TWELVE
THE BITTERLY COLD WINTER CONTINUED INTO EARLY 1942. There was cheering news, however: on 16 January General Hube was awarded the Oak Leaves to his Knight’s Cross for the superlative performance of 16th Panzer Division during the previous year and the capture of Nikolayev. The award reflected on the entire division and was well received by the men. Hube had been at the forefront of every battle, his bulky figure with his worn greatcoat and black-gloved artificial hand a familiar and welcome sight to his battle-weary, soldiers on the front line. His earthy soldier’s humour and words of encouragement were greatly appreciated, almost as much as the comforts like cigarettes and chocolates that he distributed during his visits. He shared a fondness for these treats and liked his food, making sure that he ate regularly irrespective of the tactical situation. Not a good nighttime sleeper, Hube would often take brief naps at quiet times during the day which even the odd air raid could not disturb.
Graf von Strachwitz, just recently returned from convalescent leave in Germany, also received good news. His promotion to lieutenant colonel of the reserve had come through, so he could add a pip to the silver braid of his major’s epaulettes. This now made him the second-ranking officer of the panzer regiment after Rudolf Sieckenius, and eligible for a regimental command when a suitable one became available.
Equally welcome was the new equipment the division received, with Rudolf Sieckenius returning with brand new tanks, including a few examples of the new Mark IV variant with long-barrelled 75mm gun. Eventually the short-barrelled Panzer IV would be replaced. It was intended as an infantrysupport tank, as generally a short barrel meant the high-explosive rounds were more effective than with a longer barrel.1 The reverse was true for antitank rounds. Unfortunately there were only 133 of these long-barrelled tanks available to be divided among the 10 panzer and five motorised divisions taking part in the planned southern offensive.2 But the regiment now had some tanks that were a match for the dreaded T-34s, at least in gunnery if not in thickness of armour and width of the tracks.
Adolf Hitler in the meantime was busy planning his summer offensive, a series of blows aiming one part of Army Group South toward the Volga at Stalingrad while another thrust into the Caucasus to seize the oilfields. The Caucasus operation was only revealed by Hitler to his generals at a later date; the original plan was to just block this area off. Further, just reaching the Volga and blocking that vital river traffic to Moscow was considered of far more importance than taking Stalingrad itself. Hitler only became obsessed with its capture later. Hitler’s optimism was shared by his High Command, leading him to believe that achieving both objectives was possible despite the diminishment of his own resources. Hitler had become convinced that the Red Army was about finished, as no army or regime to date had survived the magnitude of losses it had sustained. These amounted to around 5,000,000 killed or wounded with 3,000,000 taken prisoner. In addition, some 21,000 tanks, 32,000 guns and 5,000 aircraft had been destroyed. What Hitler didn’t know was that the Soviets still fielded close to 5,000,000 men in front-line units, together with 3,412 tanks, with more of both coming on line. Not only was the Red Army far from beaten, but it was still growing in strength. For instance up to April 1944 the USA sent Russia 3,734 tanks, mostly Shermans, and the British 4,292, with total tanks supplied at war’s end being 13,000, all in addition to the vast number of tanks produced in Russia.3
While Hitler had some valid grounds for believing the Red Army was beaten, it is more difficult to understand his overlooking the diminution in his own strength. The war in the east had cost the Germans 743,112 dead or wounded since the invasion, plus countless thousands suffering illnesses ranging from dysentery to typhus and frostbite. This represented about a quarter of the original force involved in Operation Barbarossa, a force which had struggled with manpower problems throughout the campaign, and was more than 70% more than all casualties sustained in the previous campaigns in Poland and the West. The 136 divisions on the Eastern Front were bled white and now only equated to the manpower of 83 full-strength divisions, not even considering the massive reduction in operational vehicles and equipment, the chronic shortage of fuel, and the increasingly vast distances that the worn-out vehicles were traversing.4 The Germans did have superiority in tactical skill, but the Russians were learning fast. It would not be long before the Russians were turning the German tactics back onto them. Hitler however wasn’t completely blind to his lack of strength and attempted to fix this for the coming offensive by the simple expedient of stripping men, tanks and equipment from Army Groups North and Centre. He ordered the removal of one tank battalion from most of the panzer divisions in these army groups, leaving them with only one tank battalion. This made them weaker than a motorized division (soon to be called Panzergrenadier), which had only one tank or assault gun battalion but had an extra infantry regiment. These panzer divisions, given current losses, were now only equivalent to a reinforced armoured brigade, reducing the offensive capacity of both army groups. By this method 16th Panzer was reinforced with an additional tank battalion on 28 May, giving it a total of around 140 operational tanks, although these included some almost useless Panzer IIs.
Thus Operation Blue came into being, which Hitler fervently hoped would finally end the war in the east. The 16th Panzer was attached to Sixth Army, which would make the central thrust. The army’s commander was 52-year-old General Frederick Paulus, a tall, immaculately groomed man who changed his uniform twice a day. He was an efficient, indeed meticulous staff officer. Unfortunately he had no operational or combat command experience and absolutely none with commanding tank forces of any size. He was good with statistics, figures and logistics, a useful man to have around a quartermaster’s headquarters or assisting an operational combat commander at a map table. He was, however, a firm believer in his Führer and a protégé of his predecessor, Field Marshal Reicheneau, which was enough to secure him the coveted Sixth Army command ahead of more experienced and senior corps commanders, who justifiably resented his elevation. His personality, lack of experience and adherence to Hitler would all contribute to the coming catastrophe.
Meanwhile, Stalin was planning an offensive of his own. Believing the Germans to be severely weakened after their winter withdrawals, and that any renewed drive to the east would occur in the Moscow sector, he resolved to retake Kharkov with a surprise thrust at their southern flank. He failed to realize that the south was precisely where the Germans were in the midst of their own buildup. On May 12, 1942, some 46 Soviet infantry divisions and 19 motorised brigades launched the two-pronged attack.5 The Soviet northern attack was contained, but their southern thrust achieved a significant breakthrough, advancing over 90 kilometres westward between 12 and 15 May. The Germans kept their heads however, and launched a counterattack against the Russian flanks which stopped them dead in their tracks. A worried Nikita Khrushchev, the army commissar, was told of the gravity of the situation by his army commanders, who urged him to request Stalin for permission to withdraw. Khrushchev flew to Moscow to urge Stalin to order the withdrawal but Stalin was having none of it, angrily telling Khrushchev “Don’t put your nose into military matters you know nothing about.” Khrushchev, glad to escape the poisonous atmosphere of Stalin’s headquarters, flew back to the front. He was grateful to get away with his life, as men had been shot for less, so he was more than happy to take his chances with the Germans.6 Now Khrushchev and his military commanders had to watch helplessly as the Germans commenced their counterattack. Codenamed Operation Fredericus, it thrust against the Soviets’ exposed flanks, breaking through to surround 28,000 men. Sieckenius’ battle group was heavily involved in the clashes, fighting alongside the 14th Panzer Division.
Battle Group Hube had assembled at Slavyansk while Sieckenius and von Strachwitz were heavily engaged at Barvenkovo. At Barvenkovo, a small armoured force led by von Strachwitz became isolated from the main body in the confused melée that had developed. Surrounded by superior forces in enemy territory, von Strachwitz formed a hedgehog position at dusk to wait out the night. Just before dawn he went on a short reconnaissance outside his perimeter. Taking one of his company commanders, Captain Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, and two artillery observers with him, he climbed a nearby hill. While searching for the enemy through their field glasses the Graf heard the whoosh of incoming shellfire. Yelling out a warning, he dived for cover, dragging von Freytag-Loringhoven down with him. The shells landed nearby, killing the two artillery observers.7 Von Strachwitz’ acute awareness and perhaps a little luck had saved both his life and that of the company commander.
The German victory involved hard fighting by von Strachwitz’s battalion against the Soviet Sixth Army around the Izyum–Barvenkovo salient. In one instance he destroyed a Russian tank force by flanking it and attacking from the rear, leaving 24 destroyed tanks, nearly all light battle tanks. Again, and again, he assaulted Russian artillery positions, scattering the crews and destroying their guns. Truck parks and supply dumps went up in flames as his tanks cut a swathe through the enemy rear lines in true cavalry style. The rather confused nature of the fighting made his task a lot easier; however, continued rapid movement and combat took a gradual toll of his tanks and his force was slowly whittled away by enemy action and mechanical problems. Fortunately it was around this time that the third tank battalion arrived, though it was really a much-needed reinforcement for the under-strength existing battalions rather than the extra-strength battalion it was intended to be. Characteristically von Strachwitz continued his actions, even with only a few operational tanks, employing surprise, superior tactics and gunnery to give him the edge. He added considerably to his own tally of destroyed enemy tanks, although unlike most panzer commanders he did not record his kills or have his gun barrel marked with kill rings. Despite this he was by now a leading tank ace of the Wehrmacht.
In all, 1,250 Russian tanks were destroyed with 239,000 Red Army men dejectedly limping off into captivity where most would die from neglect, disease and starvation.8 The Germans claimed then, as ever, that they had insufficient supplies to feed them. This was partially true; however, they made little or no effort to do so. In contrast, Russians captured by the Italian Eighth Army were fed exactly the same rations as the Italian soldiers, and the Italian supply situation was far worse than that of the Germans.9 General Paulus was awarded the Knight’s Cross for the achievements of his Sixth Army at Kharkov by a grateful Führer.
On 10 June, 16th Panzer, acting as the spearhead once again, captured an intact bridge at Mostovaya, an action that earned them a heartfelt commendation from their corps commander. Hube’s division, followed by the 22nd and 14th Panzer Divisions, penetrated deep into the Russian lines along the Burluk River. In so doing it crossed extensive Russian minefields, which took their toll of the Graf’s panzers. As these involved track damage they were all easily repaired and the disabled tanks were soon back in action.
It was here in the Oskol River area that von Strachwitz’s tankers came across Russian mine dogs. It all seemed innocent enough at first. A large German Shepherd came running towards their advancing tanks. The men were curious where this dog had come from, out in the middle of the steppe where there was not a house in sight. As it drew nearer they noticed a package strapped to its back, which was odd but they thought nothing of it. The dog ran up to the lead tank then dived beneath it. Immediately a blast stopped the tank dead in its tracks with smoke billowing out from beneath it. No sooner had the men gotten over the shock when two more dogs appeared. Suddenly they realised what the dogs were carrying. From their turret hatches the tank commanders blazed away at the dogs with their sub-machine guns, killing both dogs in short order. Knowing their handlers had to be nearby, the Graf sent a platoon of Panzer IIIs to sort them out, which they did, with a high-explosive rounds and machine-gun fire. He and his men then examined the dogs. Both had a mine strapped to their backs with a long detonation wire protruding vertically from the explosives. When the wire connected with the underside of the tank the mine was detonated. The Russians had always fed the dogs beneath tanks, training them to go there to find food. Von Strachwitz and his men, animal lovers all, were horrified at this misuse of man’s best friend.
On 24 June, engineers bridged a deep anti-tank ditch so the division could cross. It then swiftly moved on to take the vital railway junction at Kupjansk. The defenders were routed by a swiftly moving attack by von Strachwitz’s tanks supported by the infantry in armoured personnel carriers. This helped close the ring around Kharkov, sealing the fate of the Red Army troops who were trapped there.10
Concentric attacks destroyed the best part of six Soviet armies numbering some 500,000 men, but many Russians escaped through the numerous gaps in the German blocking lines. Nevertheless heavy fighting took place as the Russians desperately fought to break through or were caught later infiltrating between the German positions.
The division returned to Mareyevka and Stalino for a much-needed refit and replenishment. It also had to prepare for the principal summer offensive, Operation Blue. The refit took place from 27 June to 7 July, and it was around this time that the rifle regiments were designated as grenadier and subsequently panzergrenadier regiments, recollecting the famous grenadiers of Frederick the Great.
At his headquarters Hitler, now in direct personal command of the Eastern Front, vacillated whether to capture Stalingrad and cut the Volga supply artery, or maintain focus on seizing the oilfields of the Caucasus which he desperately needed to fuel his armies. In the end, still governed by unrealistic optimism, he decided to do both. He ordered Operation Blue to commence on 28 June with an attack force of 68 divisions, consisting of close to 1,500,000 men, and 1,495 armoured fighting vehicles including tanks, assault guns and self-propelled tank destroyers. The assault was supported by Luftwaffe General Wolfram von Richthofen’s Fourth Air Fleet with 1,550 front-line aircraft.11 Richthofen, a distant cousin of the the Red Baron of Great War fame, had served with the Condor Legion in the Spanish Civil War, and was an early exponent of ground-support squadrons especially with the Stuka dive-bomber.
On 9 July Hitler split his offensive armies in two. Army Group A under Field Marshal von List and Army Group B under Field Marshal von Bock. Army Group A would drive into the Caucasus while Army Group B would capture the Don Basin and Stalingrad. General Paulus’ Sixth Army, which included 16th Panzer Division, was in von Bock’s Army Group B.
Lieutenant Colonel von Strachwitz’s tanks crossed the Donets River along with the division on 12 July, on a captured Russian bridge near Lissitschansk, which was cleverly constructed to lie just below the water so as to evade detection, especially from the air.
Stalin was thoroughly alarmed at the Germans’ progress. On 28 July he issued order number 227, commanding “Not one step back.” To ensure that it was carried out, the NKVD and army blocking units were out in force. In all they arrested 25,000 Red Army soldiers, summarily shot 10,000, and machine-gunned countless thousands of fleeing troops, the equivalent of several rifle divisions. Others were sent to the dreaded penal battalions. Stalin threw everything he had in the area to halt the Germans. This is contrary to what communist propaganda later asserted, that the Russian retreat was merely a clever trap to suck the Germans into being encircled at Stalingrad. Soviet officer cadets, future NCOs and officers were sent in as whole units and—being without heavy weaponry—were simply slaughtered by the German panzers. A Russian armour training school hastily thrown into battle with British-supplied Matilda tanks were just target practice for von Strachwitz’s veterans, who turned their tanks into blazing funeral pyres. The Russians often sarcastically referred to the British and American tanks as coffins for five comrades. Not all the Soviet armour was British-made, however, as Stalin deployed his 5th Tank Army, equipped with T-34s, northwest of Voronezh and, along with other units, it delayed Paulus’ Sixth Army’s progress in numerous hard-fought confrontations which cost the Germans 10,000 casualties they could ill afford to lose.
Dust and heat debilitated both the tanks and men of the Panzer Graf’s battalion, so they often travelled at night, as long as the Russians were in full retreat and not likely to ambush them. Frequently the reverse was true, as they came across scattered Russian units bivouaced for the night.
The Soviets continued their withdrawal. On occasion the withdrawal became a panic-stricken rout, but some units defended their ground to the death. The behaviour of the Russian soldiers depended on where the blocking units were stationed and the strength and influence of individual officers and commissars. The Russians were accustomed to “hold fast” orders and were not trained or organised for orderly withdrawals. This made their situtation more perilous, with officers often deserting their troops, and equipment being abandoned for a lack of orders or system. To von Strachwitz and his men it seemed that the Soviets were on the point of collapse. It was a heady time. On the open steppes the German tanks roamed at will, blasting the fleeing Russian columns, decimating entire regiments, smashing tanks, guns and supply vehicles in an orgy of destruction for which the Soviets seemed to have no answer. “Panzers Vor! Keep moving!” were the panzer troops’ watchwords.
Stalin, however, was determined to halt the retreat before the city which bore his name, declaring “The city will be defended by the Second Army to the last man.” At Kalach on the Don River the Russians managed to regroup. Their rearguards waited for the German tanks, determined to sell their lives dearly, but the steppe was empty and von Strachwitz’s panzers were nowhere to be seen. The 16th Panzer Division wasn’t coming because by 28 July it had run out of fuel. This was a result of poor roads, insufficient railway lines, clogged railheads, long supply lines under attack from Russian aircraft and artillery, and insufficient trucks. In addition, many of the trucks in the theatre were non-operational, or were operational but had no tyres due to a massive shortage of spares. The Russians also had their problems, but their situation was constantly improving as they fell back toward their own supply lines and its steadily increasing production, along with the arrival of Anglo-American aid. Foreign transport vehicles alone eventually totalled over 400,000 which meant that not only were the major Soviet transport needs being met, but they could concentrate on tank production, allowing them to eventually swamp the Germans with waves of T-34s. For the Germans the situation would just continue to deteriorate.
All this of course was of little moment for von Strachwitz. His only concern at that time was for fuel. Without it his panzers were going nowhere, reduced to stationery gun emplacements. He pleaded with his regimental commander Rudolf Sieckenius, who in turn pleaded with division headquarters, all to no avail. There was no fuel to be had. All the Panzer Graf could do was carry out routine maintenance of tracks and worn-out engines, clean gun barrels, fill machine-gun belts and conduct static training. All very necessary, but no substitute for combat operations. Days not in operation gave the Russians time to escape, regroup and prepare their defences. This they did, building up their bridgehead at Kalach. Eventually the fuel arrived and 16th Panzer and XIV Panzer Corps could finally continue their advance. The 16th Panzer was part of a pincer movement to trap the remnants of Russian General K.S. Moskalenko’s 1st Tank Army in the Kalach bridgehead. The 24th Panzer Division spearheaded the southern arm of the pincer while Graf von Strachwitz’s battalion was the very tip of the northern arm.
Approaching the Liska River he noticed an intact bridge at Ostrov. He realized that with a quick assault he could seize the bridge and rushed his battalion forward. His tanks surged into the Soviet positions. Russian infantry, along with their supporting anti-tank guns, were overrun before they could offer much resistance. High-explosive rounds smashed the anti-tank guns while machine-gun fire scattered the infantry. An intense and often confused firefight developed as his tanks smashed anti-tank guns and infantry positions. Without bothering to consolidate or wipe out all the Russian outposts on his flanks von Strachwitz pushed forward to take the bridge. Behind him an armoured panzer grenadier battalion mopped up the remaining Russians. General von Wietersheim, commander of the XIV Panzer Corps to which 16th Panzer belonged, sent von Strachwitz a message of congratulatons.
Von Strachwitz then turned south, overrunning the nearby Soviet defences before pushing on with his advance. The open steppe became a borderless battleground where armoured groups operated independently, like battleships at sea. It was the type of combat in which the Panzer Graf excelled. It was a war of manoeuvre and ambush with each side trying to outflank or surround the other. Here superior German communications, training and tactics all played their part. Frequently von Strachwitz surprised Russian tank concentrations at dawn as they were preparing to move, with the crews often not even reaching their tanks before it was all over. The pall of smoke of the burning Russian tanks and vehicles would attract other Soviet units who were then caught in an ambush. It was a chain of destruction which Russians couldn’t seem to break. On seizing a village occupied by Russian supply troops, the Graf would scatter the Russians and destroy their vehicles, then move off quickly to take up ambush positions for any relief force. He employed his standard tactic of taking out the Russian command tank first with the remaining leaderless tanks being brewed up with coordinated fire and flank attacks.
Undaunted, with no time to waste, in order to concentrate his force he set off on his attacking mission. Following his usual tactic he drove deep behind enemy lines, which wasn’t difficult at this time as the whole rear area was in flux. As was his custom, he paused frequently to survey the ground ahead with his binoculars, which proved fortuitous on one occasion when he spotted a long column of Russian tanks on the horizon. A close look at the topography alerted him to an excellent ambush position behind a fold in the ground from where he could engage the Russians in an almost hull down position. Without hesitation he ordered his tanks forward to take up their new positions.
The Russian column approached along his front, exposing their flanks as if on a shooting range. The range was close, so any hits would be certain to disable, if not destroy the Russian tanks. However to his increasing dismay, the column seemed endless, and what had seemed a unit of battalion strength was rapidly appearing to be a regiment or brigade. Taking a quick count he arrived at over 100 enemy tanks. The odds seemed suicidal but with surprise, an excellent firing position, and superior gunnery he was quietly confident he could reduce the odds before the Soviets realised what was happening. He didn’t hesitate, coolly giving his tanks their instructions. What the commanders of his three under-strength tank companies must have thought can well be imagined.
Calmly, with precision, the German tanks began firing in ragged salvoes. Four, eight, 12, 16 Russian tanks were ignited in quick succession. The Russians were completely non-plussed. They couldn’t see where the fire was coming from, and certainly were not expecting a German armoured force anywhere in their area. Their best guess was that they were being subjected to a German aerial attack which meant basically riding out the storm in a zig-zag pattern with hatches closed. Not all the tanks took this approach, with some staying motionless, trying not to attract attention by any movement. These made easy targets and were quickly brewed up one by one.
The smoke from the blazing tanks obscured the battlefield making observation difficult. Most of the Russians hadn’t spotted the German tanks, but some did discern where the deadly fire was coming from and turned to confront it. These von Strachwitz and his panzers despatched before they could do any damage. Not having radios, these Russians could not enlighten their comrades as to where the danger lay, so they remained easy targets.
The German gunfire never slackened as smoke, fire, explosions, scrambling crewmen, weaving tanks, all added to the confusion in the Russian column. Several tanks crashed into each other while some crews simply abandoned their tanks, preferring to hide in the open. Many crewmen were crushed by tanks which could not see them in the smoke and confusion. The Panzer Graf’s gunner and loader worked feverishly, responding to his firing instructions, or firing on sight, loading shell after shell. The tanks reeked of gunpowder and sweat. As all the Russian tanks in his immediate vicinity were burning or destroyed the Graf ordered his tank out of concealment. He moved to the rear of the column and began taking out one Russian tank after another. In all of the chaos he was easily mistaken for a Russian and so had no trouble attacking tanks at very close range with deadly effect. A number of Russians were firing, but aimlessly, more from panic than at any identifiable threat. After half an hour of murderous mayhem the surviving Russians fled, leaving close to 50 burning or disabled tanks littering the battlefield. Not content with this victory von Strachwitz pressed on, pursuing the fleeing Russians relentlessly. Over the next three days his battalion brought their total of Russian tanks destroyed to 105, with his 1st Company alone destroying 39. Overall it was a superlative result which few panzer commanders would even come close to equalling, and formed the basis for his recommendation of the Oak Leaves to his Knight’s Cross.
Fuel remained a perennial problem, which he only solved by capturing enemy supplies. The Russian tanks used diesel fuel, which von Strachwitz destroyed when found. The gasoline the Russians required for their trucks provided the lifeline for von Strachwitz’s tanks. Soviet supply dumps were usually found in the various isolated villages or farms and the numerous balkas (ravines) in the steppe. Some balkas were large enough to hide trucks and other vehicles. The German Feisler Storch, a slow-moving light plane used for reconnaissance and liaison, proved extremely useful at spotting these supply dumps and Russian armoured forces, then landing or dropping messages for von Strachwitz. Not having an equivalent, the Russians were at a serious disadvantage, and their air force was not yet dominating the sky, allowing Luftwaffe aircraft and German Army Storchs to operate freely. The Red Air Force still challenged the Germans, and battles raged overhead, but the experienced Luftwaffe pilots asserted their dominance with better tactical skill, flying ability and aggression. Many amassed large scores, so that eventually a tally of 100 Red aircraft destroyed became necessary to win a Knight’s Cross. Some pilots, like Erich Hartmann, the world’s leading fighter ace, and Gerhard Barkhorn, shot down 300 or more Soviet aircraft, with 13 aces downing over 200. It became not unusual to achieve a score of 100. Still, Russian aircraft carried out strafing attacks on the Panzer Graf’s tanks, and remained a force to be reckoned with.
Dust clouds signified the movement of vehicles, which could only be identified as distances closed. Superior German optics helped with early identification, giving them an advantage. Here again the Fieseler Storchs, also attracted by the dust, provided vital early warning. Quite often von Strachwitz pretended to be a Soviet column waving to the Russians or showing a captured signal flag. He then closed in from the rear to attack. The first the Russians knew of hostile presence was their tanks exploding and burning around them, with their force often being decimated before they could properly react.
During the fighting Hyazinth was lightly wounded, but he was treated by Dr. Ernst Paal and remained with his troops. Being out of action for a period of days, he was back by the time Soviet General Lopatin launched a counterattack, desperate to forestall the German advance. They were no match for the Panzer Graf’s panzers and were repulsed with heavy casualties. Leaving the panzer grenadiers to mop up, von Strachwitz drove his men on to link up with 24th Panzer Division on 11 August and so close the trap on the Russians at Kalach. The now all-too-familiar containment battle ensued. Once again the shortage of German infantry had to be compensated for by the panzers in a role to which they were not suited. With little or no infantry support, von Strachwitz roamed the perimeter of the cauldron, blasting and machine-gunning the frantic Soviets. The battles raged across the steppe once again.
When it was over the Germans had captured 1,000 vehicles of all types and took some 57,000 Russian prisoners, of whom 8,300 were taken by 16th Panzer alone. The division had destroyed 298 Russian guns and 257 tanks, the largest number of which were destroyed by Graf von Strachwitz’s battalion. This tank tally brought the total number of Russian tanks destroyed by the division over the previous nine months to 1,000, of which 750 were destroyed by the panzer regiment and 250 by the anti-tank battalion and infantry. This was a kill ratio of four Russian tanks to one of the division’s—a much higher ratio than that achieved by the German panzer arm throughout the war on the Eastern Front, which was 3.26:1. This Eastern Front total included the Tiger tank kill ratio—which was 5.412:1—making 16th Panzer’s score even more impressive. This kill rate should end any argument against the Tiger tank being the most effective of the war, especially as most of their kills were T-34s. The Russians of course could afford these losses and more, which at the strategic level made the kill ratios meaningless.12
With the battle of Kalach successfully concluded, there followed two weeks of mopping-up operations. Russian units, including mechanized forces, were still wandering around seeking to escape and link up with friendly forces. Often Russian and German units would accidentally bump into each other causing a brief firefight before the Russians withdrew or surrendered. Each skirmish, however, took its toll on the Germans, slowly ebbing their strength. Replacements were urgently needed but when they did come they were never enough to replace losses.
Bridges needed to be taken and bridgeheads established across the Don. On 16 August Lieutenant Kleinjohann of the 3rd Company Engineer Battalion captured a major bridge across the Don in a surprise coup. The bridge was already burning when Kleinjohann and his men arrived, and they had to put out the flames while under fire from Russian sentries.13
NOTES
1. Dennis Showalter, Hitler’s Panzers (Berkley Publishing, USA, 2009).
2. Matthew Cooper and James Lucas, Panzer: The Armoured Force of the Third Reich (McDonalds Illustrated War Study, 1976).
3. Werner Haupt, A History of the Panzer Troops 1916–1945 (Schiffer Publishing, USA, 1990).
4. V. E. Tarrant, Stalingrad (Leo Cooper, London, 1992).
5. Tim Ripley, Wehrmacht (Brown Reference Group, 2003).
6. Interview with Nikita Khrushchev’s son Sergi (Military History Channel).
7. Antony Beevor, Stalingrad (Penguin Books 1999), pp.66–67.
8. Tim Ripley, Wehrmacht (Brown Reference Group 1992).
9. Hope Hamilton, Sacrifice on the Steppe (Casemate PS, 2011).
10. Günter Schmitz, Die 16 Panzer Division (Dörfler im Nebel Verlag Gmbh Eggolsheim).
11. Paul Carrell, Hitler’s War on Russia Vol 1 Hitler Moves East (Ballantine Books, 1963).
12. Christopher W. Wilbeck, Sledgehammers: Strengths & Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II (The Aberjona Press, Bedford PA, 2004).
13. Carrell, Hitler’s War on Russia, Vol. 1: Hitler Moves East.
An athletics demonstration at Lichterfelde Cadet School, 1912. Athletic ability as well as equestrian and sports prowess was highly prized at the academy.
Pre-WWI German cavalry. The two on the left are from von Strachwitz’s regiment, the Garde du Corps. Note the eagle on their helmets, only worn by the elite unit.
Parade of the Kaiser’s Garde de Corps regiment at his Potsdam palace in 1914. As this involved the entire regiment, Lt. Graf von Strachwitz would have been present.
Pre-WWII German cavalry on parade. Graf von Strachwitz served with these units prior to joining the Panzer arm.
Annaberg Hill and monastery. Hyazinth von Strachwitz fought to take this hill near his home from Polish opposition in May 1921.
Men of the Oberland Freikorps who fought alongside von Strachwitz’s Silesians at the Battle of Annaberg.
Hyazinth von Strachwitz in black Panzer uniform, wearing his Knights Cross with Oak Leaves. This photo appeared in the German press.
A pensive General Hans Guderian. He was the Panzer Graf ’s corps commander during the Battle of France.
Otto Carius, after his promotion to lieutenant in 1942.
Following are the four Field Marshals under whom von Strachwitz served in the East.
Günther von Kluge
Erich von Manstein
Friedrich Paulus
Gerd von Rundstedt
SS General Sepp Dietrich. Von Strachwitz fought alongside Dietrich at Annaberg, and later with Dietrich’s SS Liebstandarte in Russia.
Otto Remer. A committed Nazi, he was instrumental in putting down the attempted coup in July 1944. Nevertheless, he was a brave and capable battalion-level Grenadier commander who fought alongside von Strachwitz at Kharkov and Kursk.
General Walter Hornlein (center) with his officers. Note that he has his epaulettes covered, a precaution against snipers who targeted officers. The man on the right is wearing the black panzer uniform.
1st Panzer Division commander Friedrich Kirchner during the Battle of France, June 1940.
Colonel Graf von Strachwitz decorating his 1st Battalion commander, Major Pössl, with the Knights Cross, April 20, 1943.
Colonel Graf von Strachwitz (right) with Major Pössl reviewing the men of Grossdeutsch land’s Panzer Regiment after Pössl’s award of the Knights Cross.
A soldier from a Panzer division shows the strain of battle. A veteran, he is wearing the wound badge and Panzer assault badge in silver.
General Hans Hube bidding farewell to Colonel Rudolf Sieckenius, his Panzer Regiment commander. Hube had been promoted to command the XIV Panzer Corps.
General Hube in his APC outside Stalingrad. Below him is Luftwaffe general Wolfram von Richthofen. The Airfleet commander provided 16th Panzer Division with close support during the campaign.
Hans Ulrich Rudel and his gunner, Oberfeldwebel Hentschel, being feted after returning from their respective 1,300 and 1,000th missions south of Kharkov, 1943.
The Panzer Graf ’s eldest son, also named Hyazinth, in the turret of his shortbarreled Panzer IV. Note 11th Panzer’s divisional symbol next to the Balkan Cross. The photo was taken as part of an article in the German wartime magazine Signal.
Exercises with a Panzer IV carrying supplies. Graf von Strachwitz and other commanders were often forced to use their Panzers to carry ammunition, fuel and other supplies during the muddy periods when roads were not passable by wheeled vehicles.
Tigers being transported by rail. They required special narrow tracks to fit onto flat railcars.
German troops manning an MG34 in Stalingrad.
Grenadiers in their APC’s advancing. A very useful weapon, there were never enough to equip all Panzergrenadier battalions.
Von Strachwitz, the ‘Panzer Graf,” as he appeared in spring 1943 while commanding Grossdeutschland’s Panzer Regiment. The following summer he would take part in history’s largest tank battle, at Kursk.
The Mark II “King” Tiger. It was cumbersome and heavy, but was still a deadly weapon and extremely difficult to destroy.
Panzer IV with a short barrel in the ruins of Stalingrad. The city’s rubble made tank movement difficult.
A brewed up T-34. Unusually, it has been destroyed from a hit to the front where its armor is thickest, possibly by an 88mm gun.
Otto Carius in his earlymodel Tiger with the raised cupola.
The Panther tank. This is a later model than the ones commanded by von Strachwitz at Kursk where the Panther made its debut. Despite its faulty start, it turned out to be arguably the best tank of the war.
Grenadiers in their trench awaiting the next attack. Note the stick grenade held by the foremost soldier, which indicates he expects closequarters work.
Stug III assault guns in convoy. Grossdeutschland’s assault guns greatly assisted the Panzer Graf ’s regiment at Kharkov and Kursk.
Long-barreled Panzer IV’s with mounted Grenadiers. Despite the late production of Tigers and Panthers, the Mark IV remained the mainstay of the German Panzer force.
SS Troops with a Mark IV during the 1943 assault on Kharkov. Note the anti-tank mine held by the nearest soldier.
Tiger tanks moving up. The Tiger was the most feared tank of the war. Von Strachwitz commanded these at Kharkov, Kursk, and in the Baltics.