Chapter Five
Historically, the civilian population of Singapore had been a polyglot since the late nineteenth century. As mining and rubber estates developed, thousands emigrated from southern China to Singapore Island until they soon out-numbered the Malays. A few Japanese also settled on Singapore Island, making a living as fishermen, small businessmen and shopkeepers. In the mid-1930s, espionage activities among Japanese businessmen and officers (in mufti) were becoming increasingly obvious to the authorities on Singapore Island. In October 1941, there was a mass exodus of Japanese civilians. When hostilities erupted, there was a panic among many of the Europeans on the island that many in the Asian community were fifth columnists or Japanese sympathizers, who believed in the greater East-Asia sphere of prosperity. However, many Malay natives and Chinese residents acted courageously and suffered grievously from the air attacks on the island, which began shortly after war broke out. Notable landmarks on Singapore Island were indiscriminately damaged as well. As news of defeat after defeat on the Malayan Peninsula reached Singapore, evacuation of many European civilians commenced in January 1942.
Percival assumed operational control of all troops on the island and, despite fresh reinforcements, including the Indian 44th Indian Infantry Brigade, the British 18th Division and approximately 2,000 Australians, the situation remained bleak as they were mostly untrained and not acclimatized to the island’s weather. Although Percival commanded 85,000 troops to defend a land mass of 220 square miles, 15,000 of them were administrative and non-combatant forces. Also, many units were lacking both adequate weapons and an appropriate esprit de corps to combat the Japanese. Percival’s intelligence staff officers had clouded their commander’s military thinking by estimating that he would be fighting against 65,000 Japanese troops on the other side of the Straits of Johore. The Japanese had to do battle with only 30,000 men. Also, due to less than optimal intelligence gathering, Colonel Tsuji had planned to engage only 30,000 British and Commonwealth troops and not the accurate tally of 85,000 men. Numerically, the defenders had more than enough strength on the island to repel the invasion, particularly as it came where Wavell had expected it to be. In Percival’s favour, the island had ample provisions of food and was well-stocked with ammunition for its batteries and troops’ personal weapons and machine-guns. Again, there was a complete absence of Allied tanks on the island and an air presence had been destroyed, although as the Japanese had demonstrated on the Malay Peninsula, they were able to land tanks on Singapore Island.
Although Whitehall in London claimed that Singapore was a fortress, its 15-inch naval gun batteries were situated against a possible attack from the sea to the south and east of the island. Also, only a few of the other 6- and 9.2-inch guns that were situated on the south of the island could be swivelled about to fire mostly armour-piercing and not high explosive or anti-personnel shells on the Japanese preparing to cross the Straits of Johore to the north. Once the decision to evacuate to the island fortress was made, Percival failed to take the counsel of both his subordinate commanders and ABDA commander Wavell. In this tactical disagreement between Percival and Wavell, the former opted for an all-round perimeter defence of the island’s beaches, whereas the field marshal recommended that he concentrate his forces against the likely Japanese landing sites in most probably the north-west and, perhaps, north-east corners of the island, while also massing some reserves inland for a strong counterattack to throw the invaders back into the Straits of Johore. Percival divided the 27 mile × 13 mile island into three sectors with the Australian 22nd and 27th Brigades in the west; the 28th Indian (Gurkha) Brigade; and the British 18th Division’s 53rd, 54th and 55th Brigades in the northern sector and a southern zone to be held by the newly arrived 44th Indian Brigade, along with the Singapore Straits Volunteer Force and the 1st and 2nd Malay Brigades constituting the reserve to the west and east of Singapore City respectively (see map on p. 160–1 for troop dispositions on Singapore Island, February 1942).
Before the war, the Japanese had studied the problem of attacking Singapore Island. The decision was made that the most favourable line of attack, in strength, would be to cross the narrowest portion of the Johore Strait on the north-west coast of the island. The coast of southern Johore province, opposite this area landing area, offered both roads and swampy areas to amass the necessary forces in comparative secrecy. Yamashita’s intelligence reports indicated that the British expected the main attack to be hurled against the naval base at Sembawang and that the defences were stronger there than elsewhere. Yamashita, therefore, decided to use his pre-war analysis and make his main thrust with the 18th and 5th Divisions against the northwest coast of the island, away from the main defences of the three brigades of the newly arrived British 18th Division positioned in proximity to the naval base and the north-east section of Singapore Island. Also, Yamashita would make a diversionary attack with the Imperial Guards Division well to the east to deceive the British of the major attack site as well as to offset his numerical inferiority while crossing the Straits. Then, he would deploy the main part of this division to the immediate west of the causeway after the main attack of the Japanese 18th and 5th Divisions had been successfully delivered.
On 31 January, after the Allies abandoned the Malay Peninsula, Yamashita held a conference with his staff officers and told them that it would take four days to adequately reconnoitre for optimal crossing sites of the Straits of Johore. Concurrent with this were the efforts of the Japanese engineers to repair the destroyed causeway as soon as possible. True to his schedule, on 4 February Yamashita’s reconnaissance for the crossing of the Straits was complete. The 25th Army commanding general gathered his divisional commanders at midday on 6 February for their orders. Yamashita had established his headquarters overlooking the now-destroyed causeway in the Sultan of Johore’s palace atop a hill. He was certain that the British would never use artillery fire against the Sultan’s palace and as an observation post, it offered him a spectacular view of the forthcoming assault beaches on the north-western coast of the island. During the days preceding the Japanese attack across the Straits, Yamashita brought up his artillery, ammunition and supplies using captured railway stock and trucks. He also hid hundreds of folding boats and landing craft for the eventual crossing in the marshy swamp areas about a mile from the Straits.
The Imperial Guards Division began their demonstration attack as planned on the evening and night of 7/8 February. Twenty motor launches containing 400 guardsmen in a very noisy fashion landed on Ubin Island in the Straits overlooking the Changi fortress and airfield, in order to be easily detected by the British troops garrisoning the naval base. On the morning of 8 February, Yamashita’s artillery began its bombardment of the Changi fortress as the British, having fallen for the decoy attack, rushed reinforcements to the north-east corner of the island. After the sun had set that day, Yamashita’s 5th and 18th Divisions carried their folding boats for over a mile to the Straits’ edge. Simultaneous with these troops reaching the water, a massed artillery bombardment commenced on the naval base to destroy its oil tanks, thereby depriving the British the option of setting the Straits ablaze with dumped petrol to combat the amphibious assault, which was a ploy Churchill had planned for the Channel coast if the Nazis had launched Operation Sealion. Then, Yamashita’s artillerymen turned their guns’ attention to Percival’s machine-gun nests, infantry trenches and barbed wire below the causeway on the north-west corner of the island. At 2230 hours, 4,000 men in their flotilla of over 300 assorted boats crossed the Straits with artillery, silencing the boats engines to an awaiting 2,500 men of the 22nd Australian Brigade on Singapore’s north-west coast. Within minutes of beginning their crossing, elements of the IJA 5th Division were ashore facing heavy Australian machine-gunfire on Singapore Island, while other Japanese troops landed in a mangrove swamp that was less well-defended. In some areas the Japanese had to make three attempts before securing a beachhead on the island. After midnight, the Australians were being attacked from the rear as well as from the water to their front. Therefore, the Australian brigades on the island’s north-west coast were unable to hold back the main Japanese invasion, principally due to a lack of ammunition and an adequate counterattacking force formed before the island’s invasion. By 0300 hours on 9 February, the entire 22nd Australian Brigade was ordered back to a prepared position. As dawn came, Japanese tanks with fresh 5th and 18th Division infantry arrived in waves totalling roughly 15,000 men and artillery pieces. Once Yamashita had observed that his invading force had reached the Tengah airfield, well inland on the island western side, he crossed the Straits himself. His troops were no further than 10 air miles from Singapore City in the south-eastern corner of the island. Yamashita’s assault on Singapore Island possessed surgical precision and efficiency with its feint to the east and the main attack being launched from the west of Johore Bahru town. Also, on 9 February the main elements of the Imperial Guards crossed the Straits immediately to the west of the Causeway, deploying through Johore Bahru town to confront the Australian 27th Brigade. After landing, the Imperial Guards Division was to swing east towards Sungei Seletar and then south to interpose itself between Singapore and Changi, in order to prevent the British withdrawing into the Changi area. This attack was to be carried out by one regiment and a battalion, while the other regiment was kept in reserve. The Japanese 14th Tank Regiment was attached to this division.
On the same day, Wavell, flew from Java to Singapore Island despite the Japanese air supremacy. The ABDA commander railed at both Percival and Bennett for allowing the Japanese to establish a firm beachhead so easily. He issued an order for an immediate counter-attack and reminded the British and Commonwealth officers, ‘It is certain that our troops on Singapore Island greatly outnumber any Japanese that have crossed the Straits. We must defeat them. Our whole fighting reputation is at stake and the honour of the British Empire. The Americans have held out on the Bataan Peninsula against far greater odds, the Russians are turning back the picked strength of the Germans, the Chinese with almost complete lack of modern equipment have held the Japanese for 4½ years. It will be disgraceful if we yield our boasted fortress of Singapore to inferior forces [numerically].’ Wavell was too intelligent a soldier to ignore the plain reality that the British and Commonwealth forces lacked modern armour and aircraft, and in an antiquated manner allowed the majority of the island’s naval guns to be facing in one direction only – the wrong one. Back in Java, the field marshal cabled Churchill, ‘Battle for Singapore is not going well […] morale of some troops is not good […] there is to be no thought of surrender and all troops are to continue fighting to the end.’ Despite a shred of optimism in Wavell’s communiqué, Japanese air attacks continued against a variety of Singapore’s assets.
No successful Allied counter-attack was made against the Japanese, as Wavell had insisted upon. Instead Percival made a further tactical error by withdrawing inland toward Singapore City. General Yamashita sensed that the next British defensive site would be located on the hill at Bukit Timah, approximately 2 miles north-west of Singapore City. He attacked on the night of 10 February with his 5th and 18th Divisions and, although anticipating a desperate struggle for this strategic locale, since it possessed the island’s highest elevation just north-west of the racetrack and golf course on the outskirts of Singapore City, confusion among the British and Commonwealth troops led to a rapid loss of the position to the Japanese. In fact, it was elements of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, perhaps Percival’s best formation, which found itself caught in the muddle of battle for Bukit Timah Hill and its adjacent supply depots. With the loss of Bukit Timah Hill to the Japanese by dawn of 11 February, space was running out for Percival and his troops. Now the Japanese occupied almost half of the island.
Colonel Tsuji, the offensive’s mastermind and chief planner, had made an unsettling observation as to how the British were expending their artillery shells as if they would have no shortage, while Yamashita’s artillery ammunition stockpiles were running dangerously low. Perhaps it was Wavell’s chiding comments, but to the Japanese commanders the Allied forces having withdrawn inland were putting up a more tenacious fight and Japanese tanks were halted just south of the settlement at Bukit Timah. Some Japanese officers were also concerned that if the British held out for several more days, they would win the battle as Yamashita’s ammunition kept dwindling. As an example, Japanese artillery units had to limit their counter-battery fire on British and Commonwealth guns since the former were down to less than 100 rounds per gun. Yamashita’s supply system was drained to its utmost limit and he was informed that if fighting continued for another seventy-two hours, he and his forces would be placed in an impossible logistical situation. A few officers had the audacity to even suggest calling off the assault and returning to the mainland for resupply and re-fitting. However, Yamashita was under intense personal pressure to successfully conclude his offensive as soon as possible to avoid further disfavour from Prime Minister Tojo and other army officers in Tokyo who despised him. Later that day, Yamashita sent a request for surrender to Percival warning him about the potential harm that could come to the civilian population of Singapore City should an all-out assault become necessary.
By 13 February, the retreating British, Australians and Indian troops formed a new 28-mile perimeter around Singapore City. Unfortunately for Percival and his defenders, Japanese artillery destroyed the island’s water supply and the attackers had convinced the British that a major epidemic would ensue without fresh water. The capture of the depots at Bukit Timah reduced the island’s reserve supplies to just one week. Deserters, refugees and looters were all about the environs of the city. Percival, sensing that there was no panic in Singapore City yet, refused to reply to the surrender request. Like his naval counterpart, Admiral Yamamoto, who was widely known to be excellent at gambling, Yamashita launched into a bluff. He would expend artillery ammunition as if it were unlimited to further convince Percival that he had no alternative but to capitulate. Yamashita instructed his artillery to keep up their fire to suggest to the Allies that the Japanese had an unlimited amount of artillery ammunition. Military deception can sometimes become an added force for a commander willing to employ it at the right time and place.
Forty-eight hours later, Percival had a change of heart. He now sensed a crisis for the civilian and military forces of Singapore City as the Japanese artillery, having put the Seletar, Peirce and MacRitchie Reservoirs out of commission, truly did threaten a drought with its attendant consequences for the city’s population. Although trying to exhort his subordinates as conditions looked bleak on this day, Percival conveyed to Wavell that further resistance and loss of life would be futile and that he anticipated not lasting beyond another forty-eight hours. Percival cabled Wavell for permission to surrender. But from ABDA headquarters in Java, the latter refused and urged the island’s defenders, ‘You must continue to inflict maximum losses on enemy for as long as possible by house-to-house fighting if necessary. Your action in tying down enemy may have vital influence in other theatres. Fully appreciate your situation but continued action essential.’
After meeting with his military commanders on the morning of 15 February, Percival decided to surrender despite a personal message from Churchill to Wavell calling for a last stand by the numerically superior Commonwealth forces. Percival cabled Wavell that he would ask for a cease fire at 1600 hours. Wavell acquiesced and gave permission for the surrender if there was nothing more to be done. Percival had no petrol for vehicles; he had nearly exhausted his field artillery ammunition, since these were essentially the only heavy guns he possessed, and there would be no water in a matter of hours in a city with over 500,000 to 1,000,000 inhabitants living in an equatorial climate. For a personally brave man, such as Percival, capitulation was a bitter step, but he chose to ultimately go himself if called for by the Japanese, in the hope of obtaining better treatment for his troops and the population.
Percival sought terms from General Yamashita on 15 February. Ironically, the capitulation occurred coincident with the evident strain placed on Yamashita’s physical and logistical capabilities to continue the offensive causing the 25th Army general to harbour some anxiety. His divisional commanders were now beginning to report severe shortages in ammunition and supplies. Yamashita’s chicanery was successful because at 1100 hrs on 15 February, Japanese lookouts saw through the trees along the Bukit Timah road a white flag hoisted atop the broadcasting studios. Lieutenant-Colonel Sugita, one of Yamashita’s staff officers at 25th Army headquarters, met a British party seeking to discuss terms of surrender. Sugita told the British officers, ‘We will have a truce if the British Army agrees to surrender. Do you wish to surrender?’ The British interpreter, Captain Cyril H.D. Wild, agreed with the Japanese officer. Then Yamashita ordered that Percival and his staff come to him in person to the Ford Factory at Bukit Timah.
Six hours after the initial sighting of the white flag, Percival with two staff officers and an interpreter, Captain Wild, met with the 25th Army commander. Negotiations were brief but initially tense. Yamashita wanted an immediate surrender, although Percival was doing his best to stall and keep negotiating the next day. The Japanese 25th Army general knew his actual troop strength and did not want any surrender negotiations delay that might enable the British to discern his true numbers. This fact might embolden Percival to continue the struggle despite his major concerns about water, supplies and the civilian population. After the war Yamashita said, ‘I felt if we had to fight in the city we would be beaten.’ He went on to discuss that his strategy at Singapore was ‘a bluff, a bluff that worked’. At 1950 hours on 15 February, approximately seventy days after invading the Malay Peninsula through Thailand, the surrender document was signed. British and Commonwealth losses in Malaya and on Singapore Island totalled 9,000 killed and wounded with over 120,000 British Empire servicemen taken as prisoners-of-war. The 25th Japanese Army lost approximately 3,000 killed and almost 7,000 wounded. However, one has to remember how the Japanese advanced with almost reckless abandon during the seventy-day campaign that accounted for the greatest military disaster in British history and the greatest land victory in Japanese history.
Japanese male civilians with their families leave Singapore in October 1941. It had been widely known that Japanese spies were acquiring information about Britain’s military assets on both the island and the Malayan Peninsula. (Library of Congress)
A Singaporean of Chinese ethnicity, serving as an air-raid warden, overlooks Singapore Harbour as fears of an imminent conflict with Japan rise during the late autumn of 1941. (NARA)
An air-raid warden on Singapore douses out an incendiary device to demonstrate fire-fighting techniques to an observant crowd one night before the war started. (Library of Congress)
During a daytime demonstration, a fire-fighting patrol sprays water on a controlled fire before a crowd in front of a Singaporean department store before the war. (Library of Congress)
A Malay rescue crew evacuates the injured from a building in Singapore after an early Japanese air-raid. (NARA)
A Malay fire-fighting squad turns its water hose onto flames in a gutted building after a Japanese air-raid in early December 1941. (NARA)
A Malayan girl fills a water pitcher on Singapore Island to comfort those civilians who have lost their homes during a destructive Japanese air-raid. (Library of Congress)
Singapore residents, one carrying a newborn in her arms, flee from a burning building on a street that has been devastated by a Japanese aerial bombardment. (NARA)
A glimpse of some of the urban devastation in Singapore after initial Japanese air-raids in early December 1941. (NARA)
Singapore citizens help clear away debris from a destroyed building next to one that remains standing after an enemy air-raid. (NARA)
A Malay civil defence squad carries a wounded citizen on a stretcher. (USAMHI)
Flames burn out of control in a Singapore building while an air-raid warden (lower left) watches helplessly. (NARA)
Native workers amid smouldering ruins of a Singapore Island district after a Japanese air-raid. (NARA)
Malay workers search through Singapore’s rubble for survivors after a heavy Japanese attack. (NARA)
Ruins of a Chinese store on a Singapore street following a Japanese air-raid. A damaged car is off to the far left. (NARA)
A crowd of Indians gaze at the debris in front of the Raffles Hotel in Singapore after an early December 1941 air-raid. (NARA)
Throngs of European civilians evacuate Singapore Island in January 1942. Many perished at sea when their ships were attacked and sunk by Japanese aircraft. (Library of Congress)
Evacuation of Singapore’s European children proceeds from Keppel Harbour in January 1942. Two British soldiers and a seaman stand off to the left rear of the trio of children carrying dolls and toys. (Library of Congress)
A Gurkha infantryman of the 28th Indian Brigade that was to defend the northern coast of Singapore Island to the west of the naval base carries his Thompson submachine-gun with its drum magazine. (USAMHI)
British reinforcements with their kit and rifles on deck about to disembark at Singapore in January 1942 for the defence of the island. (USAMHI)
Australian troops disembark from their troopship to reinforce Singapore Island in early 1942. (AWM)
Japanese tanks roll down a Singapore street after the surrender in mid-February 1942. The ability of the Japanese to land and transport armour down the Malayan Peninsula and then cross the Straits of Johore was a decisive factor in overwhelming the British and Commonwealth hastily constructed defences. (USAMHI)
The first Japanese tanks begin to cross the Straits of Johore to attack Australian positions on the north-western side of Singapore Island after a feint by elements of the Imperial Guards Division to attack the northeastern portion of the island. (USAMHI)
Members of a Singapore Straits Volunteer Force (SSVF) water-cooled Vickers machine-gun crew defending the southern part of Singapore Island. Percival had many machine-gun emplacements there much to the chagrin of Field Marshal Wavell when he toured the island’s defences in January and February 1942. (Author’s collection)
Indian reinforcements stand in formation at Singapore’s dockside after disembarking from a troopship. (Library of Congress)
A large plume of smoke arises from the naval base at Sembawang far off in the background, as seen from the vicinity of the Municipal Building in the foreground, in February 1942. (USAMHI)
Japanese engineers repairing a gap in the Johore Straits causeway to expedite the transport of military vehicles from Johore Bahru, on the southern tip of Johore Province onto the north-western side of Singapore Island in February 1942. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops marching in formation across the Johore Straits causeway. In the background, Japanese engineers are busy repairing the demolished section of the causeway connecting Johore Bahru with Singapore Island. (USAMHI)
Large plumes of black smoke billow upwards from the naval base’s fuel tanks. The Japanese wanted to destroy these oil storage tanks to prohibit Percival from setting the Straits of Johore ablaze. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops coming ashore on the north-western side of Singapore Island from one of their landing barges. The British and Commonwealth troops had strung copious amounts of barbed wire at the water’s edge and initially inflicted many casualties on the Japanese amphibious troops. (USAMHI)
Japanese 18th Division infantrymen appear silhouetted as they cross the Kranji River in north-western Singapore Island soon after crossing the Straits of Johore on 8 February 1942. (USAMHI)
Japanese infantry with a Rising Sun battle flag crossing Seletar Airfield and stepping over the wrecked wing of a Bristol Bombay, which functioned as a transport aircraft and bomber. (USAMHI)
British soldiers and air-raid wardens attempt to put out fires in several trucks at Keppel Harbour after heavy attacl on the southern side of the Singapore Island. (USAMHI)
A large cloud of black smoke emanates from a rubber depot at Keppel Harbour several hours after a Japanese air attack. (USAMHI)
Civilian workers struggle to douse a fire in a railway yard at Keppel Harbour. (USAMHI)
A British merchant ship lists in Keppel Harbour after being struck by bombs. Note the smoke in the background as other parts of the port facility are ablaze. (NARA)
Smoke billows from more remote military installations north of the main buildings of Singapore City. (Library of Congress)
Japanese infantry lying prone or staying in a crouched posture advance on a burning Singapore Island village. By this time, half the island was under their control. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops hurry across a bridge to capture the naval base at Sembawang. Note the civilian car in the foreground. The base was being defended by the 28th Indian Brigade on its western side and the 53rd Brigade (18th British Infantry Division) on its eastern end. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops celebrate their capture of the 15-inch British naval guns at the Buono Vista battery on the south side of Singapore Island. (USAMHI)
British soldiers and seaman push a civilian car into Keppel Harbour to keep it out of the hands of the Japanese. (NARA)
Indian troops with their 3-inch mortar after battle at Bukit Timah, where Japanese tanks were temporarily halted by Singapore Island’s defenders in February 1941. (Author’s collection)
Japanese gunners fire their heavy artillery piece at Singapore installations, even though by the middle of February they were beginning to run low on ammunition. Nonetheless, Yamashita urged them to keep up a steady fire rate. (USAMHI)
British Major Harry Flower of the Northumberland Fusiliers negotiates under a flag of truce the return of some of his men who had been captured before the terms of surrender were agreed upon. (NARA)
The terms of surrender were negotiated at Yamashita’s pace at the Ford Factory at Bukit Timah. Yamashita is facing the camera (third from left) while Percival has his back to the camera (second from left). Yamashita would not agree to any delay of formal surrender for fear that Percival’s staff would find out how few Japanese troops he had and their almost completely expended lot of artillery ammunition. (USAMHI)
A Japanese photograph shows Lieutenant-General Yamashita (third from right) with Lieutenant-General Percival (far right) after the terms of surrender were agreed upon at Bukit Timah on 15 February 1942. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops gather to celebrate victory at dockside in Keppel Harbour after Percival’s capitulation on 15 February 1942. (USAMHI)
Japanese victors make British and Commonwealth troops pose with their hands up for the camera in Singapore on 15 February 1942. (USAMHI)
A British cemetery in Singapore with recently interred British troops at the time of the surrender in mid-February 1942. (Library of Congress)
Victorious Japanese troops in informal uniform cheerily parade down a Singapore street in front of the General Post Office after the surrender. (USAMHI)