TEN
WHILE GUDERIAN, VON BOCK AND HALDER WERE largely fixated on taking Moscow with Army Group Centre, Hitler was still worried about his southern flank and obsessing over the Ukraine. He could see the possibility of a major encirclement of the Soviets there and suggested moving General Guderian’s Panzer Group 2 from Army Group Centre to the South, catching the Russians in a large pincer movement. The Army High Command (Oberkommando das Heers, or OKH) wanted to take Moscow and argued against any weakening of Army Group Centre. This left Hitler wracked with indecision—politically (and indeed, strategically) Moscow and Leningrad “had to be got rid of,” but economically the Ukraine had to be the objective.1 These competing political and economic aspects dogged Hitler throughout the war, leading him into decisions that were not militarily sound, although from Hitler’s economic and political viewpoint were perfectly justified. His generals, including Guderian and von Manstein among others, could never appreciate this viewpoint and blamed Hitler, sometimes unfairly, for every defeat and setback. In the end, in this instance, Hitler opted to have both Moscow and the Ukraine. As for Leningrad, the former Tsarist capital could be starved into submission, as he had doubts about using tanks to demolish cities. He ordered Guderian southwards but only temporarily, to help linquidate the Soviet concentration around Kiev, after which his panzer group would move back to take Moscow. This delay and shift in resources was fatal, even though it did result in a massive Soviet defeat in the Ukraine.
Stalin expected Hitler to attack Moscow so he concentrated his strength there, although he did send Field Marshal Budenny some reinforcements. Realising that he was going to be surrounded in a pincer move, Budenny requested permission to withdraw. Stalin would have none of it, instead sending him more men to be eventually caught in the cauldron. Sanguine as he was about possible encirclement, Stalin was, however, alarmed at the hasty retreat of many Russian units in the face of what he considered very little pressure. His solution was draconian—the NKVD (internal security troops) formed halt lines behind the front. Their task was simple, to shoot any retreating troops, without question, and they did just that, machine-gunning entire companies as well as summarily executing any individuals found wandering behind the immediate front. There was no trial, perhaps one or two questions if the NKVD officer felt inclined, followed by a bullet to the back of the head. The Soviets admitted to “court-martialling,” if that term could validly be used, some one million men during the war but this figure is far too low. If found guilty, which nearly all were, the men were either executed or sent to penal battalions where death came a little later, during suicidal attacks or mine clearance. The figure also does not include summary executions without a trial, or mass shootings of retreating troops by the NKVD. The Germans resorted to similar measures late in the war, with drumhead courts-martial and summary executions for troops found behind the lines without a valid reason and relevant paperwork, however the numbers executed were small compared to the Soviet tally.
If the Russians were in dire straits, the Germans were having major problems of their own. Apart from fuel, food and transport shortages, there was the question of rapidly diminishing manpower. By 2 August the Germans had suffered 180,000 casualties along the Eastern Front, of which 63,000 were sustained by Army Group South, with only 10,000 replacements arriving to fill the gaps.2 Death was the German soldier’s constant companion, often coming very violently with consequential morale problems, as Gunter Koschorrek, a machine gunner with the 24th Panzer Division, described:
Those who lie here are not just dead bodies with one wound in them, or possibly one part missing. Here are individual lumps of flesh, from arms, legs and buttocks and in one instance a head; onto which part of a damaged helmet still clings. These are the remains of the men of the 88mm A.A. gun and the quad machine gun, both of which received direct hits from the T-34 and were blown apart, blasted into the air. I feel so miserable as we stumble forward.3
For tank crews, burns were a serious and common injury while bodies could be horribly mangled by the hot metal hurtling around inside the turret. Nevertheless the steel armour provided protection and therefore increased survivability especially, in the heavier tanks. A crew of the later Tiger tanks had far better chances of surviving than the crew of a Panzer III or IV. Another advantage for tank crews was that they didn’t have to walk, marching for hours in all weather. The German infantry marched hundreds of kilometres, and if an infantryman survived the war he would have walked for several thousand kilometres in choking dust, blazing sun, cloying mud, and freezing rain or snow. He was always covered in dirt, hungry, often thirsty and exhausted. For the Panzer Graf and his men, life was better but nevertheless had its hardships. Being confined in a greasy, smelly, dirty steel box wasn’t pleasant. In summer it was an oven, in winter a freezer. One tank crewman, Walter Thomaschek of the Grossdeutschland Division, described his life in a tank:
I never felt comfortable inside the tank. The noise was almost unbearable although we wore earplugs or were wearing headphones. Trapped inside this tin can I quickly lose my sense of orientation and often didn’t know in which direction we were heading. Our commander [von Strachwitz] received orders via the radio but didn’t give us detailed instructions or information about our whereabouts… . Only the commander and the driver were able to see the outside world, through small slits covered with bullet-proof glass [hence why most commanders had their heads and/or torsos outside the turret whenever circumstances permitted]. The rest of the crew was not able to see anything. It was a terrible feeling to see nothing during a fight. One could hear bullets ricocheting off the armour and everybody praying that no AT shell would hit us …
Inside the tank was a terrible mess. Dirt got carried inside our boots. The smell of unwashed bodies was everywhere. Quite often we had to wait in the tank for hours, be it extremely hot or terribly cold. The body hurt from sitting endlessly in the cramped space. Officially we weren’t allowed to sleep. Usually we agreed upon one crewmember staying awake to be on guard (rarely the driver as he had the more strenuous job on a continuous basis) while the others slept, but sometimes it happened that the whole crew fell asleep. In cases we couldn’t leave the tank we had to urinate and shit through the bottom hatch. When this was impossible the Commander told us to “Shit in your pants.” An alternative was to use an empty shell casing or tin.
Von Strachwitz himself was not confined as often, having to attend to various command functions, engage in reconnaissance, check out the ground or look for the enemy. Waiting periods were also shorter, but otherwise he shared the privations of his crew and had the added weight of responsibility. After actions the tank crew still had no rest, as Thomaschek explained:
After the fighting had stopped, or at the end of the day, it was impossible to rest at once. We left the tank with black faces from the gunpowder and everybody would have preferred just to sleep. Impossible. At first we had to tally our equipment. Report how much ammo we had expended, refuel the tank with a manual pump, load ammo and take back the empty cartridges which were collected and sent back to factories. Furthermore, we had to check the damage to the tracks, the gun, etc. This required our attention because these parts of the equipment were prone to damage. The tank needed to get camouflaged (far more necessary on the Western Front) to avoid spotting through enemy air recon. We also had to clean the gun, which required the strength of the whole crew. Then we had to dig the tank in (not all that often). It was incredibly hard work… . After the tank we had to clean our rifles. Only after these were clean we could have time for ourselves. Sometimes we didn’t have any time for this because new orders had arrived and we had to start moving again. Perennial roll calls and training kept us busy, that way we shouldn’t have to think about the war. We were meant to eat, drink, sleep and die. Nothing else. We were completely exhausted and weakened by lack of sleep… . We were unshaven and dirty and during the night fleas, bugs and rats made our lives miserable… . The encounter with the Ukrainian steppe was quite an experience for everybody. The endless horizon in every direction, brownish vegetation and dust, dust … dust.4
Over and above all of this the crew had to prepare meals and take care of their personal needs. As a battalion commander Graf von Strachwitz was spared all the cleaning and maintenance duties but was burdened with preparing reports, future operations, logistics, orders groups, correspondence, recommendations for awards and promotions, disciplinary action and training. He had also to oversee his officers, particularly the company commanders, and see to their development. All of this was before and after action, when he had the responsibility of leading his tanks into battle. It gave him no time to brood, or to relax, and usually meant even less sleep than the chronically sleep-deprived tank crews.
Logistical problems continued to bedevil the Germans. Poland, Belgium and France were not only much smaller than the Soviet Union, but had paved roads and advanced infrastructure that was familiar and could be used effectively. The vast spaces of Russia were poorly serviced by rail and roads, with many “roads” just dirt tracks which turned into a morass during autumn, and were deeply rutted and iced over during winter. Even tracked vehicles slid over them. Fuel was becoming increasingly precious as supplies dwindled due to poor roads, congested supply routes, both road and rail, bad weather, and above all lack of suitable transport. Wheeled vehicles were next to useless in the mud and even panzer divisions had to use horses and carts. Later the Germans would develop tracked trucks which could negotiate the bad road conditions or travel cross-country, but their numbers were also well below requirements.
Von Strachwitz fretted and fumed as he struggled to keep his tanks supplied and mobile. On good roads, his Panzer IIIs and IVs consumed 300 litres of fuel for every 100km travelled. Consumption could double in muddy conditions or when travelling cross-country. It would treble when the tanks were employed to tow a string of vehicles through the mud. He tried to conserve fuel where he could, but he couldn’t do anything about the Germans’ badly depleted motor pool. As the Germans thrust ever deeper into the Russian heartland the wear and tear on vehicles, and on the men, increased. So much so that Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt mentioned this in a statement to the men of his army group:
I know that a great many divisions have been in combat every day since the start of the campaign. I also know that the tanks seem unobtainable and that difficult combat, inclement weather and road obstacles require the greatest efforts of the troops… . It is only natural that such great effort would result in fatigue, the combat strength of the troops has weakened and in many places there is a desire for rest.5
That was certainly an understatement, and the troops no doubt thought he was stating the obvious, but at least they could appreciate that the field marshal cared enough to acknowledge the immense difficulties the troops were facing.
Von Strachwitz’s precious tanks were of course also affected by their sustained use in a challenging environment. Engines in desperate need of major overhaul were kept running with only minimal maintenance. This, together with enemy action, meant that at any one time up to 50% of his tanks would be in for repair with the maintenance company for a day or two, or in the army workshops for several weeks, with tanks shuttling back and forth from repair workshops on a regular basis. This was a problem common to all the armoured divisions. For instance on 17 August, 16th Panzers’ neighbour 11th Panzer (where von Strachwitz’s son was serving) reported “heavy material and personnel losses rendered the division no longer fully operational.” General Halder noted in his war diary that Kleist’s First Panzer Group retained only half its original strength, with the quartermaster of the panzer group classifying the supply situation as critical.6 The 16th Panzer and Graf von Strachwitz’s battalion were only marginally better off, yet they had to make do, as very little in the way of replacement parts, men, and machines was expected or indeed available. The division’s nearest railhead was some 350 kilometres of bad, congested roads away. In fact, the once-proud motorized division increasingly had to rely on horse transport, like the common infantry divisions.
But despite the shortages, the attack had to continue. Field Marshal von Rundstedt diverted 16th Panzer, along with the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH), commanded by Sepp Dietrich, further south to take the Black Sea post and Soviet naval base of Nikolayev. The two units were combined into a battle group along with the Hungarian Mobile Corps. This last unit consisted of horsed light cavalry, Toldi light tanks, some tankettes, Czaba armoured cars, bicycle-riding infantry and light artillery together with support units. The LSSAH had a nominal strength of 10,000 men plus supporting arms and a few operational tanks. Altogether it was not a large force to take an objective defended by the major portion of the Soviet Ninth Army and the 55th infantry Regiment of the Eighteenth Army. The German battle group would, in the event, prove to be insufficient to completely seal off the town.
With the Hungarians attacking in the south, the Germans struck east, crossing the Ingul River on 12 August. While the Hungarians were held up by strong Russian resistance, the Germans advanced along the east side of the river and were attacked by strong Russian forces. Kurt Meyer, LSSAH battalion commander and future divisional commander of the Hitlerjugend Division, described some of the fighting that occurred there:
Exact but cautiously the Russians advance… . I do not want merely to fend off the attack but to destroy the Russian unit! The moment arrives around 11.00 hours. Fire strikes the Russians from all weapons and tears horrible gaps in their lines. Mortars and infantry guns try to eliminate the enemy guns with precision fire. The attack waves are mown to the ground. They jump up and run forward to their deaths. Commissars and officers attempt to get the attack going again, but I only see individual Russian soldiers running forward, the majority lie nailed fast to the floor.
Now the moment has come for the motorcycles and armoured cars waiting on the flanks. They advance east and then turn in and push the Russians toward our position. By midday 650 prisoners are taken and more than 200 dead counted. According to prisoners’ statements, the commander of the 962nd Rifle Regiment shot himself after shooting some of the officers. That regiment is said to have comprised only 900 rifles, it is completely annihilated as a result of these losses.7
After a Russian artillery barrage Meyer’s unit was attacked again, this time by an armoured force:
Some amphibious tanks and armoured cars form the spearhead. A direct hit strikes our battery position and one ammunition truck explodes. Once more we let the Russians get close and run into our fire.
The amphibious tanks are the first victims to fly into the air. The familiar smoke clouds cover the battlefield while our armoured cars and fast Panzerjägers [self-propelled anti-tank guns, literally tank hunters] set off and shoot up the widely and chaotically scattering columns. One Panzerjäger comes to a smoking halt. Red flames shoot out of its interior before the driver can save himself. The survivors jump into the glow—they pull their comrade out of the burning hell and smother the flames on his body. My ears are ringing with the screams of the badly burned driver. I break away from the group and point my binoculars to the southwest. Thick clouds of dust announce the arrival of more columns which are trying to force a way through to the east. Like panthers, our armoured cars and Panzerjägers pounce on the columns and shoot up the vehicles into flaming wrecks. They try to scatter in all directions but only a few manage to flee. The bulk of the attackers have to trudge down the road to captivity.8
16th Panzer found it easygoing, with the flat terrain ideal for von Strachwitz’s tanks and little opposition initially encountered. His panzers’ task was to blast a way through for the German infantry, which he did with dash and vigour. As well as launching counterattacks against 16th Panzer and the Leibstandarte, the enemy also carried out frequent ambushes, one of which killed Major von der Marck—a friend of von Strachwitz and a popular 16th Panzer Division officer—when a Russian tank round destroyed his vehicle.
The Reds massed for a breakout, and as the German containment lines were thinly manned, they were reinforced by the Hungarian 1st Cavalry Brigade. Nevertheless a large part of the Russians managed to break out, crossing the river at Nova Dantzig. They overran 16th Panzer’s 6th Company of the 79th Regiment, a large number of whom were taken prisoner. The prisoners were then brutally murdered by their captors. This was a fairly common occurrence and a major reason why the Germans fought so desperately even when the odds were heavily weighted against them. When discovered, many of the bodies showed signs of having been tortured and nearly all were mutilated.9
During the next two days, after fierce resistance from Russian marines, the town itself was captured. Here the Germans found the 36,000-ton partially built battleship Soviet Ukraine still on the slips. The Hungarian cavalry, led by Major Kalman Mikeeoz, mounted a charge with two squadrons of Hussars (light cavalry). The Russians were so shocked by the sight of massed mounted horsemen bearing down on them with sabres drawn that they abandoned their positions in panic-stricken flight. The use of cavalry was not unusual on the Eastern Front. The Russians used cavalry extensively throughout the war, while the Italians had a cavalry regiment in their expeditionary force. The Hungarians and Romanians were also well provided with cavalry while the Germans had the 1st Cavalry Division, which at one point during Operation Barbarossa was the only fully mobile division on the central front. It was later converted to become the 24th Panzer Division and was subsequently destroyed at Stalingrad. The Waffen SS, on the other hand, maintained cavalry units throughout the war, the most notable being the Florian Geyer Division, which was commanded by Hermann Fegelein, Eva Braun’s brother-in-law. These units were generally employed in anti-partisan operations.
Heavy fighting then continued for the towns of Ongulka and Peresdavka, which the Germans captured with the help of von Strachwitz’s tanks, which had to blast the Russians out house by house. German tank doctrine warned against street fighting, and it was not a form of fighting that von Strachwitz wanted his tanks to engage in, with narrow streets and houses hiding Russians armed with grenades and petrol bombs. There was no room to manoeuvre, rendering the tanks large, slow-moving, targets. He preferred open country, so he pulled them out as soon as it was practical, providing close fire support only when urgently needed.
The division was given a much-needed rest at Kirovograd. This enabled the men to carry out urgent maintenance on the tanks, but this meant that they got no physical rest. Still, the break from the strain of combat was invaluable and the men managed to write some letters home, mend their clothes and eat hot food at their leisure. The Graf could finally catch up with his accumulating paperwork. Most of it was mundane, parade states, checking supplies, chasing up parts, writing reports, authorising leaves and so on. Among the more pleasant tasks were the recommendations for promotion, awards and decorations. Most of his men had earned their tank assault badge while others were awarded the Iron Cross First or Second class. It was around this time that he was informed that his eldest son Hyazinth had been awarded the Iron Cross (1st Class) on 6 August for bravery while serving with his Panzer Regiment. On 25 August, Graf von Strachwitz was awarded the coveted Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross for his personal bravery and leadership in numerous actions, especially Dubno, Uman and Pervomaisk. Unlike many officers who in order to preserve their Knight’s Cross, wore the smaller Iron Cross (2nd Class) around their neck, Graf von Strachwitz always wore a full-size decoration, although it may have been a privately purchased jeweller’s copy. His regimental commander, Rudolf Sieckenius, had also been presented with this high award as a testimonial to his bravery and leadership, and for the achievements of his regiment to which Graf von Strachwitz contributed so much. The two men had in the heat of battle become firm friends and worked exceedingly well together. Like General Hube, Sieckenius trusted von Strachwitz implicitly, giving him carte blanche to undertake his many forays behind enemy lines and dogged pursuits, which took his tanks well ahead of the division spearheads and away from any available support. This trust was repaid by the Panzer Graf’s impressive results.
NOTES
1. Major Gerhard Engel, At the Heart of the Reich (Greenhill Books, London, 2005).
2. David Stahel, Kiev 1941: Hitler’s Battle for Supremacy in the East (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
3. Gunter K. Koschorrek, Blood Red Snow: The Memoirs of a German Soldier on the Eastern Front (Greenhill Books, 2002).
4. Misoslav Herold (trans. Matthias Noll), Gefreiter Walter Thomaschek (http://members.shaw.ca/grossdeutschland/thomas.htm), accessed 24 August 2013.
5. Stahel, Kiev 1941, p. 94.
6. Ibid.
7. Kurt Meyer, Grenadiers (J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Canada, 1994), p. 54.
8. Ibid.
9. Günter Schmitz, Die 16 Panzer Division Bewaffnung–Einsatz–Manner 1938–1945 (Nebel Verlag GmbH, 2004).