EIGHTEEN
AT POLTAVA, THE GROSSDEUTSCHLAND DIVISION UNdertook training and repairs and received new equipment such as new self-propelled guns. Particularly noteworthy were 83 half-tracked armoured personnel carriers for the Grenadier Regiment’s 1st Battalion, and the upgrading of Graf von Strachwitz’s Panzer Regiment’s Tiger Company to a battalion. Under its commander, Major Gomille, it was in formation at the Sennelager training grounds from the middle of May. Its personnel were all experienced tankers drawn from the 30th, 31st and 18th Panzer Regiments. It comprised a battalion headquarters, with signals, pioneer, and anti-aircraft units, along with a heavy workshop company. Its principal combat units were three tank companies, of 14 Tigers each.1 Grossdeutschland was the only army division to have an organic Tiger battalion on its strength.
The Panzer Graf was kept busy supervising the training, the refurbishment of equipment, and the integration of the new Tiger battalion into the regiment. He also commanded the division as its most senior officer for a period while General Hörnlein went on leave. During his time as divisional commander, on 30–31 March, Colonel General Guderian visited the division, as part of his role as inspector-general of panzer troops. He was particularly interested to hear about the role the Tigers played in the Kharkov battles, and the Panzer Graf was the ideal man to fill him in. Von Strachwitz, however, could not have impressed him very much as Guderian mentions him only once, and very briefly, in his memoir Panzer Leader, regarding his actions in 1944. Of vital importance to the Graf were the company, battalion and regimental exercises he conducted to weld his troops into a smoothly running, well coordinated unit, especially the integration of the Tigers with the medium tanks. His tanks also took part in divisional exercises, honing their skills to work with the armoured infantry.
However it was not all work and training. Relaxation was vital for the combat-weary, exhausted troops. Sports events were organised, with races, football matches, tugs-of-war, relays, swimming and even races between the amphibious volkswagons of the Reconnaissance battalion. There were plays, concerts and for the officers, dining and card evenings. There was also a theatre in Poltava playing the Gypsy Baron as well as German films.
The Graf also had time to mix with his junior officers, who absolutely doted on him not just for his decorations and his success as a panzer commander, which ensured their own success as well as their survival, but at the human level. He was generally pleasant, never aloof, approachable at any level—personal or military—and quite relaxed without the intensity, focus and drive that he showed during combat operations. The same could not always be said for his superiors, not all of whom liked him, finding him at times a willful, opinionated and difficult subordinate. The performance of his panzers during the Kharkov battles also cemented his reputation with the ordinary troops, who were always grateful for the life-saving presence of his tanks. They were also aware that he was always in the thick of the action, leading from the front, ensuring the success of his units by his tactical skill and personal example.
From 23 June, the division’s title was officially changed to Panzer-grenadier Division Grossdeutschland, which was a misnomer as its armoured strength exceeded that of nearly every army panzer division, and was equal to the premier Waffen SS panzergrenadier divisions which shortly became officially designated panzer divisions.
While Grossdeutschland was refitting, Hitler and his High Command were planning a new offensive, which had been proposed by General Zeitzler, the army Chief-of-Staff. The Eastern Front had a large bulge—257 kilometres long and 160 kilometres deep—jutting out westwards into the German line with the industrial city of Kursk at its centre. This helped create a corresponding bulge into the east at Orel. Zeitzler proposed a two-pronged attack with pincers from the north and south cutting off the bulge and destroying the Russian forces trapped within. This would eliminate several Soviet armies and considerably shorten the German line, freeing the troops deployed around the edges of the salient.
That the bulge was an attractive target was of course not lost on the Russians, who began pouring in reinforcements and preparing their defences for the inevitable attack. Their activities depressed the observant General Model. Sitting on the salient’s northern edge, he took countless pictures which he showed to Hitler at a meeting on 4 March, and made several well-reasoned arguments why any planned attack should be abandoned. He told his Führer the Soviets were ready and waiting for any rash move to pinch the bulge off. Hitler agreed with Model, but was under pressure from his command staff to go ahead with the plan. He called a conference on 3 May, which was attended by Zeitzler; von Manstein, commanding Army Group South; von Kluge, commanding Army Group Centre; Model commanding Ninth Army; Guderian, inspector general of armoured forces; as well as Keitel, Jodl, Albert Speer, the armaments and production minister, and sundry others.
After much discussion Hitler remained undecided.2 Eventually Zeitzler, along with Keitel, won him over; the temptation of a great victory was just too much to resist. Following the conference, Guderian—who was keen to preserve his carefully built-up panzer reserve—tried to persuade Hitler not to proceed with Operation Citadel as it was now named. But the bulge was still there so, clutching at straws, Hitler became convinced that sufficient numbers of the new Panther tanks would make a difference. So he kept delaying the assault to allow time for them to reach the front. The Panther was a magnificent beast, with sloping armour copied from the T-34, wide mud-riding tracks, a 600–700hp Maybach engine and a high-velocity 75mm gun with beautiful optics. Once its teething difficulties were overcome, it would arguably be the best tank of the war.3
The Russians in the meantime were still ahead of the game. Their Swiss-based Lucy spy ring was keeping them informed of all the German moves and delays. Not that the Russians needed their spy ring for this information; their own reconnaissance told them of the large-scale movements of entire armies for the build-up. The Soviets strengthened their defences accordingly. By the time they had finished they had strung over 800 kilometres of barbed wire and laid 1,500,000 anti-tank and 1,700,000 anti-personnel mines. Their forward defence stretched 80 kilometres to the rear with two more defence lines manned by their Steppe Front beyond that. In the main defence zone there were five trench lines, each 150–250 metres apart, totalling 5,000 kilometres of trenches. They would have made even the obsessive World War I trench-builders proud. The trenches all had interconnected strongpoints, anti-tank guns, machine-gun and mortar posts, along with dug-in T-34s with barbed wire and mines laid in front. The Russians then packed 1.3 million men inside the salient supported by 19,000 guns of various calibres and 3,500 tanks. They were supported by close to 3,000 aircraft. The genial General Rokossovsky commanded the northern sector. He had been purged by Stalin in the early 1930s, suffering torture in the process, and though since rehabilitated, he was still not altogether trusted, especially by Zhukov, who serially disliked anyone with personal charisma, a quality he himself singularly lacked. General Vatutin, now recovered from his bloody defeat at Kharkov, commanded the South, while Marshal Koniev led the reserve army, ready to mount a massive counterattack when appropriate.
To help motivate their loyal communist soldiery, the Russians applied a good old capitalist incentive programme. For every German tank they destroyed, Russian tank commanders, gunners and drivers were paid a bonus of 500 rubles while the other crewmen got 200 rubles. An anti-tank rifleman also got 500 rubles while his assistant received 200. They could only hope they didn’t run into a Tiger which was impervious to their weapons, and the medium tanks were hard enough to take out in any event. Artillery gun commanders and crew received the same bonuses. Any soldier knocking out a tank using an individual anti-tank weapon received 1,000 rubles.4 On that basis Hitler was getting his tank kills on the cheap—no cash for tank or gun crews, while an infantryman got a tank destruction badge to wear on his sleeve. It was a justifiably well-respected badge and many individuals sported several.
By stripping other fronts, the Germans came close to matching the massive Russian force. They had between 770,000 and 1,000,000 men, 10,000 guns, 2,700 tanks and close to 3,000 planes. Of course the estimated numbers for both armies vary between the different sources, bearing in mind that wartime—and for the Soviets postwar—propaganda had a major bearing.
The German forces were divided into two attack groups. Coming from the south from around Belgorod there were 10 panzer, one panzer grenadier and seven infantry divisions, under the overall command of Field Marshal von Manstein. The northern pincer coming from around Orel was commanded by General Walter Model who had seven panzer, two panzer grenadier and nine infantry divisions.
Graf von Strachwitz and Grossdeutschland were in the XLVIII Panzer Corps—along with the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions under General von Knobelsdorff—which formed part of von Manstein’s southern wing. It in turn belonged to the 4th Panzer Army under General Hoth, which was the mainstay of the southern attack, and indeed the strongest force in the entire offensive. It had 1,176 armoured fighting vehicles and 1,100 aircraft, facing off against 1,699 AFVs of the Soviet Voronezh Front.5
While the various high commanders were finalising their respective attack plans, Grossdeutschland was kept busy with its refit and training programme. As the date of the attack drew closer actual rehearsals for the assault began. Tactical attack exercises at all levels were carried out with an emphasis on assaults against enemy defensive positions. Mock attacks were carried out against bunkers and trench systems with engineers clearing mines and barbed-wire obstacles. Combined armour-infantry assaults were a special feature, training the tanks and infantry how to work in very close cooperation with each other.
War games—tactical exercises using mud maps, aerial photos and drawings of actual Soviet defensive positions—were conducted by the division’s officers. Working with these aerial photos was difficult as there was no way of knowing which defences were real and which were dummies. The Russians were masters of deceit and camouflage, effectively using every trick available to good effect at Kursk. They built dummy gun positions, trench lines, tanks, even airfields and supply dumps, and managed to fool the Germans, particularly the Luftwaffe, which carried out frequent bombing raids against them.
It wasn’t long before von Strachwitz began to develop his own misgivings about the assault. Like Guderian he could see the potential for heavy tank losses in battering through the strong multi-layered Soviet defence systems, covered as they were with minefields and anti-tank weapons. This was not going to be the battle of manoeuvre that he was accustomed to and excelled at, but a grinding battle of attrition against a well-prepared determined enemy. His experience, training and finely honed cavalryman’s instincts all protested against using his precious panzers as battering rams. There were also no alternative flanking moves he could use, or gaps he could exploit, just a foolish frontal assault in a restricted attack area. For all outward appearances he radiated confidence, telling his junior officers like 1st Lieutenant Hans-Joachim Jung that he was confident of success, it being counterproductive to sow seeds of doubt in the young officers undertaking the frontal assaults. Faith in ultimate victory would make them fight all the harder, a forlorn hope being a poor prescription for success.
Given his outspoken forthright nature the Panzer Graf undoubtedly expressed his doubts to his commanding officer General Hörnlein, who perhaps may have shared them, but being fundamentally an infantryman in outlook was probably more optimistic. This dichotomy of infantry/cavalry outlook, along with their personalities, set these two officers apart. Hörnlein, sympathetic by nature, did not have Hube’s gift for understanding basic human nature nor his strength in tank tactics. Nor was Hörnlein as intense a person as von Strachwitz and he certainly didn’t appreciate the latter’s outspokenness and frank opinions, being himself far more circumspect in his personal dealings. He probably considered von Strachwitz a flamboyant panzer prima donna. He may have also been a little envious of the panzer commander’s popularity among the men, especially the junior officers. Whatever the reason, the two men did not get along, and their feelings had time to fester, and were likely exacerbated, during the relative calm away from combat in the spring of 1943.
During this time in May the Graf received one piece of good news. On 29 May his eldest son Hyazinth, who was serving in the 11th Panzer Division, was awarded the German Cross in Gold for his bravery and leadership in battle. This breast star, emblazoned with the swastika, ranked between the Iron Cross (1st Class) and the Knight’s Cross. The year also saw his eldest son marry Countess Constance (Huschi) von Franken Sierstorff who lived in a castle literally next door to the von Strachwitz family at Gross-Stein, so it was a very important year for the young officer.
After its refit Grossdeutschland had a strength of 20,468 men, which made it much stronger than nearly every panzer or panzergrenadier division, which rarely had more than 15,000 men, and more usually a strength of 10,000 to 12,000. Sustained combat often reduced these numbers down to an average of 3,000 to 6,000 men with some divisions almost ceasing to exist. With its heavily reinforced panzer and artillery regiments, a full assault-gun battalion of 34 Sturmgeschütz IIIs, two infantry regiments of three battalions each, together with various sub-units, it was an unwieldy division to handle. General Balck—who was an infantry regimental commander in the Battle of France, and who went on to become a hugely successful panzer leader—commanded Grossdeutschand for a brief period, and actually recommended it be broken up into two average strength panzer divisions. OKH refused, as it still wanted an army formation that could surpass the privileged Waffen SS panzer divisions.
As a one-off temporary reinforcement, two battalions of the long-awaited Panthers, designated the 51st and 52nd Battalions, were attached to the division. They had 200 Panthers between them, 188 battle tanks, ten command tanks, and two Bergepanther recovery tanks. They were placed under the regimental command of Colonel Meinrad von Lauchert, a veteran officer. He had served with the highly efficient 4th Panzer Division in France and Russia, where he received the Knight’s Cross on 8 September 1941, eventually going on to earn the Oak Leaves on 2 December 1944. He later fought alongside Graf von Strachwitz, serving under his command in the Baltics. Guderian had personally selected him to command and train the two Panther battalions.
The Panthers were deployed alongside Graf von Strachwitz’s Panzer Regiment with its 163 Panzer IVs6 to form Panzer Brigade 10 which became part of the Grossdeutschland Division. However, at Guderian’s behest, the brigade was to be commanded by Colonel Karl Decker, who was senior to von Strachwitz, having been promoted to Colonel on 1 February 1942, earlier than the Graf’s promotion in May 1942. Decker’s appointment was most likely due to his having served on the staff of Guderian’s newly formed Inspectorate of Panzer Troops from April 1942 to January 1943. But his appointment was not due solely to favouritism: he had previously served with the 3rd and 35th Panzer Regiments, and received the Knight’s Cross on 13 June 1941. He was a highly experienced and capable panzer commander.7
Graf von Strachwitz’s pride was deeply hurt at being passed over, ostensibly because of a slender margin in seniority. He doubtless blamed General Hörnlein for not fighting the appointment. To make matters worse, Decker was late in taking up his post, arriving after the battle had started on 5 July and then with only some of his headquarters staff. To all intents and purposes the Brigade was almost leaderless for the crucial preparation and early phases of the offensive.8 If that wasn’t enough, many of the Panther crewmen were insufficiently trained on the specifics of their new tanks and lacked practical combat experience. Their equipment was also not fully tested, while their engines had serious faults which quickly became apparent as they commenced their deployment.9
On 29 June the departure orders for the division were issued, with assembly areas assigned on the Vorska northwest of Tomarovka. The division moved out the next day. Traffic jams quickly developed as the vehicles crammed onto the few available roads, being further delayed by the dusty, poor conditions, which caused numerous vehicle breakdowns.
On 2 July all units had reached their respective assembly areas, with the combat officers wasting no time in moving forward to get acquainted with the terrain. This they did visually, together with studying abundant maps and aerial photos. It had been all too usual in the past, for von Strachwitz and his officers to operate with, at best, poor, often inaccurate maps, or with no maps at all. What the Graf saw now was only marginal tank country, consisting of an open plain cut with numerous gullies, creeks, shallow valleys and some rivers, the largest being the fast-moving Pena. The tracks and roads were just dirt, which could become impassable during the sudden heavy summer showers common to the area. Large areas were covered with cornfields, which obscured visibility and could hide significant tank and infantry units. All this, coupled with the well-camouflaged enemy defences, filled von Strachwitz with some disquiet. A narrow attack frontage of two kilometres didn’t give him the room for the wide-ranging manoeuvre that was his forté, especially as it would be filled with not only his tanks, but engineers and infantry as well.
The 11th Panzer Division was deployed on Grossdeutschland’s right flank with II SS Panzer Corps—consisting of the Leibstandarte, Das Reich and Totenkopf Divisions—further along. On the left was the 3rd Panzer Division, the second weakest panzer division in Army Group South, with only 56 tanks.10 All the Graf could hope for was an early breakthrough of the Soviet defences, so that he could range behind their lines in open country and attack their rear and flanks.
The next few days were spent finalising attack plans, studying the terrain, attending orders groups and dealing with the last-minute details of logistics, supply and future troop movements. Lights, noise and movement was kept to an absolute minimum. Plans were constantly reviewed and memorised as officers fussed over details. The sultry days were filled with a tense calm. The troops were imbued with the importance of the coming offensive and all, given the massive force on display, were quietly confident. Their superiority over “Ivan” was never in doubt and most felt that this could be the knockout blow that had eluded them hitherto, the one that would bring an end to the war in the east. If they had any doubts, Hitler’s message to the troops would have dispelled it:
Soldiers! Today you set out to a great onslaught, the outcome of which could well decide the war.
Your victory must serve to convince the world more than ever that any resistance to the German Wehrmacht is fruitless. In addition, new defeat for the Russians can only serve to shake further the already wavering belief among the men in army units of the Red Army that a Bolshevik victory is possible, Just as in the last war, they will one day be defeated.11
The Panthers arrived late on 4 July, giving their officers and crews no time to study the terrain or make all the necessary final preparations and adjustments. As radio silence was already in force, their radio operators were not even able to tune their radios.12 Even more seriously, their numbers had already been reduced due to mechanical failures. Six Panthers had spontaneously caught on fire due to leaking fuel lines and were completely burnt out. A further 20 tanks had broken down due to mechanical defects ranging from faulty fuel pumps and defective side clutches of the power transmission unit, to the driving wheels lacking the strength to perform, or failures in the control systems of the inlet shutters causing engines to overheat and burst into flames. Most of these defects had been identified much earlier during testing, but Hitler wouldn’t wait for these to be rectified and ordered the tanks into battle. This made for a devastating debut for the luckless Panther regiment. It also didn’t help that Lauchert’s hapless crews lacked the experience to react quickly enough to either fix or avoid some of the problems. What von Strachwitz must have thought when he heard of all these problems can only be imagined. If one believed in omens, it didn’t make for a very good start for the supposedly decisive offensive.
It would only get worse, as on the actual day of attack even more Panthers broke down, although many problems were minor and could be fixed by short-term repair. In all 45 Panthers did not take part in the opening attack. In fact both von Knobelsdorff, the Panther’s corps commander, and Hoth, their army commander, both thought all along that Hitler’s absolute trust in them was misplaced, and that their much-awaited contribution to the outcome would be negligible. As for Guderian, his grim forebodings had been proven correct. Hitler’s delays in starting the offensive would bear bitter fruit.
NOTES
1. Helmuth Spaeter (trans. David Johnston), The History of the Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland Vol 2 (J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Canada, 1995).
2. General Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (Futura Publications 1977), pp.306–307.
3. Some would argue that the Tiger was the best, certainly with justification. In a kill ratio of enemy tanks the Tiger was unsurpassed. At Kursk, Heavy (Tiger) Battalion 503 destroyed 72 Russian tanks for a loss of four Tigers, a kill ratio of 18:1 (see Christopher W. Wilbeck, Sledgehammer (The Aberjona Press). It also had a strong presence on the battlefield way out of proportion to its numbers employed. Enemy tanks would often withdraw rather than face them, it being regarded as suicidal to take them on. Its survivability was superb. Nevertheless it had its drawbacks. Being an extremely high-maintenance vehicle it was never deployed in optimum numbers. Its weight made for problems with deployment, as most bridges couldn’t bear their weight. They were also expensive and difficult to build.
4. Valery Zamalin (trans. Stuart Britt), Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk July 1943 (Helion & Co, UK, 2011).
5. Robert Kirchubel, Hitler’s Panzer Armies on the Eastern Front (Pen & Sword, UK, 2009).
6. The Panzer Graf’s tank figures vary according to the sources. E.W. von Mellenthin who was on von Knobelsdorff’s Corps staff listed 180 tanks in his memoirs Panzer Battles. Another source cited 300, including 180 Panthers.
7. The Panther debacle and disagreement with Graf von Strachwitz didn’t affect Decker’s career adversely in any way. He went on to command the 5th Panzer Division and the XXXIX Panzer Corps, as a Lieutenant General. He was awarded the Oak Leaves on 4 February 1944, and the Swords posthumously on 26 April 1945. He committed suicide on 1 April 1945.
8. Hans-Joachim Jung (trans. David Johnston), The History of Panzerregiment Grossdeutschland (J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Canada, 2000).
9. Ibid.
10. Werner Haupt (trans. Dr Edward Force), A History of the Panzer Troops 1916–1945 (Schiffer Publishing, USA, 1990). The average number of tanks per panzer division in Army Group South, excluding Grossdeutschland and the Waffen SS divisions, was 68, which amounted to one battalion when each division should have had two battalions.
11. Rudolf Lehman, The Leibstandarte, Vol III (J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Canada, 1990).
12. Jung, The History of Panzerregiment Grossdeutschland.