From the end of the Second World War up to the present day, many authors have asserted the ‘invincibility of the German Airforce’ as proof that the Third Reich had prepared for a war of aggression. This is a very simplistic vision, as the new German Luftwaffe was only created on 15 May 1933 (the first fighter unit being raised on 20 April 1934). Indeed, to raise such a force (forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles), the recently elected German government had to first assemble personnel ad hoc (initially ex-soldiers of the Great War coming from the Imperial Airforce as with Robert Ritter von Greim, from the Navy as with Theo Osterkamp, or from the Army as with Albert Kesselring) before launching a large programme of plane building. This was an arduous task to complete in five short years, but through competence and desire for revenge the Luftwaffe units appeared on time nearly every month.
In Spain, German specialists could examine captured Soviet planes (such as these Polikarpov I-15s lined up after the Nationalist victory). But as they were sent to the famed test centre at Rechlin, no Soviet planes could be included at that time in the Luftwaffe.
Another Soviet plane used by the Republican Airforce in Spain was the beautiful bomber Tupolev SB-2. One of them is seen here being examined by German personnel. SB-2s will later be used in numbers by the Luftwaffe.
Even if the involvement of the flying components of the Condor Legion in the civil war of Spain from 1936 helped the Luftwaffe to gain some experience in new tactics, this could in no way boost the production of planes limited by the capabilities of the aircraft industry.
Despite the reputation for German seriousness, the building of the Luftwaffe remained quite anarchic, and some important tasks had to be neglected due to lack of time or capabilities. Therefore, contrary to the simplifications of the above mentioned authors, the new (and too rapidly built) German Airforce was handicapped by many Achilles’ heels:
· the engineers did not have enough time to conceive a long range bomber (such as the future American B-17);
· the production of transport planes was limited, and throughout the war the Luftwaffe suffered severely from a lack of air supplies;
· the German industries having to build important war materials (guns, tanks, etc), and as everything had to be made from scratch, not enough aircraft were produced. So, at the time of the Battle of Britain (August/September 1940), British industries produced more fighters than their German counterparts (a fact largely unmentioned by the supporters of ‘The Few’).
Thus, before and during wartime, leaders of the Luftwaffe had to face a real problem: how to find enough planes for training, transport, fighting or bombing. Buying foreign planes was impossible due to lack of money, the normal desire to support local production and the natural distaste all pilots had for an unknown aircraft.
This is why, on all occasions, the Luftwaffe tried to include in its ranks foreign planes that had fallen into German hands. The Luftwaffe was therefore the airforce to have used the most captured planes alongside its own aircraft. That is the subject of this book.