ONE
Careful Approaches
Leonard Lundin writes that the period between the Winter War and Finland’s involvement on the side of Germany in its war against the Soviet Union in 1941 presents difficult questions for historians.1 The most important of these for our purposes was the responsibility of the Finnish political and military leaders for Finland’s unfortunate involvement in World War II.
Despite the lack of support from Germany in the Winter War, there was a rapid shift in both Finnish governmental policy and public opinion in favor of Germany soon afterward.2 The primary reason was Finland’s isolation from the world following Germany’s victories in Scandinavia and the West. To the Finns Germany looked like a rising star and the only country that could offer Finland some protection against the Soviet Union.3
In June 1940, as Germany was preoccupied in the west, the Soviet Union moved to occupy the Baltic states. Simultaneously, the Soviets began to exert renewed pressure on the Finns. The pressure took the form of several demands:
1. Return all properties removed from Hanko.
2. Soviet or joint operation of the nickel mines at Kolosjoki (Nikel).
3. Demilitarization of the Åland Islands.
4. Right to send trains across Finnish territory to Hanko.
The Finns agreed to demands 1 and 3 while the others were made subjects for negotiation. At the end of July the Soviets charged that the Finns were trying to suppress the activities of Soviet supporters in the country. To the Finns these Soviet activities were ominous and could signal that military moves against the country were in the making. German intelligence shared this view and concluded that the Soviet Union could begin military operations against Finland in mid-August.4
Conservative circles in Finland had argued for closer cooperation with Germany, and urged the government in that direction, as the Western Allies were going down to defeat in France and as the Soviets occupying the Baltic states had begun to exert pressure on Finland.5 The Finnish government needed little persuasion and its foreign minister, Rolf Witting, told the German ambassador in Helsinki, Wipert von Blücher, on July 4, 1940 that all efforts were directed at having a government oriented towards Germany. He also told Blücher that Finnish public opinion believed that the country would be able to reconquer its lost territories in the near future with the help of Germany. A month later Witting told Blücher that he wished to travel to Germany and meet with Hitler.6
Blücher told the Finnish foreign minister that it would be objectionable to have a Finnish government which overtly favored Germany. He suggested that a government that continued a neutral posture but cooperated secretly with Germany would be more acceptable. This statement was too strong for the German government. Blücher was admonished by his superiors and told to refrain from expressions that could raise false hopes among the Finns.7
However, the Germans soon began to show signs of reciprocity to the friendship expressed by the Finns. While this was no doubt tied to Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet Union, it began before the July 31, 1940 conference at which Hitler announced his decision.8
Another factor that influenced the change in German attitude involved the nickel mine concessions that were part of the Soviet demands on Finland. I. G. Farben, the German industrial concern, had contracted for delivery of 60 percent of the nickel ore production in July 1940. Finish nickel was of considerable importance to the German war industry, as was the supply of Swedish iron ore. The availability of these raw materials was an important factor in Hitler’s decision-making.
German belief that the Soviet Union might attack Finland in August 1940 caused Hitler to reinforce north Norway with units from all three services. Mountain Corps Norway, formed in June 1940, consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions under General der Gebirgstruppe Eduard Dietl. The 2nd Mountain Division, located in the Trondheim area in August 1940, was sent to the Kirkenes area in the far north. Dietl was directed to prepare plans for a speedy occupation of Pechenga and the nickel mines at Kolosjoki in case of a Soviet attack on Finland. The planned operation was code-named Renntier (Reindeer).
The Soviets were well aware of the turn in Finnish foreign policy toward Germany. The Soviet ambassador to Finland, Ivan Zotov, warned Moscow of this new trend and opined that the Finns, feverishly engaged in building fortifications, might invite the Germans into their country.9
The Transit Agreements
A German lieutenant colonel, Joseph Veltjens, appeared in Helsinki on August 18. He came ostensibly as a personal representative from Hermann Göring to Marshal Mannerheim.10 Veltjens’ task was to seek Mannerheim’s approval of a German proposal for the transit of supplies to German forces in north Norway and for the transit of German soldiers who were sick or on home leave. Göring was the director of Germany’s Four Year Economic Plan and one of Veltjens’ tasks was to firm up the option on the nickel mine concessions in Pechenga.11 For their part, the Germans proposed to provide Finland with military equipment and supplies. According to Mannerheim, he told Veltjens that he was not authorized to enter into any agreements of this nature and suggested that the proper person was the Finnish foreign minister. Veltjens replied that he was only authorized to deal with the marshal and that he was expressly forbidden to discuss the questions with the government or politicians.12
Mannerheim raised the issue with President Ryti.13 We don’t know what recommendation Mannerheim made but he had expressed an interest to Veltjens in obtaining matériel for the armed forces. Mannerheim was told to give an affirmative reply to Veltjens and it therefore appears that the ultimate responsibility for this action lies with Ryti. Finnish civilian leaders who later claimed ignorance of this exceedingly important issue for Finland’s future are less than sincere.
The German ambassador to Finland was very surprised when Veltjens told him that Hitler had made this decisive policy change14 and “that he [Veltjens] had come to explain to the Finns that all their weapon needs would be met.”15 Blücher sent his military attaché, Colonel (later Major General) Horst Rössing, to Berlin to verify the information given by Veltjens. Colonel Rössing called the ambassador from Germany and stated “The things that were reported on the day of my departure are confirmed with minor deviation.”16
General Rudolf Walden, the Finnish minister of defense, also sent officers to Berlin to clarify the German position. Further negotiations continued in Helsinki and a secret informal military agreement was reached in early September 1940. It provided for the transit of Luftwaffe personnel and equipment through Finland to Kirkenes in Norway. Notes on the subject were exchanged between the two governments two months later.
The stated purpose of these agreements sounded innocent enough but we are entitled to ask why Germany felt it necessary to make this arrangement with Finland. Sweden had allowed transit of German supplies and personnel since April 1940 and continuation of that transit would not have aroused the ire of the Soviets. The unstated purposes become obvious in Blücher’s writings about what the transit agreements actually involved:
During these weeks [April and first half of May 1941], the German military in Finland were very active. German military transports arrived in increasing numbers. Lines of communications were built throughout the country, food and ammunition depots established, and west–east roads and bridges improved. It was not possible to conceal these actions and they became the subject of discussion among the Finnish people. It was generally viewed within the framework of a German-Russian war.17
While Hjalmar J. Procopé observes that it remains a mystery which military officials supported the decision to let the Germans into the country, I believe we can draw some rather logical conclusions after we review the various known contacts between the military in the two countries. Procope’s observation that the democratic institutions in Finland were not functioning as they should is not accurate.18 The president/prime minister and probably other cabinet members were involved. Based on the fact that he immediately sent a team to Germany, we know that the minister of defense was informed. It would have been inconceivable to keep Foreign Minister Witting in the dark.
The implementation of some parts of the agreement not pertaining to the movement of military personnel had already begun as negotiations were taking place and this indicates that Veltjens’ visit may not have been much of a surprise. We have already noted that I. G. Farben obtained a concession for the nickel ore in late July and shipments of military equipment and supplies for the Finnish armed forces began in August.19
All this must be viewed in relation to the position in which Finland found itself after the Winter War and particularly after the German victories in Norway and the west. The country was isolated and threatened by its powerful neighbor and no help could be expected from the Western democracies. For the Finns, the transit agreements and the delivery of weapons and supplies for their armed forces essentially broke the isolation in which they had found themselves. These agreements may have put a brake on Soviet plans. Marshal Mannerheim writes that Finland would have fallen victim to the Soviet Union in late 1940 had it not been for the agreements reached with Germany.20 Nevertheless, it was a high-stakes gamble for the Finns to invite German forces into their country, irrevocably tying their future to that of Germany. Closer relations with Germany also damaged their relations with Great Britain and the US. The improvement in relations from the German side must also be viewed in relation to the events of the summer of 1940. These included the Soviet moves into the Baltic States and their demands on Finland, particularly as related to raw materials in the far north. Finally, Hitler’s decision in late July 1940 to mount an attack on the Soviet Union gave the final impetus and urgency to improving relations with Finland. Reports from the German military attaché in Helsinki gave the Finnish armed forces high praise.21
Soviet Reactions to the Transit Agreements
There were many spies in Finland, and the Germans realized that they needed to inform the Soviets about some of the arrangements they had made with the Finns. Schulenburg, the German ambassador in Moscow, was told to bring the matter up with the Soviets in a casual manner, but not before the afternoon of September 21.22 The Finns were also informed about German explanations to the Soviets through Ambassador Blücher in a separate message.23 The explanation the Soviets were given focused on antiaircraft reinforcements (one battalion) for north Norway to counter British air attacks. Schulenburg was instructed to tell the Soviets the following:
Investigation of the transport facilities revealed that for this purpose the route by way of Finland would present the least difficulty. This antiaircraft battery will presumably be landed near Haparanda on September 22 and transported to Norway, part way by rail, and the rest by road. The Finnish Government appreciating the special circumstances has granted the German request to permit this transport to take place.
It appears that Schulenburg left for Berlin on September 21 without carrying out his instructions. In Schulenburg’s absence the Soviet foreign minister queried the German chargé Werner von Tippelskirch about reports, including in the Finnish press, of German troops landing in a number of Finnish ports. Molotov requested a copy of the German–Finnish agreement, including any secret protocols. The chargé, who may not have been privy to Schulenburg’s instructions, answered that he would communicate Molotov’s request to the German government.24
Ribbentrop delayed his answer until October 2.25 He instructed the Embassy in Moscow to inform the Soviets that the German–Finnish agreement involved a purely technical matter without political implications, similar to that reached with Sweden about transport through Swedish territory to Oslo, Trondheim, and Narvik. The one with Finland involved only the area of Kirkenes, which could be best reached through Finnish territory. Because of the technical nature of the agreement the Germans had seen no need to notify the Soviets. The agreement resulted from an exchange of notes between the Finns and Germans and the embassy was instructed to give the Soviets, in the form of a memorandum, verbatim the four points in the agreement. These four points were spelled out in Ribbentrop’s message.
While the Soviets requested additional and more detailed information (number of troops involved, whether it involved only a single operation or a series, and whether the destination only involved Kirkenes) they did not press the matter. However, their suspicions lingered and it was only a matter of time before it surfaced at the highest levels.
Molotov’s Visit to Berlin
The Soviet foreign minister, Molotov, made his much-written-about visit to Berlin in the middle of November 1940. The discussions are fully reported by participants and in documents.26 Molotov was a survivor of the many purges in the Soviet Union and the Germans found him to be the toughest negotiator they had encountered. He was known for his no-nonsense approach and an unyielding preference for directness and explicit details that sometimes surprised and dismayed the people with whom he negotiated. They were used to politeness, subtlety, and vagueness—qualities completely missing from Molotov’s lexicon.
Hitler had never faced a foreign visitor like Molotov, who brushed aside Hitler’s broad generalities and demanded detailed answers to very specific questions.27 First and foremost on his agenda was Finland and what Germany was up to in that country. The direct, detailed, and uncompromising approach by his visitor apparently caught Hitler offguard and the meeting was adjourned to the next day when full answers to Molotov’s questions were promised.
The Soviet negotiator was equally persistent when the meeting reconvened. Again, Molotov’s focus was on Finland and he and Hitler, in the words of William Shirer, “soon became involved in a bitter and caustic dispute.”28 Molotov came right to the point on the issue of Finland, which he had raised on the previous day. He noted that Finland was the only area where the Soviet-German pact had not been fulfilled and he asked if the agreement between the two countries with respect to Finland was still valid. Molotov insisted that the presence of German troops in Finland was unacceptable as were Finnish political agitations against the Soviet Union. He was very blunt in classifying visits by prominent Finns to Germany as part of the agitation that the Soviets wanted to end.
Hitler disavowed any interests in Finland except for the uninterrupted delivery of nickel and lumber. He told Molotov that the transit of troops would end in a very short time. He stressed the importance of avoiding a war in the Baltic that could strain German-Soviet relations since it could lead to British and Swedish intervention. He labeled the whole Finnish issue as theoretical since Germany had agreed in 1939 that the country belonged in the Soviet sphere of influence.
Hitler’s statement must have sounded disingenuous to his visitor since the subject of Finland was anything but theoretical to the Soviets. Furthermore, Sweden, which was basically surrounded by German forces, showed no signs of altering its policy of neutrality, and the Germans were claiming that the war in the west had been won except for British refusal to recognize that fact. Molotov stated that he was perplexed about who would start a war in the Baltic since there was no danger of a conflict if Germany adhered to the position it had taken the previous year. Molotov wanted German acquiescence in a Soviet settlement—without war—of the Finnish issue in accordance with the Soviet-German treaty. When asked by Hitler what this meant Molotov stated bluntly that they wanted a settlement along the same lines as the one with Bessarabia—occupation—and he asked Hitler for his opinion, apparently in an effort to soften this exceedingly blunt statement. Hitler avoided a direct answer and only repeated his earlier statement that there must be no war in the Baltic.
The talks between Hitler and Molotov became very heated and Ribbentrop attempted to alter the subject by trying to entice the Soviets with a share in the breakup of the British Empire. Molotov did not take the bait and switched the conversation back to Europe. The Soviets were more interested in northern and southern Europe than in some illusive promise of possible outlets to the sea in India. Hitler apparently grew tired and weary of negotiating with the Soviet Foreign Minister and the session broke up early.
That night the Soviets hosted a party for the Germans at their embassy but Hitler did not attend. The party was interrupted by a British bombing raid and everyone hurried to the nearest air raid shelters. Churchill claims that the raid was timed for the occasion: “We had heard of the conference beforehand and though not invited to join in the discussions did not wish to be entirely left out of the proceedings.”29
Ribbentrop and Molotov shared the same air raid shelter and Ribbentrop presented Molotov with a draft treaty, which would make the Soviet Union a member of the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan. He proposed that the extension of the pact, minus the secret protocols, be made public. The secret protocol spelled out spheres of influence and the Soviet Union’s was referenced vaguely as territories south of that country towards the Indian Ocean. This did not satisfy Molotov who pressed for an expansion in the southern part of East Europe towards the Mediterranean and outlets from the Black and Baltic seas by firm agreements that would guarantee his country’s security. He raised a whole series of questions and issues that Ribbentrop was not prepared to answer. Ribbentrop therefore tried to steer the conversation back to the division of the British Empire since that country was defeated. This allegedly resulted in a rather caustic reply by Molotov, “If that is so, why are we in this shelter, and whose are these bombs which fall?”30
Molotov carried the proposed treaty back to Moscow and he promised an answer. There is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union would have rejected joining the Tripartite Pact if the membership conditions spelled out in their November 26 reply were met. However, these demands were so extensive that the Soviets must have known that Germany and the other triple alliance members would not accept them. Among these conditions was a demand for the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Finland. The Soviets, in turn, would guarantee peaceful relations with Finland and insure that German economic interests in that country were protected.31
The visit of Molotov to Berlin and the Soviet demands for joining the triple alliance spelled the beginning of the end to any meaningful German-Soviet collaboration. The idea of the Soviet Union joining the Tripartite Pact died a natural death. In the months that followed Germany avoided replying to the Soviets. Ribbentrop told the Japanese foreign minister in March 1941 that Germany would not attempt to bring the Soviet Union into the alliance at this time since the Soviets had set unacceptable conditions, particularly with regard to Finland and Turkey.32
An apparently angry and resentful Hitler proceeded to expedite the planning for the onslaught on the Soviet Union and the directive for that operation (Barbarossa) was issued on December 18. The Soviets came away from the conference with the distinct feeling that they had been warned by the Germans to stay out of Finland and they heeded this warning.
Finnish Reactions to Molotov’s Berlin Visit
Molotov’s visit to Berlin raised Finnish anxieties. They considered it possible that the Germans and Soviets had agreed to another division of spheres in East Europe and that their own future could have been part of such an agreement. Finnish worries were exacerbated when they considered the German decision to opt out of negotiations over the nickel mining concessions in October in the context of what may have happened in Berlin the following month.33
The Germans were aware of Finnish unease and Veltjens was sent on another mission to Helsinki to reassure them. He arrived in the Finnish capital on November 23 and was instructed to make three main points known to the Finns. The German ambassador to Finland made a similar representation a few days later:
1. That nothing had transpired in recent German-Soviet talks that made it necessary for Finland to adopt a yielding attitude in their negotiations with the Soviets.
2. That Germany had opted out of the mining concession talks since the matter of awarding concessions was viewed as a purely Finnish decision and that Germany would understand if Finland decided to keep the concessions for itself.
3. That the Soviets were fully aware that Germany viewed any complications in the north as undesirable and that they would keep this in mind when dealing with the Finns.34
The next sticking point in Finnish–Soviet relations was the presidential election in Finland in December 1940. The Finns wanted to elect an individual fully acceptable to the Germans and Ribbentrop threw his support behind Toivo Mikael Kivimäki, the Finnish ambassador to Germany. The Germans changed their minds after the Soviets informed the Finns that the election of a number of individuals, including Kivimäki, would not be in the best interest of Soviet-Finnish relations. The Germans decided to support Risto Ryti who was not among the ones to whom the Soviets objected. Ryti was elected.
The Soviets renewed their demands for the mining concessions in January 1941. The Soviets threatened “to bring order into the situation by the application of certain means” unless the Finns came to a speedy agreement.35 Rather than intervening directly, the Germans managed to cloud the issues by demanding various guarantees with respect to delivery of ore. While the Soviets broke off negotiations and stopped exports to Finland, they avoided an open breach with Germany. The Soviets agreed to provide Germany with their nickel supplies but Hitler believed that they would only keep their promises so long as it suited them. In a meeting with Mussolini on January 18–20, Hitler stated that he would have gone further to support the Finns and that he could not permit further Soviet encroachment on Finland.36
Early Military Interactions
The picture one gets when reading the accounts of Mannerheim, Ryti, and other high Finnish civilian and military officials is that the Finnish government and its military consistently refused to make any promises or enter into agreements with Germany about a war between Germany and the Soviet Union. This is generally true with respect to the visible and formal side of the relationship between Finland and Germany. There is strong evidence, however, that this formal side did not represent the true situation. Not only were there many meetings between the military of the two countries, but some events and movements of military forces into Finland required considerable preparation which translates into early Finnish acquiescence. It is by examining these events that we get a fuller understanding of the special relationship that existed between the two military establishments.
It is impossible to tell when the special relationship between the two military establishments began. To a large extent it may have existed since World War I. This feeling of comradeship was heavily reinforced by the realization of the Finnish military leaders that only Germany could offer them real protection against the Soviet Union. There was also considerable disappointment—even bitterness—towards the Western powers for not coming to their aid during the Winter War. After the presidential election in December 1940, Finnish foreign policy was controlled by what Olli Vehviläinen describes as an “Inner Circle” in which Mannerheim and Ryti were the leading figures.37
Whenever the special relationship started, it began to solidify when Veltjens made his visit to Helsinki in August 1940. The transit arrangements that were worked out served both sides. Finland felt more secure from its eastern neighbor since Germany now had a stake in Finland’s well-being. Numerous statements by Finnish politicians and public officials demonstrate this newfound feeling of security. For example, at a New Year’s reception in Berlin the Finnish ambassador told the German secretary of state that he believed Finland would not stand alone in a future conflict with the Soviet Union. There was also an attempt in February, through the military attaché system, to elicit direct German diplomatic support, since another crisis in Finnish–Soviet negotiations appeared to be in the making.
Germany viewed Finland as a route by which to attack the Soviet Union. An entry to this effect is found in the Halder diary on July 22. This was shortly before Hitler made his decision to attack the Soviet Union. The transit agreements served to tie Finland to Germany and the latter, in the words of the German ambassador, was able to establish a line of supply bases in northern Finland.
Otto Meissner, chief of the German Presidential Chancellery, who was a well-informed individual about what was going on, writes in his memoirs: “Rumania and Finland, in a constant state of tension with the Soviet Union, had agreed ahead of time to participate in a possible war.”38
This early participation of Finland was asserted at the Nuremberg Trials in the form of a deposition from Colonel Kitschmann. Kitschmann was assigned as the German military attaché to Finland from October 1, 1941 when the regular attaché, Major General Rössing, became ill. Kitschmann was briefed on the secret negotiations that had been carried out between the German and Finnish governments and their respective military leaders. His deposition continues:
In the course of these conversations von Albedill [German major on the attaché staff who briefed Kitschmann] told me that as early as September, 1940, Major General Roessing, acting on an order of Hitler and of the German General Staff, had arranged the visit of Major General Talwel [Paavo Juho Talvela39], the Plenipotentiary of Marshal Mannerheim, to the Führer’s headquarters in Berlin. During this visit an agreement was reached between the German and Finnish General Staffs for joint preparations for a war of aggression, and its execution, against the Soviet Union. In this connection General Talwel told me, during a conference at his staff headquarters in Aunosa in November, 1941, that he, acting on Marshal Mannerheim’s personal orders, had as far back as September, 1940—been one of the first to contact the German High Command with a view to joint preparation for a German and Finnish attack on the Soviet Union.40
It was probably not just a coincidence that the National Defense Section of the OKW submitted a plan dealing with operations against the Soviet Union to General Jodl on September 19, 1940. The plan assigned a large role to Finland. It is unlikely that planners would have given Finland such a role unless it had been discussed with Finnish military leaders.
Hitler had a conference with Field Marshal Brauchitsch and General Halder on December 5 to discuss what was essentially the latest draft of Operation Barbarossa, the German attack on the Soviet Union. Hitler approved the plan and General Jodl instructed the National Defense Section on December 6 to prepare a directive based on this plan. A meeting between General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, German Armed Forces commander in Norway, and Halder on December 7 discussed the same plan and here we learn that the Germans planned to use four divisions: two for the Pechenga area and two for the Salla area. The last two would come by rail from central Norway across Sweden.41
Major General Talvela again appears on the scene. He made a visit to Berlin in the middle of December 1940. The presence of the Finnish general in Berlin in this period caused Ziemke to suggest the possibility that the Finns may have participated in the development of the Barbarossa directive. There is no direct evidence that this was the case although his visit was probably not just a coincidence. The stated reason for Talvela’s visit was to maintain the personal contact between Mannerheim and Göring that had been established by Veltjens.
Talvela had talks with both Göring and Halder and the Finn briefed his hosts on the political and military situation in Finland. We have no information about what else may have been discussed except that Talvela tried to get German support for a political union between Sweden and Finland. Such a union had been agreed to by the Swedes provided Finland gave guarantees that it would not engage in a war of revenge against the Soviet Union. Finland accepted this condition. However, a union of Sweden and Finland ran contrary to German interests. They wanted to keep the north divided in order to maximize German influence. A Swedish-Finnish union would also alleviate Finland’s isolation and undermine German efforts to secure Finnish participation in the attack on the Soviet Union. It was a serious policy mistake by the Soviet Union to also oppose such a union. The German opposition to a union was conveyed to Talvela by Göring.
This was the second attempt to form a Scandinavian military alliance. It had been proposed earlier in 1940 after the Winter War and Norway and Sweden were positive to the idea. The Soviet Union also expressed opposition on this occasion although such a defensive alliance was not specifically prohibited by the Peace of Moscow nor was there a requirement for Finland to seek prior approval by the Soviet Union. A Scandinavian military block may have kept all of Scandinavia out of World War II and spared the Soviet Union from having to worry about the north.
Matters of more immediate interest to Germany were also touched on during Talvela’s visit. Halder requested information about the time the Finns would need to make an “inconspicuous” mobilization for an attack in the Lake Ladoga area.42 It is unlikely that Halder would have raised this question if Finnish participation had not already been discussed by representatives of the two countries.
The Barbarossa directive (No. 21), signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940, states that Finland would cover the marshalling of German troops transferred to the Rovaniemi area from Norway. In describing the operations in the far north it is again assumed that Finnish contingents would operate with the Germans against the Murmansk Railroad. The described participation of Finland is not hypothetical and since the directive served as the basis for all planning associated with the attack on the Soviet Union we must assume that the Germans had some form of assurance from the Finns and that the question of Finnish participation was a settled issue.43
In January 1941, the OKH invited the chief of the Finnish General Staff, Lt. General Erik Heinrichs, to Germany for the stated purpose of lecturing to military audiences on Finnish operations and experiences in the Winter War. General der Infanterie Waldemar Erfurth writes that there was no mention during this visit of German–Finnish military cooperation or the German plans for an attack on the Soviet Union.44
It defies logic to believe that there were no discussions—at least hypothetical—of cooperation in case of war in view of what is already discussed in this chapter and subsequent developments. Even Mannerheim’s writings, which always deny that Finnish officers made any agreements with the Germans or participated in their planning, wrote this about General Heinrichs’ visit to Germany:
During a formal visit to the Chief of the German General Staff, General Halder, the latter suggested that Finland and Germany again, as in 1918, might come to the point of fighting together, and that the natural task of the Finnish Army would be to move against Leningrad. The idea was rejected emphatically by Lieutenant General Heinrichs, who said he was convinced that neither the government nor the commander in chief would consent to such an operation—particularly since the Russians had asserted that Finland threatened the security of Leningrad. It deserves to be emphasized that neither the so-called Barbarossa Plan nor any others were shown to Lieutenant General Heinrichs.45
The refusal to threaten Leningrad is believable in light of Mannerheim’s long-standing view that nothing should be done to validate Soviet concerns and their stated reason for launching the Winter War.46 However, it is less believable that the Finns showed no interest in military cooperation in view of their strong desire to recover lost territories and to remove the threat from the east.
Helmuth Greiner, who kept the OKW diary, was exceptionally well informed of important conversations and decisions at the highest military levels in Germany. According to him, General Halder told Hitler as early as February 3, 1941, that “The Finns intended to deploy about four army corps in the south, and to assign five divisions from these to the attack on Leningrad, three divisions to Lake Onega, and two divisions against Hanko; however, they needed strong support.”47 This information was obtained by Halder in a “detailed conversation” he had on January 30, 1941 with Lieutenant General Heinrichs in Germany about cooperation between the two countries in case of a war against the Soviet Union.
The First Buschenhagen Visit
Colonel Erich Buschenhagen, chief of staff of Army of Norway, was present in Berlin during General Heinrichs’ visit. He was sent to Finland the following month (February). There are divergent statements and claims on what transpired during this visit.
Buschenhagen’s description of his mission suggests a coordination visit by the chief of staff of the organization tasked to take part in Operation Barbarossa on the northern front. It is very unlikely that the Germans would have sent this officer to Finland for that purpose if the subject of military cooperation had not been discussed in Berlin the previous month.
Buschenhagen’s explanation of his visit to Finland is contained in a deposition at the Nuremberg Trials. It was to make a personal contact with the Finnish General Staff to discuss “operations from middle and northern Finland.”48 He held meetings on this subject with Lieutenant General Heinrichs, his deputy, and Colonel Kustaa Tapola, the chief of operations of the Finnish General Staff, and relates that they reached agreement on various issues. He goes on to say that he and Colonel Tapola traveled to central and northern Finland to study “the terrain, the possibilities for deploying and billeting, and for operations in that sector.”49 According to Buschenhagen, these discussions led to the development of a plan by the Army of Norway for operations from Finnish territory. This plan was presented to, and approved by, the OKW.
Mannerheim gives a different version, claiming that the visit dealt primarily with the transit traffic. However, he goes on:
Besides that, the Colonel wanted to familiarize himself with our operational plans for Lapland and discuss traffic and communications in the north. He also let it be known that Germany would not remain inactive in case of a Soviet attack on Finland. As far as operational plans were concerned, I absolutely refused to disclose them; neither could there be any question of discussing possible German–Finnish operational coordination. On the other hand, there were no objections to discuss the communications system of Lapland within the context of the transit agreement.50
The German visitor was interested in Finnish operational plans for the northern part of the country and Mannerheim undoubtedly knew that German interest in this part of the country was due to plans to strike at the Soviet Union from northern Finland with the port of Murmansk and the Murmansk Railroad as the obvious objectives. I believe the Finnish General Staff, possibly with Mannerheim’s blessings, did discuss contingency plans. It is otherwise difficult to understand why an army level chief of staff, in the company of the operations officer of the Finnish General Staff, would travel to northern Finland. The transit traffic was operating without problems and had there been any, it would have been more appropriate for lower-level transport personnel from both sides—not two key military planners—to have addressed these problems.
General Hermann Hölter, who was General Erfurth’s chief of staff in Finland,51 writes the following:
For a group of forces provided for a thrust via Salla in the direction of Kandalaksha, which were not to be transported over the Baltic until shortly before the attack, it was necessary to create supply bases in the harbors of the Gulf of Bothnia and in the Rovaniemi district [for forces planned for the use in the Salla region]. These deployment preparations were served by the negotiations of the Chief of the General Staff of the AOK [Army High Command] Norway, Colonel Buschenhagen, with Finnish command officials in the winter of 1940–41 and his reconnoitering the boundary between northern Finland and Russia.52
Later, in discussing operational planning, Hölter quotes Buschenhagen as saying on June 13, 1941, as they traveled together to Finland that “The Finns stood by our side with advice and assistance in planning the operations.”53 A note in the Halder Diary after a conference on Operation Barbarossa on March 17, 1941, deals with security in the rear areas and it states “no difficulties in Northern Russia, which will be taken over by Finland.” Again, on March 30 Halder notes the following: “No illusion about our allies! Finns will fight bravely, but they are numerically weak and have not yet recovered from their recent defeat. Rumanians are no good at all.”54 General Walter Warlimont, deputy chief of operations at OKW, reported on April 28, 1941 that Finland’s part in Operation Barbarossa needed to be clarified with “authoritative” Finnish military officials without breaching operational security.55
There can be no doubt that much more collaboration was taking place between the Finnish and German military in this period than what is stated by Mannerheim. General Erfurth writes that “Neither negotiations nor discussions concerning a possible future cooperation between the Germans and the Finns took place during this visit of Buschenhagen at Helsinki or anywhere else” and he suggests that Buschenhagen confused the February visit to Finland with a visit he made in June 1941.56 He admits, however that Buschenhagen had a tour of eastern Lapland. This area had little to do with the transit of personnel but figured prominently in later German operations.
It should be kept in mind that Erfurth only arrived in Finland in June 1941. He spent over three years at the Finnish Headquarters and his friendship with Mannerheim is well known. His statement may therefore have been influenced by the views of the Finns rather than based on any independent knowledge he had about the events leading up to the war. Observations on German Army activities in Finland in the spring of 1941 by Ambassador Blücher, which are quoted earlier, clearly contradict statements by Mannerheim, Erfurth, and Heinrichs.
For security reasons the Germans did not want their relations with Finland to warm too rapidly. Too much activity in this area could alert the Soviet Union that something was afoot. The Finns were eager to acquire a protective umbrella in the form of Germany and Finnish foreign minister Rolf Witting went so far as to suggest to the German ambassador in Helsinki in early April that Finland join the triple alliance. The Germans ignored the suggestion. This worked to the advantage of the Finns since they later found themselves as a cobelligerent with Germany and this was preferable to that of an ally.
General Heinrichs’ Visit to Salzburg and Berlin
Karl Schnurre, a special envoy from Hitler to the Finnish president, arrived in Helsinki on May 20.57 He told Ryti that a tense situation had developed between Germany and the Soviet Union that could lead to war. In view of this hypothetical possibility, he asked that a Finnish military delegation be sent to Germany to be briefed on the situation. According to Mannerheim, President Ryti told the envoy that Finland was resolved not to attack the Soviet Union and he expressed an unwillingness to be drawn into a war between the great powers.58 Despite this statement, it was decided to send a military delegation to Germany—with the apparent approval of the cabinet and Mannerheim.
The Finnish military delegation, headed by General Heinrichs, left for Salzburg on May 24, 1941. General Heinrichs’ instructions, according to Mannerheim, did not authorize him to make any decisions or enter into any sort of agreements.59 However, the fact that the delegation included the chiefs of operations, mobilization, supply, and the navy’s chief of staff give credence to a conclusion that they came not merely to listen to a briefing of the worsening situation in Europe but to actually participate in planning.
It is difficult to determine how much reliance can be placed on the statements of the various parties in such murky circumstances. All present their actions in the very best light but the happenings on the ground—reconnaissance by planners, the establishment of a network of supply installations, strengthening of roads and bridges to support heavy military traffic, and the deployment schedules of units—speak volumes about the veracity of the different actors.
The Germans had made detailed plans for the three-day conference. The primary Finnish account is given by Mannerheim, and is supplemented by German diaries and the information contained in the testimony and documents from the Trials of War Criminals. The Finns were met by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel and Major General Alfred Jodl.
Jodl opened the conference and he described the planned attack on the Soviet Union as a preventive action. He portrayed a dangerous build-up of Soviet forces along the border that would allow the Soviet Union to select the time and place for military action. While Germany would try to resolve the issues through diplomacy, Soviet actions had forced the undertaking of certain countermeasures. If diplomatic means were not successful, military measures would become necessary.
The Finns were briefed on the German operational plan that involved the conquest of the Baltic states. Jodl explained that the Soviet defenses were expected to collapse as Army Group North advanced towards Leningrad. The primary task for the Finns would be to tie down Russian forces around Lake Ladoga. The briefing also included plans for the German attack from north Norway across Finnish territory to capture Murmansk and the planned German/Finnish attack across the waist of Finland to capture Salla together with its continuance to Kandalaksha on the White Sea to cut the Murmansk Railroad.
Germany’s requests of Finland included:60
1. Transport of a German corps headquarters and a reinforced division from harbors in the Gulf of Bothnia by rail to the Rovaniemi area.
2. Small Finnish detachments to assist the attack against Murmansk.
3. Early disguised mobilization of the Finnish Army.
4. Finnish participation in the attack out of central Finland to cut the Murmansk Railroad.
5. Finnish attack on both sides of Lake Ladoga toward the Svir (Syväri) River and the Ladoga Canal.
German friendship and protection, eagerly pursued by the Finns since the Winter War, had blossomed into full-scale participation in plans for a war of aggression at the side of Germany against the Soviet Union. The Finnish leadership must have been fully aware that events would take them in this direction. The talks that had taken place and the composition of the military delegation sent to Germany support this conclusion.
According to Mannerheim, Heinrichs told the Germans that Finland desired to remain neutral but was also determined to resist any Soviet aggression. He allegedly stated that while he was not authorized to make any commitments in operational matters, he believed that in the hypothetical case outlined by Jodl it would be possible for some smaller Finnish units to cooperate with the Germans in the far north.
From Salzburg the delegation traveled to Berlin, where it was received by General Halder, chief of staff of OKH. As chief of staff of the army, he was particularly interested in Finnish participation in the operation against Leningrad and suggested a strong attack on either side of Lake Ladoga. The German Army wanted the Finns to delay their operations for 14 days after the German attack but General Heinrichs opposed such a delay. Again, according to Mannerheim, Heinrichs stated Finland’s desire to remain neutral and that Finland would not attack Leningrad under any circumstances, even if attacked by the Soviet Union. Halder asked that the German views be given to the Finnish government and the military high command.61
Buschenhagen’s Second Visit to Finland
Talks between the German and Finnish military resumed again on June 3, 1941, this time in Helsinki. Colonel Buschenhagen represented the OKW and Colonel Eberhard Kinzel represented the OKH. The German officers discovered that the Finns were willing to accept the proposals made by the Germans at Salzburg and Berlin at the end of May.
Buschenhagen’s second visit to Finland is mentioned by Mannerheim in his memoirs, but in a misleading way. He writes:
From his [Buschenhagen’s] remarks to the General Staff it appeared that his mission this time was concerned with a discussion of practical details in connection with eventual cooperation in the north if Finland were attacked by the Soviet Union, and also with obtaining guarantees for Finland participating in the war as Germany’s ally. After I had reported to the President of the Republic and he had confirmed that he adhered to his earlier standpoint, I had Colonel Buschenhagen informed that a guarantee for Finnish participation in the war could not be given. Finland was determined to remain neutral provided she was not exposed to aggression.62
It comes as no surprise that there are major differences between the excerpt of Buschenhagen’s testimony below and Mannerheim’s statement.
At these conferences [in Helsinki], which again took place between General Heinrichs, General Halder, and Colonel Tapola, the details of this collaboration [agreed to the previous week in Germany] were worked out, such as the timetable, the schedule, measures of secrecy as to the Finnish mobilization…. All agreements between the OKW and the Finnish General Staff had as their sole purpose from the very beginning the participation of the Finnish Army and the German troops on Finnish territory in aggressive war against the Soviet Union…. There was—from the very beginning—no doubt among the Finnish General Staff that all these preparations would serve only in the attack against the Soviet Union….63
A number of Finnish military officers labeled Buschenhagen’s deposition false or distorted at the war guilt trials in Helsinki in 1945.64 Both Heinrichs and Tapola were among them. The Finnish officers denied that any agreements had been made with the Germans at any of their meetings or conferences.65 In the summary of his testimony Heinrichs declared:
Neither in conversation with him [Buschenhagen] nor in connection with the visit to Salzburg and Berlin, nor on any other occasion…were there made any written or oral commitments or agreements, binding for Finland’s government or military leadership.66
How much credibility should be given to the testimony of Buschenhagen is a controversial subject. His testimony at the Nuremberg Trials was not given in person but via a deposition taken while he was a Russian prisoner of war. Buschenhagen was released from captivity in 1955 and he did not die until 1994. There was therefore ample time for him to recant the testimony he gave while a Soviet prisoner and thus put the record straight if he had wanted. He never officially changed his testimony.
Greiner’s writings support Buschenhagen’s testimony. He claims that Finnish refusals to offer formal commitments were essentially meaningless as far as the Germans were concerned:
On this occasion [May 25, 1941], however, no firm agreements were reached, only operative possibilities were discussed in a non-binding manner, but the Finns were officially notified of the German intention, in case of a war against the Soviet Union, of having German troops push forward from northern Norway through the Petsamo region against Murmansk and from central Finland against the Murmansk Railway…. At the beginning of June the Chief of Staff of the Armeeoberkommando Norway, Colonel Buschenhagen, was sent to Helsinki to continue discussions with the Finnish General Staff. The Finns now expressed agreement to the transport of the German 169th Infantry Division as early as the first half of June [begun on June 4] from the homeland by sea to Oulu and Kemi and from there move forward by rail into an area of deployment provided east of Rovaniemi.67
Colonel Bernhard von Lossberg in the National Defense Section of the OKW expresses views similar to those of Greiner when he writes:
Finland was to cover the deployment of a Northern Group detached from our Army of Norway…and operate in cooperation with it…. The final discussion with the Finns took place at the beginning of 1941 after preliminary discussions in Salzburg…. When the Finns agreed to the question as to whether they would take part in such a campaign [pre-emptive German attack on the Soviet Union if that became necessary], Jodl explained the tasks planned for them within the context of the overall plan. The Finns basically agreed subject to the concurrence of their government….68
Finally, we should take into consideration a pro memoria which General Heinrichs gave the German military representatives on June 3, 1941:
The Commander-in-Chief [Mannerheim] wishes to take this opportunity to say that the interest called forth by these discussions is in no way purely operational or military-technical in nature.
The idea [destruction of the Soviet Union] which forms the basis of the propositions communicated to him by the highest echelons of the German leadership must arouse joy in the Finnish soldier’s heart and is regarded here as a historic sign of a great future.69
Heinrichs added orally that “for the first and probably the last time in Finland’s thousand-year history the great moment has come in which the Finnish people can free itself for all time from the pressure of its hereditary enemy.”70
Ziemke’s examination of German military records supports Buschenhagen, Greiner, and Lossberg’s accounts and allows us to summarize what was agreed to in Helsinki. The assembly of the main force of the Finnish Army would—with the Svir River as its objective—be such that it could attack east or west of Lake Ladoga on five days’ notice. A reinforced battalion would be attached to the German forces driving towards Murmansk and a corps of two divisions would participate in the attack towards the Murmansk Railroad at Kandalaksha. The Finns accepted responsibility for occupying the Åland Islands and pinning down the Soviet forces in Hanko. However, they requested that a German division be made available to attack and capture Hanko. German documents also affirm that the Finnish government and the Finnish parliament represented by the Foreign Affairs Committee approved the military arrangements between Germany and Finland on June 14.71
The Finns appear to have harbored some fears that the Germans might reach an agreement with the Soviets that would avoid war and possibly leave them exposed. In the event of a peaceful settlement between Germany and the Soviet Union they wanted guarantees from Germany of its independence, its borders (preferably the 1939 borders), and economic assistance. Two days before they began general mobilization, the Finns reiterated their demands for guarantees in case war was averted. Field Marshal Keitel authorized the German military attaché in Helsinki to tell the Finns that all conditions they had expressed were accepted and would be fulfilled.72
The Finns began a partial mobilization on June 9 and a general mobilization was ordered on June 17. The rapid and efficient mobilization called to duty reservists born between 1897 and 1918 in addition to the 1919 and 1920 year groups. The defense forces involved, including auxiliaries, numbered 630,000.73 This was a massive undertaking by a nation with a population of less than four million.
General Erfurth and Colonel Buschenhagen arrived in Helsinki on June 13. Erfurth assumed his duty as liaison officer at Mannerheim’s headquarters. Buschenhagen traveled to Rovaniemi on June 15 and established the headquarters for the Army of Norway in Finland. The Army of Norway thereafter had two headquarters more than 1,600 kilometers apart, one in Norway and one in Finland. Operational control of the Finnish III Corps, commanded by Major General Hjalmar Fridolf Siilasvuo, also passed to Army of Norway on June 15. In order not to arouse Soviet suspicions about an attack, General Falkenhorst remained in Norway until June 21.
It is impossible to reconcile the increasing interaction between the Finnish and German military from August 1940 onwards with the picture of innocence and reluctance to participate in a war against the Soviet Union painted by Finnish political and military leaders after the war. While the Finnish leaders denied that they participated in war planning with the Germans or had made any commitments to the Germans, the average Finn, watching the hectic German activities in central Finland, must have been fully aware that the country was moving rapidly towards war
While the decision to become a cobelligerent with Germany may have been made by a group of influential political and military leaders, it is safe to conclude that the decisions taken were in tune with the majority of the politicians and the Finnish population.74 President Ryti undoubtedly expressed the view of many Finns when he told a parliamentary delegation on June 21 that “this war is Finland’s only salvation. The Soviet Union will never give up its attempt to conquer Finland.”75