SIX
WHILE THE GERMANS WERE BUSILY BATTERING POLAND into submission the French were largely content to do nothing. Certainly they had to complete their mobilisation, but they nevertheless had sufficient troops and tanks on the ground to make life exceedingly difficult for the Germans, so as to force them to take some divisions from Poland to reinforce the mere 28 divisions they had guarding their frontiers. The French excuse was that they were waiting for the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to come over and deploy for action. They did manage to make an incursion into Germany, but it was only of short duration, and far too small to have any effect or unduly worry the Germans. The Poles, who had every right to expect some assistance, and planned their strategy on receiving some, were cruelly disappointed. It was all the more disappointing as France had, to quote General Heinz Guderian:
The strongest land army in Western Europe, France, possessed the numerically strongest tank force in Western Europe. The combined Anglo–French forces in the West in May 1940 disposed some 4,000 armoured vehicles: the German Army at that time had 2,800, including armoured reconnaissance cars; and when the attack was launched only 2,200 of these were available for the operation.1
He went on to say that the “French tanks were superior to the German ones both in armour and gun calibre, though admittedly inferior in control facilities and speed.”2
With better leadership and tactics the French could and should have smashed the German panzer arm but, still traumatised by memories of World War I, they lacked the motivation for a hard-fought war. They were more than happy to sit behind their heavily fortified Maginot Line and hold the Germans off. They applied World War I tactics to their armoured force, using it in separated, small amounts as infantry support, rather than en masse as a hard-hitting break-through or annihilation force. Used in this way, even their superior tanks could not match the massed might of the German panzers. Nevertheless as reluctant to fight as their men may have been, the French High Command was still supremely confident it could halt the German offensive when it came.
The British for their part were only slightly more motivated, and the will to tear out the heart of the Hun was sorely lacking. As for their tank force, it was used in the same manner as the French and was therefore no match for the Germans. All this would change, but only after the Battle of France was over.
Hitler moved his divisions from Poland to the West and waited. The winter of 1939/40 was bitterly cold and all sides seemed content to try and keep warm by staying indoors and avoid the inconvenience of fighting. The Allies called it the Phoney War, and the Germans the Sitzkreig.
The Allies considered several options. One was to move their forces along Belgium’s main line of defence running from Antwerp to the Meuse, provided the Belgians invited them in before the Germans invaded. The second option was to advance on the left to the line of the Scheldt as far as Walcheren and level up with the Belgians at Antwerp while advancing along the Meuse from Grivet to Namur. The Belgians were understandably less than enthusiastic with this plan, as it meant abandoning most of their country to the Germans. The third option, and the one adopted as a compromise, was to advance to the River Dyle with a defence line from Antwerp through Wause to Namier. The Belgians assured the French commander, Marshal Maurice Gamelin, that they would construct defences along the Dyle. This plan shortened the line by 70+ kilometres leaving 20 divisions for a strategic reserve.3
All these options were defensive in nature. A war of manoeuvre, to encircle and destroy the German invaders was never envisaged. France’s credo in WWI had been the offensive and attack, but it had had that concept knocked out of it by the bloody battles, mutiny and near-defeat in the war.
Not to be outdone in lacking imagination, the Germans came up with a variation of the old Schlieffen Plan that had been used in a modified version in the previous war. The changes were not as bold as had been planned for World War I. The Germans would still invade poor little Belgium, and this time Holland as well, scythe around into France, capture whatever territory they could, and finally destroy the Allied armies coming to meet them. If it all sounded very simple and obvious, it was. It was not intended to end the war as quickly as von Schlieffen’s original plan had been.4
So the scene was set for a long drawn-out slugging match, until German General Erich von Manstein came along with his own variation, which was to use the Schlieffen-like offensive as a feint, but launch the real attack behind the Allied armies once they had moved toward Belgium. His thrust, dubbed “Sichelschnitt” (sickle stroke) would be launched through the Ardennes Forest region, which the French considered impassable for tanks. Von Manstein’s criticisms of the German High Command’s plan, and persistence in advocating his own, annoyed the German planners, so they relegated him out of the way by giving him command of an Infantry Corps and hoped he would finally keep silent. Not to be undone, while on a courtesy visit to Hitler as a new corps commander, von Manstein outlined his plan to the Führer, who liked it. Hitler then passed it on for adoption, much to the chagrin of his planners. He may have been given some extra incentive to adopt it after some Luftwaffe staff officers whose aircraft crashed with details of the original plans, fell into Allied hands. Either way, it turned out to be one of Adolf Hitler’s better decisions.
While the phony war was ebbing slowly away, Hyazinth von Strachwitz and the 1st Panzer Division concerned themselves with repair and maintenance of equipment after the rigours of the Polish campaign. Sorting out their supplies, which involved von Strachwitz directly, and above all in training exercises at all levels. Decorations were also given out, with Graf von Strachwitz being given his Iron Cross (2nd Class), which had been awarded for his actions in Poland. His award consisted of the Third Reich’s German eagle clasp to be appended to the buttonhole ribbon of his Iron Cross (2nd Class) from World War I.
He was preparing to meet his old foe, the French, and this time was more confident of victory. The German Army was bloodied, and had gained valuable experience fighting the Poles. They had learned from their mistakes and there had been many, including the use of tanks in urban combat. The 4th Panzer Division had lost 60 tanks fighting in Warsaw’s outer suburbs, so standard practice was now to use infantry in street fighting, and tanks only if absolutely necessary. It was a valuable dictum but one that would be continually abused by infantry commanders, unaware of a tank’s limitations in built-up areas. They also learnt the limitations of their weapons and had a greater appreciation of what could or could not be achieved, and how to use them to their best advantage.
Von Strachwitz’s eldest son, also called Hyazinth, would also be joining his father in the French campaign. He too had joined the Panzer arm and was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in the 16th Panzer Regiment as a platoon commander. This was a source of both pride and concern for von Strachwitz as his son was now following in his father’s footsteps, by joining not only the army but a panzer division. He was not only following in the cavalry tradition, but being in a tank also increased his survivability over leading from the front in the infantry, where the ultimate casualty rate was around 96%.
On 1 march 1940, the 54-year-old Generalmajor Freidrich Kirchner took over command of the division. Born in 1893 he was only eight years older than von Strachwitz, but had made a career in the military, serving in the Reichswehr between the wars when the Graf had returned to his estates. He was a very capable, if not flamboyant, commander of armour, and would rise to the rank of General of Panzer Troops, as corps commander, and be awarded the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords. He would also be injured in the French campaign when a German vehicle ran over one of his legs.5 Von Strachwitz did not get to meet his new commander at the time, as he was in hospital suffering from meningitis. The Pomeranian Colonel Johannes Nedtwig, a future 5th Panzer Division commander, commanded the 1st Panzer Regiment. Lt. Colonel Hero Breusing commanded the 2nd Panzer Regiment. He would go on to command the 122nd Infantry Division as a Generalmajor. Graf von Strachwitz was in this regiment’s 1st Battalion. The infantry battalions had one or two companies equipped with half-tracked armoured personnel carriers (APCs), known as Schutzenspahwagons (SPWs), which were a major innovation. The quantity was increased to equip a full battalion later in the war but there were never enough to go around to equip a regiment, so panzer divisions still had to rely on trucks as the main means of transport for their infantry. Increasingly, the infantry would ride on the tanks themselves.
The division was then transferred to the Mosel and southern Eifel where it was attached to the XIX Motorised Corps commanded by General Heinz Guderian.
On 9 May Adolf Hitler arrived at his forward HQ, dubbed the Eagle’s Nest, to direct Operation Case Gelb (yellow), the attack in the west. On the same day Graf von Strachwitz returned from another sojourn in hospital, where he had been since 28 April for a foot injury. All along the frontier, German forces moved up to their assembly positions for the invasion. The French had timely warning provided by their military attaché in Switzerland, as well as by aerial reconnaissance. In any case, the massive amount of activity on the German side of the border could not be missed. For instance, the buildup for the thrust through the Ardennes created an almost stationary line up of vehicles from Koblenz to the border. The noise alone, if nothing else, should have woken French General Maurice Gamelin up to the fact that something was afoot.
At 4:00 a.m. on 10 May, the 75 German divisions of the invasion force attacked across a 280-kilometre front into Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and France, with air strikes, infantry assaults, armoured thrusts and paratroop landings. The last included a particularly daring drop on top of the supposedly impenetrable Belgium fortress of Eben Emael. On the same day, Great Britain replaced its pacifist Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, with the pugnacious Winston Churchill.
The thrust through the Ardennes was a risky gamble involving five armoured and three motorised divisions, comprising 1,500 armoured vehicles and 130,000 men with thousands of trucks, cars and motorcycles, clogging up the roads in a long winding traffic jam that invited aerial attack. But none came, because Gamelin regarded the Ardennes as “Europe’s best tank obstacle.”6
The spearhead of the Ardennes thrust was General Guderian’s XIX Corps, which included the 1st Panzer Division with Graf von Strachwitz still serving as a supply officer. It crossed the Luxembourg frontier at 5:30 a.m. near Wallendorf and headed for Martelange. With its tanks leading the way it attacked the fortifications on either side of Neufchâteau where it engaged the Belgian Chasseurs Ardennais and units of French cavalry, which quickly withdrew after a brief firefight. The division then took Bertix but was halted at Bouillon by strong French resistance, which lasted throughout the night.
The following morning at 7:45 a.m., 1st Panzers’ 1st Infantry regiment, led by Lieutenant Colonel Balck, mounted a strong attack, supported by heavy artillery fire, which breached the French defences and took the town. Hermann Balck was a Prussian who would rapidly rise to become a General of Panzer troops and an army commander. He was one of the elite few to be awarded the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds.
The bridge over the Samois had been destroyed, so the engineers began constructing a new one. Later in the day, General Guderian paid a visit and experienced his first air attack as French aircraft attempted to destroy 1st Panzer’s bridge.7 The 1st Panzer Regiment set up its HQ at a small hotel north of Bouillon, and Guderian paid another visit only to be bombed again, this time by Belgian planes attacking the panzer regiments’ encampment.
By 13 May, Guderian’s XIX Corps had crossed the Meuse at Sedan. They were supported by twelve squadrons of Junkers 87 Stuka dive-bombers that attacked from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. in continuous waves. These unceasing attacks had a devastating effect on French morale, far in excess of the actual damage inflicted. The Stukas were equipped with sirens that wailed like a banshee as they dived. This frayed the nerves, especially with the knowledge that at the end would be an explosion that could tear someone apart. The artillery crews dived for cover and refused to fire their guns, which were left exposed in the open. The infantry cowered trembling in their trenches, and offered very little resistance. So the Germans crossed the river virtually unopposed. Their penetration into the French rear sowed panic among the second-line troops who simply fled. The French guns, which should have caused fearful execution at the German crossing points, were simply abandoned. Thousands of French soldiers were captured, having surrendered or simply been overtaken by the advancing Germans.
On 14 May, the 1st Panzer took Chehery, while in Holland the Luftwaffe bombed an almost defenceless Rotterdam, killing 30,000 innocent civilians. The French sent in General Charles de Gaulle to lead a counterattack against the growing panzer bulge in their midst. De Gaulle, who considered himself an armoured commander par excellence, was easily repulsed.
At Chehery, 1st Panzer destroyed 50 French tanks, so a pleased Guderian paid them another visit. Soon after he had left, German Stukas dive-bombed 1st Panzer positions by mistake, causing heavy casualties. Guderian was still bringing the bombers with him.
Together with the 2nd Panzer Division, 1st Panzer then headed for the Ardennes canal, crossing and capturing Snigly and Vendresse in quick succession despite ferocious French opposition, which caused infantry casualties and tank losses.
On 16 May, Guderian drove to 1st Panzer’s HQ to ascertain the current position. He was told the situation was still unclear but heavy fighting had been reported at Bouvellemont. He dashed there, and in his memoirs described the situation he found:
In the main street of the burning village I found the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Balck, and let him describe the events of the previous night to me. The troops were over-tired, having had no real rest since the 9th of May. Ammunition was running low. The men in the front line were falling asleep in their slit trenches, Balck himself, in wind jacket and with a knotty stick in his hand, told me that the capture of the village had only succeeded because when his officers complained against the continuation of the attack, he had replied: “In that case I’ll take the place on my own!” and had moved off. His men had therefore followed him. His dirty face and his red-rimmed eyes showed that he had spent a hard day and a sleepless night. For his doings on that day he was to receive the Knight’s Cross.8
On 17 May, French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud9 replaced General Gamelin with General Maxime Weygand, who was a much better soldier than Gamelin, albeit more aged. He tried manfully to restore the situation, even dismissing 15 French generals to try and instill some fighting spirit into the remainder, but it was to no avail. On the same day, General Guderian met with his superior, General von Kleist, which developed into a blazing row.
I was personally to report to General von Kleist who would come to see me at my airstrip at 07:00 hours. He was there punctually and without even wishing me a good morning, began in very violent terms to berate me for having disobeyed orders. He did not see fit to waste a word of praise on the performance of the troops. When the first storm was passed, and he had stopped to draw breath, I asked that I might be relieved of my command. General von Kleist was momentarily taken aback, but then nodded and ordered me to hand over my command to the most senior general in my corps. And that was the end of our conversation.10
Reading his account one would believe that Guderian was serenely calm and polite throughout. He not only had a fiery temper—he even had screaming matches with Hitler later in the war—but was also extremely argumentative and demanding, as he showed during the opening months of Operation Barbarossa. He was in addition a prickly, stubborn and difficult subordinate, so it is inconceivable that he did not fly back at von Kleist and give as good as he got. His offer of resignation was probably angrily shouted out, rather than given calmly as his memoir recounts. In the event Colonel-General von Rundstedt, the army group commander, sent Colonel-General List to calm the situation and stop Guderian’s resignation from going ahead.
The altercation between von Kleist and Guderian would poison future relations between the two men. This became noticeable during the invasion of Russia when each general commanded his own panzer group, with von Strachwitz then serving in von Kleist’s group. It made for poor cooperation between the two, when cooperation, given the stretched resources of the Germans, was paramount.
While the generals were dealing with their differences, the war went on, and 1st Panzer kept up its advance to capture Ribemont and Crécy, the site of the famous battle between the French and the English. It then crossed the Oise and established a bridgehead across the Somme near Perrone, an advance so rapid that several French staff officers were captured while venturing towards Perrone to ascertain what was going on.11 The 1st Panzer attacked Amiens on 20 May, capturing it by midday, then continued to advance another 8 kilometres. Its progress was continuously stalled by long columns of refugees filling the roads, who were too slow to escape the Germans. These civilians didn’t know which way to flee and were often overtaken by the fighting, being strafed and bombed by mistake. They became a familiar sight for von Strachwitz as he often moved along with the spearheads. He just couldn’t keep himself back and became a familiar sight to the front-line troops, particularly as his decorations had not yet become commonplace, and he wore a thin black moustache which was unusual among German officers.
The next objectives were the French channel ports, with 1st Panzer given the objective of taking Calais. To assist it, Guderian gave it the Infantry Regiment Grossdeutschland which—after it became a panzergrenadier division—would later become Graf von Strachwitz’s parent unit. Fierce fighting took place at Desvres south of Boulogne where some British units were encountered. The Royal Air Force made its presence known with several strafing and bombing attacks. While still on its approach march to Calais, Guderian diverted the division to Dunkirk, then Gravelines. Meanwhile the Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler (Adolf Hitler’s SS Bodyguard) was attached to Guderian’s Panzer Corps, a unit von Strachwitz would fight alongside in the battles around Kharkov in the Ukraine.
Kirchner’s division reached the Aa Canal on 25 May and was abruptly ordered to halt. This puzzled von Strachwitz and the other officers of the division, for there seemed no reason for it. Certainly the men were tired and the vehicles needed maintenance, but not urgently so, and not enough to halt the division in mid-march. In fact all the panzer divisions had been halted, on Hitler’s personal orders. Debate still goes on as to the reason for the halt. One possibility was that he wished to show good will to the British before his peace offer in the Reichstag, but if that was the case then why did he give in to Goering’s boasting that the Luftwaffe would destroy the British Expeditionary Force from the air. One reason Hitler put forward was that the ground was not suitable for tanks, but his commanders would have told him otherwise. It may have been nervousness about letting his panzers become involved in a slugging match in built-up areas, on soft ground, against a desperate BEF. He would have envisaged that the casualties to his precious panzers would have been enormous. This was important, as already he was planning a massive expansion of the panzer force and would need every tank available to create viable new divisions. If the Luftwaffe could carry out the destruction of the British with no casualties on the ground, then so much the better. Goering boasted that it could be done, and Hitler wanted to believe him. In some ways this made sense. Bombing helpless troops into submission was an easy option. Sinking large evacuation ships would cause enormous casualties, as in fact happened when the Lancastria was sunk on 16 June, during the final evacuations from France, with a loss of 3,000 men. However it was also the riskier option with a far greater chance of allowing the BEF to escape, which is what happened. The RAF was not prepared to let bombers attack unopposed, and swarmed in with the courage of desperation. The Luftwaffe spent more time defending itself than attacking the troops. Just as importantly the British used some 800 small craft, as well as large ones, in the evacuation. These small boats were hard to strafe and almost impossible to bomb, and when they were sunk, it only resulted in the loss of a small number of lives. In all, the amazing total of 338,000 troops—mainly British but also French and Poles—were evacuated. Britain had managed, through Hitler’s blunder, and its own astounding resourcefulness, to save its army to fight another day.
Graf von Strachwitz and the men of the 1st Panzer division watched as the Luftwaffe bombers and fighters went in, weaving, diving, attacking and strafing, but also engaging in endless dogfights with the defending British aircraft. The air battles raged across the sky, with planes trailing long plumes of smoke and flame and smashing into the earth nearby. It was an impressive sight, but he could only wonder how effective the bombing was, given the stiff opposition the Luftwaffe had encountered. Later he saw the devastating effects of the Stuka attacks in Russia, but these were mostly without Russian fighter opposition, so the Germans had free rein to bomb accurately and often. When Adolf Hitler finally gave his panzers the order to advance on 26 May the evacuation was all but over. Only the debris, abandoned vehicles, and equipment of the defeated British remained. Mostly, only French prisoners were taken. They had defended the perimeter in heroic self-sacrifice to allow the British rearguard under Sir Harold Alexander to finally get away. When well led and motivated, the French could, and did, fight extremely well. Calais fell to the 10th Panzer Division on 26 May with 20,000 prisoners taken, of whom 4,000 were British, while 1st Panzer went on to attack Grave-lines, taking it on 29 May.
Guderian was given his own Panzer Group on 28 May in recognition for his superlative results and command abilities. 1st Panzer was then transferred to the XXXIV Army Corps of the Panzer Group. The Corps also had the 2nd Panzer Division and the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division. The term “motorised” was used to denote one of the new divisions that used trucks for all its transport needs. The other infantry divisions, the majority, relied on horses and wagons with only a small number of trucks, cars and motorcycles. So much for the Germans being a mechanised army. The situation did not improve as the war dragged on. It only got worse. The need got greater, but trucks got scarcer, due to attrition through enemy action, overuse, breakdowns, neglect and the stress of unsuitable roads and terrain. The Germans did capture thousands of French vehicles, but even these proved to be insufficient, and finding spare parts caused problems. The motorised divisions were eventually, later in the war, given a battalion of tanks, or more usually assault guns, and designated panzergrenadier divisions.
With its new corps posting, 1st Panzer had to move to its new assembly area, which with detours for blown bridges, meant a road march of over 300 kilometres. By this time the troops and vehicles were exhausted and run down. Little or no maintenance had been possible, and supplies had trouble keeping up with the fast-moving spearheads, a portent of what would become a crisis in Russia. The Graf was not immune to the supply problems, with which he was directly involved, nor the physical exhaustion. He was older than most in the division, and not being involved directly in the fighting, did not have the effects of adrenaline and sheer determination to keep him going. A few days of rest were finally ordered. The Graf didn’t take advantage of these as he was too restless a spirit to sit still for long, and took himself off with his driver to conduct his own forward reconnaissance.
Approaching a small town, along a narrow road bordered by a stone wall on either side, he unexpectedly came up against a barrier with a guardpost. Von Strachwitz realised that the road led directly to a French army camp. He ordered his driver to halt, then considered his options while the sentry watched them curiously. If they turned the car quickly it would alarm the sentry; if they did it slowly, the sentry could not help but see the German Balkan cross painted on the car door. Either way he would probably fire, at close range. Boldness was von Strachwitz’s best option, and characteristically he took it, ordering his driver to drive forward slowly. The driver stopped at the barrier, and the Graf got out of the car, slowly approached the sentry and asked to see the commandant in flawless French –-his years in French prisons were at last proving useful.
After staring for a moment, the sentry lifted the barrier, and led von Strachwitz through to the orderly room, where he introduced himself to the lieutenant: “I am Captain Comte von Strachwitz of the German 1st Panzer Division” (using the French “Comte” for Count, to emphasise his title). He always used his title and insisted his troops used it in preference to, or with, his military rank. It was a practice he continued throughout the war, even after he attained the rank of general.
Von Strachwitz continued before the lieutenant could reply, demanding to see the commandant. Shocked, the lieutenant complied, while the Graf waited, seeming quite relaxed. When the lieutenant returned with the commandant, von Strachwitz explained that he had come to call for the camp’s surrender, adding that there was an entire German armoured division just a short distance down the road. He said that his divisional commander had ordered him to arrange for the camp’s capitulation, wishing to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. He added that the French could of course choose to fight, but had no chance against an entire armoured division. The commandant, who knew that his signals battalion had no chance against an armoured division, left to consult his officers while von Strachwitz again relaxed, smoking a cigarette.
Von Strachwitz’s plan was very clever: even if the French rejected the demand, they would have to let von Strachwitz go, as he was ostensibly an emissary and would be required to report back. Thus he could simply walk back to his car and go. This was the main point of the whole charade, to allow him and his driver to escape unscathed. He then would return with units of his division and his prediction to the commandant would prove true. If the enemy by some chance did decide to accept his surrender demand then that was an unexpected bonus.
The commandant, clearly upset, returned and accepted von Strachwitz’ offer, asking for the terms of surrender. Hiding his shock, von Strachwitz made some up, then watched out the window as men scurried around the camp, gathering their possessions, with their NCOs barking orders.
When they were finished, von Strachwitz saluted the commandant and got back in his car, still expecting the French to realise the ruse and take him prisoner. But it didn’t happen. Instead, in orderly formation, the French battalion marched out, almost happily it seemed, and followed von Strachwitz toward their captivity. Singlehandedly he had captured a battalion of some 600 officers and men.
The surrender of the French solidified his reputation as a daredevil and an officer of exceptional bravery. It assured his promotion to major, which he received at the end of the campaign, and helped earn him the Iron Cross (1st Class), 1939 Eagle Clasp which he wore above his Iron Cross (1st Class) from World War I.
The episode showed clearly von Strachwitz’s ability to think quickly and clearly in a crisis situation. This was absolutely vital for a successful armoured commander who has to deal with fast-moving and changing battle conditions. It showed boldness and unorthodoxy—two of his personal characteristics—and above all an ability to read his enemy. He knew his surrender demand was a wild gamble but not an outrageous one. He had observed the poor fighting spirit and morale of the French. Many of their units—but by no means all—had been quick to surrender, often without putting up a fight. So the possibility of the French accepting his demand was a real one.
This ability to read a situation was not uncanny; he was simply good at closely observing his enemy, his tactics, motivation, fighting skills, morale, training and national characteristics, then apply the knowledge intelligently. To do this he had to see through the turmoil, noise, confusion, chaos and fear of death, which formed a pall over a battle, preventing the clarity needed for focused observation. Once this was done it was a matter of applying the knowledge and information acquired. It sounds simple enough, but in reality is difficult to do, especially on an ongoing basis. Distractions, exhaustion, demanding duties, personal needs and fears all get in the way. It needs conscious effort to acquire the knowledge and persist with it, as times and conditions change. Finally it requires the ability to arrive at the right conclusions and to apply them correctly, for knowledge on its own is not sufficient. This is where he did have a gift. He had a combination of intelligence, clarity of thought, courage and above all boldness. These were his personal characteristics which put together made him a formidable adversary, and which he would use to such deadly effect in the east.
On the other side of the ledger, von Strachwitz was inordinately proud, sometimes to the point of arrogance. He could be haughty, which came from his aristocratic upbringing, and was a prickly and difficult subordinate, not suffering fools gladly even when they were his superiors. He was stubborn and determined to get his way, especially when he thought he was right, which was most of the time. He was a strong personality with a determined character, who drove himself and others hard. Being very focused, he could appear to be aloof, but in fact he wasn’t. However, he was urbane, could be very charming and exceedingly polite if he had to be. He had a sardonic sense of humour and was considerate. He cared for his troops, and if his actions seemed rash, foolish even, it was because he considered it the best course of action to not only succeed but to keep his men alive. He was in every sense a true cavalier, and one of the last cavalrymen.
Having returned to the bosom of his division with his booty—which included the equipment and vehicles of the signals battalion—von Strachwitz continued with his division’s advance. On 9 June the 1st Panzer was located just north of the small town of Chateau-Porcien, ready to move to the bridgehead there. From the bridgehead the division made some rapid advances as the French changed their tactics, choosing to abandon the open ground and only defend the woods and villages where the German tanks were at a disadvantage.
The 1st Panzer then attacked along both banks of the Retourne with the tanks on the south bank and the infantrymen on the north. The division reached Juniville in the afternoon and while still in march formation was attacked by a French armoured force. A tank battle quickly developed. The French pressed their attack, their heavier guns smashing apart the more lightly armoured Mark IIs and IIIs of the Germans, whose only hope was to get in close, or manoeuvre to the rear or flanks of the larger French tanks, where their amour was thinnest. The French were outnumbered and in the end outmanoeuvred, but gamely fought on. Smoke and dust shrouded the battlefield and explosions rent the air as tanks were hit and their fuel and ammunition ignited. Tank crews from disabled tanks scattered in all directions, seeking safety from the inferno only to be cut down by machine-gun fire or crushed to a bloody pulp under the treads of an enemy tank.
The Germans threw everything into the fight, even their half-tracked light anti-aircraft guns, one of which was blown up with the loss of seven killed or wounded, but they managed to destroy at least one British Mark IIA light tank. Even Guderian got involved: “I attempted in vain to destroy a chap with a captured 47mm anti-tank gun; all the shells I fired at it simply bounced harmlessly off its thick armour. Our 27mm and 20mm guns were equally ineffective against this adversary. As a result we inevitably suffered, sadly, heavy causalities.”12
The battle lasted for two murderously gruelling hours before the French finally gave up and retreated. They left a battlefield strewn with burnt-out and disabled tanks, and dead and wounded spread over a wide area. The Germans would recover their disabled tanks, the French had to abandon theirs.
The 1st Panzer Division then put in a classic attack with artillery, tanks and infantry capturing a village and advancing towards Bétheniville, when the French counterattacked with 50 tanks. They didn’t press their attack and were repulsed. The Germans then captured the villages of Beine-Nauroy and St Hilaire le Petit in quick succession.13
On 14 June the Germans entered Paris, which had been declared an open city. It was a sad day for France. At the same time 1st Panzer reached Saint-Dizier taking numerous prisoners from the French 3rd Armoured Division, 6th Colonial Infantry Division and 3rd North African Division. These and other French colonial troops from Algeria and Morocco formed a significant part of the French Army, and while some fought extremely well, most were keen to surrender.14
After Saint-Dizier was taken, Guderian ordered 1st Panzer to capture Langres, which it did on 15 June, taking 10,000 prisoners. However it was still not allowed to rest on its laurels, being ordered to take Gray-sur-Saone and Besancon.
French Prime Minister Reynaud resigned on 16 June and Marshal Petain, the hero of World War I, took over. He immediately requested an armistice. The Germans tarried however, and it would be another nine days before they finally agreed. On the 15th the French High Command ordered their now totally redundant troops on the Maginot Line to fight their way out. On the 17th and 18th the British evacuated 136,000 of their remaining troops, together with 20,000 Poles who had been fighting the Germans, and who would form the basis of the Free Polish Army. They were taken off from the French ports on the Cherbourg peninsula.15
In the meantime, the 1st Panzer took part in the capture of Besançon on 17 June, capturing 30,000 prisoners.16 From there it advanced to Montbéliard. On reaching that town Major Walther Wenck, the division’s operations officer, advised that he had sufficient fuel to keep going on to the fortress town of Belfort. Guderian approved and they advanced, taking the surrender of numerous columns of dispirited French troops along the way. The town itself was quickly taken but not the forts, which refused to surrender.
General Guderian caught up with the division and paid a visit to General Kirchener at the hotel where he had made his headquarters. On his arrival he was informed that General Kirchener was taking a much-needed bath. Rather than enquire why Kirchener was taking a bath rather than a fort, Guderian contented himself with eating a hearty breakfast which had been prepared for the French staff officers who had been the hotel’s previous occupants.17 He then stayed to observe the division’s attack on the forts. Waiting with him, but not part of his entourage, was Hyazinth von Strachwitz.
While the forts were being taken, other units of the division under Colonel Nedtwig reached Giromagny, north of Belfort, and took 10,000 prisoners, 40 mortars and seven aircraft. From Belfort, the division took the heights of Belchen, Ballon de Servance and Le Tillot. The French were now in a state of complete collapse, and all that remained for the division to do was gather prisoners and secure French equipment. The campaign was all but over.
In six weeks, France, along with Belgium and Holland had fallen. Allied casualties were 360,000 dead or wounded 1,900,000 captured and 2,233 aircraft destroyed. The Germans had 153,276 casualties of which 1st Panzer’s losses were 45 officers and 448 other ranks.18 The Germans also lost 1,365 aircraft and 795 tanks—relatively light losses for the gains achieved. The French had fought badly, the English gamely and the Germans superbly. It gave the Germans confidence to take on new conquests, and while they would continue to fight exceedingly well, in the end it would not be enough.
NOTES
1. General Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (Futura Publications 1952), p.94.
2. Ibid.
3. D. J. Goodspeed, The German Wars (Bonanza Books, NY, 1977), p.350.
4. Ibid., p.352.
5. Kirchner was a solid, capable commander and perhaps deserves a better reputation than he got.
6. Dennis Showalter, Hitler’s Panzers (Berkley Publishing, NY, 2009), p.104.
7. Guderian, Panzer Leader, p.100.
8. Ibid., pp.107–108.
9. Reynaud would go on to become a leading collaborator with the Nazis.
10. Ibid., p.109.
11. Ibid., p.111.
12. Ibid., p.125.
13. Ibid., p.26.
14. They fought harder in the Allied invasion of Italy, and later Germany, as part of the Free French forces.
15. Goodspeed, The German Wars, p.369.
16. Horst Riebenstahl, The 1st Panzer Division 1935–1945 (Schiffer Publishing Ltd, 1990).
17. Panzer Leader, p.133.
18. R.L. Dinardo, Germany’s Panzer Arm in WWII (Stackpole Military History Series), p.109.