APPENDIX VII
OVERALL DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE
Headquarters
Commander: Generalmajor Edgar Feuchtinger
Ia (Operations): Oberstleutnant von Berlichingen
Ib (Logistics): Major Scharnhorst
Ic (Communications): Hauptmann Vorster
22. Panzerregiment: Oberst Hermann von Oppeln-Bronikowski
I./Pz-Rgt 22: Hauptmann von Gottberg
II./Pz-Rgt 22: Major Vierzig
+ attached
503. schwere Panzer-Abteilung: Hauptmann Fromme (Hptm. Scherf deputizing)
1. Kompanie: Oberleutnant Oemler
2. Kompanie: Hauptmann von Eichel-Streiber
3. Kompanie: Hauptmann Scherf (Ltn. von Rosen deputizing)
125. Panzergrenadierregiment: Major von Luck
I./Pz-Gr-Rgt 125: Hauptmann Schenk zu Schweinsburg
II./Pz-Gr-Rgt 125: Hauptmann Kurz
192. Panzergrenadierregiment: Oberstleutnant Rauch
I./Pz-Gr-Rgt 192: Hauptmann Rätzer
II./Pz-Gr-Rgt 192: Hauptmann Zippe
21. Panzer-Aufklärungsabteilung: Major Brandt
200. Panzer-Jäger-Abteilung: Hauptmann von Lynker
200. Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung: Major Becker
155. Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment: Oberst Huhne
305. Heeres-Flak-Artillerie-Abteilung: Hauptmann Ohlendorf
220. Panzer-Pioneer-Bataillon: Hauptmann Hoegl
plus various signals, workshop, supply train, medical, post, etc. elements
Notes:
1. In theory, the structure of 21. Panzerdivision broadly reflected the standard ‘Type 1944’ (‘freie Gliederung’) pattern: with its two-battalion Panzer regiment; two Panzergrenadier regiments, each of two four-company battalions. In practice, things could be very different. The actual strength and structure of German combat units in Normandy frequently differed from the theoretical tables of organization and equipment (TOE). The routine German TOE report, the Kriegstärkenachweisung (or KStN), can be misleading if taken at face value. Apparently detailing precise numbers of men and vehicles, this chart is intended mainly to depict an ideal organization. Its date shows the time that organization became official, not its actual implementation, if indeed the ideal was ever achieved. By 1944, even newly-raised units might fall far short of the officially sanctioned complement, having to beg or scrounge equipment on their officers’ initiative in order to approach the official TOE.
2. The original intent of equipping the armoured units of 21. Panzerdivision entirely from captured matériel (including at least one Churchill tank taken at Dieppe!) proved impractical. By mid July the divisional tank regiment retained few (probably only one) of the more or less converted French tanks previously on strength. Nevertheless, even by mid July captured and converted French vehicles still represented an important part of most sub units’ order of battle, from armoured personnel carriers and radio vehicles to the entire complement of the Sturmgeschütz battalion, not to mention a wide variety of extemporized artillery mounts and tractors.
3. The two tank battalions within a standard Panzerdivision typically belonged to a single, close-knit tank regiment, which in turn was closely integrated with the infantry and artillery regiments within the division. This contrasted with the British Army’s emphasis on regimental identity. Within a British armoured brigade, tank ‘regiments’ (in battalion strength) had their own regimental traditions and training, and potentially changed brigade or division affiliation in the course of the war. Indeed, the majority of British 2nd Army’s tanks fighting in Normandy were to be found in ‘independent’ brigades and not permanently attached to any particular division. And even within Commonwealth armoured divisions, tactical integration of the armour and infantry arms was not universally achieved during the Normandy campaign. As a broad generalization: German officers and men might identify more closely with their division than was the case within most Commonwealth formations.
21. PANZERDIVISION
Detailed Order of Battle
18 July, 1944
Introduction
11th Armoured Division had time to rest, refit, and absorb reinforcements before GOODWOOD. Consequently, its formal order of battle closely reflects its actual composition on 18 July. In contrast, 21. Panzerdivision had been in constant action since 6 June, and some aspects of its organization are harder to assess.
Although the division regularly returned highly detailed organization and strength reports, these require careful interpretation. As noted above, the monthly Kriegstärkenachweisung (KStN) depicted the division’s organization down to individual vehicles and machine guns, but does not necessarily show what was actually available for use. The KStN should be read in conjunction with the monthly Meldung (strength report) which lists not only authorized strengths, but also numbers currently operational plus those undergoing short-term repair. (An important consideration, since German divisions retained many vehicles for repair which Allied divisions would have passed ‘off their books’ to external workshops, sometimes creating the misleading impression that Allied armoured units had many fewer vehicle breakdowns than was actually the case.)
22. Panzerregiment
The combat-ready strength of 21. Panzerdivision on 18 July, and its losses in the ensuing battle, can in part be deduced by interpolation between monthly returns for 1 July and 1 August. For example, 22. Panzerregiment enjoyed a theoretical permitted strength (Soll) of 139 Panzer IV. On the eve of invasion, on 1 June, the unit actually possessed 104 (of which 6 were undergoing repair expected to last up to two or three weeks). On 1 July, the total had reduced to 85 (of which 24 were in the divisional workshops), reflecting serious losses incurred in the post-invasion fighting. By 1 August, the total of just 58 included 16 under repair. The picture is further clouded by the departure of the regiment’s II. Abteilung in late July to re-equip with Panther tanks, in order to bring the division into line with the usual pattern of one Panzer IV and one Panther battalion. Nevertheless, various pieces of evidence (including the daily strength report for 17 July) support the view that the regiment had approximately fifty Panzer IV combat-ready (einsatzbereit) on 18 July. Following GOODWOOD, and for the rest of the Normandy campaign, the regiment was reduced to a shadow of its former strength.
503. schwere Panzer-Abteilung
Following lengthy service on the Russian front, this unit was withdrawn and completely re-equipped before moving to Normandy. Companies two and three were given Tiger I to replace those left in the east. Company one found itself the first combat unit to receive the new Tiger II, Königstiger, issued with due ceremony on 16 June. The battalion’s first action in Normandy occurred on 11 July, when 3. Kompanie under von Rosen supported a counter attack which stopped a British advance on Colombelles. A dozen British tanks were destroyed and two captured for only minor damage to the Tiger I tanks engaged. The first ground combat involving Königstiger (and that model’s first ever loss to enemy fire) occurred at midday on 18 July.
At full strength, before the bombing on 18 July, the Abteilung was organized with fourteen tanks per company: three sections of four plus a two-tank headquarters. The 11th Armoured Division Intelligence Summary for 20 July mentions prisoners of the unit, claiming ‘They give the org of the bns as three coys of three pls of five Tigers each with 2 Tigers at each coy HQ.’ To this entirely accurate estimate, the writer adds, ‘This seems too many and should be taken with reserve.’ It was most fortunate for 11th Armoured that the prisoners’ further comment that their unit ‘had suffered cas in air attacks’ was equally accurate.
Contrary to some British accounts, this was a strictly Wehrmacht battalion and had no SS members!
125. Panzergrenadierregiment & 192. Panzergrenadierregiment
The two infantry regiments of the division were similarly equipped, though the 125 appears to have been consistently better kept up to strength (partly due to the energy, charisma, and connections of its commander). At the beginning of July, the first battalion (I./Pz-Gr-Rgt 125) stood at 78% of its quota of manpower, while the second battalion and the entire 192. Pz-Gr-Rgt were close to 50%. Additionally, it must be remembered that these personnel had been in constant action for many weeks and were seriously overdue for relief. They (and their equipment) were worn out. Also, while these numbers were maintained (or rather, regained) by 1 August, this was only by virtue of reinforcement by inferior manpower (much of the later reinforcement coming from the breaking up of the 16. Luftwaffenfelddivision after GOODWOOD).
Each regiment had a central pool of artillery: typically six self-propelled 15cm howitzers mounted on diminutive French tracked chassis (Geschütz Pz. s.F.H.13 Lorraine); and a small number, typically three or four, of ‘Reihenwerfer’, French SOMUA half-tracks each carrying a rotating array of sixteen French 8.1cm Brandt mortar tubes.
Each regiment contained two infantry battalions each of four companies. The fourth company of each battalion (i.e., Kompanien 4 and 8) held the heavy weapons: typically three 7.5cm Pak 40 and three 2cm antiaircraft guns, all mounted on French half-track chassis.
Most unusually, both of the two regiments had an armoured infantry battalion; usually a Panzerdivision had only one such. At full strength, companies 1 to 3 of these battalions each enjoyed as many as eighteen lightly armoured SPW (Schützenpanzerwagen,French half-track troop carriers), three of which would be officers’ mounts armed with 3.7cm Pak 38. A further twenty or so such SPW were shared between battalion and regimental headquarters, plus a similar number of armoured, half-tracked radio vehicles. Once again, there is some evidence that by July 125. Pz-Gr-Rgtenjoyed a disproportionate share of the remaining serviceable SPW.
21. Panzer-Aufklärungsabteilung
The reconnaissance battalion of a Panzerdivision typically had a complex structure, reflecting the wide variety of jobs it was designed to undertake. In July, 1944, 21. Pz.A.A. had five companies.
1. Kp. was mainly equipped with turreted half-tracks: about sixteen SdKfz 250/9.
2. Kp. had wheeled armoured cars, both eight-wheel SdKfz 231 and 233 and four-wheel SdKfz 221 and 222.
3. and 4. Kp. had half-tracks based on the French Unic P 107.
5. (schwere) Kp. was equipped with different models of the ubiquitous German SdKfz 251 half-track, variously mounting 3.7cm Pak 35/36, 8.1cm mortars, 7.5cm howitzers (le.I.G.18) and flamethrowers.
As noted in the text, as well as being equipped with highly mobile armoured vehicles, this unit was equally accustomed to holding the line as infantry, and it is primarily in the infantry role that we find it engaged during GOODWOOD.
200. Panzer-Jäger-Abteilung
This unit is believed to have been equipped with the 8.8cm Pak 43/41 L/71. This towed 8.8cm gun was a somewhat unsatisfactory improvization. Lacking enough specialized, cruciform Pak 43 carriages for the available barrels, guns were mounted with an improvised gunshield on the carriage of the obsolescent 10.5cm leichte Feldhaubitze 18. The resulting gun had a higher profile than the Pak 43, which earned it the name ‘barn door’. It was nose-heavy and unwieldy. Nevertheless, properly emplaced, it was a potent weapon.
200. Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung
This unit was doubly unique. A Panzerdivision did not normally possess an assault gun battalion (1. SS ‘Leibstandarte’ was an exception, also in some e.g., 10. SS-Pz-Div, companies of assault guns might be found replacing tanks in the divisional Panzerregiment or alternatively replacing self-propelled antitank guns in the Jäger Abteilung). This unit was entirely composed of scratch vehicles designed and built by the battalion commander Major Alfred Becker in his Paris workshops. While the divisional KStN authorized four batteries of varying reported strengths, on 18 July Becker’s battalion actually fielded five batteries, each with six 7.5cm Pak 40 and four 10.5cm leFH16 howitzers, all mounted on French Hotchkiss H39 tracked chassis. A sixth company under construction in Paris did not see service at the time of GOODWOOD. By 1944, the assault gun battalions had evolved from their original infantry close support role to place a greater emphasis on antitank defence. Becker’s guns had much less armour protection than normal Sturmgeschütze and their tactical employment stressed long-range fire rather than risking close engagement.