FIFTEEN
THE YEAR HAD BEGUN WELL FOR HYAZINTH GRAF VON Strachwitz. He had recovered sufficiently from his wound and had been given a generous amount of convalescent leave which allowed him to spend time with his wife and family, although not his sons who were both serving officers. He also used the time to catch up with some old friends who had staff positions in Germany or were on leave from the front. Perhaps just as importantly, he had been promoted to full colonel—a regimental officer’s rank—and could add another pip to his silver braided epaulettes.
Around this time, he was also promoted to SS Standartenführer (the equivalent of colonel in the SS). The SS administration had been keeping track of his progress and had been promoting him in parallel to his rise in the regular army. Himmler was particularly pleased that he had an army colonel and Oak Leaves-wearer in his Allgemeine SS and had kept a benevolent eye on his activities. An aristocratic war hero added to the organization’s prestige. One can only speculate as to whether Himmler made overtures to von Strachwitz to officially transfer to the Waffen SS. It was not unusual for army officers to make the move on the promise of greater advancement or to be offered inducements. For example, Himmler offered a transfer to tank ace Otto Carius when presenting him with his Oak Leaves, and Freiheer Adrian von Foelkersham, the Baltic Baron, who served with the Brandenburg Commando Special Operations regiment, transferred to Otto Skorzeny’s SS commando unit after Brandenburg took on a conventional fighting role. Field Marshal von Manstein’s aide Alexander Stahlberg remarked in his memoirs on the number of army officers seeking transfer to the Waffen SS. So it is distinctly possible that Himmler made some type of similar offer to von Strachwitz, as the Panzer Graf would have been a decided asset to one of his elite SS Panzergrenadier divisions, which were now making a name for themselves.
The Graf had also been given a new assignment commensurate with his new rank and battle experience: that of regimental commander of the new panzer regiment being formed with the elite Grossdeutschland Division, which had just been upgraded from regimental to divisional status. As reluctant as he may have been to leave 16th Panzer Division, the stump of which was being reformed, the new posting offered him greater opportunities and command responsibility. It was also more challenging to establish and wield together a new regiment, upon which he could leave his own indelible mark.
The Grossdeutschland (Greater Germany) Division had its genesis as a headquarters guard troop set up in Berlin in 1921 for ceremonial guard and parade purposes. In 1934 its name was changed to Berlin Guard Troop and it gradually increased its strength to seven rifle companies and a headquarters company. Its troops served for six months on detachment from seven infantry divisions. In 1937 its name was changed again, to The Berlin Guard Regiment.1 A special detachment called the Führer Begleit (Führer’s Escort) was set up to provide security for Hitler during his travels.2 This unit gradually evolved into a brigade and finally as a panzergrenadier division fighting on the Eastern Front. While still a brigade its battalions rotated between frontline and escort duty so its troops were not merely security and ceremonial soldiers. It was considered a sister regiment of Grossdeutschland.
In April 1939 Hitler ordered the regiment’s reorganisation and gave it the new name of Infantry Regiment Grossdeutschland. It no longer relied on the rotation of selected infantry division troops but recruited directly, calling for volunteers throughout the Reich without recourse to the military district (Wehrkreis) recruiting system which mobilised recruits from set regions in Germany and Austria. As evidence of its elite status its troops wore a GD monogram on their epaulettes, and its regimental insignia was the outline of the German steel helmet. However its guard and ceremonial duties remained the same.
It did not take part in the invasion of Poland but first saw action in the Battle of France where it served as part of Guderian’s corps where von Strachwitz was also serving as a member of the 1st Panzer Division. During the campaign 1st Lieutenant Helmut Beck-Brovchsitter’s anti-tank company destroyed 83 tanks belonging to the French 3rd Mechanised Division, a feat for which he was awarded the Knight’s Cross. Sergeant Hans Hindelane from the same company also earned the Knight’s Cross for his platoon’s destruction of 57 French tanks. The regiment went to war with three infantry battalions and a fourth battalion which included anti-tank guns and heavy infantry gun companies. This made it the strongest infantry regiment in the German Army.3 It fought in Luxembourg, Belgium and France where it acquitted itself well.
In August 1940 it was granted a green and white, later black and white-edged cuff title, showing the division’s name, worn 14cm from the right cuff. This was in the nature of an honorific as few cuff titles were awarded to army units, although it was a standard practice in the SS who wore their cuff titles on the left sleeve. The army intended to make Grossdeutschland into a premier division with better equipment and manning tables than the standard division, which it ultimately acheived. As such the Grossdeutschland was always well resourced and adequately reinforced, which was not the case with most other divisions. Because of this, much was always expected of it, and it was sent to all the hot spots, being used as a fire brigade to restore dire situations. This was reflected in the enormous casualties it suffered during the war and the number of decorations—particularly Knight’s Crosses—awarded to its members. That said, many standard panzer divisions, with fewer resources and lower equipment tables, equalled or surpassed Grossdeutschland’s clutch of high combat decorations. The division’s order of battle eventually made it comparable to a reinforced panzer division.
Its next campaign was the invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941, where it received support from Graf von Strachwitz’s panzer battalion on detachment from the 16th Panzer Division. Some of its troops took part in the occupation of Belgrade and were responsible for activating Belgrade Radio Station, which made famous the great wartime song “Lili Marlene.”4
The invasion of Russia saw the regiment crossing the river Bug a week after hostilities had commenced. Its first major battle was at the Dnieper Line in July where it suffered heavy casualties. On 10 August Colonel Walther Hörnlein took over command of the regiment from Colonel von Stockhausen. It then went on to fight at the Yelnya River and the encirclement battles of Kiev where Graf von Strachwitz and 16th Panzer also fought. The regiment was then moved to Army Group Centre, fighting particularly intense battles in the forests around Karachev in October where again it suffered heavy casualties. It fought its winter battles around Tula alongside the Berlin-Brandenburg 3rd Panzer Division. Its infantry battalions were by then down to below half strength. From a starting strength of 4,000 in 1941 to January 1942 it had lost 4,070 men.5 In early December the 17th Company Motorcycle Reconnaissance Unit was infiltrated by Russian troops while they were sleeping. Almost the entire company was wiped out. As a punishment, Hörnlein ordered that the company would not be entitled to wear the prestigious cuff title until it had made amends. This it did a short time later when it mounted an attack which threw a superior Russian force back across the Oka river.6
The regiment then underwent a major reorganisation, and on 1 April 1942 was officially converted to a motorised division which became its official designation. This involved adding a tank battalion commanded by Captain Pössl with two companies to its establishment. Also added was another infantry regiment commanded by Colonel Garski. Like the original grenadier regiment commanded by Colonel Kohler, it had three battalions.
Unusually for the German Army, the new regiment was named “Fusilier” unlike the 1st regiment and other regiments of armoured units which were called grenadier. The term fusilier, although not common, was used by a few divisions as an honorific or to designate a separate battalion outside the infantry regimental structure, often being a converted reconnaissance battalion. These fusilier battalions were generally under the direct control of the divisional commander, to be used as a fire brigade or divisional reserve. Panzer and panzergrenadier divisions invariably named their infantry regiments as panzergrenadier. This had unfortunate consequences, as this second regiment—already considered an outsider by the first grenadier regiment—now had even greater difficulty finding acceptance, as members of the units considered themselves first and foremost as either grenadiers or fusiliers. In fact the fusiliers never did gain full acceptance, as a great rivalry developed between the two units. The mutual jealousy and rivalry was epitomised by the last Grossdeutschland divisional commander, General Lorenz. He had been the regimental commander of the Grenadier Regiment and blatantly favoured it when giving out awards, assignments and promotions. When the Fusilier Regiment commander protested about the negative treatment of his regiment, Lorenz dismissed him and his adjutant on the spot.
Alfred Novotny, a member of the Fusilier Regiment, recalled how “He always felt superior to other units and were even convinced that we were better than GD1 (the Grenadier Regiment) although this was not always true.” He went on to admit that “in most instances GD1 had the better, more experienced fighting force.”7 However, as intended, it did make each regiment fight and try all the harder in order to outshine its rival, even though this was often taken to the extremes.
Also added to the new establishment were an anti-tank battalion under Major Haeke, a reconnaissance battalion under Major von Usedom, a full artillery regiment of three battalions under Colonel Jauer, an anti-aircraft battalion and extra signals and service units.
Hörnlein was a competent and caring officer, so much so that his men christened him Papa Hörnlein. His concern for his men often landed him in trouble with his superiors, as he complained about the excessive combat and casualties to which his division was subjected due to the high expectations associated with it, and the tough spots it was frequently thrown into. He was famously said to have sent a telex to the Führer’s headquarters asking whether Grossdeutschland was the only German unit available on the Eastern Front, as it had been in continuous action from one crisis to another. Despite his caring reputation, Hörnlein could also be quite ruthless when required. He was also pro-Nazi, urging his company commanders in 1942 to carry out ideological training, and reiterating the call in 1943.8 It should be noted that not all company commanders, battalion and regimental commanders carried out these instructions. Given Graf von Strachwitz’s disgust at the Nazi regime due to Hitler’s hold fast order and subsequent defeat at Stalingrad, it would hardly have applied to the Panzer Regiment. Otto Ernst Remer, a Grossdeutschland officer who helped crush von Stauffenberg’s putsch, would have certainly been one officer who carried out Hörnlein’s instructions. His speech to his troops at the time of the attempted coup gives a clear indication of his and other German officers’ beliefs. “It is our duty to secure Lebensraum, defend the Fatherland and uphold our National Socialist ideals.” The division certainly held many other officers like him as indeed it also had others like Graf von Strachwitz. In all German units, some fought for the Führer, some for a strong belief in Germany, while others fought simply because they had to.
Hörnlein’s nickname would not have impressed Graf von Strachwitz overly much, coming as he did from a panzer division whose commander was called “Der Mensch.” He would not have deemed “Papa” a suitable name for a panzer leader of a hard-hitting armoured formation. In fact as solidly competent Hörnlein was at commanding infantry, he lacked the cavalryman’s flair and élan which epitomised the great panzer leaders like Balck, von Strachwitz, Raus, Meyer, Rommel and indeed his successor, von Manteuffel. All these men, as regimental and divisional commanders, did far better with units far worse equipped and manned.
Nevertheless he was a brave and capable leader, having earned a Knight’s Cross on 30 July 1941 while commanding Infantry Regiment 80 and subsequently received the German Cross in Gold in February 1943, and he was the 213th recipient of the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross on 15 March 1943. It would be accurate to say that his Oak Leaves were earned on the back of Graf von Strachwitz’s success in commanding Grossdeutschland’s Panzer Regiment, along with the efforts of Pössl, Captain Frantz, Otto Remer and others. However this wasn’t unusual as many German divisional corps and army commanders earned their awards directly through the courage and efforts of one or two extremely brave and competent subordinate commanders (see appendix 1 for further discussion). Hörnlein survived the war leading the XXVII Army Corps, settled in Cologne after the war, and died in 1961.
Unusually, no chaplains were allowed to the division. Most army, but not Waffen SS divisions,9 had a Catholic and Protestant chaplain as a respected part of their establishment. Grossdeutschland, however, was forbidden to have a chaplain as a punishment for a prior one saying mass in Notre Dame Cathedral, attended by many of its troops. This no doubt disappointed the devoutly Catholic von Strachwitz.
The 1st Panzer Battalion was equipped with a mixture of Panzers IIIs and Panzer IVs, with both the long- and short-barrelled 75mm gun, which was normal for this time of transition, as the Germans sought to phase out the Panzer IIIs and replace the IVs with the long-barrelled gun. The changeover was taking unduly long as there were not enough long-barrelled tanks to go around and they couldn’t afford to take the outdated and outclassed Panzer IIIs away from the already under-strength panzer battalions. The varying range and penetrating power of the guns, made their tactical use in combat difficult, and Panzer IIIs often had to be rescued by Panzer IVs.
Each company had 14 tanks, and the battalion headquarters had three. The battalion also had some Panzer III flame-throwing tanks, together with some Panzer IIs for reconnaissance, but these were later phased out. Its formation took place in Erfurt and it joined the division in May 1942. In addition, the division received a battalion of 21 assault guns (Sturmgeschütz IIIs) equipped with the 75mm long-barrelled gun.10 They had been originally designed as infantry-support vehicles, but their efficiency as tank killers and the chronic shortage of tanks ensured that they were invariably used in the anti-tank role. Furthermore they were part of the artillery branch and not the panzer arm.11
The division was part of General Kempf’s XLVIII Panzer Corps along with the 9th and 24th Panzer Divisions for the 1942 summer offensive. It launched its attack on 28 April capturing the railway bridge over the river Tim. The division then struck out towards Nikolayevka. Meeting little resistance at first, Captain Pössl’s tank battalion had its first major tank engagement near Cologulovka when it repulsed an attack by T-34s without loss. This was followed by another engagement which saw 16 T-34s destroyed. Captain Pössl’s tankers were making their presence felt.
The major objectives were the Don crossings. First Lieutenant Blumenthal from the 7th Company 1st Regiment captured the road bridge at Semiluk with a coup de main for which he was awarded the Knight’s Cross. The Russians swiftly counterattacked and it was only the timely intervention of Stuka dive-bombers, bombing within a few hundred metres of their positions, that saved the German platoon and the bridge from being overrun.12 The entire attack to the Don crossing covered 300 kilometres and saw the destruction of 200 enemy tanks.13
Voronezh was captured on 7 July, and the division was tasked with taking the lower course of the Don east of Rostov. It still retained 42 operational tanks, which for a panzergrenadier division was a substantial number. It also had most of its vehicles intact. Supplies ran short, with the division having to rely on airdrops which were barely sufficient to keep the forward momentum going. Frequent halts were necessary to allow for replenishment, and the strictly rationed fuel was mostly given to Pössl’s tanks, with fuel sometimes being drained from other vehicles. Karpovka was taken with only relatively light resistance on 26 July. Fighting was fragmentary with the Russians resisting furiously in some instances while in others giving up without a struggle. One grenadier company captured an entire regiment without a fight. Savage clashes flared up along the lower Don, but despite the fierce resistance the Germans pushed on, crossing the river Muntysch on 1 August.
The division then had a brief respite, allowing for a quick refit before its next deployment. This proved necessary as the Russians launched a major offensive to retake Rzhev. The division was entrained to Army Group Centre to help counter this threat. This fighting in the Rzhev salient and the Luchessa valley was to be some of the bloodiest the division was to experience. Of the 12,000 men lost during 1942, the majority fell in the Rzhev battles.14
On 10 September the division struck the Soviet flank but suffered horrendous casualties from prepared Russian artillery batteries of some 240 guns, as well as aircraft and tank attacks. The panzer battalion went into action with 38 tanks and lost 28 destroyed or disabled by mines, artillery or tank fire. The division attack had to be called off. By the next day only four tanks were still in running order. Losses among the infantry were equally alarming with some platoons down from 42 men to 16 or fewer.15 By 13 September the two infantry regiments were down to a few hundred men from the 6,000 they had started with, having been mostly slaughtered by massed artillery fire as they attacked over open ground without artillery or tank support.
The Germans resumed their attack on 30 September, this time with the division’s tanks in support. They broke through the Russian lines led by the 2nd Regiment’s commander Colonel Eugen Garski who directed the attack personally riding on the lead tank until he was killed, shot through the head. The tank battalion also clashed with the Soviets at Urdom and Sayzevo, where it blew up seven T-34s and one KV-2 heavy tank. On 30 November Pössl’s men destroyed 22 T-34s and two T-26 light tanks with little loss. During December it accounted for eight Russian tanks near Vierfistar,16 but was eventually reduced to a platoon of six tanks by 6 January.
On 9 January the division went into reserve to undertake a major replenishment and refit. This was badly needed as its serious losses made it unfit for any offensive combat. Even for defence it was considered marginal.
In the interim a second tank battalion was being formed at the Neuhammer training grounds in Germany. Along with this battalion a regimental headquarters was also established to oversee the new panzer regiment, which was now to become a part of the division. This addition technically made it a panzer division, but it retained its designation as a panzergrenadier division throughout the war. This was anomalous because among panzer divisions, only the elite Waffen SS panzer divisions—Leibstandarte, Das Reich, Totenkopf, Hitlerjugend and perhaps Viking—equalled or exceeded it in strength. An unusual addition for the panzer regiment was the inclusion of a company of nine Tiger tanks and 10 Panzer IIIs for scouting and security purposes. The Panzer IIIs were later removed from establishment due to their poor performance. Some Tiger commanders—Graf von Strachwitz probably one of them—bemoaned their loss, as they were useful for recce missions and could reach places that the Tigers couldn’t as they were able cross lighter bridges and could be concealed more easily. They were also used to lure Russian tanks into traps as the Russians were quick to attack and pursue Panzer IIIs, but would avoid combat with the heavy Tigers. They also performed nighttime perimeter and daytime flank security, courier missions, the evacuation of wounded and a myriad of other tasks which would be considered wasteful for the Tigers to do.
Tigers were normally deployed in separate heavy battalions attached directly to corps or army headquarters. The Waffen SS divisions, LSSAH, Das Reich and Totenkopf also had Tiger companies, which were converted to separate battalions on semi-permanent attachment later, although Totenkopf retained its battalion on establishment strength. No army divisions were so favoured except for Grossdeutschland, whose company was later expanded to a battalion of 45 Tigers. These behemoths, with their 100mm thick frontal armour and powerful 88mm guns, added greatly to the division’s striking power. Its Tiger battalion was one of the highest-scoring tank-killing units in the German Army. As a company it destroyed 100 enemy tanks for a loss of six Tigers, an astonishing kill ratio of 16.67:1. As a battalion this figure dropped to 5.10:1, albeit against a larger number of tanks, including the super-heavy Josef Stalin types.17 In all, during the course of the war, Grossdeutschland’s Tiger unit destroyed 1,036 Russian tanks and fighting vehicles, and over 300 anti-tank guns and artillery pieces. A large part of this tally was inflicted during Graf von Strachwitz’s period as regimental commander. The comparatively low number of anti-tank guns destroyed was due to the fact that they were engaged less frequently, and were much harder to hit, owing to their low profile and ease of concealment.
Hyazinth von Strachwitz was the regiment’s first commander, and was well received by his troops, his reputation having preceded him. The junior officers were especially pleased to have an experienced Oak Leaves wearer as their unit commander. Even the other ranks were proud of him, including members of other units, as Fusilier Alfred Novotny recalls in his memoir:
The commander of our panzer regiment Graf von Strachwitz was simply a hero’s hero. Wherever there was trouble Strachwitz and his men were there. I saw him a few times in 1943 when he and elements of his regiment were supporting our operations, or at least passing through our area of operations. Although dignified, he appeared to be down to earth.
There was none of the haughtiness that was often displayed by other nobles. He also was often to be seen at the forefront of battle when things were hottest. We all thought highly of this especially courageous officer and were proud to be in the same division.18
This description sums up von Strachwitz reasonably well. He endeared himself to his men not just for his success and courage, but by being one of them, the front swine, old hares, without losing any of his dignity as an officer or as an aristocrat. He was immensely proud of his lineage and title, but was well aware that this did not make him better than others he was serving with.
His 2nd Battalion commander was Major Thiede, whom he got to know fairly well, as Major Pössl was serving at the front. However he soon got to know and like Pössl both as a man and superb panzer leader. The Tiger company was led by Captain Walleroth and came equipped with its own maintenance platoon, as its spare parts and maintenance requirements were different from those of the rest of the regiment.
The regiment’s company and platoon leaders were officers, although this would change during combat, with senior NCOs often taking command of a platoon. The individual tank commanders were all veteran NCOs. The regiment, and indeed the division, at full strength was the strongest and best-equipped in the German Army. With its members being mostly volunteers it was a highly motivated, elite fighting unit, to which Graf von Strachwitz was proud to belong. It was his chance to put his mark on the new regiment, and with its excellent raw material in manpower and equipment, he had a good opportunity to make it an unqualified success. The fighting in the third battle of Kharkov would soon give him the chance.
NOTES
1. James Lucas, Germany’s Elite Panzer Force Grossdeutschland (McDonald and James, London, 1979).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Paul Carrell, Hitler’s War on Russia. Vol 1. Hitler Moves East (Ballantine Books, 1963).
5. Thomas McGuirl and Remy Spezzano. God, Honor Fatherland. A Photo History of Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutschland on the Eastern Front 1942–1944 (RZM Publishing, Fl 2007).
6. Alfred Novotny, The Good Soldier (The Aberjona Press, Bedford Penn, 2003).
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Some Waffen SS divisions such as the Ukrainian “Galicia” Division had chaplains but called them liaison officers, while other non-German SS units had unofficial chaplains in their ranks.
10. Hans-Joachim Jung (trans. David Johnston), The History of Panzerregiment Grossdeutschland: Panzer Soldiers for “God, Honor, Fatherland” (J.J. Fedorwicz, Canada, 2000).
11. This anomaly came about despite General Guderian’s strenuous efforts to make them part of his panzer arm. The artillery branch wanted the assault guns to add to its strength and to provide greater opportunity for its members to earn decorations such as the coveted Knight’s Cross. The assault gun crews wore grey uniforms in the style of the panzer uniform while the panzer crews wore black. Graf von Strachwitz rarely wore field gray, preferring his panzer black.
12. Lucas, Germany’s Elite Panzer Force Grossdeutschland, p.50; Jung, The History of Panzerregiment Grossdeutschland, p.20.
13. Jung, The History of Panzerregiment Grossdeutschland.
14. “Loss ratios”, Tiger 1 Information Centre, www.alanhamby.com/losses.shtml/ (accessed 29 August 2013).
15. Novotny, The Good Soldier, p.75.
16. “Loss ratios”, Tiger 1 Information Centre, www.alanhamby.com/losses.shtml/ (accessed 29 August 2013).
17. Ibid.
18. Novotny, The Good Soldier, p.75.