EIGHT
The period from early 1943 to June 1944 was a time of total stagnation in Finland and a period of increased friction between the coalition partners extending from disagreement on military and operational matters to political and economic issues. The topics ranged from direct and indirect Finnish negotiations with the Soviets (without informing Germany)—to such seemingly mundane but highly important issues as the activities of the Finnish free press, the increasingly active peace movement, Finnish support for the Estonians, the disbanding of the Finnish SS Battalion, the Jewish issue, and German demands on the Finnish economy. Most of these issues are beyond the scope of this book while others are woven into the text at appropriate points. Many had their origins in waning German fortunes on other war fronts.
It is not unusual in a democracy for the public to be highly supportive of a military venture at the outset when effectively explained by the government as being absolutely necessary for a nation’s security or its vital interests. Public support invariably declines as a conflict becomes protracted, as reverses are encountered, as losses mount, and when the original reasons for the conflict become questionable. In Finland’s case the situation was infinitely worse since it was in coalition with and dependent for its very survival on a dictatorial government in Germany, where there was little or no understanding at the highest levels for the role public support played in Finland. German expectations that the Finns would deal decisively with public dissidence ran into well-ingrained democratic values in Finland.
Leningrad and Other Fronts in 1943
Things looked bleak for the Germans on the eastern front at the start of 1943. The fate of the German 6th Army was being sealed in the momentous and decisive battle of Stalingrad. According to General Erfurth, Marshal Mannerheim had by now lost faith in German fortunes and began preparing himself and the nation for an unsuccessful end to the war.1
The Finns had a special interest in what was happening in their immediate neighborhood—the Leningrad front. They were therefore alarmed when General Jodl issued the OKW estimate of the situation on January 2, 1943 that brought the unwelcome news that a German attack on Leningrad was not possible at this time. Instead, the German High Command expected a major Soviet offensive on the Leningrad front in the near future.
The Soviet offensive to open a land-bridge to Leningrad began on January 16. While they broke through the “bottleneck” and managed to open a corridor to Leningrad on January 19, the ferocious fighting lasted until the end of March and cost the Soviets 270,000 casualties. The Germans managed to restrict the Soviet corridor to a width of six miles, which could be brought under artillery fire thus reducing its usefulness.
Vague communiqués from the OKW were slow to arrive in Finland and they were viewed with increasing skepticism as the Finns compared them with what was reported by radio from Stockholm and Moscow. Anglo-American and Russian communiqués published in the free Finnish press spurred the desire for a separate peace. The news about breaking the Leningrad siege was followed by news of the destruction of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad, the retreat of German armies and those of their allies from the Volga and Don to the Dnieper, and the precarious German-Italian situation in North Africa.
All this news had damaging psychological effects in Finland. Senior Finnish officers viewed the struggle in the east and the unfavorable course of events in Africa with increasing alarm. They saw the industrial power of the Western Allies joined with the vast manpower of the Soviet Union as an unbeatable combination for Germany and its allies.
The day after Stalingrad fell, there was a high-level policy meeting at Finnish military headquarters which included Mannerheim, Ryti, and several influential members of the cabinet. Those assembled concluded that there had been a decisive turning point in the war and that Finland should conclude peace at the earliest opportunity. Parliament was briefed in a secret session on February 9, 1943, to the effect that Germany could no longer win the war. Mannerheim explains that the briefing “had the effect of a cold shower” on the members of parliament.2
The Germans were fully aware of the importance of Leningrad for the Finns. On March 13, 1943, Hitler therefore ordered Army Group North to prepare an offensive in late summer to capture Leningrad. This was wishful thinking. Army Group North, fighting a defensive battle, was primarily worried about what the Soviets would do. It was especially fearful that the Soviets would strike at the boundary between Army Group Center and Army Group North south of Lake Ilmen. This could split the German front and pin Army Group North against the Baltic coast.
Nevertheless, Army Group North proceeded to plan for the capture of Leningrad—code-named Operation Parkplatz. Much of the siege artillery brought north by the 11th Army was still in place but Army Group North needed eight or nine divisions in order to launch the offensive. These were promised only after Army Group South had completed its operation to pinch off the large Russian salient at Orel west of Kursk—Operation Zittadelle.
Operation Zittadelle was launched on July 5, 1943 but after initial successes, fortune quickly turned against the Germans as the Soviets launched a strong counteroffensive and the conflict developed into the largest tank battle in history. The Germans were forced to retreat and the much hoped-for success turned into a serious German defeat.3 As the fighting spread the Soviets broke through the German front on the Donets River by the end of July. In August and September the German armies were driven back from the Donets River to the Dnieper River. By the end of September the Soviets had captured Kharkov and Günther von Kluge’s Army Group Center had been forced back to the edge of the Pripet Marshes.
Disastrous news for the Germans was piling up during the summer and fall of 1943. Sicily was invaded on July 9 and by August 17 the island was in Allied hands. Hitler’s ally Benito Mussolini was overthrown on July 24, 1943 and an armistice was signed with Italy.
With their offensives making rapid progress in the south at enormous losses, the Soviets turned their attention to Army Group North. A full-scale offensive to lift the siege of Leningrad was launched on July 22, 1943. Repeated Soviet attacks south of Lake Ladoga were repulsed by Army Group North in July and August. However, the Germans knew that this offered only a temporary respite; OKH ordered Army Group North to prepare a new defensive line along the Narva River and Lake Peipus, 200 kilometers southwest of Leningrad. These positions eventually became the Panther Line. This spelled the end of Operation Parkplatz.
OKW asked the 20th Mountain Army for its opinion about a possible withdrawal to the Panther Line. The answer stated that a withdrawal should not take place. The 20th Mountain Army argued that the Finns already felt let down by the failure of the Germans to capture Leningrad despite repeated assurances to the contrary. Dietl pointed out that after such a withdrawal the Finnish fronts on the Svir River and at Maaselkä would become indefensible and the Finns would be forced to withdraw.
Dietl went on to caution that a likely result of a withdrawal to the Panther Line would be a Finnish approach to the Soviet Union for peace. If an acceptable peace was offered, the 20th Mountain Army would be cut off and a retreat over bad roads in wintertime to Norway would be extremely hazardous. Dietl’s warning was followed by a Finnish notice through Blücher, the German ambassador to Finland, that a withdrawal would have serious consequences for Finland.4 This could only be interpreted by the Germans as a warning that Finland would be forced to leave the war if the Germans withdrew to the Panther Line.
Mannerheim also expressed concerns to General Erfurth about reports of a pending German withdrawal. OKW sent an explanatory message on October 3, 1943, where it stated that there were no intentions to withdraw but that rear positions were being constructed in case of an emergency. It was anticipated that the Finns would accept this since they had themselves been busy for weeks building secondary defensive lines.
Partisan Activities
Partisan or guerrilla warfare made its appearance in Finland, but not to the same extent as in other war theaters. The possibility of conducting effective warfare behind enemy lines became possible with the appearance of new technologies, particularly aircraft and radio communications. This new phenomenon of partisan warfare in World War II necessitated making rear-area security part of all operations and it often required substantial forces.
The problems in rear-area security during the first year of the war in Finland were limited to periodic engagements with dispersed elements of Soviet units hiding out in the forested areas as the Finnish Army advanced, particularly in Karelia. These emaciated individuals were forced by hunger and cold to make their appearance and were quickly captured and disarmed by the Finns.
The rather dormant situation changed in the summer of 1942 with partisan warfare most profound in the rear areas of the 20th Mountain Army, especially in the Salla area. Organized guerrilla units were sent through German lines by the Soviets. Long stretches of the 20th Mountain Army front were guarded only by patrols or outposts. The German units in the Kandalaksha sector, for example, had no contact with adjacent units and it was therefore relatively easy for Soviet guerrilla bands to bypass the German corps on their flanks in that area and on the Litsa River. These guerrilla bands made surprise attacks on German and Finnish outposts. Traffic behind the front soon became insecure.
The Germans instituted security measures. Special companies and battalions were sent into the border wilderness off the flanks of the corps. These mobile units carried out antiguerrilla warfare, trying to sever the return routes of the guerrilla bands. This was a difficult task in the trackless wilderness during the summer but it became much easier in the fall after the first snow had fallen.
The Finnish border police and raider battalions were particularly well suited for antiguerrilla warfare since they were recruited from the border population. These men were predominantly settlers, lumberjacks, trappers, and reindeer breeders living along the border. They were far superior to the German soldiers in this kind of warfare.
These Finnish irregular battalions were particularly appreciated by General Dietl, himself an experienced mountaineer and hunter. Four of these battalions (plus the Ivalo Battalion on the Murmansk front) were left under the control of the 20th Mountain Army after the relief of the III Finnish Corps. The Germans considered these battalions indispensable assets and they strenuously resisted efforts by Marshal Mannerheim to bring them back under Finnish control.
Partisan activities increased significantly in the rear area of the 20th Mountain Army after the thaw set in during the spring of 1943. Traffic on the Arctic Ocean Highway was no longer safe and the lives of Finns and Germans even deep in the rear areas were in jeopardy. It made little difference whether a person was military or civilian.
Both the 20th Mountain Army and the Finnish High Command wrestled with this problem. In trying to come up with effective countermeasures the continuous discussions between the two headquarters resulted in friction. General Dietl suggested that the Finns chose between two alternatives. The first was to reinforce the frontier guards. The second was to evacuate the civilian population from the border region east of the road leading from Kuusamo through Salla to Ivalo.5
Mannerheim turned down both German proposals. He maintained that the increase in the strength of the border guards could only be accomplished by a reduction in the army and the evacuation of the border area would encounter much opposition from the populace and disrupt the economy. The Finns decided to activate a motorized unit for the protection of traffic along the Arctic Ocean Highway. This unit was placed under the command of Colonel Villamo, the Finnish liaison officer at Dietl’s headquarters. As a long-standing member of the border guards he was well suited for the job. The Finns also issued weapons to the civilian population in the border regions.
On January 11, 1943 Mannerheim requested that General Dietl return four of the five irregular battalions attached to the 20th Mountain Army. Mannerheim’s request resulted in weeks of discussions.
Dietl considered the issue very important since the units in question were not only needed for rear-area security but for out-posting and patrolling the gap between the northern and southern parts of his sector. No progress was made in the negotiations between Mannerheim and Dietl and the OKW became involved. Not wanting to ruffle the feathers of the Finnish marshal at this critical juncture in the war, OKW directed General Erfurth to work out a compromise.
Mannerheim upped his demand on February 7, 1943 to include the fifth battalion—the Ivalo Battalion. After lengthy negotiations Mannerheim dropped the demand for the Ivalo Battalion but only after the 20th Mountain Army agreed to return the other four to Finnish control. Dietl, while having to accept the results, felt that he had made a bad bargain. OKW may not have fully appreciated the importance of these battalions to the 20th Mountain Army and decided not to get involved in an argument with the Finns over a few battalions at a time when their support was beginning to waver.
OKW Planning Conferences
At an OKW planning conference on January 14, 1943, it was decided not to give the 20th Mountain Army any offensive missions in 1943. The planned operation against the Rybachiy Peninsula—Operation Wiesengrund—could not be executed because XIX Mountain Corps lacked the necessary strength. Operation Lachsfang against Kandalaksha required an offensive by the Finns against Belomorsk at the same time, which the Germans had finally come to view as something that could not be expected. Furthermore, such an operation required an additional division plus two regiments which could not be spared in the dire circumstances in which German Army found itself.
The OKW planning conference also made a complete revision of its view of Finland as a cobelligerent. It amounted to writing Finland off as an ally that could be counted on to carry its own weight. This estimate must have been heavily influenced by the refusal of the Finns to take part in any offensive operations over the past year since nothing else of consequence had transpired on the ground to warrant the negativism contained in the estimate. The Finnish operations in 1941 and 1942 had been very successful and achieved virtually all goals. The revised estimate concluded that the Finns would not be able to prevent setbacks in case of a major Soviet attack because their defenses were poorly constructed, they had few reserves, and the Finnish units were “not imbued with the spirit of holding to the last man.”6
A planning conference for the whole Scandinavian region took place at OKW in mid-March 1943. It included representatives from the OKW operations staff, the chief of staff of the 20th Mountain Army, and the operations officer of the Army of Norway. The conferees agreed that a British-American landing in north Norway was possible but they also agreed that such a landing would only imperil the German position in Scandinavia if it were accompanied by a Soviet offensive. It was concluded that this was not likely on the rather shaky ground of mistrust between the Soviets and the Western Allies. A more logical reason for the unlikelihood of a Soviet offensive was provided by the 20th Mountain Army. It reported that the Soviets had withdrawn three divisions and two brigades from the northern front. This was a strong indication that the Soviets did not plan an attack or anticipate one by the Germans.
The conference recognized that the fall of Stalingrad had caused a decisive shift in Finnish opinion and that the Finnish government and the Finnish military leaders no longer believed in a German victory. The conferees agreed that a major reason for the defeatist attitude of the Finnish military leadership could be found in the pessimistic reports provided by the Finnish liaison officer at OKH, General Talvela. The chief of staff of the 20th Mountain Army opined that the Finns were preparing to exit the war and could only be prevented from doing so by a convincing German military victory in the summer of 1943 or by their inability to obtain acceptable peace terms from the Soviets. General Jodl was more optimistic. He believed that the Finns would keep faith with Germany.
Stagnation
In striking contrast to what was happening in other theaters of the war, the fronts in Finland remained very quiet after the Soviet spring offensives in 1942. This situation is exemplified by a silly and aimless argument between the 20th Mountain Army and the OKW about how best to designate the front. OKW favored labeling it “the front without combat activity” (Front ohne Kampfhandlungen) while the 20th Mountain Army favored, because of continued minor casualty figures, “the front without significant combat activity” (Front ohne ghrössere Kampfhandlungen).7
Whatever action took place was limited to very light trench warfare. Neither side made any effort to increase combat activity. The troops spent their time improving positions, living quarters, and their supply routes. The front lines remained essentially as they had been at the end of the summer of 1941.
The OKW believed that a major Soviet offensive could be launched against the 20th Mountain Army at the end of the winter 1943, probably in the Murmansk sector. Dietl expected a Soviet offensive as early as the beginning of February 1943. Jodl’s letter conveying the OKW estimate promised reinforcements, including a division from Norway if the situation so dictated.
While the Finns were beginning to search for a way out of the war, they had to prepare for the eventuality that the price could be unacceptable. Therefore, they continued to call additional year groups to the colors. The second half of year group 1924 was inducted on March 8, 1943, and the first half of year group 1925 was inducted four days later. The second half of the 1925 year group was called to the colors on October 12, 1943. Individuals from older age groups were called up two weeks later. On October 28, 1943, the Finnish military headquarters announced the activation of three new mixed brigades. They also requested enough artillery from Germany to activate eight more artillery battalions. Most of the requests were granted by OKW but not delivered in time for the activation of the brigades at the end of the year. These brigades initially had to do without artillery.
The Finns suggested a modification to the boundary between Finnish and German forces in central Finland. They proposed that the boundary be shifted northward and the 20th Mountain Army agreed. The new boundary ran through the southern part of the German area in the Kestenga sector and necessitated a shift in forces by the XVIII Mountain Corps. The left flank of the Finnish forces became anchored on the Poposero River.
It is ironic that the ratio of forces on the Finnish fronts was decisively in favor of the Germans and Finns precisely at the time when decisions on offensive operations had become gridlocked.
The Soviets began their withdrawal in the spring of 1943 and an estimate of the situation by the Finnish High Command on September 15, 1943 reported that 400,000 Finnish troops were confronted by 160,000–180,000 Soviet troops. The 20th Mountain Army with its 200,000 men faced about 90,000 Soviet troops. In the whole theater the Finns and Germans numbered over 600,000 while the Soviets had only about 270,000 troops. The ratio was at least 2:1 and a more favorable condition for successful offensive operations never existed during the entire war. When the quality of the troops on both sides is factored in the Germans and Finns held a decisive advantage.
A joint Finnish-German offensive would have had a great chance of success in late 1943. The Finnish refusal to exploit this advantage has been harshly criticized both during and after the war by German and Finnish officers.
An offensive by the Finns and the 20th Mountain Army in the fall of 1943 would not have seriously influenced the deteriorating German position. They could undoubtedly have broken through the Soviet defenses and relieved Army Group North by driving south from both Ladogan Karelia and the Karelian Isthmus. This would have afforded Army Group North a badly needed but only temporary relief. The Germans and Finns could, without doubt, have cut the Murmansk Railroad in late 1943 but that link to the outside world was no longer vital for the Soviet Union. Its potential loss was more than compensated for by a great increase in Soviet production, by supplies flowing into ports in the Far East, and the opening of a new supply route through the Persian Gulf.
It is not an exaggeration to state that the German and Finnish forces in Finland were practically on a peacetime status from the summer of 1942 to the summer of 1944. The quietness of the fronts in Finland must have struck the soldiers as ominous since it could be interpreted as a Soviet decision to let them wilt while their fate was decided elsewhere.
Führer Directive No. 50
War is an extension of politics and must remain subordinate. This is invariably a problem, particularly in coalition warfare. Finnish leaders were fully aware that an offensive beyond the current positions would result in an immediate declaration of war by the US, their only friend of any consequence in the Allied camp. The US was viewed as Finland’s best hope in securing an acceptable settlement with the Soviet Union. Taken together with the view that Germany could no longer prevail in the war, this conclusion dictated a policy designed to keep the US from declaring war. Finnish insistence that their current war was a purely Finnish-Soviet affair—continuation of the Winter War—was unrealistic but colored their outlook on events. Finnish military leaders exercised great care not to put themselves in a position where they could be blamed by the government and parliament for a US declaration of war.
We can safely assume that Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States were fully aware of the Finnish dilemma. Germany’s knowledge of the state of affairs is undoubtedly the reason they did not press the Finns to undertake offensive operations in 1943. The Soviet Union’s knowledge allowed them to take the risk of removing great numbers of troops from the German-Finnish fronts in 1943. The US was the trump card and Ziemke is probably right when he writes that an offensive by the Finns in late 1943 “would in the long run have been suicidal for the Finnish nation.”8
The OKW operations staff informed Hitler on September 25, 1943 that there were increasing signs that Finland desired to leave the war and it was expected that they would take action in this direction if Army Group North was forced to withdraw. This warning resulted in the OKW issuing Führer Directive No. 50 three days later (September 28). It dealt with a possible Finnish collapse and the preparations required by the 20th Mountain Army for a withdrawal to north Finland and north Norway. Parts of the directive read:
It is our duty to bear in mind the possibility that Finland may drop out of the war or collapse.
In that case it will be the immediate task of 20th Mountain Army to continue to hold the Northern area, which is vital to our war industry, by moving back the front to a line running through Karesuando, Ivalo, and the sector at present held by the 19th Mountain Corps. 230th and 270th Infantry Divisions will come under its command in due course.9
The anticipated operation involved withdrawing the two corps in central Finland (XXXVI Mountain Corps and XVIII Mountain Corps) northward and simultaneously swinging their eastward orientation to one more southerly. The two corps would tie into the XIX Mountain Corps along the new line and the army’s mission would become one of defending the nickel mines. The directive ordered that preparations for carrying out the operation begin immediately and authorized direct coordination between the 20th Mountain Army and the Army of Norway. The implementing plans and preparations by the 20th Mountain Army are covered in Chapter 11.
Finnish recognition of the dangerously deteriorating military situation on the Russian front found its expression in a request on October 6, 1943 to General Erfurth for permission to reconnoiter defensive positions in the rear of the 20th Mountain Army. The Finns intended to construct fortifications in the rear of the German front. The request was based on the possibility of a German withdrawal from Lapland. General Erfurth quickly reported the Finnish request to OKW on October 7 and recommended that a top-level representative be sent to brief Marshal Mannerheim.
General Jodl’s Visit to Finland
This was the background for General Jodl’s visit to Finland on October 14 and 15, 1943. He had orders from Hitler to give Mannerheim a complete orientation on the overall military situation and to discuss questions of mutual interest. He also carried a personal letter from Hitler to President Ryti, which was delivered by Ambassador Blücher. Hitler scolded Ryti for the anti-German attitude of the Finnish press and the lack of supportive internal policies in Finland. Ryti replied to Hitler at the end of the month in a positive tone but without making any specific commitments.10
Jodl was well received and had a lengthy meeting with Mannerheim on October 14, 1943. It was a far-ranging discussion in which the German tried to calm some of the Finnish fears. Jodl explained that the defection of Italy had little military significance since that country had never been a strong partner in the alliance. The Germans expected an invasion in France but they were confident that it would result in a disastrous defeat for the British and Americans. In fact, the Germans were eager to deal with that threat since it would put an end to the fear of a second front and allow Germany to move troops that were now tied down in France to the eastern front. Jodl acknowledged that the situation in the sector of Army Group North was dangerous and there had been discussions of pulling back its northern flank. Such suggestions had been rejected out of consideration for the Finns. For his part, Mannerheim continued his insistence on reconnoitering the area behind the 20th Mountain Army with the intention of building fortifications. The OKW agreed to this request on October 26, 1943.
Jodl pointed out to the Finns that Germany knew about Finnish efforts to get out of the war. Commenting on this Jodl stated: “No nation has a higher duty than that which is dictated by concern for the existence of the Homeland. All other considerations must take second place before this concern, and no one has the right to demand that a nation shall go to its death for another.”11 Jodl went on to lay out Finnish possibilities as he saw them. One was to continue the war at the side of Germany which he viewed as the least risky. The other possibilities were to conclude a separate peace with the Soviet Union, conclude an armistice with the assistance of the Western Allies, or to join the Russians in the final battle against Germany. With respect to a separate peace or armistice, he did not expect that Finland would be shown much mercy at the clutches of Stalin. As to the last possibility, Jodl found it incompatible with the Nordic conception of loyalty and honor.
Mannerheim writes that he was favorably impressed by the frankness of General Jodl and the regard he had for Finnish difficulties. Nevertheless, Mannerheim notes that the strategic perspective which Jodl laid out failed to influence his own view of the situation.12
Both the Finns and Germans made short speeches at the dinner that followed the meeting between Jodl and Mannerheim. Jodl closed his with these remarks: “We shall never surrender. We will never betray our allies. We will fight to the final victory.” According to Blücher, these remarks were welcomed by those present by great applause.13 Mannerheim was apparently so satisfied by Jodl’s explanations that he asked him to delay his return to Germany so that he could brief General Walden, the minister of defense.
A few days after Jodl’s visit, General Dietl visited Helsinki and Minister of Defense Walden asked to see him. In a lengthy meeting General Walden told Dietl that he disapproved of the groundless writings in the Finnish press about a separate peace and he assured his visitor that Finland would remain faithful to its brotherhood in arms with Germany.14
The 20th Mountain Army availed itself of Jodl’s visit to argue strenuously against Führer Directive 50. The objections by the 20th Mountain Army dealt primarily with the supply situation. While it recognized that it was the best-supplied German army and had eight or nine months of supplies stockpiled in Finland and Norway, it viewed its ability to hold out in northern Finland for any length of time as very dim. The army viewed itself as isolated in an effort to hold a mining district that would be of no use if Finland left the war. The army was quite skeptical of the navy and Luftwaffe’s ability to secure the sea supply routes around Norway and to keep the enemy from interdicting the ore traffic. The 20th Mountain Army recommended a withdrawal across the Baltic in the event that a situation as depicted in Directive 50 should arise. While the OKW agreed with the 20th Mountain Army’s assessment it did not believe that a withdrawal across the Baltic was possible or that Hitler would agree giving up the mines prematurely.
It appeared that some stability was achieved in Finnish-German relations as a result of Jodl’s visit. This prompted Hitler to order that Directive 50 should be regarded only as a contingency measure and that no action should be taken for the time being.
Several changes in senior German command personnel took place in Finland in late 1943. General Ferdinand Schörner, the commander of the XIX Mountain Corps, departed Finland on October 25 and he was replaced by General der Gebirgstruppe Georg Ritter von Hengl, the commander of the 2nd Mountain Division. General Stumpff, the commander of the 5th Air Fleet, was also given a new assignment on November 2, 1943.
Situation on the Leningrad Front in early 1944
The year 1944 opened with heavy fighting along the entire eastern front. The German armies, bled white in numerous battles in 1943, found themselves withdrawing from one position to the next.
The situation south of Leningrad continued to deteriorate at the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944. The Soviets made a deep penetration southwest of Velikie Luki at Nevel on November 5, 1943. This deep penetration tore open the front of the 16th German Army. The situation was kept from becoming a total disaster by a lack of follow-up by the Soviets. The slow-moving Soviet military machinery failed to quickly exploit the breakthrough which would have outflanked the new Panther position and might have caused the whole Army Group North’s front to collapse.
The German situation in the Leningrad area remained precarious and this led Army Group North, supported by the OKH, to propose an immediate withdrawal to the Panther Line in order to avoid a disaster. Hitler failed to make a timely decision because he worried about the impact of such a withdrawal on the Finns. Nothing happened in the first half of January 1944 to force Hitler’s hand since the Soviets were not ready to exploit their earlier success that had created the Nevel salient.
This situation began to change on January 14, 1943, when the Soviets started offensive operations against the 18th Army. They began with strong attacks in the Oranienbaum-Leningrad sectors and against the army’s right flank at Novgorod. The hopes that the 18th Army might be able to contain the Soviet offensive vanished by January 17 when the Soviets broke out of the Oranienbaum pocket and began to encircle Novgorod. Field Marshal Küchler gave orders for a withdrawal from the shores of the Gulf of Finland and east of Leningrad on January 18.
The news of the events south and west of Leningrad was received with trepidation in Finland. While the German communiqué admitted heavy defensive fighting in the areas south and west of Leningrad, they maintained that the Soviet offensive had been repulsed. The Soviet broadcasts, on the other hand reported great victories. The Finns soon learned that the Soviet reports were closer to the truth as they had made deep penetrations into the German lines and the 18th Army was in mortal danger. If it continued to hold fast in the center, the two wings would most likely be enveloped and the army would find its lines of communications to the west severed.
Field Marshal Küchler requested permission to make a withdrawal that would shorten his front lines. It involved the line east of Leningrad and the city of Novgorod. This would free up forces that he could use as reserves. Hitler agreed reluctantly but then changed his mind. He was told that it was too late as orders for the withdrawal had already been issued. The army group commander was convinced that he would have to retreat to the Panther Line and that he would not be able to make a stand short of that line. Hitler did not agree despite the fact that Field Marshal Küchler’s infantry strength was down to 17,000 troops. Küchler made two trips to Hitler’s headquarters to plead his case. Hitler demanded that the withdrawal be limited to the Luga River, a line that basically did not exist and one that the Soviets had already penetrated. Hitler relieved Küchler of his command on January 31, 1943, and placed General Walter Model in command of Army Group North.
Mannerheim doubted that Army Group North would be able to extricate itself and occupy a new defensive line. However, the 18th Army carried out a masterly withdrawal under nearly hopeless conditions without stopping at any intermediate positions. It managed even to bring along all the heavy artillery from the Leningrad area.
OKW’s Offer of Help and the Finnish Response
The loss of the territory south of Leningrad left Finnish positions exposed in East Karelia, on the Karelian Isthmus, and along the Svir River. They formed deep salients into Soviet-controlled territories and invited attack. The danger that the German withdrawal posed for the Finns was recognized by the Germans. Consequently, the OKW sent a message to Mannerheim on January 31, 1944, asking him for suggestions on how Germany could help the Finns compensate for the increased Soviet threat they now faced. The message also assured Mannerheim that the 20th Mountain Army would remain in Finland at full strength.
The Finns made a quick response to the German Liaison Staff at Finnish Headquarters on February 1, 1944. The list they presented was long. It included 4,000 M42 machineguns, 200 Soviet 152mm guns, 60 122mm guns, a renewal of the call for artillery for the three brigades being formed, and a request that the 20th Mountain Army take over the Ukhta sector so that the 3rd Finnish Division could be released for other missions. The requirements were sent to OKW on February 3.
General Dietl learned about the Finnish demands and lodged an immediate protest over the request that he take over the Ukhta sector. Dietl had become irritated by previous Finnish protests against the withdrawal of even minor German units from Finland. He felt that it was a waste of manpower to tie down additional German troops on a secondary front and felt that the Finns, who had not accepted the concept of total war, were quite capable of creating reserves from their own resources. Dietl, who was obviously upset, went even further. He questioned the audacity of the Finns in “laying claims on the German Army which is already carrying the entire burden.”15 Instead, Dietl recommended that Mannerheim be requested not to object if the 20th Mountain Army sent all the troops it could spare to Army Group North. The OKW, apparently trying to appease the Finns, rejected Dietl’s protests on February 6 and ordered him to effect the relief of the 3rd Finnish Division as quickly as possible.
Negotiations between the Germans and Finns for establishing a new boundary line between the Finnish and German fronts were initiated on February 14, 1944 between General Heinrichs and General Erfurth. The boundary had to be shifted south as a consequence of the Germans taking responsibility for the Ukhta sector. It was not simple to arrive at an acceptable solution, particularly since Dietl was doing so against his will. It took several weeks to settle some of the issues.
After the news of the German reverses south of Leningrad, the Finns called the first half of the 1926 year group to the colors with a reporting date of February 21, 1943. Mannerheim, seeing the need for the country’s best-qualified commanders to be at the front, also recalled General Talvela as Finnish representative at OKH and replaced him with Lieutenant General Hugo Viktor Österman. As another precaution, Mannerheim moved the newly formed Finnish armored division from Petrozavodsk to the Viipuri area.
Despite Germany agreeing to virtually everything on the Finnish requirement list of February 3, the Finnish government’s worry about the country’s future was not alleviated. The withdrawal of Army Group North, the German reverses on other fronts, and increased Soviet bombings of Finnish towns only added to the desire of many to end the war. A heavy air raid on Helsinki on February 6, 1944, caused much damage as did another raid on February 27. The Finns requested German help to protect against Soviet air raids and the Germans responded quickly. German night fighters arrived at Helsinki on February 15, 1944. This was a gracious step when one considers that it was only possible through reducing the air defenses of German cities that were being bombed into rubble.
Diplomatic Negotiations and German Reactions
Efforts to arrange a separate peace between the Soviet Union and Finland had gone on since 1942 and have been touched on at various points in this book. It may be helpful to review them as we approach the decisive events in the summer of 1944.
In his observations of the Finnish political scene Ziemke makes these very accurate observations:
To save what they could of their credit with the democracies, to avoid falling completely under the influence of Germany, and yet to preserve their existence as a nation, the Finns were forced to equivocate, claiming for themselves an exceptional status as cobelligerents and speaking of their German friends as brothersin-arms rather than allies. These semantic distinctions, which on the surface only created a somewhat ludicrous picture of tiny Finland fighting the Soviet Union and professing itself mildly surprised to find the Germans there too, in fact were evidence of forces which were to influence Finland’s entire conduct of war. It must be said to the credit of the Germans that it was mainly their unusual and, for themselves, unprofitable restraint which allowed the Finns to play an independent game to the extent that they did.
Hitler’s visit to Finland to pay his respect to Mannerheim on his seventy-fifth birthday on June 4, 1942, had been an unwelcome event for the Finns. While the visit was covered favorably in the Finnish press, it resulted in an immediate deterioration of US-Finnish diplomatic relations. A reduced level of diplomatic relations kept the hope alive that the US would still be a positive influence in Finland’s negotiations with the Soviet Union. American-Finnish relations were not helped by Marshal Mannerheim’s return visit to Germany in late June where he was accorded the full range of courtesies. The two-day visit ended with Mannerheim flying back to Finland in Hitler’s private plane.
This may have been the high point in German–Finnish relations as they deteriorated significantly in the wake of the German failure to achieve a decisive victory in the summer campaign against the Soviet Union. There was a noticeable change in public opinion. This trend accelerated with the news of German defeats in Russia during the winter of 1943 and the troubling reports from North Africa, coming as they did not long after President Roosevelt recalled his ambassador in Helsinki. Only a legation secretary remained to represent the US.
There was an election in Finland in the middle of February 1943. This gave President Ryti, who was re-elected, an opportunity to reshuffle his cabinet in a way that would make the government more acceptable to the Allies. The more pro-German foreign minister Rolf Witting was replaced by Henrik Ramsay who had connections to both the US and Great Britain. This was an unmistakable signal of a change in policy and the US transmitted an offer to establish contact between Finland and the Soviet Union on March 20, 1943.
Ramsay had little experience in diplomacy and naively traveled to Berlin on March 25, 1943 to seek that country’s friendly acquiescence in Finland’s withdrawal from the war. Ribbentrop quickly dispelled Ramsay’s illusions. The Germans were not about to tolerate any flirtations between their “brothers-in-arms” and the Soviets. Instead of acquiescing in Ramsay’s request, Ribbentrop demanded that Finland quickly reject the US offer and that the Finns give a written assurance that Finland would not negotiate a separate peace.
The US proposal had not involved any specifics, only an offer to mediate between Finland and the Soviet Union. That part of the German demand was therefore not difficult to deal with; it only involved declining the offer at mediation. Ribbentrop demanded that the text of the Finnish reply to the US be shown to the Germans before it was sent. This was done before Ramsay departed Germany.
The second part of the German demand was the most difficult to meet since it would nullify something Finland had insisted on since the beginning of the war—the status as an independent cobelligerent. The Finns delayed their answer until May 16, 1943 and it took the form of a speech by the prime minister where he stated that the Finns would fight to the end rather than submit itself to the mercy of the Soviet Union. The text of the speech was sent to Berlin with the explanation that it represented the official Finnish attitude. Ribbentrop did not find the answer specific enough and recalled Ambassador Blücher for two months.
Sweden also began to exert pressure on Finland to withdraw from the war. In July 1943 Sweden forwarded an oral offer from the Soviets to discuss peace. The Finns rejected this offer but the same month Ramsay informed the US in a personal message to the Department of State through the Finnish embassy in Portugal that they would not join the Germans in resisting a US invasion of Norway. According to Mannerheim the message went as far as stating that the Finns would not resist even if the US extended its operations into Finland, “an operation which would naturally win my full approval.”16
In August 1943 three members of the Finnish parliament presented a petition to President Ryti signed by 33 prominent Finns requesting that steps be taken not only to strengthen relations with the US, but to find a way out of the war. We need to put this in the context of the fact that the tide of war had by now turned clearly against Germany. This petition was published in a Swedish newspaper and it touched off a public discussion that showed clear preference among the Finns for a separate peace.
Stalin had promised Churchill and Roosevelt at Teheran in December 1943 to make a peace offer to the Finns that would preserve their national independence. That peace offer was now made through the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Alexandra Kollontai. Finland did not dare jeopardize its relationship with the US and dispatched a former prime minister, Dr. Juho K. Paasikivi, to Stockholm to receive the Soviet offer. Paasikivi returned from Stockholm on February 24, 1944, with the Soviet terms. They involved the restoration of the 1940 borders, Finnish internment of the German troops in Finland, war reparations, and the demobilization of the armed forces. The Soviet offer was more stringent than expected and it was rejected by the Finns, particularly the part dealing with the internment of German troops which they considered impossible. However, both the Finns and Soviets indicated willingness for further negotiations and this led to an invitation for a Finnish delegation to come to Moscow. This may have been a genuine action on the part of the Soviets, or they may have hoped for a Finnish rejection which would have allowed them to disregard the promise made by Stalin at Teheran and given them a free hand to deal with the Finns on their own terms. The invitation was accepted and Paasikivi and former Foreign Minister Carl Enckell flew to Moscow on March 26, 1944.
The Finnish delegation returned from Moscow on April 1, 1944. The conditions given the Finns for a peace were no more lenient than those given in Stockholm. They were:
1. Internment or elimination of German troops in Finland, with Russian support if necessary.
2. Restoration of the 1940 peace treaty and Finnish withdrawal to the boundary established by that treaty.
3. Immediate release of Soviet prisoners of war.
4. Demobilization of the Finnish armed forces.
5. Reparations to the amount of $600 million over five years.
6. Surrender of the Pechenga area in return for Hanko.
These conditions were made public on April 3, 1944. The Finnish government was particularly resistant to the requirement for the internment or elimination of the 20th Mountain Army, the demobilization of the armed forces, and the hefty reparations. The parliament endorsed the government’s position on April 12, 1944, and the Finnish answer was provided to the Soviets through the Swedish government. The answer left the door open for further negotiations.
The alarm in Finland that had resulted in Paasikivi’s visit to Stockholm had subsided by the beginning of March 1944. General Model had brought Army Group North back to the Panther Line and managed to establish a somewhat stable front. The stabilization of this front had a calming effect on the charged political atmosphere in Finland. The German occupation of Hungary in March 1944 also demonstrated the fate that could befall a defector from the German cause.
The Finnish attempt to find a way out of the war came as no surprise to the Germans. The Germans at first adopted a wait-and-see attitude since they did not think the Finns were ready for the expected harsh Soviet terms. However, Hitler began taking steps to bind Finland irrevocably to the fortunes of Germany as soon as General Model managed to stabilize the military situation on the Narva front. The Germans began reducing the flow of weapons to Finland and in early April 1944 he directed Dietl to inform Mannerheim that further German weapons would not be provided until the possibility of them falling into Soviet hands was removed.
The free Finnish press, which had been very supportive of the war in 1941, had now turned hostile towards Germany. Stories condemning the actions of German troops in Estonia and Italy, occupation and repression in Hungary, and the imposition of martial law in Denmark began to circulate in the Finnish media. This infuriated the leadership in Germany. Keitel made it clear to the Finns that these conditions were intolerable for the German troops in Finland. With respect to negotiations with the Soviets, the rather feeble Finnish explanation to Germany was that they were necessary to convince the Finnish people that obtaining acceptable terms from the Soviet Union was impossible.
Military Events in Finland in early 1944
While the fronts in Finland continued quiet in early 1944, by February unmistakable signs appeared of a large Soviet buildup of forces in the sectors of the 20th Mountain Army. In the opinion of both the 20th Mountain Army and the OKW, these signs pointed to a full-scale Soviet offensive. In mid-March the 20th Mountain Army and the Finnish High Command concluded that the new troops which had appeared in front of the 20th Mountain Army were forces withdrawn from the Finnish Maaselkä front. It was estimated that the forces opposing the Germans in the Kestenga and Kandalaksha sectors had grown from about 100,000 to at least 150,000 (possibly 165,000). All intelligence pointed to a large-scale Soviet offensive before the end of the month.
On March 13, 1944 Dietl requested that Mannerheim delay the withdrawal of the 3rd Finnish Division. This division had been withdrawn from the line in the Ukhta sector but had not yet moved out of the area. Dietl wanted the division left behind the boundary of the German and Finnish fronts. Dietl also wanted two Finnish battalions left in the Ukhta sector for the next four weeks. Mannerheim agreed to leave the two battalions in the Ukhta sector and to station the reinforced 11th Infantry Regiment in the Suomussalmi-Kuusamo area but he reiterated his intention to move the rest of the 3rd Division to the Karelian Isthmus.
It appeared to the Germans that the Soviets were continuing to switch forces from the Karelian front to the Kestenga and Kandalaksha area. The Germans viewed this as preparation for striking a severe blow against the 20th Mountain Army at the same time as they were negotiating with the Finns. The greatest threat was in the XXXVI Mountain Corps sector where the Soviets had brought up two new divisions and four brigades. They had also brought up additional artillery and rocket launchers and were in process of extending their right flank northward in an attempt to envelop the German left.
On March 22, 1944 Dietl renewed his appeal to Mannerheim to transfer a Finnish division to central Finland. On the next day Dietl informed his army that Soviet attack preparations were completed and that an attack could be expected at any time. He ordered his troops to hold their well-prepared positions at all costs. His stirring order of the day ended with the ominous words, “There is no road back.”17
Marshal Mannerheim had now become more accommodating to Dietl’s requests. While he could not spare a division as Dietl had requested, he agreed on March 25, 1944, to transfer the reinforced Finnish 3rd Brigade to the Lake Kemi area. The Germans were well prepared for the anticipated Soviet offensive and the victor of Narvik, at the end of his career, may have achieved another spectacular success. However, the Soviet offensive did not materialize. It remains a mystery why the Soviets did not attack. Perhaps they never intended to attack and the whole buildup may have been a successful deceptive maneuver.
In an apparent attempt to influence Finnish attitudes in their negotiations with the Soviets, Field Marshal Keitel sent a message to Mannerheim on April 2, 1944, expressing appreciation for the accommodation of Dietl’s request by the transfer of the 3rd Finnish Brigade. He expressed the opinion that this action signaled Finnish intentions to continue the war. He also leveled mild criticism at the Finnish peace movement and the fact that this could possibly lead to a lowering of the fighting spirit of the Finnish Army. In view of the strong Finnish interest in the Narva front he assured Mannerheim that the situation there had stabilized and invited the Finn to judge for himself by sending a delegation of Finnish officers to that front.
Mannerheim accepted Keitel’s invitation on April 3, 1944. He respectfully rejected the German notions about the fighting spirit of the Finnish Army. German arrangements for the inspection trip by Colonel Valo Nihtilä, chief of operations of the Finnish General Staff, and his group, in the second week of April, were well planned. The Finns were apparently impressed by German defensive preparations.
General Österman, the Finnish liaison officer at OKW, was ordered to report to the Finnish High Command in early April. He had a meeting with Field Marshal Keitel before his departure on April 4, 1944. Keitel told him that the coverage in the Finnish press about military measures taken by Germany against Hungary had caused much resentment in Germany. General Österman was asked to obtain clear answers from Mannerheim as to future Finnish policy. Keitel’s discussion with Österman contained clear warnings of problems if Finland continued down the road it appeared to be taking. Österman was warned that there were already discussions in the OKW about the advisability of continuing arms deliveries to Finland.
In early April 1944 Dietl requested a meeting with Marshal Mannerheim to discuss the military situation. The meeting took place at Mikkeli on April 6. Dietl pointed out to Mannerheim that it appeared that the Soviets were positioning themselves for an envelopment of the German left flank that would threaten the German supply route from Salla. Dietl outlined his plan to disrupt the Soviet attack preparation by an attack of his own. Mannerheim liked the plan and offered to relieve the German security forces at the Kolosjoki nickel mines by moving the Finnish 3rd Brigade to that area. Dietl replied to this offer by pointing out that the German security force at the mines was not suited for offensive missions. It had become obvious to Dietl that Mannerheim was interested in the attack in the Kandalaksha sector, as long as it was performed by German forces. The meeting broke up without a decision.
OKW was also interested in the operation and General Erfurth was requested on April 11, 1944, to try to convince Mannerheim to participate with Finnish troops. Mannerheim rejected the proposal.18
Hitler Applies Pressure on Finland
Despite the fact that the Finns rejected the Soviet peace terms for a second time on April 12, 1944, the whole sequence of events resulted in a loss of confidence by the Germans in their “brothers-at-arms.” There can be no doubt that Mannerheim and some of the other Finnish military leaders approved of the action of the government, actions they saw as necessary for the survival of the Finnish nation. The difference in the behavior of the Finnish political circles and those of the military leaders had become blurred in the eyes of the Germans and this led to a new reality in German–Finnish relations.
Hitler had become increasingly annoyed and his distrustful nature was deeply offended by the Finns going their own way. He began to exert pressure on the Finns in the military and economic area that was intended to insure that the peace offensive would come to a final end. He ordered grain shipments to Finland stopped on April 13, the day following the Finnish parliament’s rejection of the Soviet peace terms. This was followed by an embargo on war matériel on April 18. The incident that Hitler used as a pretext for applying strong pressure on Finland was a critical article in the Finnish press over German action to evacuate the collections and other items from Tartu University in Estonia, ostensibly to keep them from falling into the hands of the Soviets.
The directive from the OKW informed the recipients that the Finns were not to be told about the arms embargo. This placed Dietl and Erfurth in an awkward position since they were sure to be queried by the Finns when planned shipments did not arrive as scheduled. OKW directed that such inquiries be forwarded to them for answers, on a case-by-case basis. Only such equipments as were absolutely necessary for the fighting ability of the Finnish Army would be provided in the future. This meant an end to Finnish hopes for modernizing and expanding their army.
Both Dietl and Erfurth protested the embargo and pointed to the unpleasant consequences that were likely to follow. They explained that the Finns would find it difficult to believe that an article in a newspaper, which most Finns were not familiar with, could cause Germany to take such extreme measures. The OKW refused to modify the directive, probably because it had been drawn up by Hitler. The requirement for secrecy was left standing and this seriously undermined the frankness and honesty that had, for the most part, characterized the dealings between Finnish and German military leaders.
Erfurth writes that the OKW “endeavored to re-strengthen the weakened German-Finnish relations by inviting General Heinrichs, the Finnish Chief of Staff, to the Führer’s headquarters.”19 I believe he is wrong in his assessment of German motives based on the events that transpired during the visit. It is more likely that it was a continuation of the increased pressure Hitler was applying on the Finns.
The OKW invitation was accepted and Heinrichs and Erfurth departed for Salzburg on April 27, 1944. They were billeted at Berchtesgaden. General Kurt Zeitzler, chief of the German General Staff, was staying at the same hotel and Heinrichs paid him a courtesy call on April 28 as Erfurth had a meeting with Keitel and Jodl prior to the visit by Heinrichs.
The meeting between Field Marshal Keitel and General Heinrichs did not go well. Heinrichs had obviously expected to be received as an honored guest as on previous visits to Germany but he was in for an unpleasant awakening. Keitel started out with a condemnation of the peace talks that Finland had held with the Soviets over the past weeks. He pointed out that there was great danger in Finland allowing a political minority to dictate its policies. The reproachful tone of Keitel’s remarks surprised Heinrichs who tried to defend the Finnish government’s action since they were in accord with the wishes of the Finnish people as expressed by the parliament. Neither Keitel nor Heinrichs fully appreciated how political opposition was handled in the other man’s country. Keitel also complained of the unfriendly attitude of the Finnish press and used the Tartu University case as an illustration. Heinrichs claimed he knew nothing about the incident.
After the dressing down by Field Marshal Keitel, General Jodl took over—in a friendlier tone—to brief the guest on the situation on the various fronts. Neither he nor Keitel made any reference to the arms embargo already in effect. Jodl ended his briefing by making two requests:
1. That Heinrichs obtain an authoritative written statement that arms given to Finland by Germany would never be allowed to fall into Soviet hands. This was a prerequisite for continued German military assistance.
2. That Heinrichs use his influence to stop attacks on Germany and the Wehrmacht in the Finnish press.
In a private conversation between Jodl and Erfurth after the meeting, the former promised to use his influence to have Hitler cancel the embargo, provided he received a declaration from Marshal Mannerheim or President Ryti on the points he had raised in his briefing to Heinrichs.
Heinrichs felt that the Keitel’s tone had been overbearing, that he did not understand the Finnish situation, and that his statements were reproachful and contained unjustified thinly veiled threats against Finland. The lavish social entertainment in Heinrichs’ honor failed to soften the blow of the bad official treatment.
It was a very reflective Heinrichs who headed back to Helsinki. He had now experienced the full range of Finnish-German relations from their birth in 1940/41 to what now looked like the beginning of a rupture. He still knew nothing about the embargo. That news awaited him on his return to Mikkeli. The chief of staff of the Luftwaffe had inadvertently let that information slip out in a discussion with the Finnish air attaché in Berlin.
While the Finns had no prior knowledge about the embargo they obviously knew that something was not right when expected shipments failed to arrive. Both military and food assistance were indispensable for Finland. Grain deliveries ceased at the beginning of May 1944.
Marshal Mannerheim gives a very different account in his memoirs of General Heinrichs’ visit to Germany from that of Erfurth.20 There is, for example, no mention of the conditions laid down for the continuance of military assistance. However, there is no doubt that the Finns had become fully aware of the seriousness of the situation and they tried to find a way to appease Hitler by agreeing to Jodl’s suggestions. Two letters from the Finnish High Command were sent to the Führer’s Headquarters on May 12, 1944. General Heinrichs prepared one letter to Jodl while Marshal Mannerheim wrote one to Hitler. Mannerheim’s letter failed to change the situation since Hitler considered it too noncommittal and full of generalities. Again, Mannerheim makes no mention of these two letters. The German embargo continued.
General Hermann Hölter, the new chief of staff of the 20th Mountain Army, made an introductory call on Marshal Mannerheim on May 16, 1944. He had replaced General Ferdinand Jodl.21 General Hölter brought several requests from General Dietl. The harder German attitude seems to have brought results since Mannerheim granted the requests. These included leaving the bulk of the 3rd Finnish Brigade in a position behind the front of the XXXVI Corps, but under Finnish control. Mannerheim also agreed to the use of units of the 3rd Brigade on the left flank of the XXXVI Mountain Corps, something he had resisted earlier. The 11th Finnish Infantry Regiment was to be withdrawn from the Kestenga sector and rejoin its division. However, the Finns agreed to replace it with a Finnish construction battalion that could complete the construction of the Sofyanga Position. Two of the four border guard battalions were to remain in the Kestenga sector despite Mannerheim’s earlier insistence during negotiations with Dietl in 1943 that these battalions be returned.
The Finns also took token action to satisfy the Germans with respect to their complaints about articles appearing in the Finnish newspapers. The newspaper Svenska Pressen, which had displayed an anti-German attitude was closed down for a period of three months on June 8.
Hitler’s Letters to Mannerheim and Ryti
A letter from Hitler to Mannerheim arrived at the Finnish High Command on June 1, 1944. It was in answer to Mannerheim’s letter of May 12 and added new complications to an already strained relationship. As far as Mannerheim personally was concerned, the letter was written in a polite and friendly manner. However, Hitler was harsh in his condemnation of the independent approach taken by Finland and he warned of serious consequences. He explained the vastness of the German undertakings and that “we feel all the more offended by the way in which one ally [Italy] has broken faith to a large extent, while other allies consider it a matter of course to go their own ways.”22 It was not purely a Finnish matter, Hitler wrote, to enter into peace negotiations with a common enemy.
Hitler wrote that Mannerheim was correct in referring to his requests for armaments from Germany as massive. He pointed out that his responsibility to the German people made it impossible for him to withhold urgently needed weapons from the German armed forces and send them to another front where their employment was in question.
While there is no discussion of Hitler’s letter of June 1 in Mannerheim’s memoirs, there is no doubt that it caused a crisis situation for the Finnish military and political leadership. Most civilian and military leaders were assembled on June 4, 1944, to observe Mannerheim’s seventy-seventh birthday and the situation in which the country found itself was of course the main topic of discussion. They were desperately trying to find a way to appease Hitler without giving up the nation’s independence in foreign affairs, something the parliament would not accept.
The discussions about what to do continued for several days without an apparent decision. Mannerheim may have tried to extricate himself from this controversy and leave it to the diplomats. He sent a letter thanking Hitler for his birthday wishes and added a few words thanking Hitler for his June 1 letter! That apparently closed the matter as far as Mannerheim was concerned although he could not escape the fact that the Finnish armed forces would soon find themselves in a desperate situation without German assistance.