Chapter 9
Since the close of GOODWOOD, debate has continued as to whether the operation was a success or a failure. Without the achievements of 19 July, there could have been little debate.
THE SCORE CARD
The great armoured assault of 18 July had pushed out the British bridgehead east of the Orne River by five miles in the direction of the Bourguébus ridge and the Falaise road. The ruins of Cuverville and Démouville were in British hands. The village of Grentheville was secured, likewise the farm complexes of le Mesnil Frémentel and le Prieuré, and around these three positions the new British front coalesced overnight.
On the flanks of VIII Corps, the ground gained was screened by moderate gains made by neighbouring formations. On the I Corps front, 3rd Division’s 18 July advance had been impeded by the struggle for Touffréville and the total devastation of Sannerville. At length, Touffréville had been cleared as a firm anchor for the push into the Bois de Bavent, threatening Troarn and the Dives valley. On the Canadian II Corps front to the west, 3rd Canadian Division had been slowed by determined resistance in the chateau and village of Colombelles, and stopped dead in the Caen metalworks (by the defenders of Colombelles who escaped the worst of the bombing and subsequently occupied the factory debris). The straggling village of Giberville had been taken and held against determined counter attacks. South of Caen a small Canadian bridgehead had been pushed across the Orne River, guided by resistance fighters into the ruins of Vaucelles. Construction of new bridges had been interrupted by continuing fire from Mondeville and the metalworks. But by the end of the day, a new pair of Class 9 bridges (‘TAY’ Bridge) and a DUKW crossing (ramps for amphibious trucks) were nearing completion north of Colombelles, while work had commenced on the first of several bridges intended to restore road links between Caen and Vaucelles.
A new pair of Class 9 bridges completed north of Colombelles.
Arrow marks 29 Brigade Tac HQ move. (See page 195 and Appendix II for map coordinates)
So far, no gain of great strategic value could be set in the balance against a huge investment in logistics and air support, to say nothing of the previous day’s losses in men and (especially) materials.
On the German side, the key ground had been held. The Bourguébus ridge was reinforced. So long as it remained in German hands the loss of its lower slopes, from Vaucelles and Cormelles to Grentheville, could be tolerated. Events to the east were a lesser concern: the close terrain between Banneville and Troarn would exact a high price from any attackers, and still further eastwards the soggy Dives valley with its broken bridges offered no easy route for armoured breakout. Many of the defenders of 18 July had already been relieved, with the greater part of 1.SS-Panzerdivision (the ‘Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler’) holding the line from Ifs to Frénouville, and 12. SS ‘Hitlerjugend’ moving up to relieve 21. Panzerdivision to the east.
Nevertheless, the damage done to the Germans was considerable. Being forced to move the SS armour out of reserve and back into the line was a defeat in itself. Already in the course of 18 July, the Leibstandarte had suffered heavily. The vehicle strengths of its Panther and Sturmgeschütz Abteilungen fell sharply after 18 July; many a damaged Panther was retrieved and repaired but few new replacements were forthcoming. Already below establishment at the beginning of July, the Leibstandarte experienced heavy losses during the month: the tank regiment ten percent of its manpower, the assault gun battalion over fifty percent. Much of this loss occurred on the Bourguébus ridge.1 While some new formations, mainly infantry, were arriving to shore-up the Normandy defences, most of the units already there continued to suffer losses of men and materials considerably exceeding the meagre issue of reinforcements. And less visible but no less acute was the impact on morale. From inexperienced units to veterans of the Russian front; from Oberbefehlshaber West von Kluge, keeping up the pretence of possible victory, to the Landser focused merely on surviving from day to day in his foxhole: confidence ebbed. Rommel had predicted in mid June that the Normandy front could hold only a month more. By 18 July the field marshal was gone but his prediction remained prophetic.
The bombing was an important psychological blow. Troops who had (almost) become accustomed to the day-to-day reality of enemy air superiority were taken aback by this awesome display of overwhelming power. The sheer material extravagance contrasted markedly with German supply shortcomings. And few things sap the morale of the front line soldier more readily than attacks against which he can make no effective reply. Neither those who suffered under the mind-numbing bombardment of 18 July nor those who arrived later could predict when a similar ordeal might again be visited on them. The apprehension was ever present. It bred caution. A senior officer of the relieving Hitlerjugend recalled,
The devastating effects of the carpet bombing in the morning of 18 July on the front line positions made it appear reasonable to only establish individual positions forward, i.e., battle front positions, and to set up the main line of defence markedly separate and to the rear. The operational reserves would be held as far as possible to the rear.2
For the individual soldier, a new terror was added to the experience of life at the front. From now on, at every dawn, wary eyes scanned the lightening sky for danger signals.
PREPARATIONS AND PLANS
While German troops anxiously anticipated a resumption of the previous day’s bombing, the British set about urgent reorganization. Having spent the night in the field at his Tac HQ by le Mesnil Frémentel, one of Pip Roberts’ first tasks of the day was to inform his nearest neighbours of the state of his division.
Having established the situation in 29th Armoured Brigade, I sent a message over to Bobbie Erskine in 7th Armoured Division that the reorganisation required in 29th Armoured Brigade was such that we could not do much in the way of offensive action for the first few hours of daylight.3
That a unit as seriously mauled as 29 Brigade might even be contemplating offensive action seems remarkable. For 18 July, 29 Brigade reported 126 tanks lost from its ‘sabre’ squadrons. Such figures always require further explanation. In this case, the total excludes many other armour losses: reconnaissance and antiaircraft tanks, plus scout cars, carriers, and half-tracks ; it includes a proportion of tanks subsequently repaired.
3rd RTR had continued losing tanks throughout the previous day: as late as 22.15 hours, six further Shermans were recorded as knocked out by enemy fire from the ridge. By the end of the day, the regiment had lost forty-one of its Shermans (including eight Fireflies). Only twelve tanks remained when the regiment finally leaguered at 22.30 hours. Fortunately, many tank crews had survived, and replacement tanks permitted the formation of two squadrons: A under Major Close; B under Major Watts; C Squadron survivors were allocated to A and B. The Fife & Forfar Yeomanry had lost forty-three Shermans, including eight Fireflies. They too consolidated their remaining strength into two squadrons: A under Major Powell with twelve tanks, and C under Captain Millar with eleven, with a regimental headquarters of just two Shermans. 23rd Hussars had lost so many officers that the regiment was to remain in reserve throughout the day.
To imagine the division spending the morning hours of 19 July in peaceful rest and repair would be quite wrong. For all its losses of tanks and personnel, 11th Armoured remained in the front line. No one was under any illusions about the German will to fight. The divisional intelligence assessment promulgated at 08.00 hours, 19 July began,
Tuesday’s fighting has… provided convincing proof, if this were not already at hand, that the enemy will relinquish no ground without being driven from it by very hard fighting. Whatever their long term feelings, the Germans, particularly SS tps are determined to take advantage of any advantage in ground and the undoubtedly efficient weapons which they possess… It is unlikely that he will be content with static defence, and a counter attack is to be expected.
Signs of German aggression were not slow in coming. As Pip Roberts rose from his tent, a burst of shellfire spilled his morning tea. As early as 06.15 hours, the M10 tank destroyers of 119 Battery around Grentheville rebuffed an advance by three Panther, led by a captured Sherman. At 07.15 hours, German infantry attacked north out of Hubert-Folie: these were stopped by 8th Rifle Brigade and broken up by artillery concentrations. Meanwhile, enemy infantry and tanks were observed strengthening positions the length of the line from Bras to Four, while German artillery sporadically lashed out at the positions their own troops had so recently occupied. 3rd RTR reported ‘intermittent shelling’. Roscoe Harvey’s Tac HQ, still west of the rail embankment at 083652, was caught by a severe burst in the early afternoon. The Protection Troop commander, Lieutenant Gordon, was badly wounded and the Brigade Major, Anthony Kershaw, received a shoulder wound which he endured for four hours before being evacuated. Even the fearless brigadier recognised the need to move the Tac HQ a mile north up the embankment (to 086664), though as he stipulated, ‘to an equally good point of vantage’! All this time, the Cromwells of 2nd Northants Yeomanry and the armoured cars of the Inns of Court probed aggressively to the division’s front as well as its flanks, testing for points of weakness and alert for the first signs of the expected counter-attack.
About 10.30 hours, Roberts received word that his task for the day was to take Bras, in order to ‘dominate’ the main Falaise highway. Shortly after, the three divisional commanders met for a conference, significantly at Roberts’ own Tac HQ. Roberts, Erskine, and Adair between them agreed a plan for the day. The plan was aggressive: Operation GOODWOOD was by no means over. Each division established a primary and a secondary objective. 11th Armoured would attack Bras then carry on to Hubert-Folie; 7th Armoured would attack Four then Bourguébus; the Guards would take le Poirier with a view to carrying on towards Frénouville. O’Connor’s role in this decision making process remains unclear. He subsequently arrived at 11th Armoured Tac HQ and gave his approval to the divisional commanders’ plan. For a senior commander urgently striving to rehabilitate his reputation, the battle so far must have been a keen disappointment, the limited goals set for the second day unlikely to excite Montgomery or Dempsey, even if achieved in their entirety. One commentator has likened the 19 July plan to Third Ypres of 1917, in which O’Connor commanded an infantry battalion.4 More likely, the corps commander now recognised that a strategic breakthrough was unlikely and now (at last) delegated tactical management to his division commanders. Many years later, O’Connor chose not to dwell on the subject:
‘I do not look upon GOODWOOD as one of my more successful battles, and I would like to leave it at that.’5
BRAS
For all its losses, 11th Armoured Division now enjoyed one supreme advantage. For the first time, the division was to go into a major battle as a single unit, its tactical plan directed solely by its own leader. The three infantry regiments of Churcher’s 159 Brigade were now available to support the division; so too the towed 25 pounders of the Ayrshire Yeomanry, its twenty four guns and the Sextons of 13th RHA giving Roberts two full field regiments of dedicated fire support. The Cromwell tanks of 2nd Northants Yeomanry were released to rejoin 29 Brigade. And freed of the rigid requirement to apportion its rifle companies to regimental battle groups, the 8th Rifle Brigade could be employed more flexibly.
The planned attack on Bras and Hubert-Folie involved all arms of the division, working in coordination as they had so long trained. The tanks would lead over the open ground, supported by the division’s own artillery and closely followed up by the motor infantry, racing across the open fields to get to grips with the defenders of the village. Once taken, the place would be secured by the infantry battalions of 159 Brigade, and the armoured elements quickly reorganized for the next task. But even a plan devised and executed by the division’s own commanders could go wrong.
All indications from the morning’s reconnaissance were that the enemy line was weakest in the west. After a morning spent venturing far and wide, from Frénouville to the outskirts of Caen, the armoured cars of the Inns of Court reported at 10.55 hours ‘Have a small party almost into CORMELLES. Does not appear to be strongly held.’ Added credence came from Corps intelligence who claimed Vaucelles ‘practically clear’. No longer tied to giving close support to the infantry brigade, the Northants Yeomanry reverted to its ‘official’ reconnaissance role. C Squadron probed westward into Cormelles: first a reconnaissance of the area around the ‘blockhouse’ at 068647 (actually, a former powder magazine, served by its own narrow-gauge railway), and by about 12.30 hours the orchard south of Cormelles was reported clear. The regiment was told off at 15.10 hours to ‘be certain of getting the Eastern part of BRAS so that they can sp 3 R Tks attack on HUBERT FOLIE which was to follow up immediately.’ Clearly, there could be no better spot than C Squadron’s orchard from which to begin the battle, and the rest of the regiment assembled there by 16.00. Pip Roberts later claimed that,
‘I was able to warn the CO of 2nd Northants Yeomanry personally and said he would have to support the Rifle Brigade into the village from the north-east – he must not get due north of the village or he would be shot at.’6
The Northants Yeomanry advance.
But since their starting position was to the north-west of Bras, the Yeomanry could hardly be blamed for missing the target.
The Northants Yeomanry history recounts that:
‘At about 17.15 hrs the Regiment set off with “C” Squadron Right, “A” Squadron Left, “B” Squadron in reserve. The main road from Caen to Falaise was the Right boundary and the Canadians were reported to be attacking Ifs in the valley beyond it. From the Start Line to the Objective was only about 1,000 yards, but across completely open ground covered with high crops to the ridge beyond. Heavy mortar fire greeted the advance, a smoke screen put down on the right flank blew back making visibility very poor; while the crops were studded with foxholes filled with snipers and bazookas. The enemy fired until in danger of being run down… long range AP shells kept on knocking out tanks… one of the A/Tk guns , previously reported destroyed, suddenly came to life again and brewed-up 3 tanks at point-blank range… Two complete troops returned on their feet after losing their tanks.7
A destroyed Cromwell IV. One of the fastest tanks of the Second World War with a speed of around 40 mph. The 75 mm gun would not penetrate the frontal armour of the Panther and Tiger but its high manoeuvrability meant that a deadly flank shot could be achieved.
The picture painted in this regimental history is vivid but at fault in some details, not least in that it fails to disentangle the two separate actions fought by the 2NY that afternoon. The account is clearly drawn from the 2NY war diary, itself usually a model of accuracy but in this instance lacking precision, due to the original being later lost in action along with the officer who had written it. In fact, the advance began about 16.00 hours. Churning through the tall crop, their vision obscured by the smoke helpfully laid down by 13th RHA, C Squadron’s route led them to become hull-down to the objective. Lacking a visual reference they strayed westwards. This path took them towards German guns which were poised to defend the Falaise highway against all comers.
A personal reminiscence fills in some of the detail. With C Squadron locked in its close-range struggle for survival, B Squadron to their left received the order:
You will not close with the objective. Halt well clear of the perimeter. Make feint attack by maintaining fire into area until ordered to stop. Real attack will be made from other side by friends on left.8
So it was that the Yeomanry Cromwells’ assault on Bras was first delayed, then abandoned, replaced by the task of shooting a regiment of Shermans onto the objective.
Along the line the bell muzzles of the forward troops’ 75mms were recoiling as projectiles spurted on their way, then smoking blue until the next round followed. The sun shone brightly down on us all… the whole area was becoming a Hades of flame and smoke, tree splinters and other debris. I had seen nothing human there, even from my very first view… and yet it was illusory because the enemy was there, no doubt making use of the available cover. We continued firing into the smoke.9
The village of Bras.
Earlier that day, Colonel David Silvertop had warned his surviving 3rd RTR officers to be ready to follow through after the Northants Yeomanry took Bras; meanwhile they should ‘try not to get involved.’ Most knew better than to take his warning at face value. Silvertop had every intention of ‘getting involved’ if the need arose. Seeing the Northants’ Cromwells advance stalled, Silvertop lost no time proposing to Roscoe Harvey that his own regiment immediately take on the role of supporting the Rifle Brigade into Bras. This was agreed, with roles being reversed and the Yeomanry told to prepare for an assault on Hubert-Folie as soon as they had reorganized.
The engagement that ensued was a good example of a combined-arms assault on a strongly entrenched enemy in a superior position. With two field regiments laying down smoke around the objective, enemy artillery was blinded and the village effectively isolated from the rest of the battlefield. About 16.25, while B Squadron of the Northants Yeomanry fired into the western side of the village, 3rd RTR began their advance. The ground was familiar. Just as the day before, the approach to the village stretched for a mile, upwards across the open fields, the heading this time due south from a start position by Cormelles. The tanks suffered losses but carrying on regardless. Within fifteen minutes the leading troops reached the outer buildings. ‘Some a tk and Bazooka fire. Odd snipers.’ Some paused to fire as others plunged on. By 16.50 hours, ‘Fwd tps enter village. Progress slow because of rubble etc in streets. Some tks had to break walls by firing 75mm. Prisoners surrendering in twos and threes.’ The few remaining tanks used shock tactics to suppress the defenders, but only infantry could secure the objective. Keeping up abreast of the tanks, two 8th Rifle Brigade scout platoons in their fast carriers had swept forward, guns blazing, ‘thrashing through the corn like destroyers’. For a brief period, the tanks remained exposed, with only the dismounted carrier crews for infantry support. With one depleted squadron passing through Bras and another working around its eastern side (and the Northants’ Cromwells still firing from the west), there was a risk that the overrun SS Panzergrenadiere might recover their composure. Then, urged on by 29th Brigade, the half-tracks of H and F Companies’ motor platoons sped through the crops, flushing out as-yet undetected German positions, halting just short of the village. Their riflemen dismounted and moving in bounds covered the short distance into the builidings, F Company to the east and H to the west. Further still to the west, from the watching Yeomanry tanks,
through gaps in the smoke and flames we could see a company of the armoured brigade’s motor battalion, operating in small groups, covering each other forward, fire and movement at the double, clearing ruins, dug-outs and other posts of the surviving SS garrison.10
The view north from the German gun positions above Bras.
Bras had been held by the third battalion of the 1. SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment , closely supported by elements of the Leibstandarte Sturmgeschütz Abteilung, whose thirty five assault guns had taken up positions on the ridge the previous evening. German accounts of the engagement are understandably confused, as the whole affair was conducted with great speed using shock as well as firepower. Tanks confident of their following infantry entered narrow lanes, temporarily trusting in buildings and rubble to protect their vulnerable flanks while their fire suppressed the defenders; the infantry in their turn found many Germans pinned in their entrenchments by the tanks’ very presence. By 17.20 hours, one F Company platoon led by Philip Sedgwick had fought its way to the far side of the village. Now the open country played against the Panzergrenadiere, as their avenue of retreat was swept by fire. While the three remaining tanks of Bill Close’s A Squadron...
had an excellent shoot at some fleeing Germans… B and C Squadrons, also depleted, and down to two or three tanks each, entered the village at the same time. We were able to knock down the walls of houses from where cowering Germans emerged with their hands raised. Antitank guns were knocked out at point blank range.11
By 17.40 hours the village was effectively clear. The German defenders were mopped up: to sixty or so dead were added three hundred prisoners, greatly outnumbering their Rifle Brigade guards. The cost had been heavy. An 8th RB rifleman found,
We had lost an awful lot more men… All the sections were short handed and some no longer existed. Many of our own vehicles, particularly bren carriers, had been lost.12
Even as 3rd RTR prepared to pull its handful of tanks out of the village, Lieutenant Maurice Thompson, one of the last surviving officers, was killed by a single shell falling amidst an O Group. Nevertheless, an entire battalion of 1.SS-Panzergrenadier-Regimenthad been eliminated in about an hour.
VIII Corps’ history records, ‘This little action is not only of text-book perfection, but the prize thereby won was of the utmost importance to the Corps.’13 The Corps commander took an immediate interest in the victory, declaring that no effort must be spared to preserve the precious gain from counter-attack. At 18.05 hours, VIII Corps signalled 11th Armoured: ‘Super Sunray [i.e., O’Connor] directs BRAS will be firmly held. Cdns will take over as soon as Super Sunray can arrange.’ To complete the picture of an armoured division working as an integrated, multi-arm force, Churcher’s 159th Brigade was already standing ready to reinforce any success on the ridge. Shortly after Bras was taken, the 3rd Monmouths were ordered forward. Soon after 18.00 hours, the ‘Mons’ were in Bras. Already, 29th Brigade had its sights set on the next objective.
HUBERT-FOLIE, BOURGUEBUS, FRENOUVILLE
Even before 8th Rifle Brigade’s H and F Companies had handed over Bras to the infantry of 3/Monmouths, E (Support) and G Companies were preparing for the attack on Hubert-Folie. This was now to be led by the tanks of 2nd Northants Yeomanry, who were put on immediate notice by Brigade at 17.03 hours and at 17.33 given the direct order to move on Hubert-Folie. But once again the Northants were thrown into confusion, this time by an unconfirmed (and inaccurate) report that the place had already been entered by elements of 7th Armoured Division’s 22nd Armoured Brigade.14 The delay caused confusion to the Northants Yeomanry at a time when they were shaking out into attack formation, under enemy fire. By 18.30 they were reported to be taking heavy losses in their vulnerable, fire-swept position. At length reduced to a single squadron, they were simply unable to continue forward. At 18.40, it was decided that the Fife and Forfar should do the job. This was not the only source of confusion. As the Rifle Brigade companies in Bras waited to give fire support to the advance on Hubert-Folie, the intermittent shelling from the south was supplemented by an intense British concentration, intended for Hubert-Folie, falling on Bras. There followed ‘a very unpleasant ten minutes.’15
The Fifes’ tanks moved up to a position north east of Hubert-Folie, mortared and shelled all the way. At 20.00 hours they attacked: C Squadron leading, followed by A. This time the advance went relatively smoothly. By 20.35 hours, to Roberts’ evident relief, he was able to report to Corps ‘2 FFY going in now. Little opposition.’ Meanwhile, G Company of 8th RB advanced from the direction of Bras. With 10 and 11 Platoon up and 12 Platoon in support, the first infantry reached Hubert-Folie at 20.35. G Company commander Noel Bell recalled,
The village had been previously shelled and the tanks were pumping stuff into it too. As the motor platoons moved in I called over the air for the tanks to stop firing but one went on firing and nothing could be done to stop it. It later transpired that this was a tank knocked out the day before and a German was manning its machine gun. The carriers who were acting as flank protection ahead of the motor platoons came under fire from this machine gun, and Cpl. Isard, a very old and popular member of the Company, was killed. We later had the satisfaction of this German “brewed up” in no uncertain manner at very close range.16
E Company followed G into the village and by 21.15 hours Hubert-Folie was reported occupied – occupied, but not necessarily cleared. Once again, it fell to the division’s infantry brigade to secure the valuable prize.
The 4th King’s Shropshire Light Infantry marched three hundred yards up open slopes to Hubert-Folie. This was a classic infantry action. Lieutenant Mike Sayer was a C Company platoon commander:
The advance on Hubert-Folie was an infantryman’s nightmare. There we were in a huge open field of corn dominated by high ground ahead and a railway embankment on the [left] flank, from which the enemy machine gunners and artillery FOOs had us in full view. At first we were encouraged by the sight of a squadron of tanks, in battle formation, ahead of us but to our astonishment and discomfiture it became apparent that they had all been knocked out on the previous day.
The KSLI Carrier Platoon moved ahead around the eastern flank to give covering fire. By 21.15 hours, 4th KSLI were in possession of Hubert-Folie, and frantically digging-in around the place. Company commander Ned Thornburn ‘did not normally dig my own slit-trench’ but now dug frantically in the soft sandy soil as mortar bombs descended.
I don’t think I have ever been in such a flat spin as I was for the first few minutes at Hubert-Folie. However, by 22.00 hours the company was adequately dug in and prepared for any eventuality.17
All the afternoon and evening of 19 July, Guards Armoured Division kept up the pressure on the eastern side of the battlefield. But the defence line hastily thrown up behind Cagny held. With no repeat of the previous day’s bombing, the antitank screen in the hedges and orchards from Frénouville to Emiéville was able to stop the tanks of the Coldstream and the Irish Guards from breaking through towards Vimont. Even the small farm complex of le Poirier succeeded in putting up a stiff fight until its defenders were finally thrown out around 17.00 hours by 1st Welsh Guards. By last light on 19 July, the infantry battalions of 32 Guards Brigade were firmly in charge of Cagny and le Poirier, and poised to assault Frénouville the next morning, following air support planned at first light.
Meanwhile, far from threatening Hubert-Folie, 7th Armoured was still struggling forward along the eastern side of the Minier railway. Only in the early hours of 19 July had the last fighting elements of the division cleared the monumental traffic jams around the Orne crossings. Only as the infantry battalions of 131 Brigade arrived in the course of the afternoon would the division be able to tighten its grip on Four and push forward with confidence towards Bourguébus. And confidence ebbed as stern resistance was encountered around Soliers, with long-range fire taking its toll of the tanks moving south to Bourguébus. As afternoon turned to evening, 22nd Armoured Brigade had repeatedly to report the objective of Bourguébus still untaken. By 19.25 hours Hinde’s Tac HQ was calling for air strikes on La Hogue and the ridge behind, ‘first top priority and must be done this evening and sooner the better’. Amid the smoke and confusion, tanks of both sides infiltrated north and south. Even the village of Four, believed to be clear, came to life again. Around 18.45 hours an exasperated General Erskine had to report to Corps,
Our chaps attacking BOURGUEBUS, SOLIERS and FOUR – lost 3 tks in FOUR after the place had been reported clear by Inns of Court.’ (It is interesting to note how widely the Inns were operating.) At last light, Bourguébus could not be claimed as taken, and even around Soliers the situation remained uncertain, with 11 th Armoured complaining as late as 22.50 of fire on Hubert-Folie from that area: ‘Tracer and MG coming from SOLIERS.’ 131st Brigade’s response was ‘tell 29 Armd Bde that SOLIERS is definitely ours’, though the 11 th Hussars were less certain, ‘We are not shooting but some shells may be coming from houses east of PEKINESE (BOURGUEBUS) not yet cleared.
Once again, German infiltration and Panzerkampftrupptaktik had sowed confusion amongst the British attackers. The day ended without a clearly defined front line east of the Chemin de Fer Minier. Nevertheless, to the west of the railway embankment the ridge was held. The prongs driven into the German line the previous day had by the end of 19 July become stakes firmly implanted in the Bourguébus ridge.
RAIN AND RECRIMINATION
O’Connor had promised that ‘Cdns will take over as soon as Super Sunray can arrange’, and the corps commander was as good as his word. Through the morning of 20 July, though interrupted by yet further German counter attacks, the relief of 11th Armoured Division in Hubert-Folie and Bras was completed by 3rd Canadian Division. Meanwhile, the Guards’ renewed their advance on Frénouville. The promised air support was laid on and at 05.45 hours 1st Battalion Welsh Guards and 5th (Armoured) Coldstream Guards charged in unopposed. The place had been evacuated the previous night. In 7th Armoured Division’s central part of the battlefield, B Squadron of 5th RTR attacked Bourguébus at first light, destroying one German tank. There was no further opposition. The division established its part of the Bourguébus ridge line and turned to support the Canadians’ left flank as they prepared to advance further south, in the direction Verrières.
Suddenly the weather changed. About 16.00 hours there began a violent thunderstorm. All Allied air was grounded. Within a short time, entrenchments began to flood and soon all tracks except metalled roads became impassable. Wheeled vehicles in open ground became immobilized and had to be towed onto roads by tracked tanks. At 10.00 hours on 21 July, VIII Corps ceased to have responsibility for any section of the front, and Operation GOODWOOD was officially terminated.
The storm of protest that followed the GOODWOOD battle is beyond the scope of a history focusing on the details of the battle itself. Suffice to record that Montgomery’s enemies took every opportunity to criticize his failure to achieve a clean breakout. Eisenhower had been allowed to form the impression that GOODWOOD was to be a decisive breakthrough battle. His aide later recalled the staff being ‘completely disgusted with the lack of progress’. Tedder encouraged his superior to sack Montgomery, and Eisenhower might well have taken this step had it been politically feasible. Bomber Command felt let down. On the face of it, an advance of five miles seemed small reward for their support, let alone the loss on the ground of three hundred tanks and fifteen hundred men. It was said with some bitterness that at the rate of one thousand tons of bombs for each mile advanced, it would be ‘six hundred thousand tons to Berlin’.
The village of Hubert-Folie.
Ever one for the dramatic claim that would make headlines, Montgomery had gone a step too far in his 18 July announcement that ‘Early this morning British and Canadian troops… attacked and broke through into the area east of the Orne and south-east of Caen.’ Fleet Street seized on the words ‘break through’. On 19 July, the Times headlines trumpeted ‘Second Army breaks through – armoured forces reach open country’; as late as 24 July the Manchester Evening News front page still carried news of ‘Montgomery’s Break Through in Normandy’. A breakthrough GOODWOOD was not. Montgomery himself later admitted that he had been ‘too exultant’ at the 18 July press conference.
But, as has been shown, the battle had made a deep impression on the German defenders of Normandy. The day after the battle ended, barely a month before his sacking and suicide, von Kluge wrote to Hitler of his conviction that the struggle was hopeless:
In the face of the enemy’s complete command of the air, there is no possibility of our finding a strategy which will counter-balance its truly annihilating effect, unless we give up the field of battle.
Strategically, GOODWOOD had contributed to the matériel and morale weakening of the German army in Normandy. Tactically, it had shown up British weaknesses and (a few at least) strengths. To varying degrees from division to division, British and Canadian units took important lessons from GOODWOOD which would influence later operations such as BLUECOAT and TOTALIZE. To this extent at least, GOODWOOD was a step in the honing of operational and tactical skills which would take the British Liberation Army to the Baltic, and make some parts of it worthy heirs to the victors of 1918.
References
1
Zetterling, p 307-8; ‘Waffen SS Panzer Units in Normandy’, M Wood & J Dugdale, 2000, ISBN 0 9528867 0 7
2
Meyer, ‘Hitlerjugend’, p 159
3
Roberts p 180-181
4
‘Panzer Bait’, William Moore, 1991, ISBN 0 85052 3281, p 155
5
O’Connor quoted in Dunphie, Pendulum of Battle’, p 187
6
Roberts, p 182
7
‘The 1st and 2nd Northamptonshire Yeomanry’, D G Bevan, p 121
8
‘Sixty-Four Days of a Normandy Summer’, Keith Jones, 1990, ISBN 0 7090 4240 X, p 104; the 29th Brigade war diary confirms that the 2NY was ordered at 16.20 hours ‘to get up on the West side of the village.’
9
Jones, p105-7
10
Jones, p 108
11
Close, p 129
12
‘Soldiering at the Sharp End’, R W Jefferson diary
13
Jackson, ‘Eighth Corps’, p 106
14
Communication in mid-battle between the armoured division headquarters was not a precise science. After an ambiguous signal about 16.50 hours (‘Tell 11 Armd Div… another regt [of 22 Armoured Brigade] will be on later – task GRIFFON (HUBERT FOLIE) and BRAS’) there followed misunderstandings and an increasingly urgent exchange of communications between 11th and 7th Armoured HQs which can be followed in the 7th Armoured signals log.
15
BAOR Battlefield Tour, 1947
16
Jefferson diary
17
This and preceding quote from ‘The 4th KSLI in Normandy’, Major Ned Thornburn, 1990, p 77-78