military District, the area around Saigon. Within days, the commanders of two divisions in III Corps, the 5th and the 25th, were relieved for corruption. Thieu also replaced five province chiefs and several other division commanders. By early November, he had also relieved the Quang Duc province chief and the 23rd Division commander for their failure to retake two Montagnard villages lost during the Quang Duc fighting.
By the end of 1973, Thieu’s tolerance for the Communist attacks and continued infiltration had reached its limit. Speaking in Can Tho on 4 January 1974, Thieu stated: “We cannot sit by idly. We must take appropriate actions to punish the Communist aggressive actions. We will not allow the Communists to enjoy stable security in their staging areas from which they will harass us, attack our posts, destroy our infrastructure, and steal our rice. We must take these actions not only in our zone of control, but also right in the areas where the North Vietnamese troops are still stationed. . . . Only when the Communists . . . have the good will to hold elections, will we stop these actions at precisely the moment the Communist actions are stopped. . . . We must not heed groundless comments and criticism—no matter where it comes from.”21
It was a challenge to his enemies, and to the Americans. He could not watch the war, and his country, slip away. For Thieu, the ceasefire was dead. Looking out at the crowd, he spoke from his gut. “The war,” he declared, “has begun again.”