15

Without Gustavus 1633–4

THE HEILBRONN LEAGUE

Stabilization of the Swedish Crown

The Swedish government presented their monarch’s death as a national emergency, and encouraged the population to close ranks and secure a satisfactory outcome to the war. Material intended for an external audience depicted him dying for the Protestant cause and sought to perpetuate his memory as a reminder to Germans of Sweden’s sacrifice on their behalf. Peace was not considered, because the government feared negotiations would be interpreted as a sign of weakness, implying Swedish power had rested on the king alone.¹

Gustavus left a six-year-old daughter, Christina, and a constitution that made no provision for rule without a king. His widow, Maria Eleonora, was incapable of exercising power. Distraught at the news, she locked herself and her daughter in a room, blackening the windows. When her husband’s embalmed body eventually reached Nyköping in August 1633 she ordered the coffin be left open so she could visit him every day. Oxenstierna managed to have the corpse interred in Ridderholm church in Stockholm ten months later, but had to post guards after she tried to dig it up. The grief suggests mental instability, but may also have been an attempt to postpone her inevitable loss of influence, as control over Christina represented Maria Eleonora’s only asset. Oxenstierna finally freed Christina from her mother’s gloomy apartment by banishing the queen to Gripsholm island in 1636. She fled in disguise to Denmark four years later and spent seven miserable years in Brandenburg before her daughter consented to see her again.²

The political vacuum was filled by ten councillors of state who assumed responsibility for the regency until Christina was declared of age in 1644. The Riksdag ratified these arrangements early in 1633 and they were confirmed by constitutional reforms drafted by Oxenstierna the following year. The largely aristocratic regents were not wholeheartedly behind Oxenstierna, but all recognized him as indispensable and he was confirmed as Sweden’s high chancellor and legate in Germany in January 1633. He received wide powers, but ‘where the king would have simply ordered, the chancellor must seek to persuade and convince’.³ He remained the man on the spot, conducting policy largely on his own initiative since it took a month or more for letters to reach him from Stockholm. He maintained cordial relations with the precocious Christina who initially was in awe of him but soon began to resent his tutelage. She asserted herself after her majority, notably backing those councillors more inclined to make concessions to obtain peace. By then, however, Swedish policy was firmly established and there was little she could have done to change it and few indications that she really wanted to. Her Francophile cultural sympathies and interest in Catholicism already inclined her towards Sweden’s main ally. Her poor health and reluctance to marry proved more worrying, because they left open the question of the succession and sustained Polish hopes of recovering the crown.

The Question of Command

If the home front proved relatively unproblematic, Oxenstierna faced far greater difficulties in Germany, where the first priority was to secure the army’s loyalty. Swedish service remained attractive thanks to the prestige attached to Gustavus’s victories, and well-qualified officers continued to join after his death, but there were few native-born generals of sufficient experience and reputation to command respect. Oxenstierna was the first to recognize he could not lead himself, since his skills as a strategist fell far below those as a statesman and he lacked the personal charisma necessary for authority on the battlefield. His preferred choice was his son-in-law, Gustav Horn, himself a councillor of state since 1625. Horn was a cautious commander, unable to assert himself over the other generals. Johan Banér, a more forceful character, had yet to prove himself and fully came to the fore only once Horn was captured in 1634. Gustavus’s rising star, the artillery general Lennart Torstensson, had been captured at Alte Veste. Though released in a prisoner exchange in 1633, his health had been broken by his imprisonment in poor conditions in Ingolstadt and he remained unavailable until 1635.

Even had a suitable Swede been available, it is unlikely Oxenstierna could have imposed him on the German generals. There was never any thought of giving command to Johann Georg of Saxony, whom Oxenstierna distrusted and despised as ‘an insignificant tosspot’.⁴ Wilhelm of Weimar was formally next in line as Gustavus’s official second-in-command, but he had left the army after Alte Veste citing ill-health to mask his disappointment at not being given conquered land. Having effectively excluded himself from the top position, he tried to recover influence by organizing his own army as Sweden’s governor of Erfurt. However, he was already overshadowed by his ambitious younger brother Bernhard, who became Oxenstierna’s main problem. Interpretations of Bernhard have been coloured by nineteenth-century German historians who present him as a national Protestant alternative to both the emperor and the Swedes.⁵ His own courage and enthusiasm won loyalty from his men who became known as the ‘Bernhardines’. He was capable of sudden, bold moves that disconcerted his opponents, but often ended in near-disaster. He also frequently changed his mind, wasting time marching in different directions to little effect. This, and his subsequent defection to France in 1635, already made him a controversial figure, but it was his political ambition that caused the greatest difficulties. As the youngest of the (originally eleven) Weimar brothers, he resented deferring to his elder siblings. Their father’s arrangement of 1605 entrusting rule to them jointly left little scope for Bernhard to act as a full imperial prince. He was determined that Sweden reward him with his own principality and he insisted on being made commander.

Oxenstierna was well-aware of Bernhard’s ambitions and struggled to avoid a firm commitment that would inevitably complicate his task of persuading the emperor and other princes to accept Sweden’s own territorial demands. The situation was precarious, because ‘ownership’ of the army was unclear. German officers had raised regiments under contract with Gustavus. His death raised doubts over their continued obligations to Sweden and they were owed considerable pay arrears. There was a danger that Johann Georg would persuade the Germans that their prospects lay in joining Ferdinand in return for an amnesty and minor concessions.

The issue was debated by a special committee in Vienna that reported on 28 January 1633, condemning the restitution policies. Trauttmannsdorff, Stralendorff and Wallenstein all urged peace, but Ferdinand had not learned the lessons of the two previous years and saw the revival of the military situation as a chance to resume his hard line. Nonetheless, the death of his Swedish rival allowed Christian IV of Denmark to renew his offer to mediate, sending emissaries to Saxony and Wallenstein. Encouraged, Johann Georg still feared Swedish reprisals and so remained discreetly behind Landgrave Georg of Darmstadt who pressed on with his proposal for a temporary suspension of the Edict. Saxony briefly held direct talks with imperial representatives at Leitmeritz in March 1633, but was unable to persuade Brandenburg to abandon Sweden.⁶ Ferdinand gave ground, authorizing Trauttmannsdorff in July to offer a suspension of the Edict and a revision of the normative year to 1612, thereby safeguarding the Lutheran administrators. Denmark could recover Bremen and Verden, but Magdeburg and Halberstadt would be reserved for the emperor’s younger son, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm.

Oxenstierna moved swiftly to neutralize the threat. He rejected Bernhard’s call to combine all armies under his command for a decisive strike against the emperor. Instead, Bernhard was sent to command in Swabia and Franconia, and Horn, who was to join Bernhard from Alsace, was assigned to keep an eye on him. Banér was kept busy with the honour of taking Gustavus’s body back to Sweden. Duke Georg of Lüneburg and Landgrave Wilhelm V were left their separate commands in Lower Saxony and Westphalia respectively. The best Swedish units were withdrawn to garrison Mecklenburg and Pomerania, though Oxenstierna still hoped at this point to obtain Bremen, Verden and Mainz and left garrisons there too. A few regiments commanded by German and Bohemian exiles were assigned to assist Saxony and Brandenburg and prevent either from defecting. Command in Silesia was entrusted to Thurn. Oxenstierna knew he was a poor general, but he needed a prominent figure to counterbalance Arnim. Actual command was exercised by Duwall who refused to take orders from Duke Franz Albrecht whom Johann Georg had promoted to Saxon field marshal. Duwall’s small contingent of largely German troops was Oxenstierna’s insurance for the Oder should Saxony change sides.⁷

The League of Heilbronn

Having secured the army for the moment, Oxenstierna pre-empted Johann Georg’s attempt to draw Sweden’s German allies into a neutral party by pushing ahead with Gustavus’s planned Protestant corpus politicorum in January 1633. It was vital to move quickly because Richelieu was considering dropping Sweden in favour of sponsoring the more easily controllable Saxony.⁸ French subsidy payments had already slowed down during 1632 and stopped altogether after Gustavus’s death. Richelieu sent the marquis de Feuquières to assess who would be the better partner for France. Oxenstierna opened his congress in the relatively safe Protestant imperial city of Heilbronn in March, where he received strong support from the minor counts and princes already compromised as Sweden’s collaborators. By contrast, Johann Georg’s rival meeting in Dresden was poorly attended. Anxious France should not fall between two stools, Feuquières renewed the Treaty of Bärwalde on 19 April. Crucially, France agreed to continue paying subsidies to Sweden, rather than to the new alliance Oxenstierna had negotiated with the German collaborators in Swabia, Franconia and the Upper Rhine. This enabled Oxenstierna to retain the commanding position in the organization that was formally constituted as the League of Heilbronn on 27 April 1633. The Germans agreed to continue fighting until Sweden secured ‘proper’ compensation for its efforts, while Oxenstierna promised to press the emperor to restore the Empire to its pre-war condition, which now became the official League negotiating position. They accepted Oxenstierna as League director with an absolute veto in military affairs. He was to be advised by ten councillors, three of whom were Swedes while the others were largely veteran collaborators like Count Solms-Hohensolms, or other enthusiasts like the Württemberg chancellor, Dr Löffler.

Formation of the League was a remarkable achievement given the circumstances. The organization’s effectiveness depended, however, on continued military success to persuade its members to remain on board. Members promised to make regular contributions to maintain 78,000 soldiers, but the organization was not large enough to raise the money needed to pay these men properly. At best, members’ contributions would raise 2.5 million tlr a year, whereas the real cost of the army was 9.8 million. Richelieu was also not happy at Sweden’s autonomy and directed Feuquières to undermine Oxenstierna’s authority as director. Feuquières held out the offer of switching French subsidies to the League if members accepted that country’s protection. This policy was contradictory. France needed the League as a stop-gap while it marshalled the Germans into a broad cross-confessional neutral block, but it would have to destroy the organization to achieve this goal.

Oxenstierna had to win over the Lower and Upper Saxons, including Saxony and Brandenburg, for his new League to be truly effective. Feuquières came close to persuading Brandenburg’s Georg Wilhelm of the League’s merits at its first general congress that convened in July to September 1633. However, Brandenburg only joined a Franco-Swedish alliance on 28 October, not the League because this had agreed that Sweden could have Pomerania. Oxenstierna bullied Darmstadt into paying contributions by threatening to invade, but visits to Lower Saxony and Berlin all hit the Pomeranian rock on which the chancellor’s ‘whole German policy foundered’.⁹

The Swedish Mutiny

The deteriorating military situation hardly encouraged wider support. Aldringen had exploited the confusion after Lützen to clear southern Germany of Swedish garrisons at the beginning of 1633. Horn counter-attacked from Alsace with the Rhenish army, while Bernhard swept through Thuringia with the remnants of the royal army, picking up units there and in Franconia. Having crossed the Danube at Donauwörth, he joined Horn at Augsburg on 9 April, creating a total force of 42,700 men. These outnumbered the Bavarians and Imperialists in southern Germany by more than two-to-one, but any chance of using this superiority was wrecked by a mutiny on 30 April, just as the combined army entered Bavaria.

The soldiers had not been paid in full since 1631 and were owed bonuses promised after Breitenfeld and Lützen. Discipline was declining, as demonstrated by Bernhard’s disorderly march through Franconia and the four-day sack of Landsberg on the Lech where 300 of the surrendering garrison were cut down, along with 154 inhabitants, including children. Many have concluded that the officers had lost control and that the subsequent destruction during the war was due to insubordination by ordinary soldiers.¹⁰ In fact, all the major mutinies were orchestrated by senior officers who manipulated or fanned soldiers’ grievances for their own ends.

The mutiny revealed how far Sweden had mortgaged its policy to the German officers. The sense of serving a great, victorious leader had checked discontent while Gustavus was alive. However, they were no longer prepared to wait, especially as news of the Heilbronn League and renewed French subsidy suggested Sweden could easily pay the 3 million tlr it owed them. This was not the case, nor was money alone the problem. Bernhard used the lull in official operations to attempt his own conquests, invading Eichstätt in May with the nominally mutinous troops.

Oxenstierna capitulated when Bernhard arrived in Heilbronn to press his demands. Gustavus had donated individual monasteries and districts, carefully reserving Swedish overlordship to expand his empire. The chancellor abandoned this political programme and assigned territories wholesale to satisfy the officers. The bishoprics of Eichstätt and Augsburg were sold to Colonel Brandenstein, along with four large lordships and an abbey, for 800,000 tlr and the promise of another 1 million over two years in lieu of the bishopric of Konstanz, yet to be captured. Brandenstein was an opportunist. A former Saxon officer, he deserted to the Swedes despite having been made a count by the emperor. As only a minor noble, it was impossible for him to pay these sums himself and it was accepted they would be delivered from contributions. To legitimize this licence to plunder, Brandenstein was appointed treasurer to the Heilbronn League. The arrangement typified the sort of expedients that now undermined Sweden’s war effort since it merely transferred assets to an officer in return for money the army would have raised anyway.¹¹Monasteries and districts were distributed to colonels and League war councillors. As Gustavus’s illegitimate son, Colonel Gustavsson was particularly handsomely rewarded with the city of Osnabrück. Most doubted Sweden’s long-term chances of holding these recently acquired lands and sold their new possessions at knock-down prices. In all, 250 donations were made in 1631–5, including 92 in Swabia. Those in Franconia alone were valued at 4.9 million tlr.

By far the most significant was the transfer in June 1633 of Bamberg and Würzburg to Bernhard as hereditary possessions with the title of duke of Franconia. He was to pay 600,000 tlr spread over four years over and above the contributions expected from his territories as League members. He had little time to enjoy his new status. Government was entrusted to his brother Ernst, who struggled against mounting local opposition and the hostility of the other Franconians. Their brother Wilhelm was compensated with the Eichsfeld in August. Horn had already received the Teutonic Order’s headquarters at Mergentheim the year before and opposed the mutiny, widening the rift between himself and Bernhard.

TENSION ALONG THE RHINE

Trier and Maastricht 1632–3

Bernhard and Horn did not resume operations until July 1633, by when the wider situation had shifted decidedly against Sweden. To understand this, we need to review what had happened along the Rhine since Gustavus captured Mainz at the end of 1631. Sweden’s growing difficulties removed it as a competitor to France in the Rhineland. Richelieu continued his precarious strategy of keeping Sweden embroiled in the Empire after 1631, covertly assisting the Dutch, extending protection to German Catholics and neutralizing Lorraine, all without provoking Spanish retaliation. While this continued to work into 1634, it succeeded only because Sweden remained successful in Germany while Spain suffered further reverses. These developments were viewed with deep suspicion by the Liga, which became convinced by Trier’s fate of the wisdom of its decision in 1632 to reject French protection.

Elector Sötern’s new alliance with France was unpopular among his cathedral canons who had let Spanish troops into Trier city and Koblenz before the French arrived in April 1632. Lieutenant-Colonel Bamberger, commandant of Sötern’s fortress of Philippsburg, defected to the emperor, denying France an important bridge over the Rhine that gave access round the northern end of the Black Forest. D’Effiat and a French army allegedly 23,000-strong advanced from Lorraine to eject the Spanish from Trier in May, cooperating briefly with Swedish troops to capture the Ehrenbreitstein fortress that commanded the crossing at Koblenz. Trier and Koblenz briefly changed hands again as the French were distracted by Gaston’s rising and d’Effiat’s death, but the French returned and secured them in August.¹² These exchanges were significant, because they placed both French and Swedish troops in close proximity with the Spanish just as the Dutch under Frederick Henry attacked Maastricht. Again, it looked as if Europe’s hostilities might fuse into general war.

Frederick Henry pinned his hopes on provoking an uprising in the southern Netherlands provinces thought to be growing restless at the continued burden of war. Count van den Bergh, who replaced Spinola as commander in Flanders in 1628, was convinced the conflict could not be won and had fled into nominally neutral Liège. While one Dutch column feinted at Antwerp, Frederick Henry advanced with 30,000 troops up the Meuse (Maas), through Liège, to attack Maastricht, the bishopric’s second city, on 8 June 1632. The attack infringed the neutrality agreed with Ferdinand of Cologne, who was also bishop of Liège. The Dutch had no desire to involve themselves in the Empire’s war, however; their attack was dictated by strategic reasoning, as possession of Maastricht would help cut communications between the two halves of the Spanish Netherlands. The Brussels government appealed for help. Despite the critical situation in Germany, Pappenheim took 8,000 men of the Westphalian army across the Rhine to relieve the city in return for much-needed Spanish subsidies.¹³

The siege of Maastricht drove a wedge between the two great conflicts, by obliging the Spanish to pull out of Trier and recall most of their men from the Lower Palatinate. A combined attack with Pappenheim failed to breach the Dutch siege lines on 17 August. Three days later Dutch engineers exploded mines under the walls and the surviving Spanish capitulated on 23 August. Limburg to the south-east surrendered after slight resistance on 5 September. The remaining Spanish garrisons further east on the Lower Rhine and in Westphalia were now cut off from the southern provinces.

The crisis compelled Isabella to permit the Netherlands Estates to reassemble for what would be their last meeting under Spanish rule. She already favoured peace and opened negotiations in November, while the Estates sent their own delegation as well.¹⁴ Many hoped it would lead to a general pacification across north-western Europe. Richelieu was sufficiently alarmed to send Charnacé to stiffen Dutch resolve in January 1633. Frederick Henry meanwhile continued operations to force Isabella to improve her terms, launching another offensive along the Meuse and Lower Rhine in April 1633 with 16,000 men. These reprovisioned the Maastricht garrison and captured the Rhine crossings at Rheinberg and Orsoy, reducing the Spanish holdings to Jülich itself, Düren and a few other towns west of the river. The campaign completed the reshuffling of garrisons under way since Spain abandoned most of its German outposts in 1630 (see Chapter 13, pp.436–8). The Liga forces occupying Lingen since 1630 now abandoned it to avoid contact with the advancing Dutch. The Dutch had already evacuated their posts in the duchies of Jülich and Berg, and returned those in Mark to Brandenburg control in April 1632, allowing them to concentrate their forces in the duchy of Cleves closer to home. Swedish forces on the middle Rhine had grown to 19,000 by June 1632, but 8,000 were recalled to join Gustavus at Alte Veste the following month. Though Horn pushed into Alsace, capturing the bishop of Strasbourg’s fort at Benfeld in November, he lacked the men to conquer the rest of the province. The wars remained separate because the belligerents’ interests diverged and they had no intention of making new enemies.

Lorraine 1633–4

In 1633, news that Spain was sending a new army to Alsace prompted Richelieu to settle with the duke of Lorraine. Charles IV was already wriggling free of the constraints imposed on him in June 1632 and had rebuilt his army to 9,000 men by August 1633. Renewed strength improved his credentials as a potential protector for the Rhinelanders, and the Habsburg governor in Alsace had already invited him to garrison Hagenau and Saverne in December 1632. Richelieu engineered a rupture between France and Lorraine by demanding Charles accept French jurisdiction over his subsidiary duchy of Bar, and then promptly declared him a rebel in July when he predictably refused. The French then waited until he crossed into Alsace with most of his army to relieve Hagenau which was under siege by Christian von Birkenfeld’s 8,000-strong Swedish Rhine army.¹⁵Birkenfeld caught the duke at Pfaffenhofen on 11 August, routing the Lorraine army in a battle that cost it 1,500 men.

Now that it was safe to attack, Richelieu ordered Marshal La Force to occupy Bar three days later. Reinforced to 30,000 men, La Force proceeded to overrun most of Lorraine, taking Nancy on 25 September where he captured Charles’s wife Nicole as a hostage. Charles evaded French pursuit, retreating into the Franche-Comté with 1,000 followers. His brother, Cardinal Nicolas François, initially agreed to French terms, but managed to escape Nancy disguised as a valet, while his sister Marguerite left dressed as a soldier. This provided Richelieu with the excuse to occupy the rest of Lorraine, capturing the last stronghold in August 1634. The Rhinelanders bowed to the new conditions and by January 1634 the French were admitted to Mömpelgard, Hagenau, the bishopric of Basel and the Alsatian possessions of the count of Hanau.¹⁶

The Battle of Hessisch-Oldendorf 1633

Sweden also lost its grip on north-west Germany where its local allies refused to join the Heilbronn League. Oxenstierna tried to reimpose Swedish control over them by extending the territorial concessions promised by Gustavus, but this only fuelled fragmentation as each concentrated on its own conquests. The Hessians under Melander broke into Westphalia, intent on capturing Münster, while Duke Georg and the Lüneburgers besieged the remaining imperial outposts of Corvey, Hoxter and Hameln. Duke Friedrich Ulrich refused to cooperate altogether, hoping that negotiations with the emperor would secure a return of Wolfenbüttel. The few Swedish units under Knyphausen were too small to impose any central command.

This dispersal of Swedish and allied forces allowed the Liga regional commander, Gronsfeld, to rebuild his army around the few units left by Pappenheim when he marched to Lützen. He was reinforced by 4,000 Walloons recruited by Merode with money provided by the fugitive Catholic princes in Cologne. With these he repulsed an attempt by the Swedish Rhine army to advance downstream from Mainz at the start of 1633. By June he had assembled 10,800 infantry, 3,900 cavalry and 15 guns and marched east to relieve Hameln. In a rare show of solidarity, Melander and Knyphausen force-marched to join Duke Georg at Hessisch-Oldendorf, 20km north-west of Hameln, arriving on 7 July to give 7,000 foot, 6,000 horse and 37 guns.¹⁷

The battle the next day was the largest action in Westphalia during the war and, like Steinau (1632), it allows valuable insight into the relative flexibility of seventeenth-century tactics. The allies deployed at night on a 20-metre high plateau north of the town facing north-west with their left, under Knyphausen, resting on Oldendorf and the right under Melander in front of the village of Barksen, where the ground rose sharply into the Weser hills. Georg commanded the infantry and artillery in the centre, while the entire line was protected by a marshy stream. This prevented him from crossing, but equally nullified Gronsfeld’s superior numbers of infantry. Gronsfeld deployed about 500 metres away with his left, under Geleen, largely screened from the enemy by two further streams and a wood projecting from the hills. He had slightly more infantry, but many were new recruits, while his cavalry was outnumbered. He proposed staying put, pinning the enemy down while Bönninghausen slipped past to relieve Hameln, which was now blockaded by a mere few hundred enemy musketeers. Merode and the other officers objected that they would be accused of cowardice and felt they would miss a chance to crush the enemy with one blow.

The action commenced at 7 a.m. with the customary cannonade, while opposing parties of musketeers contested possession of the wood. Melander’s regimental guns and cavalry supported their foot, riding forward in small detachments to tip the balance against Geleen’s infantry. The imperial and Liga cavalry officers, by contrast, refused to lead their units forward, arguing that they would get disordered in the trees. Geleen lost the wood and fell back, exposing the centre which was now subject to growing fire on its flank as well as Georg’s guns to its front.

Knyphausen meanwhile led 900 cavalry across the stream against the imperial right. Gronsfeld charged, expecting to drive them off the plateau, but was himself repulsed, enabling more Swedes to deploy. Further attacks were also beaten off and soon Knyphausen outflanked the imperial right, which now collapsed and fled. Geleen’s troopers gave way around the same time, leaving the infantry alone. They fought bravely until 2 p.m., but were surrounded and cut down. Only 4,200, mainly cavalry, escaped, while at least 6,000 were killed in the final stages and the pursuit. The allies lost around 300 men. It was one of the most complete victories of the war.

Hameln surrendered on 18 July, followed by Osnabrück in October. The latter remained the principal Swedish base in the region until 1643, because Oxenstierna refused to hand it over to Duke Georg. He also withdrew five of Knyphausen’s regiments to Franconia in August, weakening the common army and frustrating Hessian and Lüneburg plans to capture more land west of the Weser. Dispirited, Knyphausen resigned on 26 February 1634, leaving the surviving Swedish units effectively leaderless.

Hessian Policy

The Swedish weakness unsettled the Hessians whose operations in Westphalia were intended to conquer the bishoprics and thereby establish a land bridge to the Dutch Republic. Dutch assistance had long been sought and Landgrave Wilhelm V now redoubled his efforts, hoping the Republic would prove a more reliable partner than Sweden. Oxenstierna supported Hessian diplomacy as a device to entice the Dutch to back the Heilbronn League. Melander and 1,000 Hessian and 2,600 Swedish cavalry joined Frederick Henry’s army in August 1633. Like the earlier Swedish thrusts to Trier and Cologne, this threatened to merge the two wars. However, Frederick Henry was annoyed by the Hessians’ late arrival and thought they had only come at all because they had eaten everything in Westphalia. He sent them and the Swedes back over the Rhine in late October. The Hessians were increasingly resented by the Dutch as rivals, especially after they captured Lippstadt in December and proceeded to take the entire line of the Lippe river, occupying posts the Dutch had just returned to Brandenburg. Additional outposts gave them most of the western half of Münster next to the Dutch frontier.¹⁸

Melander pursued negotiations for a Dutch alliance into 1635, coming closest to an agreement in 1634 when the Republic offered a subsidy and 3,500 auxiliaries. Their purpose was to use the Hessians to carve out a buffer along the Dutch eastern frontier to insulate the Republic from the German war. Success depended on the Hessians capturing Münster city, which was still held by the Imperialists. For this the Hessians were too weak, and the Guelphs refused to help, preferring to besiege Hildesheim and Minden instead, finally taking them in June and November 1634 respectively.

The 1633–4 campaigns established a regional balance that persisted with minor modifications until 1648. The Swedes were restricted to Osnabrück until they conquered Bremen and Verden in 1645. The Guelphs held Minden and Hoya in north-east Westphalia, as well as Hildesheim and Lower Saxony south of the Elbe. The Hessian conquests cut the Liga and imperial positions in two, isolating the remaining garrisons along the Ems valley in east Münster from the core positions in Cologne, its associated duchy of Westphalia, and Paderborn. The Imperialists had largely lost Lower Saxony, but Wolfenbüttel remained strongly garrisoned as a staging post should their main army need to cross that region. Periodic attempts to conquer the Lippe valley proved counterproductive, as it left much of the area devastated.

The failure to evict the Hessians destroyed Westphalian hopes of neutrality. Ferdinand of Cologne had deliberately rejected Archduchess Isabella’s appeal for aid against Frederick Henry in 1633 so as not to alienate the Dutch. The Estates of his duchy of Westphalia and various other Catholic micro territories made a pact with the neighbouring Calvinist counties to maintain the neutrality of much of the area south of the Lippe that August. Meanwhile, the partial Dutch withdrawal in 1632 encouraged Wolfgang Wilhelm of Pfalz-Neuburg to declare Jülich and Berg neutral. The Estates of these two duchies renewed their alliance with their counterparts in Cleves and Mark to the same ends.

These promising developments were frustrated by the breakdown of the Dutch-Belgian talks following Isabella’s death on 1 December 1633. Olivares had long distrusted her efforts and his interim governor, the marquis de Aytona, dissolved the southern Estates assembly and helped arrest its negotiators on suspicion of involvement with Count Bergh. Dutch policy moved in a similar direction as Frederick Henry swung behind the Gomarist war party. Though Richelieu refused to sign an open alliance, he agreed on 15 April 1634 to increase the subsidy paid to the Republic since 1630 from 1 million to 2.3 million livres in return for the Dutch suspending the talks.

Disheartened, Ferdinand of Cologne saw no option but to renew efforts to eject the Hessians. For their part, the Hessians dug in, recognizing that the conquered areas not only sustained their army but were bargaining chips should their homeland be overrun. Both sides were short of men and money and viewed Wolfgang Wilhelm of Pfalz-Neuburg’s territories as the only remaining soft target. Appreciating the danger, the duke raised his army to (on paper) 7,365 to defend 52 castles and towns. This merely whetted the appetites of Ferdinand and the Hessians who hoped to incorporate his soldiers into their own forces. Ferdinand sent Bönninghausen to raid Berg, while the Hessians seized Elberfeld in November 1633, disarming the Pfalz-Neuburg garrison, forcing the men to undress and giving them pieces of their flag as clothing in a deliberate attempt to humiliate them. The emperor meanwhile backed the Estates’ refusal to pay the duke’s soldiers, in the hope that they would redirect their money to him instead. Unpaid and demoralized, the Pfalz-Neuburg soldiers deserted in droves, but the duke stuck to his neutrality.¹⁹

These events have been covered in some detail because they are generally overlooked. They demonstrate the danger posed by the Swedes’ initial appearance on the Rhine, shattering the Liga-imperial dominance that had prevailed since 1622 and creating a vacuum which was increasingly filled by France. France and Spain drew closer to war, but Europe’s conflicts remained distinct. Confessional solidarity proved insufficient to forge an alliance between the Dutch, Swedish and German Protestants. The latter remained disunited, pursuing their own objectives with little regard to Sweden and failing to capitalize on their numerical superiority. Relative failure fuelled rivalry and resentment of Sweden’s supposed lack of support, contributing to a willingness to defect to the emperor in 1635.

SPAIN INTERVENES

Wallenstein’s Secret Diplomacy

Peace was impossible as long as Swedish power in southern and central Germany remained unbroken. The task of ejecting the Swedes devolved to Wallenstein and an imperial army that totalled 72,000 men in Bohemia and Silesia, with another 30,000 scattered in garrisons across Alsace, Westphalia, Lake Constance and the Danube.²⁰ Wallenstein’s strategy hinged on persuading Saxony and Brandenburg to abandon Sweden, thereby exposing the Baltic bridgehead and isolating Swedish bases elsewhere. What he intended to follow remains uncertain, but it seems likely he sought a genuine compromise, involving a partial reversal of the Restitution Edict and the cession of at least part of Pomerania to Sweden to enable Oxenstierna to withdraw with honour. Oxenstierna negotiated with Wallenstein, because he preferred him to the Danish mediation efforts which remained totally unacceptable. Wallenstein kept Ferdinand informed, even reporting his use of Bohemian exiles as intermediaries, and relaying some information about the terms discussed.²¹

Many opposed compromise, not least Brandenburg that stood to lose Pomerania. There is little evidence that Wallenstein would have upheld the Bohemian exiles’ demands either, since he and his closest relatives were leading beneficiaries of the land transfers. His discussions with them nonetheless raised suspicions in Vienna that grew with his practice of presenting each partner with different terms. These inconsistencies became increasingly obvious as the various parties conferred and rumours leaked out. For example, the Swedes intercepted his letter to the duke of Lorraine in October 1633 which suggested that Wallenstein intended to exclude them from Germany altogether.²²

Though he sent a few units to reinforce Aldringen in Bavaria at the beginning of 1633, he wasted the opportunity presented by the Swedish mutiny. His failure to move out of the Habsburg hereditary lands left these bearing the brunt of the financial burden. Already in January 1632 he had demanded 200,000 florins up front, followed by 100,000 fl. monthly. He received at least 1.3 million to purchase artillery and equipment. Some of the cost was recouped by a second round of confiscations following the ejection of the Saxons and exiles from Bohemia in May 1632, when property worth 3 million fl. was seized from 16 lords, 126 knights and 190 commoners.²³ The windfall was soon exhausted, while Wallenstein expected Bohemia and Silesia to feed, house and clothe his troops throughout 1633. He mollified his more distinguished critics by exempting their properties from billeting. This simply shifted the burden onto the medium and lesser landlords whose peasants then fled, initiating a vicious cycle of more demands for contributions to feed his hungry troops as agriculture ground to a halt.

Instead of moving, Wallenstein sent emissaries to Arnim and Thurn in April. The moment was opportune as the formation of the Heilbronn League caused consternation in Saxony, but without the other Protestants, Johann Georg felt too weak to abandon Sweden. Arnim urged the elector to increase the army to pursue a more independent course, but there was no money. He remained suspicious of Wallenstein whose troops outnumbered his two-to-one. Rumours of his talks nonetheless alarmed Oxenstierna who ordered Banér to stay in Pomerania to take command of the Saxon forces if necessary. Reliable officers were sent to Silesia to ensure that the small Brandenburg corps there served under Swedish, not Saxon command.

Wallenstein marched with 25,000 men and 28 new cannon (cast from melted-down Prague church bells) in mid May to join Gallas who had a similar number of troops in Upper Silesia. Heavily outnumbered, Arnim retreated northwards to Langenöls near Schweidnitz. The two armies closed to within cannon shot, but Wallenstein offered a truce on 7 June 1633, which was extended for two weeks for more talks. Wallenstein ended the truce on 2 July, and tried to surprise the 1,800 allied garrison in Schweidnitz two days later, but was repulsed and fell back to Wilkau, while Arnim entrenched nearby on virtually the same ground occupied by Frederick the Great at Bunzelwitz in 1761. On 11 August Wallenstein directed Holk with 10,000 soldiers from Eger to raid Saxony to put pressure on its elector. Holk retired after two weeks and, on Wallenstein’s orders, renewed talks with Arnim who was then visiting Johann Georg. The two generals met for dinner when Holk suddenly fell ill. Fearing poison, he was assured otherwise and left in his coach to confer with his subordinates. By now it was obvious he had the plague and they refused to see him. He died by the roadside alone, his coachman having gone to fetch a priest.

Wallenstein’s behaviour was by now alienating the Spanish, who had initially welcomed his reinstatement. Olivares opened unofficial contact with the general through Quiroga and a series of special envoys who from May 1632 brought subsidies that totalled 1 million fl. by the end of 1633. Spain’s intentions were clear. The money was to bring the German war to a swift conclusion so Wallenstein could attack the Dutch. He was offered the title of duke of West Frisia, yet to be recaptured from the Republic, as compensation for the loss of Mecklenburg. He refused the bait, regarding Spain’s problems as separate from those in the Empire.²⁴

The Decision to Send Feria

Talks continued into January 1634, but from the previous February Olivares had already sought an alternative plan, resolving on substantial intervention in the Empire to reverse the deteriorating situation along the Rhine. The decision represented a significant change of course and evolved as Olivares tried to harmonize several partially contradictory objectives. One was to continue the existing policy of strengthening the emperor, but now through means other than Wallenstein. Saaveda was despatched to Munich to revive plans shelved in 1630 to elect Archduke Ferdinand as king of the Romans. This got nowhere and made it harder for Spain to win backing for Olivares’ plan to reinforce the Army of Flanders by sending reinforcements along the Spanish Road, blocked since 1632.

Feria, governor of Milan, received instructions in May 1633 to collect an army to cross the Alps and reopen the Road. This expedition would fulfil another objective by escorting Philip IV’s younger brother, Fernando, to replace the then ailing Isabella as governor of the Netherlands. With manpower declining throughout the Spanish monarchy, Olivares’ agents paid the Tirolean government to recruit 6,000 Germans, while another 4,500 Burgundians were levied in the Franche-Comté. Once Feria joined them, he should have 4,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry. This powerful Ejército de Alsacia would face down the French and restore Spanish power throughout the Rhineland.²⁵

With Fernando ill, Feria set out without him at the head of 11,000 Spaniards and Italians in August 1633, making the first transit of the Valtellina for ten years.²⁶ Richelieu had made arrangements to prevent just such a move, paying the Rhetian free states to maintain a small force under the Huguenots’ former leader Henri de Rohan since 1631. However, the cardinal proved too clever for his own good. Suspecting Rohan of plotting with the Protestant Swiss, he ordered all but one of the French-paid regiments to be disbanded at the end of 1632. News of Feria’s march prompted hasty orders for Rohan to reassemble, but it was too late and the Spanish advance guard was already in the valley.

Feria’s approach transformed the situation in Germany. Bernhard and Horn had resumed operations against Bavaria in July, while Wallenstein remained inexplicably inactive in Silesia. Ferdinand formally appealed to Philip IV to redirect Feria into Germany once he was over the Alps. By now, the emperor was seriously concerned about Wallenstein’s inactivity, which he blamed for reverses elsewhere. War Council President Schlick was sent to find out what Wallenstein was doing and why he was so adamant in opposing Feria’s march. Schlick arrived in Silesia on 22 August to discover Wallenstein had just agreed another four-week truce that was eventually extended until October. Ferdinand now broke the Göllersdorf agreement with Wallenstein, which had given him sole command of the imperial army, by placing Aldringen’s imperial detachment in Bavaria directly under the command of Maximilian on 18 September. This persuaded the elector to consent to Spanish intervention and the arrangement was confirmed when Spain granted a small subsidy to Bavaria for a year.²⁷

The Siege of Konstanz

Feria’s approach prompted Bernhard and Horn to separate their forces. The former continued operations against Aldringen and the Bavarians under Werth, but was defeated and driven from most of the earlier gains, including Eichstätt. Horn meanwhile headed south on 18 August, intending to take Konstanz and block the exit from the Tirolean passes into south-west Germany. The (then Austrian) town of Konstanz sat on a short promontory protruding from the south side of the lake. It could only be reached by crossing the Upper Rhine downstream and marching through Swiss territory to attack it from the south.

Individual Swiss had joined the Swedes, but the Protestant cantons had consistently rebuffed approaches for an alliance, knowing this would split the Confederation. Gustavus’s empire-building contradicted their republican ideals and they were antagonized by his hostility towards their Calvinist religion. Horn gambled on infringing Swiss neutrality, hoping that capturing Konstanz would persuade the Protestant cantons to join him and block the Alpine passes for good. Having left infantry and gunboats to watch the town from the northern shore, he crossed the Rhine at Stein on 7 September, arriving to bombard Konstanz the next day. He had around 10,000 men and might have broken in if he had attacked immediately, because the town had relied on Swiss neutrality and its defences only faced the lake. There were only 1,200 defenders, half of whom were militia. The bishop and clergy fled by boat to Lindau on the other side of the lake, but the local commander showed greater resolve. Gaps in the defences on the south side of the town were hastily blocked with earth, while infantry and militia were ferried over to bring the garrison to over 3,000.

Though Bernhard and others were marching to reinforce Horn, the situation grew critical with the news that Feria was across the mountains. France offered mediation, hoping to achieve Horn’s objective by persuading the town to accept neutrality with a Swiss garrison. Some citizens were willing, but the authorities refused. Only Zürich connived at Horn’s presence which the other Swiss felt was endangering their neutrality. In desperation, Horn launched a series of costly assaults against the town, but Feria with 9,200 men joined Aldringen and another 12,000 at Ravensburg on 29 September and pushed towards Überlingen near the lake’s western end to trap the Swedes in Switzerland. Having failed to take the town with a final assault, Horn retreated on 2 October, escaping just in time.

The French claimed he had withdrawn out of courtesy to the Swiss, but no one was convinced. The episode weakened the influence of Protestant militants within the Confederation and prompted the Catholic cantons to renew the 1587 transit agreement with Spain that had expired in 1626. The Confederation also incorporated Spanish Franche-Comté within their neutrality in March 1634.²⁸

Disaster

Lorraine’s unexpected and sudden collapse under French invasion that September had transformed the situation on the Rhine by the time Aldringen and Feria arrived and it was now dangerous to march through Alsace with La Force’s powerful army on the other side of the Vosges. Horn was already across the Rhine and joined Birkenfeld in northern Alsace, confining Feria and Aldringen to the south. Meanwhile, Bernhard doubled back with 12,000 men, surprising Werth’s small Bavarian detachment and capturing Regensburg on 14 November after a mere ten-day siege. The loss of such a prestigious imperial city was a major blow to the emperor and enabled Bernhard to ravage previously untouched areas in eastern Bavaria.

Aldringen was forced to send his cavalry back to Bavaria to help Maximilian, further weakening the combined army on the Rhine. With winter drawing in and no food left, Feria and Aldringen re-crossed the Rhine, harried by Horn. Weakened by plague the Habsburg forces now disintegrated. Maximilian refused to let them into Bavaria, and Ferdinand reluctantly agreed some could winter in Lower Austria with the rest going to Salzburg. Prior Friesenegger reported ‘that was a spectacle. Many companies only half strength, black and yellow faces, emaciated bodies, half covered, or hung with rags, or masked in stolen women’s clothing, looking just like hunger and need. Yet the officers next to them were handsomely and magnificently dressed.’²⁹ The archbishop of Salzburg also refused shelter and eventually the survivors joined their comrades in Austria in January 1634, by which time Feria was already dead.

The rapid spread of the war since 1631 combined with the plague to stir widespread discontent that was an important, if understudied aspect of the war. Whereas the Westphalian civic rebellion of 1622–3 (see Chapter 10) and the Upper Austrian Rebellion of 1626 (Chapter 12) contained political and religious grievances, the new unrest was fuelled largely by resentment of the soldiers and the disruption of daily life. The movement was primarily rural and uncoordinated. Peasants ambushed foraging parties and stragglers, or resisted raids on their villages. They received assistance from the authorities in areas where the imperial military presence was slight, leaving the Swedes as the primary targets for popular fury. Catholic peasants rose against the Swedes in the Sundgau, a Habsburg possession in southern Alsace, in January 1633, while those in Westphalia were joined by local nobles and Bönninghausen’s imperial cavalry to harass the Hessians. Peasants in Upper Swabia and Bamberg assisted the official militia in raiding Swedish outposts, while the Bavarians resisted Horn and Bernhard’s invasion in the summer of 1633. Swedish reprisals were swift. At least 4,000 people were killed in the Sundgau alone, while numerous villages were torched without ever entirely suppressing the guerrillas.³⁰

However, the unrest also contained a strong element of protest against the authorities who were failing in their duty to preserve tranquillity. Bavarian discontent turned against the poorly behaved imperial units left by Aldringen to defend the electorate when he marched to join Feria in September 1633 and was concentrated in the area between the Isar and Inn where these were based, and not further west towards the Lech where the Swedes were operating. Protests grew to involve at least 20,000 as the plague-ridden Habsburg troops tried to enter the electorate at the end of the year. Troops confronted a large assembly at Ebersberg on 18 January and attacked when they realized the peasants were poorly armed. Around 200 were killed and the authorities were able to prosecute 100 alleged ringleaders. The local authorities accepted the peasants’ argument that they were acting in self-defence. Even Maximilian was eventually persuaded to approve the relatively mild court verdicts. One was beheaded for rebellion, five executed for having murdered soldiers and eleven banished for three years, but the rest were released.³¹

Sporadic unrest in Upper Austria since 1630 deepened after 1632, but unlike in 1626 it was restricted to those suffering most from the social dislocation of the war. Fiscal pressures ended patrimonial benevolence as the authorities were no longer prepared to allow leeway for struggling families unable to pay taxes. This may explain why the Upper Austrian unrest was expressed in mystical, religious terms as its leader, Michael Aichinger called Laimbauer, claimed visions of a better future. He lived on the run, sheltered by sympathizers until he was finally cornered in the ruins of Frankenberg church by a mixed force of 1,000 mercenaries, local officials and armed Catholic civilians. Only 60 of his 300 followers were armed men, the rest were women and children. Allegedly found hiding under the skirts of two of his followers, he was cruelly executed along with six others, including his four-year-old son, on 20 June 1636.³²

WALLENSTEIN: THE FINAL ACT

The Second Battle of Steinau

The same epidemic that swept away Holk and Feria ravaged the armies in Silesia, the effects worsened by dysentery in the imperial camp and hunger in the Saxon. Wallenstein’s effective strength fell by 9,000 to 36,000, while Arnim lost nearly a third of his 25,000 men.³³ Wallenstein finally ended the truce on 2 October 1633, sending Piccolomini with a small detachment westwards through Lusatia. Piccolomini spread rumours that he was the advance guard of the main army, deceiving Arnim who marched after him. Wallenstein followed to make sure the Saxons had gone and then sent Isolano and seven Croat regiments to continue the pursuit, while he double-backed with 30,000 men north-eastwards to the Oder. He intended to capture Steinau to isolate the 6,000 Swedes and Saxons holding the Silesian fortresses further south. Thurn and Duwall mustered only 2,400 infantry in Marradas’s old camp by the burned-out town, with 2,300 cavalry scattered in villages east of the river.³⁴

Thurn ignored warnings from his outposts that 8,000 imperial cavalry under Schaffgotsch had crossed downstream at Köben. These swept south early on 11 October, while Wallenstein and the infantry advanced to the Sand Hill west of the town. The Swedes claimed the officers commanding the outposts deliberately ordered their troopers not to fire as Schaffgotsch’s men crossed. Certainly, both colonels subsequently entered imperial service. Duwall was blind drunk and incapable of uttering a word of command. Thurn surrendered, including all the garrisons in his capitulation, which naturally increased Swedish suspicions of treachery. Wallenstein kept Thurn and Duwall with him as he summoned the fortresses to accept these terms. Glogau and Leignitz agreed, but the others refused and Duwall escaped and organized an energetic defence from Breslau until he died, probably from liver failure, in April 1634.

Georg Wilhelm of Brandenburg reinforced his garrison at Küstrin in case Wallenstein decided to advance down the Oder, but 11,000 Imperialists swept past, capturing Frankfurt and Landsberg on the Warthe, before fanning out either side to overrun much of eastern Pomerania and Brandenburg. Oxenstierna sent frantic appeals to Bernhard to march from south Germany to threaten Bohemia from the Upper Palatinate. Bernhard belatedly obeyed once he had taken Regensburg. His siege had already caused great alarm in Munich and Vienna, prompting calls for Wallenstein to march to its relief. Wallenstein had left detachments to mop up the remnants of the allied forces in Silesia and was already on his way across Bohemia when Regensburg fell. He left his advance guard of 2,000 cavalry to continue over the mountains to Passau, but turned back with the main force and went into winter quarters around Pilsen.

The Plot against Wallenstein

Wallenstein’s actions no longer appeared those of a rational person – people found his inactivity inexplicable. Many observers now openly attributed his behaviour to an alleged obsession with astrology. He was certainly fascinated by this branch of the magic arts that contemporaries associated as much with medicine as astronomy. He famously commissioned Kepler to prepare his horoscope in 1608 and again once he became commander in 1625. Kepler formally entered his service in 1628, while Wallenstein later consulted others, notably Gianbattista Senno from Genoa who had been Kepler’s assistant. He also possessed an astrolabe and an amulet, and had asked Arnim to discover Gustavus’s date of birth so he could read his horoscope. However, he was aware that the church condemned astrology as blasphemy and was careful, as in all matters, to conceal his true thoughts. His interest was already known by 1627, however, when pamphlets appeared claiming his decisions were guided by astrologers’ predictions. This was a deliberate fabrication propagated by Maximilian as part of his campaign to get Wallenstein dismissed and was calculated to appeal to Ferdinand’s piety. It spread swiftly through diplomatic reports and had gained wide credence by 1633, assisting the task of those who now sought to remove him again.³⁵

Whereas external pressure had been decisive in Wallenstein’s first dismissal, opposition this time came from within the Habsburg monarchy where Ferdinand had viewed Wallenstein’s inactivity with mounting suspicion. Maximilian worked discreetly to fan Ferdinand’s doubts, but did not demand Wallenstein’s dismissal until 18 December and had no direct role in events. Lamormaini and the Jesuits also opposed the general, but likewise were not instrumental in removing him. Spanish pressure was more significant. Though Quiroga admired Wallenstein and still wrote favourable reports, Oñate immediately sensed the change of mood in Vienna when he arrived in November, having accompanied Feria’s army.³⁶ Crucially the moderate faction that favoured a compromise peace along the lines suggested by Wallenstein no longer trusted him to obtain it. Opposition became personal, not political, as moderates closed ranks with militants, all arguing that Wallenstein’s behaviour was undermining imperial authority and prestige. Wallenstein’s aversion to court life rebounded against him. He had not spoken to Ferdinand since 1628 and had deliberately failed to use the negotiations in nearby Göllersdorf to visit Vienna in 1632. There was now virtually no one left there to defend him. It was widely believed he had told the Bohemian exiles that Ferdinand was too dependent on clerics to make the concessions necessary for peace, and that he would arrange terms himself and use the army to force the emperor to accept them. This was tantamount to treason. Having conferred with Trauttmannsdorff and Bishop Anton Wolfradt, Gundacker Liechtenstein sent Ferdinand a formal memorandum on 11 January 1634 recommending Wallenstein’s ‘liquidation’.³⁷

Wallenstein’s alienation of the army made this feasible. He had spent most of 1633 in Silesia far from other senior officers whom he left largely to their own devices. His passivity caused concern. Inactivity damaged the army’s morale and health, while offering no opportunities for the officers to distinguish themselves and gain promotion. Reluctant to approach their chief directly for fear of his notorious temper, they discussed matters among themselves, becoming increasingly conspiratorial and finally corresponding in code by August 1633. Piccolomini emerged as their leader. Despite continued promotion through Wallenstein’s favour, Piccolomini sensed the emperor’s mounting dissatisfaction with the general and possibly hoped to be chosen as the new imperial commander.³⁸ One of Piccolomini’s subordinates, Fabio Diodati, penned an anonymous tract known as the Bamberger Schrift that summarized the army’s grudges against its general.

Ferdinand sent Trauttmannsdorff to meet Wallenstein after Schlick returned from Silesia in August without a satisfactory explanation for his conduct. Trauttmannsdorff met the general in Pilsen on 28 November after he had already abandoned his march to Regensburg. Wallenstein was aware of the criticism and defended himself, for example responding to Ferdinand’s fury at his release of Thurn from captivity by claiming it would be more use to have the incompetent count commanding the enemy army than in prison. He also wrote to the emperor explaining that he did not want to risk the army’s health in a winter campaign, repeating this argument again at the end of December.³⁹

These letters effectively sealed his fate by providing evidence of his direct disobedience of imperial orders. He appeared unaware of the consequences, not least because there were in fact good reasons for not continuing into Bavaria as it was now filling with Aldringen’s and Feria’s troops retreating from the Rhine. However, arriving after months of suspicious behaviour, his refusals now appeared to confirm he was planning to defect to the enemy. He compounded the situation by seeking to reassure himself of his subordinates’ loyalty, summoning his colonels to Pilsen and threatening to resign. Of those present, 49 signed a declaration of personal loyalty on 12 January, known as the First Pilsner Reverse. Wallenstein directed Schaffgotsch to secure the signatures of officers still in Silesia, while General Scherffenberg was instructed to do the same in Upper Austria. Most signed because they expected that Wallenstein’s resignation or dismissal would precipitate another credit collapse as in November 1630, which would ruin them personally and destroy the army’s cohesion.

Piccolomini meanwhile presented his own damning critique of Wallenstein on 10 January. This carried weight in Vienna where he had been regarded as the commander’s trusted subordinate and because news of the Pilsner Reverse appeared to confirm his accusations. Ferdinand met Trauttmannsdorff, Bishop Anton and Eggenberg in the latter’s mansion in mid-January and agreed that Wallenstein should be taken dead or alive. Eggenberg’s involvement indicates Wallenstein’s complete isolation. By the time Piccolomini received word of this decision on 22 January, he had established contact with a small group of Scottish and Irish officers prepared to act as assassins. Walter Butler was colonel of a German dragoon regiment largely officered by fellow Irishmen, including Major Robert Fitzgerald and captains Walter Devereux, Dennis MacDonnell and Edmond Boorke. John Gordon, a Scot, was the exception in that he was a Calvinist, whereas the others were all Catholics. As lieutenant-colonel of Trčka’s infantry regiment, he served as commandant of the Eger garrison, assisted by his friend Major Walter Leslie.⁴⁰

It is likely that senior Habsburg officials were aware of this. With Wallenstein now considered a notorious rebel, there was no need for a formal trial. Ferdinand signed a patent on 24 January, releasing all officers from obedience to Wallenstein and instructing them to follow Gallas until a new commander was appointed. A second, harsher patent was signed on 18 February that directly accused Wallenstein of conspiracy and was essentially a death warrant. It was not publicized immediately, because all were convinced of the need for secrecy to avoid splitting the army. It was still unclear how many officers would follow Wallenstein. There were 54,000 Imperialists in Bohemia, Silesia and the eastern parts of Brandenburg and Pomerania at this point. Less than a third were scattered around Pilsen, while there were another 20,000 men under Aldringen in Austria, Ossa in the Tirol and Gronsfeld in Westphalia. Piccolomini signed the Pilsner Reverse so as not to arouse suspicions. He returned with Gallas to Pilsen on Wallenstein’s orders for consultations, but managed to leave on 15 February. Copies of the emperor’s first patent were distributed to loyal officers ready for publication to their units. The Upper and Lower Austrian Estates met in emergency session and agreed to vote additional funds to keep the soldiers content.

Events moved rapidly after Wallenstein’s ally Scherffenberg was arrested in Vienna on 17 February. The next day, Ferdinand ordered the Prague garrison to be reinforced and Aldringen to collect loyal troops to capture Wallenstein. Other units were concentrated at Budweis and in the Upper Palatinate to stop him escaping. Wallenstein suspected nothing until Colonel Diodati left Pilsen with his regiment on the night of 17–18 February. A series of couriers were despatched to Vienna with letters refuting the rumours against him, while the remaining officers were reassembled to sign a second declaration on 20 February. Only thirty complied this time and were sent to collect their units and assemble at Prague. As soldiers began deserting the regiments still in Pilsen, Wallenstein realized he could no longer trust the army. Having spent the night packing, he left on 22 February, heading west for Eger from where he could join the Saxons or Swedes. Franz Albrecht of Lauenburg was still acting as intermediary for the secret talks with Saxony and was sent to tell Bernhard to meet Wallenstein in the Upper Palatinate.

There is no evidence that this defection had been planned. As late as 18 February, Johann Georg was still instructing Arnim to continue talks and, if the rumours were true, to dissuade Wallenstein from defecting. The second truce of August–October 1633 had convinced Oxenstierna of Wallenstein’s insincerity. Arnim failed to persuade the chancellor during a five-hour meeting on 11 September that Wallenstein genuinely sought peace. The death in October of Lars Tungel, Sweden’s envoy in Dresden, removed Oxenstierna’s main source of news and heightened his suspicions of Saxony. He now sought Wallenstein’s downfall to prevent him detaching Saxony in a separate peace, and spread rumours through the Frankfurt papers, playing on Wallenstein’s known opposition to Feria’s march to sow dissension in Vienna.

The Eger Bloodbath

Wallenstein abandoned most of the slow-moving infantry and artillery still with him in Pilsen, marching out with around 1,300 men and summoning Butler to join him with his 900 dragoons. Butler sent his confessor, Patrick Taaffe, to assure Piccolomini that he was still loyal and was only acting under duress. The conspirators had expected a long struggle and were encouraged by the rapidity of the army’s disaffection from Wallenstein. Colonel Wangler secured the Prague garrison and units poured in from their outlying billets to declare loyalty to Ferdinand. Piccolomini set off in pursuit of Wallenstein with 2,000 cavalry, cutting off his rearguard outside Mies. Piccolomini halted there, subsequently claiming his men were too tired to go further, but probably to distance himself from the coming massacre.

Wallenstein’s dwindling party reached Eger late in the afternoon on 24 February. Gordon gave him his own quarters in the Pachabel house, a fine three-storey building on the main square that had been commandeered from a Lutheran citizen living in exile. Most of the troops were obliged to camp outside the town as it was already occupied by Gordon’s 1,200 infantry. Ilow, Wallenstein’s trusted second-in-command, held a series of meetings the next day with Gordon, Leslie and Butler trying to persuade them to remain loyal to their chief. All three wrestled with their consciences. Professions of religious and dynastic loyalty loom large in their later statements, but clearly personal advancement was a factor. They also realized they had already gone too far: if they did not execute Wallenstein they would be implicated in his crimes. They agreed privately to separate Wallenstein from his remaining inner circle of Ilow, Trčka, Kinsky and Captain Niemann who commanded his bodyguard. They took a calculated risk of inviting all five to dinner in the castle, guessing correctly that Wallenstein would decline. The meal started after 6 p.m. with Gordon as host. Leslie excused himself to let MacDonnell and a party of Butler’s dragoons into the castle. Having returned to the table, he waited until a servant entered and nodded, indicating all was ready. Six dragoons burst in crying ‘Who is a good Imperialist?’ Gordon, Leslie and Butler leapt to their feet shouting ‘Long live Ferdinand!’ Kinsky was killed in his chair, while the others were butchered after a brief but violent fight in which the table was overturned. Butler then rushed to the Pachabel house, arriving around 10 p.m. Fitzgerald secured the doors, while Devereux dashed upstairs, killing a page who got in the way. Having broken his sword, he grabbed a half-pike and burst into Wallenstein’s bedroom. The general had taken off his sword, boots and coat and was about to go to bed. After a moment’s hesitation, Devereux ran him through. The corpse was dragged down the stairs, bundled into a chest and taken to the castle.⁴¹

The assassins spent the next day assuring the loyalty of the soldiers. Leslie went to Vienna to report, while Butler, who must have had detailed knowledge of Wallenstein’s plans, sent a party of dragoons to capture the unsuspecting Franz Albrecht as he rode back from seeing Bernhard. They also tried as an additional coup to kidnap Arnim by sending a forged letter sealed with Kinsky’s signet ring, but rumours of the murder were already out. The Saxons had genuinely believed Wallenstein was defecting, but Bernhard suspected his appeals were yet another trick.

The situation remained confused. Unaware of what had happened, the commandant of Troppau declared for Wallenstein on 1 March, but was forced to surrender when his men accepted an imperial amnesty. Imperial garrisons in Swabia offered little resistance as Horn exploited the situation and 3,000 enlisted in his army.⁴² Bernhard only left Regensburg on 1 March when he learned of the murder and dashed north hoping to seize Eger and rally disgruntled imperial units to the allies, but it was already too late.

Rewards and Cover-up

Discontent continued nonetheless, because credit collapsed as feared, and the conspiracy split the officer corps. The prime movers were Italians, while Scots and Irish had done the deed. The victims were Bohemians, Silesians or north Germans. Melchior von Hatzfeldt regarded his appointment to the court martial to review the events as a trick by Gallas to land a German with the disagreeable task. He managed to dodge this duty, but resentment remained, especially towards the unsympathetic Piccolomini.⁴³Protestant propaganda, initially hostile to Wallenstein, switched to fan tensions and destabilize the army.

The emperor moved quickly, announcing his son, Archduke Ferdinand, as the new commander on 27 April, with Gallas as second-in-command. He reassumed responsibility for appointing colonels who were now forbidden to command more than two regiments simultaneously. Some other attempts were made to improve discipline and to rationalize the artillery, but otherwise the army and its funding remained unchanged.⁴⁴ Finances and loyalty were underpinned by accelerating the confiscation of Wallenstein’s properties and those of his collaborators, already authorized on 20 February, netting assets estimated at over 13 million florins.⁴⁵ Butler, Leslie and Gordon all received estates. Butler did not enjoy his for long, dying of plague in December 1634, while Gordon soon left imperial service for that of the Dutch, probably because his arrogance alienated his comrades. Leslie, by contrast, became a wealthy and influential figure without exercising further active command. The actual assassins received cash and more modest honours, but remained without significance. Devereux died five months later as a colonel. The real beneficiaries were the chief conspirators like Piccolomini, Gallas and Aldringen, who all received large estates, partly as rewards, but also to settle their pay arrears.

The contemporary press reported 24 executions.⁴⁶ In fact only the commandant of Troppau was executed, as was General Schaffgotsch despite lack of evidence. Seven others were deprived of their regiments and a few more temporarily imprisoned, including Franz Albrecht who was released in August 1635 once Saxony changed sides. A series of reports concluded by July 1634 that the two Pilsner Reverses constituted mutiny and justified assassination on the ‘notorious rebel’ argument. The findings were belatedly published as an official justification in October. The search for evidence continued, but little could be unearthed, beyond a confession from Rasin, one of Wallenstein’s Bohemian intermediaries.

Ferdinand had no desire for a witch hunt, especially once the initial investigations confirmed that Wallenstein had acted largely alone. Like Maximilian, he was simply relieved that the danger had passed and wanted the matter buried. It is clear that potentially incriminating documents like the Göllersdorf agreement were destroyed to silence possible criticism of the emperor. Wallenstein’s relations did not protest and provision was belatedly made for his widow, who was allowed to live on one of his properties. Only Eggenberg displayed any real disquiet, resigning his post as privy councillor, but his death shortly after minimized the impact of this gesture.

Wallenstein passed rapidly from current controversy to literature and drama; a play about him was performed in London as early as 1640. Interest waned around 1700, but revived with Schiller’s trilogy at the end of the eighteenth century that sparked historical debate about his significance. Perhaps the real tragedy was that he was already slipping into irrelevance by the time of his murder. With the Saxons actively seeking peace, he was more a hindrance than help. The general conclusion is that he represented the last of the condottieri, or great mercenary captains who emerged in the Italian Renaissance.⁴⁷ Such figures are thought to represent a transition in historical development as expedients employed by states until governments were capable of organizing armies themselves. This is misleading. Wallenstein’s failure to secure his subordinates’ loyalty indicates the relative strength of the Habsburg state. The officers recognized that, ultimately, it was the emperor, not Wallenstein, who guaranteed their funding and legitimized their actions. Wallenstein might have won support if he had acted as spokesman for the officers’ grievances, as Bernhard had done during the Swedish mutiny. The First Pilsner Reverse suggests this. However, the events proved very few were prepared to follow him in an act of political disloyalty.

THE TWO FERDINANDS

Renewed Spanish Intervention 1634

Wallenstein’s murder cleared the way for Olivares to renew his strategy of 1633 to combine the restoration of Spanish power along the Rhine with pressure on the emperor to assist against the Dutch. He did not expect Ferdinand to declare war on the Republic, but hoped an improved position in the Empire would prompt the emperor to detach part of his army to Flanders. Matters there were pressing following Isabella’s death in December 1633 and further evidence of Count van den Bergh’s conspiracy. A new army was collected in Milan to escort Philip’s brother Fernando to the Netherlands. This would collect the survivors of Feria’s expedition who were still in Bavaria, restore the situation in southern Germany, clear the Spanish Road and provide a powerful reinforcement for Flanders. Oñate was instructed to offer more substantial subsidies to be released as soon as Ferdinand agreed to reciprocate with military assistance.⁴⁸

Oñate met senior Bavarian and imperial advisers in Vienna in late April 1634 to make the necessary arrangements and plan the liberation of southern Germany. With Bavarian support, he persuaded the Imperialists to remain on the defensive against Saxony and direct their main effort against Bernhard and Horn. Archduke Ferdinand and Gallas advanced a month later with 25,000 men from Pilsen to join Aldringen who had 3,000 Imperialists, 7,500 Bavarians and 4,000 Spanish survivors on the Danube. Rodolfo Colloredo was left with 25,000 in Bohemia, while his brother Hieronymus had 22,000 in Silesia and along the Oder. There were about 6,000 holding Breisach and the remaining outposts around Lake Constance, while the Liga units in Westphalia totalled 15,000.⁴⁹

These were substantial numbers and indicate the continued scale of an imperial effort capable of maintaining several large armies simultaneously. With Wallenstein gone, command was also more coherent, in contrast to the Swedes who remained disunited. Horn stayed bogged down besieging Überlingen in an effort to close the Lake Constance route to Fernando. Bernhard was still in Franconia and did not think the Imperialists would attempt anything until the Spanish arrived, giving him time to resume the fruitless attacks on Kronach and Forchheim that would secure his possession of Bamberg.

This dispersal of the two main Swedish armies exposed Regensburg, their chief prize from the previous year. Imperial and Bavarian forces besieged the city from 23 May. Lars Kaage conducted an energetic defence with his 4,000-strong garrison, but could not hold out indefinitely. Horn and Bernhard united near Augsburg on 12 July, but campaigning had reduced their combined strength to only 22,000. They pushed east into Bavaria, defeating a blocking force at Landsberg on the Lech where Aldringen was killed on 22 July. A week was wasted before they resumed their advance, by when it was already too late because Regensburg surrendered on 26 July. Kaage was recalled to Sweden in disgrace, but had done his job well, weakening the besiegers who lost 8,000 casualties and 6,000 deserters. The static character of sieges gave ample opportunity for sickness and hunger to bite, making them often more costly than battles. The imperial losses were compounded by bad news from the Habsburg hereditary lands where a combination of poor leadership and insufficient numbers prevented the exploitation of the gains following the second battle of Steinau.

Oxenstierna was determined to eliminate the threat to Pomerania and distract Johann Georg from his peace talks. Alexander Leslie retook Landsberg on the Warthe on 16 March while Hieronymus Colloredo was busy blockading Breslau far to the south. It was not until May that Banér rebuilt the wreck of Thurn’s army to 14,000 men. Georg Wilhelm sent 3,000 Brandenburgers, while Arnim arrived with 14,000 Saxons. The combined army routed Hieronymus Colloredo at Liegnitz on 8 May in a hard-fought battle decided by the better-disciplined Saxon infantry. The imperial army disintegrated, losing over 5,000 troops. Colloredo was court-martialled and briefly imprisoned. By June Banér had retaken the positions along the middle Oder, including Frankfurt. He then turned west with Arnim to invade Bohemia, appearing before Prague the day Regensburg fell.

Archduke Ferdinand marched down the Danube towards Bohemia, but stopped on 2 August when news arrived that Arnim had already withdrawn, citing lack of supplies as an excuse to abandon Banér. Eleven regiments continued to reinforce Rodolfo Colloredo, while the rest of the archduke’s men headed back to capture Donauwörth on 16 August. The Imperialists’ crisis had passed, but it had alarmed Spain sufficiently to instruct Fernando to make a detour and assist the Imperialists in Franconia.

The 11,700 Spanish and Italians who crossed the Valtellina in July represented both the largest and last contingent to use that route. Their advance was delayed by high water at Lake Como at the entrance to the valley, but they joined the remnants of Feria’s army in August to total 3,892 cavalry and 18,700 infantry.⁵⁰ Archduke Ferdinand, meanwhile, advanced a short distance north-west to besiege Nördlingen, held by only 500 men, sending cavalry to relieve Forchheim, which was still blockaded by around 4,000 troops under Cratz. The thrust into Franconia struck the heart of the Heilbronn League. Oxenstierna struggled to maintain flagging support at the League’s second congress, currently meeting in Frankfurt. Nördlingen had little strategic value, but Oxenstierna could not afford to lose it and directed all available forces to its relief.

The Battle of Nördlingen

Having fallen back into Swabia to regroup, Horn and Bernhard reunited at Ulm and marched east through Aalen and Bopfingen, arriving too late to stop Archduke Ferdinand commencing his siege of Nördlingen on 18 August. Horn refused to attack across the river Eger against superior numbers. He knew the Spanish were on their way, but expected the reinforcements organized by Oxenstierna to arrive first. Having cleared the Croats screening the town on 24 August, Horn threw in 250 musketeers and promised to relieve the defenders within six days. Around 7,000 troops arrived on 28 August, but they were mainly Württemberg militia and of limited value. Bernhard and Horn heard the sounds of celebration as Fernando arrived in the enemy camp on 3 September. The meeting between the two Ferdinands was commemorated in a painting by Rubens. The two cousins got on well, but actual command was exercised by their experienced lieutenants – Gallas and Spinola’s son-in-law, the marquis of Leganés. The fugitive duke of Lorraine arrived as the Bavarian commander following Aldringen’s death.⁵¹ The Spanish were already infected with the plague that had killed 4,000 since their arrival in Bavaria, but the combined army was still powerful, numbering 15,000 cavalry, 20,500 infantry and at least 52 cannon. Of these troops, 15,000 were ‘Spanish’, 8,500 Bavarian, 10,000 Imperialists and 2,000 Croats.

Nördlingen came under heavy bombardment and nearly fell to an assault on 4 September. Alerted by distress flares, Horn and Bernhard conferred at midnight. Horn wanted to wait for Solms who was expected within six days with 6,000 men, but Bernhard rightly believed the town would not last that long and argued that Cratz’s arrival from Forchheim the next day would already give them 16,000 foot, 9,700 horse and 70 guns. They were probably unaware of the true odds and certainly only had a sketchy idea of the ground beyond the river, because the imperial Croats and dragoons prevented effective reconnaissance. They decided to march west as if retreating to Ulm, but cross the Eger upstream at Bopfingen and then head south to seize a line of hills 2km south of Nördlingen to outflank the two Ferdinands. Setting off at 5 a.m., they picked up Cratz, left their baggage at Neresheim guarded by 3,000 Württembergers and headed east across the wooded Jura hills. Horn and Bernhard had been alternating command of the advance guard so neither would feel subordinate to the other. It was Bernhard’s turn to lead and he pressed on, making but slow progress along the single-track road.

He was spotted by imperial pickets around 4 p.m. Leganés and Gallas reacted immediately to secure the line of hills to their left. These ran north-west to south-east from the Eger and were separated from the Jura by the marshy Retzenbach stream. Bernhard’s troops appeared by the Himmelreich hill in the west shortly after 4 p.m. and engaged the Spanish and imperial pickets, including Butler’s dragoons.⁵² A struggle developed as Bernhard tried to clear the hills one after another from west to east. His troops were still disgorging from the Jura and crossing the Retzenbach, but after three hours he had taken the Himmelreich, the wooded Ländle and the open, lower Lachberg in succession. The time allowed Spanish and imperial musketeers to collect on the wooded Heselberg where they continued to resist, backed by cavalry. Horn arrived after 10 p.m. to relieve Bernhard’s exhausted troops and the Heselberg finally fell four hours later.

The delay proved crucial, allowing 6,600 Spanish and 1,500 Bavarian infantry to occupy the Albuch at the eastern end of the hills that was the key to the entire position, because it blocked the way around the Habsburg flank. They spent the night digging three small entrenchments for 14 cannon, while 2,800 Burgundian and Italian cavalry drew up nearby. The rest of the army deployed along another line of hills running north to Nördlingen where 2,000 infantry were left in the entrenchments to prevent a sortie.

The Habsburgs expected the enemy to cross the Himmelreich and deploy on the Herkheimerfeld plain between their position and the Eger. Bernhard and Horn had no intention of carrying out such a dangerous manoeuvre. Instead, Bernhard’s tired troops would wait on the Ländle and Lachberg, while Horn’s slightly fresher men attacked the Albuch from the Heselberg and the Retzenbach valley. Horn had about 4,000 cavalry and 9,400 infantry, though 3,000 of the latter were Württemberg militia. He attacked at dawn on 6 September, probably prematurely because his cavalry commander misinterpreted a reconnaissance and launched an assault up the steep south-east slope. The cavalry were repulsed, but the crack Scottish and German infantry from the first wave soon overwhelmed the Habsburg front line composed largely of Germans recruited that winter for Spanish service. The Protestants blamed the subsequent debacle on a powder wagon exploding, temporarily throwing their victorious infantry into confusion. It is more likely they were caught unprepared by a sudden counter-attack by the veteran native Spanish Idiaquez regiment that had been waiting behind the entrenchments. Within an hour, Horn’s troops were back in their starting positions.

Each subsequent assault was pressed with dwindling enthusiasm, whereas the Spanish could feed fresh troops from their reserves north-east of the hill. The Spanish also knew how to deal with the feared Swedish salvo, crouching down each time the enemy prepared to fire. As soon as the bullets whistled over their heads, the Spanish sprang up and fired a volley of their own. Bernhard sent over two infantry brigades to assist and moved his own cavalry onto the plain to distract the Habsburgs and deter them from reinforcing the Albuch. The fresh infantry were soon pinned at the foot of the hill by Spanish musketry and then attacked by the Italian cavalry waiting to the north. A fierce cavalry mêlée developed as Horn sent his own horse to the rescue, while Duke Charles, typically bored of sitting idle at the other end of the line, rode over at that point and organized a counter-attack. The sound of battle carried as far as Andech, 120km away.⁵³

Horn gave way around 10 a.m., exposing Bernhard’s other infantry still waiting on the Lachberg. Reinforced by more Bavarians, the Spanish carried the Heselberg, scattering the last of Horn’s troops who tried to

escape across the Retzenbach. The Croats had meanwhile worked their way along the Eger to pass the Himmelreich, turning Bernhard’s flank. Even he realized the situation was hopeless and tried to extricate himself from the plain. ‘The Spanish cut everyone down.’⁵⁴ Bernhard escaped only because a dragoon lent him a fresh horse. Horn was captured along with 4,000 others. The Bavarian and imperial prisoners pressed into Swedish service now rejoined their units, as did many of the men captured from the Heilbronn League regiments. Around 8,000 were killed, including 2,000 of the Württembergers who were massacred when the Croats captured the baggage left at Neresheim. Only about 14,000 men remained when Bernhard reached Heilbronn a few days later. He admitted to Oxenstierna that ‘the great misfortune is so bad it could not be any worse’.⁵⁵

Sweden Loses Southern Germany

Against this the Habsburg loss of 2,000 seemed slight and enabled them to claim a major triumph. Following a long succession of defeats, Nördlingen appeared to be vindication for Wallenstein’s murder and cemented the influence of Gallas and Piccolomini by associating them with victory. As at Breitenfeld, the scale was magnified by the demoralization of the enemy army. News of the defeat reached Frankfurt on 12 September along with a flood of refugees. The remaining Heilbronn delegates fled the next day. Oxenstierna tried to improvise a new line of defence along the Main to contain the defeat to the south. No one cooperated. Johann Georg failed to launch the requested diversionary attack against Bohemia, while Duke Georg refused to move south to hold the middle section of the river. Wilhelm of Weimar abandoned Franconia and fell back with 4,000 men to his base at Erfurt, exposing the upper Main to Piccolomini and Isolano who approached with 13,000 troops from Nördlingen and north-west Bohemia. Piccolomini took Schweinfurt, while Isolano destroyed the Suhl arms workshops that had supplied most of the Swedes’ small arms and munitions since 1631. Isolano and 6,000 Croats then swept down the Main in November, rampaging into the Hessian possession of Hersfeld.

The main imperial army moved west, bypassing Ulm to enter Stuttgart on 19 September. Duke Eberhard III fled to Switzerland and the last Württemberg fort surrendered in November. Only the isolated Hohentwiel on the upper Danube held out. While the Imperialists made themselves at home, the Spanish continued westwards and the Bavarians, now under the command of Werth, captured Heidelberg on 19 November, though its castle remained defiant. Riding ahead, Werth’s cavalry harried the remnants of Bernhard’s army as it fled to Frankfurt. The commanders of Sweden’s Rhine army refused to join him, on the ground this would spread demoralization to their own troops. Birkenfeld abandoned Heilbronn and retreated to the Kehl bridgehead opposite Strasbourg. His hopes of replacing Bernhard were dashed by Oxenstierna, who felt there was no realistic alternative to the defeated general. The death of Count Salm-Kyrburg to plague on 16 October enabled Bernhard to incorporate the former Alsatian units into his command.

Leaving Werth and Duke Charles to complete the conquest of the Lower Palatinate, Fernando continued his march down the Rhine, crossing at Cologne on 16 October to reach Brussels nineteen days later. Meanwhile, Philipp Count Mansfeld collected the Westphalians at Andernach, allegedly accompanied by a hundred coach-loads of Catholic lords and clergy eager to recover their property.⁵⁶ As Philipp marched south, it looked as if Bernhard would be crushed between his hammer and Gallas’s anvil.

The situation mirrored that of 1631, only this time Protestant areas were the ones affected as government collapsed in the wake of the headlong flight of Sweden’s German collaborators. Suffering was also more general because the plague hindered the harvest, causing widespread hardship. There were signs that Emperor Ferdinand had learned the lessons of 1629 as efforts were made to restrain over-zealous Catholics. He intervened to stop Bishop Hatzfeldt punishing the Franconian knights for collaborating with the Swedes and the Jesuits were refused permission to take over Württemberg’s university at Tübingen. Political considerations undoubtedly influenced this, since Vienna did not want to jeopardize promising negotiations with Saxony. Archduke Ferdinand’s presence was another moderating factor. However, it often proved impossible to stop officers and administrators exploiting the situation, either to enrich themselves or to find cash for the perennially underpaid imperial army.⁵⁷ Catholic government resumed relatively quickly in Würzburg despite the Swedish garrison holding out on the Marienberg and in Königshofen until January and December 1635 respectively.

Oxenstierna worked feverishly to salvage what he could of the situation, reconvening the Heilbronn League congress at Worms on 2 December. Though some members were willing to fight on, most sought a way out through Saxon mediation. Saxon and Darmstadt envoys agreed draft peace terms, known as the Pirna Note, on 24 November. Oxenstierna tried to stem desertion by publishing what he could discover of the terms, notably the suggestion of 1627 as a new normative year that would secure many of the Catholic gains.⁵⁸

The French Take Over

His position was undermined by Richelieu who saw an opportunity to displace Sweden and convert its League into a cross-confessional neutral block. France had offered Sweden a closer alliance on 15 September 1633, but made ratification dependent on handing over Philippsburg, which had eventually been captured by Salm-Kyrburg in January 1634. Oxenstierna hesitated to relinquish the fortress since this would allow France into Germany. The remaining League militants increasingly saw France as a more desirable partner. All were aware that the sultan had suspended operations against southern Poland in 1633 in order to attack Persia. Poland made peace with Russia after a two-year struggle in June 1634, leaving it free to resume war with Sweden once the Altmark truce expired in 1635.⁵⁹ Wilhelm V of Hessen-Kassel had already opened talks with France, in parallel to his negotiations with the Dutch, and had accepted a French pension in February 1634. French troops were admitted to Philippsburg on 26 August, though the fortress nominally remained under League control with the duke of Württemberg as commandant.

The Württemberg chancellor Löffler and Palatine envoy Streiff von Lauenstein now went to Paris to negotiate behind Oxenstierna’s back. The terms they accepted on behalf of the League on 1 November give a good indication of Richelieu’s objectives. France would effectively assume control of the League and the League promised not to make peace without its consent. A subsidy of 500,000 livres would be paid direct to the League treasury, cutting out Sweden. Richelieu would also send 12,000 troops – who would not be Frenchmen so as to distance Louis XIII from open war with the emperor. The League would restore Catholic worship throughout its remaining conquests. Finally, it would provide appropriate ‘satisfaction’ for France’s efforts in the form of the Austrian parts of Alsace, Breisach, Konstanz and all the Rhine forts in between.⁶⁰

Some of these concessions were already in French hands before the ink was dry. In the panic and confusion following Nördlingen, Swedish officials made their own arrangements. Mockel, the resident in Alsace, surrendered seventeen towns, including Colmar and Sélestat, to the French on 9 October, retaining only Benfeld. While Rohan occupied these with 5,000 men, La Force moved 19,000 to the Rhine opposite Mannheim, and another 3,000 in Nancy held down Lorraine.

The scramble for the League’s assets now focused on its army at Frankfurt, which still numbered about 18,000, and the garrisons in Mainz, Speyer, Hanau and Heidelberg castle. Feuquières was prepared to kidnap Oxenstierna to prevent him moving the troops north of the Main beyond French influence. The Heilbronn delegates in Worms offered Bernhard exclusive command provided he remained in the south to protect them. Oxenstierna reluctantly conceded absolute control over the army on 12 March 1635 on the condition Bernhard remained subordinate to him as League director. The princes’ representatives ratified Löffler and Streiff’s treaty, but their civic colleagues and Oxenstierna refused. Feuquières withheld the promised subsidy, but had to authorize military intervention when the situation deteriorated as Philipp Count Mansfeld advanced slowly up the Rhine and Gallas tightened his siege of Heidelberg castle. La Force sent 7,000 men across the Mannheim boat bridge to help Bernhard relieve Heidelberg on 22 December. Mansfeld did not reach the Main until after the French had arrived and fell back to avoid contact.

The pressure continued to mount regardless. Imperialists disguised as peasants tricked their way into Philippsburg and overpowered its garrison of French infantry and Württemberg militia on 24 January 1635. With this threat eliminated, Werth led 3,700 men over the frozen Rhine to take Speyer on 2 February. Charles of Lorraine crossed upstream at Breisach with 9,000 Bavarians and Imperialists, occupied Mömpelgard and began reconquering Alsace. La Force had no choice but to abandon Heidelberg and re-cross the Rhine at Mannheim on 22 February. Though he recovered Alsace and Speyer, the operation drew off men assigned to another army Richelieu had intended should assist the Dutch. The winter campaign reduced La Force to only 9,000 effective combatants, obliging him to retreat to Metz to join 11,000 reinforcements assembling under Cardinal La Valette. Both were kept busy until June repelling Duke Charles’s attempts to recover his duchy.⁶¹

The Worms congress reconvened on 17 February 1635 after four weeks’ recess. The Lutheran members accepted the Pirna Note that the Calvinists still rejected. The congress broke up on 30 March without agreement, effectively dissolving the League. The Pirna Note offered Sweden nothing. Oxenstierna had already sent Hugo Grotius to Paris in February, but Richelieu refused to meet him. The chancellor swallowed his pride, bought new clothes and set out with a deliberately large retinue numbering 200 to meet the cardinal at Compiègne on 27 April. Louis XIII gave Oxenstierna a ring as a token of respect, but refused to agree anything beyond a vague treaty of friendship. By then Sweden was not France’s only problem, as Richelieu and his master were in the midst of embarking on an entirely different war.