FOUR
WITH CALM RESTORED TO SILESIA, HYAZINTH VON Strachwitz could begin to lead a normal family life at Gross-Stein. His castle or manor house with its surrounding lands offered a secure, comfortable lifestyle. It was located 17 kilometres southeast of the regional capital, Oppeln. It consisted of a large rectangular building of four storeys including the attic, which ran along the length of the building. Its dominant feature was a large square tower. There was a large raised terrace along most of the front of the building, which was planted as a formal garden. It wasn’t spectacular, but was large and pleasant to the eye. However, due to growing disagreements and estrangement with his father, who was as strong willed and determined as he was, he moved his family to a 583-hectare manor at Alt Seidel. There he lived a comfortable life until 1929 when, after reconciling with his father, he returned to Gross-Stein.
The countryside surrounding Gross-Stein was typical of Upper Silesia, flat with large tracts of forest. The village of Gross-Stein, home to around one thousand people, was a short distance away. The woodlands were an important source of income for the estate, its management requiring a good deal of time and knowledge, so the Graf took up forestry studies in 1929. Dairying was another major source of revenue and Hyazinth became the manager of a dairy co-operative. In addition to this, the estate grew vegetables, potatoes, barley, corn and rye, and had the usual range of farm animals, pigs, chickens, geese and above all, horses. This made the family largely self-sufficient so while they were affected when the Depression hit in the early 1930s, they could cope far more readily than most. Nor was the rampant unemployment an issue, for it provided cheap labour for their estates. So despite some yearning to be active in the military again, life for von Strachwitz was uneventful, staid and pleasant.
Elsewhere, however, conditions were anything but idyllic. Germany, still traumatised by the war, was feeling the burdens of the Treaty of Versailles and was almost crippled by the reparations. The French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 was a running sore, a constant reminder of defeat and a massive loss of resources, with the occupying French plundering some $106 million worth of goods, further draining the Germany economy.1
Inflation was rampant, affecting every facet of life, with one US dollar being worth 5,000,000 Marks. The middle class had their wealth eroded or wiped out, while wealthy industrialists paid off their massive debts with the almost worthless paper money. Large landowners like von Strachwitz could buy up more land, but it was all at the expense of the lower classes, who increasingly resented the powerless Weimar government. These were conditions a demagogue could thrive on. One was in the making.
Adolf Hitler, an Austrian, unsuccessful artist, a former corporal in the German Army—albeit as an Iron Cross winner—and post-war informer for the government, was taking his first steps in politics. In September 1919 he joined the miniscule Nationalist Socialist German Workers Party, which he had been sent to spy on by the army who were wary of any party with socialist in its title. He built up the membership who were enthralled by his oratory and captivated by his zeal. The expansion also applied to the party’s Sturm Abteilung (SA) which consisted of brown-shirted street fighters and thugs. Its main purpose was to protect the Nazis’ own meetings and disrupt their opponents’, namely the communists. It would rise to be a force that would rival, and indeed threaten, the army. With some adroit manoeuvres Hitler took over the party on 28 July 1921. He would never look back. With an almost pathological belief in himself and his destiny, and an iron will, he was determined to win over anyone who could be useful, and crush anyone who stood in his way. In this he was singularly successful. He was a forceful orator, exciting the crowds and whipping them into frenzies of support, and for many, adoration.
Hitler’s overconfidence led him into an abortive putsch in Munich in November 1923, which was easily put down by a fusillade of shots from the police. He was arrested, tried and sentenced to five years in Landsberg prison. It was hardly onerous; he had his own quarters and cronies to accompany him. His cell on the second floor was comfortably furnished and filled with wine, beer, fruit, flowers and food brought in by his wealthy supporters. So much so that he put on considerable weight during his incarceration. He was allowed out during the day to visit Landsberg. Prison warden Otto Loybold wrote of him on 18 September 1924, “Hitler was always reasonable, frugal, modest and polite to everyone, especially officials of the facility,”2 a model prisoner. He only served nine months of his sentence, being released due to political influence and pressure. He used the time to dictate to Rudolf Hess, the party secretary, his political manifesto and memoir, Mein Kampf (My Struggle). In it he clearly stated his political aims and beliefs, rampant anti-Semitism, anti-communism and the acquisition of lebensraum (living space) in the east at the expense of Russia—he would build a large Germanic empire at the expense of Eastern Europe. There was a lot more, but this goal would cause the greatest bloodshed and misery. The book eventually became a best seller and an important source of income, earning Hitler 1,500,000 Reich Marks in 1933. It should have been a source of great concern to any normal, sane-thinking people but, as is often true with the Bible, hundreds of thousands of homes had a copy but very few people actually took the trouble to read it. Anyone but the most fanatical Nazi would have very quickly put it down, due to its turgid prose and nonsensical views. Even Hitler’s friend and ally, Benito Mussolini, gave up in disgust, finding it too boring and difficult to read. A great orator Hitler was, a writer he wasn’t.
Oddly enough, and contrary to what many believe, Hitler became Chancellor of Germany through the democratic process. In the elections of 5 March 1932 the Nazis received 13.4 million votes (36.8%), disappointing for Hitler, but a solid result nevertheless. Hitler’s 1933 election vote was 17.27 million (43.91%), a much better tally, and if not a majority it nevertheless made the Nazis the largest party in the Reichstag (Parliament). This led, after some political manoeuvring, to President von Hindenburg reluctantly offering Hitler the chancellorship of Germany. Hitler was in, and it wouldn’t be too long before democracy was out.
Along with the vote, Nazi Party membership was also increasing. In 1931 the party had 400,000 card-carrying members, with the figure rising to 900,000 in 1932. This was before Hitler’s accession to power in 1933 when the party received a massive influx of members. These new members were always looked down upon by those who had joined before 1933. Those who had joined earlier, even if only by a year, had committed themselves before the fruits of office and headiness of power had materialised, and considered themselves the true believers, the rest being mere opportunists.
Hitler’s acquisition of dictatorial power also used the democratic process. The Enabling Act of 1934, after Hindenburg’s death, was passed by the Reichstag with the necessary help of the Catholic Centre Party. This enabled Hitler to rule by decree. In the meantime, democracy or not, Hitler had been busy removing his enemies and cementing his support. On 30 June 1934 he arrested or murdered the leadership of the SA, his two-million-strong party militia which, under its leader Ernst Rohm, was getting too independent and powerful.3 More ominously it was part of a deal with the army, which regarded the SA a rival. To get army support for his assuming the presidency after the octogenarian Hindenburg’s death, Hitler agreed to downgrade the SA and ensure that the army would be the country’s main bearer of arms. In its gratitude the army proposed that its members take a personal oath of loyalty to Hitler.4 All of this would affect Graf von Strachwitz in the future. The time would come when he would have to search his own conscience vis-à-vis his oath to Hitler. This would be an important issue for a man whose decency, integrity and humanity outweighed a personal but artificial sense of honour.
At the same time as bringing the SA to heel, Hitler, Goering and Himmler took the opportunity to settle old scores and eliminate any other opposition through their new paramilitary arm, the Schutzstaffel (SS). Hundreds were murdered, including close associates of Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen, such as his secretary Hubert von Bose and Erich Klausener, the Catholic Action leader. General Kurt von Schleicher, the former Chancellor, and his wife were murdered in their home, and Gustav Ritter von Kahr, the former Bavarian State Commissioner, who smashed Hitler’s putsch attempt in 1923 was also murdered. Goering and Goebbels suppressed details of the murderous events, sending out the message that they had blocked an attempt by Rohm and others to seize the government. Hitler gave a speech in the Reichstag on 13 July justifying his actions, and the Reichstag applauded them. As far as the German public was concerned—and this included von Strachwitz—it was a job well done. For the Graf and indeed for most army officers, the move against the SA was more than welcome. He would have shared the army’s concern about the party militia, and the result would only have confirmed his commitment to Hitler and the party.
On Hindenburg’s death in August 1934, Hitler assumed the presidency, thus becoming both president and chancellor of Germany, a title which was shortened simply to Führer (Leader). The Enabling Act of 1933 gave him dictatorial powers with the ability to rule by decree without recourse to the Reichstag. The army, happy to have the SA neutralised and anticipating a major rearmament programme, meekly went along. Any voices of dissent were too small to be heard. There was now no turning back.
Like the majority of Germans, Hyazinth Graf von Strachwitz did not oppose Hitler’s seizure of power. He had joined the Nazi Party in 1932 (party no. 1405562) before Hitler had become Chancellor so he was a real Nazi, not a mere opportunist nor just a sympathizer or supporter.
So why would a proud aristocratic reserve army officer and devout Catholic join one of the most odiously evil organisations in the history of mankind? He didn’t need membership to secure his future, or career, as many certainly did. He seemingly had very little to gain from membership. Wealth, status, security, social acceptance, were all his already.
Moreover he was not a political animal per se. He was however, directly affected by the Polish claims to Silesia, and worried by the spread of communism, having fought communists while in the Guard Cavalry Freikorps. A staunch nationalist, it grieved him to see Germany belittled, shunned and kept deliberately suppressed by the Allies and the Treaty of Versailles. His concerns would most likely have included the economy, unemployment, abrogation of the Versailles Treaty, rearmament, defeating communism, restoration of German pride and national consciousness, securing Germany’s borders (Silesia from the Poles) and obliterating the Polish corridor separating East Prussia, to name a few. What happened to Germany in the broader sense mattered greatly to him, hence his interest in politics. These were all matters Hitler was resolved to fix or had already taken measures to fix. It was a strong inducement for von Strachwitz to join and become involved.
The lesser option of just being a supporter also had appeal. There were, after all, aspects of Nazism that gave him great disquiet, such as anti-clericalism and anti-Semitism. He could easily have opted for the role of supporter which would have involved no more than a vote at elections, perhaps a donation to party coffers and optional attendance at some public meetings or private functions. Instead however he chose to become a full member, an open public commitment for the record.
While history has thoroughly examined and judged the Nazi regime to be evil, many people at the time believed in the purity and good intentions of the Führer and the wisdom of his policies. This was, of course, because they wanted to, and because they were manipulated by an unrelenting campaign of propaganda and indoctrination. For them, and for von Strachwitz, Hitler was not all bad. In the 1930s, Hitler did a great deal of good for the German people, unifying the country, reducing unemployment, abrogating the Treaty of Versailles, ending the French occupation of the Ruhr, restoring the economy and national pride.
Hitler’s murderous intent and thirst for war were known only to a few of his acolytes and generals, and while the Nazis’ anti-Semitism would eventually result in the horror of the Final Solution, such sentiment was nothing new in Europe. It had risen its ugly head through the centuries, at times inflamed into hatred, resulting in pogroms and often outright murder. Nazi propaganda and indoctrination would do the same in Germany. A classic example of the conditioning that incessant propaganda can achieve is illustrated by an incident Siegfried Knappe describes in his memoir:
While doing some of my paperwork one evening I was distracted by shouting. I recognised the voice as Hauptwachtmeister Schnabel’s and went to investigate. I found him in a school building with a middle-aged Polish civilian. He was not only shouting at the man, he slapped him in the face!
“Schnabel,” I shouted.
“Jawohl, Herr Oberleutnant,” he responded, coming to attention.
“What do you think you are doing?” I demanded.
“But he is a Jew, Herr Oberleitnant,” Schnabel assured me.
“I don’t care what he is or who he is, as long as you are under my command you will not mistreat anybody,” I ordered.
His actions were obviously the result of incessant anti-Jewish propaganda of the Nazi government. He undoubtedly was doing what he thought was expected of him, but the incident enabled me to establish to my men that I would not tolerate such behaviour, and it never happened again in my unit.5
It also shows that not everyone was taken in by the propaganda, and decent standards could be set by those prepared to maintain them.
At the time that Graf von Strachwitz joined the party there was nothing to suggest that the Nazis’ bullying, intimidation and denial of civil rights to Jews would turn into industrialised mass murder, something that was so evil as to be totally incomprehensible to him. So if anti-Semitism was of some concern at the time, it was not the major issue; the major issues were Germany’s straitened economy, weak military, communist resurgence, the Polish claims on Silesia, and its corridor separating Prussia from Germany. Hitler’s aims to fix these problems, and then his actions in carrying most of them out and rebuilding Germany, would have outweighed any doubts von Strachwitz may have had.
Hitler began rearming after he came to power, surreptitiously at first, then more brazenly, building up the armed forces for the war he planned. This gave the economy a boost and helped alleviate unemployment. He also began a major building programme, constructing autobahns, bridges, buildings and other infrastructure, creating even more jobs. This meant a rise in living standards for most Germans and great wealth for some. Unemployment, the blight of the Weimar Republic, was eliminated as economic growth took on a greater pace. Finally compulsory labour service was introduced. The state labour service and the Hitler Youth organisations were quasi-military in nature, and a further extended means of indoctrinating children and young men in Nazi ideology, along with healthy outdoor activities. Given his own youthful military training at the cadet schools, von Strachwitz would have approved of both organisations.
Hitler lauded the greatness of the German people, making them feel special and therefore good about themselves. That this exceptionalism was due to their Aryan race implied that other races, particularly the Slavs, were inferior. As for the Jews they were even worse than inferior, they were considered vermin, as Goebbels’ fake documentary The Eternal Jew clearly implied. This was part of a sustained, relentless propaganda campaign, which brooked no contrary opinions or opposition.
As for the army, an organisation close to the heart of Captain (Reserve) von Strachwitz, it was once more given an eminent place, second or equal to the party, in German society. Given the quasi-military nature of the Hitler Youth and the Reich Labour Service, together with the expanding armed forces, Hitler effectively militarised German society. This was virtually an extension of the Kaiser’s Germany, so the people readily adapted. The Weimer democracy had been a mere interruption, a bump in the road.
The Nazi Party’s anti-communism was a big plus for von Strachwitz, who had been personally involved in combating it with the Horse Guard Cavalry Freikorps in Berlin. Communism was a threat to Germany as a nation, and to him personally, given that he was an aristocratic class enemy and devout Catholic.
Upper Silesia was Graf von Strachwitz’s great love. It wasn’t just his home, but had nurtured his family for generations, being a source of their pride and wealth. The family was rooted in its soil, its traditions and culture. He had fought for it against the Poles, whom he knew still had designs on it. A mere plebiscite was not going to stop them. Here Hitler’s militarism and fervent nationalism was Silesia’s best defence against any future Polish actions.
Finally, Hitler was charismatic, a demagogue who could sway the masses to a fever pitch of adulation and support for a greater Germany, unified under his leadership. It was no small thing to unify a nation so recently and violently divided on ideological grounds. That force and repression was also used was generally overlooked. On a personal level Hitler could be extremely affable and charming, almost mesmerising.6 Among others, General Werner von Blomberg, his war minister, was totally enthralled by him and incapable of any realistic and sensible opposition to his expansionist territorial goals.7 Officers meeting him for the first time in the early war years commented on his warmth, extraordinary presence and his piercing blue eyes. These personal qualities gradually declined with the pressure of defeats, exhaustion, suspicion and the drugs being prescribed by his physician, Dr. Morell.
There remains the question of Graf von Strachwitz’s Catholicism, given that a large part of the church, especially the Episcopate, opposed National Socialism as being incompatible with the church’s teachings. The parish priest of Kirschhausen informed his parishoners that a Catholic could not be a card-carrying member of the Hitler Party. The Vicar General of Mainz supported his stand, declaring that the Nazi Party policy of racial hatred was “un-Christian and un-Catholic,” and that despite seeming to be supportive of the church in his book Mein Kampf, Hitler’s religious and educational policies “were inconsistent with Christianity.”8
Indeed, Hitler was conciliatory to Christianity, writing in Mein Kampf, “Political parties have nothing to do with religion as long as they are not alien to the nation undermining the morals and ethics of race; just as religions cannot be amalgamated with the scheming of political parties.” In 1927 Hitler ordered that statements about religion be prohibited for political reasons. His aim throughout was to avoid confrontation with the Catholic Church. In his speech to the Reichstag in 1933 prior to the Enabling Act, he declared that churches were to be an integral part of German national life, and affirmed his support for Christianity and the Catholic Church. Of course this was just a cynical exercise to win over the Catholic Centre Party whose vote Hitler needed to pass the Enabling Act. Hitler’s private attitude to Christianity and the Catholic Church was the exact opposite to his public statements. He fully intended, after dealing with the Jews and subjugating the Slavs, to eliminate Christianity. He made his views clear, declaring to his cronies, “You are either a Christian or a German. You cannot be both.”9 And again in July 1941: “Christianity is the hardest blow that ever hit humanity. Bolshevism is the bastard son of Christianity, both are the monstrous issue of the Jews.”10 Later in December he remarked “…and I shall see my task as cleaning up the church problem. Only then will the German nation be completely safe …”11
Of course Hyazinth von Strachwitz was not cognisant of Hitler’s private views. He was only aware of his supportive public stance. Just as important for Graf von Strachwitz’s opinions, the Catholic bishops’ opposition was weak, uncoordinated and at times divided. The Bavarian bishops declared in February 1931 that “As guardians of the true teaching of faith and morals, the bishops must warn against National Socialism, so long and so far as it proclaims cultural and political opinions that are incompatible with Catholic teaching.” However, after Vatican pressure was applied by the future Pope, Cardinal Pacelli, the Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Fiellhaber wrote to his bishops’ conference: “I must after what I encountered at the highest places in Rome—which I cannot communicate to you now—reserve to myself, in spite of everything, more toleration towards the new government which today is not only in a position of power—which our formulated positions could not reverse—but which achieved this power in a legal fashion.”12
The signing of the concordat between Germany and the Vatican in 1933 was for von Strachwitz—as it was for most Catholics—convincing evidence of Hitler’s positive attitude toward the church. The previous Weimer government had refused to sign a concordat as they could not agree to the Vatican’s terms. Hitler of course could, as he had no real intention of abiding by it in the long term. For Hitler, treaties like the Munich Agreement with Chamberlain, the German/Russian Pact and the Concordat were merely pieces of paper. As he declared to Generals Krebs, Westphal and Field Marshal Keitel on 31 August 1944, “I guess I have proved plenty of times during my life that I am capable of achieving political success. I don’t have to explain to anybody that I won’t pass up an opportunity.”13 A treaty’s intent and provisions were only important in as far as they suited either his short- or long-term goals. When they ceased to be helpful, they could be discarded without a moment’s hesitation.
The Concordat didn’t end Catholic opposition but it certainly muted it. Nor did it stop Hitler from persecuting and harassing Catholic priests, nuns or their institutions. Von Strachwitz would have been aware of this but would have probably put it down to the actions of petty officialdom and overzealous party functionaries, who were acting without the full knowledge or even consent of the Führer, whose attitudes and statements were clearly supportive of the church.
When Cardinal Bertram of Breslau made a statement warning against political extremism and the wickedness of racism, the Graf would have unreservedly agreed with him. Party member though he was, he did not consider himself a racist, and certainly did not support violence and hatred towards the Jews. Nor did he consider the Nazi Party as being at the political extreme, as by this time the party had become, by fair means and foul, mainstream.
So the Nationalist Socialist Party and Hitler in particular were in tune with many of Graf von Strachwitz’s ideas and had achieved a great deal that was, in his eyes, good for Germany. That then leaves the question of why he joined Heinrich Himmler’s Schutzstaffel (SS)? Party membership should have been sufficient, particularly as he was non-political. At least as far as political activism per se was concerned, there is nothing on record to suggest that von Strachwitz was anything more than a fairly passive member. Nor could he have been under great pressure to get heavily involved. The local party functionaries would have been singularly happy enough just to have someone with his title and local prominence as a member.
Why then did he join the SS? A major reason was his love of horses and the equestrian life. The Allgemeine SS (General SS) had 24 cavalry units (Standarten) with attached riding academies, which would certainly have been a big inducement for joining. Here horsemanship was the raison d’être and was highly prized, the military role being secondary. In fact, all the Standarten were disbanded at the beginning of the war,14 and these units were specifically excluded when the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal declared the SS a criminal organisation.
He may also have been persuaded or pressured to join by Heinrich Himmler. In the early years of the SS, Himmler went to great pains to recruit members of the aristocracy in order to add prestige to his nascent SS formations. These aristocrats, like Graf von Strachwitz, would join the reserve Allgemeine SS in an honorary capacity as opposed to the full-time Security (SD) headquarters or guards units, such as the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Guard Regiment or the Totenkopf (Death’s Head) units, some of which guarded the concentration camps.15 The Allgemeine SS enabled people to join on a part-time or purely honorary basis without any time-consuming or onerous duties to perform. In 1938 it had over 480,000 members, though only 13,800 were full-time. Many industrialists also joined, hoping to curry favour with Heinrich Himmler. Nevertheless, although unconnected to the nefarious activities of the other branches of the SS, and far removed from the murderous activities of the concentration camps and execution squads, the General SS was part of the organisation, and membership in it was still membership of the SS. That said, at the time the General SS was a relatively innocuous organisation to which to belong, being comparable to service in the diplomatic corps or the army, where von Strachwitz held the rank of captain in the reserve. As he was already a party member, joining the General SS was not really a big step to take; moreover, it did confer some advantages such as the Reiter Standarts which gave him access to their riding academies. Von Strachwitz could not have known just how murderous and sinister the SS was to become. At the time that he joined, it was generally considered an elite organisation of the party, and for him involved no onerous duties.
Admitted with the SS no. 82857 he was given the starting rank of Untersturmführer (2nd Lieutenant) on 20 March 1934. He was then progressively promoted to Obersturmführer (1st Lieutenant) on 15 June 1934; Hauptsturmführer (captain) on 13 September 1936; Obersturmbannführer (lieutenant colonel) on 30 January 1943; and Standartenführer (colonel) on 1 September 1943. These were standard promotions given his length of service and his decorations for bravery. The Graf neither actively sought nor desired promotion within the SS. He rapidly gained high army rank, reaching major general (General Leutnant) which was a high achievement, and for him more than sufficient.
In order to consider the Graf’s attitude to Hitler as a dictator, it must be remembered that von Strachwitz had little experience of a proper functioning democracy. The Kaiser had been an autocrat, despite having a parliament, while the immediate post-war period had been rent by insurrection, mutiny, revolution and turmoil. The Weimar Republic, Germany’s only true democracy, was weak and buffeted by events over which it had little or no control. For many Germans, including the army, the experience was a bad one, and they looked for a strong leader to restore Germany’s prominence and prosperity. For von Strachwitz, Hitler’s assuming supreme power was not necessarily a matter for concern. He also judged Hitler by the standards set for normal people, not realising that Hitler was anything but normal. Hitler was totally devoid of any conscience, bereft of compassion, with absolutely no moral compass. Deeds that were evil by any normal standard were acceptable to him as either necessary or convenient in order to meet his aims and manifest destiny. If millions had to die, including his own people, then so be it, morality had nothing to do with it. His only true love, if it could be called that, was his belief in himself, his iron will and destiny. The lives and sacrifices of others meant absolutely nothing to him. He made his attitude clear in a meeting on 31 August 1944 with Generals Krebs and Westphal and Field Marshal Keitel, his toadying commander of the OKW:16
I think it’s pretty obvious that this war is no pleasure for me, for five years I have been separated from the rest of the world. I haven’t been to the theatre. I haven’t heard a concert, and haven’t seen a film. I live only for the purpose of leading this fight because I know that if there is not an iron will behind it, this battle cannot be won.17
With millions dead, wounded, crippled, traumatised, homeless, tortured and suffering from hunger, fear and exhaustion, all Hitler could think of was is his own petty inconveniences. The death and suffering of others, even his own people, just didn’t matter.
So ultimately Hyazinth Graf von Strachwitz was duped by Hitler, but he was not alone. Hitler also deceived world leaders, politicians, the army, the church and the German people.
NOTES
1. D. J. Goodspeed, The German Wars (Bonanza Books, NY, 1985).
2. Jan Friedmann, Spiegel Online, International Article.
3. Rohm, who was a homosexual, which Hitler conveniently overlooked, wanted the SA to become the people’s army and the nation’s bearer of arms, which the army naturally vehemently opposed. He also opposed Hitler on ideological grounds, believing that the socialism in the party’s name actually meant what it said.
4. This oath was used by many German officers as an excuse not to act against Hitler, even after they knew of his grossly criminal actions and incompetence. For some, their personal code of honour far outweighed the greater imperative of morality and decency.
5. Knappe, Soldat.
6. Unlike his fellow dictator Joseph Stalin, who evoked fear and dislike not just with his immediate entourage but his family.
7. It didn’t do Blomberg much good however, Hitler sacking him after complaints about his second marriage to a former prostitute.
8. John Cornwall, Hitler’s Pope (Viking), pp.108–109. It is perhaps worth remembering that Hitler was an Austrian Catholic, albeit one who rejected his church.
9. Hitler’s Pope.
10. Hitler’s Pope, p.261, citing Adolf Hitler: Monologue in Führerhauptquartier 1941–1944 (Hamburg, 1980), p.41.
11. Hitler’s Pope, p.261.
12. Hitler’s Pope, p.137.
13. Felix Gilbert (trans. and ed.), Hitler Directs His War (Award Books, 1950).
14. The Waffen SS, however, established several cavalry divisions during the war which performed effectively as mounted infantry. Hermann Fegelein, Hitler’s future brother-in-law, whom he had executed in 1945, commanded a cavalry division in Russia. Two SS cavalry divisions—the 8th and 22nd—were annihilated in the siege of Budapest in 1945. Several other units fought the partisans in the east.
15. The Allgemeine SS consisted of all the branches except the Waffen SS but each branch used its own title, i.e. RSHA, SD, etc., and the Allgemeine SS attended to the part-timers.
16. Oberkommando de Wehrmacht—High Command of the Armed Forces.
17. Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War, p.161.