NOTES

REFLECTING ON HITLER

1. The title of the masterly analysis by Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991, London, 1994.

2. An attempt to speculate counter-factually on how different world history would have been had Hitler been killed when the car in which he was travelling was struck by a large lorry in 1930 is offered by Henry A. Turner, Geißel des Jahrhunderts. Hitler und seine Hinterlassenschaft, Berlin, 1989. The accident is described in Otto Wagener, Hitler aus nächster Nähe. Aufzeichnungen eines Vertrauten 1929–1932, ed. Henry A. Turner, 2nd edn, Kiel, 1987, 155–6.

3. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Moscow, 1954, 10.

4. A number of general analyses of the history of the Third Reich in recent years have made impressive advances in synthesizing and interpreting a vast outpouring of detailed research. These include: Hans-Ulrich Thamer, Verführung und Gewalt. Deutschland 1933–1945, Berlin, 1986; Norbert Frei, National Socialist Rule in Germany: the Führer State 1933–1945, Oxford/Cambridge Mass., 1993 (an extended version in English of the original German edition, Der Führerstaat. Nationalsozialistische Herrschaft 1933 bis 1945, Munich, 1987); Jost Dülffer, Deutsche Geschichte 1933–1945. Führerglaube und Vernichtungskrieg, Stuttgart/Berlin/Cologne, 1992 (Engl.: Nazi Germany 1933–1945: Faith and Annihilation, London, 1996); Karlheinz Weißmann, Der Weg in den Abgrund 1933–1945, Berlin, 1995; Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany: a New History, London, 1995; and, a particularly valuable interpretative synthesis, Ludolf Herbst, Das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933–1945, Frankfurt am Main, 1996.

5. See the comment, still thought-provoking, of Wolfgang Sauer, ‘National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?’, American Historical Review, 73 (1967–8), 404–24; here 408: ‘In Nazism, the historian faces a phenomenon that leaves him no way but rejection, whatever his individual position. There is literally no voice worth considering that disagrees on this matter… Does not such fundamental rejection imply a fundamental lack of understanding?’

6. This was the essential criticism of the incisive review of Joachim C. Fest, Hitler. Eine Biographie, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Vienna, 1973, by Hermann Graml, ‘Probleme einer Hitler-Biographie. Kritische Bemerkungen zu Joachim C. Fest’, VfZ, 22 (1974), 76–92. Graml regards (78, 84) the problems posed by the writing of a biography of Hitler – integrating a history of the individual into an analysis of his impact on German society – as ‘insoluble’. A harsh judgement on biographies of Hitler in general, in a thoughtful and interesting approach to the social sources of Hitler’s power, was also offered by Michael Kater, ‘Hitler in a Social Context’, Central European History, 14 (1981), 243–72, here esp. 243–6. A less pessimistic evaluation is provided by Gregor Schöllgen, ‘Das Problem einer Hitler-Biographie. Überlegungen anhand neuerer Darstellungen des Falles Hitler’, Neue politische Literatur, 23 (1978), 421–34, reprinted in Karl Dietrich Bracher, Manfred Funke, and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (eds.),Nationalsozialistische Diktatur 1933–1945. Eine Bilanz, Bonn, 1983, 687–705.

7. Gerhard Schreiber, Hitler. Interpretationen 1923–1983. Ergebnisse, Methoden und Probleme der Forschung, Darmstadt, 1984, 13.

8. Guido Knopp, Hitler. Eine Bilanz, Berlin, 1995, 9.

9. The essential survey is that of Schreiber, Hitler. Interpretationen; a more recent critical and thoughtful assessment of the interpretations advanced by biographers of Hitler is provided by John Lukacs, The Hitler of History, New York, 1997. See also Ron Rosenbaum, ‘Explaining Hitler’, New Yorker, 1 May 1995, 50–70. For further evaluations of the differing approaches, see Klaus Hildebrand, Das Dritte Reich, Munich/Vienna, 1979, 132–46, and Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 3rd edn, London, 1993, chs. 4–6. Earlier historiographical analyses and attempts to address the problem of the ‘Hitler factor’ were provided by: Klaus Hildebrand, ‘Der “Fall” Hitler’, Neue politische Literatur, 14 (1969), 375–86; Klaus Hildebrand, ‘Hitlers Ort in der Geschichte des Preußisch-Deutschen Nationalstaates’, Historische Zeitschrift, 217 (1973), 584–631; Wolf-Rüdiger Hartmann, ‘Adolf Hitler: Möglichkeiten seiner Deutung’, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 15 (1975), 521–35; Eberhard Jäckel, ‘Rückblick auf die sogenannte Hitler-Welle’, Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 28 (1977), 695–710; Andreas Hillgruber, ‘Tendenzen, Ergebnisse und Perspektiven der gegenwärtigen Hitler-Forschung’, Historische Zeitschrift, 226 (1978), 600–621; Wolfgang Mich-alka, ‘Wege der Hitler-Forschung’, Quaderni di storia, 8 (1978), 157–90, and 10 (1979), 125–51; John P. Fox, ‘Adolf Hitler: the Continuing Debate’, International Affairs (1979), 252–64; and William Carr, ‘Historians and the Hitler Phenomenon’,German Life and Letters, 34 (1981), 260–72.

10. Alan Bullock, Hitler: a Study in Tyranny, revised edn, Harmondsworth, 1962, 804. Bullock later completely revised his early views (see Rosenbaum, 67). The centrality of Hitler’s ideology is fully incorporated into the analysis in Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin. Parallel Lives, London, 1991.

11. See, for example, the comment of Karl Dietrich Bracher, ‘The Role of Hitler: Perspectives of Interpretation’, in Walter Laqueur (ed.), Fascism. A Reader’s Guide, Harmondsworth, 1979, 193–212, here 201: ‘It was indeed Hitler’s Weltanschauung and nothing else that mattered in the end, as is seen from the terrible consequences of his racist anti-semitism in the planned murder of the Jews.’ In the realm of foreign policy, the programmatic driving-force of Hitler’s ideology is most strongly emphasized by Klaus Hildebrand, Deutsche Außenpolitik 1933–1945. Kalkül oder Dogma?, 4th edn, Stuttgart/Berlin/Cologne, 1980, 188–9. The internal coherence of Hitler’s ideas was fully illustrated for the first time by Eberhard Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung. Entwurf einer Herrschaft, Tübingen, 1969, extended and revised 4th edn, Stuttgart, 1991.

12. Cit. H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, 3rd edn, London, 1962, 46.

13. This standard line of GDR historiography was nowhere more expressively captured than by Wolfgang Ruge, ‘Monopolbourgeoisie, faschistischer Massenbasis und NS-Programmatik’, in Dietrich Eichholtz and Kurt Gossweiler (eds.), Faschismusforschung. Positionen, Probleme, Polemik,Berlin (East), 1980, 125–55, who saw (141) Mein Kampf as having ‘the role of a testimonial (Empfehlungsschreiben) to the great captains of industry (Wirtschaftskapitäne)’, and spoke (144) of Hitler as the ‘star agent’ (Staragenten)of’ the most extreme monopolists (Monopolherren)’ of big business. The full version of this interpretation is brought out in Wolfgang Ruge, Das Ende von Weimar. Monopolkapital und Hitler, Berlin (East), 1983, where Hitler is referred to (334, 336) as the ‘compliant creature’ (willfährige Kreatur) of the ‘backers’ (Hintermänner) from big business. Given such a premiss built into official state ideology, no biography of Hitler was possible in the GDR. Two historians who had produced the only general history of the Nazi Party to be published during the existence of the GDR (Kurt Pätzold and Manfred Weißbecker, Geschichte der NSDAP,Cologne, 1981; originally Hakenkreuz und Totenkopf. Die Partei des Verbrechens, Berlin (East), 1981) have subsequently brought out a personalized study of the German Dictator which had been impossible in their former State, expressly emphasizing (589) ‘that the fascist Leader was no marionette’ (Kurt Pätzold and Manfred Weißbecker, Adolf Hitler. Eine politische Biographie, Leipzig, 1995).

14. John Toland, Adolf Hitler, London, 1976, a work of 1,035 Pages, begins with the comment (p.xiv): ‘My book has no thesis.’ Helmut Heiber, Adolf Hitler. Eine Biographie, Berlin, 1960, is far briefer but still a ‘cradle-to-grave’ description of Hitler’s life which appears to lack a specific interpretative framework.

15. Joshua Rubenstein, Hitler, London, 1984, 87; Wulf Schwarzwäller, The Unknown Hitler, Bethesda, Maryland, 1989, 9. Guido Knopp’s description (Hitler, Eine Bilanz, 13) of Hitler as ‘a sick swine’ (kranker Schweinehund) might be seen to point in the same direction, though was actually framed within a multi-faceted attempt to grapple with the problem of understanding Hitler.

16. The descriptions are those, in turn, of Norman Rich, Hitler’s War Aims, 2 vols., London, 1973–4, i.II, and Hans Mommsen, Beamtentum im Dritten Reich, Stuttgart, 1966, 98 n.26. The clash of these interpretations has been surveyed in Manfred Funke,Starker oder schwacher Diktator? Hitlers Herrshaft und die Deutschen: Ein Essay, Düsseldorf, 1989. See also Wolfgang Wippermann (ed.), Kontroversen um Hitler, Frankfurt am Main, 1986, and Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, ch. 4.

17. Eberhard Jäckel has never deviated, in numerous publications, from the position that Hitler’s rule was a ‘monocracy’, and ‘sole rule’ (Alleinherrschaft). See, for example, his Hitler in History, Hanover/London, 1984, 28–30; Hitler’s Herrschaft, (1986) 2nd edn, Stuttgart, 1988, 59–65; and – strongly implied – Das deutsche Jahrhundert. Eine historische Bilanz, Stuttgart, 1996, 164. An emphatic argument against interpretations which diluted Hitler’s ‘monocracy’ was advanced by Klaus Hildebrand, ‘Monokratie oder Polykratie? Hitlers Herrschaft und das Dritte Reich’, in Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), Der ‘Führerstaat’: Mythos und Realität. Studien zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten Reiches, Stuttgart, 1981, 73–97.

18. Lines of interpretation which arise, most notably, from the numerous studies of Hans Mommsen and, to a lesser extent, of Martin Broszat. See especially Hans Mommsen, ‘Hitlers Stellung im nationalsozialistischen Herrshaftssystem’, in Hirschfeld and Kettenacker, 43–72, and his brief textAdolf Hitler als ‘Führer’ der Nation, Deutsches Institut für Fernstudien, Tübingen, 1984; also Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, Munich, 1969, and ‘Soziale Motivation und Führer-Bindung des Nationalsozialismus’, VfZ, 18 (1970), 392–409.

19. See Ernst Nolte’s essays, ‘Zwischen Geschichtslegende und Revisionismus?’ and ‘Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will’, in ‘Historikerstreit’. Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung,Munich, 1987, 13–35, 39–47, and hisDer europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917–1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus, Berlin, 1987, esp. 501–2, 504, 506, 517.

20. Rainer Zitelmann, Adolf Hitler. Eine politische Biographie, Göttingen/Zurich, 1989, 9; and for the full unfolding of Hitler’s statements over many years, on which the generalization rested, Rainer Zitelmann, Hitler. Selbstverständnis eines Revolutionärs,Hamburg/Leamington Spa/New York, 1987. See also the critical review by Reinhard Bollmus, ‘Ein rationaler Diktator? Zu einer neuen Hitler-Biographie’, Die Zeit, 22 September 1989, 45–6.

21. The thesis that Hitler’s conscious intention was Germany’s modernization was advanced in Rainer Zitelmann’s essays, ‘Nationalsozialismus und Moderne. Eine Zwischenbilanz’, in Werner Süß (ed.), Übergänge. Zeitgeschichte zwischen Utopie und Machbarkeit, Berlin, 1990, 195–223, and ‘Die totalitäre Seite der Moderne’, in Michael Prinz and Rainer Zitelmann (eds.), Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, Darmstadt, 1991, 1–20.

22. Fest, Hitler, (paperback edn, 1976), 25.

23. The role of the individual – directed by the notion that ‘men make history’ – was a central feature of the German ‘historicist’ tradition which tended to idealize and heroize historical figures (notably Luther, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck) in its emphasis on the idea, intentions, and motives of great personalities as the framework of historical understanding. Even if ‘greatness’ could override conventional laws of morality, it was taken to embrace a certain – indefinable – nobility of character. ‘We cannot look, however imperfectly, on a great man,’ wrote the British Germanophile biographer of Frederick the Great, Thomas Carlyle, himself much admired by Goebbels and Hitler, ‘without gaining something by him. He is the living light-fountain, which it is good and pleasant to be near,… of native original insight, of manhood, and heroic nobleness.’ (Cited, from Carlyle’s ‘Lecture One’ ‘On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History’, in Fritz Stern (ed.), The Varieties of History. From Voltaire to the Present, 2nd Macmillan edn, London, 1970, 101.) In the last weeks of the Third Reich, Goebbels spent time reading Carlyle’s biography of Frederick the Great and recounted parts of it to Hitler who, the Propaganda Minister claimed, knew the book very well (TBJG, II.15, 384 (28 February 1945)).

24. See the ‘aesthetic’ more than moral doubts which Fest (Hitler, 19–20) emphasizes. Fest’s answer to the question he himself raised (Hitler, 17): ‘should he be called “great”?’ is, accordingly, ambivalent. Elsewhere, however, he was less ambiguous. ‘Any consideration of the personality and career of Adolf Hitler will for a long time to come be impossible without a feeling of moral outrage. Nevertheless he possesses historical greatness’ (Joachim Fest, ‘On Remembering Adolf Hitler’, Encounter, 41 (October, 1973), 19–34, here 19).·Fest’s biography was written at a time when the biographical genre had fallen in Germany into disrepute, as part of the general rejection of the historicist tradition and its replacement by ‘structural history’ and ‘historical social science’ from the 1960s onwards. The introduction to his biography seems in part at least to have been a self-conscious defence against the contemporary scepticism. For the difficulties facing biography through the advance of ‘structural history’, see Imanuel Geiß, ‘Die Rolle der Persönlichkeit in der Geschichte: Zwischen Überbewerten und Verdrängen’, and Dieter Riesenberger, ‘Biographie als historio-graphisches Problem’, both in Michael Bosch (ed.), Persönlichkeit und Struktur in der Geschichte, Düsseldorf, 1977, 10–24, 25–39. Attempts to rehabilitate biography – though not of ‘great’ figures – as part of ‘social’ and ‘mentality’ history can be seen in Andreas Gestrich, Peter Knoch, and Helga Merkel, Biographie – sozialgeschichtlich, Göttingen, 1988.

25. Fest, ‘On Remembering Adolf Hitler’, 19, explained that what he saw as Hitler’s ‘greatness’ lay chiefly in the fact that ‘the things which happened in his time are inconceivable without him, in every respect and in every detail’.

26. Churchill’s remark was his characterization of Russia in speaking of the uncertainties of Soviet actions in a broadcast he made on 1 October 1939 (Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 1: The Gathering Storm, London, 1948, 403). I am grateful to Gitta Sereny for providing me with the reference.

27. Fest, Hitler, 697–741, devotes a chapter to a ‘glance at an unperson’ (Blick auf eine Unperson).

28. Cited in Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, London, 1991, xxvi. This is a somewhat loose translation of the passage, defending the prowess and virtue of Alexander the Great, in Plutarch’s Moralia, Loeb edn, vol. 4, London/Cambridge, Mass., 1936, 443f. I am grateful to Richard Winton for locating the text for me.

29. An insight offered in an extraordinarily perceptive early study by Sebastian Haffner, Germany: Jekyll and Hyde, London, 1940, 16. For an evaluation of this study, see Hans Mommsen, ‘Ein schlecht getarnter Bandit. Sebastian Haffners historische Einschätzung Adolf Hitlers’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 November 1997.

30. See Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5th revised edn, Tübingen, 1972, 14off. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ‘30 January 1933 – Ein halbes Jahrhundert danach’, Aus Parlament und Zeitgeschichte, 29 January 1983, 43–54, here 50, expressively recommended the application of Max Weber’s concept of ‘charismatic rule’ as an interpretative model capable of overcoming some of the deep divides in approaching the historical problem of Hitler. See also Schreiber, Hitler. Interpretationen, 330.

31. See Franz Neumann, Behemoth: the Structure and Practice of National Socialism, London, 1942, 75.

32. Haffner, Germany: Jekyll and Hyde, 24. Sebastian Haffner’s later work, Anmerkungen zu Hitler, Munich, 1978, remains, in its seven brilliant thematic essays, one of the most impressive studies of the Nazi dictator.

33. This stands in contrast to Alan Bullock’s announced aim (13), at the beginning of his early and magisterial biography: ‘My theme is not dictatorship, but the dictator, the personal power of one man.’

34. For the term and its implications, see Hans Mommsen, ‘Cumulative Radicalisation and Progressive Self-Destruction as Structural Determinants of the Nazi Dictatorship’, in Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin (eds.), Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison, Cambridge, 1997, 75–87.

35. See note 1 to Chapter 13, below, for the reference to this document, which was published for the first time (in English translation) in Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (eds.), Nazism 1919– 1945. A Documentary Reader, vol. 2, Exeter, 1984, 207.

36. While a tension in method between classical biography and social (or structural) history is undeniable, the irreconcilability is arguably fictive if ‘power’ is taken as the key focus of inquiry – particularly if the view of one prominent social historian is accepted that ‘power, after all, is the key concept in the study of society’ (Tony Judt, ‘A Clown in Regal Purple: Social History and the Historians’, History Work-shop Journal, 7 (1979), 66–94, here 72).

37. Gerhard Schreiber ends his superb historiographical survey of differing interpretations of Hitler with a plea to seek, through a pluralism of methods, an understanding of the dictator and his regime – for which he sees the notion of ‘charismatic rule’ as offering a framework – anchored in a ‘depiction of the National Socialist epoch’ (Schreiber, Hitler. Interpretationen, 329 – 35). See also Gerhard Schreiber, ‘Hitler und seine Zeit-Bilanzen, Thesen, Dokumente’, in Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), Die Deutsche Frage in der Weltpolitik, Stuttgart, 1986, 137–64, here 162: ‘What is still missing is an interpretation of Hitler and his era which integrates all essential components of the National Socialist system, acknowledging – and deploying where necessary – in unprejudiced fashion the given plurality of methodological approaches.’

38. For the phrase, see Mommsen, ‘Hitlers Stellung’, 70.

39. As Jürgen Kocka put it (‘Struktur und Persönlichkeit als methodologisches Problem der Geschichtswissenschaft’, in Bosch (ed.) Persönlichkeit und Struktur, 152–69, here 165); ‘Every worthwhile explanation of National Socialism will have to deal with the person of Hitler, not reducible just to its structural conditions.

CHAPTER 1: FANTASY AND FAILURE

1. August Kubizek, Adolf Hitler. Mein Jugendfreund, Graz (1953), 5th edn 1989, 50.

2. Hans-Jürgen Eitner, ‘Der Führer’. Hitlers Persönlichkeit und Charakter, Munich/Vienna, 1981, 12.

3. Franz Jetzinger, Hitlers Jugend, Vienna, 1956, 16–18.

4. Bradley F. Smith, Adolf Hitler. His Family, Childhood, and Youth, Stanford, 1967, 19. Thomas Orr, ‘Das war Hitler’, Revue, Nr 37, Munich (13 September 1952), 4, states – though without a source – that Maria Anna (whom he misnames Anna Maria) brought 300 Gulden, the price of fifteen cows, into the marriage, contributed by her relatives and probably the reason why Hiedler was prepared to marry her at all. Thomas Orr was a pseudonym for a former employee of the NSDAP-Hauptarchiv (Werner Maser, Adolf Hitler. Legende, Mythos, Wirklichkeit, 3rd paperback edn, Munich, 1973, 541).

5. Smith, 19 n.7; Jetzinger, 19.

6. His initial opportunity came, it seems, through a recruitment drive to take on more lower civil servants from rural areas (Orr, Revue, Nr 37, 5).

7. Smith, 23; Jetzinger, 21, 44–6.

8. Smith, 20; Maser, Hitler, 43–4.

9. Smith, 30–31; Jetzinger, 21–2; Kubizek, 59.

10. Anton Joachimsthaler, Korrektur einer Biographie, Munich, 1989, 12–13.

11. Jetzinger, 16, 22.

12. Jetzinger, 22; Smith, 30.

13. Jetzinger, 22; Rudolf Koppensteiner (ed.), Die Ahnentafel des Führers, Leipzig, 1937, 39.

14. Maser, Hitler, 47; Jetzinger, 19–20.

15. See Jetzinger, 22–5, and Smith, 29, for the dubious character of the legitimation; see also Joachimsthaler, 12–13.

16. Maser, Hitler, 41–2; Smith, 48.

17. See Maser, Hitler, 34–5. Konrad Heiden, Der Führer, London (1944), 1967 edn, 38–9, had already noted this suggestion. Orr, Revue, Nr 37, 4, referred to village rumours that Nepomuk was the actual father.

18. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Munich, 1943 edn, 2: ‘eines armen, kleinen Häuslers’.

19. See Koppensteiner, 39–44. Jetzinger’s claim (10–12) that the name ‘Hitler’ was of Czech origin has been shown to rest on flimsy grounds. ‘Hüttler’, meaning cottager or smallholder, was not an uncommon name in Austria. See Anton Adalbert Klein, ‘Hitlers dunkler Punkt in Graz?’,Historisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Graz, 3 (1970), 27–9; Orr, Revue, Nr 37, 6; and also Brigitte Hamann, Hitlers Wien. Lehrjahre eines Diktators, Munich, 1996, 64. Since the various forms of the name had evidently been for decades interchangeable, it is unclear why Maser, Hitler, 31, can be so adamant that Nepomuk (who himself had used more than one form) insisted at the legitimation upon ‘Hitler’ rather than ‘Hiedler’ as being closer to his own name of ‘Hüttler’.

20. Koppensteiner, 46.

21. Joachimsthaler, 12–13.

22. Kubizek, 50.

23. Maser, Hitler, 12–15. One example of the sensationalism was an article published in the British Daily Mirror of 14 October 1933, purporting to show the ‘Jewish grave of Hitler’s grandfather’ in a cemetery in Bucharest (IfZ, MA-731 (= NSDAP, Hauptarchiv, Reel 1)). The press interest in Hitler’s alleged Jewish forebears had blown up in summer 1932, when the Neue Zürcher Zeitung had picked up on the name ‘Salomon’ that had appeared in the eighteenth century in the official genealogy approved by Hitler. In fact, the name ‘Salomon’ had been an error made by the Viennese genealogist Dr Karl Friedrich von Frank, which he hastily corrected. But the damage was done. See Hamann, 68–71.

24. Hans Frank, Im Angesicht des Galgens, Munich/Gräfelfing, 1953, 330–31.

25. Jetzinger’s uncritical acceptance of Frank’s recollection (see 28–32) was above all responsible for the spread of the story. One piece of his ‘evidence’, a picture of Hitler’s father indicating his ‘Jewish’ looks, is self-evidently a portrait of someone other than Alois Hitler. See Jetzinger, picture opposite p. 16; Smith, p1. 5, following p. 24. For an early critical review of Jetzinger’s book, and, particularly, a rejection, based on the findings of the Austrian scholar Dr Nikolaus Preradovic, of his claims that Hitler had a Jewish grandfather, see ‘Hitler. Kein Ariernachweis’, Der Spiegel, 12 June 1957, 54–9, esp. 57–8.

26. Klein, 10, 20–25.

27. Smith, 158–9.

28. Patrick Hitler, ‘Mon oncle Adolf’, Paris soir (5 August 1939), 4–5. The article amounted to no more than a largely worthless diatribe. See also Maser, Hitler, 18.

29. Robert G.L. Waite, The Psychopathic God: Adolf Hitler, New York, 1977, 129 n.; Maser, Hitler, 15 and n.

30. Smith, 158. Brigitte Hamann, also dismissive of the Frank story, speculates that his motive, as a long-standing Jew-hater himself, could have been to blame the Jews for producing an allegedly ‘Jewish Hitler’ (Hamann, 73–7, here 77).

31. It has been claimed that, as the motivation of his paranoid antisemitism, the more relevant question is not whether Hitler in fact had a Jewish grandfather, but whether he believed he was part Jewish (Waite, 126–31). The origins and sources of Hitler’s hatred of the Jews are something to which we will return. But since there is no evidence to suggest that the idea that he was part-Jewish might have occurred to him before his political enemies started spreading the rumours in the 1920s, by which time his antisemitism was long-established, there is little to support the speculation. Concern about whether he was part-Jewish would, of course, in any case have meant that Hitler was already antisemitic. See Rudolph Binion’s review of Waite’s book in Journal of Psychohistory, 5 (1977), 297.

32. According to Maser’s account of the testimony of Adolf’s remaining relatives in Spital long after the war, there was talk while Adolf was visiting Spital on leave from the army in 1917 of Nepomuk as his paternal grandfather (Maser, Hitler, 35). However, the testimony is worthless: Hitler never visited Spital in 1917. See Joachimsthaler, 171; and Rudolph Binion, ‘Foam on the Hitler Wave’, JMH, 46 (1974), 522–8, here 523.

33. Maser, Hitler, 35.

34. Smith, 39; Jetzinger, 39, 54.

35. Smith, 28, 35; Jetzinger, 50.

36. Pointed out by Rudolf Olden, Hitler the Pawn, London, 1936, 16.

37. Jetzinger, 48; Smith, 28; Orr, Revue, Nr 37, 5.

38. Jetzinger, 49; Smith, 28, 47; Orr, Revue, Nr 37, 5. According to Orr, Anna (whom he calls Anna Glasl-Hörer) was the adoptive daughter of a civil servant by the name of Hörer, who was a near neighbour of Alois in Braunau.

39. Jetzinger, 51; Smith, 29, 32–3; Orr, Revue, Nr 37, 6.

40. Smith, 32–3; Jetzinger, 52–3; Orr, Revue, Nr 37, 6, Nr 38, 2.

41. Jetzinger, 44; Smith, 35–7.

42. Jetzinger, 56–7; Smith, 40–41.

43. Maser, Hitler, 9.

44. Copy of birth-certificate in HA, Reel 1; IfZ, MA-731; Koppensteiner, 18.

45. MK, 1.

46. MK, 2; Smith, 53.

47. A point acknowledged by Waite, 145. See also Smith, 51 and n.5.

48. Smith, 46–9.

49. Following based upon Smith, 43–8; and Jetzinger, 58–63. Jetzinger’s information on Hitler’s father drew on an interview he conducted with one of Alois’s former colleagues, Emanuel Lugert. This was also reproduced in Orr, Revue, Nr 39, 14, 35. The former cook in the Hitler household, Rosalia Hörl (née Schichtl), later told the NSDAP-Hauptarchiv that he was a ‘good-natured (gemütlicher) but strict gentleman’. A colleague at the Customs Office in the early 1880s was less flattering, describing him as ‘unsympathetic to all of us. He was very strict, exact, even pedantic at work and a very unapproachable person.’ Both accounts in HA, Reel 1 (IfZ, MA-731).)

50. Smith, 51.

51. Smith, 45–8.

52. Smith, 43.

53. Kubizek, 46.

54. Eduard Bloch, ‘My Patient, Hitler’, Collier’s (15 March 1941), 35.

55. For speculation on the psychological effect, see Alice Miller, Am Anfang war Erziehung, Frankfurt am Main, 1983, 213–15.

56. Smith, 41–3; Jetzinger, 62, 71–2; Kubizek, 38–45; Bloch, 36.

57. Bloch, 36.

58. MK, 16; and see Albert Zoller, Hitler privat. Erlebnisbericht seiner Geheimsekretärin, Düsseldorf, 1949, 46.

59. Waite, 141.

60. NA, NND/881077, Interview with Mrs Paula Wolf (i.e. Paula Hitler), Berchtesgaden, 5 June 1946 (transcript only in English). Hitler’s half-sister Angela Hammitzsch (formerly Raubal) also spoke after the war of the regular beatings Adolf used to receive from his father. (Cit. in Christa Schroeder, Er war mein Chef. Aus dem Nachlaß der Sekretärin von Adolf Hitler, Munich/Vienna, 1985, 336 n.139.)

61. Schroeder, 63. Hitler described his father to Goebbels in 1932 as a ‘tyrant in the home (Haustyrann), while his mother was ‘a source of goodness and love’ (TBJG, 1.2, 219 (9 August 1932)). See also TBJG, I.2, 727 (15 November 1936), where Hitler was reported to have spoken of his ‘fanatical father’.

62. MK, 32–3. See also the commentaries on the passage by Helm Stierlin, Adolf Hitler. Familienperspektiven, Frankfurt am Main, 1976, 24–5; and Miller, 190–91. According to Hans Frank, Hitler told him of his shame as a boy at having to fetch his drunken father home from the pub at night (Frank, 331–2). However, Emanuel Lugert, who had worked with Alois Hitler for a time at Passau, told Jetzinger that Hitler’s father had normally drunk at most four halves of beer a day, had never to his knowledge been drunk, and went home at the right time for his evening meal (Jetzinger, 61). The same witness apparently told Orr that Alois sometimes drank up to six halves of strong beer in an evening, but repeated that he had never seen him drunk (Orr, Revue, Nr 39, 35). Conceivably, Hitler’s own aversion to alcohol had its roots in his father’s drinking and behavioural habits.

63. Psychologists and ‘psycho-historians’ have seen Adolf’s relationship to both parents, not just to his father, as disturbed in the extreme. Those who have looked to an underlying love-hate relationship with his mother include Waite, esp. 138–48; Miller, 212–28; Eitner, esp. 21–7; Stierlin, esp. ch.2 (who takes from family-therapy the notion that the child could identify itself in extreme fashion with the sense of being the ‘delegate’ of the unfulfilled dreams of the mother, in this case seeing the salvation of the mother in the quest to save Germany); Walter C. Langer, The Mind of Adolf Hitler, London, 1973, esp. 150–52; Rudolph Binion, Hitler among the Germans, New York, 1976 (who finds the key to Hitler’s quest to kill the Jews in his subliminal reaction to the death of his mother at the hands of a Jewish doctor); Rudolph Binion, ‘Hitler’s Concept of “Lebensraum”: the Psychological Basis’, History of Childhood Quarterly, 1 (1973), 187–215 (with subsequent discussion of his hypotheses, 216–58), where Hitler’s perceived mission to provide ‘feeding-ground’ for the ‘motherland’ is located in his need to save and avenge his mother, in the shape of Germany; Erich Fromm, Anatomie der menschlichen Destruktivät, Stuttgart, 1974, esp. 337–8; and Erik H. Erikson, ‘The Legend of Hitler’s Youth’, in Robert Paul Wolff (ed.), Political Man and Social Man, New York, 1966, 370–96, here esp. 381–3. Surveys of psychological approaches to Hitler are provided by William Carr, Hitler: a Study in Personality and Politics, London, 1978, esp. 149–55; Wolfgang Michalka, ‘Hitler im Spiegel der Psycho-History’, Francia, 8 (1980), 595–611; Schreiber, Hitler, 316–27; and, most extensively, Thomas Kornbichler, Adolf-Hitler-Psychogramme,Frankfurt am Main, 1994. For some of the difficulties in reaching any scientifically sound assessment of Hitler’s later personality, see Desmond Henry and Dick Geary, ‘Adolf Hitler: a re-assessment of his personality status’, Irish Journal of Psychological Medicine, 10 (1993), 148–51·

64. Quotation from Waite, foreword to the 1992 edition, and see, especially, ch.3. The most critical review of Waite’s book was that of another ‘psycho-historian’, Rudolph Binion, in Journal of Psychohistory, 5 (1977), 295–300. See also Binion’s comment in his review article, ‘Foam on the Hitler Wave’, JMH, 46 (1974), 522–8, here 525: ‘No hate was manifest in young Hitler as far as the direct evidence discloses.’

65. A point made by Smith, 8.

66. Smith, 55.

67. Max Domarus, Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945, Wiesbaden, 1973, 1935 (8 November 1942).

68. Smith, 56.

69. Smith, 58.

70. MK, 3.

71. MK, 3–4; Smith, 61; Jetzinger, 73.

72. Smith, 62.

73. See, e.g., Tb Reuth, iii.1254 (19 August 1938), where Hitler spoke of the happy days of his youth in Leonding and Lambach.

74. See Hermann Giesler, Ein anderer Hitler, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1977, 96, 99, 215 – 16, 479–80; Zoller, 57; Evan Burr Bukey, Hitler’s Hometown, Bloomington/Indianapolis, 1986, esp. 196–201; and Hamann, 11–15. Hitler spoke during the war of turning Linz into a ‘German Budapest’, and was prepared to put 120 million Marks into his grandiose building schemes – ‘money you can do something with’, as Goebbels remarked. See, for example, TBJG, II.5, 367 (20 August 1942), 597 (29 September 1942), II.8, 265 (10 May 1943); Monologe, 284 (19–20 February 1942), 405 (25 June 1943).

75. MΚ,3.

76. Jetzinger, 92.

77. Jetzinger, 92.

78. MK, 4. He still had the two-volume work – a ‘treasure loyally guarded’ – in 1912 in the Men’s Home in Vienna (Hamann, 562).

79. MK, 173; Hugo Rabitsch, Aus Adolf Hitlers Jugendzeit, Munich, 1938, 12–13; Smith, 66.

80. Smith, 66–8; Waite, 11–12, 60. See Hamann, 544–8, for Hitler’s enthusiasm after hearing Karl May speak – even on a pacifist theme – in Vienna in 1912.

81. Walter Görlitz, Adolf Hitler, Göttingen, 1960, 23.

82. MK, 6.

83. Smith, 64; Maser, Hitler, 62. Though it seems hard to believe, elderly inhabitants of Leonding in the 1950s claimed that Edmund’s parents did not attend the boy’s funeral. See Orr, Revue, Nr 40, 36; Waite, 169–70.

84. See Smith, 68–9.

85. MK, 5.

86. Kubizek, 57.

87. Jetzinger, 105–6; Smith, 76, 79.

88. Jetzinger, 105–6. For Huemer’s subsequent relationship with Hitler, see Smith, 79 n.34. See also Rabitsch, 57–65 for Huemer’s later visit to Hitler. For Hitler’s schooling, see also Zoller, 47. Hitler later claimed the marks for his school-work dropped when he started to read Karl May (Monologe, 281 (17 February 1942)).

89. Jetzinger, 107, 109–11; Rabitsch, 72.

90. Kubizek, 61; Monologe, 185–8 (8–9 January 1942); Henry Picker, Tischespräche im Hauptquartier, Stuttgart, 1963, 273 (12 April 1942); Smith, 79; Eitner, 30–31; Maser, Hitler, 68–70; Zoller, 47–9.

91. MK, 12–13; Jetzinger,110, 113 for German nationalism in Linz; see also Bukey, 7ff. Hamann, 23–7, describes the German nationalist political leanings in the school, as does Jetzinger, 99, 110, 113.

92. MK, 5–8.

93. Picker, 324 (10 May 1942).

94. MK, 6 (trans., MK Watt, 8).

95. MK, 7.

96. See Smith, 70–73, also for dismissal of the objections of Jetzinger, 98–9 to any substance in Hitler’s depiction of a conflict with his father over a civil service career.

97. MK, 10. See Hamann, 23.

98. MK, 8–14; Smith, 81–5; Olden, 21; Hamann, 22–3.

99. MK, 15.

100. Jetzinger, 72–3. See also Olden, 21. The cause of the death was a haemorrhage of the lungs. He had suffered a prior haemorrhage the previous August (Jetzinger, 72)

101. Jetzinger, 122–9; Smith, 91, 97.

102. Kubizek’s comment about Adolf’s sobbing at the funeral (54) was only based on casual hearsay evidence and is not reliable.

103. Kubizek, 46, 61–2.

104. Jetzinger, 102; Smith, 92.

105. TBJG, I.3, 447 (3 June 38). In his recollections of his time in Steyr, he claimed to have disliked it as too Catholic-clerical and not nationalist enough compared with Linz (Monologe, 188 (8–9 January 1942)).

106. Smith, 95–6.

107. MK, 8.

108. This follows Heiden, Der Führer, 46, who lists the grades for both semesters of the school-year 1904–5, as given in the report issued on 16 September 1905 (including the re-sit in geometry), and Smith, who summarizes these results, 96. Maser, Hitler, 70, gives the results only in the report from 11 February, for the first semester, and has Hitler as ‘unsatisfactory’ in French (though this is not mentioned on Heiden’s list). The results listed in Orr, Revue, Nr 42, 3, and repeated in Jetzinger, 103, as those of the report of 16 September 1905, correspond with those given by Heiden for the first semester and those provided by Maser (apart from the entry for French) for the report dated 11 February. See also Waite, 156.

109. According to stories he later told, Adolf mistakenly used one of his reports from Steyr as toilet paper after an evening with friends celebrating the end of term. (Monologe, 189–90 (8–9 January 1942); see Zoller, 49, for a different version in which he was sick over the report). Maser, Hitler,70, presumes the report is that of February 1905, while Smith, 99, dates it to summer 1905. In the anecdote, Hitler claims that he slept out and was wakened by a milkwoman. This seems to rule out February. And in summer, Hitler only received his certificate following the re-sit examination in September, when there would have been no social gathering. Zoller’s account is in at least one respect inaccurate, since Adolf allegedly had to show the report to his father, who by then was already dead. Whether Hitler’s story had any substance to it at all must be regarded as doubtful.

110. Smith, 95–9; Jetzinger, 99–103.

111. Smith, 98.

112. Jetzinger, 148–51, denies an illness altogether, though his evidence is not strong. Smith, 97–8, provides some evidence for illness in summer 1905, though not for the autumn, accepts Adolf’s pale and sickly appearance at this time, but rightly doubts that it was sufficient reason for ending his schooling.

113. MK, 16; Smith, 97–8. See also the picture of Hitler from this period, showing him as thin, weak and consumptive in appearance, in Smith, pl. 13.

114. MK, 16–17; see Jetzinger, 130.

115. Paula Hitler testimony, NA, NND-881077, 3; IfZ, MA-731 (=HA, Reel 1), ‘Notizen für Kartei’, 8 December 1938.

116. Kubizek, 63; IfZ, MA-731 (=H A, Reel 1), ‘Adolf Hitler in Urfahr’ (recollections in 1938–9 of the postmaster’s widow who had lived in the same house as the Hitler family).

117. MK, 16.

118. Hamann, 80. Kubizek had already been approached by a representative of the NSDAP-Hauptarchiv at the end of 1938 with a view to writing up his memoirs of the youthful Hitler, foreseen as ‘one of the most significant pieces of the central archive’ in bringing out the ‘inconceivable greatness of the Führer in his youth’ (IfZ, MA-731 (= HA, Reel 1), ‘Notizen für Kartei’, 8 December 1938, and report on visit to Kubizek).

119. See Jetzinger, 117–22, 133–81; Smith, 101 n. 30. Jetzinger had a personal animus against Kubizek, and his own – rival, though second-hand – account of Hitler’s youth did most, deliberately, to discredit Kubizek. See Hamann, 83–6.

120. See Hamann, 77–86.

121. Kubizek, 17; Jetzinger, 140–41.

122. MK, 15; Paula Hitler testimony, NA, NND-881077, 3^_ 4.

123. Kubizek, 22.

124. Kubizek, 18–25.

125. Kubizek, 22–3.

126. Kubizek, 17, 19, 112.

127. Kubizek, 75–86.

128. Smith, 103. Adolf was so stirred by a performance of Wagner’s early opera, Rienzi (which glamorized the tale of a fourteenth-century Roman populist who in the opera purportedly attempted to unify Italy but was ultimately brought down by the people he had led) that he took Kubizek on a long nocturnal climb up the Freinberg, a mountain outside Linz, and lectured to him in a state of near ecstasy on the significance of what they had seen. Kubizek’s account (111–18), is, however, highly fanciful, reading in mystical fashion back into the episode an early prophetic vision of Hitler’s own future. Plainly, the strange evening had made a lasting impression on Kubizek. He reminded Hitler of it when they met at Bayreuth in 1939. On the spot, Hitler seized on the story to illustrate his early prophetic qualities to his hostess, Winifred Wagner, ending with the words: ‘in that hour, it began’ (Kubizek, 118). Kubizek, more impressed than ever, subsequently produced his post-war, highly imaginary depiction, with the melodramatically absurd claim at the forefront of his mind. This has not prevented the ‘vision’ on the Freinberg being taken seriously by some later writers. See e.g. Joachim Köhler, Wagners Hitler. Der Prophet und sein Vollstrecker, Munich, 1996, ch.2, esp. 34–5.

129. Köhler, Wagners Hitler, takes this on to a new plane, however, with his overdrawn claim that Hitler came to see it as his life’s work to fulfil Wagner’s visions and put his ideas into practice.

130. Kubizek, 83.

131. Kubizek, 18–19.

132. Kubizek, 97–110.

133. Kubizek, 64–74; see Jetzinger, 142–8; and Hamann, 41–2.

134. Kubizek, 106–9; see Jetzinger, 166–8.

135. According to Hitler himself, the trip lasted two weeks (MK, 18). Kubizek, 121–4, reckons it was around four weeks, and is followed by Smith, 104. Jetzinger, 151–5, concluded that Hitler’s recollection was probably correct. The dating can only be determined by the postmarks (some indistinct) and dates (not always given) on the cards which Hitler sent to Kubizek. See Hamann, 42–4. The length of Hitler’s visit is scarcely of prime historical importance.

136. Kubizek, 129; Hamann, 43–4.

137. Kubizek, 129.

138. Kubizek, 127–30. The objections came primarily from Leo Raubal, the husband of Adolf’s half-sister, Angela. He tried to persuade Klara that it was about time that Adolf learnt something sensible. Adolf raged to Kubizek: ‘This pharisee is ruining my home for me’ (Kubizek, 128). Adolf won the battle. According to the later testimony of a neighbour, he insisted so firmly on his intention of becoming an artist that he finally persuaded his mother to send him to the Academy in Vienna (IfZ, MA-731 (= HA, Reel 1), ‘Adolf Hitler in Urfahr’).

139. Gerhart Marckhgott, ‘“Von der Hohlheit des gemächlichen Lebens”. Neues Material über die Familie Hitler in Linz’, Jahrbuch des Oberösterreichischen Musealvereins, 138/I (1993), 275–6. The entry by Aunt Johanna – twice-noted – in the family household-account book is undated, but from internal evidence can be seen to fall at the end of Adolf’s time in Linz. Brigitte Hamann (196) suggests that it dates from August 1908, and that Adolf persuaded his aunt to loan him the money during a summer visit to the family home in the Waldviertel. Why, then, Aunt Johanna would have entered it in the family household-book which was kept in Urfahr is not apparent. It seems more likely, as Marckhgott infers, that the loan was made the previous year, in 1907, while Klara Hitler was still alive, and when Adolf needed to secure some funding before he left to take the admission examination for the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna. As Marckhgott points out, the loan – amounting to about a fifth of Johanna Pölzl’s entire savings – perhaps sparked the protest by Leo Raubal about Adolf being allowed to entertain studying art instead of earning his living. But once he had obtained funding, it was presumably more difficult for his mother to stand in his way of going to Vienna.

140. Binion, Hitler among the Germans, 138–43; Binion, ‘Hitler’s Concept of Lebensraum’, 196–200; Bloch, 36; Jetzinger, 170–72; Smith, 105; Hamann, 46–8.

141. Hamann, 46–7.

142. Bloch, 36.

143. Bloch, 39.

144. Hamann, 47.

145. MK, 18.

146. Hamann, 51–2. Maser, Hitler, 75–7, 114, inverts the examinations procedures. Hamann, 51 (without source), refers to 112 candidates; Maser (75, 77, 114), with reference to information provided by the Academy itself, speaks of 113 candidates.

147. Maser, Hitler, 77. Among those who failed alongside Hitler was a subsequent rector of the Academy. See also Hamann, 52.

148. MK, 18–19 (trans., MK Watt, 18).

149. MK, 19 (trans., MK Watt, 18–19); and see Smith, 108–10. Orr, Revue, Nr 43, 40–41 (followed by Maser, Hitler, 78, and L.Sydney Jones, Hitlers Weg begann in Wien, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin, 1990, 64) has Hitler applying, after his rejection by the Academy of Fine Arts, for entry to the school of architecture, but the assertion is unsupported by any evidence. Even the most tentative inquiry would have revealed – as Hitler must surely have known – that he did not possess even the minimal qualifications for entry.

150. Kubizek, 133. Allegations that Hitler’s antisemitism had its source in his rejection by Jewish examiners at the Academy are wide of the mark. Both Waite, 190, and Jones, 317, speak of four Jews among his examiners. In fact, none of the Academy’s professors involved in rejecting Hitler was Jewish (Hamann, 53).

151. Hamann, 53; Binion, Hitler among the Germans, 139; IfZ, MA-731 (= HA, 1),’Adolf Hitler in Urfahr.’

152. NA, NND-88I077, 3;Bloch, 39. See also Kubizek, 138–41. Jetzinger’s account, 176–81, claiming that Hitler did not return to Linz before his mother’s death was at least in part aimed at discrediting Kubizek. However, both Paula Hitler and Dr Bloch independently confirm that Adolf was present while his mother was dying, thus lending support to Kubizek’s account, despite its containing a number of factual inaccuracies. Smith, 110 and n.54, follows Jetzinger. See Waite, 180–83, and Hamann, 84–5.

153. Jetzinger, 179; Hamann, 54. According to two witnesses, Adolf sketched his mother on her deathbed (Bloch, 39; IfZ, MA-731 (= HA, Reel 1), ‘Adolf Hitler in Urfahr’).

154. Bloch, 39. Dr Bloch went on to mention Adolf’s avowed lasting gratitude. Hitler subsequently sent Dr Bloch a number of picture-postcards and a present of a picture he had painted (Bloch, pt.II, Colliers, 22 March 1941, 69–70; Hamann, 56). After the Anschluß, Dr Bloch appealed to Hitler and was granted relatively favourable treatment. Even so, he lost his livelihood, was forced to emigrate to the USA, and died in straitened circumstances in New York in 1945 (Bloch, pt.II, 72–3; Hamann, 56–7).

155. MK, 16 (trans., MK Watt, 17).

156. Jetzinger, 181.

157. MK, 16–17 (trans., MK Watt, 17).

158. MK, 19–20 (trans., MK Watt, 19).

159. Jetzinger, 180; Hamann, 55; Marckhgott, 272.

160. Hamann, 58, 85.

161. E.g. Maser, Hitler, 81. See Hamann, 58.

162. Jetzinger, 180–82, 185–9; Smith, 111–12.

163. NA, NND-881077, 4; Jetzinger, 182, 186–7.

164. Jetzinger, 187.

165. Marckhgott, 271.

166. Kubizek, 146–55; Jetzinger, 189–92; Smith, 114–15.

167. IfZ, MA-731 (= HA, Reel 1), ‘Adolf Hitler in Urfahr’.

CHAPTER 2: DROP-OUT

1. Above quotations from MK, 20–21 (trans., MK Watt, 20–21).

2. MK, chs.2–3, 18–137.

3. MK, 137.

4. The best account by far is that of Brigitte Hamann, Hitlers Wien. Lehrjahre eines Diktators, Munich, 1996.

5. See Hamann, 77–83, 264–75, for the credibility of these accounts.

6. Josef Greiner, Das Ende des Hitler-Mythos, Zürich/Leipzig/Vienna, 1947. Jetzinger, 225, 294; Waite, 427–32; Hamann, 275–80, are rightly dismissive, Smith, 165–6, less so.

7. See Carl E. Schorske, Fin-de-Siècle Vienna. Politics and Culture, New York, 1979, xviii, 3.

8. See William A. Jenks, Vienna and the Young Hitler, New York, 1960, 219.

9. See Schorske, 6, 12, 15, 19, 22.

10. Schorske, 129.

11. Hamann, chs.2–5, 9–10, provides an excellent description of the social and political fabric of the Vienna that Hitler experienced.

12. Jenks, 38–9.

13. Jenks, 39.

14. Jenks, 118.

15. See Jenks, 119–21.

16. See Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Antisemitism in Germany and Austria, rev. edn, London, 1988, esp. chs.14–15; Hamann, 470–71.

17. Schorske, pp. 146–80; Hamann, 486–8.

18. Jenks, 118.

19. MK, 135 (trans., MK Watt, 113).

20. See Hamann, 128–9; Joachimsthaler, 39–40.

21. Jenks, 53.

22. Jenks, 107.

23. Schorske, 130–31.

24. Hamann, 177–9.

25. Jenks, 54–5, 101.

26. MK, 80–101.

27. Jenks, 73–8.

28. Schorske, 129.

29. See, for Schönerer, Hamann, 337–64 (here esp. 362); and Andrew G. Whiteside, The Socialism of Fools. Georg von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-Germanism, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1975.

30. Jenks, 106.

31. Schorske, 128.

32. Jenks, 91–6, 103–10.

33. MK, 106–30; and see Jenks, 110.

34. MK 106–10, 130–34. During reminiscences more than three decades later, Hitler was still singing the praises of Lueger (Monologe, 152–3, 17 December 1941). On Lueger, see esp. Hamann, 393–435, and John W. Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna. Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848–1897, Chicago, 1981, esp. ch.4.

35. MK, 108, 130.

36. Schorske, 139; Jenks, 88.

37. Cit. Hamann, 417; Schorske, 145.

38. Schorske, 145.

39. Jenks, 50.

40. Schorske, 140.

41. Hamann, 411.

42. Hamann, 413.

43. Hamann, 412.

44. Hamann, 412, and see 490.

45. MK, 132–3; and see Hamann, 431–2.

46. MK, 133–4.

47. MK, 108, 130.

48. Jenks, 168, 175.

49. Jenks, 158.

50. Jenks, 181–2.

51. Jenks, 178–9.

52. Jenks, 181.

53. Jenks, 168–9.

54. Jenks, 158.

55. Jenks, 179–80.

56. Jenks, 180.

57. Quotations from MK, 43–4 (trans., MK Watt, 38–9); and see Hamann, 254–7.

58. Marckhgott, 271.

59. Jetzinger, 206.

60. NA, NND-881077, 4, testimony of Paula Hitler (1946).

61. Marckhgott, 273, 275.

62. NA, NND-881077, 4; Jetzinger, 230–32, speculates that Adolf inherited a substantial legacy from Aunt Johanna in 1911. But she had loaned him 924 Kronen no later than 1908 (probably towards the end of 1907), a sum amounting to around a fifth of her savings, and probably constituting his share of the inheritance (Marckhgott, 275–6; Hamann, 196, 250). There is no hint from Hitler’s lifestyle that he benefited from a significant inheritance in 1911.

63. Kubizek, 128, 148.

64. NA, NND-881077, 4.

65. Kubizek, 148–9.

66. Smith, 108, for the renting of the room in late September or early October 1907; he gives the date for the return to Vienna as 14–17 February 1908. The card to Kubizek is dated 18 February; Hitler was still in Urfahr on 14 February (Jetzinger, 187–8). Hamann (49) points out that Maria Zakreys was Czech and not Polish, as Kubizek (157) implied. She also corrects Kubizek’s error (132, 156) that the address was Stumpergasse 29, not 31.

67. Kubizek, 152.

68. Kubizek, 153–4 (trans., August Kubizek, Young Hitler, London, 1973, 99).

69. Kubizek, 157–8.

70. Kubizek, 150, points out that Adolf was continuing more or less to lead the same sort of life in Vienna.

71. Kubizek, 159.

72. Kubizek, 159, 161.

73. Kubizek, 159–60.

74. Kubizek, 160.

75. Kubizek, 161–7; quotations 167 (trans., Young Hitler, 113).

76. Kubizek, 167 (trans., Young Hitler, 114).

77. Jetzinger, 187–8.

78. Kubizek, 163.

79. Kubizek, 165 (trans., Young Hitler, III, where the words ‘and cheated’ – ‘und betrogen’ – are omitted).

80. Kubizek, 182 (trans., Young Hitler, 129).

81. Kubizek, 163 (trans., Young Hitler, 109).

82. IfZ, F19/19 (copies of the correspondence). See Jones, 33–7; Smith, 113; Joachimsthaler, 35; Maser, Hitler, 81–4; Hamann, 59–62.

83. Monologe, 200. According to one story, Hitler tried several times to see Roller, but eventually gave up and tore up his letter of introduction (John Toland, Adolf Hitler, London, 1977, 31, 929 but on the basis of an interview carried out decades later, in 1971. See also Jones, 51).

84. Maser, Hitler, 84–5; Jones, 33, 121 (though on 311 n.65 he accepts the weakness of the evidence). And see Joachimsthaler, 35.

85. Despite Kubizek’s propensity to fantasize parts of his memoirs (see Jetzinger, 117–21, I35ff.), the very singularity of the episodes he describes, when relating Hitler’s ‘projects’, suggests they were beyond his own originality or fantasy, and the picture of Hitler which emerges has an authentic ring to it. See Hamann, 80–82. Hitler himself, in his wartime monologues, spoke of starting to write a play at the age of fifteen (Monologe, 187, 8–9 January 1942). The English translation, Hitler’s Table Talk, 1941–1944,London, 1953, 191, omits the relevant sentence.

86. Kubizek, 164–5.

87. Kubizek, 184–5.

88. Kubizek, 200–208, quotation, 208 (trans., Young Hitler, 153).

89. Kubizek, 179 (utopian plans); 172, 176–8 (housing in Vienna); 178–9 (new popular drink); 209–18 (travelling orchestra); 174, 197 (rebuilding of Linz).

90. Kubizek, 176–8. Jones, 62–3, 68–9, accepts Kubizek’s story, though attributes Hitler’s interest in the housing problem to his own conditions in the dismal room in Stumpergasse more than to any humanitarian sympathy with the underprivileged.

91. Kubizek, 211.

92. Jones, 52–8, 63–7. Hitler did later acquire some erotic paintings by Klimt’s Munich counterpart Franz von Stuck, who was one of his favourite artists (Jones 57; Waite, 66–9).

93. For the ferocious opposition in Vienna to the work of Klimt and Kokoschka, see Schorske, chs.5, 7.

94. Kubizek, 186–7.

95. Kubizek, 173–4.

96. Kubizek, 173.

97. Kubizek, 188.

98. Kubizek, 153.

99. Kubizek, 188. Hitler had paid the relatively high subscription of 8.40 Kronen on 7 January 1908 to become a member of the Linzer Musealverein, giving him access to the Linz Landesmuseum and library. He resigned his membership on 4 March 1909 (Hamann, 57, 197).

100. Kubizek, 188, 191.

101. Kubizek, 189–90.

102. Jetzinger, 216.

103. Kubizek, 190; Jetzinger, 217. Hitler was later capable of conversing about the comparative merits of Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, though this is no proof that he had read their works (TBJG, II.7, 181, 21 January 1943). He had, in fact, been caught out ‘lecturing’ on Schopenhauer in the Men’s Home in Vienna, conceded that he had only read ‘some’ of his work, and been admonished to ‘speak about things that he understood’ (Reinhold Hanisch, ‘I Was Hitler’s Buddy: III’, New Republic, 19 April 1939, 297). According to Hans Frank, Hitler told him that he read Schopenhauer during the First World War and Nietzsche during his imprisonment in Landsberg in 1924 (Frank, 46).

104. In MK, 43, 56, 58, Hitler explicitly mentions the Social Democratic Arbeiterzeitung, the Liberal Neue Freie Presse and Wiener Tagblatt, and the Christian Socialist Deutsches Volksblatt. For his daily newspaper reading he probably turned first of all to the organ of the Schönerer movement, Das Alldeutsche Tagblatt, which was published a few doors down Stumpergasse from where he lived (Hamann, 50). He read these, and no doubt other newspapers as well as periodicals and political pamphlets, mainly in cafés(MK, 42–3, 65).

105. MK, 35–6. Maser, Hitler, 179–82 accepts that the sources on Hitler’s reading in this early period are unreliable – which does not prevent him citing at length a passage from Greiner that is pure fantasy. See Binion’s scathing comments on Maser’s views of Hitler’s alleged extensive reading in ‘Foam on the Hitler Wave’, JMH, 46 (1974), 522–4. Jones, 312 n.12, casts doubt upon Hitler’s use of the Hofbibliothek.

106. NA, NND-881077, 4· An indication that the young Hitler had been something of a bookworm before he left Linz can be gleaned from the testimony of neighbours and relatives, though of course this was only gathered in 1938 (HA, Reel 1 (IfZ, MA-731), ‘Adolf Hitler in Urfahr’, and reported recollections of Johann Schmidt).

107. MK, 36–8 (trans., MK Watt, 33–4).

108. Maser, Hitler, 110; Monologe, 198; Jenks, 14; Zoller, 58.

109. Kubizek, 198.

110. Kubizek wrote (196) of ‘the perfect interpretations of the musical dramas of Wagner by the Viennese Court Opera led by Gustav Mahler’, and mentions (192) Hitler’s admiration for Mahler, ‘at that time the conductor’ in the opera. Whether Hitler experienced Mahler conducting during his first two stays in Vienna cannot be established, but he and Kubizek could not have seen Mahler together, since Mahler’s last performance, before leaving to take up his appointment at the New York Metropolitan Opera, was on 15 October 1907, five months before Kubizek’s arrival in Vienna (Jones, 40, 48; Maser, Hitler, 264; Hamann, 44, 94–5).

111. Kubizek, 196. Hitler’s sister Paula claimed to remember him seeing Götterdämmerung thirteen times even while still in Linz (NA, NND-881077, 4). Hitler himself said he had seen Tristan (which he thought Wagner’s greatest opera) ‘thirty to forty times’ during his years in Vienna (Monologe, 224, 294 (24–5 January 1942, 22–3 February 1942)).

112. Kubizek, 195.

113. Schorske, 163.

114. Jenks, 202; and see Hamann, 89–95.

115. Kubizek, 195 (trans., Young Hitler, 140).

116. Monologe, 234 (25–6 January 1942; trans., Table Talk, 251).

117. A point made by Joachim Fest, Hitler. Eine Biographie, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Vienna, 1976 edn, 75.

118. Heiden, Der Führer, 52–3.

119. For an overdrawn depiction of Hitler as a self-styled Wagnerian hero, see Köhler, esp. ch.13; and also Waite, 99–113.

120. See Carr, 155; Waite, 184–6.

121. Without him, it has been rightly said, the reduction of politics in the Third Reich to drama and pageantry would be difficult to imagine (Fest, 74–7). It is nevertheless a gross oversimplification and distortion to reduce the Third Reich to the outcome of Hitler’s alleged mission to fulfil Wagner’s vision, as does Köhler, in Wagners Hitler.

122. Kubizek, 162, 238.

123. Kubizek, 163.

124. Kubizek, 162.

125. Kubizek, 193.

126. Kubizek, 230.

127. Hanisch, 297.

128. Hamann, 523–4.

129. Hanisch, 297–8.

130. See Hamann, 519–21.

131. Hanisch, 297.

132. Cited Waite, 51 (‘Eine Frau muß ein niedliches, molliges, Tschapperl sein: weich, süß und dumm’).

133. MK, 44 (trans., MK Watt, 39).

134. Kubizek, 231.

135. Maser, Hitler, 527–9.

136. Heiden, Der Führer, 63–4, makes this point.

137. The evidence that Hitler had only one testicle depends solely upon the Russian autopsy evidence (Lev Bezymenski, The Death of Adolf Hitler, London, 1968, 46, 49). This stands diametrically contradicted by several detailed medical examinations carried out at different times by his doctors, who were adamant that his sexual organs were quite normal. In a critical review in the Sunday Times, 29 September 1968, Hugh Trevor-Roper gave cogent reasons for scepticism about the general reliability of Bezymenski’s report. Maser, Hitler, 527–9, summarizes the medical examinations of Hitler by his own doctors and raises the possibility that the body on which the Soviet autopsy was performed may not have been that of Hitler. Waite, 150–62, accepts the dubious evidence of monorchism and builds it into an elaborate explanation of Hitler’s psychological abnormalities. Binion, in his biting review of Waite, Journal of Psychohistory, 5 (1977), 296–7, is more properly sceptical, coming down – as the weight and nature of the testimony surely demands – in favour of the several examinations of Hitler while he was alive, none of which indicated any genital abnormality.

138. Greiner, 54–67; Fest, 63, repeats the Greiner story and regards it as a plausible cause of Hitler’s antisemitism. For reasons why Greiner’s book should be totally discounted as worthwhile evidence, see Waite, 427–32.

139. See Schorske, chs.1, 5.

140. Jenks, 123–5; Jones, 72–9; Hamann, 519–22.

141. Jones, 73; Kubizek, 158–9.

142. Kubizek, 237.

143. Kubizek, 228–9.

144. Kubizek, 237.

145. Kubizek, 237.

146. Kubizek, 239. Later rumours that he had himself been infected with syphilis by a Jewish prostitute were without foundation. Medical tests in 1940 showed that Hitler had not suffered from syphilis. (See Maser, Hitler, 308, 377, 528).

147. Kubizek, 235–6.

148. MK, 63. Reliable figures on the extremely large numbers of prostitutes in Vienna at the time are unobtainable. That prostitution was run by Jews was a standard weapon of the antisemites’ armoury. As always, it was a gross distortion. But to combat such allegations, the Jewish community itself supported and publicized attempts to break the criminal trade, in which some eastern Jews were involved, in importing young Jewish girls from poverty-stricken backgrounds in eastern Europe to Vienna’s brothels. (See Hamann, 477–9, 521–2.)

149. Hitler’s juvenile entry to the adult part of the Linz waxworks (see Monologe, 190) can doubtless be attributed to normal adolescent curiosity.

150. Kubizek, 233–5, 2.37; and see Waite, 241.

151. See Kubizek, 170–71, where it was said that he was ‘almost pathologically sensitive about anything concerning the body’, and ‘disliked any physical contact with people’ (trans., Young Hitler, 116–17).

152. See the references in ch.1, n.63.

153. Much goes back to ΝA, The Hitler Source Book, the OSS wartime compilation, and the book substantially based upon it, Walter C. Langer, The Mind of Adolf Hitler, Pan Books edn, London, 1974, esp. 134, 165ff. The sensationalism of David Lewis, The Secret Life of Adolf Hitler,London, 1977, rests in good measure on the same material and adds little or nothing. Waite (237–43) infers that the perversion existed but accepts (239) that the ‘shreds of evidence’ are ‘insufficient in themselves’ to support such a conclusion. Based mainly on Langer and Waite, Jones, 91–4, 308, describes the same perversions (though they contribute nothing to his account of Hitler in the Vienna years). Hitler’s erstwhile comrade, later bitter enemy, Otto Strasser was a source of some of the stories.

154. MK, 20.

155. MK, 17 (trans., MK Watt, 17).

156. Hamann, 58, 85; Maser, Hitler, 81; Smith, 108; Jetzinger, 172, 180–83. For further attempts to estimate Hitler’s financial position at this time, see Smith, 112; Toland, 29, from NA, The Hitler Source Book, 925–6, interview with William Patrick Hitler; and Jones, 300–301 n.35. Hitler claimed in 1921 that he had had only 80 Kronen on him when he went to Vienna (Letter of 29 November 1921, in IfZ, MA-731 (= HA, Reel 1), reproduced in Joachimsthaler, 92.

157. Kubizek, 156 (trans., Young Hitler, 101).

158. Kubizek, 158.

159. Kubizek, 157, 160, 162, 170, 223, 247, 258 for descriptions of the room and surroundings.

160. Kubizek, 161.

161. Kubizek, 157, 161–2, 178, 273 (for eating and drinking habits).

162. Kubizek, 178. According to one account, he did smoke very occasionally when in the Men’s Home (Honisch testimony in HA, Reel 1,File 17 (IfZ, MA-731), printed in Joachimsthaler, 58). Hitler himself much later claimed to have smoked, when down and out in Vienna, between twenty-four and forty cigarettes a day, before realizing how foolish this was when he had no money for food. It has the ring of a moralistic homily rather than a true story. (Monologe, 317, 11–12 March 1942).

163. Kubizek, 192.

164. Kubizek, 193.

165. Smith reckoned (119) that Hitler’s monthly expenditure was in the region of 80–90 Kronen, meaning that his savings were falling by around 60 Kronen a month. The basis of his reckoning is not, however, given.

166. Monologe, 294 (22–3 February 1942).

167. Kubizek, 192–3.

168. Smith, 123.

169. Kubizek, 253–5.

170. Kubizek, 272–8.

171. Kubizek, 256–61.

172. Smith, 121. Two of his relatives told the NSDAΡ-Hauptarchiv in 1938 that they had last seen Hitler in the Waldviertel in 1907 (Binion, ‘Foam’, 523). The Kubizek postcards seem, however, to confirm that he paid a visit there in August 1908 (Kubizek, 260–61; Jetzinger, 204–6).

173. Kubizek, 261–2.

174. Jetzinger, 218; Smith, 122.

175. Heiden, 49.

176. Smith, 122. Hitler’s shame at his failure was lasting. In 1912, according to the account of an anonymous co-resident of the Men’s Home, he said that he had completed a few semesters at the Academy of Fine Arts but then had left because he had been too involved in student political organizations and because he did not have the means for further study (Anonymous, ‘My Friend Hitler’, 10 – see below, n.253, for full reference). If the account is accurate, then Hitler was already a practised liar.

177. See Smith, 8–9.

178. Kubizek, 246. See Jetzinger, 210–11 on the worker demonstration Kubizek allegedly witnessed with Hitler, and 210–14 on criticism of other parts of Kubizek’s account of Hitler’s political views at this time. The ‘pacifism’ might have been Kubizek’s garbled version of Hitler’s dislike of the Habsburg army and the annexation of Bosnia in 1908.

179. At the end of his lengthy contemptuous description in Mein Kampf (MK, 80–100), Hitler claimed (100) that he had attended the Vienna parliament for two years.

180. Kubizek, 249.

181. MK, 135 (trans., MK Watt, 113).

182. See MK, 14.

183. MK, ch.3.

184. MK, 59. In his letter to the anonymous ‘Herr Doktor’ of 29 November 1921 (IfZ, MA-731 (= HA Reel 1), repr. in Joachimsthaler, 92) Hitler wrote that he ‘became an antisemite in scarcely a year’ after arriving in Vienna. However, the letter contains numerous chronological inaccuracies. It would be unwise to accept the dating literally, as do Waite, 187 and Marlis Steinert, Hitler, Munich, 1994, 50. Smith, 148 is rightly sceptical that Hitler’s ‘conversion’ took place in 1908, during the time he was mainly with Kubizek.

185. Kubizek, 251.

186. He was resident there from 18 November 1908 to 22 August 1909 (Smith, 122–3, 126).

187. Testimony of Marie Fellinger (née Rinke), IfZ, MA-731 (= HA, Reel 1), part of the recollections of Marie Fellinger and Maria Wohlrab (née Kubata) about Hitler in Vienna, collected for the party’s archive on 11 June 1940. These relate to Hitler’s frequenting of ‘Kaffee Kubata’, owned by Frau Wohlrab between 1912 and 1919, where Marie Fellinger had been an assistant. The café was in the vicinity of Felberstraße, but Hitler had long been departed from that area when Frau Wohlrab took over its running. She claimed to recall a lady-friend of Hitler – ‘Dolferl’ as she called him – by the name of Wetti or Pepi calling in the café to tell her that he was leaving for Germany and Hitler bidding her, Frau Wohlrab, a gracious farewell, saying he did not expect to return to Austria. It seems highly unlikely that Hitler would, in 1913, have been frequenting a little café in the south of the city when he had for three years been living in Brigittenau, in the north. The whole tale sounds like a fabrication. Jones, 133, 271, 283, 344 n.92 accepts the story as valid (and turns Hitler’s supposed lady friend into a man). See Joachimsthaler, 20, 161.

188. E.g. Smith, 148; implied in Jones, 135–8, and Fest, Hitler, 59–65; this timing is central to the argument of Wilfried Daim, Der Mann, der Hitler die Ideen gab, Vienna/Cologne/Graz, 1985.

189. The magazine claimed a circulation for itself of 100,000, and was apparently well known in student circles. However, it may be doubted that the circulation was anything so wide as Lanz claimed. (See Daim, 47, 127.)

190. Daim, 48; and see Hamann, 308–19.

191. Hamann, 293–308, here 293, 299, 303–5.

192. Hamann, 300–303.

193. Hamann, 309.

194. Daim, 48–207, describes at length Lanz and his extraordinary ideas. See also Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, The Occult Roots of Nazism, Wellingborough, 1985, 90–105.

195. Daim, 25.

196. The title of Daim’s book.

197. See e.g. Fest, 59–60; Steinert, 56, 109; Hamann, 317.

198. MK, 59–60 (trans., MK Watt, 52).

199. See Daim, 190–207, for illustration of the point in the dissection of Lanz’s crackpot ideology. Issue Nr 25 of O stara (July 1908) did have a section on ‘the solution of the Jewish Question’, within an essay on ‘Aryanism and its Enemies’, but was prepared even to state (7) that ‘not all Jews are naturally hostile to aryanism’ and that, consequently, ‘not all Jews should be lumped into one pot’. Issue Nr 26, ‘Introduction to Racial Knowledge’, contains nothing specifically on the ‘Jewish Question’, and is largely devoted to evaluation of skull types, etc. I am grateful to Gerald Fleming for supplying me with these two issues of Ostara.

200. Daim, 25–6, 269–70 n.8.

201. A point made by Rudolph Binion, in the symposium following his paper, ‘Hitler’s Concept of Lebensraum’, History of Childhood Quarterly, 1 (1973), 251. The suspicion must be that the obscure occultist Lanz was keen to establish his own place in history as ‘the man who gave Hitler his ideas’. Compared with his apparently clear memory of the young Hitler, it is striking that Lanz could not remember the name of a journalist he also allegedly influenced, who was with Hitler in Landsberg after the putsch (Daim, 270 n.8). On the other hand, he claimed to have met Lenin, who had allegedly studied his ideas and approved of them (Daim, 110–11). Evidently, Lanz was keen to assert an influence for his ideas on important historical figures.

202. Daim, 36–7, 274–5 n·39·

203. Daim, 40, 275 n.42; Hamann, 318, for the absence of any provable ban on Lanz’s works during the Third Reich.

204. As pointed out by George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, London, 1966, 295.

205. Binion, ‘Hitler’s Concept of Lebensraum’, symposium, 251.

206. See Hamann, 318–19.

207. Cit. Hamann, 318.

208. Address registration: IfZ, MA-731 (HA, Reel 1); Smith, 126; Hamann, 206.

209. Smith, 127; Hamann, 206. It was three months before he resurfaced in the police records. There is no first-hand account of his activities in this period.

210. Eberhard Jäckel and Axel Kuhn (eds.), Hitler. Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen 1905–1924, Stuttgart, 1980 (= JK), 55 (letter to the Magistrat der Stadt Linz of 21 January 1914). Hitler went on to claim that he had no income whatsoever when down and out. He was, in fact, still in receipt of his orphan’s pension until 1911 (Jetzinger, 220).

211. Hitler later spoke of living on milk and dry bread in this period, and not having a warm meal ‘for months’ (Monologe, 317 (11–12 March 1942)).

212. Heiden, Der Führer, 50; Jetzinger, 219; Smith, 127.

213. Hanisch, 239.

214. Heiden, Der Führer, 50; Smith, 127 n.33; Joachimsthaler, 48–9, who also points out that Hitler by this time had no money to rent a furnished room; Hamann, 206–8, notes that the publicity given by the Nazis after the Anschluß to this one address at which Hitler was supposed to have lived in Vienna may well have been consciously intended to obscure any investigation of his time in the city.

215. Joachimsthaler, 49, 51 (Hanisch’s testimony), for Hitler’s appearance. For conditions in such hostels, and the life of down-and-outs in Vienna at that time, see Heiden, Der Führer, 60; Jenks, 31–9; Jones, 157–61; Hamann, 222–5. For Hitler, who had always been punctilious about personal hygiene and fearful of infection, the squalor must have been hard to take, and almost certainly contributed to his later cleanliness fetishism. In Mein Kampf he wrote: ‘Even today it fills me with horror when I think of those wretched caverns, the lodging houses and tenements, sordid scenes of garbage, repulsive filth, and worse’ (MK, 28 (trans., MK Watt, 26–7)).

216. See MK, 22.

217. Reinhold Hanisch, ‘Meine Begegnung mit Hitler!’, H A, Reel 3, File 64 (two-page account from 1933, reproduced in Joachimsthaler, 49–50); Reinhold Hanisch, ‘I Was Hitler’s Buddy’, 3 parts, New Republic, 5, 12, 19 April 1939, 239–42, 270–72, 297–300. The lengthier version published only in English in New Republic appeared two years after Hanisch’s death. The following passages are based on these descriptions, which, despite different length, correspond closely with each other. (See Smith, 161ff., and Hamann, 265–71, for Hanisch as a source and the context within which his accounts were written. Biographical details on Hanisch are provided by Joachimsthaler, 268 n.115. Hanisch was an important source for Heiden’s early biography. See Heiden, Der Führer, 51ff.)

218. Joachimsthaler, 268. Hitler told the police in 1910 that he had met Hanisch in the Asyl in Meidling, and that he had only ever known him as Fritz Walter (Jetzinger, 224).

219. See Smith, 129 n.39 for acceptance of Hanisch’s story of how he met Hitler, despite doubts raised by police records.

220. HA, Reel 3, File 64 (printed in Joachimsthaler, 49); Hanisch, 240; Heiden, Der Führer, 51. Hanisch found work again in domestic service on 21 December 1909 (Joachimsthaler, 268 n.115).

221. Hanisch, 240; Heiden, Der Führer, 51; and see Smith, 130–31 and n.41.

222. See Kubizek, 183–5.

223. According to Hanisch, he did contemplate digging ditches, but was dissuaded from the idea on the grounds that it was ‘difficult to climb up’ once started upon such a job (Hanisch, 240).

224. Joachimsthaler, 70.

225. MK, 40–42. In his 1921 account (IfZ, MA-731, repr. in Joachimsthaler, 92), Hitler claimed he was working as a labourer on a building site before he was eighteen years old. That was before he had even gone to live in Vienna.

226. Hanisch, 240.

227. See Hamann, 208–11. The suspicion voiced by Heiden, Der Führer, 60, that it might even have been ‘copied… with small changes’ from the autobiography of the first leader of the Nazi Party, Anton Drexler, Mein politisches Erwachen, Munich, 1919, seems baseless. None of Drexler’s text bears close comparison.

228. Smith, 131–2; Jetzinger, 223; Hamann, 227. Hanisch’s presumption (HA, 3/64; New Republic, 5 April 1939, 240) that Hitler had written to his sister and received the money from her was most probably incorrect.

229. Hanisch (HA, 3/64; New Republic, 5 April 1939, 240) stated that Hitler purchased the overcoat at Christmas 1909. In his account in the NSDAP-Hauptarchiv, he then inaccurately remarked that Hitler lived ‘from now on’ in the Men’s Home in Meldemannstraße. In the later New Republicarticle, he more correctly states that Hitler subsequently moved to Meldemannstraße (where he lived from 9 February 1910) (Hamann, 227).

230. Hanisch, 242; Heiden, Hitler, 15; Heiden, Der Führer, 61; Smith, 136.

231. Hanisch, 241. Hanisch was registered on 11 February 1910 at an address in Herzstraße in the Favoriten district. He claimed (240) that he also moved into the Men’s Home in Meldemannstraße. There is no record of him living in there at that time, though he certainly frequented it, and was indeed later resident, from November 1912 to March 1913, living under his pseudonym of Friedrich Walter (Joachimsthaler, 268 n.115; Hamann, 542).

232. Hanisch, HA, 3/64 and New Republic, 5 April 1939, 241; and Karl Honisch, ‘Wie ich im Jahre 1913 Adolf Hitler kennen lernte’, HA, Reel 1, File 17, printed, with some minor inaccuracies, in Joachimsthaler, 50–55; though this latter description relates to 1913, there is little doubt that it was the same in 1910. See also Smith, 132–3; Jenks, 26–8; Hamann, 229–34.

233. Hanisch, 272.

234. Hanisch, 241, 271–2. See Joachimsthaler, 67–9, 270 n.161; Smith, 137–8; Hamann, 499–500.

235. Hanisch, HA, 3/64, and New Republic, 5 April 1939, 240–41; Honisch, HA, 1/17; Smith, 135–6. Joachimsthaler, 58–76, deals with Hitler’s pictures, and forgeries of them, including some by Hanisch (58–61). See also Hamann, 234–7.

236. Hanisch, HA, 3/64, and New Republic, 5 April 1939, 241–2. See also Smith, 137–40.

237. Hanisch, 297. And see Smith, 139.

238. Hanisch, HA, 3/64. For Karl Hermann Wolf, see Hamann, 375–93. About this time, too, according to Hanisch’s account (also in New Republic, 5 April 1939, 242), Hitler was impressed by a silent film called The Tunnel, based on a novel by Bernhard Kellermann, in which the masses were stirred by a demagogue. Though he was said much later to have referred approvingly to the film (see Albert Speer, Spandau. The Secret Diaries, Fontana edn, London, 1977, 328), Hitler certainly did not see it during his time in Vienna. The film was only completed in 1915 (Hamann, 238, 605 n.20).

239. Hanisch, 241–2.

240. HA, 3/64; New Republic, 12 April 1939, 271; Smith, 136–7.

241. Hanisch, 241, 271–2, 297–8. See also Smith, 137, 139.

242. HA, 3/64; New Republic, 5 April 1939, 241; 19 April 1939, 298–9; Smith, 140.

243. Hanisch, 299.

244. Hanisch, 241.

245. See Joachimsthaler, 69; Smith, 138. Speculation – it can be no more – on a possible visit to the Waldviertel is made by Hamann, 245.

246. Smith, 137; this is one story that Hanisch and Greiner (39–42) have in common, and which has been taken to demonstrate that Greiner, for all his inaccuracies and fabrications, did indeed know Hitler in the Men’s Home, and was almost certainly writing without any knowledge of Hanisch’s account. (See Smith, 165–6.) Other anecdotes about Hitler in the Men’s Home where Greiner overlaps with Hanisch – the poor state of Hitler’s clothing, his support of the Schönerer movement, the disturbances caused by his verbal aggression towards Social Democracy – may also, therefore, be based on reality, unlike some of his wilder flights of fantasy. The most likely explanation is, however, that Greiner had come to know Hanisch, or at least to hear some of the stories he was putting round, in Vienna in the 1930s, and opportunistically embellished them for his own purposes.

247. Hanisch, 298–9; on Hanisch’s later forgeries of Hitler paintings, Joachimsthaler, 59–61; Smith, 140; Heiden, 61–3; Hamann, 265–71.

248. Honisch, in HA, 17/1 (printed in Joachimsthaler, 54, 58).

249. When Hanisch had asked in 1909 about his future aims, Hitler had confessed that he did not know what they were (Hanisch, 240).

250. Honisch, HA, 17/1 (Joachimsthaler, 55).

251. See Christa Schroeder, Er war mein Chef, 134.

252. HA, 17/1 (Joachimsthaler, 55, 57–8); Smith, 141–2; Br.Anon. (Hamann, 541).

253. Anonymous, ‘Muj Prítel Hitler’ (‘My Friend Hitler’), Moravsky ilustrovanyzpravodaj, 40 (1935), 10–11 (in Czech). I am grateful to Neil Bermel for providing me with a translation.

254. Hanisch, 242, 272.

255. Smith, 141.

256. Jetzinger, 230–32; Smith, 143.

257. Jetzinger, 231.

258. Jetzinger, 226–7; Smith, 143.

259. Marckhgott, 273, 275–6; Hamann, 250–51.

260. Hamann, 251.

261. Smith, 9.

262. Smith, 140–41; Honisch, HA, 17/1 (Joachimsthaler, 54–5). Hitler was disparaging about his own paintings – though proud of his architectural drawings – when speaking to his photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann, in 1944, commenting that it was ‘madness’ to pay such high prices as they were fetching. He added that he had in Vienna around 1910 never received more than about (the equivalent of) 12 Reich Marks for a picture. He had painted, he said, only to earn a bare living and so that he ‘could study’. He had not wanted to become an artist, he somewhat disingenuously claimed (omitting the fact that this had been a very real ambition in 1907–8) (Schroeder, 134).

263. Honisch, HA, 17/1 (Joachimsthaler, 54).

264. MK, 35 (trans., MK Watt, 32). And see Honisch, HA, 17/1 (Joachimsthaler, 54)·

265. Above based on Honisch’s testimony, in HA, 17/1 (Joachimsthaler, 54–7).

266. See MK, 117–21, for Hitler’s attitude towards the Churches, and recognition of Schönerer’s mistakes. For the lack of influence on Hitler of the National Socialist movement which had emerged in Bohemia in 1904, see Smith, 146–7.

267. MK, 40–42.

268. Greiner, 43–4.

269. Franz Stein, born in Vienna in 1869 in humble circumstances, was a fervent Schönerer admirer whose raucous agitation was directed at winning German-speaking workers in the industrialized region of northern Bohemia to a national, German, socialism. See Hamann, 354–75, here 367, and ch.9 for anti-Czech feeling. The growth of anti-Czech nationalist feelings among workers is dealt with by Andrew Whiteside, Austrian National Socialism before 1918, The Hague, 1962, ch.4.

270. See Heiden, Der Führer, 53.

271. MK, 30 (trans., MK Watt, 28).

272. MK, 22 (trans., MK Watt, 21).

273. MK, 40 (trans., MK Watt, 36).

274. See Kubizek, 30 (trousers under the bed to obtain correct creases); 156 (appearance when he meets Kubizek); 170 (anxious to keep clothes and underclothes spotlessly clean).

275. See Heiden, Der Führer, 60; the point is also made by Alan Bullock, Hitler. A Study in Tyranny, Harmondsworth, 1962 edn, 36.

276. MK, 22 (trans., MK Watt, 21–2).

277. MK, 24 (trans., MK Watt, 23).

278. MK, 43.

279. MK, 46 (trans., MK Watt, 41).

280. See Joachimsthaler, 45, and his comment: ‘That Hitler already put forward in Vienna his political arguments of 1920/21 is not credible.’

281. MK, 55–9 (trans., MK Watt, 48–51). In his letter to the anonymous ‘Herr Doktor’ of 29 November 1921, Hitler wrote of his ‘conversion’: ‘Coming from a family more attuned to more cosmopolitan (weltbürgerlich) views, I became an antisemite in scarcely a year through the school of hard reality’ (IfZ, MA-731 (HA, Reel 1), repr. in Joachimsthaler, 92).

282. MK, 59 (trans., MK Watt, 52).

283. MK, 60 (trans., MK Watt, 52).

284. MK, 61.

285. MK, 64 (trans., MK Watt, 56).

286. MK, 65–6. Hitler singled out the names of four Jewish leaders of the working class: Viktor Adler, Friedrich Austerlitz, Wilhelm Ellenbogen, and Anton David. The first three were frequently linked together in the attacks of Viennese antisemites; the fourth played a leading role in worker demonstrations against inflation in 1911 (Hamann, 258–9).

287. MK, 66 (trans., MK Watt, 57).

288. MK, 69.

289. Kubizek, 94.

290. Kubizek, 62 (aversion to Jewish students in the Mensa); 249–50 (Jewish journalist).

291. Kubizek, 250–51. Kubizek’s story was probably based on Hitler’s own account in Mein Kampf (59). And see Jetzinger’s criticism of Kubizek’s account (214).

292. Hamann, 83.

293. See Hamann, 82–3.

294. Hamann, 22.

295. Hamann, 28–9. Hitler (MK, 55) claimed he was not antisemitic in Linz. Stronger emphasis is placed on antisemitism in Hitler’s school in Linz, and on support in the school and town for the antisemitic programme of Schönerer, by Friedrich Heer, Der Glaube des Adolf Hitler,Munich/Eßlingen, 1968, 25, 72; Friedrich Heer, Gottes erste Liebe, Munich/Eßlingen, 1967, 355. But Bukey, 8–9, also implies that antisemitism in Linz, while widespread and pernicious, was far less significant than anti-Czech feeling.

296. Albert Speer, Erinnerungen, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin, 1969, 112; Hamann, 29–30. To Goebbels, too, Hitler spoke of Vienna as the place where he first became an antisemite (Tb Reuth, iii. 1334 (17 October 1939)).

297. See Hamann, 344–7, for Schönerer’s racial antisemitism.

298. IfZ, MA-731 (HA, Reel 1), ‘Notizen für Kartei’ of 8 December 1938, refers to Bloch receiving two cards, one a nicely painted one with New Year greeting (presumably 1908), and ‘cordial thanks’ (‘herzlichem Dank’). They were confiscated by the Gestapo in March 1938. Bloch, 69–70, refers to the cards in his own account. See also Binion, Hitler among the Germans, 19.

299. MK, 59.

300. Daim, 25–6, 270.

301. MK, 59–60.

302. Hanisch, 271.

303. Hamann, 242.

304. Hanisch, 271–2, 299. And see Hamann, 242, 246–7, 498.

305. Smith, 149.

306. Anonymous, ‘My Friend Hitler’, 11.

307. Hanisch, 272.

308. Greiner, 75–82. Greiner (79) claimed Hitler brought his antisemitism with him from Linz.

309. Binion, Hitler among the Germans, 2, 19; Binion, ‘Hitler’s Concept of Lebensraum’, 201–2.

310. See Binion, ‘Hitler’s Concept of Lebensraum’, 189; Binion, Hitler among the Germans, 2. Joachimsthaler, 44, sees no significant hatred of the Jews in Hitler before as late as June 1919.

311. See MK, 71 for the implication that his unchanging political philosophy had been formed before entry into politics at the age of thirty.

312. Jones, 129. On the menacing anti-Jewish atmosphere in Vienna, see Hamann, 472–82.

313. Pulzer, 202.

314. Jenks, 127–33.

315. Hitler later claimed to have ‘intensively studied’ Theodor Fritsch’s Handbuch der Judenfrage as a young man in Vienna (Hitler. Reden, Schriften, Anordnungen. Februar 1925, bis Januar 1933, Munich etc., 1992- (= RSA), IV/1, 133).

316. Carr, 123; Waite, 188.

317. Langer, 187. And see Carr, 121–2.

318. See Fest, Hitler, 65.

319. Hanisch, 272. Hitler referred in Mein Kampf (61) to ‘the smell of these caftan-wearers’.

320. After the war, Hitler’s sister, Paula, thought it ‘possible that the hard years during his youth in Vienna caused his anti-Jewish attitude. He was starving severely in Vienna and he believed that his failure in painting was only due to the fact that trade in works of art was in Jewish hands.’ This seems, however, merely a surmise on her part; there is no evidence that Hitler gave her such an explanation (NA, NND-881077).

321. Hanisch, 272.

322. Hanisch, 271–2.

323. Hamann, 246.

324. Smith, 149–50.

325. Honisch testimony, HA, 17/1 (Joachimsthaler, 54).

326. Anonymous, ‘My Friend Hitler’, 10.

327. Langer, 185–6, commented on the lack of explanation for Hitler’s apparent reluctance for so long to leave Vienna (despite, as we have noted, his long-standing admiration for Germany and some reported talk of wanting to go to Munich). The wait for the inheritance provides the answer.

328. Hamann, 85, 568.

329. Jetzinger, 254.

330. Joachimsthaler, 25.

331. Smith, 150–51.

332. Jetzinger, 250.

333. Joachimsthaler, 15, 257–8. He established the fact, previously unknown, that Hitler’s travelling companion was Häusler. See especially on Häusler, Hamann, 566–8.

334. MK, 137.

CHAPTER 3: ELATION AND EMBITTERMENT

1. The title of ch.4 of Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, London, 1968.

2. The thesis of Germany’s ‘special path’ (Sonderweg) to modernity found classical expression in Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871–1918, Göttingen, 1973. The clash of traditional and modern values and social structures as the framework for Hitler’s rise was advanced by Ernst Bloch, ‘Der Faschismus als Erscheinungsform der Ungleichzeitigkeit’, in Ernst Nolte (ed.), Theorien über den Faschismus, 6th edn, Königstein/Ts., 1984, 182–204.

3. The possibilities are outlined most prominently in Manfred Rauh, Die Parlamentarisierung des deutschen Reiches, Düsseldorf, 1977, esp. here 13–14, 363–5; the openness of the future development of the Kaiserreich is emphasized by Thomas Nipperdey,Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1918,vol.ii, Munich, 1992, 755–7, 890–93. The rejection of the ‘Sonderweg’ interpretation is most plainly evident in Nipperdey’s comment (891), that ‘the history of the Reich from 1871 to 1914 is a history of common European normality’.

4. The argument is most powerfully adduced by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1849–1914, Munich, 1995, esp. 460–86, 1279–95, restated briefly and pointedly in Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ‘Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, sozialer Wandel, politische Stagnation: Das Deutsche Kaiserreich am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs’, in Simone Lässig and Karl Heinrich Pohl (eds.), Sachsen im Kaiserreich, Dresden, 1997, 301–8.

5. Nipperdey’s massive two-volume study of Imperial Germany ends with the comment: ‘The basic colours of history are not black and white, their basic pattern not the contrast of a chess-board; the basic colour of history is grey, in endless variations’ (Nipperdey, ii.905).

6. This was implicit in Gerhard Ritter’s comment that it was ‘almost unbearable’ to think how ‘the will of a single madman’ had driven Germany into the Second World War (Gerhard Ritter, Das deutsche Problem. Grundfragen deutschen Staatslebens gestern und heute, Munich, 1962, 198). The use of the ‘works accident’ metaphor to describe Hitler as an unpredictable and sharp break in the continuity of German history is analysed by Jürgen Steinle, ‘Hitler als “Betriebsunfall in der Geschichte”’, Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 45 (1994), 288–302. Eberhard Jäckel reverses the usual argument in insisting that Hitler was, indeed, the equivalent of a nuclear accident in society (Jäckel, Das deutsche Jahrhundert, ch.4, 153–82, and ‘L’arrivée d’Hitler au pouvoir: un Tschernobyl de l’histoire’, in Gilbert Krebs and Gérard Schneilin, Weimar ou de la Démocratie en Allemagne, Paris, 1994, 345–58). I had used precisely the same metaphor in The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 215–16, but emphasized – a point Jäckel included in his argument – that a nuclear accident did not occur without structural systemic causes as well as human errors and miscalculations.

7. See Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right, New Haven/London, 1980, ch.10.

8. The title of George Mosse’s book, The Nationalisation of the Masses, New York, 1975.

9. Nipperdey, ii.265; see also Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1918, vol.i, Munich, 1990, 599–600 for nationalist academics.

10. Cit. Pulzer, 242.

11. See Lothar Kettenacker, ‘Der Mythos vom Reich’, in K. H. Bohrer (ed.), Mythos and Moderne, Frankfurt am Main, 1983, 261–89.

12. Mosse, Nationalisation, 62–3 and pl. 9; Nipperdey, i.739, ii·599·

13. MK, 180. For the monuments, see Nipperdey, i.738–41, ii.261.

14. Mosse, 36–7; Nipperdey, ii.599.

15. Elisabeth Fehrenbach, ‘Images of Kaiserdom: German attitudes to Kaiser Wilhelm II’, in John C.G. Röhl and Nicolaus Sombart (eds.), Kaiser Wilhelm II. New Interpretations, Cambridge, 1982, 269–85, here 276.

16. Nipperdey, ii.289; Léon Poliakov, The History of Anti-Semitism, vol.iv, Oxford, 1985, 23–4, 31, 83ff.

17. See Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair, Berkeley, 1961; George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, pts. I—11 ; and – specifically for Paul de Lagarde’s influence – Nipperdey, i.825–6.

18. Nipperdey, ii.256.

19. Pulzer, 231.

20. Pulzer, 236 (citing August Julius Langbehn).

21. See Nipperdey, ii.290.

22. Nipperdey, ii.299, 305; Mosse, Crisis, esp. 93–7, 112. Houston Stewart Chamberlain, born in England but an avid Germanophile, became a German citizen, married Richard Wagner’s daughter, and developed his racist theories within the Wagner circle at Bayreuth. He saw history as racial struggle, with the German race representing good and the Jewish race evil. He was full of praise for Hitler, who visited him shortly before his death in 1927. Theodor Fritsch was one of the most vitriolic early antisemitic writers and founder of the radical racist ‘Hammerbund’ to propagate his ideas, which linked racism to vehement opposition to urbanism and industrialization. He died, aged seventy-nine and much honoured by the Nazis, in 1933.

23. Jeremy Noakes, ‘Nazism and Eugenics: the Background to the Nazi Sterilisation Law of 14 July 1933’, in R.J. Bullen, H. Pogge von Strandmann and A.B. Polonsky (eds.), Ideas into Politics, London/Sydney, 1984, 79–80.

24. The title of the popular novel by Hans Grimm, Volk ohne Kaum, Munich, 1926.

25. On the development of the dual forms of expansionist idea, see Woodruff D. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism, New York/Oxford, 1986.

26. Nipperdey, ii.601.

27. Eley, Reshaping, 218–23. Eley (230–31) notes that the Imperial League against Social Democracy put out close on 50 million pamphlets and leaflets between 1904 and 1914 attacking the Social Democrats.

28. Nipperdey, ii.601; Roger Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German. A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886–1914, London, 1984, 191.

29. Nipperdey, ii.602–9; Chickering, esp. chs.4, 6; Eley, Reshaping, 337–43.

30. Nipperdey, ii.607–8.

31. Daniel Frymann (Heinrich Gaß), Wenn ich der Kaiser wär!, 5th edn, Leipzig, 1914, 227.

32. See Axel Schildt, ‘Radikale Antworten von rechts auf die Kulturkrise der Jahrhundertwende’, Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung, 4 (1995), 63–87.

33. See Geoff Eley, ‘The German Right, 1860–1945: How it Changed’, in his essay collection, From Unification to Nazism, London, 1986, 231–53, and his subsequent article along similar lines, ‘Conservatives and radical nationalists in Germany: the production of fascist potentials, 1912–1928’, in Martin Blinkhorn (ed.), Fascists and Conservatives. The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe, London, 1990, 50–70.

34. Wilhelm II, born in Potsdam on 27 January 1859, became German Emperor and King of Prussia in 1888. His childish immaturity, extreme restlessness, imperious and explosive temperament, unbridled arrogance, intolerance of the slightest opposition, gross exaggeration of his own abilities, and obsessive hatreds – scarcely less violent than Hitler’s – were unmistakable indicators of personality disturbances in the man who ruled Germany for thirty years. He was to die in exile at Doom in Holland on 4 June 1941. See John C.G. Röhl, ‘Kaiser Wilhelm II. Eine Charakterskizze’, in his Kaiser, Hof und Staat, Munich, 1987, 17–34; and his major study, Wilhelm II. Die Jugend des Kaisers 1859–1888, Munich, 1993, where the birth trauma and withered left arm are strongly emphasized as contributory factors to the ‘disturbed character-formation of the last German Emperor’ (38).

35. MK, 138 and (139) ‘I achieved the happiness of a truly inward contentment’ (trans., MK Watt, 116–17).

36. MK, 138.

37. MK, 135–6 (trans., MK Watt, 113).

38. MK, 179 (trans., MK Watt, 150). In the Reichshandbuch der deutschen Gesellschaft, vol.i, Berlin, n.d. (1931?), 771, Hitler’s entry – misleading both as to date and motive – stated: ‘In spring 1912 he moved to Munich in order to have a greater, more promising, field for his political activity.’ Also cited in Fest, i.91.

39. MK, 139 (trans., MK Watt, 117).

40. Cit. Max Spindler, Handbuch der bayerischen Geschichte, vol.iv, pt.2, Munich, 1975, 1195. Lovis Corinth (1858–1925), though he came from East Prussia, made his mark in Munich during the 1890s as part of a group of progressive Munich artists who formed the Münchner Sezession and was in his early period one of the leading exponents of Jugendstil. See Spindler, iv.1196. Also Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie, vol.2, Munich etc., 1995, 373. The artistic and literary scene in Munich at the turn of the century is fully described in the Introduction and ch.1 of David Clay Large, Where Ghosts Walked. Munich’s Road to the Third Reich, New York, 1997.

41. MK, 139. Hitler claimed, too, that the Bavarian dialect had affinities for him – presumably a glamorized reference to the short time as a child that he had lived in Passau in Lower Bavaria (MK, 135, 138). His memories of Passau could not have been extensive. He had left around his sixth birthday, having lived there for only just over two and a half years (Jetzinger, 58, 64, 66; Smith, 53, 55).

42. MK, 139.

43. Monologe, 201 (15–16 January 1942).

44. Heinz A. Heinz, Germany’s Hitler, London (1934), 2nd edn, 1938, 49. This account, written to portray Hitler, soon after his takeover of power, in the best possible light to an English readership, evidently draws in this passage on Mein Kampf (including giving the date of 1912 for the move to Munich). There is, however, no reason to doubt Hitler’s admiration for the splendour of Munich’s buildings.

45. Monologe, 400 (13 June 1943).

46. See, for the grandiose rebuilding plans for Munich, Hans-Peter Rasp, ‘Bauten und Bauplanung für die “Hauptstadt der Bewegung”’, in München – ‘Hauptstadt der Bewegung’, ed. Münchner Stadtmuseum, Munich, 1993, 294–309.

47. MK, 136.

48. Heinz, 56 – the glowing account, given in the 1930s, of his landlady, Frau Popp (who repeated the incorrect date of 1912, as given in Mein Kampf, for his arrival). On his police registration form in Munich, Hitler described himself as a painter (Kunstmaler)(Joachimsthaler, 17, 32).

49. JK, 54, written as ‘Architektur Maler’; Werner Maser, Hitlers Briefe und Notizen, Düsseldorf, 1988, 40; Jetzinger, 262.

50. IfZ, MA-731 (= HA, Reel 1), repr. in Joachimsthaler, 91–2.

51. Der Hitler-Prozeß 1924. Wortlaut der Hauptverhandlung vor dem Volksgericht München I, Teil 1, ed. Lothar Gruchmann and Reinhard Weber, assisted by Otto Gritschneder, Munich, 1997, 19; JK, 1062. The wording given by Joachimsthaler, 31, based uponDer Hitler-Prozeß vor dem Volksgericht in München, Munich, 1924, deviates in places from the authentic text.

52. Monologe, 115 (29 October 1941). The translation in Hitler’s Table Talk, 97–8 is incomplete and, as often, somewhat too loosely rendered.

53. Heinz, 49–50.

54. Orr, Revue, Nr 46 (1952), 3; Joachimsthaler, 16, 81; Hamann, 570–74. Häusler, unlike Hitler, returned to Vienna at the outbreak of the war (Joachimsthaler, 81). Curiously, in an application to rejoin the NSDAP in Austria on 1 May 1938, Häusler made no mention of his earlier connection with Hitler (BDC, Parteikorrespondenz, Rudolf Häusler, geb. 5 December 1893, Personal-Fragebogen, 1 May 1938).

55. Heinz, 50.

56. Joachimsthaler, 84–9.

57. Report of a discussion at the midday meal on 12 March 1944 on the Obersalzberg, HA, Reel 2, File 3, printed in Schroeder, 134 (see ch.2, n.262).

58. JK, 54; Schroeder, 134 (from HA Reel 2, File 3).

59. Heinz, 51.

60. Heinz, 50–52 (account of Frau Popp).

61. MK, 139.

62. MK, 169–70.

63. Heinz, 51. See Franz Georg Kaltwasser, ‘Hitler als Benutzer der Königlichen Hofund Staatsbibliothek in München 1913/14’, Bibliotheksforum Bayern, 27 (1999), 46–9.

64. Heiden, Der Führer, 65, remarks – though without references – on Hitler haranguing people in beerhalls, including the Schwemme of the Hofbräuhaus.

65. MK, 171 (trans., MK Watt, 142).

66. MK, 139–42.

67. Jetzinger, 254–7; Joachimsthaler, 25–6.

68. Jetzinger, 259–62.

69. Jetzinger, 262–4 (and part-reproduction between 272–3); Maser, Hitlers Briefe, 40–42; JK, 53–5. Jetzinger’s criticism (265–72) of Hitler’s letter is excessively pedantic.

70. Jetzinger, 258–65.

71. Joachimsthaler, 27–31.

72. Jetzinger, 284–92.

73. MK, 173 (trans., MK Watt, 145).

74. MK, 173–4, 1 77 (trans., MK Watt, 145–6, 148).

75. David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, vol.i, London, 1933, 52.

76. J.P. Stern, Hitler: the Führer and the People, London, 1975, 12.

77. Fritz Wiedemann, Der Mann, der Feldherr werden wollte, Velbert/Kettwig, 1964, 29.

78. Joachimsthaler, 159–60.

79. MK, 179 (trans., MK Watt, 150).

80. Monologe, 79 (13 October 1941).

81. Monologe, 46 (24–5 July 1941).

82. Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, London, 1955, 34.

83. Ernst Toller, I Was a German, London, 1934, 54.

84. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Der autoritäre Nationalstaat, Frankfurt, 1990, 407. See Richard Bessel, Germany after the First World War, Oxford, 1993, 2–4, for a balanced account of the varied mood and the differing motives for war enthusiasm.

85. Cit. Adrian Lyttelton (ed.), Italian Fascisms from Pareto to Gentile, London, 1973, 211.

86. Mommsen, Der autoritäre Nationalstaat, 407.

87. Werner Abelshauser, Anselm Faust and Dietmar Petzina (eds.), Deutsche Sozial-geschichte 1914–1945. Ein historisches Lesebuch, Munich, 1985, 215, cit. Soziale Praxis, 23 (1913–14), Sp. 1241–4.

88. One German soldier, in a letter to his father on 7 October 1915, wrote: ‘What people call “patriotism” – I haven’t got all that stuff (den Klimbin). Rather, pity, sympathy with the plight of the dear German people, the wish to understand its weaknesses and mistakes, and to help. So I don’t want to flee from my people, also not in heart and mind. No, instead to place myself in the midst of the great misery and woe, to be a proper fighter for my people’ (Philipp Witkop (ed.), Kriegsbriefe gefallener Studenten, Munich, 1928, 22).

89. MK, 177 (trans., MK Watt, 148).

90. Joachimsthaler, 101. The cited passage is not included in the English version of Hoffmann’s memoirs – Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, London, 1955 – though the picture with Hitler ringed is printed opposite 16. The picture was publicized widely on the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War (see Daily Telegraph, 3 August 1934). The picture without the famous ringing of Hitler is printed in Rudolf Herz, Hoffmann und Hitler. Fotografie als Medium des Führer-Mythos, Munich, 1994, 29. By 1943, Hoffmann enjoyed an annual income of over 3 million Marks, and his estate was worth over 6 million Marks (Herz, 37–8).

91. MK, 179.

92. Joachimsthaler, 102, 104.

93. Joachimsthaler, 108, attributes Hitler’s acceptance in the Bavarian army to ‘apparently the carelessness and lack of attention of some sergeant in the 2nd Infantry Regiment’.

94. Joachimsthaler, 103–8.

95. Joachimsthaler, 107. See Hitler’s letter to the anonymous ‘Herr Doktor’ of 29 November 1921 (IfZ, MA-731 (= HA, Reel 1), reproduced in Joachimsthaler, 93).

96. Joachimsthaler, 106–7, 109–14, 116. Hitler was assigned to the First Company of the First Battalion of the Reserve Infantry Regiment 16 (List) in the Twelfth Infantry Brigade of the Sixth Bavarian Reserve Division (comprising in all around 17,000 men). The List Regiment was drawn mainly from Upper and Lower Bavaria. Difficulties in arming and uniforming the regiment meant that it only received spiked helmets in November 1914, and the full steel helmets in 1916 shortly before the Battle of the Somme.

97. JK, 59·

98. JK, 59 (postcard to Joseph Popp en route from Ulm to Antwerp); Joachimsthaler, 117.

99. JK, 60, 68.

100. Joachimsthaler, 120–21, 124.

101. Monologe, 71 (25–6 September 1941).

102. Joachimsthaler, 159–60.

103. Wiedemann, 26.

104. Joachimsthaler, 159–60.

105. Joachimsthaler, 126–7, 135, 277 n.339; Heinz, 65.

106. MK, 181–2; see Joachimsthaler, 129.

107. Examples cited in Joachimsthaler, 125, 128, 152–3, 155–6.

108. The regimental command post at Fromelles, from where military operations were directed, was about three kilometres behind the front. The regimental staff, forming the administrative support, were based an hour’s walk away at Fournes. Hitler and the other dispatch runners worked in shifts of three days at Fromelles followed by three rest days at Fournes. (For Hitler’s time there, see Joachimsthaler, 123, 126–7, 135–40.) Hitler claimed in 1944 that he had carried around with him throughout the entire First World War the five volumes of Schopenhauer’s work (Monologe,411 (19 May 1944)). Hans Frank remembered him saying much the same thing (Frank, 46).

109. Wiedemann, 24–5.

110. Balthasar Brandmayer, Meldegänger Hitler 1914–18, 2nd edn, Munich/Kolber-moor, 1933, 51–2. Brandmayer remained one of the few people allowed to address Hitler with the familiar ‘Du’. This did not prevent him receiving a warning in 1939, passed on by the Kanzlei des Führers, to avoid meddling in Party matters and ‘sowing discontent among the people’ through his complaints about the closure of a Catholic Kindergarten in his home town of Bruckmühl in Bavaria. Two years earlier, the Munich branch of the Reichsschrifttumskammer had sought permission to drop any reference to Hitler in the title of Brandmayer’s book (BDC, Personal File of Balthasar Brandmayer, letters of Kanzlei des Führers, 18 October 1939, and Reichsschrifttumskammer München-Oberbayern, 12 November 1937).

111. JK, 68; Joachimsthaler, 130–31. The British journalist Ward Price much later recorded Hitler’s characteristic embellishment of the story, claiming that he followed an inner voice as clear as a military command, telling him to leave the trench immediately (G. Ward Price, I Know These Dictators, London, 1937, 38).

112. JK, 60.

113. JK, 68.

114. JK, 61.

115. Wiedemann, 25–6; Brandmayer, 61, 68; Joachimsthaler, 140–44, 155–6. Two of those who knew Hitler during the war – Hans Mend and Korbinian Rutz – and subsequently published less than flattering recollections of him landed after 1933 in Dachau. See Joachimsthaler, 113, 143, 152–4, 271 n.193, 284 n.430. Rutz was dismissed from his teaching post after Hitler had been consulted but had declined to intervene on behalf of his former wartime comrade, declaring him to be ‘inferior’ (minderwertig) (BDC, Personal File, Korbinian Rutz, Hans-Heinrich Lammers to the Reich Governor of Bavaria, 17 March 1934).

116. Brandmayer, 105. For the suggestion that Hitler fathered a son, Jean-Marie Loret, during his time in the army, see Werner Maser, ‘Adolf Hitler: Vater eines Sohnes’, Zeitgeschichte, 5 (1977–8), 173–202. The extreme unlikeliness of this is emphasized by Joachimsthaler, 162–4. The alleged son, Jean-Marie Loret, went on to produce (in collaboration with René Mathot) his ‘memoirs’, Ton père s’appelait Hitler, Paris, 1981. They included (107–16) his mother’s purported revelations of her relationship with Hitler and (127–49) an account of his own dealings with the German historian Werner Maser, on the trail of ‘Hitler’s son’. M. Loret had shown himself, in correspondence with Berlin museums in 1980, keen to establish the authenticity of a number of drawings which had been in his mother’s possession as works of Hitler (IfZ, ZS 3133, Jean-Marie Loret).

117. Joachimsthaler, 144–6, 167. Max Amann and Fritz Wiedemann, who later made major careers for themselves in the Third Reich, of course did better than that. Amann’s property in 1943 was worth more than 10 million Marks; though not in that league, Wiedemann was given a position as Hitler’s adjutant, a six-seater Mercedes, and ‘loans’ and other gifts worth tens of thousands of Marks during the Third Reich (Joachimsthaler, 150).

118. Brandmayer, 72, 105; Joachimsthaler, 133, 156–8.

119. See Joachimsthaler, facing 128, 129, 161.

120. Brandmayer, 52–6.

121. Brandmayer, 43–4.

122. Brandmayer, 102.

123. Monologe, 219 (22–3 January 1942).

124. Hitler told Albert Speer in autumn 1943 that he would soon have only two friends, Fräulein Braun and his dog (Speer, 315). Around that time, Goebbels remarked in his diary: ‘The Führer has his great happiness in his dog Blondi, who has become a true companion for him… It’s good that the Führer has at least one living being who is constantly around him’ (TBJG, 11.9, 477 (10 September 1943)).

125. Monologe, 219.

126. Heinrich Lugauer testimony in HA, Reel 2, Folder 47; extract printed in Joachimsthaler, 134.

127. Brandmayer, 66–8.

128. JK, 69; Maser, Hitlers Briefe, 100–101.

129. But see the comment of Ignaz Westenkirchner, one of Hitler’s comrades, in the admittedly rosy-coloured Heinz, 66: ‘For the most part he was always on about politics.’

130. MK, 182 (trans., MK Watt, 152), 192.

131. Joachimsthaler, 159. Ernst Schmidt, probably Hitler’s closest comrade, also later remarked: ‘He didn’t try to bring any political influence to bear on me at that time’ (Heinz, 98).

132. Toland, 66.

133. Brandmayer, 115. See also Westenkirchner’s recollection in the 1930s: ‘Two things seemed to get his goat – what the papers were saying at home about the war and all, and the way the government, and particularly the Kaiser, were hampered by the Marxists and the Jews’ (Heinz, 66). In a post-war interview, Westenkirchner reversed his position, denying that Hitler had spoken with any ‘spitefulness’ about the Jews (Toland, 66).

134. Brandmayer, 91–2.

135. MK, 209–12.

136. Joachimsthaler, 135.

137. MK, 209; Joachimsthaler, 164.

138. Hitler dated his wounding to 7 October (MK, 209). It seems more likely that it occurred two days earlier (see Joachimsthaler, 164–6, 286 n.487; also Brandmayer, 81, 89; Wiedemann, 28–9).

139. MK, 209–12. (Cited passages, 211, trans., MK Watt, 175); and see Joachimsthaler, 166. For the hatred of the Prussians in Bavaria, one of the foremost resentments of the civilian population, see Karl-Ludwig Ay, Die Entstehung einer Revolution. Die Volksstimmung in Bayern während des Ersten Weltkrieges, Berlin, 1968, 134–448.

140. Nipperdey, i.412; Werner Jochmann, ‘Die Ausbreitung des Antisemitismus’, in Werner Mosse (ed.), Deutsches Judentum in Krieg und Revolution 1916–1923, Tübingen, 1971, 425–7; Toland, 933; Wiedemann, 33.

141. Joachimsthaler, 174; Binion, Hitler among the Germans, 2; Toland, 66.

142. See above n. 133.

143. See Ay, 32–3 for the growth of complaints in Bavaria about the Jews as alleged shirkers. How much, even at the beginning of the war, antisemitism had been part of Munich’s popular culture is brought out by Robert Eben Sackett, ‘Images of the Jew: Popular Joketelling in Munich on the Eve of World War I’, Theory and Society, 16 (1987), 527–63, and his Popular Entertainment, Class, and Politics in Munich, 1900–1923, Cambridge, Mass., 1982. See also Large, Where Ghosts Walked, ch.I. For the spread and increasing ferocity of anti-Jewish feeling during the second half of the war, see, especially, Saul Friedländer, ‘Die politischen Veränderungen der Kriegszeit und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Judenfrage’, and Werner Jochmann, ‘Die Ausbreitung des Antisemitismus’, in Mosse, Deutsches Judentum in Krieg und Revolution, 27–65, 409–510.

144. JK, 78, 80; MK, 212.

145. Joachimsthaler, 169.

146. MK, 219–20; Joachimsthaler, 170.

147. Joachimsthaler, 170–71; Monologe, 100 (21–2 October 1941).

148. JK, 82. Joachimsthaler, 170–71, dispatches suggestions, which have found their way into the literature, that Hitler visited his relatives in Spital, or went to Dresden before going to Berlin.

149. Joachimsthaler, 172.

150. Wiedemann, 25–6. Wiedemann points out that he and Max Amann had unsuccessfully nominated Hitler on a previous occasion. Gutmann was generally unpopular with the men, and – whether simply because he was a Jew is uncertain – detested by Hitler. See Brandmayer, 55; Monologe,132 (10–11 November 1941); Toland, 932–3; Joachimsthaler, 173–4.

151. The figure fluctuated. Berlin newspapers wrote in 1933 of him capturing an officer and twenty soldiers (Daily Telegraph, 4 August 1933). The account by Westenkirchner in Heinz, 80–81, has twelve French soldiers captured by Hitler on 4 June 1918, but does not link this to the award of the Iron Cross. Toland, 69 (without source), speaks of Hitler delivering four prisoners to his commanding officer in June and being commended for it.

152. According to a letter from Eugen Tanhauser, Landrat in Schwabach, to the Nürnberger Nachrichten, of 4 August 1961, he had been told this by Gutmann himself, whom he had known for years and trusted implicitly (IfZ, ZS 1751, Eugen Tanhauser). This is cited by Joachimsthaler, 175–6, as the basis of his account, along with the post-war comments of Hitler’s comrade, Johann Raab, and the remarks from 31 July 1918 on the nomination (from HA, Reel 2, File 47) of the Deputy Commander of the Regiment, Freiherr von Godin.

153. Joachimsthaler, 176. He did not travel to Spital, where his relatives lived, as stated by Maser, Hitler, 142, and Toland, 71.

154. MK, 220; Joachimsthaler, 176–7.

155. The testimony given to the NSDAΡ-Hauptarchiv (HA, Reel 2, Folder 47) of Johann Raab and Heinrich Lugauer, who were also blinded by the gas attack, is printed in Joachimsthaler, 177–8. Hitler said in his 1921 letter (see Joachimsthaler, 93) that he was ‘at first totally blinded’; he used exactly the same words in his Munich trial in 1924 – Hitler-Prozeß, i.19. (The wording given by Joachimsthaler, 177, that he was for a time ‘almost blind’ is inaccurate.) His account in Mein Kampf suggests that he was partially blinded at first, stumbling back ‘with burning eyes’ before, a few hours later, the burning sensation had increased and ‘it had grown dark around me’ (MK, 220–21 (trans., MK Watt, 183).

156. Nipperdey, ii.861–2.

157. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf Bd.I, Eine Abrechnung, Munich, 1925, 213 (trans., MK Watt, 183). In the single-volume ‘Volksausgabe’ (People’s Edition) of Mein Kampf, the wording ‘greatest villainy of the century’ was changed to ‘revolution’ (MK, 221; Hermann Hammer, ‘Die deutschen Ausgaben von Hitlers “Mein Kampf”’, VfZ, 4 (1956), 161–78, here 173).

158. Nipperdey, ii.865–6.

159. Bessel, 46–7.

160. Bessel, 5–6, 10.

161. Toller, 100–101, and see also 95: ‘There is only one way for us. We must revolt!’

162. See Bessel, 257.

163. Bessel, 258.

164. Nipperdey, ii.855.

165. Bessel, 33.

166. Ay, 101–2.

167. Nipperdey, i.412.

168. Poliakov, iv. 148–9.

169. Nipperdey, ii.413.

170. Cit. Poliakov, iv.151.

171. Poliakov, iv.150, 152.

172. Poliakov, cit. iv.153.

173. MK, 218–19.

174. See Ay, 106–9 for the mood among Munich’s soldiers in the last two war years.

175. MK, 213–14, 217.

176. Brandmayer, 92.

177. MK, 213–14, 218–19.

178. MK, 219.

179. MK, 219–20.

180. Brandmayer, 67.

181. MK, 222.

182. MK, 222–3.

183. MK, 223–5 (trans., MK Watt, 185–7).

184. Summarized in Binion, Hitler among the Germans, 136–8.

185. J K, 1064.

186. Cit. Binion, Hitler among the Germans, 137.

187. Binion, Hitler among the Germans, esp. 3–14; Toland (following Binion), 71, 934·

188. Binion, Hitler among the Germans, 14–35.

189. Ernst Günther Schenck, Patient Hitler. Eine medizinische Biographie, Düsseldorf, 1989, 298–9, 306–7. He refers to the comment of Dr Martin Dresse in 1952, after allegedly seeing the patient’s record in Pasewalk, that Hitler was not blind, but suffered from severe ‘burning eyes’, a description which fits Hitler’s own in Mein Kampf. Schenck is strongly critical, on the basis of medical knowledge, of Binion’s interpretation, especially his views on Bloch and his treatment (Schenck, 515–33, esp. 523–9)·

190. See Albrecht Tyrell, ‘Wie er der “Führer” wurde’, in Guido Knopp (ed.), Hitler heute. Gespräche über ein deutsches Trauma, Aschaffenburg, 1979, 20–48, here 25–6.

191. See Axel Kuhn, Hitlers außenpolitisches Programm, Stuttgart, 1971, esp. ch.5.

192. MK, 225; JK, 1064; Hitler-Prozeß, i.20.

193. Ernst Deuerlein, Hitler. Eine politische Biographie, Munich, 1969, 40.

194. The rapidity and success of the demobilization programme is emphasized by Richard Bessel, ‘Unemployment and Demobilisation in Germany after the First World War’, in Richard J. Evans and Dick Geary (eds.), The German Unemployed, London/Sydney, 1987, 23–43.

195. Joachimsthaler, 187, 203.

196. Joachimsthaler, 255.

CHAPTER 4: DISCOVERING A TALENT

1. Ernst Deuerlein, ‘Hitlers Eintritt in die Politik und die Reichswehr’, VfZ, 7 (1959), 177–227, here 200.

2. There is no evidence to support this story. Ernst Schmidt’s account in Heinz, 92, simply echoes Hitler’s in MK, 226. The ‘Central Council’ did not even exist any longer by that date. It had been dissolved on 13 April; and the Communist Executive Council, which replaced it, was by the last days of April in total disarray. (See Werner Maser, Die Frühgeschichte der NSDAP. Hitlers Weg bis 1924, Frankfurt am Main/Bonn, 1965, 131–2 (cit. information provided by Ernst Niekisch); Joachimsthaler, 212.) According to Ernst Schmidt (see Maser, Frühgeschichte, 132; Maser, Hitler,159; Werner Maser, Adolf Hitler. Das Ende der Führer-Legende, Düsseldorf/Vienna, 1980, 263 n.), Hitler was briefly arrested by the ‘white’ troops of the Freikorps Epp, before being recognized and released. (See also Heinz, 95–6; Joachimsthaler, 218; and Heiden, Hitler, 54.) If the story is true, it suggests that they initially took him for a supporter of the ‘Red Army’. In Mein Kampf, Hitler converted the tale into an attempt, which he fought off, at his arrest by soldiers of the ‘Red Army’.

3. MK, 226–7 (trans., MK Watt, 188–9).

4. Eberhard Kolb, Die Weimarer Republik, 3rd edn, Munich, 1993, 4.

5. Ernst Toller, I Was a German, 133.

6. See Wolfgang J. Mommsen, ‘Die deutsche Revolution 1918–1920’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 4 (1978), 362–91. A different emphasis on the aims of the Councils is given by Reinhard Rürup, ‘Demokratische Revolution und “dritter Weg”’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 9 (1983), 278–301. Among the most important works dealing with the Councils are Eberhard Kolb, Die Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Innenpolitik 1918–1919, Düsseldorf, 1962; and Reinhard Rürup, Probleme der Revolution in Deutschland 1918/19,Wiesbaden, 1968.

7. Anthony Nicholls, ‘The Bavarian Background to National Socialism’, in Anthony Nicholls and Erich Matthias (eds.), German Democracy and the Triumph of Hitler, London, 1971, 105–6.

8. Most of the demonstrators, supporters of the Majority Social Democrats, had headed into the city centre, following a speech by their leader, Erhard Auer. The Independents, far smaller in number, had stayed behind to listen to Eisner, before heading for the barracks to win the support of the troops in the Munich garrison (Joachimsthaler, 180).

9. Abelshauser, Faust and Petzina (eds.), Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1914–1945, 247.

10. Monologe, 64 (21 September 1941).

11. Hitler himself recognized this – though it was not convenient for him to admit until a much later date that he distinguished between the Social Democrats and more radical forces during the 1918 revolution (Monologe, 248 (1 February 1942)).

12. An immediate bloody reaction to the news of Eisner’s assassination occurred when a number of left-radical workers forced their way into the Bavarian Landtag, killing two members of the parliament and severely wounding through pistol shots the Bavarian Minister of the Interior and opponent of Eisner, Erhard Auer (Wilhelm Hoegner, Die verratene Republik, Munich, 1979, 87; Spindler, i.425–6). As conditions deteriorated, the Bavarian government and Landtag fled to Bamberg, leaving Munich to the radical forces which, on 7 April, proclaimed the Räterepublik.

13. Toller, 151.

14. Spindler, i.429; Gerhard Schmolze (ed.), Revolution und Räterepublik in München 1918/19 in Augenzeugenberichten, Düsseldorf, 1969, 263–71; Allan Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria 1918–1919. The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic, Princeton, 1965, 299–311.

15. Heinrich August Winkler, Weimar 1918–1933. Die Geschichte der ersten deutschen Demokratie, Munich, 1993, 80. See also Joachimsthaler, 299 n.675; Schmolze, 298ff.; Mitchell, 317–19.

16. The above account draws on Spindler, i.430–34; Schmolze, 349–98; Mitchell, 329–31; Joachimsthaler, 219–20; Toller, 191ff.; and Ernst Deuerlein (ed.), Der Aufstieg der NSDAP in Augenzeugenberichten, Munich, 1974, 54–5. There are some discrepancies in the numbers given of those killed and injured.

17. Josef Karl (ed.), Die Schreckensherrschaft in München und Spartakus im bayrischen Oberland 19 19. Tagebuchblätter und Ereignisse aus der Zeit der ‘bayrischen Räterepublik’ und der Münchner Kommune im Frühjahr 1919, Munich, n.d. (1919?), 45–8 (entry for 19 April 1919).

18. The title of Josef Karl’s book.

19. Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 3 May 1919.

20. See Hoegner, 87.

21. See Hoegner, 109ff. for the so-called ‘Ordnungszelle Bayern’.

22. Joachimsthaler, 14, 184.

23. Joachimsthaler, 187, 189–90, where it is pointed out that the deputation to Traunstein followed a regimental order. But this does not rule out the likelihood that volunteers to serve at Traunstein were sought within the regiment.

24. Heinz, 89.

25. Cit. Joachimsthaler, 192.

26. Heinz, 90; Joachimsthaler, 193.

27. MK, 226; Joachimsthaler, 193–4.

28. See Bessel, Germany after the First World War, chs.2–7, and Bessel, ‘Unemployment and Demobilisation’.

29. Joachimsthaler, 224.

30. Joachimsthaler, 198–9.

31. Heinz, 90.

32. Joachimsthaler, 195.

33. BHStA, Abt.IV, 2.I.R., Batl. Anordnungen, Bl.1504. The meeting which Hitler attended was to discuss ‘the socialization in Bavaria and in Germany’ and ‘the existence of the councils’ (Bl.1503). Hitler’s involvement as a battalion representative was brought to light by Joachimsthaler, 200–204, 211. See 188 for the establishment of battalion representatives in December 1918. Hitler’s name appears in regimental records as ‘Hittler’, ‘Hüttler’, and ‘Hietler’, but from the ‘Gesamtregister’ of the 2nd Demobilization Company for this period it is plain that the same person is meant by the variable spellings (Joachimsthaler, 213, 217, 223, 296 n.641).

34. BHStA, Abt.IV, 2.I.R., Batl. Anordnungen, BI.1505, 1516; Joachimsthaler, 212–13, 217.

35. Cit. Joachimsthaler, 201–2, 204.

36. See Joachimsthaler, 205–6, for references to comments in the Berliner Tagblatt, 20 October 1930 and Westdeutsche Arbeiterzeitung, 12 March 1932.

37. Toller, 256. Hitler, he said, had been silent during the revolution. Toller had not heard his name at that time.

38. Heiden, Hitler, 54; Joachimsthaler, 203. According to Deuerlein, Hitler, 41, the Münchener Post later reported that Hitler had thought about entering the SPD in the winter of 1918–19, but neither reference nor any supportive evidence for the assertion is provided. Hitler’s cautious opportunism, and his reluctance in pre-war Vienna and Munich to commit himself to any political party or organization, pose grounds for scepticism about the rumours that he tried to join the Majority SPD in the revolutionary period.

39. JK, 448.

40. Joachimsthaler, 189.

41. Walter Görlitz and Herbert A. Quint, Adolf Hitler. Eine Biographie, Stuttgart, 1952, 120; Robert Wistrich, Wer war wer im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1983, 66. Esser had worked on the Allgäuer Volkswacht.

42. Albrecht Tyrell, Vom ‘Trommler’ zum ‘Führer’, Munich, 1975, 23.

43. Brandmayer, 114–15.

44. This seems the implication of Joachimsthaler, 184–5, 200–206. Elsewhere, however, Joachimsthaler advances the more probable suggestion of a release of latent feelings of hatred through the events of 1918–19. See 179–80, 200, 234, 240.

45. See Rainer Zitelmann, Hitler. Selbstverständnis eines Revolutionärs, Hamburg/Leamington Spa/New York, 1987, 22–6.

46. Heiden, Hitler, 35, repeated in Heiden, Der Führer, 75.

47. Joachimsthaler, 188, 197–8, 215; Maser, Hitler, 159; Maser, Ende der Führer-Legende, 263 n. (citing remarks made to him in the early 1950s by Otto Strasser and Hermann Esser); Eitner, 66.

48. Joachimsthaler, 189; Deuerlein, Hitler, 41 (without source).

49. Heiden, Hitler, 54.

50. Heinz, 92.

51. BHStA, Abt.IV, 2.I.R., Batl. Anordnungen, Bl.1516; Joachimsthaler, 213, 217.

52. Joachimsthaler, 201, 214, 221.

53. Maser, Hitler, 159.

54. BHStA, Abt.IV, 2.1.R., Batl. Anordnungen, BI.1535; Regt. Anordnungen, Stadtkommandatur München, ‘Auflösung der Garnison’, 7 May 1919, Zusätze des Regiments zur Stadtkommandaturverfügung, 9 May 1919; Joachimsthaler, 221, 223.

55. Joachimsthaler, 224.

56. Deuerlein, ‘Hitlers Eintritt’, 178.

57. See Oswald Spengler’s description of the city centre in Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 83.

58. Deuerlein, ‘Hitlers Eintritt’, 178; Joachimsthaler, 224–8.

59. Over 500 officers and men attended the first three courses, according to a summary report compiled on 25 July 1919 by the course leader Karl Graf von Bothmer: BHStA, Abt.IV, Bd.307. The report, though with some omissions (including the reference to the numbers involved), is printed in Joachimsthaler, 235–40.

60. Helmuth Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre und die Münchener Gesellschaft 1919–1923’, VfZ, 25 (1977), 1–45, here 18.

61. Deuerlein, ‘Hitlers Eintritt’, 179; Joachimsthaler, 228, 304 n.744; Ernst Röhm, Die Geschichte eines Hochverräters, 2nd edn, Munich, 1930, 99–101.

62. Karl Mayr (= Anon.), ‘I Was Hitler’s Boss’, Current History, Vol.1 N0.3 (Nov. 1941), 193.

63. Deuerlein,’Hitlers Eintritt’, 179–80, 182 and n.19, 191–2; Joachimsthaler, 230— 34, 242; MK, 228–9, 232–5; and see Albrecht Tyrell, ‘Gottfried Feder and the NSDAP’, in Peter Stachura (ed.), The Shaping of the Nazi State, London, 1978, 49–87, esp. 54–5.

64. Karl Alexander von Müller, Mars und Venus. Erinnerungen 1914–1919, Stuttgart, 1954, 338–9.

65. MK, 235; Joachimsthaler, 229–30, 250.

66. Deuerlein, ‘Hitlers Eintritt’, 179, 182–3, 194, 196;Joachimsthaler, 241. The instructors were provided with a mass of anti-Bolshevik pamphlets to assist them in their ‘educational’ task.

67. Deuerlein, ‘Hitlers Eintritt’, 197–200; Joachimsthaler, 247; JK, 87–8. He also lectured on capitalism.

68. MK, 235 (trans., MK Watt, 196). Hitler repeated the same stylized description of discovering that he could ‘speak’ in relation to his first notable success as a speaker for the DAP (MK, 390).

69. Deuerlein, ‘Hitlers Eintritt’, 200. The reports are contained in BHStA, Abt. IV, RW GrKdo 4, Nr 309.

70. For antisemitism in the army in early 1920, see Joachimsthaler, 248. The cited comments from reports on the popular mood are contained in BHStA, Abt.IV, RW GrKdo 4, Bd.204, ‘Judenhetze’.

71. Deuerlein, ‘Hitlers Eintritt’, 199; Joachimsthaler, 247; JK, 88.

72. Deuerlein, ‘Hitlers Eintritt’, 184–5, 2.01–2; Joachimsthaler, 243–7. Mayr addressed Hitler as ‘sehr verehrter Herr Hitler’, an unusually respectful form of address from a captain to a corporal.

73. JK, 88–90; Deuerlein, ‘Hitlers Eintritt’, 185, 202–5; Joachimsthaler, 243–9. Hitler’s letter survives in typed copy, signed by him (BHStA, Abt.IV, RW GrKdo 4, Nr 314). Whether the original was handwritten or dictated is not known. Mayr approved of Hitler’s reply, apart from some reservations about his interpretation of the ‘interest problem’.

74. Tyrell, Trommler, 25–6.

75. Deuerlein, ‘Hitlers Eintritt’, 186, 205.

76. Deuerlein, ‘Hitlers Eintritt’, 187. The V-Men wrote their reports under a code number. None from Hitler has survived, but numerous reports on early DAP meetings, including those addressed by Hitler, are in the files (BHStA, Abt.IV, RW GrKdo 4, Nr 287). Those concerning the DAP/NSDAP were printed by Deuerlein, ‘Hitlers Eintritt’, 205–27, and JK, 129–298.

77. Tyrell, Trommler, 195 n.77. On subsequent occasions, too, as Tyrell points out, he was accompanied by other military personnel and evidently did not go alone, as he implied in Mein Kampf, 236–7. The attendance list for 12 September 1919 contains thirty-nine names; Hitler gave a figure of between twenty and twenty-five as present.

78. MK, 237–8. See Tyrell, Trommler, 195 n.77, for a discussion of this first meeting on the basis of the early attendance lists. Baumann did not attend on 12 September according to those lists, though the dating was attached later and may be incorrect. The lists are part of the file on the early records of the DAP/NSDAP, 1919–1926, in the BDC, and in BAK, 26/80.

79. Cit. Georg Franz-Willing, Die Hitlerbewegung. Der Ursprung 1919–1922, Hamburg/Berlin, 1962, 66–7, reporting a comment to him by Michael Lotter, one of the original members of the DAP; see also Tyrell, Trommler, 196 n.99. Lotter’s earlier version, from 1935, which he sent to the NSDAP-Hauptarchiv, runs along similar lines, though with slightly different wording (IfZ, Fa 88/Fasz.78, ‘Vortrag des Gründungsmitglied der D.A.P. und 1. Schriftführer des politischen Arbeiterzirkels Michael Lotter am 19. Oktober 1935 vor der “Sterneckergruppe” im Leiberzimmer des “Sterneckers”’ (also HA, 3/78), Fol.6). In this account, Lotter says Drexler requested Hitler to come back ‘because we could use such people’. According to this account, Drexler went on to say: ‘Now we have an Austrian. He’s got such a gob’ (‘Jetzt haben wir einen Österreicher, der hat eine solche Goschen’) (Lotter, Fol. 6; partly reproduced in Joachimsthaler, 251–2). Drexler himself, in a letter he composed but did not send to Hitler in 1940, spoke of pressing a copy of his pamphlet Mein politisches Erwachen into Hitler’s hand, following his intervention in the discussion at the meeting ‘attended by at least 80 persons’, and urging him most strongly ‘to join our party, because we needed to make use of such people’(dringendst bat, sich doch unserer Partei anzuschließen, denn solche Leute könnten wir notwendig gebrauchen) (BHStA, Abt.V, P3071, Slg. Personen, Anton Drexler, Abschrift, Drexler to Hitler, ‘Ende Januar 1940’, 1–2). Hitler’s own version (MK, 238) says nothing about Drexler urging him to come back and join the party.

80. Lotter gives the date of Hitler’s entry to the party as 16 September 1919 (IfZ, Fa 88/Fasz.78, Lotter Vortrag, 19 October 1935, Fol. 6). Drexler claimed he asked Hitler to return in eight days, i.e. by 20 September. Hitler’s own account suggests that something like a week and a half elapsed between his initial attendance at the party meeting and going to the committee meeting, and that some further days followed thereafter before he finally made up his mind to join the party (MK, 239–44; Joachimsthaler, 251–2).

81. MK, 240. Max Amann spoke after the war in testimony to the denazification court of meeting Hitler in early 1920 and being told that Hitler was keen to establish his own party, to be called ‘The Party of Social Revolutionaries’ to win over the workers from Bolshevism (Joachimsthaler, 230–31, 252–3). That this was the case in spring 1920, after Hitler had launched the party programme of the DAP (now renamed NSDAP), can be dismissed. Probably Amann, speaking so many years later, was postdating Hitler’s remarks (which he may well have taken from Mein Kampf).Hitler himself wrote of having such ideas in summer 1919, following the Munich course, which makes better chronological sense (MK, 227).

82. MK, 241 (trans., MK Watt, 201).

83. MK, 243 (trans., MK Watt, 202–3).

84. MK, 244. See Maser, Hitler, 173, 553 n.225. The precise date on which Hitler joined the party’s steering committee cannot be determined (Tyrell, Trommler, 198 n.118).

85. BHStA, Abt.V, P3071, Slg. Personen, Anton Drexler, Abschrift, Drexler to Hitler, ‘Ende Januar 1940’, 2, partly printed in Deuerlein (ed.), Aufstieg, 97–8. And see the letter to the NSDAP HauPtarchiv of Michael Lotter, first secretary of the DAP, dated 17 October 1941, pointing out that-for ‘image’ reasons-the membership numbers began at number 501 and were then alphabetically assigned. Lotter confirmed that a membership card number 7 did not exist. He took it that the number 7 referred to Hitler’s membership of the ‘Politischer Arbeiterzirkel’ (to which he himself belonged), but did not know who had given him the number 7 membership certificate (Mitgliedschein) (IfZ, Fa 88/Fasz.78, F0l.11–12 (and HA 3/78); Joachimsthaler, 252). Rudolf Schüssler recalled, so he wrote in 1941, Hitler receiving a small card in September 1919 registering him as the seventh member of the committee (Arbeitsausschuß), but distinguished this from his membership card no. 555 of the DAP (IfZ, MA-747, letter to NSDAP-Hauptarchiv, 20 November 1941). Schüssler had been in the same regiment as Hitler in the first half of 1919, and became the first ‘business manager’ (Geschäftsführer) of the infant DAP (Tyrell, Trommler, 28, 33; Joachimsthaler, 301 n.705).

86. Mayr, 195. Documents 62 and 64 in JK, 90–91, purporting to relate to Hitler’s request of 19 October 1919 to join the DAP, after reporting on a meeting of the party on 3 October, are, according to information kindly provided by Prof. Eberhard Jäckel, to be regarded as forgeries.

87. Joachimsthaler, 255.

88. Joachimsthaler, 14.

CHAPTER 5: THE BEERHALL AGITATOR

1. MK, 388.

2. Tyrell, Trommler, 274 n. 151.

3. Hoffmann, 46.

4. This strategic framework is broadly encapsulated in MK, 364–88; see also Tyrell, Trommler, 171; and Tyrell, ‘Wie er der “Führer” wurde’, 27–30.

5. Text of the letter in JK, 88–90.

6. For sharply differing views on this point, see the contributions by Klaus Hildebrand and Hans Mommsen on ‘Nationalsozialismus oder Hitlerismus?’, to Bosch (ed.), Persönlichkeit und Struktur in der Geschichte, 55–71.

7. Stern, Hitler, 12.

8. Tyrell, Trommler, 19–20.

9. Whiteside, esp. ch.5; and see Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship, Harmondsworth, 1973, 74–80.

10. Hitler-Prozeß, 19; JK, 1062; and see Tyrell, Trommler, 187–8 n.29.

11. RSA, II, 49, Dok.24 and n.2; Bracher, 80; the background is outlined in Bruce F. Pauley, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis. A History of Austrian National Socialism, London/Basingstoke, 1981, ch.3.

12. See esp. Mosse, Crisis of German Ideology, pt.I; and George L. Mosse, Germans and Jews, London, 1971, Introduction.

13. See Kurt Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik, 3rd edn, Munich, 1992, esp. ch.II and Mosse, Crisis of German Ideology, ch.16.

14. See Sontheimer, 271–2.

15. Weimar coalition parties won only 44.6 per cent (205 seats out of 459) of the vote compared with over 78 per cent (331 seats out of 423) in the National Assembly elections of 1919 (Kolb, Die Weimarer Republik, 41).

16. MK, esp. 415–24; and see Martin Broszat, Der Nationalsozialismus. Weltanschauung, Programm und Wirklichkeit, Stuttgart, 1960, 29.

17. Broszat, Nationalsozialismus, 23.

18. Tyrell, Trommler, 191 n.53. A good description of the atmosphere in Munich at the time Hitler was stepping on to the political stage is provided by Large, Where Ghosts Walked, ch.4.

19. Helmuth Auerbach, ‘Nationalsozialismus vor Hitler’, in Wolfgang Benz, Hans Buchheim and Hans Mommsen (eds.), Der Nationalsozialismus. Studien zur Ideologie und Herrschaft, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, 13–28, here 26; Jeremy Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, 1921–1933,Oxford, 1971, 9. A comprehensive exploration of the organization is provided by Uwe Lohalm, Völkischer Radikalismus. Die Geschichte des Deutschvölkischen Schutz-und Trutz-Bundes, 1919–1923, Hamburg, 1970.

20. Noakes, Nazi Party, 9–10.

21. Lohalm, 89–90; Noakes, Nazi Party, 11.

22. Tyrell, Trommler, 20, 186 n.21; Lohalm, 283–302.

23. For the following see Tyrell, Trommler, 72–89; and Noakes, Nazi Party, 12–13.

24. Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 6–8. Lehmann is one of the central subjects of the study of Gary D. Stark, Entrepreneurs of Ideology. Neoconservative Publishers in Germany, 1890–1933, Chapel Hill, 1981.

25. See Rudolf von Sebottendorff, Bevor Hitler kam, 2nd edn, Munich, 1934 (the account by the Society’s leading figure); the scholarly analysis by Reginald H. Phelps, ‘“Before Hitler Came”: Thule Society and Germanen Orden’, Journal of Modern History, 35 (1963), 245–61; Goodrick-Clarke, 135–52; also Tyrell, Trommler, 22 and 188–9 n.38; Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 8–9; and Noakes, Nazi Party, 13. The Thule Society took its name from that given by the ancient Greeks to the northernmost land they knew. The name had mystical significance for Nordic cultists.

26. A clear distinction between the Arbeiterzirkel (which Hitler attended for the first time on 16 November 1919) and the Arbeitsausschuß, the committee of the DAP, is difficult to draw. The former, controlled by Harrer and clearly bearing his imprint, remained reminiscent of the inner core of a secret society and seems to have been essentially a small debating club (Reginald H. Phelps, ‘Hitler and the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei’, in Henry A. Turner (ed.), Nazism and the Third Reich, New York, 1972, 5–19, here 11). The committee was officially responsible for party business matters, but in practice there was overlap in both personnel and matters under consideration (Tyrell, Trommler, 24–5, 190 n.48).

27. BHStA, Abt.V, Slg. Personen, Anton Drexler, ‘Lebenslauf von Anton Drexler, 12.3.1935’, 3 (partly printed in Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 59); Drexler’s initial suggestion was ‘Deutsche Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei’, but Harrer objected to ‘sozialistische’ and it was dropped (IfZ, Fa 88/Fasz.78, Fol.4 (Lotter Vortrag, 19 October 1935)). Harrer was not present at the foundation meeting of the DAP, and was possibly not enamoured by the creation of a ‘party’. According to Sebottendorff, on 18 January 1919 he was named 1st Chairman and Drexler 2nd Chairman of the Deutscher Arbeiterverein, which was founded in the rooms of the Thule Society (Sebottendorff, 81; see also Tyrell, Trommler, 189 n.42).

28. BHStA, Abt.V, Slg. Personen, Anton Drexler, ‘Lebenslauf von Anton Drexler, 12.3.1935’, 3; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 56–9; IfZ, Fa 88/Fasz. 78, Fol.4 (Lotter Vortrag, 19 October 1935); Phelps, ‘Hitler’, 8–9; Tyrell, Trommler, 22; Drexler states that there were around thirty present (not fifty, as given in Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 59). In his 1935 lecture, Lotter (Fol.4), probably from notes he made at the time, is more precise: ‘There were 24 present, mainly railway workers’ (‘Anwesend waren 24, überwiegend Eisenbahner’). In his letter to the NSDAP Hauptarchiv six years later, on 17 October 1941 (Fol. 10), Lotter refers to between twenty and thirty being present.

29. Phelps, ‘Hitler’, 10, where he gives the number of forty-two as attendance at the meeting on 12 September. Tyrell, Trommler, 195 n.77, refers to thirty-nine

30. signatures with four names of committee members added at the end. The manuscript of the attendance list (BDC, DAP/NSDAP File) actually contains thirty-eight signatures – one of those attending had taken up two spaces for his name and address – followed by three added names (including Harrer’s) written in the same hand, presumably of well-known members attending but not signing themselves in.

31. MK, 388–9, 659–64, 669.

32. MK, 390–93; JK, 91. Hitler still spoke at this time in uniform. Part of his initial impact was unquestionably owing to the way he could portray himself as the spokesman for the ordinary soldier back from the war who could express, in their own earthy language, the sense of betrayal among his former comrades. One who heard him for the first time in the ‘Deutsches Reich’, Ulrich Graf, later became his chief bodyguard and leader of the Saalschutz, the protection squad which in 1921 turned into the SA. Graf was still bitterly angry at the events of the previous year – defeat, revolution, and especially the Soviet ‘Councils Republic’ in Munich. He was drawn to Hitler, according to his later (admittedly glorified) account, because he saw in him from the way he spoke and acted ‘a soldier and comrade to be trusted’ (IfZ, ΖS F14, Ulrich Graf, ‘Wie ich den Führer kennen lernte’, 2).

33. MK, 400–406.

34. MK, 406 (trans., MK Watt, 336).

35. Phelps, ‘Hitler’, 7–8.

36. MK, 658–61.

37. As pointed out by Tyrell, Trommler, 10–11.

38. Tyrell, Trommler, 29–30, criticizing Franz-Willing, Hitlerbewegung, 68, 73, together with Maser, Frühgeschichte, 170; and Fest, Hitler, 175.

39. BHStA, Abt. V, Slg. Personen, Anton Drexler, typescript copy of Drexler’s letter to Hitler (not sent), ‘Ende Januar 1940’, 7 (printed in Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 105).

40. Tyrell, Trommler, 30–31; Phelps, ‘Hitler’, 12; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 169.

41. MK, 390–91.

42. Reginald H. Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner im Jahre 1920’, VfZ, 11 (1963), 274–330, here 276.

43. Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 10; see also Phelps, ‘Hitler’, 13.

44. JK, 101.

45. MK, 405; BHStA, Abt. V, Slg. Personen, Anton Drexler, typescript copy of Drexler’s letter to Hitler (not sent), ‘Ende Januar 1940’, 7 (printed in Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 105); Phelps,’Hitler’, 13 (where reference is made to the fact that Dingfelder had given the speech five times before for the Heimatdienst).

46. Phelps, ‘Hitler’, 12–13.

47. Tyrell, Trommler, 76–83. There were also overlaps with the twelve-point völkisch programme that had been published in the Münchener Beobachter on 31 May 1919, which itself had possibly been intended as an initial statement of the DSP’s aims (Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 9–10 and n.34).

48. Printed in Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 108–12.

49. See Tyrell, Trommler, 84–5.

50. See Phelps, ‘Hitler’, 13.

51. JK, 447, 29 July 1921.

52. BHStA, Abt. V, Slg. Personen, Anton Drexler, typescript copy of Drexler’s letter to Hitler (not sent), ‘Ende Januar 1940’, 1, 7 (trans., Phelps, ‘Hitler’, 13).

53. The police report, printed in Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner’, 292–6, speaks of over 2,000 persons present. Dingfelder later told the NSD AΡ-Hauptarchiv that 400 of them were ‘Reds’ (Phelps, ‘Hitler’, 14).

54. Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner’, 293–4.

55. Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner’, 294–6.

56. MK, 405 (trans., MK Watt, 336).

57. Phelps, ‘Hitler’, 15.

58. VB, Nr 17, 28 February 1920, 3, ‘Aus der Bewegung’ (trans., Phelps, ‘Hitler’, 14).

59. The new name appears to have come into use at the beginning of March, though, remarkably, there was no account of the change of name in the party’s own archive. It may have been in the hope of forging closer links with the national socialist parties in Austria and Czechoslovakia (Phelps, ‘Hitler’, 13 and n.37). Police reports first added ‘national socialist’ to the party’s name following a meeting (not addressed by Hitler) on 6 April 1920 (Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner’, 277).

60. MK, 544 (trans., MK Watt, 442).

61. MK, 538–51.

62. MK, 551–7. Hitler also designed the party insignia and, two years later, the SA standards. His banner design was based on that submitted by Friedrich Krohn, a Starnberg dentist and wealthy early supporter who left the party in 1921. Hitler gave Krohn only indirect credit, and not by name, in his account in Mein Kampf (556).

63. MK, 543.

64. MK, 549–51; and see Heinrich Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, Munich, 1962, 26–7. The name ‘Gymnastics Section’ (Turnabteilung) was used for the last time on 5 October 1921, and was thereafter replaced by ‘Storm Section’ (Sturmabteilung) (Tyrell,Trommler, 137, 266 n.25).

65. Though the meeting was no different in style to previous DAP meetings, announcing it for the first time in a newspaper alongside the usual invitations brought an attendance of over 100 persons. In MK, 390, Hitler gives the attendance as in; the attendance list contains 131 names (Tyrell,Trommler, 27–8, 196–7, nn.100–101).

66. MK, 390 (trans., MK Watt, 323).

67. Oskar Maria Graf, Gelächter von außen. Aus meinem Leben 1918–1933, Munich, 1966, 114–15.

68. Frank, 38–42.

69. Tyrell, Trommler, 33; Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner’, 284, has slightly different figures.

70. MK, 561.

71. Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner’, 279–80; Tyrell, Trommler, 33.

72. Examples are given in JK, 126, 205–13, 271–6. Ulrich Graf, Hitler’s bodyguard, was entrusted with the task of ensuring that the notes were correctly placed before the beginning of a speech. He confirmed that Hitler mainly improvised from them, claiming that he often scarcely glanced at them (IfZ, ΖS F14, 4). Graf’s account, written in August 1934, was, of course, attempting to highlight the extraordinary talent of the Führer at every opportunity. Comparison of the notes and the reports on the content of his speeches suggests that Hitler used his jottings more than Graf implies. Later, as Reich Chancellor, with the world’s diplomats and press interpreting every word of what he said, the speeches had to be fully written out and carefully edited.

73. Meetings lasted generally between two and a half and three and three-quarter hours (Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner’, 275). Hitler mentioned in Mein Kampf that his first speech in the Circus Krone, on 3 February 1921, lasted about two and a half hours (MK, 561).

74. MK, 565.

75. The term ‘November criminals’ was, in fact, used by Hitler for the first time – to storms of applause that lasted for minutes – as late as September 1922 (JK, 692), and regularly (and unceasingly) only from December that year.

76. Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner’, 283–4.

77. JK, 126–7.

78. Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner’, 286.

79. E.g., JK, 179, 204, 281–2, 302, 312.

80. Carr, Hitler, 5.

81. In the JK collection of Hitler’s speeches before the Putsch the word ‘Lebensraum’ does not appear once. See also Karl Lange, ‘Der Terminus ‘Lebensraum’ in Hitlers Mein Kampf, VfΖ, 13 (1965), 4263–37, for further insight into the development of the word ‘Lebensraum’.

82. JK, 213.

83. Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner’, 278, 288; JK, 126–7.

84. On other occasions he spoke more generally about ‘nationally minded leadership personalities’ or a ‘government of power and authority’, seeming to imply a collective rather than individual leadership. See Tyrell, Trommler, 60; Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner’, 299, 319, 321.

85. JK, 126–7(27 April 1920), 140 (beginning of June 1920), 163 (21 July 1920).

86. Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner’, 288. For Hitler’s sources, see Reginald H. Phelps, ‘Hitlers “grundlegende” Rede über den Antisemitismus’, VfZ, 16 (1968), 390–420, here 395–9.

87. See Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner’, 284.

88. JK, 200.

89. JK, 119–20.

90. JK, 119, 128, 184.

91. JK, 348.

92. JK, 115, 148, 215, 296.

93. JK, 201.

94. JK, 119.

95. One hostile commentator on a Hitler speech in late June 1920 even reported that he made ‘demand upon demand for the murder of the Jews’ (‘Aufforderung um Aufforderung zur Ermordung der Juden’), Der Kampf, 28 June 1920 (JK, 152). An explicit call to murder can be found, however, in no other speech. It is fair to presume that it reflects the interpretation of the reporter rather than the precise word used by Hitler.

96. Cited in Alexander Bein, ‘Der moderne Antisemitismus and seine Bedeutung für die Judenfrage’, VfZ, 6 (1958), 340–60, here 359. See also Alexander Bein, ‘“Der jüdische Parasit”. Bemerkungen zur Semantik der Judenfrage’, VfZ, 13 (1965), 121–49.

97. JK, 176–7.

98. Phelps, ‘Hitler als Parteiredner’, 286; and see, e.g., JK, 201.

99. See Phelps, ‘Hitlers “grundlegende” Rede’, 393–5, for the structure of his speech on ntisemitism on 13 August 1920, and for audience reactions.

100. Phelps, ‘Hitlers “grundlegende” Rede’, 395. As Phelps notes (391), the full text (400–420; JΚ, 184–204) – unusually among early Hitler speeches – survives perhaps precisely because of its significance as a programmatic statement.

101. Deuerlein, ‘Hitlers Eintritt’, 215; JK, 231 n.7. Hitler recognized, in a letter of 3 July 1920, the difficulty of winning support from the industrial working class (JK, 155–6).

102. MK, 722 (trans., ΜK Watt, 620).

103. JK, 337 (speech of 6 March 1921); Phelps, ‘Hitlers “grundlegende” Rede’, 394, 398.

104. The view that Hitler’s genocidal hatred of the Jews derived from his fear of Bolshevik terror, shored up by horror stories of barbarity during and after the Russian civil war, was famously advanced by Ernst Nolte in interpretations.which were one of the triggers to the ‘Historikerstreit’ (‘Historians’ Dispute’) of the late 1980s. See Ernst Nolte, ‘Zwischen Geschichtslegende und Revisionismus’, and ‘Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will’, in ‘Historikerstreit’. Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung, 13–47, together with Nolte’s book Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917–1945.

105. JK, 88–90.

106. JK, 126–7 (27 April 1920), 140 (beginning of June 1920), 163 (21 July 1920).

107. JK, 231.

108. Phelps, ‘Hitlers “grundlegende” Rede’, 398.

109. Nolte, Bürgerkrieg, 115, 564 n.24, pointed, for instance, to the publication in the VB of stories that during the Russian civil war the Cheka forced confessions out of prisoners by exposing their faces to hunger-crazed rats.

110. The swelling of KPD membership in Germany in autumn 1920 through the influx of former adherents of the USPD’s radical wing provided a further spur (Tyrell, Trommler, 49–50), but the focus on ‘Jewish Bolshevism’ was by then already well established. The onslaught on Jewish finance capital did not thereby abate. It became incorporated somewhat uneasily in the notion of international finance capital and the international element in Soviet Russia working together against Germany’s national interests. (See JK,337.)

111. Phelps, ‘Hitlers “grundlegende” Rede’, 398 and n.33. See MK, 337, for Hitler’s acceptance of their authenticity, 111. Mayr, 195–6.

112. Phelps, ‘Hitler’, 11; JK, 106–11.

113. Dirk Stegmann, ‘Zwischen Repression und Manipulation: Konservative Machteliten und Arbeiter- und Angestelltenbewegung 1910–1918. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte der DAP/NSDAP’, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 12 (1972), 351–432, here 413. Mayr had already met Kapp personally on two occasions, once with Eckart and once alone, as the contact man of Generals Lüttwitz and von Oldershausen. Mayr was, according to Ernst Röhm, ‘the most decisive promoter of the Kapp enterprise in Bavaria’ (Röhm, Die Geschichte eines Hochverräters, 100–101).

114. Stegmann, 413–14. As Tyrell correctly remarked (Trommler, 296), this proves efforts to manipulate Hitler, not that Hitler was the tool of such external forces.

115. Röhm, 100–101, 107.

116. Tyrell, Trommler, 27–8, 61, 197 n.104; Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 16, 18.

117. On Eckart, see Margarete Plewnia, Auf dem Weg zu Hitler. Der völkische Publizist Dietrich Eckart, Bremen, 1970; and Tyrell, Trommler, 190–91 n.49, 194 n.70. Tyrell is persuasive in his refutation of the view that Eckart’s posthumous (1924) publication,Der Bolschewismus von Moses bis Lenin. Zwiegespräch zwischen Adolf Hitler und mir, Munich, 1924, was based on discussion with Hitler, as first claimed by Ernst Nolte, ‘Eine frühe Quelle zu Hitlers Antisemitismus’, Historische Zeitschrift, 192 (1961), 584–606, and Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, Mentor edn, New York, 1969, 417–21. Eckart’s financial support for Hitler is dealt with by Franz-Willing, Hitlerbewegung, 1 80ff. and Plewnia, 66–71.

118. Tyrell, Trommler, 23.

119. By 1923 Eckart was no longer in favour and in March was left greatly embittered by his dismissal as editor of the Völkischer Beobachter. He rarely saw Hitler thereafter, and took no part in the putsch. He became increasingly ill, and died towards the end of the year. The dedication ofMein Kampf to Eckart was pro forma – directed at the many who knew full well Hitler’s early indebtedness to Eckart (Tyrell, Trommler, 194 n.70).

120. Franz-Willing, Hitlerbewegung, 179–80, 190.

121. Tyrell, Trommler, 110, 177. As Tyrell (Trommler, 110) points out, Grandel also brought the supporters from the Schutz- und Trutzbund that he had built up in Augsburg into the NSDAP after he himself had joined the party in August 1920.

122. BHStA, Abt.V, Slg. Personen, Anton Drexler, copy of Drexler’s draft letter to Hitler, end of January 1940, 3 (partly printed in Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 128–9). (See also Tyrell, Trommler, 175–7.)

123. JK, 277–8.

124. Tyrell, Trommler, 38, 42, 206 n.189.

125. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 136.

126. Gustave Le Bon’s study, published in France in 1895 and in English translation as The Crowd a year later, had appeared in a German edition, Psychologie der Massen, in 1908. A few days before Hitler joined the DAP, in September 1919, a lengthy article in the VB had drawn attention to a published lecture by a Dr J.R. Roßbach, a Munich nerve specialist, on ‘The Soul of the Masses. Psychological Reflections on the Emergence of Popular Mass Movements’ (Die Massenseele. Psychologische Betrachtungen über die Entstehung von Volks-(Massen)-Bewegungen (Revolutionen)).Roßbach made frequent use of quotations from Le Bon, and summarized his findings in pithy language. There are striking similarities between Roßbach’s phraseology and that of Hitler in his comments on the psychology of the masses. Perhaps Hitler was drawn from Roßbach to read Le Bon’s own work. But what does seem likely is that he read Roßbach and was influenced by him. (See Tyrell, Trommler, 54–6.)

127. Tyrell, Trommler, 42–64, for the above.

128. In April, the Reparations Commission reassessed the payments at 132,000 million Gold Marks (Kolb, Weimarer Republik, 44), which Hitler must have had in mind when he spoke in Mein Kampf of ‘the insane sum of a hundred milliard [thousand million] gold marks’ (MK, 558).

129. The Circus Krone’s manager was said to have been a party member who charged a much reduced rent for the hire of the hall (Toland, 109, but without any supportive evidence).

130. MK, 558–62; JK, 311–12. In his own account, Hitler states that, following the Circus Krone triumph, he booked the hall for two more successful meetings in the coming two weeks. While the NSDAP did go on to use the hall increasingly for major rallies, the next meeting there did not take place until 6 March 1921, the one thereafter on 15 March. These were, however, the next two meetings after the one described by Hitler (JK, 335ff, 353ff.). The early meetings in the Circus Krone, and how nervous Hitler had felt about them, figured in his frequent reminiscences during the Second World War about the ‘good old days’ of the party’s history. See, for example, his comments to Goebbels on the occasion of Heydrich’s state funeral (TBJG, 11, 4, 492 (10 June 1942)).

131. JK, 312; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 129–30.

132. MK, 562.

133. Based on JK, 279–538.

134. Ernst Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre mit Hitler. Zwischen Weißem und Braunem Haus, 2nd edn, Munich/Zurich, 1980, 52–3.

135. Tyrell, Trommler, 40–41.

136. Hoffmann, 50.

137. Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 20–21.

138. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 49.

139. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 49–52.

140. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 52.

141. Deuerlein, Hitler, 53.

142. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 132–4.

143. Tyrell, Trommler, 208 n.215, cit. VB, 9 September 1920.

144. Tyrell, Trommler, 40 (reports of two visitors to Munich from the Deutschsozialistische Partei in February 1921); Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 139 (an extract from the anonymous pamphlet circulated by Hitler’s enemies in the party in July 1921, entitled ‘Adolf Hitler – Verräter’).

145. JK, 529–30. He said nothing about fees received from the articles he wrote in 1921 in the VB, though he claimed in July 1921 that he lived from his earnings as a ‘writer’ (Schriftsteller) (JK, 448).

146. Tyrell, Trommler, 216 n.209, citing Münchener Post, 5 December 1921; Heiden, Hitler, 97.

147. Heiden, Hitler, 100 where she is mistakenly named ‘Carola’. I am grateful to Martha Schad and Anton Joachimsthaler for informing me of the correct name.

148. Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 22; Tyrell, Trommler, 267 n.54.

149. According to Heiden, Hitler, 116, though without supporting evidence, Hitler’s lengthy absence in Berlin was spent at the Bechsteins while he was taking elocution lessons. Whether or not he was brushing up his diction at the same time, the real purpose of his visit was more important than elocution: trying – if without great success – to rustle up funds for the party newspaper, probably through contacts opened up to him by Max Maurenbrecher, the editor of the Pan-German newspaper Deutsche Zeitung, with a number of individuals connected with the Pan-Germans (Tyrell,Trommler, 117–18).

150. Tyrell, Trommler, 96.

151. Tyrell, Trommler, 103–4.

152. JK, 436 (Hitler’s resignation letter of 14 July 1921).

153. Tyrell, Trommler, 99–100, 105.

154. Tyrell, Trommler, 101–3.

155. The above based on the findings of Tyrell, Trommler, 106–9, 122·

156. JK, 437; Tyrell, Trommler, 118–19.

157. Tyrell, Trommler, 110– 16, 119–20.

158. JK, 437–8; Franz-Willing, Hitlerbewegung, 110.

159. Based on Tyrell, Trommler, 120–22.

160. JK, 438.

161. JK, 277. Dok. 198 (JK, 320), recording Hitler’s resignation on 16 February 1921, must be regarded as a forgery.

162. Tyrell, Trommler, 123.

163. JK, 438.

164. Tyrell, Trommler, 126–8, 130. Hitler’s ultimatum to the party committee of 26 July 1921, printed in JK, 445 (Dok.266), is a forgery.

165. JK, 446.

166. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 138–41; JK, 446–7; Tyrell, Trommler, 128–30.

167. JK, 439–44; Tyrell, Trommler, 129 and 264 n.506.

168. See Tyrell, 130–50, for an examination of the new statutes.

169. VB, 4 August 1921, 3.

170. VB, 4 August 1921, 3.

CHAPTER 6: THE ‘DRUMMER’

1. Rudolf Pechel, Deutscher Widerstand, Erlenbach/Zurich, 1947, 280.

2. Cit. Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 29; Tyrell, Trommler, 117.

3. Bernd Weisbrod, ‘Gewalt in der Politik. Zur politischen Kultur in Deutschland zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen’, Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 43 (1992), 392–404, here esp. 392–5. See also George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, New York/Oxford, 1990, ch.8; and Robert G.L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism. The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany 1918–1923, Cambridge, Mass., 1952.

4. Weisbrod, 393; Peter Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone. Geschichte der SA, Munich, 1989, 12. Detailed accounts of the Einwohnerwehr are presented by Hans Fenske, Konservativismus und Rechtsradikalismus in Bayern nach 1918, Bad Homburg/Berlin/Zurich, 1969, ch.5, 76–112; Karl Schwend, Bayern zwischen Monarchie und Diktatur, Munich, 1954, 159–70; and, especially, David Clay Large, The Politics of Law and Order: A History of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, 1918–1921, Philadelphia, 1980.

5. See Fenske, 148–59; Hoegner, Die verratene Republik, 131; and Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 14, for ‘Consul’. The figures for the numbers of political murders are taken from Ralf Dreier and Wolfgang Sellert (eds.), Recht und Justiz im ‘Dritten Reich’,Frankfurt am Main, 1989, 328; most of the murders were leniently dealt with by the courts compared with the far fewer (twenty-two in all) committed by members of left-wing parties.

6. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 143–4.

7. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 142; Fenske, 89–108.

8. Georg Franz-Willing, Ursprung der Hitlerbewegung, 1919–1912, 2nd edn, Preußisch Oldendorf, 1974, 62–3 and n.15a.

9. Based on: Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 12–14, 23–4; Hoegner, 129–33; Harold J. Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, Princeton, 1972, 88–92; Spindler, i.462–4; Fenske, 143–72; Large, Where Ghosts Walked, 142–6.

10. See Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 35.

11. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 22; Bennecke, 26, implies that the ‘hall protection’ began with the Hofbräuhaus meeting on 24 February 1920; Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 206, suggests that it went back even earlier, to the Eberlbräu meeting in October 1919. It is too early at these dates, however, to speak of anything more than the taking of obvious precautions at big meetings to have strong-arm supporters at the ready to combat the expected violent disturbances from political opponents.

12. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 23; Tyrell, Trommler, 137.

13. Tyrell, Trommler, 266 n.25; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 15–6.

14. Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 205; see Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 35 n.158; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 23, 25.

15. See, esp., Klaus Theweleit, Männerphantasien, Rowohlt edn, 2 vols., Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1980.

16. Tyrell, Trommler, 28, 197 n.104.

17. Based on Röhm, Die Geschichte eines Hochverräters, esp. pt.II, chs.13–20, 75–145; and Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 15–22. See also the biographical sketch by Conan Fischer, ‘Ernst Julius Röhm – Stabschef der SA und Außenseiter’, in Ron Smelser and Rainer Zitelmann (eds.),Die braune Elite, Darmstadt, 1989, 212–22, and the character study by Joachim C. Fest in his The Face of the Third Reich, Pelican edn, Harmondsworth, 1972, 207–25.

18. Heiden, Hitler, 124.

19. The above relies mainly on Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 24–6; and Bennecke, 28–30. Hitler’s proclamation of 3 August 1921, creating the party’s own paramilitary organization, is printed in Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 144.

20. Cooperation with Ehrhardt came to an end with Klintzsch’s resignation from the SA to return to his naval company on 11 May 1923 (Bennecke, 28–9).

21. See Heiden, Hitler, 121–2.

22. Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 35 n.158.

23. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 26–8.

24. Spindler, i.464; Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 244.

25. Dietmar Petzina, Werner Abelshauser and Anselm Faust (eds.), Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch, Band III. Materialen zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches 1914–1945, Munich, 1978, 83.

26. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 145–6.

27. Heiden, Hitler, 125.

28. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 150–51, 154; Heiden, Hitler, 125.

29. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 147–9.

30. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 147. The speaker at the SPD meeting, Erhard Auer, suffered an attempt on his life, which the Social Democrats suspected the Nazis of being involved in, on 25 October 1921 (Maser, Frühgeschichte, 301; see Hitler’s comments in MK, 562–3).

31. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 147.

32. MK, 563–7; and Heinz, 117–20, an eye-witness account of a Nazi supporter which also glorifies the brawl. Hitler’s words to the SA before the meeting, and reports on the content of the speech, ‘Who Are the Murderers?’, are reproduced in JK,513.

33. Hanfstaengel, 15 Jahre, 59; and see Kurt G.W. Ludecke (= Lüdecke), I Knew Hitler. The Story of a Nazi Who Escaped The Blood Purge, London, 1938, 123.

34. Spindler, i.466–8.

35. Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 247–9 (quotation, 248). In one incident, in September 1922, for which a National Socialist was arrested, hand-grenades made by a party comrade in Munich, a watch-maker by trade, were thrown at the Mannheim stock-exchange.

36. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 153–4.

37. JK, 578–80.

38. JΚ, 625. Esser and Eckart made vague menacing noises about the party’s possible retaliation should Hitler be expelled (Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 246–8).

39. JK, 679 and n.1.

40. Bennecke, 42; Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 36. By the end of the year, the SA’s numbers had risen to about 1,000 men, almost three-quarters of them based in Munich (Bennecke, 45).

41. JK, 687.

42. Ernst Deuerlein, Der Hitler-Putsch. Bayerische Dokumente zum 8./ 9. November 1923, Stuttgart, 1962, 42 – 4; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 155–6; Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 36 and n.160; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 353–4; Fenske, 182–4. Deuerlein,Putsch, 43, has the demonstration taking place on the Karolinenplatz; Fenske, 184, on the Königsplatz. Since the squares are almost adjacent to each other, it seems likely that the demonstration spilled over into both.

43. Lüdecke, 59–61 (where the events are misdated – and followed in this by Toland, 118 – to 20 September 1922). In a court case in 1925, in which Hitler alleged slander against Pittinger, he claimed that the latter had attempted the same thing in 1922 that had proved unsuccessful for him the following year (RSA, I, 10–14, here 11).

44. Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Politik in Bayern. Berichte des württembergischen Gesandten Carl Moser von Filseck, Stuttgart, 1971, 108; Deuerlein, Putsch, 44; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 156.

45. Hitler’s account is in MK, 614–18; Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1355-I-38, contains reports of the Vorstand of the Bezirksamt Coburg, on the disturbances to the Regierungspräsidium of Upper Franconia, 16 October 1922, and to the State Ministry of the Interior in Munich, 27 October 1922 (quotation from p. 5 of latter report); see also Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 249; Lüdecke, 85–92.

46. The reason was a rancorous split with Dickel over debts owed to the latter by the near-bankrupt Nuremberg branch of the Werkgemeinschaft. The NSDAP showed itself, with a grant to Streicher of 70,000 Marks, ready to pay off the debt and provide a loan to acquire the Deutscher Volkswille (Robin Lenman, ‘Julius Streicher and the Origins of the NSDAP in Nuremberg’, in Nicholls and Matthias, 129–59, here 135).

47. Monologe, 158, 293, 430–31 n.175–6.

48. Lenman, 129; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 355–6.

49. Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 36 and n.162; Tyrell, Trommler, 33. For the social structure of the early party, see Michael Kater, ‘Zur Soziographie der frühen NSDAP’, VfZ, 19 (1971), 124–59.

50. MK, 375. Hitler was also effusive in private, even many years later, about Streicher’s ‘lasting service’ to the party in subordinating himself and winning over Nuremberg. ‘There would have been no National Socialist Nuremberg if Julius Streicher had not come,’ he claimed (Monologe, 158 (28–9December 1941)).

51. Lenman, 144–6, 149, 159.

52. Francis L. Carsten, The Rise of Fascism, London, 1967, 64–5.

53. Maser, Frühgeschichte, 356 and n.570, referring to oral testimony of Esser. VB, 8 November 1922, 2, has the illogical formulation: ‘We, too, have Italy’s Mussolini. He is called Adolf Hitler.’ (‘Den Mussolini Italiens haben auch wir. Er heiβt Adolf Hitler.’)

54. Günter Scholdt, Autoren über Hitler. Deutschsprachige Schriftsteller 1919–1945 und ihr Bild vom ‘Führer’, Bonn, 1993, 34.

55. Scholdt, 35.

56. Cit. Sontheimer, 217. For a biographical sketch of Stapel, see Wolfgang Benz and Hermann Grami (eds.), Biographisches Lexikon zur Weimarer Republik, Munich, 1988, 325–6.

57. Sontheimer, 214–22, quotation 218.

58. See Tyrell, Trommler, 274 n.151.

59. Tyrell, Trommler, 161–2.

60. Tyrell, Trommler, 62.

61. Tyrell, Trommler, 274 n.152.

62. JK, 729.

63. Cornelia Berning, Vom ‘Abstammungsnachweis’ zum ‘Zuchtwart’. Vokabular des Nationalsozialismus, Berlin, 1964, 82.

64. Maser, Frühgeschichte, 382; Georg Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr der Hitler-bewegung 1923, Preußisch Oldendorf, 1975, 73–4, 127–9 an d 128 n.23. Letters poured in during 1923, from north as well as south Germany, seeing in Hitler the German ‘redeemer’. Once Hitler had given up the ban on photographs of himself (see Hoffmann, 41–9), intended to add to the mystique about his person, the sale of portraits of him contributed to the spread of the cult. On Göring, see the character sketches in Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, 113–29; and Ron Smelser and Rainer Zitelmann (eds.),Die braune Elite, Darmstadt, 1989, 69–83. Göring succeeded Lieutenant Johann Klintzsch, formerly a member of the Ehrhardt Brigade, as leader of the SA in February 1923. Göring’s standing as a war-hero, decorated with the highest award, the Pour le Mérite, could only benefit the S A, and was probably the reason for the change in leadership (see Bennecke, 54). According to Lüdecke, Hitler had remarked: ‘Splendid, a war ace with the Pour le Mérite – imagine it! Excellent propaganda! Moreover, he has money and doesn’t cost me a cent’ (Lüdecke, 129).

65. Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 74 refers to Pittinger’s contempt; as Heiden, Der Führer, 102, points out, for the Left Hitler was no more than ‘the common demagogue’.

66. Hanfstaengel, 15 Jahre, 109.

67. Oron James Hale, ‘Gottfried Feder calls Hitler to Order: An Unpublished Letter on Nazi Party Affairs’, JMH, 30 (1958), 358–62.

68. JK, 723–4(8 November 1922).

69. JK, 729 (14 November 1922).

70. See Tyrell, Trommler, 60–62.

71. JK, 837 (26 February 1923).

72. JK, 916 (27 April 1923).

73. JK, 933 (1 June 1923).

74. JK, 923 (4 May 1923). The speech was given in the light of what Hitler saw as the ‘capitulation’ of Chancellor Cuno to the French through the policy of passive resistance in the Ruhr and the disaster of ‘fulfilment policy’.

75. JK, 923–4·

76. JK, 946 (6 July 1923). See also 973 (14 August 1923), stressing the responsibility of the leader, who risked victory or defeat as in the army and could not pass the blame to parties. He returned to the theme of heroism, personality, and leadership in a speech on 12 September, though he spoke of leaders collectively (J K, 1012–13).

77. JK, 984 (21 August 1923).

78. A remark allegedly made to Hanfstaengl, if accurately recalled, in which Hitler commented ‘I don’t have the intention of playing the role of the drummer,’ was made in the context of hints that he might become the tool of powerful conservative interests (Hanfstaengl, 47–8).

79. JK, 1027, cit. Daily Mail, 3 October 1923, under the heading ‘A Visit to Hittler’ (!)

80. Hitler appears to have compared himself with Mussolini in Lossow’s presence (Georg Franz-Willing, Putsch und Verbotszeit der Hitlerbewegung, November 1923 – Februar 1925, Preußisch Oldendorf, 1977, 56.

81. JK, 1034 (14 October 1923).

82. JK, 1043 (23 October 1923).

83. JK, 1034 (14 October 1923). At his trial, Hitler repeated that Kahr was ‘no hero, no heroic figure’ (‘kein Held, keine heldische Erscheinung’) (JΚ, 1212).

84. JK, 1032; Deuerlein, Putsch, 220.

85. As pointed out by Tyrell, Trommler, 162.

86. Tyrell, Trommler, 163.

87. JK, 1268.

88. See Tyrell, Trommler, 158–65.

89. JK, 939 (Regensburger Neueste Nachrichten, 26 June 1923).

90. Lüdecke, 17, 20. Hitler’s speech (in JK, 679–81) was on 16 August, not 11 August, as Lüdecke (20) states. The general reliability of Lüdecke’s memoirs – though there are numerous lapses as well as exaggerated claims – is upheld by Roland V. Layton, ‘Kurt Ludecke [= Lüdecke] and I Knew Hitler: an Evaluation’, Central European History, 12 (1979), 372–86.

91. Lüdecke, 22–3.

92. Lüdecke, 69–70, 83–4. His claim to have engineered the support of Ludendorff and Pöhner for Hitler was exaggerated in the attempt to bolster his own importance. Heß had established the first contact between Hitler and Ludendorff around May 1921 (Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 30). Pöhner, through his close connection with Frick, needed no introduction to Hitler from Lüdecke and had been sympathetic to the NSDAP during his time as Police President of Munich before 1921.

93. Lüdecke, 71–4, 126–7.

94. Lüdecke, 108, and see also 103; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 402–3. Hitler was certainly underplaying Lüdecke’s financial contribution when he claimed, in 1925, that the latter had given the Movement 7–8,000 Marks (RSA, I, 12).

95. Lüdecke, 101–6, 111–22; Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 286–7and n.73·

96. Lüdecke, 156.

97. From Hanfstaengl’s account, the meeting was on the day that Hitler had met in the morning the US Assistant Military Attaché Truman Smith, and took place in the Kindlkeller (Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 32–3, 35, 39). Hitler’s discussion with Truman Smith was, however, on 20 November, in the afternoon, and Hitler next spoke publicly on 22 November in the Salvatorkeller (JK, 733–40). Hanfstaengl (35, 39) also mistakenly states that it was Hitler’s first speech since serving a term of imprisonment for disturbance of the peace in the Ballerstedt incident. He held this speech on 28 July, after serving his sentence from 24 June to 27 July (JK, 656– 71; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 154).

98. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 41 and see also 84–7.

99. The description of Hitler from Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 35, 44.

100. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 71–4; visit to Berlin’s museums.

101. Ernst ‘Putzi’ Hanfstaengl, ‘I was Hitler’s Closest Friend’, Cosmopolitan, March 1943, 45·

102. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 41.

103. Hanfstaengl, Cosmopolitan, 45.

104. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 43–4.

105. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 61.

106. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 37, 61.

107. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 55.

108. Lüdecke, 97.

109. See Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 47ff

110. Lüdecke, 97; Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 33–4.

111. Baldur von Schirach, Ich glaubte an Hitler, Hamburg, 1967, 66–7.

112. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 48.

113. See the description in Karl-Alexander von Müller, Im Wandel einer Welt, Erinnerungen 1919–1932, Munich, 1966, 129.

114. Gerhard Roßbach, Mein Weg durch die Zeit. Erinnerungen und Bekenntnisse, Weilburg/Lahn, 1950, 215. In an interview in 1951, Roßbach described Hitler as ‘a pitiful civilian with his tie out of place, who had nothing in his head but art, and was always late’, but was a ‘brilliant speaker with suggestive effect’. (‘Erbärmlicher Zivilist mit schlecht sitzender Krawatte, der nichts wie Kunst im Kopf hatte, immer zu spät kam. Glänzender Redner von suggestiver Wirkung.’) (IfZ, ΖS 128, Gerhard Roßbach).

115. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 48–9; Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 289–90; Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 33–4and n.150.

116. Friedelind Wagner, The Royal Family of Bayreuth, London, 1948, 8–9; interview with Friedelind Wagner in NA, Hitler Source Book, 933. On the same occasion, at the end of September 1923, Hitler had met Wagner’s son-in-law, the now aged racist writer Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who subsequently wrote Hitler an effusive letter, saying that he had ‘transformed the condition of his soul at one fell swoop’, and ‘that Germany should have brought forth a Hitler in the time of its greatest need’ was proof of its continued vitality as a nation. (IfZ, MA-743 (= HA, 52/1210), letter of Chamberlain to Hitler, 7 October 1923. And see Auerbach, 34 and n.151.) Hitler still spoke fulsomely in the middle of the war of his admiration for the Wagner family, especially Winifred. He pointed out that he had never been introduced to the aged and blind widow of Richard Wagner, Cosima, although she lived for some time after he had first gone to Bayreuth (TBJG, II/4, 408 (30 May 1942)).

117. For funding and patrons, see Maser, Frühgeschichte, 396–412; Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 266–99; and Henry Ashby Turner, German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler, New York/Oxford, 1985, 59–60, who provides the most reliable assessment of the Nazis’ sources of income at this time. Franz-Willing, 266–8, 280, 299 and Turner, 59–60, emphasize the contribution from ordinary members. For the continued reliance of the party on funding from its own members in the run-up to power, see Henry A. Turner and Horst Matzerath, ‘Die Selbstfinanzierung der NSDAP 1930–32’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 3 (1977), 59–92.

118. This is emphasized, for the period prior to the takeover of power, by Richard Bessel, ‘The Rise of the NSDAΡ and the Myth of Nazi Propaganda’, Wiener Library Bulletin, 33 (1980), 20–29, esp. 26–7.

119. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 70, 76.

120. Lüdecke, 78–9.

121. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 65.

122. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 60. This format began, according to Hanfstaengl, on 29 August 1923. The VB, still in serious financial trouble in the second half of 1921, was able through financial assistance of Nazi patrons – Bechstein had supported it two or three times – to appear as a daily from 8 February 1922. (Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 60; Oron J. Hale, The Captive Press in the Third Reich, Princeton, 1964, 29–30; Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 277–8, 289).

123. See the biographical comments in Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 197.

124. Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 266 n.214, 281–8; and see Maser, Frühgeschichte, 397–412.

125. Turner, 50–55; Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 288. Turner, 54, points out that, other than a dubious passage in Thyssen’s ghost-written memoirs, the evidence points towards the donation being made to Ludendorff, and that Hitler most likely gained only the similar sort of portion that was given to others.

126. Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 291.

127. Deuerlein, Putsch, 63.

128. Deuerlein, Putsch, 62.

129. Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 296–7. On Gansser, see Turner, 49, 51–2, and 374–5 n.4.

130. Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 297.

131. Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 31–2; Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 281.

132. JK, 725–6.

133. Lüdecke, no.

134. Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 36 n.162; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 376; Michael Kater, The Nazi Party. A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919–1945, Oxford, 1983, 19–31, 243; and see Kater, ‘Soziographie’, 39.

135. See Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 85.

136. Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 357–8.

137. Winkler, Weimar, 194; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 102.

138. Winkler, Weimar, 189; Hans Mommsen, Die verspielte Freiheit. Der Weg der Republik von Weimar in den Untergang, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin, 1989, 143. The execution of one saboteur, Albert Schlageter, on 26 May 1923, led to nationalist demonstrations of sympathy throughout Germany and was used by Nazi propaganda to create a martyr for the cause of the movement. See Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 102, 139–41. Hitler was at first uninterested in taking part. He was on holiday in Berchtesgaden with Eckart and Drexler, and had ‘Other worries’ (Hanfstaengl, 15Jahre, 108). Hanfstaengl’s suggestion (according to his own account) that great propaganda capital could be gained from it persuaded Hitler to become involved. Hitler’s ‘worries’ in Berchtesgaden doubtless included the proceedings just begun against him for breach of the peace, which threatened to put him behind bars again for at least two months to complete the partly suspended sentence of January 1922.

139. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 163–4.

140. MK, 768. His account of the Ruhr occupation is MK, 767–80.

141. See JK, 692, for the first usage, on 18 September 1922; also Maser, Frühgesch – ichte, 368 n.II.

142. JK, 783.

143. JK, 781–6.

144. Maser, Frühgeschichte, 368–9.

145. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 164.

146. JK, 802–5.

147. JK, 805–26; Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 362–4; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 375.

148. Röhm, 2nd edn, 150–51. See also Franz-Willing, Ursprung, 361–2; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 375–6; and Hans Mommsen, ‘Adolf Hitler und der 9. November 1923’, in Johannes Willms (ed.), Der 9. November. Fünf Essays zur deutschen Geschichte, Munich, 1994, 33–48, here 40.

149. Wolfgang Horn, Der Marsch zur Machtergreifung. Die NSDAP bis 1933, Königstein/Ts./Düsseldorf, 1980, 102.

150. JK, 811.

151. See n.191 below.

152. Müller, Wandel, 144–8.

153. Maser, Frühgeschichte, 374, 376–7; Bennecke, 69.

154. Röhm, 2nd edn, 158–60; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 376–8; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 36–76. Röhm’s break with Pittinger’s Bund Bayern und Reich at the end of January meant the split of the former VVVB into its ‘white-blue’ and nationalist components (Röhm, 2nd edn, 152–3; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 37–9).

155. Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 38; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 42. ‘Orgesch’, named after its leader Georg Escherich, loosely linked together Einwohnerwehren within and outside Bavaria.

156. JK, 1109–11; Bennecke, 66–70; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 55, 59–61; Hitler-Prozeß, LI. In his recollections of the year of the putsch, Theodor Endres, at the time Lieutenant-Colonel and 1. General Staff Officer under Lossow in Wehrkreiskommando VII, underlined the close connections between the Reichswehr in Bavaria and the Hitler Movement, which won notable support among the troops. Officers were willing to put in extra hours to train the nationalist paramilitaries (ΒHStA, Abt. IV, HS-925, Theodor Endres, ‘Aufzeichnungen über den Hitlerputsch 1923’, 10).

157. Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 43. Some 1,300 SA men took part on 25 March 1923 as a contingent of almost 3,000 paramilitaries in combined military exercises near Munich (Röhm, 2nd edn, 170; Bennecke, 57–8). The fact that Röhm had named Reichswehr officers as leaders of the exercise was publicized by the Social Democrats in the Münchener Post and led to a ban on members of the Reichswehr joining the patriotic organizations. Röhm had to resign the leadership of the Reichsflagge in Munich (Röhm, 2nd edn, 177; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 75–6).

158. Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 43, 65.

159. Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 59.

160. Hitler’s memorandum, which Röhm regarded as the Working Community’s political programme, was dated 19 April 1923 (Röhm, 2nd edn, 175–7).

161. JK, 1136; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 43; Feuchtwanger, 124.

162. Röhm, 2nd edn, 164–6.

163. Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 30.

164. JK, 1111; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 53–4; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 383.

165. JΚ, 1136; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 55. The conflict between Seeckt and Lossow lasted until the autumn. At a meeting on 7 April in Berlin, Seeckt demanded that Lossow maintain independence of political parties and paramilitary organizations. Lossow had told Seeckt that he could not dispense with the ‘patriotic associations’ that controlled 51 per cent of the weapons in Bavaria (Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 68).

166. JK, 1111.

167. JK, 1110.

168. Deuerlein, Putsch, 56.

169. Cit. Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 76.

170. Gordon, 194, 196.

171. Deuerlein, Putsch, 56–7; Benz, Politik in Bayern, 125; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 81.

172. Gordon, 196–7; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 80.

173. Maser, Frühgeschichte, 393.

174. Gordon, 196–200; Deuerlein, Putsch, 56–60; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 79–83; BHStA, Abt.IV, HS-925, Endres Aufzeichnungen, 19–23. See Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 170–73 for the police report of the demonstration on the Oberwiesenfeld; also Maser,Frühgeschichte, 394.

175. JK, 918.

176. Cit. Deuerlein, Putsch, 61. This was also the view of the acting United States Consul in Munich, Robert Murphy. He reported that people ‘are wearied of Hitler’s inflammatory agitation which yields no results and offers nothing constructive’ (cit. Toland, 142).

177. Cit. Gordon, 194. A similar comment – ‘the enemy stands on the right’ – had been most famously made by Reich Chancellor Joseph Wirth in the Reichstag after Walther von Rathenau’s murder in summer 1922 (Peter D. Stachura, Political Leaders in Weimar Germany, Hemel Hempstead, 1993, 187).

178. Other states had reacted more zealously to head off the evidently looming danger of a putsch attempt headed by Hitler’s movement. The NSDAP had been banned since the previous autumn in Prussia and several other states (though not in Bavaria) for its blatant and continued agitation aimed at undermining the state in defiance of the Law for the Protection of the Republic, which had been promulgated following Rathenau’s assassination in 1922 and aimed to combat the threat from the radical Right (Deuerlein,Aufstieg, 158, 166–70). Kahr remarked bitterly on 30 May 1924 that if the Bavarian government had wanted to bring it about, Hitler’s ignoring of security restrictions on 1 May would, in the light of the depressed mood among his followers in the aftermath of the failure, have given the opportunity for the suppression of the NSDAP also in Bavaria. Then, he went on, the ‘catastrophe of November 1923 and the still greater catastrophe of the Hitler trial would have been avoided’. This retrospective judgement was, however, quite different from Kahr’s attitude towards the NSDAP during the previous year (Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 173)

179. See Maser, Frühgeschichte, 394–5.

180. Lothar Gruchmann, ‘Hitlers Denkschrift an die bayerische Justiz vom 16. Mai 1923’, VfZ, 39 (1991), 305–28; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 394; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 86–9; Hitler-Prozeß, LIV. Had the prosecution been pursued, Hitler would with certainty have been put behind bars for at least the two months suspended from the sentence he had received in January 1922, but dependent on his good behaviour. This would have put him out of action in the late summer or autumn of 1923, and have ruled out his chances of taking a leading role in the Kampfbund. The likelihood of a putsch taking place would, in such circumstances, have been significantly diminished. In fact, despite Hitler’s blackmail, Gürtner could have pressed on with the case – had the political will been there – and had it heard in camera. He did not entertain this possibility because of the fear that Bavarian ministers would have been forced to appear as witnesses and thereby exposed to damaging cross-examination. More important than the blackmail attempt were ultimately the political motives related to the anti-Berlin aims of the leading forces in Bavaria (Gruchmann, ‘Hitlers Denkschrift’, 306–13).

181. See Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 159.

182. JK, 918–66; Milan Hauner, Hitler. A Chronology of his Life and Time, London, 1983, 40.

183. Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 110.

184. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 177–9; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 414–16.

185. Maser, Frühgeschichte, 412–14.

186. Cit. Maser, Frühgeschichte, 421.

187. See Bennecke, 78, noting that the Munich regiment increased by around 400 to 1,560 men between the end of August and 6 November 1923.

188. Hanfstaengl, Jahre, 108. See also Auerbach, ‘Hitler’s politische Lehrjahre’, 38–9; and Toland, 142–3.

189. See Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 117.

190. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 181–3.

191. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 182. The occasion was the first time that the Nazi greeting with raised right arm was in evidence in photographs. The form of greeting became uniformly deployed in the NSDAP for the party’s rally in Nuremberg in 1927 (Gerhard Paul,Aufstand der Bilder. Die NS-Propaganda vor 1933, 2nd edn, Bonn, 1992, 175–6; RSA, III.3, 382–3 n.3).

192. Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 118; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 421.

193. Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 39; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 119–21; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 424.

194. Bennecke, 79; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 39.

195. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 39. Hitler’s takeover of the leadership was the background to the splinter in the Reichsflagge, arising from the objections of its leader, Heiß (Horn, Marsch, 123–5).

196. Mommsen, ‘Adolf Hitler und der 9. November 1923’, 42.

197. Deuerlein, Putsch, 202–4n·69·

198. See Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 188, for Hitler’s reported comments at a meeting of Kampfbund leaders on 23 October 1923, summarized by a witness at his trial, on 4 March 1924: ‘Independent action by the troops of the Kampfbund would be nonsense and was to be ruled out. The national uprising could only take place in the closest association with the Bavarian army and state police.’ (‘Ein selbständiges Handeln seitens der Truppen des Kampfbundes sei ein Unding und sei ausgeschlossen . Die nationale Erhebung könne nur in engster Vereinigung mit der bayerischen Reichswehr und der Landespolizei erfolgen.’)

199. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 176; Winkler, Weimar, 207; Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 158.

200. Winkler, Weimar, 225–6. The atmosphere in Hamburg is captured in the contemporary account, sympathetic to the insurgents, of Larissa Reissner, Hamburg at the Barricades, London, 1977.

201. Kolb, Weimarer Republik, 51–2; Winkler, Weimar, 213–16, 224–8;Mommsen, Verspielte Freiheit, 160–64; Peter Longerich, Deutschland 1918–1933, Hanover, 1995, 140–43. The radical Right had already made its own first amateurish attempt at a putsch by this time, with the action of volunteers of the ‘Black Reichswehr’ – secretly trained reserve formations of the army – on 1 October, led by Major Bruno Ernst Buchrucker, aimed at taking the fortresses of Küstrin and Spandau, near Berlin, as the signal for a general rising. The regular Reichswehr immediately intervened and the putsch fizzled out as quickly as it had started. (See Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 117, 300, 307–10.)

202. Winkler, 224–5; Kolb, Weimarer Republik, 51–2.

203. Deuerlein, Putsch, 70–71. He also hoped to put Kahr, whom he disliked and distrusted, in the firing line of responsibility for unpopular policies (Gordon, 217).

204. Deuerlein, Putsch, 72–3; Gordon, 220.

205. JK, 1017 (protest to Kahr); Deuerlein, Putsch, 74. One meeting of the Kampfbund, with Hitler as speaker, was held, despite the ban (JK, 1017–18).

206. Maser, Frühgeschichte, 417, 422–3, 425–6. Hitler’s speeches between 29 September and the beerhall putsch on 8 November contain numerous criticisms of Kahr’s inadequacies (JK, 1019–50).

207. Deuerlein, Putsch, 71–2, 164–5(quotation, 165).

208. Gordon, 242.

209. Gordon, 241.

210. Deuerlein, Putsch, 162.

211. Deuerlein, Putsch, 164 (8 September 1923).

212. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 185–6for rumours circulating in mid-October in the left-wing press in Austria about a forthcoming putsch involving Hitler, Ludendorff and Kahr.

213. Cit. Gordon, 243.

214. Cit. Gordon, 244.

215. Cit. Gordon, 255.

216. Cit. Otto Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist für den Terroristen Adolf H. Der Hitler-Putsch und die bayerische Justiz, Munich, 1990, 42. Not dissimilar retrospective sentiments were also recorded by Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 167.

217. Above based on Gordon, 246–9, 251–3, 256–7; and see Franz-Willing, Putsch, 57.

218. Deuerlein, Putsch, 258; Hitler-Prozeß, LXI and n.23. But see Gordon’s qualifying comments, 253, on the reliability of the report.

219. See Gordon, 253–5.

220. Gordon, 255.

221. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 189–90.

222. Franz-Willing, Putsch, 57–9, where the suggestion is raised that the action was agreed between Kahr and the Kampfbund, and that Kahr intended to proclaim Crown Prinz Rupprecht, who was present at the gathering, as King of Bavaria. It is difficult to see, however, why the nationalist Kampfbund, with no interest in the restoration of the Bavarian monarchy, would have agreed to such a move. And the orders to prepare for action were given, apparently, to the nationalist SA and Bund Oberland, but not to the ‘white-blue’ pro-monarchy paramilitary organizations.

223. See Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 126–7; Gordon, 259.

224. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 190–91; Franz-Willing, Putsch, 59–60; Gordon, 248.

225. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 191–2; Gordon, 255–6.

226. Franz-Willing, Krisenjahr, 386–7; see also Deuerlein, Putsch, 99. Rumours of an impending putsch were current in Munich at the beginning of November. According to one, the restoration of the monarchy was to be proclaimed on 9 November; in another, Captain Ehrhardt’s organization intended to strike at Berlin on 15 November. In fact, 15 November was the date which Lossow had in mind for the Bavarian Reichswehr’s march on Berlin (Hans Hubert Hofmann, Der Hitlerputsch. Krisenjahre deutscher Geschichte 1920–1924, Munich, 1961, 135, 141).

227. Franz-Willing, Putsch, 63–4, 68. Kahr, together with Seißer and Lossow, did have a meeting that day with Ludendorff, at which there were sharp differences of opinion (Franz-Willing, Putsch, 68).

228. Gordon, 259.

229. Gordon, 259–60; Franz-Willing, Putsch, 66.

230. Gordon, 260. It has been estimated that around 4,000 armed putschists would have confronted about 2,600 state police and army troops in Munich (Gordon, 273)

231. Hofmann, 146; Franz-Willing, Putsch, 66 (based on oral testimony from 1958). Gordon, 259 n.63, mentions that there may have been an alternative plan to move on 10 or 11 November, but does not amplify. Deuerlein, Putsch, 99; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 192, refer to plans only for 8 November.

232. Franz-Willing, Putsch, 64, 67–9, accepts that such a proclamation to restore the monarchy was feared; Hofmann, 147, is sceptical, presuming they feared instead an independent strike by Kahr against Berlin. For Lossow’s comment, see Deuerlein, Putsch,99, 258.

233. Deuerlein, Putsch, 99; Hofmann, 147. According to Hanfstaengl, Hitler later acknowledged that Kahr’s manoeuvrings had forced him to take immediate action ‘to get the situation in hand again’, and that he had in any case been compelled to act in order to fulfil the expectations that had been aroused among his supporters (Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 167–9).

234. VB, 10 November 1937, p. 2: ‘… Unsere gegnerische Seite beabsichtigte, um den 12. November herum eine Revolution, und zwar eine bajuvarische, auszurufen… Da setzte ich den Entschluß, vier Tage zuvor loszuschlagen…’ Franz-Willing, Putsch, 64 n.166, has slightly different wording.

235. Graf testimony, IfZ, ΖS-282/52, 60.

236. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 129.

237. Franz-Willing, Putsch, 71, 73–4.

238. Franz-Willing, Putsch, 71, has Esser also left uninformed, but Maser, Frühgeschichte, 443–4, has him being told in mid-morning.

239. Franz-Willing, Putsch, 72–3.

240. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 192–3; Müller, Wandel, 160–66; Gordon, 287–8; Franz-Willing, Futsch, 78–9.

241. JK, 1052. The police report has Hitler himself firing the shot. Müller’s testimony at Hitler’s trial (Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 193) mentioned two shots fired, the first by Hitler’s guard, the second, minutes later, by Hitler himself. Probably Müller was mistaken. No one else recalled a second shot, or noted anyone other than Hitler firing the alleged first shot.

242. JK, 1052. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 133, also has Hitler making this remark after his first entry to the hall. Müller (Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 194) has the remark made after Hitler’s re-entry.

243. JK, 1052.

244. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 134; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 193–4.

245. JK, 1053.

246. JK, 1054–5. The police reporter evidently understood Ludendorff’s designated position to be Reich President (JK, 1054), though it seems unlikely that Hitler used those words.

247. JK, 1054–5; Müller, Wandel, 162–3 (trans., Gordon, 288).

248. Müller, Wandel, 162 (‘ein rednerisches Meisterstück’); also, Müller’s trial testimony in Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 194 (‘rednerisch ein Meisterstück’).

249. Gordon, 288–9.

250. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 195–6; Gordon, 288–9.

251. The above based on Gordon, 290–94.

252. Gordon, 289–90.

253. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 196–7.

254. JK, 1056–7.

255. Maser, Frühgeschichte, 454. The proclamation appeared in the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, which had rushed out its morning edition of 9 November with the banner headline ‘Establishment of a National Directory’ (ΜΝΝ, 9 November 1923, reproduced in Hellmut Schöner (ed.),Hitler-Putsch im Spiegel der Presse, Munich, 1974, 34–7).

256. JK, 1058 (Dok.600); the authenticity of the accompanying Dok.599 (1057–8) is extremely doubtful. Hitler’s authorization was dated 8 November. In his Nuremberg trial, Streicher stated that it was given after midnight, with the implication that Hitler was by then resigned to failure (see Maser, Frühgeschichte, 453). The date of 8 November suggests, however, that Hitler at the time of his authorization still believed in success.

257. Gordon, 316–20; Toland, 164,

258. Frank, 60; Gordon, 324–7.

259. Gordon, 327.

260. Graf testimony, IfZ, ΖS-282/52, 63.

261. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 41.

262. Frank, 61.

263. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 21–2.

264. Maser, Frühgeschichte, 454; Franz-Willing, Putsch, 109. At some point on 8–9November, an emissary did apparently visit the Crown Prince, though when precisely is unclear (Gordon, 445–6).

265. Frank, 60; Gordon, 330–32.

266. Gordon, 351–2. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 141, and Frank, 60, mention the snowy and slushy conditions.

267. Gordon, 333; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 141. The putschists were handed out 2 billion Marks each (Frank, 61).

268. Maser, Frühgeschichte, 457. According to Frau Ludendorff, the suggestion for the march came from the General (Margarethe Ludendorff, My Married Life with Ludendorff, London, n.d., c.1930, 251; see also Franz-Willing, Putsch, 110).

269. JK, 1117 (28 February 1924); Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 214.

270. Gordon, 350–52. Frau Ludendorff had the impression that the purpose of the march – or ‘public procession’ as she called it – was to test popular feeling in support of the overthrow of the Republic and the restoration of the monarchy (Margarethe Ludendorff, 251). Lieutenant-Colonel Endres thought the idea was to use the figure of Ludendorff to win over the Reichswehr to the putsch (BHStA, Abt.IV, HS-925, Endres Aufzeichnungen, 51).

271. See Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 199.

272. Gordon, 357–8; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 197–8. In the view of one contemporary witness to the events, Lieutenant-Colonel Endres, however, the majority of the people of Munich were unenthusiastic (BHStA, Abt.IV, HS-925, Endres Aufzeichnungen, 52).

273. Frank, 61.

274. Frank, 61–2.

275. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 197; Frank, 61–2.

276. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 198–9 (Godin’s account); Gordon, 360–65; Deuerlein, Putsch, 331; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 459–60 (hinting that the police opened fire first).

277. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 200; Franz-Willing, Putsch, 116 n.182, 119; Gordon, 364. Two other putschists were killed in the Wehrkreiskommando, making up the sixteen dead in all who were, in the Third Reich, regarded as heroes of the Nazi Movement. The dead policemen have in the much more recent past been commemorated by a memorial near the Feldherrnhalle in Munich’s Odeonsplatz.

278. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 147; Gordon, 353 and n.124, 364 and n.152; Endres Aufzeichnungen, BHStA, Abt.IV, HS-925, 56 (where Endres, critical in every other respect of Hitler’s action in the putsch, was certain that he had thrown himself to the ground at the outbreak of gunfire, and thought this action ‘absolutely right’).

279. The initial diagnosis of the doctor in Landsberg, where Hitler was interned, that he had broken a bone in his upper arm, proved mistaken (Schenck, 299–300).

280. Gordon, 467.

281. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 144–5; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 460; Gordon, 469–71. Ludendorff’s wife had initially received the news that he, too, had been killed (Margarethe Ludendorff, 251–2).

282. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 146–9; Toland, 174–6, based on Helene Hanfstaengl’s unpublished notes.

283. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 149.

284. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 147.

285. Gordon, 465. According to Hanfstaengl, his wife Helene jerked the revolver from Hitler’s hand as he threatened ‘to end it all’ (Hanfstaengl, Cosmopolitan, 45).

286. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 33–4, cit. the report of the Government President of Upper Bavaria on Hitler’s arrest; Gordon, 465–6.

287. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 201; and see Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 146; Gordon, 413–15, 442–3.

288. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 202.

289. Cit. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 202, from Die Welt von gestern, Stockholm, 1942, 441.

290. Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 42. It attained twenty-three from 129 seats in the Bavarian Landtag (Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 231).

291. Dietrich Thränhardt, Wahlen und politische Strukturen in Bayern 1848–1953, Düsseldorf, 1973, 173; Meinrad Hagmann, Der Weg ins Verhängnis, Munich, 1946, 14*–20*.

292. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 427.

293. Gordon, 495–503.

294. Gordon, 486–95; Seißer was subsequently restored to office, but was never again a powerful figure.

295. See Tyrell, Trommler, 166; and also Mommsen, ‘Adolf Hitler und der 9. November 1923’, 47.

296. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, citing comments made to him in 1988 by the then ninety-eight-year-old Alois Maria Ott, former Anstalts-Psychologe at Landsberg.

297. Röhm, 2nd edn, 272; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 203; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 154; Heiden, Hitler, 175; Tyrell, Trommler, 277 n.178; Hitler-Prozeß, XXX-XXXI; and see Gordon, 477. Prison psychologist Ott also claimed to have calmed Hitler down in the course of several hours of discussion, and to have persuaded him to break off his hunger-strike (Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 35).

298. Cit. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 37–42, from Ehard’s private papers.

299. Cit. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 43.

300. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, Z03; Gordon, 455, 476. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 49–52, clearly outlines the legal position: under Article 13 of the Law for the Protection of the Republic of 21 July 1922, the ‘Staatsgerichtshof’ (State Court) placed under the aegis of the Reichsgericht (Reich Court) at Leipzig had competence to try cases of alleged high treason. However, the Bavarian government had refused to concede its judicial authority and had passed three days later a decree establishing People’s Courts (Volksgerichte)for treason cases in Bavaria. Under the Reich Constitution of 1919, Reich law was superior to laws passed by individual states. Despite this, Bavaria refused to comply with the order of the Staatsgerichtshof in Leipzig, immediately following the putsch, to arrest Hitler, Göring and Ludendorff with a view to opening preliminary hearings against them. The only obvious way of overriding the Bavarian government in practice would have been through the use of force, which the Reich government was anxious to avoid. The complex and sensitive relations between the Reich and Bavaria at precisely this juncture, and the readiness of the Reich cabinet to concede – after pressure from the Bavarian Justice Minister Gürtner – that the trial should be held in Munich, are fully explored by Bernd Steger, ‘Der Hitlerprozeß und Bayerns Verhältnis zum Reich 1923/24’, VfZ, 25 (1977), 441–66, here esp. 442–9, 455·

301. Gordon, 476.

302. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 156; and see Heiden, Hitler, 176–7.

303. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 203–4.

304. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 215; Gordon, 480.

305. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 205–6, cit. Hans von Hülsen.

306. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 215–16, 217–20.

307. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 225.

308. Monologe, 260 (3–4 February 1942) and 453 n.168.

309. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 227.

310. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 227–8.

311. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 22, 48–54; and Hitler-Prozeß, esp. XXX–XXXVII.

312. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 58–60.

313. Laurence Rees, The Nazis. A Warning from History, London, 1997, 30. In this earlier trial, Judge Neithardt had sought an even more lenient punishment – a fine, instead of imprisonment – than the mild sentence actually imposed.

314. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 234–6; Tyrell, Trommler, 277 n.180; Heiden, Hitler, 184–5; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 156–7; Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 98. And see Hermann Fobke’s description of lazy days in Landsberg, in Werner Jochmann (ed.),Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, Frankfurt am Main, 1963, 91–2.

315. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 232.

316. MK, 603–8, 619–20; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 47.

317. See Tyrell, ‘Wie er der “Führer” wurde’, 34–5.

318. JK, 1188.

319. JK, 1210.

320. JK, 1212. ‘There is a single person who seems fit to have the German army lower its weapons to him and to bring about in peacetime what we need.’ (‘Es gibt einen einzigen, der in meinen Augen befähigt erscheint, daß das deutsche Heer die Waffen senkt vor ihm und daß im Frieden das erfolgt, was wir brauchen.’)

321. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 188 (23 October 1923).

322. JK, 1056–7.

CHAPTER 7: EMERGENCE OF THE LEADER

1. Georg Schott, Das Volksbuch vom Hitler, Munich, 1924, 18, 229.

2. MK, 362.

3. See Horn, Marsch, 174–5.

4. Horn, Marsch, 172 and n.56; Franz-Willing, Putsch, 193; David Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution. Hitler and the Verbotzeit 1923–25, London, 1989, 43 and 189 n.99.

5. For biographical sketches, see Fest, Face of the Third Reich, 247–64; and Smelser/Zitelmann, 223–35.

6. Alfred Rosenberg, Letzte Aufzeichnungen. Ideale und Idole der nationalsozialistischen Revolution, Göttingen, 1948, 107.

7. Bullock, Hitler, 122.

8. See Horn, Marsch, 172.

9. Jablonsky, 44.

10. Horn, Marsch, 173–5.

11. Jablonsky, 50.

12. Jablonsky, 46–7; Albrecht Tyrell, Führer befiehl… Selbstzeugnisse aus der ‘Kampfzeit’ der NSDAP, Düsseldorf, 1969, 68, 72–3; Franz-Willing, Putsch, 197.

13. Tyrell, Führer, 73.

14. Roland V. Layton, ‘The Völkischer Beobachter, 1920–1933: The Nazi Party Newspaper in the Weimar Era’, Central European History, 4 (1970), 353–82, here 359.

15. Tyrell, Führer, 68.

16. Jablonsky, 192 n.1.

17. Tyrell, Führer, 81–2.

18. Jablonsky, 10, 22, 179 n.16, 181–2n.67.

19. Jablonsky, 58–63, 175.

20. Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1355/I/2, Fol. 75, Privatkanzlei Adolf Hitler, Rudolf Heß to Kurt Günther, 29 July 1925.

21. Tyrell, Führer, 76; Franz-Willing, Putsch, 231.

22. Lüdecke, 218; and see Jablonsky, 85.

23. Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1355/I/2, Fol.286. Rudolf Heß to Wilhelm Sievers, 11 May 1925.

24. Tyrell, Führer, 76.

25. Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey (eds.), Das Ende der Parteien 1933, Königstein, Ts/Düsseldorf, 1969, 782; Hagmann, 15*–16*. The Franconian heartlands of Nazism recorded even higher levels of support for the Völkischer Block: 24.5 per cent in Upper Franconia and 24.7 per cent in Middle Franconia (Hagmann, 18*).

26. Jablonsky, 85.

27. Jochmann (ed.), Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 77, 114.

28. Jablonsky, 87–8.

29. Franz-Willing, Putsch, 252; Jablonsky, 89.

30. Tyrell, Führer, 77–8, cit. from Der Pommersche Beobachter, 11 June 1924; Franz-Willing, Putsch, 253.

31. Franz-Willing, Putsch, 256–7; Noakes, Nazi Party, 45.

32. Jablonsky, 93.

33. Jochmann, 77–8; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 234; Jablonsky, 94–5; and see Hitler’s letter of 23 June to Albert Stier, in Tyrell, Führer, 78.

34. Jochmann, 91; Jablonsky, 95.

35. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 235–6; Jablonsky, 96. He had told Ludendorff of his decision to withdraw early in June but had been asked to delay a public announcement.

36. Jablonsky, 96.

37. Tyrell, Führer, 77–8.

38. Jochmann, 90. Hitler seems to have indicated his decision to Ludendorff at a meeting, also attended by Graefe, on 12 June, the day after the appearance of the newspaper statement in question (Jablonsky, 96 and 203 n.19).

39. See Lüdecke, 222, for such an interpretation.

40. Lüdecke, 222–4 (quotation, 224).

41. Jablonsky, 90–91, 99–101.

42. Tyrell, Führer, 79. The date is mistakenly given in the press statement as 15–17 July, not August.

43. Tyrell, Führer, 80; Jablonsky, 101–2.

44. Jochmann, 96–7.

45. Franz-Willing, Putsch, 261–5; Jablonsky, 103–7.

46. Jochmann, 120–21.

47. Jochmann, 122–4; Jablonsky, 111; Franz-Willing, Putsch, 266. Hitler, noted Fobke, was preoccupied with his book, of which he had high expectations. It was scheduled for mid-October. Hitler fully expected to be free on 1 October, though Fobke added that he could not see the reason for his optimism (Jochmann, 124).

48. Jochmann, 125–7(quotation, 126).

49. Jablonsky, 118–23, 210 n.189, cit. Völkischer Kurier, Nr 165, 19 August 1924.

50. Jochmann, 130–37; Jablonsky, 124–5.

51. Jablonsky, 125–8.

52. Jochmann, 154, 165; Tyrell, Trommler, 167; Jablonsky, 135–9.

53. Tyrell, Führer, 86–7.

54. Jablonsky, 142–5.

55. Tyrell, Führer, 76; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 241, 427; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 163; Franz-Willing, Putsch, 276.

56. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 241; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 163; Jablonsky, 150.

57. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 97–8.

58. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 238–9.

59. On 16 September, the Munich police had found incriminating files of members and correspondence in the house of Wilhelm Brückner, formerly the Munich SA leader, and Karl Osswald, a former leader of the Reichskriegsflagge (Jablonsky, 132).

60. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 101–2.

61. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 103–10.

62. In a report of 26 September, the day after this judgement, however, Prison Governor Leybold accepted the seriousness of the breach of trust in smuggling out a number of letters, though his criticism was aimed at Kriebel and Weber, not at Hitler (Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 109–10).

63. Jablonsky, 132–3.

64. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 114–16.

65. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 116–18.

66. Hitler, Kriebel and Weber had attempted, in a declaration of 26 September, to distance themselves from Röhm’s plans for the Frontbann and show their disapproval of his actions. Hitler emphasized that he had laid down his political leadership, and that his refusal to be involved in the defence organizations set up by Röhm followed as a matter of course (Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 110– 12; see also Jablonsky, 133, and Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 160–61).

67. Jablonsky, 150.

68. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 239–40.

69. Jetzinger, 276–7; Donald Cameron Watt, ‘Die bayerischen Bemühungen um Ausweisung Hitlers 1924’, VfZ, 6 (1958), 270–80, here, 272; Jablonsky, 91 and 202 n.190; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 239. The initial inquiry of the Bavarian police about deporting Hitler, in March 1924, had been prompted by concern that he would be acquitted at his trial, along with Ludendorff. The concern was also voiced by the Bavarian Minister President, Knilling.

70. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 101. As we have seen, the Munich Police Direction reinforced this opinion in its report of 23 September.

71. Watt, ‘Die bayerischen Bemühungen’, 273.

72. Jetzinger, 277.

73. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 240. Hitler’s war service, it was claimed, meant that he was no longer an Austrian citizen (Watt, ‘Die bayerischen Bemühungen’, 274).

74. Watt, ‘Die bayerischen Bemühungen’, 276–7; Jetzinger, 278.

75. Whether, as has often been accepted (see Bullock, 127; Toland, 203) Gürtner, influenced by the Austrian refusal to take him back, played a decisive role in having deportation proceedings against Hitler quashed remains, in the light of Watt’s examination of the evidence, uncertain. See Watt, ‘Die bayerischen Bemühungen’, 270–71, 279.

76. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 250–52; Jetzinger, 272, 279.

77. Jetzinger, 280.

78. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 119–30 (quotation, 130). Leybold had already further testified to Hitler’s good conduct in a report of 13 November.

79. See Jablonsky, 150.

80. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 130.

81. Monologe, 259–60. For Müller, see Monologe, 146, and Heiden, Hitler, 199–200.

82. Gritschneder, Bewährungsfrist, 130.

83. Monologe, 259–60; Hoffmann, 60–61; Franz-Willing, Putsch, 278–9, cit. Der Nationalsozialist of 25 December 1924 and Völkischer Kurier of 23 December 1924.

84. Monologe, 261.

85. Frank, 46–7.

86. See Jochmann, 91–2, for Fobke’s description of his normal day in Landsberg.

87. See MK, 36.

88. Frank, 47.

89. Frank, 45.

90. Eitner, 75. Eitner (75–82) was prepared to see the time in Landsberg as the major turning-point in Hitler’s life, the ‘Jordan experience’ that convinced him of his messianic mission, that he was no longer Germany’s ‘John the Baptist’, but its actual messiah.

91. Even allowing for Hitler’s usual underlining of his own ‘intuitive genius’, his later comment, that it was during this time that a good deal of reflection made him for the first time grasp fully many things that he had earlier understood only by intuition, accords with this interpretation(Monologe, 262).

92. Monologe, 262.

93. Otto Strasser, Hitler und ich, Buenos Aires, n.d. (1941?), 56.

94. Franz-Willing, Putsch, 251; Jochmann, 92. Fobke speaks of one hour’s ‘lecture with the chief, or better, from the chief (‘Vortrag beim Chef, besser vom Chef). According to one of his warders (who subsequently became an SS-Sturmführer), in an account published in 1933, Hitler read out chapters of his book on Saturday evenings (Otto Lurker, Hitler hinter Festungsmauern, Berlin, 1933, 56). See also Werner Maser, Hitlers Mein Kampf, Munich/Esslingen, 1966, 20–21 and Hammer, ‘Die deutschen Ausgaben’, 161–78, here 162.

95. Hinted at in Heiden, Der Führer, 226.Though plausible, there is no corroborative evidence for Heiden’s inference (which did not appear in his 1936 biography of Hitler). Heiden, Der Führer, 226, also appears to be the source of the suggestion that Hitler had begun work in 1922 on a book entitled ‘A Reckoning’ (the title of the first volume of Mein Kampf), aimed at dealing with his enemies and rivals.

96. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 172.

97. Heiden, Hitler, 206; Heiden, Der Führer, 226.

98. Franz-Willing, Putsch, 251.

99. Strongly hinted in Heiden, Der Führer, 226 (though without corroborative evidence).

100. Otto Strasser, Hitler und ich, 59; Frank, 45; Heiden, Hitler, 188–90; Hans Kallenbach, Mit Adolf Hitler auf Festung Landsberg, Munich, 1933, 56. See also Hammer, ‘Die deutschen Ausgaben’, 161–2; Lurker, 56; Maser, Frühgeschichte, 304 and n.325; Maser, Adolf Hitler, 192. Ilse Heß claimed after the war that her husband had not taken down the text in dictation, but that Hitler had typed it himself with two fingers on an old typewriter, and subsequently, after his release, dictated the second volume to a secretary (Maser, Mein Kampf, 20–21). Given Hitler’s aversion to writing, and the availability of willing hands (including Heß’s) in Landsberg, this seems highly unlikely.

101. Otto Strasser, Hitler und ich, Constance, 1948, 78.

102. Heiden, Hitler, 206; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 172–3.

103. Hammer, ‘Die deutschen Ausgaben’, 163; Görlitz-Quint, 236–43. Ilse Heß claimed somewhat unpersuasively, after the war, that only she and her husband had been involved in what amounted to purely stylistic amendments to Hitler’s text (Maser, Mein Kampf, 22–4).

104. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 173–4.

105. Frank, 45–6. According to Frank, he said that had he guessed in 1924 that he would become Reich Chancellor, he would not have written the book.

106. Heiden, Hitler, 206; Maser, Mein Kampf, 24; Oron James Hale, ‘Adolf Hitler: Taxpayer’, American Historical Review, 60 (1955), 830–42, here 837.

107. Hammer, ‘Die deutschen Ausgaben’, 163; Maser, Mein Kampf, 26–7, 29; [No author given], ‘The Story of Mein Kampf,’ Wiener Library Bulletin, 6 (1952), no.5–6, 31–2, here 31.

108. According to Otto Strasser, Hitler und ich, 60–61, the leading members of the party had privately to admit, during the Nuremberg Rally of 1927, that they had not read the book. See also Karl Lange, Hitlers unbeachtete Maximen: ‘Mein Kampf und die Öffentlichkeit, Stuttgart, 1968. Those well acquainted with Hitler from the earliest days of the party, such as Christian Weber, occasionally made fun of the contents of Mein Kampf (see Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 188).

109. Hitler’s declared gross taxable income largely derived from the sales of Mein Kampf, was 19,843 RM in 1925, dipped to 11,494 RM by 1927, was 15,448 RM in 1929, rising sharply the following year to 48,472 RM, then soaring to 1,232,335 RM in 1933. Hitler was delinquent in paying his tax for 1933, but action by the revenue authorities was first delayed, then stopped when he was declared tax exempt. He paid no taxation, therefore, on the vast royalties earned on Mein Kampf during the Third Reich (Hale, ‘Adolf Hitler: Taxpayer’, 839–41).

110. The outstanding analysis is that of Eberhard Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung. Entwurf einer Herrschaft, Tübingen, 1969; extended and revised 4th edn, Stuttgart, 1991.

111. See MK, 317–58.

112. MK, 372 (trans., MK Watt, 308).

113. MK, 358.

114. See MK, 742–3, 750–52. For the development of the ‘Lebensraum’ idea from its early usage in a programmatic declaration by the Pan-Germans in 1894, see Lange, ‘Der Terminus “Lebensraum”’, 426–37, esp. 428ff.

115. See Martin Broszat, ‘Soziale Motivation’, 392–409, here esp. 403.

116. A point established, against the current interpretation at that time, as early as 1953 by Hugh Trevor-Roper, ‘The Mind of Adolf Hitler’, his introduction to Hitler’s Table Talk, 1941–44, London, 1953, vii–xxxv. Trevor-Roper reinforced the argument in his article ‘Hitlers Kriegsziele’, VfZ,8 (1960), 121–33. But it was only in the light of Jäckel’s masterly analysis of Mein Kampf, in his book Hitlers Weltanschauung, in 1969 that Hitler’s ideas became generally accepted as inherently cohesive as well as consistent.

117. Frank, 45. Subsequent editions of Mein Kampf down to 1939 nevertheless contained, in all, around 2,500 largely minor stylistic corrections (Hammer, 164; Maser, Hitler, 188).

118. See Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, esp. 152–8.

119. The linking role of the Deutschvölkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund in the continuity of extreme antisemitic ideas between the Pan-Germans and the Nazis is excellently brought out in Lohalm, Völkischer Radikalismus.

120. JK, 176–7.

121. MK, 372 (trans., MK Watt, 307).

122. MK, 772 (trans., ΜK Watt, 620).

123. As implied in the title of the important analysis of Nazi anti-Jewish policy by Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz. Nazi Policy toward German Jews 1933–1939, Urbana/Chicago/London, 1970.

124. JK, 646.

125. JK, 703–4.

126. JK, I2I0.

127. JK, 1226.

128. JK, 1242 and n.2–3.

129. Wolfgang Horn, ‘Ein unbekannter Aufsatz Hitlers aus dem Frühjahr 1924’, VfZ, 16 (1968), 287, 288. For the conventionality of Hitler’s Pan-German notion of foreign policy in the early 1920s, see Günter Schubert, Anfänge nationalsozialistischer Außenpolitik, Köln, 1963, esp. ch.1–2; Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, 31–8; and, in particular, Kuhn, Hitlers außenpolitisches Programm, 31–59, esp. 56.

130. Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, 33–4.

131. Horn, ‘Ein unbekannter Aufsatz Hitlers’, 283, 291; Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, 35–6; Geoffrey Stoakes, Hitler and the Quest for World Dominion, Leamington Spa, 1987, 137.

132. Horn, ‘Ein unbekannter Aufsatz Hitlers’, 284–91; Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, 35.

133. Horn, ‘Ein unbekannter Aufsatz Hitlers’, 285, 289–90; Stoakes, 122–35.

134. JK, 96; Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, 39.

135. JK, 427. See also Binion, Hitler among the Germans, 59. The May 1921 speech was shortly after Hitler’s first visit to Ludendorff, who may have put the idea into his head (Auerbach, ‘Hitlers politische Lehrjahre’, 30 n. 127). By the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Russia had withdrawn from the war at a cost of conceding vast tracts of territory to Germany.

136. JK, 505; Stoakes, 96.

137. See Stoakes, 120–21.

138. Stoakes, 118–20.

139. See Stoakes, 135, for Ludendorff’s views, and the possibility of his influence on Hitler.

140. JK, 773 (trans., Stoakes, 137).

141. See Horn, ‘Ein unbekannter Aufsatz Hitlers’; the text is printed in JK, 1216–27.

142. See Heiden, Hitler, 188.

143. Woodruff Smith, 110–11, 164.

144. See Woodruff Smith, esp. ch.6.

145. Woodruff Smith, 224–30. Despite a turgid style, the novel sold 265,000 copies between 1926 and 1933 (Lange, ‘Der Terminus “Lebensraum”’, 433).

146. Woodruff Smith, 223, 240; Lange, ‘Der Terminus “Lebensraum’”, 430–33. The part played by ‘Lebensraum’ in Hitler’s changing ideas on foreign policy at this time is brought out by Kuhn, ch.5, pt.3, 104–21, esp. 115–17.

147. Horn, ‘Ein unbekannter Aufsatz Hitlers’, 293 and n.67.

148. For Haushofer’s denial at Nuremberg that Hitler had understood his works, see Lange, ‘Der Terminus “Lebensraum”’, 432 (where serious doubt is cast on that assertion).

149. Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, 37, points out that it is impossible to establish plainly the direct influence on the development of Hitler’s ideas during the period in Landsberg. Maser, Hitler, 187, takes for granted, on the basis of comments in Mein Kampf,that Hitler knew the theories of Haushofer, Ratzel, and – though he did not read English – the Englishman Sir Halford Mackinder. Haushofer visited Heß in Landsberg. He later admitted that he had seen Hitler, though he denied seeing him alone (Toland, 199). His name does not appear in the list of Hitler’s own visitors (Horn, ‘Ein unbekannter Aufsatz Hitlers’, 293, n.68).

150. See Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, 37; Kuhn, 104–21.

151. Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, 38–41.

152. MK, 741–3(trans., slightly amended, ΜK Watt, 597–8). The first edition of Mein Kampf had ‘Persian Empire’ (Perserreich), not ‘giant Empire’ (Riesenreich) (Hammer, 175; Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, 45 n.32).

153. Hitlers Zweites Buch. Ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928, ed. Gerhard L. Weinberg, Stuttgart, 1961; republished under the title ‘Außenpolitische Standorts-bestimmung nach der Reichstagswahl Juni-Juli 1928’, in RSA, IIA.

154. Monologe, 262.

155. JK, 1210; Tyrell, Führer, 64; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 155.

156. Tyrell, Trommler, 166–7.

157. See Eitner, 75–84.

158. See Tyrell, Trommler, 167.

159. MK, 229–32 (quotations 231–2).

160. MK, 650–51 (trans., MK Watt, 528).

161. MK, 70.

162. Bullock’s formulation (Hitler, 804) – ‘an opportunist entirely without principle’ in a system whose theme was ‘domination, dressed up as the doctrine of race’ – was guided by Hermann Rauschning, Die Revolution des Nihilismus. Kulisse und Wirklichkeit im Dritten Reich, Zürich/New York, 1938, esp. pt.1.

163. Tyrell, Führer, 85.

164. Jochmann, 134 (Fobke to Haase, 21 August 1924).

165. See Tyrell, Trommler, 174.

166. See Broszat, Der Nationalsozialismus, 21–2: ‘The National Socialist ideology has correctly been spoken of as a mixed-brew, a conglomeration, a mush of ideas.’ (‘Man hat mit Recht von der Weltanschauung des Nationalsozialismus als von einem Mischkessel, einem Konglomerat, einem “Ideenbrei” gesprochen’.)

167. See above, n.162.

CHAPTER 8: MASTERY OVER THE MOVEMENT

1. BAK, R43 I/2696, Fol.528. See also Thomas Childers (ed.), The Formation of the Nazi Constituency, 1919–1933, London/Sydney, 1986, 232.

2. See Jürgen Falter, Thomas Lindenberger and Siegfried Schumann (eds.), Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik. Materialien zum Wahlverhalten, Munich, 1986, 45.

3. See Detlev J. K. Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik, Krisenjahre der Klassischen Moderne, Frankfurt am Main, 1987, 125, 132ff., 141–2, 176; Petzina, Abelshauser and Faust (eds.), Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch, Band III, 61, 98, 114–15, 125, 137. The extensive improvements in the framework of a welfare state are dealt with in Ludwig Preller, Sozialpolitik in der Weimarer Republik, Düsseldorf (1949), 1978.

4. See Peter Gay, Weimar Culture, London, 1969.

5. Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik, 175–6.

6. See Michael Kater, Different Drummers. Jazz in the Culture of Nazi Germany, New York/Oxford, 1992, 3–28, for the spread of jazz in the Weimar Republic.

7. BHStA, MA 102 137, RPvOB, HMB, 18 February 1928, S.I.

8. Tyrell, Führer, 382.

9. Tyrell, Führer, 352. The figures given by the party did not take account of those leaving, and are therefore too high.

10. A point made by Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party, vol. 1, 1919–33, Newton Abbot, 1971, 76, of the 1926 party.

11. Tyrell, Trommler, 171.

12. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 163; Lüdecke, 252.

13. Hanfstaengl had on a visit to Landsberg encouraged Hitler to take some physical exercise and play some sport to reduce the weight he was putting on. Hitler rejected the idea on the grounds that ‘a leader cannot afford to be beaten by his followers – not even in gymnastic exercises or in games’ (Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 157).

14. Hanfstaengl, 15Jahre, 164. On Hitler’s later strict vegetarianism, and the varied explanations he and others gave for this, see Schenck, 27–42.

15. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 166–7.

16. Monologe, 260–61, 453, n. 170. Hitler had moaned to Hanfstaengl at Christmas that ‘mein Rudi, mein Hessen’ was still in prison (Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 165).

17. Monologe, 261 (where Hitler remarked that Held had been decent to him at their meeting and that he had later, therefore, ‘done nothing to him’); Karl Schwend, Bayern zwischen Monarchie und Diktatur, Munich, 1954, 298; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 169; Lüdecke, 255; Margarethe Ludendorff, 271–4.

18. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 193–4.

19. Schwend, 298. And see Jablonsky, 155 and 218–19 n.166–7.

20. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 170. The ban automatically ceased with the lifting of the Bavarian state of emergency (Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 245).

21. Tyrell, Führer, 89–93, letter of the later Gauleiter of Pomerania (1927–31), Walther von Corswant-Cuntzow. See also Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 242–3, based on an account in the Münchener Post, 4 February 1925; and Jablonsky, 156. For Reventlow’s public attack on Hitler soon after the‘Preußentagung’, see Horn, Marsch, 213.

22. Tyrell, Führer, 92.

23. Horn, Marsch, 216 and no.23.

24. Horn, Marsch, 212 n.6.

25. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 193–4. In a private letter in July 1925 dealing with Hitler’s relationship with Ludendorff, Rudolf Heß wrote: ‘Herr Hitler never authorized his Excellency Ludendorff to lead the National Socialist Movement. Herr Hitler repeatedly requested his Excellency to withdraw from the petty political dispute immediately after the trial. His Excellency L[udendorff] should retain his name for the nation and not enter it and use it up on behalf of a small party’ (Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1355-I-2, Fol.75, Heß to Kurt Günther, 29 July 1925).

26. Tyrell, Führer, 93–4.

27. Horn, Marsch, 213 and n.13, 214 and n.14; Jablonsky, 158; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 245. The DNVP immediately reformed itself as the DNVB (Deutschvölkische Freiheitsbewegung).

28. Tyrell, Führer, 104.

29. Tyrell, Führer, 71.

30. Hitler rejected the term ‘völkisch’ as unclear. – RSA, I, 3. Despite his statement, some sympathizers of his Movement were still unclear about the attitude towards religion. On his behalf, Rudolf Heß answered a letter from a Fräulein Ilse Harff from Chemnitz on 22 May 1925 by stating that ‘Herr Hitler has never opposed the Christian religion of any denomination, merely parties calling themselves Christian which misuse the Christian religion for political purposes’ (Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1355/I/2, Fol.127).

31. RSA, I, 1–6.

32. Lüdecke, 248.

33. RSA, I, 9.

34. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 51–2; Horn, Marsch, 226–7. Hitler waited more than a year before placing the reorganization of the S A in the hands of Franz Pfeffer von Salomon in autumn 1926.

35. RSA, I, 7–9.

36. Lüdecke, 256.

37. Heiden, Hitler, 198.

38. Jablonsky, 168, based on the police report of the meeting.

39. Rosenberg made plain in his memoirs that he stayed away from the meeting because of resentment which went back to the support Hitler had given during his internment to the clique around Esser and Streicher. He knew that Hitler planned a public display of mutual forgiveness for what had gone on, but wanted no part in the theatricals (Rosenberg, Letzte Aufzeichnungen, 114, 319–20).

40. Lüdecke, 257.

41. Lüdecke, 275.

42. Jablonsky, 168, 220 n.9. At the meeting in Munich in March to dissolve the Völkischer Block, Drexler is reported to have said that it was impossible to work alongside Esser. Nothing separated him from Hitler, but he could not continue with him as long as Esser was there (BHStA, Slg.Personen, Anton Drexler, Miesbacher Anzeiger, 19 May 1925).

43. Lüdecke, 255.

44. RSA, I, 14–28.

45. In his ‘Call to Former Members’ published the previous day, he had promised to account within a year for whether ‘the party again became a movement or the movement became stifled as a party’. In either event, he accepted responsibility (RSA, I, 6).

46. BHStA, MA 101235/I, Pd. Mü., Nachrichtenblatt, 2 March 1925, S.16.

47. BHStA, MA 101235/I, Pd. Mü., Nachrichtenblatt, 2 March 1925, S.16; RSA, I, 28 n.9; Lüdecke, 258.

48. RSA, I, 446, 448.

49. RSA, I, 5, 28 n.9; Horn, Marsch, 216–17 and n.25–6.

50. According to Lüdecke, 253, Hitler fell into a rage about the inadequacies of generals as statesmen when the handling of Ludendorff was broached.

51. Horst Möller, Weimar, Munich, 1985, 54.

52. Ludwig Volk, Der bayerische Episkopat und der Nationalsozialismus 1930–1934, Mainz, 1965, 5, 7.

53. RSA I, 36.

54. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 179–80; Horn, Marsch, 217.

55. See RSA, I, 38 n.2.

56. Lüdecke, 255.

57. Margarethe Ludendorff, 277–8.

58. Winkler, Weimar, 279; Horn, Marsch, 218 states that the choice for Jarres was to prevent embarrassment for Ludendorff. This was surely, however, an excuse rather than a reason.

59. Julius Streicher stated in a speech on 27 March, two days before the election, that the meaning of the election was to show that Germany needed a man like Hitler at its head (cit. Horn, Marsch, 217 n.28).

60. Falter et al., Wahlen, 76. The Communists also registered serious losses, as the radicalization of politics in the Weimar Republic was – temporarily as it turned out – reversed.

61. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 180.

62. The Tannenbergbund was banned in 1933. For image reasons, however, the Ludendorffs were still allowed to publish. There was an official reconciliation of Hitler and Ludendorff in 1937, and at his death in December that year the General was accorded a state funeral. The völkischreligious movement he and his wife founded – the Deutsche Gotterkenntnis (German Knowledge of God) – was even granted formal status (Benz and Grami (eds.), Biographisches Lexikon zur Weimarer Republik, 212–13; Wistrich, Wer war wer im Dritten Reich, 180).

63. The death-throes of the DVFB were to last until 1933, but it was never again a force to be reckoned with (Horn, Marsch, 218 and n.32).

64. Horn, Marsch, 215–16; Joseph Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party, Minneapolis, 1967, 72–3. On 8 March, the NSFB (Völkischer Block) was dissolved in Bavaria, and most members returned to the NSDAP. Four days later, the GVG dissolved itself with a unanimous pledge of support for Hitler and the NSDAP.

65. Tyrell, Führer, 107–8; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 246–7; Horn, Marsch, 222 and n.43. Hitler was permitted during the period of the bans only to speak at private functions – such as the meeting of the Hamburger Nationalklub he addressed in February 1926 – and at closed party meetings (though in Bavaria even speaking at these was for some time prohibited).

66. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 247; Reinhard Kühnl, ‘Zur Programmatik der Nationalsozialistischen Linken. Das Strasser-Programm von 1925/26’, VfZ, 14 (1966), 317–33, here 318.

67. Albert Krebs, Tendenzen und Gestalten der NSDAP, Stuttgart, 1959, 183, 185. Strasser’s importance to the NSDAP is thoroughly examined by Peter D. Stachura, Gregor Strasser and the Rise of Nazism, London, 1983 and Udo Kissenkoetter, Gregor Strasser und die NSDAP, Stuttgart, 1978. Kissenkoetter provides a brief biographical sketch in Ronald Smelser and Rainer Zitelmann (eds.), Die braune Elite, Darmstadt, 1989, 273–85.

68. Nyomarkay, 72–3. In southern Germany, by contrast, the 222 local branches before the putsch (all but thirty-seven in Bavaria), compared with only 140 by late 1925.

69. Tyrell, Führer, 97–9.

70. See Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 207; Tyrell, Führer, 113; Nyomarkay, 71–89; Jeremy Noakes, ‘Conflict and Development in the NSDAP 1924–1927’, Journal of Contemporary History, 1 (1966), 3–36.

71. Noakes, Nazi Party, 65.

72. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 207.

73. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 210–11; Noakes, Nazi Party, 84–5.

74. See Krebs, 187. Goebbels’s radical, ‘national’ brand of ‘socialism’ is heavily emphasized by Ulrich Höver, Joseph Goebbels – ein nationaler Sozialist, Bonn/Berlin, 1992.

75. TBJG, I. i, 99 (27 March 1925). Three substantial biographies of Goebbels appeared during the 1990s: Ralf Georg Reuth, Goebbels, Munich, 1990; Höver (who, however, deals in detail only with the period before 1933); and David Irving, Goebbels. Mastermind of the Third Reich, London, 1996. Shorter character sketches are provided by Elke Fröhlich in Smelser-Zitelmann, Die braune Elite, 52–68, and Fest, Face of the Third Reich, 130–51.

76. Peter Hüttenberger, Die Gauleiter. Studie zum Wandel des Machtgefüges in der NSDAP, Stuttgart, 1969, 33, 223; Shelley Baranowski, The Sanctity of Rural Life. Nobility, Protestantism, and Nazism in Weimar Prussia, New York/Oxford, 1995, 136.

77. TBJG, I.1, 127 (11 September 1925).

78. For public consumption at least, Hitler did not distance himself from the idea at this time. Replying for Hitler on 4 June 1925 to a query from a party sympathizer, Heß was apologetic about the absence of trade unions attached to the Movement, which he blamed on lack of funding (Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1355-I-2, Fol.22, Heß to Alfred Barg, Kohlfurt-Dorf).

79. Noakes, Nazi Party, 85–6.

80. See Krebs, 119.

81. Krebs, 187.

82. This and the following paragraph are based on Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 207–11. See also Noakes, Nazi Party, 71.

83. TBJG, I.1, 126 (11 September 1925). For Fobke’s description of Strasser, see Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 208.

84. Though the meeting had not attained all its goals, Goebbels noted his satisfaction: ‘Everything then, just as we wanted’ (TBJG, I.1, 126 (11 September 1925)).

85. The Göttingen group had regarded the Community as a vehicle for representing its views within the movement, for blocking electoral participation, and for purging the party of Esser and his clique (Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 211).

86. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 212–13. The Briefe appeared for the first time on 1 October 1925. The statutes were approved at the second meeting of the Community, held at Hanover on 22 November 1925.

87. Tyrell, Führer, 116–17; Nyomarkay, 80–81; Kühnl, 321ff. Gregor Strasser recommended to Goebbels the exclusion of all personal factors in the case of Esser and Streicher. Both were in demand as speakers in northern Gaue.

88. Tyrell, Führer, 115–16; Nyomarkay, 80–81; Noakes, Nazi Party, 74.

89. Tyrell, Führer, 119; Noakes, ‘Conflict’, 23ff.; Orlow, i.67–8.

90. Noakes, Nazi Party, 74–5.

91. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 223.

92. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 220; TBJG, I.1, 157 (21 January 1926); Noakes, Nazi Party, 76; Tyrell, ‘Gottfried Feder and the NSDAP’, 48–87, here 69; Horn, Marsch, 237.

93. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 222. It is possible that there was direct criticism of Hitler. But the two witnesses, Otto Strasser, and Franz Pfeffer von Salomon – speaking many years after the events – cannot be relied upon. (See Noakes, Nazi Party, 76–8.)

94. Horn, Marsch, 237–8; Gerhard Schildt, ‘Die Arbeitsgemeinschaft Nord-West. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der NSDAP 1925/6’, Diss.Phil., Freiburg, 1964, 148ff. Hitler had initiated the division of the Reich into Gaue following the refoundation of the party in 1925. There was a good deal of amalgamation and renaming of them in the late 1920s before the organizational structure of the party’s regions settled down. (See Hüttenberger, Gauleiter, 221–4; and Wolfgang Benz, Hermann Grami and Herman Weiß (eds.), Enzyklopädie des Nationalsozialismus, Stuttgart, 1997, 478–9.) Hitler’s chieftains in these areas were his vital props in extending and supporting his leadership in the provinces.

95. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 221. The plebiscite proposal was to fail, on 20 June, to acquire the necessary majority (RSA, I, 296 n.4, 451 n.26).

96. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 220; Tyrell, ‘Feder’, 69–70 and 85 n.105; RSA, I, 294 n.1.

97. Orlow, i.68–9; Nyomarkay, 83–4 and n.45.

98. Tyrell, ‘Feder’, 70.

99. TBJG, I.1, 161 (15 February 1926). Goebbels went on (161–2) to refer to a half hour’s discussion after a speech of four hours. According to the police report, the speech lasted five hours (RSA, I, 294 n.1).

100. VB report in RSA, I, 294–6. See also HStA, MA 101235/II, Pd. Mü., LB, 8 March 1926, S.16.

101. The ‘sic!’ is in the original (TBJG, I.1, 161).

102. Though a member of the Working Community, Ley – described by Fobke in his report on the Community’s first meeting as ‘intellectually a nonentity’ – had distinguished himself as an ‘unconditional supporter of the person of Hitler’ (Jochmann,Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 209).

103. TBJG, I.1, 161–2. Goebbels was reported to have stated, following the Bamberg Meeting: ‘Adolf Hitler betrayed socialism in 1923’ (Tyrell, Führer, 128). On the Bamberg meeting (if inaccurate in detail) see also Krebs, 187–8.

104. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 225; Kühnl, 323.

105. Horn, Marsch, 243 and n.119; Noakes, Nazi Party, 83.

106. Orlow, i.72. He must have had reservations. When Goebbels was in Munich in April, he and Kaufmann were strongly criticized by Hitler for their part in the Working Community and the Gau Ruhr (TBJG, I.1, 172 (13 April 1926)).

107. Stachura, Strasser, 50.

108. Horn, Marsch, 243; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 53.

109. See Horn, Marsch, 242 n. 117; Orlow, i.72; Nyomarkay, 88. Goebbels had to respond publicly to ‘Damascus’ allegations (TBJG, I.1, 204 (25 August 1926)).

110. TBJG, I.1, 134–5(14 October 1925).

111. TBJG, I.1, 141 (6 November 1925), 143 (23 November 1925).

112. Nyomarkay, 87.

113. TBJG, I.1, 167 (21 March 1926): ‘Julius is at least honest,’ he wrote. Strasser advised caution (Noakes, Nazi Party, 82).

114. TBJG, I.1, 169 (29 March 1926).

115. TBJG, I.1, 171 (13 April 1926)

116. Tyrell, Führer, 129; TBJG, I.1, 171–2(13 April 1926). Goebbels gives no indication in his diary of the content of the speech. From Pfeffer’s remarks to Kaufmann, that, having previously thought his and Goebbels’s views on socialism went too far, he was almost persuaded to advocate socialism on the basis of the latter’s speech, it can be presumed that Goebbels watered down his early views considerably for consumption for his Munich audience.

117. TBJG, I.1, 172–3(13 April 1926).

118. TBJG, I.1, 175 (19 April 1926).

119. Horn, Marsch, 247. Martin Broszat, ‘Die Anfänge der Berliner NSDAP, 1926/27’, VfZ, 8 (1960), 88ff; Hüttenberger, Gauleiter, 39 ff .

120. TBJG, I.1, 244 (13 July 1928).

121. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 190.

122. Tyrell, Führer, 103.

123. RSA, I, 430; the police report spoke of around 2,500 members present (RSA, 430 n.18).

124. RSA, I, 431.

125. RSA, I, 437.

126. RSA, I, 430.

127. RSA, I,461–5; Tyrell, Führer, 104, 136–41, 216; Horn, Marsch, 278–9; Orlow, i.72–3.

128. RSA, I, 461; and see Noakes, Nazi Party, 83 n.1.

129. RSA, II/1, 6–12 (quotations, 6, 7).

130. RSA, II/1, 15 n.1. The violence and thuggery of those attending led to a protest resolution of the Weimar town council and heated debate in the Thuringian Landtag. It also brought much welcome publicity for the NSDAP (RSA, II/1, 17 n.3).

131. It was subordinated, until 1934, to the SA. At the time of the Weimar Party Rally of 1926, it was no more than about 200 strong. (See Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head, London, 1969, 17–23.)

132. RSA, II/1, 16 and n.5.

133. Orlow, i.76; text of the speech, RSA, II/1, 17–25. Dinter had used his influence to obtain the National Theatre for the party congress (Tyrell, Führer, 149).

134. TBJG, I.1, 191 (6 July 1926).

135. Orlow, i.76. The party had an estimated 35,000 members at this time. Membership in many localities stagnated in 1926–7. (See Orlow, i.111.)

136. Orlow, i.75.

137. See Lüdecke, 250–52.

138. See Tyrell, Führer, 196.

139. See Krebs, 126–7 on Hitler’s speech in Hamburg in early October 1927.

140. See Krebs, 128.

141. See Hanfstaengl, 183; Krebs, 134–5.

142. The following description draws in the main on Krebs, 126–35.

143. Krebs, 133.

144. Krebs, 132.

145. Krebs, 135.

146. Müller, Wandel, 301.

147. Krebs, 128–9.

148. Tyrell, Führer, 212, letter of Walter Buch, 1 October 1928. The document is a handwritten draft of a letter which may never have been sent.

149. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 183. The ‘coffee-house tirades’ were, presumably, outbursts which Hanfstaengl frequently experienced during the regular gatherings of Hitler and his cronies in Munich’s cafés.

150. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 183–4. A similar incident had apparently caused trouble between Hermann Esser and his wife. According to Hanfstaengl, Hitler also found himself for a time persona non grata in the house of one of his Berlin benefactors, the later Minister for Post Wilhelm Ohnesorge, on account of pathetic professions to his daughter that though he could not marry he could not live without her. The reliability of the story might be justifiably doubted. Similarly, though Hitler greatly enjoyed the company of Winifred Wagner, the wife of the composer’s son, Siegfried, there are no grounds to believe (as was hinted, for instance, by Heiden, Hitler, 349) that the relationship was other than platonic.

151. See the writer Hans Carossa’s impressions in Deuerlein, Hitler, 86.

152. Müller, Wandel, 301.

153. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 157.

154. Krebs, 126.

155. Lüdecke, 252; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 163.

156. Krebs, 129; the Munich police noted in March 1925 that Hitler had bought the black Mercedes as a second car (BHStA, MA 101235/1, PD Mü., Nachrichtenblatt, 2 March 1925, S.17). The car cost a handsome 20,000 Reich Marks – more than Hitler’s declared taxable income in the year 1925. He told the tax authorities that he had purchased the car through a bank loan (Hale, ‘Adolf Hitler: Taxpayer’, 831, 837).

157. See Monologe, 282–3, for Hitler’s preference for Bavarian short trousers.

158. Heiden, Hitler, 184.

159. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 185.

160. Müller, Wandel, 301.

161. See Krebs, 127–9, 132, 134for the above.

162. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 176.

163. Hitler was in Berchtesgaden from 18 July until the end of the month (TBJG, I.1, 194–8(18 July – 1 August 1926)).

164. Monologe, 202–5. The first volume of Mein Kampf, originally intended for publication in March – the printers had pressed Hitler to no avail in February to let them have the final manuscript (Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1355–I–2, Fol.223) – was eventually published on 18 July 1925. Hitler’s dictation must, therefore, have been of the second volume, work which he completed the following summer, not the first volume, as Toland, 211, thought. This is confirmed in a letter by Rudolf Heß on 11 August 1925 in which he states that Hitler ‘is retreating for about 4 weeks to Berchtesgaden to write the second volume of his book’ (Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1355-I-2, Fol.101). The second volume was published on 11 December 1926 (Maser, Mein Kampf, 272, 274).

165. Monologe, 206–7. In his related note, the editor, Werner Jochmann, 439 n.60, dates the renting to 1925, though without source, and in variation from Hitler’s own dating in the text. Heiden, Hitler, 205 also dates it to 1925. Toland, 229, presumes the same date. Hitler himself seemed in no doubt, however, that the year was 1928. It is unlikely that, on a matter of such significance to him, his good factual memory was playing tricks on him. The businessman concerned was Kommerzienrat Winter from Buxtehude, near Hamburg. He had had Haus Wachenfeld built in 1916 (1917 according to Hitler, Monologe, 202) (Josef Weiß, Obersalzberg. The History of a Mountain, Berchtesgaden (n.d., 1955), 59, 67). The house was close to the Platterhof – the new name of what was formerly Pension Moritz. Hanfstaengl thought that the purchase was brought about with the financial help of the Bechsteins. But there is no evidence of this (Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 186).

166. Heiden, Hitler, 205: ‘Seven Years on the Magic Mountain’. Gauleiter Giesler of Munich allegedly referred to the Obersalzberg as the ‘Holy Mountain’ (Weiß, 65).

167. For the Berghof, its prehistory, and its symbolism for Hitler’s rule, see Ernst Hanisch, Der Obersalzberg: das Kehlsteinhaus und Adolf Hitler, Berchtesgaden, 1995.

168. Heiden, Hitler, 207–8.

169. Monologe, 206; TBJG, I.1, 195–7(23–4July 1926).

170. TBJG, I.1, 194–7(18–26 July 1926), quotations, 196, 197.

171. This is presumably one of the two meetings Hitler addressed in Berchtesgaden on 9 and 13 October 1926 (RSA, II/1, 71). Mimi’s mother had died on 11 September. Hitler and Mimi must have met around the end of September or beginning of October.

172. Günter Peis, ‘Hitlers unbekannte Geliebte’, Der Stern, 13 July 1959; see also Maser, Hitler, 312–13, 320–21; Ronald Hayman, Hitler and Geli, London, 1997, 93–6; Nerin E. Gun, Eva Braun – Hitler. Leben und Schicksal, Velbert/Kettwig, 1968, 62–4.

173. Knopp, 135, and see also 143–4. The source of Hitler’s letter is not given.

174. RSA, I, 297 n.1–2(text of the speech, 297–330). Hitler was allowed to speak, despite the still prevailing ban, because it was a closed society.

175. Falter et al., Wahlen, 70; Edgar Feuchtwanger, From Weimar to Hitler. Germany, 1918–33, 2nd edn, London, 1995, 191.

176. RSA, I, 318.

177. Above quotations, RSA, I, 323.

178. RSA, I, 324.

179. RSA, I, 325.

180. RSA, I, 315.

181. RSA, I, 320.

182. RSA, I, 330.

183. See, for a few of many examples: RSA, I, 362 (‘international Jewish stock-exchange and finance capital, supported by Marxist-democratic backers within’); RSA, 1,457 (mission to defend the German people against ‘the Jewish international bloodsuckers’);RSA, I, 476 (‘the profit landed in the pockets of the Jews’); RSA, II/1, 62 (‘the possibility of a German resurrection only in the annihilation of Marxism’, which could not be achieved without ‘a solution of the race problem’); RSA, II/1, 105–6(Hitler claiming to complete Christ’s ‘struggle against the Jew as the enemy of mankind’); RSA, II/1, 110 (the need for struggle against policies which ‘hand over our people to the international stock-exchange and raise Jewish world capitalism to the unrestrained ruler of our Fatherland’ and struggle against ‘the Jewish plague of our press and newspaper poisoning’); RSA,II/1, 119 (‘the international world-Jew is master in Germany’).

184. E.g. RSA, II/2, 567, 742, 848, 858.

185. RSA, II/1, 158. See also RSA, I, 20.

186. He appears to have used the term ‘Lebensraum’ on only one occasion, 30 March 1928 (RSA, II/2, 761).

187. RSA, I, 240–41.

188. RSA, I, 295.

189. RSA, II/I, 17–25, esp. 19–21.

190. MK, 726–58.

191. RSA, II/2, 552.

192. R5A, I, 137.

193. RSA, I, 25.

194. RSA, I, 100.

195. RSA, I, 102, II/1, 408.

196. E.g., RSA, I, 37, 472.

197. RSA, I, 426.

198. TBJG, I.1, 172 (13 April 1926), 196 (23 July 1926).

199. That Hitler held to a more or less coherent social revolutionary programme and consciously aimed to modernize German society has been consistently advanced by Rainer Zitelmann in his studies, notably: Hitler. Selbstverständnis eines Revolutionärs,Hamburg/Leamington Spa/New York, 1987; Adolf Hitler, Göttingen/Zürich, 1989; and ‘Die totalitäre Seite der Moderne’, in Michael Prinz and Rainer Zitelmann (eds.), Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, Darmstadt, 1991, 1–20, here esp. 12f

200. RSA, l , 62.

201. RSA, II/2, 674.

202. Weinberg (ed.), Hitlers Zweites Buch. His dictation of the book can be dated to the last weeks of June and the first week of July 1928 (RSA, IIA, XIX). Gerhard Weinberg’s introduction to the new edition of the work (RSA, HA) – now given the descriptively accurate if less pithy designation ‘Außenpolitische Standortsbestimmung nach der Reichstagswahl’ (Foreign Policy Position after the Reichstag Election) – authoritatively explains the background, timing, and content of the tract. See also Hitlers Zweites Buch, 7, 20;RSA, III/1, xi. For an analysis of the content, see Martin Broszat, ‘Betrachtungen zu “Hitlers Zweitem Buch”’, V fz, 9 (1961), 417–29.

203. Hitlers Zweites Buch, 21–6; RSA, IIA, 1–3.

204. Hitlers Zweites Buch, 21–2; RSA, I, 269–93; MK, 684–725 (with minor stylistic alterations).

205. Hitlers Zweites Buch, 23; RSA, IIA, XVI. The introduction in early 1928 of the Italian language for religious instruction in South Tyrol had prompted the revival of agitation.

206. Hitlers Zweites Buch, 36. Sales of Mein Kampf totalled only 3,015 in 1928, the worst sales figures since the publication of the first edition (RSA, IIA, XXI).

207. RSA, IIA, XXI-XXII.

208. RSA, IIA, 182–7.

209. RSA, IIA, XXIII. In contrast, see Toland’s interpretation, which notably exaggerates the significance of the ‘Second Book’ as the point at which Hitler had ‘seen the light’ and ‘finally come to the realization that his two most urgent convictions – danger from Jews and Germany’s need for sufficient living space – were entwined’ (Toland, 230–32).

210. Full recognition of this was late in coming, and only followed the publication in 1969 of Jäckel’s study, Hitlers Weltanschauung. One of Hitler’s early biographers, Alan Bullock, subsequently recognized that he had been mistaken, in the first edition ofHitler. A Study in Tyranny, in playing down the importance of Hitler’s ideas (Ron Rosenbaum, ‘Explaining Hitler’, 50–70, here 67). Hitler’s ideology figures prominently in Bullock’s later work, Hitler and Stalin. Parallel Lives, London, 1991.

211. Tyrell, Führer, 107–8; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 267–8. The ban had first been lifted in the small state of Oldenburg on 22 May 1926.

212. RSA, II/1, 165–79; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 268–9.

213. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 269–75.

214. RSA, II/1, 179–81.

215. Heiden, Hitler, 221.

216. RSA, II/1, 221 n.2.

217. RSA, II/1, 235, n.2.

218. BHStA, MA 102 137, RPvOB, HMB, 21 March 1927, S.3.

219. BHStA, MA 101 235/II, Pd. Mü., LB, 19 January 1928, S.11.

220. BHStA, MA 101 238/II, Pd. Nbg. – Fürth, LB, 22 November 1927. S.1, 4.

221. Tyrell, Führer, 108 (Prussia, 29 September 1928; Anhalt, November 1928).

222. Tyrell, Führer, 129–30, 163–4. The salute may, indeed, have been used sporadically (as Rudolf Heß claimed) as early as 1921, though he did not deny the likely influence from Fascist Italy. ‘Heil’ had long been used in the Schönerer Pan-German Movement and among Austrian as well as German youth groups as a mode of greeting before the turn of the century. (See Hamann, 347, 349; Klaus Vondung, Magie und Manipulation. Ideologischer Kult und politische Religion des Nationalsozialismus, Göttingen, 1971, 17; and also Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 181–2, for the Heil-Hitler greeting and the growing Führer cult in the party.)

223. Tyrell, Führer, 163–4.

224. See Theodore Abel, Why Hitler came into Power, Cambridge, Mass. (1938), 1986, 73, for Heß’s eulogy of great leadership, claiming the need for a dictator, in a prize essay of 1921 written in a competition sponsored by a German-American on the ‘cause of the suffering of the German people’.

225. Tyrell, Führer, 171.

226. Tyrell, Führer, 169.

227. Tyrell, Führer, 173.

228. Joseph Goebbels, Die zweite Revolution. Briefe an Zeitgenossen, Zwickau, n.d. (1926), 5 (trans., Ernest K. Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda 1925–1945, Michigan, 1965, 199).

229. Abel, 70.

230. Abel, 152–3.

231. Peter Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika, Princeton, 1975, 106.

232. Tyrell, Führer, 167; Hüttenberger, Gauleiter, 19, for Dincklage.

233. Tyrell, Führer, 186–8; and see Rüssel Lemmons, Goebbels and Der Angriff, Lexington, 1994, 23–4.

234. RSA, II/1, 309–11 (18 May 1927), and also 320–22 (25 May 1927); Orlow, i.106; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 64.

235. See Tyrell, Führer, 147–8.

236. See Tyrell, Führer, 388 and illustration 5.

237. Tyrell, Führer, 145; Orlow, 1.96–7and n.86.

238. Albrecht Tyrell, III. Reichsparteitag der NSDAP, 19–21. August 1927, Filmedition G122 des Instituts für den wissenschaftlichen Film, Ser.4 N0.4/G122, Göttingen, 1976, esp. 20–1, 23–5, 42–5. The attendance was lower than had been hoped.

239. Tyrell, Führer, 149, 202–3. Dinter’s book, Die Sünden wider die Zeit (Sins against the Epoch), had appeared in several hundred thousand copies since its publication in 1917, and was a best-seller in nationalist-racist circles. Dinter published his exchange of letters with Hitler in his journalGeistchristentum (Spiritual Christianity).

240. Tyrell, Führer, 149, 208–10; Orlow, i.135–6, 143. Hitler had written in firm but conciliatory vein to Dinter in July, inviting him to discussions. Dinter had been summoned by telegram to the Party Leaders’ Conference in September, but had failed to turn up.

241. Tyrell, Führer, 210–11.

242. Tyrell, Führer, 203–5.

243. Tyrell, Führer, 225–6.

244. See Tyrell, Führer, 170 (Heß to Hewel, 30 March 1927); and Krebs, 127 (Hamburg speech, October 1927).

245. Tyrell, Führer, 225. The total of 20,000 speeches given by only 300 or so party speakers during 1928 puts the number of Hitler speeches – though not of course their impact – into perspective (Tyrell, Führer, 224). Worries about his health may have been at least in part responsible for the decline in frequency of his speaking engagements. See David Irving, The Secret Diaries of Hitler’s Doctor, paperback edn, London, 1990, 31–2, for Hitler’s later comments about his violent stomach spasms in 1929.

246. Tyrell, Führer, 225, and 219–20 for the party’s financial problems; see also Orlow, i.109–10.

247. Turner, German Big Business, 83–99; Orlow, i.110 n.137.

248. Orlow, i.109.

249. With typical exaggeration, Hitler told Goebbels nine years later that he had been so distressed at the party’s financial state that he had thought of shooting himself. Then Kirdorf had come along with his contribution (TBJG, I.2, 727 (15 November 1936)). Turner, German Big Business, 91 regards the gift as ‘improbable’, though he refers (cf. 386 nn. 15, 17) only to the post-war memoirs of August Heinrichsbauer and Albert Speer’s recollections of Hitler’s comments, and not to Goebbels’s diary entry. For the intermediacy of Elsa Bruckmann, see Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 285–6. Kirdorf asked Hitler to put down his views in a brochure to be distributed privately to industrialists (Adolf Hitler, Der Weg zum Wiederaufstieg, Munich, August 1927; reprinted in RSA, II/2, 501–9). Kirdorf, formerly a member of the DNVP, resigned his membership of the Nazi party in 1928, within a year of joining, because of the ‘socialist’ aims of the party, but was an honoured guest at the 1929 Party Rally and rejoined the NSDAP in 1934.

250. According to the party’s own issue of membership cards, the number of members was 50,000 in December 1926 – still lower than before the putsch – 70,000 in November 1927, 80,000 on the eve of the 1928 election, and 100,000 by October 1928 (Tyrell,Führer, 352). These figures take no account of the considerable numbers leaving the party, nor of blocks of cards issued but not occupied. Real numbers were, therefore, substantially smaller. Local membership figures reveal stagnating membership (Orlow, i.110–11). See Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 291, for more exact figures for the distribution of membership cards by end of 1927 (72,590, marking a rise of 23,067 in the year).

251. Tyrell, Führer, 196.

252. Tyrell, Führer, 222.

253. Orlow, i.58–9. Philipp Bouhler became business manager (Reichsgeschäftsführer) of the party after its refoundation in 1925 and rose rapidly through the ranks of the NSDAP, ultimately becoming Chef der Kanzlei des Führers and head of the ‘Euthanasia Programme’. For a pen-portrait, see Wistrich, 29.

254. Stachura, Strasser, 62–5, 67ff.; Tyrell, Führer, 224.

255. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 287.

256. Peter Stachura, ‘Der kritische Wendepunkt? Die NSDAP und die Reichstagswahlen vom 20. Mai 1928’, VfZ, 26 (1978), 66–99, here 79–80.

257. Tyrell, Führer, 188.

258. Tyrell, Führer, 150.

259. See Bradley F. Smith, Heinrich Himmler 1900–1926. Sein Weg in den deutschen Faschismus, Munich, 1979; Peter Padfield, Himmler. Reichsführer-SS, London, 1990; character sketches of Himmler are provided by Fest, Face of the Third Reich, 171–90; and Josef Ackermann, in Smelser-Zitelmann, Die braune Elite, 115–33.

260. Tyrell, Führer, 224.

261. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 292; Tyrell, Führer, 193.

262. Orlow, i.151 speaks of a ‘new propaganda strategy, the rural-nationalist plan’, to replace the failed ‘urban plan’. (See also i.138.) Stachura, ‘Wendepunkt?’, 93 (discussion of the relevant literature, 66 n.2) also sees a fundamental shift, but as a consequence of the poor election results.

263. Frankfurter Zeitung, 26 January 1928, cit. in Philipp W. Fabry, Mutmaßungen über Hitler. Urteile von Zeitgenossen, Düsseldorf, 1979, 28.

264. See Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 249–50, cit. a Weltbühne comment of 17 March 1925, registering the ‘death’ of the völkisch movement.

265. See, for example, BHStA, MA 102 137, RPvOB, HMB, 19 May 1928, S.1: ‘In broad circles there is indifference towards the electioneering of the party leaderships’. The Nazi campaign remained largely confined to towns and cities (Geoffrey Pridham,Hitler’s Rise to Power. The Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923–1933, London, 1973, 80.) The turn-out was the lowest (75.6 per cent) of any Weimar Reichstag election (Falter et ai, Wahlen, 71).

266. See e.g. RSA, III/2, 202 for Hitler’s criticism in April 1929 of the ‘20, 30 and more parties’ and politicized economic interest groups, a reflection of the division in all areas.

267. Falter et al., Wahlen, 44.

268. The Völkisch-Nationaler Block put up its own candidates in 1928 and, to the NSDAP’s pleasure, gained only 0.9 per cent (266,430 votes) of the vote and not a single seat (Stachura, ‘Wendepunkt?’, 91).

269. Stachura, ‘Wendepunkt?’, 85–7. The party subsequently acknowledged publicly that ‘the election results of the rural areas have proved that with a smaller expenditure of energy, money, and time, better results can be achieved than in the big cities’ VB, 31 May 1928, cit. in Noakes, Nazi Party, 123).

270. Noakes, Nazi Party, 121–3).

271. Falter et al., Wahlen, 71; and Stachura, ‘Wendepunkt?’, 85–6, for derisory levels of support for the NSDAP in eastern regions. For the drop in votes for the DNVP, see also Baranowski, Sanctity, 127–8.

272. TBJG, I.1, 226 (22 May 1928), for Goebbels’s appreciation of the importance of his immunity from prosecution. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 192, recalled Göring’s satisfaction at free first-class travel on the Reichsbahn and other material advantages from becoming a Reichstag deputy. According to Hanfstaengl, Göring had threatened Hitler with an ultimatum: he was to be put on the candidate’s list, or he and Hitler would part as opponents. Hitler conceded.

273. Cit. Stachura, ‘Wendepunkt?’, 81, from Der Angriff, 30 May 1928.

274. Orlow, i.132.

275. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 293; and see Stachura, ‘Wendepunkt?’, 91.

276. Orlow, i.137–8; RSA, III/1, 22, 35. For Hitler’s passivity and near contemptuous indifference at the proceedings of the conference, condemning them to pointlessness since those attending looked all the time for decisions from Hitler that never came, see Krebs, 131–2(misdated to October).

277. RSA, III/1, 56–62. For Gregor Strasser’s organizational plan, see Stachura, ‘Wendepunkt?’, 94; Orlow, i.139–41.

278. Stachura, ‘Wendepunkt?’, 95.

279. RSA, II/2, 847.

280. RSA, III/1, XI; also RSA, IIA, XIV, XIX.

281. Tyrell, Führer, 289.

282. RSA, III/1, 3.

283. Wilhelm Hoegner, Der schwierige Außenseiter. Erinnerungen eines Abgeordneten, Emigranten und Ministerpräsidenten, Munich, 1959, 48; Stachura, ‘Wendepunkt?’, 90.

284. The ban was terminated on 28 September 1928 (RSA, III/1, 236 n.2). Hitler had spoken on 13 July to around 5,000 in Berlin, but at a closed party meeting. (RSA, III/1, 11–22; TBJG, I.1, 245 (14 July 1928)).

285. RSA, III/1, 236–40; TBJG, I.1, 291 (17 November 1928). Goebbels commented that the hall was closed by the police with 16,000 inside. The VB’s estimate (see RSA, III, 236 n.2) was 18,000.

286. RSA, III/1, 238–9.

287. RSA, III/1, 239.

288. See Sefton Delmer, Trail Sinister, London, 1961, 101–2.

289. Bernd Weisbrod, Schwerindustrie in der Weimarer Republik, Wuppertal, 1978, 415–56.

290. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 297–8; Kolb, Die Weimarer Republik, 90. The annual average for 1929, at a little under 2 millions, was around half a million higher than the previous year. There was also a sharp rise in the numbers of workers on short-time (Petzina et al., 119, 122).

291. Joseph P. Schumpeter, Aufsätze zur Soziologie, Tübingen, 1953, 225.

292. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 296.

293. See Winkler, Weimar, ch.10; Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik, ch.7.

294. Ten per cent of the working-age population and 18 per cent of trade unionists were unemployed in 1926 (Petzina et al., 119). For the extensive alienation of working-class youth, see Peter D. Stachura, The Weimar Republic and the Younger Proletariat,London, 1989. The particularly severe impact of unemployment on youth is dealt with by Dick Geary, ‘Jugend, Arbeitslosigkeit und politischer Radikalismus am Ende der Weimarer Republik’, Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 4/5 (1983), 304–9.

295. See Larry Eugene Jones, ‘The Dying Middle: Weimar Germany and the Fragmentation of Bourgeois Polities’, Central European History, 5 (1969), 23–54; and his book, German Liberalism and the Dissolution of the Weimar Party System, 1918–1933,Chapel Hill, 1988.

296. See Heinrich August Winkler, ‘Extremismus der Mitte? Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte der nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung’, VfZ, 20 (1972), 175–91. Harold James, ‘Economic Reasons for the Collapse of the Weimar Republic’, in Ian Kershaw (ed.),Weimar. Why did German Democracy Fail?, London, 1990, 30–57, here 47, points out that in the 1928 election, a quarter of the total vote went to parties with an individual share of under 5 per cent.

297. James, ‘Economic Reasons’, 32–45. The underlying structural economic weaknesses of the Weimar Republic were most emphatically outlined by Knut Borchardt in his Wachstum, Krisen, Handlungsspielräume der Wirtschaftspolitik, Göttingen, 1982.

298. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 297.

299. RSA, III, 245–53.

300. See Baldur von Schirach, 17–25, 58–61, 68; Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, 332–54; and Michael Wortmann’s pen-portrait in Smelser-Zitelmann, Die braune Elite, 246–57. Figures for the Nazi successes in student union elections are given in Tyrell,Führer, 380–81.

301. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 299–301; Hitler’s own accounts, in articles published in the VB, are printed in RSA, III/2, 105–14. Orlow, i.154, referred to them as among ‘the few humanly moving articles [Hitler] ever wrote’. The vivid, and rich, descriptive style is not, however, typically Hitlerian and suggests considerable editorial embellishment of the text. For ‘Wöhrden’s Night of Blood’ (Blutnacht von Wöhrden), see also Gerhard Stoltenberg, Politische Strömungen im schleswig-holsteinischen Landvolk 1918–1933,Düsseldorf, 1962, 147; and Rudolf Heberle, Landbevölkerung und Nationalsozialismus. Eine soziologische Untersuchung der politischen Willensbildung in Schleswig-Holstein 1918 bis 1932, Stuttgart, 1963, 160.

302. For use of the term ‘crisis before the crisis’, see Dietmar Petzina, ‘Was there a Crisis before the Crisis? The State of the German Economy in the 1920s’, in Jürgen Baron von Kruedener (ed.), Economic Crisis and Political Collapse. The Weimar Republic 1924–1933, New York/Oxford/Munich, 1990, 1–19.

303. RSA, III/2, 202–13, 233–6, 238–9, 260–62.

304. RSA, III/2, 210.

305. RSA, III/2, 238.

306. Orlow, i.161–2; Stachura, Strasser, 69. Some support for the suggestion that Himmler was responsible for the tactic of ‘speaker concentration’ is offered by two letters from Gauleiter Kube to Himmler from 23 June and 4 November 1928 in BDC, Parteikanzlei, Correspondence, Heinrich Himmler.

307. See Ellsworth Faris, ‘Takeoff Point for the National Socialist Party: The Landtag Election in Baden, 1929’, Central European History, 8 (1975), 140–71, here 168. The penetration of social networks by the Nazis is emphasized by Rudy Koshar, Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism: Marburg, 1880–1935, Chapel Hill, 1986; and, for Catholic districts in the Black Forest, by Oded Heilbronner, ‘The Failure that Succeeded: Nazi Party Activity in a Catholic Region in Germany, 1929–32’, Journal of Contemporary History, 27 (1992), 531–49; and ‘Der verlassene Stammtisch. Vom Verfall der bürgerlichen Infrastruktur und dem Aufstieg der NSDAP am Beispiel der Region Schwarzwald’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 19 (1993), 178–201.

308. Orlow, i.162.

309. See Faris, 168.

310. Falter et al, Wahlen, 108.

311. Falter et al., Wahlen, 98; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 302.

312. RSA, III/2, 275–7, 277 n.3; Pridham, 85–6.

313. Falter et al., Wahlen, 90; Faris, 144–6.

314. RSA, III/2, 291 n.10.

315. Winkler, Weimar, 346 ff.

316. RSA, III/2, 290 n.1; Winkler, Weimar, 354. Hitler took the decision to join without consulting other leading figures in the party (Orlow, i.173).

317. RSA, III/2, 292 n.1.

318. Orlow, i.173. Goebbels claimed to be on the scent of a plot by Otto Strasser and his supporters against Hitler in early August 1929. Though this was a reflection of Goebbels’s paranoia, Hitler’s dealings with the ‘reaction’ had indeed sharpened the growing antagonism of the ‘national revolutionary’ grouping around Otto Strasser (TBJG, I.1, 405 (3 August 1929); Tb Reuth, i.393–4, note 54).

319. Winkler, Weimar, 354–6. Nine out of thirty-five electoral districts returned over a fifth of votes in favour of the plebiscite proposal.

320. The VB’s circulation was still only 18,400 (for a membership of around 150,000) (Tyrell, Führer, 223).

321. Albrecht Tyrell, IV. Reichsparteitag der NSDAP, Nürnberg 1929, Filmedition G140 des Instituts für den wissenschaftlichen Film, Ser.4, Nr.5/G140, Göttingen, 1978, 6–7; Orlow, i.173; RSA, III/2, 313–55, 357–61.

322. Otto Wagener, Hitler aus nächster Nähe. Aufzeichnungen eines Vertrauten 1929–1932, ed. Henry A. Turner, 2nd edn, Kiel, 1987, 16–17 (and 7–21 for a description of the Rally and the deep impression it made on Wagener). See also the description inTBJG, I.i, 403–6(1–6August 1929).

323. Tyrell, Reichsparteitag 1929, 6, 14.

324. Orlow, i.167, 169.

CHAPTER 9: BREAKTHROUGH

1. Abel, 126–7.

2. Abel, 126.

3. For the social structure of the party membership, see, among an extensive literature, Kater, Nazi Party, and Detlef Mühlberger, Hitler’s Followers. Studies in the Sociology of the Nazi Movement, London, 1991 (containing, in ch.1, a detailed survey of the historiography).

4. Abel, 119.

5. See Juan J. Linz, ‘Political Space and Fascism as a Late-Comer: Conditions Conducive to the Success or Failure of Fascism as a Mass Movement in Inter-War Europe’, in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (eds.), Who Were the Fascists?, Bergen/Oslo/Tromso, 1980, 153–89.

6. Orlow, i.175 and n.166.

7. See, amid a vast literature, Harold James, The German Slump. Politics and Economics, 1924–1936, Oxford, 1986; and Dieter Petzina, ‘Germany and the Great Depression’, Journal of Contemporary History, 4 (1969), 59–74; Petzina et al., 84, provide the bare statistical indices of the economic crisis and social misery. See also Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik, 245–6. Wilhelm Treue (ed.), Deutschland in der Weltwirtschaftskrise in Augenzeugenberichten, 2nd edn, Düsseldorf, 1967, esp. 245–53, provides some contemporary reflections of the social distress.

8. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 305–6.

9. RSA, III/3, 63.

10. Tyrell, Führer, 383; Falter et al., Wahlen, 90, 97, 107, III; Martin Broszat, Die Machtergreifung. Der Aufstieg der NSDAP und die Zerstörung der Weimarer Republik, Munich, 1984, 103.

11. RSA, III/3, 59–60; Fritz Dickmann, ‘Die Regierungsbildung in Thüringen als Modell der Machtergreifung’, VfZ, 14 (1966), 454–64, here 461.

12. See Dickmann, 460–64.

13. RSA, III/3, 6o.

14. RSA, III/3, 61–2. Günther was appointed to the Chair of Social Anthropology at Jena in 1930.

15. Broszat, Die Machtergreifung, 108. See Donald R. Tracy, ‘The Development of the National Socialist Party in Thuringia 1924–30’, Central European History, 8 (1975), 23–50, esp. 42–4, for Frick’s period of office.

16. Tyrell, Führer, 352; RSA, III/3, 62 n.22. It has been estimated that real membership was probably some 10–15 Per cent below the level given by the party. See ch.8, n 250.

17. For the following account, see William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, revised edn, New York, 1984, here esp. 28–34.

18. Allen, 32.

19. Allen, 33.

20. Allen, 84. See Donald L. Niewyk, The Jews in Weimar Germany, Louisiana/Manchester, 1980, ch.3, esp. 79–91, and Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the ‘Jewish Question,’ Princeton, 1984, ch.2, esp. 88–90, for studies supporting this assertion.

21. Tyrell, Führer, 308.

22. See Allen, 32–3, and the works by Koshar and Heilbrunner indicated in ch.8 n.307.

23. Rudolf Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism. A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany, Baton Rouge, 1945, 109–11.

24. See Bessel, ‘The Rise of the NSDAP’, 20–29, esp. 26–7.

25. RSA, III/3, 63.

26. Tyrell, Führer, 327.

27. Wagener, 126–7.

28. Tyrell, 310, 327–8 (Hierl Denkschrift, 22 October 1929).

29. See Wagener, 127, reported comments of Gregor Strasser.

30. Winkler, Weimar, 366–71.

31. Broszat, Die Machtergreifung, 109–10; Winkler, Weimar, 367, 371.

32. Winkler, Weimar, 368–71.

33. Winkler, Weimar, 363.

34. Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, ed. Karl Dietrich Bracher et al., Bd.4/1, Politik und Wirtschaft in der Krise 1930–1932. Quellen zur Ära Brüning, Teil I, Bonn, 1980, 15–18, Doc. 7, here 15 (Aufzeichnung von Graf Westarp über eine Unterredung mit Reichspräsident v. Hindenburg, 15 January 1930); Broszat, Die Machtergreifung, 110–11.

35. Kolb, Die Weimarer Republik, 127–8; Winkler, Weimar, 378–81; Broszat, Die Machtergreifung, 111.

36. See Mommsen, Die verspielte Freiheit, 320.

37. Tyrell, Führer, 383. The election was held on 22 June 1930. The Nazis won fourteen of the ninety-six seats in the Saxon Landtag.

38. TBJG, I.1, 577–82 (18–29 July 1930).

39. Nyomarkay, 98 n.67; Tyrell, Führer, 312. With Gregor Strasser so heavily committed as Organization Leader of the NSDAP, Otto had become the effective head of the publishing house.

40. Tyrell, Führer, 312–13; Nyomarkay, 96–8.

41. TBJG, I.1, 492–3(30–31 January 1930), 496–503 (6–22 February 1930). See also Lemmons, 44–7; Reuth, 163–5.

42. TBJG, I.1, 492 (31 January 1930).

43. See Reuth, 164–5 and Tb Reuth, ii.451 n.14 for the suggestion that this was possibly because of the prospect of spring elections, given the crisis of the government.

44. TBJG, I.1, 507 (2 March 1930). On the death of Wessel, see Thomas Oertel, Horst Wessel. Untersuchung einer Legende, Cologne, 1988, esp. 83–105. For Goebbels’s irritation at Hitler’s refusal to attend Horst Wessel’s funeral, on 1 March, see ΤΒJG, l.1, 507 (1–2 March 1930); see also Reuth, 161. Hitler was dissuaded by Göring, despite Goebbels’s pleas, from attending the funeral because of the tension and threat of violence (Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 204). Despite heavy police cordons, there were indeed disturbances between Communists and Nazis leading to a number of serious injuries (Oertel, 101–3; TBJG, I.1, 507–8 (1–2 March 1930)). The ‘Horst-Wessel-Lied’ became, under Goebbels’s influence (though he privately thought little of its musical qualities) the party’s own anthem and, especially after 1933, was frequently sung on major representative occasions after ‘Deutschland, Deutschland über alles’, the national anthem. Horst Wessel had provided only the text of the tune associated with him; the melody derived from an old army song (Oertel, 106–13).

45. TBJG, I.1, 507 (2 March 1930), 515 (16 March 1930).

46. TBJG, I.1, 515 (16 March 1930).

47. TBJG, I.1, 524 (5 April 1930).

48. TBJG, I.1, 528 (13 April 1930).

49. TBJG, I.1, 538 (28 April 1930); RSA, III/3, 168–9; Tyrell, Führer, 331–2.

50. TBJG, I.1, 538 (28 April 1930).

51. Strasser, Hitler und ich , 101 .

52. Strasser, Hitler und ich, 105–6. The discussions are summarized by Patrick Moreau, Nationalsozialismus von links, Stuttgart, 1984, 30–35.

53. Strasser, Hitler und ich, 106.

54. Strasser, Hitler und ich, 104–7. An earlier version, which can be taken as authentic, since it was based on notes made at the time and was not disclaimed by the Nazis, was published by Strasser, in the form of a polemical pamphlet, immediately following the meeting: Otto Strasser,Ministersessel oder Revolution?, Berlin, 1930. See Moreau, 205, n.48. The pamphlet contained Otto Strasser’s version of his dialogue with Hitler in May, which later served as the basis of his book Hitler und ich. Hitler’s comments on socialism were similar to those he had made at the meeting of party leaders in Munich on 27 April (RSA, III/3, 168 n.4). At his meeting with Otto Strasser, there were also serious disagreements about foreign policy, on which Hitler upheld the notion of an alliance with Britain (Otto Strasser, Hitler und ich, 108–9; Nyomarkay, 99). See Gregor Strasser’s comments – critical of his brother and of his ‘One-sided’ account of the meeting – in his letter to the Sudeten leader Rudolf Jung of 22 July 1930 (Tyrell, Führer, 332–3).

55. Strasser, Hitler und ich, 104. The diffuseness of the party’s programme meant that total subordination to the Leader was the only device to prevent fragmentation. As Baldur von Schirach pointed out, with reference to this period, ‘practically every leading National Socialist had his own National Socialism’ (B. v. Schirach, 87).

56. Strasser, Hitler und ich, 107.

57. Strasser, Hitler und ich, 112–14.

58. TBJG , I.1 , 550 (22 May 1930).

59. Tyrell, Führer, 333.

60. TBJG, I.1, 561 (14 June 1930).

61. TBJG, I.1, 568 (30 June 1930); Otto Strasser’s published account was in his pamphlet, Ministersessel oder Revolution?

62. TBJG, I.1, 564 (23 June 1930).

63. TBJG, I.1, 565–6 (26 June 1930).

64. TBJG, I.1, 567 (29 June 1930). Goebbels wanted Hitler to attend a meeting of the membership of Gau Berlin at which he planned a showdown with his enemies. (See Reuth, 167–8;Tb Reuth, ii.493 n.54.)

65. RSA, III/3, 250 n.15.

66. TBJG, I.1, 568 (30 June 1930).

67. RSA, III/3, 249–50; TBJG, I.1, 568 (1 July 1930);Tb Reuth, ii.493 n.54·

68. RSA, ΠΙ/3, 264 n.4; Moreau, 41, and 35–40 for the build-up to the expulsion.

69. TBJG, I.1, 569 (I July 1930).

70. TBJG, I.1 570 (3 July 1930).

71. TBJG, I.1, 572 (6 July 1930).

72. TBJG,.I.1, 576 (16 July 1930), with reference to the suggestion – which in the event did not materialize into anything – that Gregor Strasser should become Minister for the Interior and for Labour in Saxony.

73. TBJG, I.1, 582 (29 July 1930). The former Barlow-Palais in Briennerstraße had been bought by the NSDAP on 26 May 1930 – the earlier headquarters in Schellingstraße had become far too cramped, given the party’s expansion – and was soon known as the ‘Brown House’. A special levy of at least 2 Marks per head for party members (though not SA and SS members) was imposed to help fund the purchase. (See RSA, III/3, 207–9, and 209 n.17.)

74. TBJG, I.1, 581 (28 July 1930).

75. RSA, III/3, 249 n.4.

76. Orlow, i.210–11; Tyrell, Führer, 312; Nyomarkay, 102.

77. RSA, III/3, 264; TBJG, I.1, 566 (26 June 1930).

78. Tyrell, Führer, 332–3. See TBJG, I.1, 571 (5 July 1930): ‘Gregor ist voll Sauwut auf seinen Bruder’ (‘Gregor is in a steaming rage at his brother’).

79. See Benz/Graml, Biographisches Lexikon, 333, for a brief summary of Otto Strasser’s subsequent political career.

80. Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter. The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919–1933, Chapel Hill/London, 1983, 138–9, 317 n.72, cit. VB, 20–21 July 1930; Orlow, i.183.

81. A brown uniform, based on the khaki shirts and trousers of the German colonial troops in East Africa before the war, had been worn by stormtroopers as early as 1921. It was officially adopted by the party in 1926, after which the term ‘Brownshirts’ was used to depict the NSDAP, especially by the opponents of the Nazis (Benz, Graml, and Weiß, Enzyklopädie des Nationalsozialismus, 403).

82. Wilfried Boehnke, Die NSDAP im Ruhrgebiet, 1920–1933, Bad Godesberg, 1974, 147, cit. Dortmunder General-Anzeiger, 5 May 1930.

83. Rainer Hambrecht, Der Aufstieg der NSDAP in Mittel und Oberfranken (1925–1933), Nuremberg, 1976, 201.

84. Hambrecht, 186–7.

85. Childers, Nazi Voter, 139; RSA, III/3, 114 n.9, 322; Gerhard Paul, Aufstand der Bilder. Die NS-Propaganda vor 1933, Bonn, 1990, 125.

86. Orlow, i.183; RSA, III/3, VIII-X. The following analysis of the speeches is based on the texts of the twenty speeches held from 3 August to 13 September 1930 in RSA, III/3, 295–418.

87. RSA III/3, 408 n.2. According to the police report, which gave the estimated attendance, Hitler made a tired impression at first, and his audience showed signs of being bored, at least by the first part of his speech. Goebbels’s record was quite different. ‘For the first time in Berlin really big,’ he wrote (TBJG, I.1, 601 (11 September 1930)). Hitler had to cancel a further speech the same evening through exhaustion.

88. RSA, III/3, 413 n.1.

89. See Thomas Childers, ‘The Middle Classes and National Socialism’, in David Blackbourn and Richard Evans (eds.), The German Bourgeoisie, London/New York, 1993, 328–40; and Thomas Childers, ‘The Social Language of Politics in Germany. The Sociology of Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic’, American Historical Review, 95 (1990), 331–58.

90. RSA, III/3, 368, for example. See also 391.

91. RSA, III/3 , 317.

92. RSA, III/3, 411.

93. RSA, III/3, 355, for example. See also 337, where Hitler indicated that the only way out was through the re-establishment of foreign-political power.

94. RSA , III/3, 410.

95. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 314. Carl von Ossietzky suffered imprisonment for his attacks on the Reichswehr even during the later years of the Weimar Republic. He was arrested by the Nazis at the end of February 1933 and spent over three and a half years in concentration camps. Following an international campaign, he was awarded at the end of 1936, while still in the hands of the Gestapo, the Nobel Peace Prize for 1935. He died in May 1938 of tuberculosis brought on by the conditions he endured in the concentration camps. (See Benz/Graml, Biographisches Lexikon, 244; Elke Suhr, Carl von Ossietzky. Eine Biografíe, Cologne, 1988.)

96. See, for example, Martin Broszat, ‘Zur Struktur der ΝS-Massenbewegung’, VfZ, 31 (1983), 52–76, esp. 66–7; Michael H. Kater, ‘Generationskonflikt als Entwicklungsfaktor in der ΝS-Bewegung vor 1933’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 11 (1985), 217–43; Jürgen Reulecke, ‘“Hat die Jugendbewegung den Nationalsozialismus vorbereitet?” Zum Umgang mit einer falschen Frage’, in Wolfgang R. Krabbe (ed.), Politische Jugend in der Weimarer Republik, Bochum, 1993, 222–43; Ulrich Herbert, ‘“Generation der Sachlichkeit”. Die völkische Studentenbewegung der frühen zwanziger Jahre in Deutschland’, in Frank Bajohr, Werner Johe and Uwe Lohalm (eds.), Zivilisation und Barbarei, Hamburg, 1991, 115–44.

97. See Karl Epting, Generation der Mitte, Bonn, 1953, 169. For the emphasis on the ‘national community’ (Volksgemeinschaft) in Nazi ideology, see Bernd Stöver, Volksgemeinschaft im Dritten Reich, Düsseldorf, 1993, ch.2.

98. Merkl, 12.

99. Merkl, 32–3, 453, 522–3.

100. The lack of ideological reflection among ‘old fighters’ of the NSDAP and among SA men is emphasized by Christoph Schmidt, ‘Zu den Motiven “alter Kämpfer” in der NSDAP’, in Detlev Peukert and Jürgen Reulecke (eds.), Die Reihen fast geschlossen,Wuppertal, 1981, 21–43, here 32–4; and Conan Fischer, Stormtroopers. A Social, Economic, and Ideological Analysis 1925–35, London, 1983, ch.6.

101. See Noakes, Nazi Party, 162–82; Orlow, i.193; Tyrell, Führer, 310.

102. Zdenek Zofka, Die Ausbreitung des Nationalsozialismus auf dem Lande, Munich, 1979, 89–90, 96, 105–16, 154, 341–50; Baranowski, Sanctity, 150off. An over-emphasis on economic rationality as the determinant of Nazi support, as in William Brustein,The Logic of Evil. The Social Origins of the Nazi Party 1925–1933, New Haven/London, 1996, nevertheless produces a distorted perspective.

103. Falter et al., Wahlen, 41, 44.

104. Falter et al., Wahlen, 108.

105. TBJG, I.1, 522 (I April 1930)

106. TBJG, I.1, 600 (9 September 1930)

107. Monologe, 170. In a speech on 20 August, he had mentioned the figure of 50 and 100 seats, but only to emphasize that no one could know how the election would turn out, and that the important thing was the continuation of the struggle as soon as it was over (RSA, III/3, 359). According to Hanfstaengl, Hitler was privately expecting between thirty and forty seats (Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 207).

108. TBJG, I.1, 603 (15–16 September 1930).

109. TBJG, I.1, 603 (16 September 1930); Monologe, 170.

110. Falter et al., Wahlen, 44; Broszat, Machtergreifung, 112–13.

111. Jürgen W. Falter, Hitlers Wähler, Munich, 1991, 111, 365, and see the detailed analysis of Nazi voter support in ch.5.

112. Falter et al., Wahlen, 44; Falter, Hitlers Wähler, 81–101, 365. See also Jürgen W. Falter, ‘The National Socialist Mobilisation of New Voters’, in Childers, Formation, 202–31.

113. Falter et al., Wahlen, 71–2.

114. Falter, Hitlers Wähler, 287.

115. Falter, Hitlers Wähler, 143–6.

116. Winkler, Weimar, 3 89; Jürgen W. Falter, ‘Unemployment and the Radicalisation of the German Electorate 1928–1933: An Aggregate Data Analysis with Special Emphasis on the Rise of National Socialism’, in Peter D. Stachura (ed.), Unemployment and the Great Depression in Weimar Germany, London, 1986, 187–208.

117. Falter, Hitlers Wähler 287–9; Childers, Nazi Voter, esp. 268, where he describes the NSDAP as ‘a unique phenomenon in German electoral politics, a catchall party of protest’.

118. See, esp., the studies of Mühlberger and Kater mentioned in n.3 to this chapter.

119. Mühlberger, 206–7.

120. Broszat, ‘Struktur’, 61.

121. Hambrecht, 307–8.

122. See the studies of Koshar, Heilbronner, and Zofka referred to in ch.8 n.307, and above n.102.

123. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 318.

124. Scholdt, 488.

125. Weigand von Miltenberg (= Herbert Blank), Adolf Hitler–Wilhelm III, Berlin, 1931, 7; Fabry, 30; Schreiber, Hitler. Interpretationen, 44 n.64.

126. Miltenberg (= Blank), 7.

127. See Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 323; Heinrich August Winkler, Der Weg in die Katastrophe. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik 1930 bis 1933, Berlin/Bonn, 1987, ch.2, pt.3, 207ff; Gerhard Schulz, Von Brüning zu Hitler. Der Wandel des politischen Systems in Deutschland 1930–1933, Berlin/New York, 1992, 202–7.

128. Cit. Winkler, Der Weg in die Katastrophe, 209.

129. Scholdt, 480–81.

130. Scholdt, 494.

131. Winkler, Weimar, 391: TBJG, I.1, 620 (19 October 1930).

132. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 325; and see Fabry, 39–40.

133. RSA , III/3, 452/68, and 454 n.1; RSA, IV/1, 3–9.

134. RSA, III/3, 452 n.4; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 322–3. The article appeared in the Daily Mail on 24 September 1930 and in German the following day in the VB.

135. RSA, III/3, 452 n.2, cit. Daily Mail, 27 September 1930.

136. E.g., RSA, III/3, 177 (2 May 1930), 320 (10 August 1930), 338 (15 August 1930), 359 (20 August 1930).

137. Reconstruction of his speech in RSA, III/3, 434–51; Peter Bucher, Der Reichswehrprozeß. Der Hochverrat der Ulmer Reichswehroffiziere 1929–30, Boppard am Rhein, 1967, 237–80; and see Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 328–36; Frank, 83–6. For personal details of those indicted, see RSA, III/3, 450 n.86.

138. RSA, III/3, 439.

139. RSA, III/3, 441.

140. RSA, III/3, 441.

141. RSA, III/3, 442.

142. RSA, III/3, 445. Hitler made plain that, for him, the state was merely a means to an end (Bucher, 275).

143. Bucher, 296–8.

144. Richard Scheringer, Das große Los. Unter Soldaten, Bauern und Rebellen, Hamburg, 1959, 236. Scheringer later became a Communist supporter.

145. TBJG, I.1, 608 (26 September 1930).

146. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 213–16. In fact, during the Depression even luxury suites at the Kaiserhof dropped sharply in price. A surviving bill shows the cost of Hitler and his entourage for a stay of three days in 1931, including meals and service, at a modest 650.86 Reich Marks (Turner,German Big Business, 155).

147. Frank, 86.

148. Goebbels thought the Leipzig trial had won ‘enormous sympathy’ for the Nazis (TBJG, I.1, 609 (27 September 1930)). See also Reuth, 176.

149. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 340–42; Heinrich Brüning, Memoiren 1918–1934, dtv edn, 2 vols., Munich, 1972, i.2ooff.; Winkler, Weimar, 394.

150. Above from Brüning, i.203–7 (quotation, 207); see also Krebs, 140: Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 342; Winkler, Weimar, 393.

151. Brüning, i.207.

152. Krebs, 141.

153. TBJG, I.1, 614 (6 October 1930): ‘Es bleibt bei unserer Opposition. Gottlob’ (‘Our opposition remains, thank God’).

154. RSA, III/3, 430.

155. Friedrich Franz von Unruh, Der National-sozialismus, Frankfurt am Main, 1931, 17. See also Broszat, Der Nationalsozialismus, 43–4.

156. Bessel, ‘Myth’, 27.

157. Broszat, ‘Struktur’, 69–70.

158. On the high membership fluctuation within the NSDAP, see Hans Mommsen, ‘National Socialism: Continuity and Change’, in Walter Laqueur (ed.), Fascism: A Reader’s Guide, Harmondsworth, 1979, 151–92, here 163; and Hans Mommsen, ‘Die ΝSDAΡ als faschistische Partei’, in Richard Saage (ed.), Das Scheitern diktatorischer Legitimationsmuster und die Zukunftsfähigkeit der Demokratie, Berlin, 1995, 257–71, here 265.

159. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 319, cit. Frankfurter Zeitung, 15 September 1930.

160. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 218.

161. Wagener, 24.

162. Wagener, 59, 73, 83–4.

163. Wagener, 128.

164. Tyrell, Führer, 348.

165. Wagener, 128. See former Leutnant Scheringer’s recollection of a meeting with Hitler in 1930: ‘Listening to him, I had the firm impression that the man believes what he says, as simple as the slogans are. He is suspended in his thinking three metres above the ground. He doesn’t speak; he preaches… He is incapable of a clear political analysis however powerful his talent as an agitator might be’ (Scheringer, 242).

166. Wagener, 59.

167. Wagener, 84.

168. Wagener, 96.

169. Wagener, 98. According to Wagener, there were ten rooms, on two floors. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 231, speaks of a ‘nine-room apartment’. Schroeder, 153, like Wagener, spoke of a double-apartment. Lüdecke, 454, describes the ‘luxurious, modern flat’ as comprising ‘eight or nine beautiful large rooms covering the entire second floor’.

170. Wagener, 98.

171. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 223; TBJG, I.1, 578 (20 July 1930); Hoffmann, 49–50.

172. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 182; Hoffmann, 70.

173. Wagener, 127.

174. Hitler’s self-perceived infallibility left a striking impression on Albert Krebs in a speech Hitler made to party leaders in Munich (Krebs, 138–40). According to Krebs, the speech was made at the end of June 1930. This must be a mistake. Hitler held no speech in Munich in June 1930. Moreover, Krebs refers to a visit, before the speech, to the newly completed ‘Brown House’. The contract for the purchase of what would become the party headquarters was signed on 26 May 1930. But major rebuilding to the former ‘Barlow-Palais’ took place before it was occupied by a number of central party offices on 1 January 1931 (RSA, III/3, 209 n.17; IV/1, 206–18).

175. Wagener, 127–8.

176. Wagener, 119–20.

177. Wagener, 128.

178. Frank, 93.

179. Frank, 91–2. Wagener, 107, refers to the ban on smoking in Hitler’s room. From the date indicated, early summer 1930, this presumably refers to the party headquarters in Schellingstraße, before the move to the Brown House took place.

180. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 223.

181. Frank, 93–4.

182. Wagener, 72.

183. See Wagener, 111–12 (Wagener’s economic proposals).

184. See Tyrell, Führer, 311 for the suggestion that Hitler’s self-belief was even now less pronounced than the image he presented to others – a possibility, but an unprovable assertion.

185. See the repeated references in Wagener, e.g., 43, 48, 56, 96–7, 111–12.

186. Wagener reported that Hitler stopped eating meat only after Geli Raubal’s death (Wagener, 362). This contrasts with Hanfstaengl’s less dramatic explanation, that Hitler gradually began to cut out meat (and alcohol) after putting on weight in Landsberg, until it turned into a dogma (Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 164). The health reasons adduced by Krebs would accord better with such an explanation, though it is possible that the trauma following his niece’s death led to Hitler’s final turn to complete vegetarianism.

187. Krebs, 136–7.

188. Wagener, 72; and see 127 for similar comments by Wagener and Gregor Strasser.

189. Wagener, 301.

190. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 346; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 108–9.

191. See OSAF-Stellvertreter Süd Schneidhuber’s remarks in Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 106.

192. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 102–4.

193. TBJG, I.1, 596–7 (1 September 1930).

194. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 104; RSA, III/3, 377–81.

195. Tyrell, Führer, 338; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 106.

196. Tyrell, Führer, 314; Wagener, 60–62. Hitler’s personal aversion to smoking had, of course, no bearing on his party’s readiness to benefit from its contact with cigarette firms.

197. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 107.

198. RSA, IV/1, 183; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 108–10.

199. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 110– 11.

200. RSA, IV/1, 200.

201. RSA, IV/1, 229–30. What the legal route to power would mean had again been explicitly stated, this time by Goebbels, in a speech to the Reichstag on 5 February: ‘According to the constitution we are only bound to the legality of the way, not the legality of the goal. We want to take power legally. But what we once do with this power when we have it, that’s our business’ (Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 347). The ‘Third Reich’, which Hitler mentioned, today synonymous with the period of Nazi rule, derived originally from the apocalyptic notions of the twelfth-century mystic Joachim of Fiore, who had seen three ages – of the Father, the Son, and coming age of the Holy Spirit. The term had been made popular in more recent times by the book of that title published in 1923 by the neo-conservative Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, advocating a new state – the third great Reich to succeed those of the Holy Roman Empire and of Bismarck – to replace the detested Weimar democracy. Hitler famously declared in 1933 that ‘the Third Reich’ would last for 1,000 years. But already in 1939 the press was instructed to avoid usage of the term (Benz, Graml and Weiß, Enzyklopädie des Nationalsozialismus, 435).

202. In practice, Communists accounted for close on two-thirds of the arrests made under the decree (Winkler, Weimar, 401). For Hitler’s response to the decree, see RSA, IV/1, 236–8. A uniform ban on the SA had already been attempted the previous year (Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone,100).

203. TBJG, I.2, 41 (30 March 1931).

204. RSA, IV/I, 236–8.

205. TBJG, I.2, 42 (31 March 1931).

206. TBJG, I.2, 42–3 (2 April 1931);Tb Reuth, ii.575 n.25, cit. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 April 1931; RSA, IV/1, 248 n.2; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 111.

207. RSA, IV/1, 246–8.

208. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 111.

209. RSA, IV/1, 248–59.

210. RSA, IV/1, 251.

211. RSA, IV/1, 256.

212. RSA, IV/1, 258.

213. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, III.

214. RSA, IV/1, 26o.

215. TBJG, I.2, 44 (4 April 1931)

216. RSA, IV/1, 263–4; TBJG, I.2, 44 (4 April 1931).

217. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 111.

218. The term ‘politics of hooliganism’ was coined with reference to the SA by Richard Bessel, Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism. The Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany 1925–1934, New Haven/London, 1984. 152.

219. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 97–8; Broszat, ‘Struktur’, 61. And see Bessel, Political Violence, 33–45, for the social structure in eastern regions.

220. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 243; Wagener, 98.

221. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 183–4; Toland, 204, 236.

222. Heiden, Hitler, 347–9.

223. Hoffmann, 147–8.

224. Hoffmann, 161. For Hitler’s first meeting with her, see Gun, Eva Braun-Hitler, 46. Gun suggests (55) that the relationship was a sexual one after the first months of 1932, but that Eva’s infatuation for Hitler was not reciprocated. According to Fritz Wiedemann, Hitler casually commented – though conceivably for effect – around this time that being a bachelor had its uses, ‘and as far as love goes, I keep a girl for myself in Munich’ (Und für die Liebe halte ich mir eben in München ein Mädchen) (Gun, 57). On Eva Braun see also Henriette von Schirach, Der Preis der Herrlichkeit. Erlebte Zeitgeschichte, Munich/Berlin, 1975, 23–5.

225. Based on conversations with Anni Winter, housekeeper in Hitler’s apartment, his later secretary, Christa Schroeder, was convinced that he had had no sexual relations with Geli (Schroeder, 153). She was, however, guessing – like everyone else.

226. Heiden, Führer, 304.

227. Strasser, Hitler und ich, 74–5, hinted strongly at.perverted sexual practices inflicted by Hitler on his niece. In an interview for the American OSS on 13 May 1943 he was explicit (NA, Hitler Source Book, 918–19). See also Toland, 252; Hayman, 145; Lewis, The Secret Life of Adolf Hitler,10, 136. This account (132–46) attributes sado-masochistic practices to Hitler, based on speculation and unreliable evidence, and concludes that the SS had Geli shot to prevent a scandal arising from her pregnancy by a Jewish student.

228. Heiden, Hitler, 352; Heiden, Der Führer, 304–6; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 234–5. And see Hayman, 154.

229. Hoffmann, 148–9; B.v. Schirach, 106; Henriette von Schirach, 205. Hitler even took her in July 1930, along with Goebbels, to Oberammergau to see the Passion Play (TBJG, I.1, 578 (20 July 1930)).

230. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 236.

231. Hoffmann, 151–2.

232. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 232–3.

233. Hoffmann, 150; Β.v. Schirach, 107.

234. Hanfstaengl, 15Jahre, 233. Hayman, 139–48, interprets the phrase to mean that Hitler demanded sexually perverted acts of his niece.

235. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 242; Hoffmann, 151. Bridget Hitler, the first wife of Hitler’s half-brother, Alois, related the story, allegedly told to her son, William Patrick, by Alois’ second wife, Maimee (The Memoirs of Bridget Hitler, London, 1979, 70–77). These ‘memoirs’ (which include the tall story of Hitler’s alleged stay in Liverpool in 1912) are notoriously unreliable. Lewis, 145, has a variant – based on an interview with a former SS officer in 1975 – of Geli discovering that she was bearing the child of a Jewish student in Munich and wanting to go to Vienna for an abortion. He takes this as the motive for the SS to kill Geli. According to Hans Frank’s version, the relationship was with a young officer (Frank, 97).

236. Schroeder, 154, 296 n.34, 364–6 nn.280–82.

237. RSA, IV/2, 109 n.1, cit. MP, 22 September 1931; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 239, 242.

238. In the Münchener Post article of 22 September 1931 (RSA, IV/2, 109 n.1).

239. Hayman, 164, 166.

240. RSA, IV/2, 109–10.

241. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 238; Hoffmann, 152; B.v. Schirach, 108.

242. Hoffmann, 152–3, for a dramatized version; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 238. See also, for Geli’s relationship with Hitler, and on her suicide, with some inaccuracies, Gun, 17–28. The conflicting evidence is closely assessed by Hayman, 160–201, who strongly hints at Hitler’s direct complicity in his niece’s death. He refers to the speeding offence on 174.

243. Frank, 97; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 239.

244. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 239. Heiden, Der Führer, 307–8, speculated, on the basis of reported allegations by Geli’s mother, Angela Raubal, exonerating Hitler from blame and claiming even that he had intended to marry Geli, that Himmler had been responsible.

245. A point made by Toland, 255. The police doctor certified that the cause of death was suicide, and that she had died during the evening of 18 September 1931 (Hayman, 164).

246. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 239, 241; Wagener, 358–9; Hayman, 162–3.

247. The above based on Frank, 97–8; Hoffmann, 156–9 (a highly embellished account); Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 240; Heiden, Der Führer, 307; RSA, IV/2, 110 n.5.

248. Text of the speech in RSA, IV/2, 111–15. For Hitler’s reception in Hamburg, Frank, 98.

249. RSA, IV/2, 111 n.1. Hitler did not appear in two parallel meetings addressed by leading Nazis. Illness was given as the reason.

250. See Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 242–3; Hoffmann, 159; also, implicitly, Wagener, 358; and H. v. Schirach, 205. Long after the war, Hitler’s sister, Paula, suggested that everything might have been different had Hitler married Mimi Reiter (Peis, ‘Die unbekannte Geliebte’).

251. Hoffman, 155–6; Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 243–4. Hanfstaengl regarded it as a politically inspired, somewhat pathetic but unconvincing display of grief.

252. Falter et al., Wahlen, 94. Tyrell, Führer, 383, has 25.9 per cent.

253. Falter et al., Wahlen, 100; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 352.

254. Falter et al., Wahlen, 95.

255. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 357; RSA, IV/2, 123–32.

256. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 352–8; RSA, IV/2, 159–64; Turner, German Big Business, 189.

257. Turner, German Big Business, 167–71.

258. Turner, German Big Business, 144.

259. Turner, German Big Business, 144–5.

260. Hjalmar Schacht, My First Seventy-Six Years, London, 1955, 279.

261. Schacht, 279–80.

262. Turner, German Big Business, 145.

263. Cuno had been persuaded by some of his supporters – including the powerful Ruhr industrialist Paul Reusch – to consider making a political comeback and standing for the Reich Presidency. Retired Admiral Magnus Levetzow, one of those most keen to see Cuno stand, arranged for him to meet Hitler in Berlin in the hope of winning the backing of the NSDAP (Turner, German Big Business , 129).

264. Turner, German Big Business, 129–30.

265. Turner, German Big Business, 130–32.

266. Turner, German Big Business, 146, 150; Wagener, 368–74.

267. Turner, German Big Business, 142, 187.

268. Turner, German Big Business, 128, 181–2.

269. Turner, German Big Business, 191–203.

270. Otto Dietrich, Mit Hitler an die Macht. Persönliche Erlebnisse mit meinem Führer, 7th edn, Munich, 1934, 45–6; Turner, German Big Business, 171–2.

271. Henry Ashby Turner, ‘Big Business and the Rise of Hitler’, in Turner, Nazism and Third Reich, 93–7 (originally publ. in American Historical Review, 75 (1969), 56–70).

272. Turner, German Big Business, 204–19. Many leading industrialists were in any case conspicuous by their absence. Dietrich, Mit Hitler, 46–9, depicts Hitler winning the hearts and minds of his initially cool audience. In his post-war memoirs, Dietrich emphasized the limited financial contributions of big business to the Nazi Party before 1933 (Otto Dietrich, Zwölf Jahre mit Hitler, Cologne (n.d., 1955?), 185–6).

273. Turner, German Big Business, 208–10, 213–14; text of speech, RS A, IV/3, 74–110; and in Domarus, 68–90.

274. Turner, German Big Business, 217–19.

275. See the character sketch in Henry Ashby Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power: January 1933, London, 1996, 39–41.

276. Turner, ‘Big Business and the Rise of Hitler’, 94, 97.

277. Turner, German Big Business, 111–24; Henry Ashby Turner and Horst Matzerath, ‘Die Selbstfinanzierung der NSDAP 1930–32’, 59–92.

278. Wagener, 221–2.

279. Turner, German Big Business, 148–52, 157; Wagener, 226–9.

280. Wagener, 227; Turner, German Big Business, 152.

281. See Turner, German Big Business, 47–60.

282. Above based on Turner, German Big Business, 153–6. Hitler’s income tripled in 1930 to reported gross taxable receipts of 48, 472 Reich Marks. This rose further by 1932 to 64, 639 Reich Marks (Hale, ‘Adolf Hitler: Taxpayer’, 837). See also, for Hitler’s earnings around this time, Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 216; and B.v. Schirach, 112–13.

283. Franz von Papen, Memoirs, London, 1952, 142–3; Otto Meissner, Staatssekretär unter Ebert – Hindenburg – Hitler, Hamburg, 1950, 216.

284. TBJG, I.2, 106 (7 January 1932); Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 370–72; Papen, 146.

285. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 372; Walther Hubatsch, Hindenburg und der Staat, Göttingen, 1966, 309–10.

286. The exchange was published by the Nazis in a brochure: Hitlers Auseinandersetzung mit Brüning. Kampfschrift, Broschürenreihe der Reichspropagandaleitung der NSDAP, Heft 5, Munich, 1932, 73–94. Hitler’s open letter to Brüning, dated 15 January 1932, is reprinted in RSA IV/3, 34–44.

287. Meissner, 216–17.

288. TBJG, I.2, 120–21 (3 February 1932). See Fest, Hitler, 439–40.

289. TBJG, 1.2, 130–31 (22 February 1932), 134 (27 February 1932).

290. Rudolf Morsey, ‘Hitler als Braunschweigischer Regierungsrat’, VfZ, 8 (1960), 419–48; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 373–6.

291. See Papen, 147.

292. RSA, IV/3, 138–44 (quotation, 144);Domarus, 95; TBJG, 1.2, 134 (27February 1932).

293. Domarus, 96.

294. TBJG, I.2, 140–41 (13 March 1932).

295. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 381; Falter et al., Wahlen, 46.

296. RSA, V/1, 16–43; Domarus, 101–3.

297. Falter et al., Wahlen, 46.

298. TBJG, I.2, 152–3 (8–11 April 1932).

299. Saxony, Baden, Hessen and Thuringia were the largest states, with a total population of just over 10 million, not voting on that day. Roughly another 2 million lived in the smaller states which were not holding Landtag elections on 24 April. The population of those states going to the polls that day numbered close on 50 million. Figures taken from Falter et al., Wahlen, 90–113.

300. RSA, V/1, 59–97; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 385–6; Domarus, 106–7.

301. Miesbacher Anzeiger, 19 April 1932.

302. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 404–5; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 386–7; RSA, V/1, 97 and Doc.61 n.1–2 (and 92–6, Doc.60, for the speech).

303. Falter et al., Wahlen, 89, 91, 94, 101; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 387–8.

304. TBJG, I.2, 160 (23 April 1932).

305. Domarus, 105; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 154.

306. Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik. Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in einer Demokratie, Stuttgart/Düsseldorf, 1955, 481 and n.2; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 153–4.

307. Ulrich Herbert, Best. Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft 1903–1989, Bonn, 1996, 111–19.

308. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 363.

309. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 159 for membership growth in early 1932.

310. TBJG, I.2, 139 (11 March 1932).

311. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 153.

312. TBJG, I.2, 150 (2 April 1932).

313. TBJG, I.2, 154 (11 April 1932). Goebbels had noted in his diary on 17 March that the Prussian Interior Minister Severing, following house-searches in Berlin, was apparently planning a ban on the SA (TBJG, I.2, 144).

314. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 154.

315. RSA, V/1, 54–6; Domarus, 105–6. Hindenburg had wanted the ban extended to the Communists (Papen, 149).

316. Kolb, Die Weimarer Republik, 136–7.

317. TBJG, I.2, 162 (28 April 1932); Winkler, Weimar, 461–2. Schleicher had already had talks with Röhm and Graf Helldorf, the Berlin SA leader. See also Thilo Vogelsang, Reichswehr, Staat und NSDAP, Stuttgart, 1962, 188–9.

318. TBJG, I.2, 165 (8 May 1932).

319. Papen, 153; see Winkler, Weimar, 462–3.

320. TBJG, I.2, 166–7 (10–11 May 1932); Schulz, Von Brüning zu Hitler, 821.

321. TBJG, I.2, 168 (12 May 1932); see Winkler, Weimar, 465.

322. TBJG, I.2, 169 (13 May 1932).

323. Brüning, Memoiren, ii.632–8; Winkler, Weimar, 470–72.

324. Joseph Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei. Eine historische Darstellung in Tagebuchblättern (Vom 1. Januar 1932 bis zum 1. Mai 1933), 21st edn, Munich, 1937, 103–4 (30 May 1932); TBJG, I.2, 177.

325. Papen, 150–56.

326. Papen, 162.

327. Falter et al., Wahlen, 98, 100.

328. Falter et al., Wahlen, 95.

329. Papen, 163; Winkler, Weimar, 404.

330. See Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 111 (14 June 1932); TBJG, I.2, 185.

331. For evidence of the strong support offered to the NSDAP from the well-to-do middle classes, see the examination of votes cast at holiday resorts or on cruise liners in July 1932 in Richard F. Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton, 1982, 220–28.

332. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 392–3; Winkler, Weimar, 490–93. And see, for the local background to the violence in Altona, Anthony McElligott, ‘“… und so kam es zu einer schweren Schlägerei”. Straßenschlachten in Altona und Hamburg am Ende der Weimarer Republik’, in Maike Bruns et al.(eds.), ‘Hier war doch alles nicht so schlimm.’ Wie die Nazis in Hamburg den Alltag eroberten, Hamburg, 1984, 58–85.

333. Winkler, Weimar, 495–503; Broszat, Machtergreifung, 148–50.

334. TBJG, I.2, 155 (15 April 1932).

335. Childers, Nazi Voter, 203.

336. See Allen, 322, for the high percentage of Nazi meetings in the Lower Saxon town of Northeim that consisted of little beyond pageantry.

337. RSA, V/1, 216–19; Domarus, 115; Z.A.B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, 2nd edn, London/New York, 1973, 31.

338. Hamilton, 326.

339. RSA, V/1, 210–94; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 394; Domarus, 114–20.

340. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 267.

341. RSA, V/1, 216–19; Domarus, 115–17 (Adolf-Hitler-Schallplatte: ‘Appell an die Nation’).

342. Falter, et al., Wahlen, 44. The turn-out, 84.1 per cent, was the largest for a Reichstag election during the period of the Weimar democracy.

343. TBJG, 1.2, 211 (1 August 1932). The published ‘Kaiserhof’ version had a more optimistic tone: Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 135–6 (31 July 1932). The following day, in his unpublished diary entry for 2 August, Goebbels again expressed Hitler’s agreement that the time for power had arrived. The only alternative was ‘sharpest opposition’. There could be no more question of toleration of the Papen government (TBJG, I.2, 212–13).

344. TBJG, I.2, 214 (3 August 1932).

345. TBJG, I.2, 215 (5 August 1932).

346. TBJG, I.2, 217 (7 August 1932).

347. See Winkler, Weimar, 509.

348. Thilo Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers gegenüber der NSDAP 1932’, VfZ, 6 (1958), 86–118, here 89.

349. Hubatsch, Hindenburg, 335–8, Nr.87 (Meissner’s minutes from 11 August 1932).

350. Winkler, Weimar, 509.

351. TBJG, I.2, 218 (9 August 1932).

352. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 140 (8 August 1932); TBJG, I.2, 218.

353. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 93–8; Winkler, Weimar, 509–10.

354. TBJG, I.2, 221 (11 August 1932). For Gayl’s speech, see Eberhard Kolb and Wolfram Pyta, ‘Die Staatsnotstandsplanung unter Papen und Schleicher’, in Heinrich August Winkler (ed.), Die deutsche Staatskrise 1930–1933, Munich, 1992, 155–81, here 160.

355. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 142–4 (11–12 August 1932); TBJG, I.2, 222–3; see also Papen, 195.

356. Papen, 195–7; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 144 (13 August 1932); TBJG, I.2, 224.

357. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 144–5 (13 August 1932); TBJG, I.2, 224.

358. Hubatsch, 338–9, Nr.88; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 397–8; Papen, 197. Hitler objected to Meissner’s wording of the official communiqué and within hours dispatched his own version, put together, he said, together with Frick and Röhm immediately after they had returned from the meeting. This stressed Hitler’s denial that he would demand all cabinet seats for his party, if he were given the leadership. It mainly, however, concentrated on the subsequent exchange in the corridor and on Hitler’s resentment that he had been called to the meeting when, in fact, the decision had already been taken in advance of it by Hindenburg. Unsurprisingly, neither Papen nor the Reich Chancellery were prepared to alter anything in the published communiqué (IfZ, Fa 296, Bl.165–71).

359. IfZ, Fa 296, Bl.169, ‘Besprechung in der Reichskanzlei am 13.8.32’, signed by Röhm, Frick and Hitler.

360. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 145 (13 August 1932); TBJG, I.2, 225.

361. See Lüdecke, 351–2.

362. See Winkler, Weimar, 511–12.

CHAPTER 10: LEVERED INTO POWER

1. For the splits in élite strategies and aims during the final phase of the Weimar Republic, see the contributions by Henry Ashby Turner, Jürgen John and Wolfgang Zollitsch (together with the subsequent discussion) in Heinrich August Winkler (ed.), Die deutsche Staatskrise 1930–1933,Munich, 1992, 205–62.

2. A point emphasized by James, ‘Economic Reasons for the Collapse of the Weimar Republic’, in Kershaw (ed.), Weimar: Why did German Democracy Fail?, 30–57, here 55; see also the perceptive analysis by Gerald D. Feldmann, ‘Der 30 Januar. 1933 und die politische Kultur von Weimar’, in Winkler, Staatskrise, 263–76. Eberhard Jäckel is adamant that Hitler’s takeover of power did constitute a ‘works accident’, though on his own analysis (Das deutsche Jahrhundert, 126–58) of the behaviour of the national-conservative, pro-monarchist élites it was at the very least an accident waiting to happen.

3. Letter from Wilhelm Keppler to Kurt von Schröder, 26 December 1932, cit. in Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 86.

4. Winkler, Weimar, 511; Schulz, Von Brüning zu Hitler, 964; Domarus, 123–4.

5. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 86–7.

6. Joachim von Ribbentrop, The Ribbentrop Memoirs, London, 1954, 21. This was the first time Ribbentrop had met Hitler, who told him he was prepared to work with other political forces but insisted upon the Chancellorship. Ribbentrop came away very impressed, convinced that only Hitler and his party could save Germany from Communism, and joined the NSDAP straight away.

7. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 87–8.

8. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 99–100 n.29; Werner Freiherr von Rheinbaben, Viermal Deutschland. Aus dem Erleben eines Seemanns, Diplomaten, Politikers 1895–1954, Berlin, 1954, 303–4.

9. See Domarus, 123 for such an inference.

10. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 279. How accurate Hanfstaengl’s recollection of Hitler’s exact words was might justifiably be doubted. In his wartime interview for the American OSS, he had Hitler saying: ‘We’ll see. Perhaps it’s better like this’ (‘Wir werden ja sehen. Es ist vielleicht besser so’) (NA, Hitler Source Book, 911).

11. RSA, V/1, 304–9; Domarus, 125–9.

12. RSA, V/1, 316.

13. The following is based on Paul Kluke, ‘Der Fall Potempa’, VfZ, 5 (1957), 279–97 and Richard Bessel, ‘The Potempa Murder’, Central European History, 10 (1977), 241–54.

14. RSA, V/1, 317; Domarus, 130 (dated 23 August, when the telegram was published in the press).

15. Goebbels acknowledged that public opinion was against the party (TBJG, I/2, 230 (25 August 1932)).

16. RSA, V/1, 318–20 (quotation, 319); Domarus, 130; Kluke, 284–5.

17. Papen, 200. Hindenburg, on the other hand, claimed on 30 August at a meeting with Papen, Gayl and Schleicher in Neudeck that he was swayed only by legal, not political, considerations. Since the deed had been committed only an hour and a half after the decree came into effect, Hindenburg suggested that it could not be presumed that they had knowledge of it. This dubious argument was accepted by Papen and advanced as the reason for leniency (Winkler, Weimar, 514).

18. Kluke, 286.

19. Kluke, 281.

20. Kluke, 281–2, cit. VB (11 August 1932).

21. Kluke, 285, cit. VB (26 August 1932).

22. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 89, 110.

23. Brüning, ii.658; see Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 154–5, TBJG I.2, 235–6 (31 August 1932, 2 September 1932), where Hitler points for the first time to intrigues and opposition which he saw as emanating from Strasser and his ‘clique’.

24. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 160, TBJG, II.2, 239 (9 September 1932).

25. Brüning, ii.657–9.

26. Winkler, Weimar, 519–20; Papen, 215–16.

27. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 101.

28. Eberhard Kolb and Wolfram Pyta, ‘Die Staatsnotstandsplanung unter den Regierungen Papen und Schleicher’, in Winkler, Staatskrise, 155–81, here 161.

29. Winkler, Weimar, 518–19; Kolb and Pyta, 165–6. For wide-ranging hopes invested in a revised constitutional arrangement see Hans Mommsen, ‘Regierung ohne Parteien. Konservative Pläne zum Verfassungsumbau am Ende der Weimarer Republik’, in Winkler, Staatskrise, 1–18, here esp. 3–4.

30. Kolb and Pyta, 166.

31. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 401; Papen, 207; Winkler, Weimar, 521; Mommsen, Dieverspielte Freiheit, 474. Göring’s extensive contacts with the national-conservative élite had been important to Hitler and promoted his own advancement within the Nazi Party (though he never became a ‘party man’ as such) and in the Reichstag, which he had joined as a Deputy in 1928.

32. Winkler, Weimar, 521.

33. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 159–60 (8 September 1932, 10 September 1932), TBJG, I.2, 239–240.

34. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 152 (28 August 1932), and also 153 (30 August 1932), TBJG, I.2, 233–4.

35. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 159 (8 September 1932), TBJG, 1.2, 238. Goebbels noted the demand for a Hitler Chancellorship again on 9 September. ‘Only Strasser speaks against’ (Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 160, TBJG, I.2, 239 (9 September 1932)).

36. Papen, 208.

37. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 162 (12 September 1932), TBJG, 1.2, 241; Papen, 208.

38. The above account is based on Akten der Reichskanzlei. Das Kabinett von Papen, ed. Karl-Heinz Minuth, Boppard am Rhein, 1989, ii.543–5; Papen, 208–9; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 162–3 (12 September 1932), TBJG, I.2, 241–2; Lüdecke, 433–4; Winkler,Weimar, 522–4; Schulz, Von Brüning zu Hitler, 993–4; Bracher, Auflösung, 627–9; Mommsen, Die verspielte Freiheit, 475–6.

39. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 163 (12 September 1932), TBJG, I.2, 242.

40. Mommsen, Die verspielte Freiheit, 476.

41. Kolb and Pyta, 166; Winkler, Weimar, 528.

42. Broadcasting was controlled by the government, which allowed little time for political broadcasts. The Nazis had had no access to the radio before the summer of 1932 (Zeman, 31).

43. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 165 (16 September 1932), 167 (20 September 1932), for the quotation; TBJG, I.2, 243–4, 246–7. For extensive reports from regional and local party organizations of financial difficulties hampering the campaign, see Childers, ‘Limits’, inThe Formation of the Nazi Constituency, 1919–1933 , 236–8.

44. Lüdecke, 438.

45. Domarus, 137. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 176 (4 October 1932); TBJG, I.2, 254–5 (5 October 1932). See also Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 174 (2 October 1932), TBJG, I.2, 252 for Hitler’s conveying of optimism to others, and Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I87 (28 October 1932), TBJG, I.2, 265 where Hitler was said to be ‘very certain of victory’.

46. Lüdecke, 461–2, 469, 475–6.

47. Lüdecke, 476.

48. Lüdecke, 479. Above account based on Lüdecke, 475–9; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I74 (2 October 1932), TBJG, I.2, 252.

49. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 402–3 notes forty-nine speeches, but does not include Regensburg on 5 November; Domarus, 138–42 has forty-seven, including Regensburg, but omitting Gummersbach, Betzdorf-Walmenrot, and Limburg; Hauner, 85, lists forty-seven but omits Schweinfurt, Würzburg and Betzdorf-Walmenrot.

50. Maser, Hitler, 317 and n.

51. Gun, Eva Braun-Hitler, 55–7. Hoffman, 161–2, dates the incident to summer 1932. For other suicide attempts of women who knew Hitler, see Maser, Hitler, 313.

52. Domarus, 141.

53. VB, 14 October 1932, IfZ, MA-731, HA Reel 1 Folder 13.

54. VB, 14 October 1932, IfZ, MA-731, HA Reel 1 Folder 13.

55. IfZ, MA-731, NSDAP-HA, Reel 1 Folder 13, Pd Hof, 15 October 1932.

56. Domarus, 138.

57. Above quotations from IfZ, MA-1220, HA, Reel IA Folder 13.

58. IfZ, MA-731, HA Reel I Folder 13.

59. See Childers, ‘Limits’, 236, 246–51.

60. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I91 (2 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 268. Goebbels may, like Hitler, have been deceived into over-optimism by the type of reception he had at his meetings. After a speech in Stettin on 31 October, he wrote in his diary: ‘The mood is excellent everywhere. We are making mighty inroads.’ His adjoining comment revealed, however, his concern: ‘If it goes on like this, 6 November won’t be all that bad.’ And the next day he was already consoling himself for an impending defeat: ‘It’s not all that bad if we lose a few million votes’ (Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I90 (31 October 1932, 1 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 267).

61. IfZ, MA-731, HA Reel 1 Folder 13, Pd Nbg, 14 October 1932.

62. BHStA, MA 102144, RPvNB/OP, 19 October 1932.

63. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I95 (5 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 271. Even in early October, Gregor Strasser had predicted a loss of forty seats (Stachura, Strasser, I04).

64. Falter et al., Wahlen, 41, 44.

65. Falter, Hitlers Wähler, I09.

66. Falter, ‘National Socialist Mobilisation’, 219.

67. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I96 (6 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 272.

68. See Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I92 (2 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 269 where Goebbels had spoken of the lack of funding in the campaign as ‘a chronic sickness’. On the very day before the election, he noted, it had been possible to drum up 10,000 Marks ‘at the last minute’, which were immediately thrown into the last efforts of propaganda (Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I95 (5 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 271). The DΝVP’s propaganda had been better funded and, it was accepted, as a result quantitatively superior (Childers, ‘Limits’, 238).

69. Childers, ‘Limits’, 243–4; and see Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I96 (6 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 272.

70. BHStA, MA 102151, RPvUF, 21 September 1932.

71. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I96 (6 November 1932), ΤΒJG, I.2, 272.

72. Childers, ‘Limits’, 238–42.

73. The strike, called by the Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition (Revolutionäre Gewerkschafts-Opposition (RGO)) – the factory-cell organization of the KPD – was in protest at wage reductions imposed on Berlin transport workers. Initially swingeing, these had been reduced to more modest levels, but were still sufficient to provoke the Communists into declaring a strike, opposed by the SPD-linked unions, but backed by the NSBO. The strike began on 3 November and was broken off by the strikers four days later. The underground was brought to a complete standstill; trams and buses attempting to leave the depots were in the main halted by pickets. There was a good deal of public disorder, including clashes between strikers and the police which ended with three dead and eight injured as police shot into a crowd. See Winkler, Weimar, 533–5. Goebbels, overjoyed, described the mood as ‘revolutionary’ (Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I94 (4 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 270). For the KPD, the strike probably played a part in the increased vote in the November election, and also shored up the already existent over-confidence in the party’s ability to cope with a National Socialist government. (Christian Striefler, Kampf um die Macht. Kommunisten und Nationalsozialisten am Ende der Weimarer Republik,Berlin, 1993, 177–86).

74. Childers, ‘Limits’, 238.

75. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I92 (2 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 268–9.

76. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I94 (4 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 270.

77. Childers, ‘Limits’, 240.

78. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 416 (3 November 1932, 6 November 1932).

79. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 417 (7 November 1932, 9 November 1932).

80. Winkler, Weimar, 536–7.

81. TBJG, I.2, 274 (9 November 1932).

82. IMT, vol.35, 223–30, Docs. 633-D and 634-D; Domarus, 144–8; AdR, Kabinett von Papen, ii.952–60; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I99 (9 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 276; Papen, 212–13; Bracher, Auflösung, 659–60 and n.31; Winkler, Weimar, 543.

83. AdR, Kabinett von Papen, ii.951–2 (meeting of Papen and Schäffer, 16 November 1932). See also Winkler, Weimar, 541, 543.

84. Hubatsch, Hindenburg, 353.

85. Papen, 214; Winkler, Weimar, 543.

86. Printed in Eberhard Czichon, Wer verhalf Hitler zur Macht? Zum Anteil der deutschen Industrie an der Zerstörung der Weimarer Republik, Cologne (1967), 3rd edn, 1972, 69–71.

87. Based on Turner, German Big Business, 303–4; see also Winkler, Weimar, 540–41.

88. Lüdecke, 413.

89. Hubatsch, 350–52; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 206 (20 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 282.

90. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 207 (20 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 282.

91. Hubatsch, 350–52, here 352; Domarus, 149; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 207–8 (20 November 1932, 21 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 282–3.

92. Domarus, 150 (21 November 1932).

93. Hubatsch, 353–6; Domarus, 151: communiqué of the second discussion of Hindenburg and Hitler on the morning of 21 November 1932.

94. Hubatsch, 354–5; Domarus, 152 (21 November 1932); Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 208 (21 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 283.

95. Hubatsch, 356–7; Domarus, 153–4 (22 November 1932); Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 208 (23 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 283.

96. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 209 (23 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 284.

97. Hubatsch, 358–61; Domarus, 154–7 (23 November 1932).

98. Domarus, 157 n.274.

99. Hubatsch, 361–2; Domarus, 158 (24 November 1932).

100. Domarus, 159, Hitler’s final letter on the matter, written on 24 November; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 209–10 (24 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 284.

101. Hubatsch, 365–6.

102. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 104–5; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 209 (23 November 1932), TBJG, I.2, 284.

103. Stachura, Strasser, I07. Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power, 25, states that Schleicher’s hope was not to split the NSDAP but to win the backing of the whole party for such a strategy. He was sufficient of a realist, however, to recognize that, without Hitler’s blessing, this was hardly likely.

104. TBJG, I.2, 288 (2 December 1932); Domarus, 161. Hitler, in Weimar on account of the Thuringian local elections (Gemeindewahlen), had declined to travel to Berlin to meet Schleicher.

105. Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 105 and n.44.

106. Papen, 216–23; Vogelsang, ‘Zur Politik Schleichers’, 105–7, 110–11 and n.65; Winkler, Weimar, 547–50, 553–5; see also Kolb and Pyta, 170–77. Schleicher’s expectations of support from the SPD would probably have proved illusory, though the party thought of him as a lesser evil than Papen or Hitler. He did, however, have good connections with the Reichsbanner. And the trade unions were inclined to give Schleicher a chance.

107. Peter D. Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”: Strasser, Hitler, and National Socialism, 1930–1932’, in Stachura, Shaping, 88–130, here 88.

108. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 281. The quoted comments of Spengler are a further illustration of the dangerous dismissal of Hitler by right-wing intellectuals. Spengler, made famous by his book on the decline of western civilization, became effectively the philosopher of the culturally pessimistic anti-democratic Right. His dislike of the vulgarity of the Nazis persisted, however, until his death in 1936.

109. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 217–18 (6 December 1932), TBJG, I.2, 294.

110. Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 103, 108.

111. Turner, German Big Business, 311–12.

112. Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 90–91.

113. Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 94–95; Turner, German Big Business, I48–9.

114. Turner, German Big Business, 311–12.

115. Krebs, 191–2; Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 96–7. Hans Zehrer, a political journalist in his early thirties, had, together with a number of like-minded colleagues, used the periodical Die Tat since 15)29 to expound his views of the cleansing nature of Weimar’s crisis. He saw it as bringing about the end of capitalism and ushering in a new system of ‘national socialism’. In this, he was close to the ideas of Gregor Strasser. The ‘Tat Circle’ developed links with General Schleicher in the summer of 1932. (Kurt Sontheimer, ‘Der Tatkreis’, Vfz, 7 (1959), 229–60; Benz-Graml,Biographisches Lexikon, 375–6; Winkler, Weimar, 525, 551; Mommsen, ‘Regierung ohne Parteien. Konservative Pläne zum Verfassungsumbau am Ende der Weimarer Republik’, in Winkler,Staatskrise, 5–9, 15–17; Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken, 205–6, 268–9).

116. For Strasser’s inability to cope with probing questions on his economic ideas by the American journalist H. R. Knickerbocker, see Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 281–2.

117. Tyrell, Führer, 316.

118. In late August and September 1932, prompted by his good connections with Brüning, Strasser had pressed energetically for the NSDAP to come to terms with the Zentrum (Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 101). On 23 March 1932, he had written to Graf Reventlow insisting that the party must be ready to enter coalitions (even if that could not be broadcast too loudly). And earlier still, in a letter to Gauleiter Schlange of Brandenburg on 12 September 1931, he had suggested that the way to power was via a ‘right-wing cabinet’ (Tyrell, Führer, 316, 343–5).

119. Stachura, Strasser, I03.

120. Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 97–100.

121. Wagener, 477–80; Stachura, Strasser, I03–4.

122. Frank, 108.

123. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I54 (31 August 1932), TBJG, I.2, 235.

124. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I56 (3 September 1932), TBJG, I.2, 236.

125. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I59–60 (8 and 9 September 1932), TBJG, I.2, 238–9.

126. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, I69–70 (25 September 1932), TBJG, I.2, 248.

127. Stachura, Strasser, I08.

128. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 282.

129. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 216 (5 December 1932), TBJG, I.2, 292–3; Stachura, Strasser, I08.

130. Stachura, Strasser, I08–12; Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 108–9.

131. Hinrich Lohse, ‘Der Fall Strasser’, unpubl. typescript, c.1960, Forschungsstelle für die Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, Hamburg, sections 20–22.

132. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 218 (8 December 1932), TBJG, I.2, 295.

133. Text of the letter in Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 113–15.

134. Lohse, section 23.

135. Lohse, sections 23–8. See Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 219 (8 December 1932), TBJG, I.2, 295.

136. TBJG, I.2 295 (unpublished entry, 9 December 1932); the published version (Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 220 (8 December 1932), TBJG, I.2, 296–7) adds ‘with the pistol’.

137. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 220 (8 December 1932), TBJG, I.2, 297–8.

138. Domarus, 166.

139. Lohse, section 30; Orlow, i.293–6.

140. Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 112.

141. Lohse, sections 30–33, Domarus, 165; Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 112; Orlow, i.293.

142. Domarus, 165; TBJG, 1.2, 299 (10 December 1932, unpubl.).

143. TBJG, I.2, 299 (10 December 1932, unpubl.).

144. Domarus, 166–7; Orlow, i.293; see Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 226 (16 December 1932), TBJG , 1.2, 309; Lohse, section 31.

145. Stachura, Strasser, I16, 118–19.

146. Lohse, section 33; TBJG, 1.2, 340 (17 January 1933); Domarus, 180.

147. Goebbels, Kaiserhof 243, (16 January 1933), TBJG, I.2, 340–41. The unpublished diary entry is more prosaic: ‘No more demand… He will end as nothing, as he deserves’ (TBJG, I.2, 340–41, 17 January 1933).

148. BDC, Gregor Strasser, Parteikorrespondenz, Antragsschein zum Erwerb des Ehrenzeichens der alten Parteimitglieder der NSDAP, 29 January 1934; Besitzurkunde, 1 February 1934.

149. BDC, OPG-Akte Albert Pietzsch, Gregor Strasser to Rudolf Heß, 18 June 1934.

150. See Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 110.

151. See Stachura, ‘“Der Fall Strasser”’, 113.

152. BAK, ΝS22/110, ‘Denkschrift über die inneren Gründe für die Verfügungen zur Herstellung einer erhöhten Schlagkraft der Bewegung’; see Orlow, i.294–6. The directions for the reordering of the party’s apparatus that followed the memorandum, drafted by Ley, put into operation the changes in the organizational structure which had been determined on 9 December (Orlow, i.293 and n.234, 294 and n.239). Goebbels showed a copy of the memorandum to Hitler at a crisis-point in the war, in January 1943, remarking in his diary that the memorandum contained ‘such classical arguments’ that it could still be used without any amendment. Hitler had completely forgotten about the document (TBJG, II.7, 177 (23 January 1943)).

153. All the above from BAK, ΝS 22/110.

154. See Orlow, i.296.

155. Abelshauser, Faust and Petzina (eds.), Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1914–1945, 327–8; Petzina et al., Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch III, 61, 70, 84.

156. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 411.

157. Abelshauser et al., Deutsche Sozialgeschichte, 328.

158. See Allen, 136–7; Abelshauser et al., Deutsche Sozialgeschichte, 343–4.

159. Siegfried Bahne, ‘Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands’, in Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey (eds.), Das Ende der Parteien 1933, Königstein/Ts., 1979, 655–739, here 662. For the radicalization of the unemployed, see Anthony McElligott, ‘Mobilising the Unemployed: The KPD and the Unemployed Workers’ Movement in Hamburg-Altona during the Weimar Republic’, in Evans and Geary, The GermanUnemployed, 228–60; and Eva Rosenhaft, Beating the Fascists? The German Communists and Political Violence, 1929–1933, London, 1983.

160. See Fischer, Stormtroopers, esp. 45–8 and ch.8.

161. See Detlev Peukert, ‘The Lost Generation: Youth Unemployment at the End of the Weimar Republic’, in Evans and Geary, The German Unemployed, I72–93, here esp. 188–9; and Peter D. Stachura, ‘The Social and Welfare Implications of Youth Unemployment in Weimar Germany’, in Stachura, Unemployment, I21–47, here 140.

162. Cornelia Rauh-Kühne, Katholisches Milieu und Kleinstadtgesellschaft. Ettlingen 1918–1939, Sigmaringen, 1991, 270.

163. A point emphasized by Dick Geary, ‘Unemployment and Working-Class Solidarity: the German Experience 1929–33’, in Evans and Geary, The German Unemployed, 261–80; see also the contribution to the same volume (194–227) by Eva Rosenhaft, ‘The Unemployed in the Neighbourhood: Social Dislocation and Political Mobilisation in Germany, 1929–1933’.

164. Among many examples: BHStA, MA 102151, RPvUF, 5 January 1933; MA 102138, RPvOB, 5 December 1932.

165. See, e.g., BHStA, MA 102154, RPvMF, 19 October 1932.

166. BHStA, MA 102154, RPvOF/MF, 5 January 1933 (citing a report from the District Office (Bezirksamt) of Ansbach).

167. BHStA, MA 106672, RPvNB/OP, 19 January 1933.

168. BHStA, MA 106672, RPvNB/OP 3 February 1933.

169. BHStA, MA 102144, RPvNB/OP 6 December 1932.

170. BHStA, MA 106672, RPvNB/OP, 3 February 1933, 20 February 1933.

171. See the analysis of ideological preference, levels of disaffection, and dimensions of prejudice in Merkl, 450–527.

172. BHStA, MA 102155/3, RPvNB/OP 16 December 1932 (citing Bezirksamt Ebermannstadt).

173. Heinrich August Winkler, ‘German Society, Hitler, and the Illusion of Restoration 1930–33’, Journal of Contemporary History, I1 (1976), 10–n; Heinrich August Winkler, Mittelstand, Demokratie und Nationalsozialismus, Cologne, 1972, 166–79.

174. See Michael H. Kater, ‘Physicians in Crisis at the End of the Weimar Republic’, in Stachura, Unemployment, 49–77; also – a study which graphically brings out the impact of the Weimar years on medical practice in the Third Reich, and on the attractions for doctors of National Socialism – Michael H. Kater, Doctors under Hitler, Chapel Hill/London, 1989, here 12–15.

175. Based on: Peukert, ‘The Lost Generation’; Elizabeth Harvey, ‘Youth Unemployment and the State: Public Policies towards Unemployed Youth in Hamburg during the World Economic Crisis’, in Evans and Geary, The German Unemployed, I42–71; Stachura, ‘The Social and Welfare Implications of Youth Unemployment’; Elizabeth Harvey, Youth and the Welfare State in Weimar Germany, Oxford, 1993; Abelshauser et al., Deutsche Sozialgeschichte, 332–4; Stachura, The Weimar Republic and the Younger Proletariat; Peter D. Stachura, The German YouthMovement 1900–1945. An Interpretative and Documentary History, London, 1981; Peter Loewenberg, ‘The Psychohistorical Origins of the Nazi Youth Cohort’, American Historical Review , 76 (1971), 1457–1502; Peter D. Stachura, Nazi Youth in the Weimar Republic, Santa Barbara/Oxford, 1975; and Kater, ‘Generationskonflikt als Entwicklungsfaktor in der NS-Bewegung vor 1933’, 217–43.

176. Karin Hausen, ‘Unemployment Also Hits Women: the New and the Old Woman on the Dark Side of the Golden Twenties in Germany’, in Stachura, Unemployment, 78–120, here esp. 112; Helgard Kramer, ‘Frankfurt’s Working Women: Scapegoats or Winners of the Great Depression?’, in Evans and Geary, The German Unemployed, I08–41, here esp. 134; Renate Bridenthal, ‘Beyond Kinder, Küche, Kirche: Weimar Women at Work’, Central European History, 6 (1973), 148–66; Tim Mason,’Women in Germany, 1925–1940: Family, Welfare, and Work’, History Workshop Journal, 1 (1976), 74–113; Richard J. Evans, ‘German Women and the Triumph of Hitler’, Journal of Modern History, 48 (1976, demand supplement), 1–53; Helen L. Boak, ‘Women in Weimar Germany: the “Frauenfrage” and the Female Vote’, in Richard Bessel and E. J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Social Change and Political Development in the Weimar Republic, London, 1981, 155–73, here 165–8.

177. See Allen, 146.

178. See Allen, 147.

179. Statistics on the demographic and social structure of German Jewry are provided in Werner Mosse (ed.), Entscheidungsjahr. Zur Judenfrage in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik, Tübingen, 1965, 87–131 (94 for the proportion of Jews in the total population). See also Helmut Genschel,Die Verdrängung der Juden aus der Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich, Göttingen, 1966, 20–28.

180. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 411. See also Tyrell, Führer, 352, where the membership numbers on 30 January 1933 were given as 1, 435, 530. Since the membership numbers were given out in continuous series and numbers of those leaving the party not renewed, the figures for members actually in the party were substantially lower.

181. Fischer, Stormtroopers, 6.

182. Fischer, Stormtroopers, ch.6 downplays the role of ideology at all in recruiting for the SA.

183. Cit. Niewyk, 82 and n.2.

184. Arnold Paucker, Der jüdische Abwehrkampf gegen Antisemitismus und Nationalsozialismus in den letzten Jahren der Weimarer Republik, Hamburg, 1968; Niewyk, 86ff.

185. Niewyk, 82–6.

186. See Peter Gay, ‘In Deutschland zu Hause… Die Juden der Weimarer Zeit’, in Arnold Paucker (ed.), Die Juden im Nationalsozialistischen Deutschland 1933–1943, Tübingen, 1986, 31–43.

187. Lion Feuchtwanger, Die Geschwister Oppermann, Fischer edn, Frankfurt, 1983, 116. The novel brings out brilliantly the anxieties, but also the complacency, in Jewish bourgeois society in the months immediately before Hitler’s takeover of power. See, e.g., 15–16, 69, 119–32.

188. Richard J. Evans, ‘Die Todesstrafe in der Weimarer Republik’, in Bajohr et al., Zivilisation und Barbarei, 156–61; and Richard J. Evans, Rituals of Retribution: Capital Punishment in Germany, 1600–1987, Oxford, 1996, ch. 13, esp. 604–10.

189. Noakes, ‘Nazism and Eugenics’, 84–5.

190. The varied contemporary impressions of Hitler are excellently surveyed in Schreiber, Part I.

191. Turner, German Big Business, 314–15 and 460 n.2; Papen, 225–6. And see, for the Papen-Hitler meeting at Schröder’s house, Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power, 42–52.

192. Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, ed. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED, East Berlin, 1966, iv.604–7.

193. Turner, German Big Business, 315–17.

194. Turner, German Big Business, 311–12.

195. Turner, German Big Business, 321–2.

196. Winkler, Weimar, 570–72; Turner, German Big Business, 324.

197. Papen, 227–8.

198. See Winkler, Weimar, 568.

199. Domarus, 175; Papen, 227; Winkler, Weimar, 569; see Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 235 (5 January 1933), TBJG, I.2, 328 (6 January 1933, unpubl.).

200. Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, iv. 604–7; reprinted in Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 411–14, here 412.

201. Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 412.

202. TBJG, I.2, 332 (10 January 1933, unpubl.).

203. Papen, 228; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 412–13; Winkler, Weimar, 568.

204. Meissner, Staatssekretär, 261–2; Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power, 50–51·

205. Ribbentrop, 22 and n.1.

206. Falter et al., Wahlen, 96.

207. Stories advanced at the time, and often repeated in later accounts, of subventions from big business to finance the Lippe campaign have been shown to be wide of the mark. The campaign had to pay for itself. Higher entrance fees than normal were charged for meetings addressed by Hitler and other celebrities. Funds raised were immediately poured back into the campaign. Financial embarrassment in settling the claims of creditors and in raising money to rent halls for speakers was on more than one occasion only narrowly avoided. See Turner, German Big Business, 318 and 463 n.25.

208. Winkler, Weimar, 573. A full analysis of the campaign is provided by Jutta Ciolek-Kümper, Wahlkampf in Lippe, Munich, 1976; for Nazi propaganda in Lippe, see also Paul, Aufstand der Bilder, I09–10.

209. Beginning on 4 and ending on 14 January 1933: Domarus, 175–80; Ciolek-Kümper, 318–64. Nazi gains at the election were over-average in places where Hitler spoke (Ciolek-Kümper, 264).

210. Falter et al., Wahlen, 96; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 415; Winkler, Weimar, 574. Despite the saturation propaganda, the Lippe election is a clear indicator of the limits of Nazi penetration in a pluralist system. Recent empirical findings have confirmed the view that propaganda success relied upon prior ideological leanings in those susceptible to it. (See Dieter Ohr, Nationalsozialistische Propaganda und Weimarer Wahlen. Empirische Analysen zur Wirkung von ΝSDAP – Versammlungen, Opladen, 1997.)

211. See Goebbels’s diary entry (unpubl.), for 16 January 1933: ‘Party again on the forward march. So, it has paid off (TBJG, I.2, 339).

212. Schleicher had, by the time of his cabinet meeting on 16 January, still not completely given up hope of winning over Strasser, whose supporters had likewise not finally given up. Their efforts, and news of Strasser meeting President Hindenburg, sowed great distrust in the minds of Hitler and his entourage (Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power, 60–61).

213. Papen, 234; Winkler, Weimar, 571–2, 578–80, 606–7; Turner, German Big Business, 324.

214. Winkler, Weimar, 574–5.

215. Ribbentrop, 22–3. After consultations with Hitler, he had tried to arrange the meeting on one of the previous two days, but the respective movements of Hitler and Papen had made this impossible. Papen stated in his memoirs that he did not meet Hitler between 4 and 22 January (Papen, 236). Frau Ribbentrop’s dictated notes show that there were two meetings in the interim, on 10 and 18 January (Ribbentrop, 22–3).

216. Ribbentrop, 23; Papen, 235.

217. TBJG, I.2, 346 (22 January 1932, unpubl.). Goebbels does not appear to have been informed about the meeting until two days later, on 24 January (TBJG, I.2, 349 (25 January 1933, unpubl.)).

218. Domarus, 181–2; TBJG, I.2, 348 (23 January 1932, unpubl.). Goebbels attributed Hitler’s poor form to the arrogance of Frau Wessel, Horst’s mother, on the anniversary of her son’s murder (TBJG, I.2, 347–8).

219. Papen, 235.

220. Hans Otto Meissner and Harry Wilde, Die Machtergreifung, Stuttgart, 1958, 148ff., esp. 162–3; Domarus, 183 (who states, mistakenly, that the demands were the same; moreover, the Göring ministry was left undetermined). See also Winkler, Weimar, 580.

221. TBJG, I.2, 349 (25 January 1933, unpubl.).

222. Ribbentrop, 23.

223. Winkler, Weimar, 580. Otto Meissner, Staatssekretär, 263, makes no mention of this conversation in his brief account of the meeting at Ribbentrop’s house. The version of his son, Hans Otto Meissner, and Harry Wilde, noting Oskar von Hindenburg’s seemingly grudging admission that Hitler’s many concessions and solemn promises made it difficult to refuse him the Chancellorship, derived, however, from Otto Meissner’s recollection (Meissner-Wilde, 163, 291 n.37).

224. TBJG, 1.2, 349 (25 January 1933, unpubl.).

225. Papen, 236; Winkler, Weimar, 581. For reasons not entirely clear, Schleicher had not considered putting to Hindenburg the suggestion of his Defence Ministry staff, on the advice of legal theorists, that a loophole in the Weimar Constitution might allow the cabinet, even after defeat in a vote of confidence, to remain in office indefinitely as a caretaker government unless the other parties could agree on an alternative Chancellor and government (Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power, I18–21, 124–5).

226. Ribbentrop, 23.

227. Winkler, Weimar, 581–3, 587–9.

228. Akten der Reichskanzlei. Das Kabinett von Schleicher, ed. Anton Golecki, Boppard am Rhein, 1986, 306–11, Nr.71–2; Papen, 237–8; Winkler, Weimar, 584–6.

229. Schulthess’ Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1933, Bd. 74, Munich, 1934, 28–30; AdR, Kabinett von Schleicher, 316–19, Nr.77. And see Winkler, Weimar, 586.

230. Papen, 239. And see AdR, Kabinett von Schleicher, 318.

231. Ribbentrop, 25.

232. Winkler, Weimar, 584.

233. Ribbentrop, 24–5.

234. Papen, 239; Winkler, Weimar, 589. In a third meeting, Fritz Schäffer, the head of the ΒVP, probably speaking on behalf of the Zentrum as well as his own party, was prepared to support a parliamentary government under Hitler. But, as earlier, this proposal had no chance of meeting the approval of the Nazi leader.

235. Papen, 239.

236. Ribbentrop, 25; Papen, 241: Hitler was told on 29 January that the President would not appoint him Reich Commissar for Prussia.

237. AdR, Kabinett von Schleicher, 318; Papen, 240; Winkler, Weimar, 589.

238. Papen, 240; Winkler, Weimar, 590.

239. Papen, 241; Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 417; Winkler, Weimar, 590–91.

240. TBJG, I.2, 355 (30 January 1933, unpubl.); 357 (31 January 1933, unpubl.).

241. Papen, 241.

242. Hubatsch, 347 (18 November 1932).

243. Theodor Duesterberg, Der Stahlhelm und Hitler, Wolfenbüttel/Hanover, 1949, 38–9. Support from the Stahlhelm, the conservative veterans’ organization, was still not guaranteed. While Seldte had been won over, Duesterberg remained irked by earlier Nazi insults about his ‘non-Aryan’ background. His backing for the cabinet was only assured on the morning of 30 January, when Hitler expressed his regrets for the attacks on Duesterberg by his party and, with tears in his eyes, gave the Stahlhelm deputy leader his word that he had not instigated them (Duesterberg, 40; Winkler, Weimar, 592). It did not take Hugenberg long to realize the error of his ways. The very day after Hitler’s appointment to the Chancellorship, he was reported as saying: ‘Yesterday, I did the most stupid thing of my life. I joined forces with the greatest demagogue in world history’ (cit. in Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung, Stuttgart, 1956, 64. And see Larry Eugene Jones, ‘“The Greatest Stupidity of My Life”. Alfred Hugenberg and the Formation of the Hitler Cabinet, January 1933’, Journal of Contemporary History, 27 (1992), 63–87).

244. Papen, 242.

245. Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, Es geschah in Deutschland, Tübingen/Stuttgart, 1951, 147. To the arch-conservative opponent of the Nazis, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, who would later pay for his principled opposition with his life, Papen asserted that within two months he would have Hitler pushed into a corner. Kleist-Schmenzin was duly scathing at such a presumption (Bodo Scheurig, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin. Ein Konservativer gegen Hitler, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 121).

246. TBJG, I.2, 355 (30 January 1933, unpubl.).

247. Ribbentrop, 26; Winkler, Weimar, 590–91.

248. TBJG, I.2, 355–6 (30 January 1933, unpubl.). Hitler still vividly recalled Alvensleben’s news in his story of the takeover of power, told on 21 May 1942 in his ‘Special Train’ en route to Berlin (Picker, 364).

249. Papen, 242–3; Duesterberg, 39; Winkler, Weimar, 591–2.

250. Papen, 243–4; Duesterberg, 40–41; Meissner, Staatssekretär, 269–70; Winkler, Weimar, 592.

251. AdR, Kabinett von Schleicher, 322–3; Meissner, Staatssekretär, 270. Remarkably, it was the first time that the Finance Minister, Schwerin von Krosigk, had seen Hitler. Half an hour before arriving in the Reich Chancellery, he had thought Papen, not Hitler, was to be sworn in as Chancellor (AdR, Kabinett von Schleicher, 321–3. Krosigk, Es geschah in Deutschland, I93; Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power, I56–7).

252. Meissner, Staatssekretär, 270; Papen 244; Hans Otto Meissner, 30. Januar 1933. Hitlers Machtergreifung, Munich 1979, 275–6 (Hindenburg’s reply – see 388 n.31 – apparently based upon a verbal account by Otto Meissner); Winkler, Weimar, 593·

253. TBJG I.2, 357 (31 January 1933, unpubl.).

254. For an example of intellectual underestimation of National Socialism, see Thomas Mann’s comments on 12 January 1933 in a letter to the Prussian Education Minister, Adolf Grimme: ‘The social and democratic Germany, I am firmly convinced, can trust in the fact that the present constellation is a passing one and that, despite everything, the future is on its side. The raging of nationalist passions is nothing more than a late and final flickering of an already burnt-out fire, a dying flare mistaken for a new glow of life’ (Deuerlein, Aufstieg, 414).

255. See, for the landed élites, Wolfgang Zollitsch, ‘Adel und adlige Machteliten in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik. Standespolitik und agrarische Interessen’, in Winkler, Staatskrise, 239–56; Horst Gies, ‘NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche Organisationen in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik’, VfZ, I5 (1967), 341–76; Dieter Gessner, Agrarverbände in der Weimarer Republik, Düsseldorf, 1976; Gustavo Corni and Horst Gies, Brot, Butter, Kanonen: Die Ernährungswirtschaftin Deutschland unter der Diktatur Hitlers,Berlin, 1997, Part I. For the military élite, the argument has been most cogently advanced by Michael Geyer in his study, Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit. Die Reichswehr in der Krise der Machtpolitik 1924–1936, Wiesbaden, 1980, his more general survey, Deutsche Rüstungspolitik 1860–1980, Frankfurt am Main, 1984, 188–39, and his essays, ‘Etudes in Political History: Reichswehr, NSDAP, and the Seizure of Power’, in Peter D. Stachura (ed.), The Nazi Machtergreifung, London, 1983, 101–23, and ‘Professionals and Junkers: German Rearmament and Politics in the Weimar Republic’, in Bessel and Feucht-wanger, 77–133.

256. See Turner, German Big Business, 318–28, for the stance of big business in late January 1933; also, Reinhard Neebe, Großindustrie, Staat und NSDAP 1930–1933, Göttingen, 1981.

257. An attempt to use the ‘Bonapartist’ model of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to explain how Hitler gained power is advanced by Eberhard Jäckel, ‘Wie kam Hitler an die Macht?’, in Karl Dietrich Erdmann and Hagen Schulze (eds.), Weimar. Selbstpreisgabe einer Demokratie, Düsseldorf, 1980, 305–21.

258. See, for instance, the recognition of this by Friedrich Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe, 3rd edn, Wiesbaden, 1947, esp. 11–12, 39–40.

259. See Mosse, Crisis, esp. Part One, for a thorough exploration of the strands of this consciousness.

260. See, esp., the influential work of David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History, Oxford, 1984, and the debate on the ‘Sonderweg’ question: Deutscher Sonderweg – Mythos oder Realität, Kolloquien des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte,Munich/Vienna, 1982. The complexity of the differing continuities in German history which made National Socialism and a Hitler dictatorship possible – but by no means inevitable – is emphasized in a sophisticated analysis by Thomas Nipperdey, ‘1933 und Kontinuität der deutschen Geschichte’, Historische Zeitschrift,227 (1978), 86–111.

261. See Lothar Kettenacker, ‘Sozialpsychologische Aspekte der Führer-Herrschaft’, in Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), Der ‘Führerstaat’: Mythos und Realität. Studien zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten Reiches, Stuttgart, 1981, 98–132.

262. Regensburger Anzeiger, 31 January 1933.

263. Sebastian Haffner, Geschichte eines Deutschen. Die Erinnerungen 1914–1933, Stuttgart-Munich, 2000, 104–6 (quotation, 106).

CHAPTER 11: THE MAKING OF THE DICTATOR

1. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 421.

2. Julius Leber, Ein Mann geht seinen Weg, Berlin, 1952, 90.

3. Josef and Ruth Becker (eds.), Hitlers Machtergreifung. Dokumente vom Machtantritt Hitlers 30. Januar 1933 bis zur Besiegelung des Einparteienstaates 14. Juli 1933,2nd edn, Munich, 1992, 45, cit. Schwäbische Volkszeitung, 7 February 1933.

4. Becker, Hitlers Machtergreifung, 32.

5. Becker, Hitlers Machtergreifung, 34–5.

6. John Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches 1933–45, London, 1968, 9.

7. H. Rößler, ‘Erinnerungen an den Kirchenkampf in Coburg’, Jahrbuch der Coburger Lande s Stiftung (1975), 155–6.

8. Theophil Wurm, Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben, Stuttgart, 1953, 84.

9. Cit. in Klaus Scholder, Die Kirchen und das Dritte Reich, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Vienna, 1977, i.279–80.

10. DBFP, 2nd Ser., iv.401.

11. StA München, GS Ebersberg, 11 February 1933; see also BHStA, MA 106672, RPvNB/OP, 3 February 1933.

12. Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 31 January 1933. The journalist was Erwein Freiherr von Aretin, a monarchist who was to be taken into ‘protective custody’ a few weeks later.

13. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 288; TBJG, I.2, 357 (31 January 1933, unpubl.).

14. See Hoffmann, 69, for Hitler’s praise and surprise at Goebbels’s ability to stage it at such short notice.

15. TBJG, I.2, 358 (31 January 1933). The British Ambassador reported: ‘During the demonstration Herr Göring, the President of the Reichstag, took possession of the microphone and after delivering a speech of the usual turgid kind handed the instrument to his followers. Berlin radio listeners were consequently deprived of their evening’s entertainment and treated to an absurdly sentimental account of the torchlight procession and the final triumph of the National Socialist movement’ (DBFP, 2nd Ser., iv.402).

16. TBJG, I.2, 358, 31 January 1933; DBFP, 2nd Ser., iv.402.

17. See Melita Maschmann, Fazit. Mein Weg in der Hitler-Jugend, 5th paperback edn, Munich, 1983, 7–9; André François-Poncet, Souvenirs d’une ambassade à Berlin, Septembre 1931–Octobre 1938, Paris, 1946, 70; Frank, 111; Harry Graf Kessler,Tagebücher 1918–1937, Frankfurt am Main, 1961, 704.

18. Maschmann, 8, 17–19.

19. Hans-Jochen Gamm, Der Flüsterwitz im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1963, 8. Sir Horace Rumbold remarked that the President normally retired at 7 p.m. but stood at his window until after midnight, saluting the cheering crowd (DBFP, 2nd Ser., iv.401). (Actually, as photos show, the President was seated, not standing. See the photo in Hans Otto Meissner, 30.Januar 1933. Hitlers Machtergreifung, Munich, 1979, between 178 and 179.)

20. Papen, 264.

21. Papen, 264; TBJG, 358 (31 January 1933); Frank, 111.

22. Papen, 264.

23. Norbert Frei, ‘“Machtergreifung”. Anmerkungen zu einem historischen Begriff’, VfZ, 31 (1983), 136–45, here 139, 142.

24. Monologe, I55; Frei, ‘“Machtergreifung”’, 136.

25. Frei, ‘“Machtergreifung”‘,esp. 141–2. ‘Machtergreifung’ (‘seizure of power’)ap-pears, from Frei’s findings (143), to have been more a product of the historical writing of the 1950s than a term widely used during the Third Reich itself.

26. Papen, 264.

27. See Nipperdey, ‘1933 und Kontinuität der deutschen Geschichte’, esp. 94–101. As Nipperdey points out (93), there were also important and long-standing counter-continuities in German history – such as ideas of democracy and liberalism – that suffered an abrupt and lengthy break in 1933.

28. Nipperdey, ‘1933 und Kontinuität der deutschen Geschichte’, 100–101.

29. See Richard Bessel, ‘1933: A Failed Counter-Revolution’, in Ε. Ε. Riche (ed.), Revolution and Counter Revolution, Oxford, 1991, 109–227, esp. 120–21; and Martin Broszat et al. (eds.), Deutschlands Weg in die Diktatur, Berlin, 1983, 95 (comment of Richard Löwenthal). See also Horst Möller, ‘Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung. Konterrevolution oder Revolution?’, VfZ, 31 (1983), 25–51; Jeremy Noakes, ‘Nazism and Revolution’, in Noel O’Sullivan (ed.), Revolutionary Theory and Political Reality,London, 1983, 73–100; and for Hitler’s views on revolution, Zitelmann, Hitler. Selbstverständnis eines Revolutionärs, 44–86.

30. Akten der Reichskanzlei. Die Regierung Hitler. Teil I: 1933/34, e d. Karl-Heinz Minuth, 2 vols., Boppard am Rhein, 1983, i.XVII.

31. Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk, Staatsbankrott, Göttingen, 1974, 185; Krosigk, Es geschah, I99; see also Papen, 260, and John L. Heinemann, Hitler’s First Foreign Minister, Berkeley, 1979, 65.

32. AdR, Reg. Hitler, I–4.

33. See Rudolf Morsey, ‘Die deutsche Zentrumspartei’ in Matthias and Morsey, Ende der Parteien, 281–453, here 340–43; and Rudolf Morsey, ‘Hitlers Verhandlungen mit der Zentrumsführung am 31. Januar 1933’, VfZ, 9 (1961), 182–94. See also Karl Dietrich Bracher, Gerhard Schulz and Wolfgang Sauer, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (1960), paperback edn, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Vienna, 3 vols., 1974, i. 85.

34. Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.89.

35. Brüning, Memoiren, ii.684; AdR, Reg. Hitler, 2. Franz Gürtner was only confirmed in his office as Reich Justice Minister on 2 February. But his retention had already been agreed with the Reich President on 29 January. The delay was solely owing to Hitler’s wish to use the occupancy of the Reich Ministry of Justice as a bargaining card in his negotiations with the Zentrum (Lothar Gruchmann, Justiz im Dritten Reich 1933–1940. Anpassung und Unterwerfung in der Ära Gürtner, 2nd edn, Munich, 1990, 9–10, 64).

36. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 5–7 and n.6; Becker, Hitlers Machtergreifung, 34–5.

37. Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.85.

38. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 6. Another conservative, Hugenberg, pressed to depose the ‘so-called sovereignty government of Braun’ in Prussia as soon as possible. State Secretary Meissner took this up and went on to propose the dissolution of the Prussian Landtag, if necessary by use of Article 48, since ‘it is in any event necessary that the so-called sovereignty government of Braun soon disappears’ (AdR, Reg. Hitler, 7–8 and n.10). (A decision of the Supreme Court – Staatsgerichtshof – of 25 October 1932 had upheld the removal of the Prussian government that had taken place on 20 July 1932, but ruled that the Prussian government still had the right to represent the Prussian state in dealings with the Reich and other states.)

39. Meissner, Staatssekretär, 225; Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.86; Meissner and Wilde, Machtergreifung, I97–8.

40. A point made by Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.86.

41. As regards economic recovery, Hitler’s first move was to back the initiative to suspend compulsory farm sales, pointing to the necessity of satisfying the wishes of at least a part of the nation at first (AdR, Reg. Hitler, 7–8, 11).

42. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 9 and n.3.

43. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 29 and n.7, 30, 34–5 and n.7.

44. AdR, Reg. Hitler, I5.

45. Papen, 265.

46. Heinz Höhne, Die Zeit der Illusionen. Hitler und die Anfänge des 3. Reiches I933 bis 1936, Düsseldorf/Vienna/New York, 1991, 13–14; see also Schacht, 300: ‘I happened to be in the room with a mere handful of his entourage when he made his first speech to the German people over the radio… I had the impression that the burden of his new responsibilities weighed heavily upon him. At this moment he felt clearly what it meant to be transferred from the propaganda ranks of the Opposition to a post of Government responsibility.’

47. Papen, 265.

48. Domarus, 191–4.

49. Domarus, 193.

50. Thilo Vogelsang, ‘Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930–1933’, VfZ, 2 (1954), 434, n.127; Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.88; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 55. Earlier in the day, Blomberg had met District Commanders at the Reichswehr Ministry. Vogelsang links the Hammerstein invitation with this earlier meeting as an attempt to introduce Hitler to leading officers. He inclines to follow John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power. The German Army in Politics, London, 1953, 291, in seeing it as a response to Hitler’s unannounced visits to a number of Berlin barracks on the morning of 31 January, which had caused a ripple of alarm as a reminder, it seemed, of the spirit of 1918. A different reason for Hammerstein’s home as the venue and setting – a sixtieth birthday party for Neurath – is given by Wolfgang Sauer, Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, iii.55, 387 n.107. The two reasons are, perhaps, complementary rather than contradictory.

51. Vogelsang, ‘Neue Dokumente’, 434–5 (notes of General Liebmann). According to the notes of Major von Mellenthin, also present at the meeting, Hitler’s posed alternatives were markets or colonies, and he favoured the latter (cit. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen,55). It seems likely, however, that Mellenthin misinterpreted Hitler’s reference to ‘living-space’ as meaning ‘colonies’.

52. Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, iii.75–6, 393 n.183–91; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 56.

53. In a memorandum of 6 March 1926, Otto Stülpnagel, Abteilungschef in the Truppenamt, had spoken of the build-up of the armed forces as the basis of expansionism aimed at recovering Germany’s territories lost in the Versailles Treaty, re-establishing its European supremacy (at the expense of France), and preparing for ultimate global struggle for domination against the Anglo-Saxon powers (Klaus-Jürgen Müller, ‘Deutsche Militär-Elite in der Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges’, in Martin Broszat and Klaus Schwabe (eds.), Deutsche Eliten und der Weg in den Zweiten Weltkrieg, Munich, 1989, 226–90, here 246–7).

54. Vogelsang, ‘Neue Dokumente’, 432–4; Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Armee und Drittes Reich 1933–1939. Darstellung und Dokumentation, Paderborn, 1987, 158–9. The emotional and impressionable Blomberg had been completely won over to Hitler (Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Das Heer und Hitler. Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime 1933–1940, (1969) 2nd edn, Stuttgart, 1988, 51).

55. Geyer, ‘Reichswehr, NSDAP, and the Seizure of Power’, 118.

56. Geyer, ‘Reichswehr, NSDAP, and the Seizure of Power’, 111; and Geyer, ‘Professionals and Junkers’, esp. 86–7, 116–23.

57. Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Armee, Politik und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1933–1945, Paderborn, 1979, 11–33; Wilhelm Deist, The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament, London, 1981, ch.1; Geyer, ‘Reichswehr, NSDAP, and the Seizure of Power’, 101–23.

58. Müller, Heer, 53. Reichenau had first met Hitler, for a lengthy private talk, in spring 1932. The colonel had evidently seen in Hitler and his Movement the potential to instigate the revolutionary renewal that he himself was seeking. Hitler, for his part, had recognized Reichenau’s instinctive backing for his radical approach. Aware of Reichenau’s sympathies (and in reply to a request for clarification about his stance to the defence of East Prussia in the event of Polish aggression), Hitler had, in December 1932, overcome his normal aversion to letter-writing to compose a lengthy statement of the need for a ‘deep process of regeneration’, destruction of Marxism ‘down to its complete extermination’, and ‘general psychological, ethical, and moral rearmament of the nation based on this new ideological unity’ as the framework for national defence (Thilo Vogelsang, ‘Hitlers Brief an Reichenau vom 4. Dezember 1932’, VfZ, 7 (1959), 429–37, here esp. 437).

59. DRZW, i.404; Deist, Wehrmacht, 26.

60. Cit. Vogelsang, ‘Hitlers Brief an Reichenau’, 433; Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, iii.68; Müller, Armee, I60; Müller, Heer, 61ff. for Blomberg’s understanding of keeping the army out of politics.

61. Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, iii.68. The officer was Oberstleutnant Ott.

62. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 50–51.

63. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 62–3; see DRZW, i.234.

64. See, for the above, DRZW, i.234–5, 404–5; Geyer, Rüstungspolitik, I40; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 58.

65. IMT, xxxvi.586, Doc. 611–EC.

66. Deist, Wehrmacht, 24–6; Müller, Heer; Bracher et al, Machtergreifung, iii.41ff; DRZW, i.403; Peter Hüttenberger, ‘National-sozialistische Polykratie’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 2 (1976), 417–42, here 423–5.

67. Müller, Armee, Politik und Gesellschaft, 44–5.

68. Dietmar Petzina, Die deutsche Wirtschaft in der Zwischenkriegszeit, Wiesbaden, 1977, 114–15; Dieter Petzina, ‘Hauptprobleme der deutschen Wirtschaft 1932–1933’ Vfz, 15 (1967), 18–55, here 41–3, 53–5; Gustavo Corni, Hitler and the Peasants, New York/Oxford/Munich, 1990, 41ff; Turner, German Big Business, 328.

69. For the meeting, see Turner, German Big Business, 328.

70. IMT, XXXV.42–7, Doc. 203–D.

71. IMT, XXV.48, Doc. 204–D.

72. IMT, xxxv.47–8, Doc. 203–D.

73. Turner, German Big Business, 330–31. At the cabinet meeting on 2 February, Frick had raised the question of subsidizing election propaganda of the government to the tune of a million Reich Marks. Objections were raised by Krosigk, the Finance Minister, and upheld by Hitler. At a subsequent cabinet meeting, on 21 February, it was, however, accepted that the Reichspost could be used to send out propaganda material (AdR, Reg. Hitler, 30–31, 102).

74. Turner, German Big Business, 332.

75. See Turner, German Big Business, 333–9.

76. Based on Turner, German Big Business, 71–83; Henry Ashby Turner, ‘Hitlers Einstellung zu Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft vor 1933’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 2 (1976), 89–117; Avraham Barkai, ‘Sozialdarwinismus und Antiliberalismus in Hitlers Wirtschaftskonzept’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 3 (1977), 406–17; James, The German Slump, 345–54; see also Avraham Barkai, Das Wirtschaftssystem des Nationalsozialismus, Fischer edn, Frankfurt am Main, 1988, ch.1, and Zitelmann, Hitler. Selbstverständnis eines Revolutionärs, ch.4, for Hitler’s social and economic ideas.

77. James, The German Slump, 344.

78. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I09–13, here 113.

79. Schacht, 317–19; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I31–2; Richard J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, Oxford, 1994, 56. Following legislation brought in at the time of the currency stabilization in 1924, there were firm restrictions on the government’s scope for printing money. The discount bills – greatly extended under Schacht – were a way of getting round such restrictions.

80. Richard J. Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery, 2nd edn, Cambridge, 1996, 37.

81. Barkai, Das Wirtschaftssystem des Nationalsozialismus, I51; James, The German Slump, 344; Overy, War and Economy, 60.

82. Domarus, 208–9; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 59.

83. Cit. Heidrun Edelmann, Vom Luxusgut zum Gebrauchsgegenstand. Die Geschichte der Verbreitung von Personenkraftwagen in Deutschland, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, 173.

84. AdR, Reg. Hitler, xliii; Edelmann, 173.

85. Edelmann, 189 n.141; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen 62–3.

86. Hansjoachim Henning, ‘Kraftfahrzeugindustrie und Autobahn in der Wirtschaftspolitik des Nationalsozialismus 1933 bis 1936’, Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 65 (1978), 217–42, here, esp., 228.

87. AdR, Reg. Hitler, xliii. For Todt’s contribution to motorway construction, see Franz W. Seidler, Fritz Todt. Baumeister des Dritten Reiches, Munich/Berlin, 1986, Part 3, here 97ff.

88. Kurt Kaftan, Der Kampf um die Autobahnen, Berlin, 1955, 81–3; and see Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 60, 62–3.

89. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 59, 62. For Hitler’s personal interest in cars, and his friendship with Jakob Werlin of Mercedes, see Overy, War and Economy, 72 n.17.

90. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 60, cit. VB, I2–13 February 1933.

91. Hans Mommsen, Das Volkswagenwerk und seine Arbeiter im Dritten Reich, Düsseldorf, 1996, 56–60.

92. Henning, 226 n.37.

93. Henning, 221–7.

94. See Overy, War and Economy, 70–71.

95. AdR, Reg. Hitler, xliii.

96. AdR, Reg. Hitler, xliii-v. In fact, far more of the expenditure went on ordinary roads than motorways. (See Overy, War and Economy, 60, 85.)

97. Edelmann, 174–5. The motorways were at first not a major factor in the reduction of unemployment (Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I29–31).

98. Helmut Heiber, ed., Goebbels-Reden, Bd .I: 1932–1939, Düsseldorf, 1971, 67–70 (with Heiber’s editorial interpolations referring to the background acoustics in brackets); reprinted in Becker, Hitlers Machtergreifung, 57–60, here 58–9.

99. Domarus, 204–8.

100. TBJG, I.2, 371 (11 February 1933).

101. Erich Ebermayer, Denn heute gehört uns Deutschland, Hamburg/Vienna, 1959, 21.

102. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 424–5.

103. Becker, Hitlers Machtergreifung, 74–5; Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung, Munich, 1969, 93.

104. Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, 90–95.

105. Papen, 260.

106. Domarus, 213; Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, 95.

107. Domarus, 210–11; Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, 98.

108. BHStA, MA 106672, RPvNB/OP, 20 February 1933.

109. Staatsarchiv München, LRA 76887, GS Anzing, 24 February 1933.

110. Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, 99.

111. Hans Mommsen, ‘Van der Lubbes Weg in den Reichstag – der Ablauf der Ereignisse’, in Uwe Backes et al., Reichstagsbrand. Aufklärung einer historischen Legende, Munich/Zurich, 1986, 33–57, here 33–42.

112. The question of who set the Reichstag ablaze has provoked the most rancorous of disputes. The Nazi version that it was a Communist plot was widely disbelieved at the time by critical observers and was not even convincing enough to secure the conviction of the leading Communists tried at the show trial at the supreme Reich Court in Leipzig in autumn 1933. The view that the Nazis, with most to gain, had set fire to the Reichstag themselves was immediately given wide currency among diplomats and foreign journalists, and in liberal circles in Germany (see François-Poncet, 94–5). Nazi authorship, as put forward in Communist counter-propaganda, orchestrated by Willi Münzenberg, in The Brown Book of the Hitler Terror and the Burning of the Reichstag, Paris, 1933, carried the day for a long time. But the findings of Fritz Tobias in the 1960s, collected in his extensive evaluation and documentation (Der Reichstagsbrand. Legende und Wirklichkeit, Rastatt/Baden, 1962), supported by the scholarly analysis of Hans Mommsen (‘Der Reichstagsbrand und seine politischen Folgen’, VfZ, I2 (1964), 351–413), that Marinus van der Lubbe acted alone, are compelling and are now widely accepted, though not by Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany: A New History, London, 1995, 272. The counter-claims of the Luxemburg Committee (see Walther Hofer et al. (eds.), Der Reichstagsbrand. Eine wissenschaftliche Dokumentation, 2 vols., Berlin, 1972, Munich, 1978), that the Nazis were indeed the perpetrators, are regarded by most experts as flawed. The consequences of the Reichstag fire were, of course, always more important than the identity of whoever instigated the blaze. But the question of authorship was nevertheless of significance, since it revolved around the question of whether the Nazis were following through carefully laid plans to institute totalitarian rule, or whether they were improvising reactions to events they had not expected. (See, for an assessment and re-evaluation of the debate, Backes et al., Reichstagsbrand. The latest rekindling of the debate has again, following careful research in sources that have only recently become available, led to the conclusion that van der Lubbe acted alone. – See Klaus Wiegrefe, ‘Flammendes Fanal’, Der Spiegel, I5 (2001), 38–58, which convincingly defends Tobias’ version against the counter-interpretation of a Nazi conspiracy, advanced once more in Jürgen Schmädeke, Alexander Bahar, and Wilfried Kugel, ‘Der Reichstagsbrand in neuem licht’, Historische Zeitschrift, 269 (1999), 603–51.)

113. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 291–5.

114. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 269–70 (27 February 1933), TBJG, I.2, 383.

115. Heiden, Führer, 434–7; Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.123–4.

116. Mommsen, ‘Van der Lubbes Weg’, 44–7.

117. Mommsen ‘Van der Lubbes Weg’, 40–41.

118. Mommsen ‘Der Reichstagsbrand’, 382–3.

119. Mommsen ‘Van der Lubbes Weg’, 47–8; Mommsen, ‘Der Reichstagsbrand’, 384. Hitler appears at first, however, to have been less than wholly certain that it was the work of the Communists (Sefton Delmer, Trail Sinister, London, 1961, 187–9).

120. Rudolf Diels, Lucifer ante Portas, Stuttgart, 1950, 194; Mommsen, ‘Der Reichstagsbrand’, 116.

121. Delmer, Trail, I89; Mommsen, ‘Der Reichstagsbrand’, 384.

122. Diels, 194–5; Mommsen, ‘Der Reichstagsbrand’, 362, 385 and n. 143. Göring’s order to arrest all Social Democrat functionaries was omitted when the telex was transmitted.

123. TBJG, I.2, 383 (27 February 1933), gives the opposite impression, though this version of his diaries was the published account (Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 270).

124. Diels, 195; Mommsen, ‘Der Reichstagsbrand’, 362, 386.

125. TBJG, I.2, 383 (Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 270); Mommsen, ‘Der Reichstagsbrand’, 390.

126. Mommsen, ‘Der Reichstagsbrand’, 389–90.

127. Mommsen ‘Van der Lubbes Weg’, 51; AdR, Reg. Hitler, I30 and n.12: Frick expressly stated that he had based the decree on Papen’s decree for the ‘Restoration of Public Security and Order in Greater Berlin and the Province of Brandenburg’, of 20 July 1932.

128. Mommsen ‘Van der Lubbes Weg’, 51–3.

129. AdR, Reg. Hitler, I30–31.

130. RGBl, I933. I. Nr.17, 83.

131. AdR, Reg. Hitler, I28.

132. See e.g. Kessler, Tagebücher, 710.

133. Hans-Norbert Burkert, Klaus Matußek and Wolfgang Wippermann, ‘Machtergreifung’ Berlin 1933, Berlin, 1982, 65.

134. Hans Buchheim et al., Anatomie des SS-Staates, 2 vols., Olten/Freiburg im Breisgau, 1965, ii.20.

135. Miesbacher Anzeiger, 2 March 1933.

136. VB, 2 March 1933; and see Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.124–5, 515 n.17.

137. Jochmann, Natonalsozialismus und Revolution, 427–8.

138. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 427.

139. Jochmann, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution, 426.

140. Domarus, 216–17; Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 273–4 (4 March 1933), TBJG, I.2, 386.

141. Falter et al., Wahlen, 44. (See the analysis in Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.143–90.)

142. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 275 (5 March 1933), TBJG, I.2, 387.

143. Martin H. Sommerfeld, Ich war dabei. Die Verschwörung der Dämonen 1933–1939. Ein Augenzeugenbericht, Darmstadt, 1949, 32.

144. Falter et al., Wahlen, 44; Falter, Hitlers Wähler, 111–12.

145. Falter et al., Wahlen, 74–5. And see Falter, Hitlers Wähler, I86–8. In Catholic rural districts of Bavaria, a double or even trebling of the Nazi vote was common (Hagmann, 12–27, and Thränhardt, 181–3).

146. Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, I33–4. However, Hitler was not passive. The decision to extend the ‘coordination’ to Bavaria was taken in his presence on 8 March. Four days later he flew to Munich to discuss ‘the most pressing Bavarian matters’ with party leaders (Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 277 (8 March 1933), 280 (12 March 1933), TBJG, I.2, 389, 391).

147. Above based on Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, I30–40; Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i. 190–202.

148. AdR, Reg. Hitler, I88–92.

149. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 204–8; here 207.

150. Domarus, 219.

151. Domarus, 221.

152. AdR, Reg. Hitler, I90.

153. Martin Broszat, Elke Fröhlich and Falk Wiesemann (eds.), Bayern in der Ν S-Zeit, vol.1, Munich, 1977, 209 n.30, 240–41.

154. BHStA, M A 106682, RPvS, 6 April 1933; MA 106680, RPvUF, 20 April 1933. The extent to which, nevertheless, the police depended upon denunciations has been emphasized – based on material drawn largely from Lower Franconia – by Robert Gellately, ‘The Gestapo and German Society: Political Denunciation in the Gestapo Case Files’, Journal of Modern History, 60 (1988), 654–94, and The Gestapo and German Society. Enforcing Racial Policy 1933–1945, Oxford, 1990, ch.5.

155. Becker, Hitlers Machtergreifung, I49–50.

156. Tony Barta, ‘Living in Dachau, 1900–1950’, unpublished paper, 14.

157. François–Poncet, 103–7; Ebermayer, 45–7; Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.212; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 74; Hans-Ulrich Thamer, Verführung und Gewalt. Deutschland 1933–1945, Berlin, 1986, 270–72; Klaus-Jürgen Müller, ‘Der Tag von Potsdam und das Verhältnis der preußisch-deutschen Militär-Elite zum Nationalsozialismus’, in Bernhard Kröner (ed.), Potsdam–Stadt, Armee, Residenz, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin, 1993, 435–49, here 435, 439, 448.

158. AdR, Reg. Hitler, I57–8.

159. Müller, ‘Der Tag von Potsdam’, 435.

160. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 283–4 (16–19 March 1933), TBJG, 1.2, 393–5. For Goebbels’s own description of the day’s events: TBJG, I.2, 395–6 (Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 285–6, 22 March 1933).

161. Müller, ‘Der Tag von Potsdam’, 435–8; Werner Freitag, ‘Nationale Mythen und kirchliches Heil: Der “Tag von Potsdam”’, Westfälische Forschungen, 41 (1991), 379–430, provides a good account of the ritualistic nature of the proceedings (esp. 389–404), and emphasizes their symbolic significance, in particular, for the Protestant Church through the express linkage of religious motifs and the glorification of the Prussian-German state (see esp. 427–30).

162. Domarus, 227–8.

163. Ebermayer, 46.

164. Müller, ‘Der Tag von Potsdam’, 438.

165. Domarus, 228.

166. Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.213–15.

167. AdR, Reg. Hitler, I60.

168. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 213–14, 216.

169. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 239.

170. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 239–40.

171. Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.221–4. See also, on the genesis of the Enabling Act, Hans Schneider, ‘Das Ermächtigungsgesetz vom 24. März 1933. Bericht über das Zustandekommen und die Anwendung des Gesetzes’, VfZ, I (1953), 197–221.

172. Domarus, 229–37; Rudolf Morsey (ed.), Das ‘Ermächtigungsgesetz’ vom 24. März 1933, Düsseldorf, 1992, 55–62; Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.229–33.

173. Josef Becker, ‘Zentrum und Ermächtigungsgesetz’, VfZ, 9 (1961), 208–10; Morsey, ‘Ermächtigungsgesetz’, 63, 69–71.

174. Domarus, 239–41; Morsey, ‘Ermächtigungsgesetz’, 64–6.

175. Domarus, 242–6; Morsey, ‘Ermächtigungsgesetz’, 66–9. See Ebermayer, 48, for the impact Hitler’s reply made on one critic: he thought Hitler had ‘ripped poor Wels apart’ (Dann zerriß er den armen Wels förmlich in der Luft).

176. Becker, Hitlers Machtergreifung, I76–7; Domarus, 246–7; Morsey, ‘Ermächtigungsgesetz’, 69–75; Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.234–5.

177. RGBl, I933, Teil I, Nr.25, S.141. Its duration was four years. But in 1937 it was renewed without discussion, as it was in 1939, and, finally – without limits on its duration–by Führer decree on 10 May 1943 (Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, I17 and note).

178. RGBl, I933, Teil I. Nr.33, S.173; Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, I43.

179. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 273.

180. RGBl, I933, Teil I. Nr.33, S.173; Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, I43.

181. Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, I44–50.

182. Peter Diehl-Thiele, Partei und Staat im Dritten Reich. Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von NSDAP und allgemeiner innerer Staatsverwaltung, Munich, 1969, 61–9.

183. Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, I50.

184. Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, I53.

185. Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, I45.

186. Alfred Kube, Pour le mérite und Hakenkreuz. Hermann Göring im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1986, 31–3; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 96–7.

187. For the term, see Hans Mommsen, ‘Kumulative Radikalisierung und Selbstzerstörung des Regimes’, Meyers Enzyklopädisches Lexikon, Bd.16, Mannheim, 1976, 785–90.

188. Domarus 219; Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, 249.

189. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 84–5; for ‘Einzelaktionen’, see Die Lage der Juden in Deutschland 1933. Das Schwarzbuch – Tatsachen und Dokumente, ed. Comité des Délégations Juives, Paris, 1934, repr. Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Vienna, 1983, 93ff.

190. Die Lage der Juden, 495–6.

191. Walter Tausk, Breslauer Tagebuch 1933–1940, East Berlin, 1975, 32–7.

192. Die Lage der Juden, 496.

193. See Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 76–9.

194. Hans Mommsen, ‘Die Realisierung des Utopischen: Die “Endlösung der Judenfrage” im “Dritten Reich”’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 9 (1983), 381–420, here 390. See also Genschel, 46–7; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 86–7.

195. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 87.

196. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 288 (26 March 1933), TBJG, I.2, 398.

197. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 271 and n.3; Domarus, 248–51.

198. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 87–8.

199. Jürgen Hagemann, Die Presselenkung im Dritten Reich, Bonn, 1970, 139 n.2; Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich, Düsseldorf, 1972, 63 n.196.

200. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 277.

201. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 91.

202. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 277.

203. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 290 (31 March 1933), TBJG, I.2, 400; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 91–2.

204. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz, I970, 87.

205. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, 291–2 (1–2 April 1933), TBJG, 1.2, 400–401; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 92–3; Die Lage der Juden, 292–314; Rumbold report of 5 April 1933 in DBFP, V, No.22, 24–5, No.30, 38–44.

206. Tausk, 52; Schleunes, 88–9.

207. Tausk, 58; Allen, 219; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 92–3.

208. Allen, 220–21. As Gay, ‘In Deutschland zu Hause’, 32–3, points out, however, many Jews continued to harbour the fateful illusion that the antisemitic whirlwind would blow itself out; that what was happening to them was something not typical of Germans, and would be eventually overcome by the strong civilizing traditions of the German culture which they shared with their non-Jewish neighbours.

209. Schleunes, 88.

210. Adam, 61 and n.190, 63–71; Schleunes, 101–3. And see Hans Mommsen, Beamtentum im Dritten Reich, Stuttgart, 1966, 48–53 for the background to the ‘Aryan Paragraph’ in the Civil Service Law of 7 April 1933.

211. Erich Matthias, ‘Die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands’, in Matthias and Morsey, Das Ende der Parteien, I01–278, here 177–8.

212. Matthias, 178–80.

213. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I01–2, 105–7; Thamer, 284–6; Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.254–9.

214. Domarus, 259–64.

215. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I05.

216. On the formation of the Labour Front see Ronald Smelser, Robert Ley: Hitler’s Labor Front Leader, Oxford/New York/Hamburg, 1988, ch.5.

217. Timothy W. Mason, Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft. Dokumente und Materialien zur deutschen Arbeiterpolitik 1936–1939, Opladen, 1975, 78–81. The NSBO had effectively lost all influence by the turn of the year 1933–4, though was eventually extinguished only in mid-1934.

218. Domarus, 270–79.

219. Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, I19–20; Thamer, 286–7.

220. Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, I21–3; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I14–15.

221. Hans Müller, Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus, Munich, 1965, 88–9.

222. Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, I23–6; Thamer, 289–90.

223. RGBl, I933, Teil I, Nr.81, S.479; Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, I26.

224. At the city level, the change of personnel at the top of local government was drastic: some three-fifths of Oberbürgermeister and Bürgermeister of towns and cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants had been dismissed by the end of 1933. The bigger the city, the greater was the turnover: in only four out of twenty-eight was the Oberbürgermeister not replaced by the end of 1933 (Horst Matzerath, Nationalsozialismus und kommunale Selbstverwaltung, Stuttgart, 1970, 79–80). See also Jeremy Noakes, ‘Oberbürgermeister and Gauleiter. City Government between Party and State’, and Horst Matzerath, ‘Oberbürgermeister im Dritten Reich’, both in Hirschfeld and Kettenacker, Der ‘FührerStaat’, 194–227, 228–54.

225. See Zofka, 238–86 for examples.

226. Martin Broszat and Norbert Frei (eds.), Das Dritte Reich im Überblick. Chronik, Ereignisse, Zusammenhänge, Munich, 1989, 195, 212; Kater, Nazi Party, 262 (Figure 1).

227. Broszat et al., Bayern in der NS–Zeit, i.494.

228. Cit. Thamer, 299.

229. E.g. see Allen, 222–32; Koshar, 253ff.

230. Allen, 222.

231. Thamer, 305. Hitler had promised a ‘far-reaching moral renewal (Sanierung) of the public body’, including education, theatre, film, literature, press, and radio (Domarus, 232 (23 March 1933)).

232. Paul Meier-Benneckenstein, Dokumente der deutschen Politik, Bd .1, 2nd edn, Berlin, 1937, 263–4; Heiber, Goebbels-Reden, i.90.

233. Thamer, 301.

234. See, from an extensive literature, the outstanding work of Michael H. Kater, The Twisted Muse. Musicians and their Music in the Third Reich, New York/Oxford, 1997.

235. J. M. Ritchie, German Literature under National Socialism, London/Canberra, 1983, 9–10. The regime remained cool towards Hauptmann, recognizing the superficiality of his commitment to National Socialism.

236. Cit. Thamer, 300–301.

237. Cit. Hans Mommsen, ‘Der Mythos des nationalen Aufbruchs und die Haltung der deutschen Intellektuellen und funktionalen Eliten’, in 1933 in Gesellschaft und Wissenschaft, ed. Pressestelle der Universität Hamburg, Hamburg, 1983, 127–41, here 132.

238. Ritchie, 48–9.

239. Cit. Thamer, 301.

240. Cit. Mommsen, ‘Mythos’, 132.

241. Cit. Mommsen, ‘Mythos’, 129, 132.

242. Cit. Mommsen, ‘Mythos’, 131.

243. See the entries in Thomas Mann, Diaries, 1918–1939, paperback edn, London, 1984, 141–51 (1–13 April 1933).

244. Mann, Diaries, I50 (9 April 1933). And see Thamer, 302.

245. Cit. Mommsen, ‘Mythos’, 134.

246. See Mommsen, ‘Mythos’, 132–5.

247. Thamer, 303.

248. See Gerhard Sauder, Die Bücherverbrennung, Munich/Vienna, 1983.

249. Cit. Sauder, 181 (and see also 177).

250. Mommsen, ‘Mythos’, 128; Thamer, 304.

251. Cit. Thamer, 305.

252. Ian Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’. Image and Reality in the Third Reich, Oxford (1987), paperback edn., 1989, 53, 55.

253. Beatrice and Helmut Heiber (eds.), Die Rückseite des Hakenkreuzes. Absonderliches aus den Akten des Dritten Reiches, Munich, 1993, 119–20 and n.1, 181–3.

254. Rolf Steinberg, Nazi-Kitsch, Darmstadt, 1975.

255. Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, 57–9.

256. BAK, R43II/1263, Fols. 93, 164.

257. Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, I26–7.

258. Kershaw, The ‘HitlerMyth’, 61, cit. Schwäbisches Volksblatt, 9 September 1933.

259. BHstA MA-106670, RPvOB, 19 August 1933; Heiber, Rückseite, 9.

260. Above from Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 309–17.

261. See Papen, 261.

262. TBJG, I.2, 410 (23 April 1933, unpubl.).

263. RGBl, I933, Teil I, Nr.86, 529–31.

264. On Gütt, see Wistrich, Wer war wer, I06; Gisela Bock, Zwangssterilisation im Nationalsozialismus. Studien zur Rassenpolitik und Frauenpolitik, Opladen, 1986, 25.

265. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 664–5; Noakes, ‘Nazism and Eugenics’, 84–7.

266. Bock, 8, 238.

267. Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, London, 1964, 77; ch.3 deals with the background to the Concordat, and the important role played by Kaas. See also Conway, 24–8.

268. Conway, 41.

269. Lewy, 88–9.

270. Papen, 281; Lewy, 77–8.

271. Lewy, 72–7.

272. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 683; Lewy, 78. He had also not thought it possible, he said, that the Vatican would be so quickly ready to abandon the Christian trade unions and political parties.

273. Lewy, ch.4, esp. 99, 103–4. The text of the pastoral letter is printed in Müller, Katholische Kirche, I63–73.

274. Alfons Kupper (ed.), Staatliche Akten über die Reichskonkordatsverhandlungen 1933, Mainz, 1969, 293–4, Nr.117.

275. Conway, 33.

276. Kurt Meier, Kreuz und Hakenkreuz. Die evangelische Kirche im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1992, 42.

277. Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.452; Domarus, 290–91.

278. Conway, 49.

279. Above from Conway, 34–55.

280. The term is the subtitle of the first volume of Gerhard L. Weinberg’s authoritative study, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany. Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933–36, Chicago/London, 1970.

281. Günter Wollstein, ‘Eine Denkschrift des Staatssekretärs Bernhard von Bülow vom März 1933’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, I (1973), 77–94; AdR, Reg. Hitler, i.313–18; Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, Großdeutschland. Außenpolitik und Kriegsvorbereitung des Hitler-Regimes, Munich, 1987, 72–9; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I49. Bülow’s memorandum provides the clearest indication of the thinking of the Foreign Ministry at the beginning of the Third Reich. The tone is one of the need for early caution and avoidance of external conflict, during which phase internal rebuilding as well as careful formation of bilateral alliances could pave the way for later revisionism and expansion. Drawing heavily upon the conception of an expansionist foreign policy developed in the Wilhelmine era, it demonstrates how extensive the platform was for close collaboration with Hitler even where, as in the case of Russia and Poland, the views were rapidly shown to differ sharply from his own notions. The structure of the Foreign Office, and how it altered under Hitler, was thoroughly explored in the extensive work of Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik 1933–1938, Frankfurt am Main, 1968.

282. Weinberg, i.161. Hitler had commented to Nadolny, soon after becoming Chancellor, that he knew nothing of foreign policy, that it would take him four years to make Germany National Socialist, and only after that would he be able to concern himself with foreign affairs. The Foreign Office, he remarked, was run according to traditional rules, and had to consider the wishes of the Reich President (Rudolf Nadolny, Mein Beitrag. Erinnerungen eines Botschafters des Deutschen Reiches, Cologne, 1985, 239).

283. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I50, 152, 158.

284. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I54–5, 161.

285. Weinberg, i.164. See also Gerhard Meinck, Hitler und die deutsche Aufrüstung, Wiesbaden, 1959, 22–6, 35–51.

286. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I58, 166–8.

287. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I58–9.

288. AdR, Reg. Hitler, 447–8.

289. Brüning, ii.706–7.

290. Morsey, ‘Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei’, 388.

291. Brüning, ii.707.

292. Wilhelm Hoegner, Flucht vor Hitler, Munich, 1977, 203.

293. Domarus, 273.

294. Domarus, 278; for the text of the speech, 270–79.

295. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I61, 168, 169–70. Goebbels, visiting Geneva at the end of September, though full of contempt for what he saw, sounded like a peace-loving, amenable diplomat (Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923–45, Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas, Bonn, 1953, 283–6; TBJG, I.2, 465–6 (25 September 1933, 27 September 1933)). However, he appears to have favoured taking advantage of the impasse in negotiations to leave the talks (Weinberg, i.165 and refs. in n.28).

296. Weinberg, i.165 and n·29·

297. NCA, Supplement B, 1504; Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i. 338.

298. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I71; Weinberg, i.165 (with different emphasis); Papen, 297–8.

299. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I72. Neurath, though strongly supportive of the move, was in fact only informed once the decision had been taken. He was told by Bülow on the evening of 4 October that Hitler and Blomberg now intended to leave the League (Günter Wollstein, Von Weimarer Revisionismus zu Hitler, Bonn/Bad Godesberg, 1973, 201 and n.39–40).

300. AdR, Reg. Hitler, ii.903–7, here 904–5.

301. Weinberg, i.166. Formal notice of withdrawal from the League was only presented on 19 October (DGFP, C, II, 2 n.2).

302. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I73, 178–9; Jost Dülffer, ‘Zum “decision-making process” in der deutschen Außenpolitik 1933–1939’, in Manfred Funke (ed.), Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte. Materialien zur Außenpolitik des Dritten Reichs, I86–204, here 188–90.

303. Domarus, 308–14.

304. Domarus, 323–30.

305. Hans Baur, Ich flog Mächtige der Erde, Kempten (Allgäu), 1956, 108–10; Domarus, 325 and n.293.

306. Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, 62.

307. Domarus, 331.

308. BAK, R18/5350, Fols. 95–104, 107–22, contains inquiries into complaints about irregularities in the election. See also AdR, Reg. Hitler, ii.939 n.1; and Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.480–85.

309. If the point needed emphasis, the vote of 99.5 per cent in favour by the inmates of Dachau concentration camp underlined it (Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, I3 November 1933). In the circumstances, the levels of those refusing their support – greater in the election than the plebiscite – was sometimes remarkable (over 21 per cent in Hamburg and Berlin, over 15 per cent in Cologne-Aachen in the election) and corresponded broadly to the types of social structure and religious allegiance that had provided relative immunity to the Nazi breakthrough before 1933 (see Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, i.486–97).

310. AdR, Reg. Hitler, ii.939 n.1.

311. AdR, Reg. Hitler, ii.939–41.

CHAPTER 12: SECURING TOTAL POWER

1. The term was coined by Richard Bessel, Political Violence, I52.

2. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, I65–76.

3. Diels, 254ff.

4. Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1235-VI-2, Fol.2–28, here 19–21.

5. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 166, I98.

6. The file of Meissner’s Präsidialkanzlei in Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1413-I-6, contains 460 folios relating to such cases between 1933 and 1935. The complicity of the judicial system, and of Gürtner personally, in the quashing of sentences against SA men convicted of acts of brutality is thoroughly explored by Gruchmann, Justiz, ch.4.

7. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, I77–9.

8. Heinz Höhne, Mordsache Röhm. Hitlers Durchbruch zur Alleinherrschaft 1933–1934, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1934, 46, referring to remarks made by Hindenburg to Hitler on 29 June 1933. The comments were made in the context of the discord in the Protestant Church and did not mention the SA explicitly. Hindenburg’s view on the ‘excesses’ was, however, that Hitler ‘has the best will and is only working in with a pure heart in the interests of justice’, while ‘his subordinates unfortunately kick over the traces’ – something which would be sorted out in time (Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1235 – vI-2, Fol. 271, notes on a discussion of Hindenburg with Hugenberg, 17 May 1933).

9. Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, 4 (1933), 251–4, passages quoted, 253–4.

10. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, I84. The figure was swollen by the paramilitary organizations incorporated in the SA, the most important of which was the Stahlhelm. Only around a third of the SA men were party members.

11. Domarus, 286.

12. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, I82–3; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 46–9.

13. Shlomo Aronson, Reinhard Heydrich und die Frühgeschichte von Gestapo und SD, Stuttgart, 1971, 71, 92.

14. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, I84–7.

15. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I43–8.

16. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, I85, 188.

17. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, I27–8.

18. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, I88–90. Unemployed workers had always, during the period of Nazism’s surge to power and continuing throughout 1933 and 1934, constituted a substantial proportion of the SA’s membership (Fischer, Stormtroopers, 45–8).

19. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 200–205; Hermann Mau, ‘Die “Zweite Revolution” – der 30. Juni 1934’, VfZ, I (1953), 119–37, here esp. 124–7; Otto Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer hat Sie zum Tode verurteilt…’. Hitlers ‘Röhm-Putsch’-Morde vor Gericht,Munich, 1993, 30, citing the testimony from 1953 of Paul Körner, formerly State Secretary in the Prussian Staatsministerium; Höhne, Mordsache Rohm, 218–19.

20. See Martin Loiperdinger and David Culbert, ‘Leni Riefenstahl, the SA, and the Nazi Party Rally Films, Nuremberg 1933–1934: “Sieg des Glaubens” and “Triumph des Willens”’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio, and Television, 8 (1988), 3–38, here esp. 12–13.

21. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 201.

22. Domarus, 338, for a glowing expression of Hitler’s thanks to Röhm on 31 December 1933 for his services to the Movement. Among the twelve such letters sent to Nazi leaders, only Röhm was addressed in the ‘Du’ form (Domarus, 338–42).

23. See Immo v. Fallois, Kalkül und Illusion. Der Machtkampf zwischen Reichswehr und SA während der Röhm-Krise 1934, Berlin, 1994, 101: the decision in principle for a Wehrmacht based on general conscription had already been taken. Hitler, in his speech on 30 January 1934, praised the party and the armed forces, seen as two pillars of the state (Domarus, 355–6; and see Müller, Heer, 95).

24. Fallois, 105–6, 117.

25. Fallois, 123 and n.560.

26. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Werner Jochmann (eds.), Ausgewählte Dokumente zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, 3 vols., Bielefeld, 1961, unpaginated, vol.I, C, 2 February 1934. Heß also gave a plain warning to the SA leadership around the same date in an article published in theVölkischer Beobachter and the Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte (Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 203).

27. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 200.

28. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I81.

29. Fallois, 105, 117.

30. Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, iii.336; Fallois, 106–8.

31. Fallois, 117–18.

32. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, I83.

33. Fallois, 118–19, cit. Nachlaß Weichs, ΒΑ/MA, Freiburg, N19/12, S.12.

34. Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, iii.337; Mordsache Röhm, 205; Toland, 330 (based on Weich’s testimony).

35. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 206.

36. Fallois, 123, 131 and n.602, but claiming Hitler was waiting for the right psychological moment; Zitelmann, Selbstverständnis eines Revolutionärs, 77, interprets Hitler’s hesitancy to mean that he was incapable of coming to a decision in the conflict between the SA and the Reichswehr. Since he eventually did arrive at a decision – and one of the utmost ruthlessness – the former seems a more likely explanation.

37. Fallois, 125–6.

38. Diels, 379–82.

39. Fallois, 125, 131.

40. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 205, 209; Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, iii.343.

41. See Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 218, 223–4.

42. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 210; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 205; Fallois, 124. At the disarming of the SA following the Röhm crisis, the collection of arms found amounted to 177,000 rifles, 651 heavy and 1250 light machine-guns.

43. Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs. Facing the Dictators, London, 1962, 65.

44. See Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 221–2; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 213–14.

45. Kurt Gossweiler, Die Röhm-Affäre. Hintergründe, Zusammenhänge, Aus-wirkungen, Cologne, 1983, 76, cit. the headline of the Evening Standard (London), of ii June 1934, that Hitler was on the verge of catastrophe, with the implication that the Reichswehr would step in should he fail.

46. AdR, Reg. Hitler, I197–1200 (quoted words 1197); Norbert Frei, Der Führerstaat. Nationalsozialistische Herrschaft 1933 bis 1945, Munich, 1987, 13.

47. See Frei, Führerstaat, I4–15; Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich. Bavaria, 1933–1945, Oxford, 1983, 46–7, 76, 120–21; Timothy W. Mason, Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich. Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft, Opladen, 1977, 192; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 207.

48. DBS, i. 172 (26 June 1934).

49. Cit. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 232. Jung’s fundamental resistance to Hitler from late 1933 onwards is emphasized in the memoirs of a former close acquaintance and sympathizer, Edmund Forschbach, Edgar J. Jung. Ein konservativer Revolutionär, 30. Juni 1934, Pfullingen, 1984. Fallois, 114 n. 522, suggests, however, that Jung wanted only to modify, not replace, the regime. Even after Jung’s arrest – ordered by Hitler (Hans-Günther Seraphim (ed.), Das politische Tagebuch Alfred Rosenbergs 1934/35 und 1939/40,Munich, 1964, 42–3) – following Papen’s Marburg speech, the plan worked out by Bose and Tschirschky for Papen to put to Hindenburg still foresaw, as a continuation of the ‘taming concept’, the membership of Hitler and Göring in a Directory also including Fritsch, Papen, Brüning, and Goerdeler (Karl Martin Graß, Edgar Jung, Ρ apenkreis und Röhmkrise 1933–34, Diss., Heidelberg, 1966, 264–6).

50. See Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 233–4; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 208. The Gestapo was well informed of their activities; and Blomberg and Reichenau in the Reichswehr leadership were aware of the advantages to the army that Hitler, removed from the clutches of the SA, would bring (Frei, Führerstaat, 23–5). See also the pessimistic evaluation of Fallois, 112–16, about the chances of an alternative to Hitler’s regime, especially given the opportunities it provided for the rearmament plans of the army.

51. Heinrich Brüning, in a letter written after the war, said he had heard in April 1934 that Hindenburg was unlikely to live until August, and that three weeks afterwards he learnt of Hitler’s plans to ensure that he would become head of state on the Reich President’s death. Brüning received, too, he stated, information about a ‘proscription list’ containing the names of Schleicher, Strasser and others who were subsequently murdered, together with that of Papen (Heinrich Brüning, Briefe und Gespräche 1934–1945,ed. Claire Nix, Stuttgart, 1974, 26–7). Hindenburg’s doctor, Ferdinand Sauerbruch, Das war mein Lehen, Bad Wörishofen, 1951, 511, remarks simply that Hindenburg became ill in spring 1934. Meissner, Staatssekretär, 375, comments that the President became ill in spring with a bladder complaint. (See also Andreas Dorpalen, Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic, Princeton, 1964, 478.)

52. Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, 311–13, without giving any source, refers to a communiqué on Hindenburg’s health on 27 April, over two weeks after Hitler and Blomberg had been informed that the President would not live much longer.

53. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 228–9; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 207–8; Longerich Die braunen Bataillone, I20.

54. Graß, 227 and n.570; Forschbach, 115–16.

55. Jacobsen and Jochmann, Ausgewählte Dokumente zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, unpaginated, vol.1, CJ, 17 June 1934; Papen, 309.

56. Papen, 310–11.

57. Brüning commented, in a letter he wrote on 9 July to the former British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold, that to hold the speech without agreeing any subsequent action with the Reichswehr and Reich President was ‘a huge mistake’ (ein riesiger Fehler). Brüning added that he had heard from a reliable source that Papen had read the speech for the first time only two hours before speaking in Marburg. (See, on this point, Forschbach, 115–16.) After the war Brüning said he had himself received a copy of Edgar Jung’s text in April or May, and strongly advised against putting it into Papen’s hands (Brüning, Briefe und Gespräche, 25, 27)·

58. Domarus, 390–91.

59. Fallois, 132.

60. Papen, 310–11.

61. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 237.

62. Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, 319–20.

63. Meissner, Staatssekretär, 363.

64. Cit. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 212.

65. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 239; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 211.

66. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 215.

67. Fallois, 126–30, 135–6, 138–9; Müller, Heer, I13–18.

68. Graß, 260–61; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 239–42.

69. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 242.

70. Domarus, 394, 399.

71. Graß, 264–8; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 247–51, 256.

72. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 256.

73. Graß, 263 and n.728; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 257.

74. Graß, 269; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 216; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 256–7.

75. TBJG, I.2, 472–3 (29 June 1934). For Hitler’s visit to the Labour Service camps, see Hartmut Heyck, ‘The Reich Labour Service in Peace and War: A Survey of the Reichsarbeitsdienst and its Predecessors’, unpublished M.A. thesis, Carleton University, Ontario, 1997, 69.

76. Tb Reuth, ii.843 (1 July 1934); and see Reuth, Goebbels, 314.

77. Tb Reuth, ii.843 (1 July 1934)·

78. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 265.

79. Domarus, 394–5; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 216.

80. Domarus, 399; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 260–66 (quoted words, 266).

81. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 266–7; Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, I8.

82. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 267–8; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 214; Domarus, 396, 399–400; Library of Congress: Adolf Hitler Collection, C-89, 9376–88A-B, Erich Kempka interview, 15 October 1971. Röhm was the only one of those arrested to be taken away in a car; the rest went in the chartered bus.

83. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 271, cit. Schreiben von Karl Schreyer an das Polizeipräsidium München, 27 May 1949, Prozeßakten Landgericht München I. See also IfZ, Fa 108, SA/OSAF, 1928–45, Bl.39, for the official report of the meeting by the Reichspressestelle der NSDAP.

84. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 273.

85. Domarus, 397; Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 21–8. Evidently in a calmer mood, Hitler went on to dictate a number of press communiqués and Lutze’s letter of appointment as new SA Chief of Staff (Domarus, 397–402).

86. Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 24, 26.

87. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 274.

88. Seraphim, Das politische Tagebuch Alfred Rosenbergs, 46, (7 July 1934).

89. Domarus, 396; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 270–71.

90. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 218.

91. For the above, see Papen, 315–18; Hans Bernd Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 2 vols., Zürich, 1946, i.225–81; Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 36–44, 135 (relating to Edgar Jung); Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 219; Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 271, 281–2, 284–9. Klausener’s name (along with those of Schleicher, Bredow, and Bose) had appeared on lists privately compiled – without any conspiratorial plans – by Edgar Jung of those who might belong to a future government (Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 251–2).

92. Hans Bernd Gisevius, Adolf Hitler. Versuch einer Deutung, Munich, 1963, 291; Frei, Führerstaat, 32.

93. Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 30.

94. Papen, 320.

95. Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 32, based on Körner’s testimony in 1953.

96. Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 32–6.

97. Domarus, 404.

98. Domarus, 405.

99. Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, i.270.

100. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 296, 319–21; Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 219.

101. Bracher et al., Machtergreifung, iii.359. Mau, ‘Die “Zweite Revolution”’, 134, guesses that the number of victims was at least twice, and perhaps three times, as many as the official figure given of seventy-seven. It was later officially announced that, on Göring’s orders alone, as many as 1, 124 persons had been taken into custody in connection with the ‘Röhm revolt’ (Domarus, 409).

102. Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone, 220–24.

103. On the reactions of the foreign press, see AdR, Reg. Hitler, I376 n.3, citing Goebbels’s radio comments on 10 July 1934, as reported in the VB the following day.

104. Domarus, 405.

105. Domarus, 405.

106. Papen, 320.

107. Domarus, 406. Gürtner’s retrospective legalization of the murderous actions reflected the hopeless strategy followed by jurists in the Third Reich: seeking, so they imagined, to protect the principles of law against arbitrary and illegal force by declaring such force legal. See Gruchmann,Justiz, 448–55, for the mentality of Gürtner which lay behind his framing of the law, and 433–84 for the reactions of the legal administration to the murders perpetrated in the ‘Röhm affair’.

108. AdR, Reg. Hitler, ii.1354–8. According to the post-war testimony of Lammers, several cabinet ministers (including, he said, himself and Gürtner) preferred an amnesty for the actions rather than a declaration of their legality. But Hitler insisted on a law, and the rest of the cabinet came round to accepting this. Lammers said it amounted to one and the same thing in practice (Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 47–9)·

109. Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party, vol.2, 1933–1945, Newton Abbot, 1973, 114–15.

110. Domarus, 406.

111. AdR, Reg. Hitler, I375–7. Pearson’s question about whether the government would now swing to the Left or the Right – Hitler predictably answering that no other course than the one already charted would be followed – was presumably a somewhat clumsy attempt to allay fears that further turbulence, affecting the economy, might follow.

112. Papen, 321.

113. Domarus, 407, points out that the speech would have taken time to prepare. It is unlikely that the initial intention was not to give a public account, but to hush up the matter and simply let things die down. This would have flown in the face of all Hitler’s propaganda instincts. Suggestions of inner uncertainty also seem wide of the mark (Fest, Hitler, ii.643–4). The justification, when it came, was framed consistently along the lines Hitler had taken both in public announcements and in his statements to party leaders in Munich and then to the cabinet in the immediate aftermath of the events. Nor was it the case, as has been claimed, that Hitler went on holiday with Goebbels and his family to Heiligendamm on the Baltic coast, then to Berchtesgaden, to recuperate (Höhne,Mordsache Röhm, 298–9; Orlow, ii.114; Frei, Führerstaat, 33). These accounts appear to draw on passages in Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 341ff., whose own account, however, makes it clear that he visited Hitler and Goebbels in Heiligendamm after Hitler’s speech which he had heard on board ship while passing through the English Channel on his way back from a visit to America. The engagements Hitler held on 6 July left, in any case, only the period between 7 and 13 July available for any retreat – precisely the days when Hitler would have been involved in preparing his speech, not holidaying on the Baltic.

114. Domarus, 410; Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 52.

115. Domarus, 421.

116. Gritscheder, ‘Der Führer’, 54.

117. DBS, i.250 (21 July 1934).

118. BHStA, MA 106670, RPvOB, 4 July 1934.

119. BHStA, MA 106675, Arbeitsamt Marktredwitz, 9 July 1934.

120. See the reports from the Prussian provinces in BAK, R43II/1263, Fols. 238–328.

121. BHStA, MA 106691, LB of RPvNB/OP, 8 August 1934.

122. BAK, R43II/1263, Fols. 238–328; DBS, i.198–201 (21 July 1934).

123. Domarus, 401–2. Almost a fifth of the SA leaders were eventually removed from office in a long-drawn-out purging process (Mathilde Jamin, ‘Zur Rolle der SA im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem’, in Hirschfeld and Kettenacker, Der ‘Führerstaat’, 329–60, here 345).

124. DBS, i.249 (21 July 1934).

125. BAK, R43II/1263, Fols.235–7, letter of Göring to Heß, 31 August 1934. A copy of the letter was passed on to Hitler.

126. Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 71–2; Lewy, 169–70.

127. Höhne, Mordsache Röhm, 303–5; Müller, Heer, I25–33. When Hammerstein turned up at Lichterfelde Cemetery for the burial of his friend, it transpired that the bodies of Schleicher and his wife had been removed during the night.

128. Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 72–3.

129. Cit. Fallois, 9.

130. Mau, ‘Die “Zweite Revolution”’, 137.

131. Weinberg, i.87–101, esp. 99–101; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 223–4; Bruce F. Pauley, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis, chs.7–8.

132. Domarus, 426, has no doubt that Hitler gave Habicht, who would never have dared operate independently, the order. Weinberg, i.104, suggests that ‘it may be assumed that the coup was launched with the knowledge and at least tacit approval of Hitler’. Pauley, 133–7, greatly modifies such views, reaching the conclusion that Hitler’s responsibility lay in his reluctance to take any firm line on Austria, allowing policy to drift and be dominated by the local hot-head forces. Hermann Graml, Europa zwischen den Kriegen, Munich, 1969, 298, also suggests that misinterpretation by the Austrian Nazi leadership of Hitler’s passivity, encouraged by the uncertain domestic situation following the Röhm affair, prompted the putsch attempt. Reinhard Spitzy, So haben wir das Reich verspielt. Bekenntnisse eines Illegalen, Munich (1986), 4th edn., 1994, 61–6, provides an account from an insider to the Austrian putsch plans, though without casting light on the question of Hitler’s knowledge and approval.

133. Pauley, 134; Jens Petersen, Hitler-Mussolini: Die Entstehung der Achse Berlin-Rom, 1933–1936, Tübingen, 1973, 338; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 224. See, however, Weinberg, i.104 n.89, suggesting that the reliability of Göring’s testimony at Nuremberg(IMT, ix.294–5), on which this is based, may be questioned.

134. Anton Hoch and Hermann Weiß, ‘Die Erinnerungen des Generalobersten Wilhelm Adam’, in Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Miscellanea. Festschrift für Helmut Krausnick, Stuttgart, 1980, 32–62, here 47–8, 60 n.40.

135. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 223.

136. Weinberg, i.105.

137. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 353–4.

138. Papen, 339.

139. See Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 352 for Dietrich’s press directions; Pauley, 134–6.

140. Domarus, 427; Weinberg, i.106.

141. Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 354. As a Catholic, experienced diplomat, and personal friend of the murdered Dollfuss, Papen evidently seemed to Hitler the right person to allay Austrian suspicions about German intentions and to pour oil on troubled water. According to his own version of events, Papen was able to extract conditions from Hitler for his appointment (Papen, 340–41; Pauley, 135).

142. Papen, 337ff; Domarus, 428; Weinberg, i.106.

143. Domarus, 429. Precisely when Hitler was told that the President’s death was imminent is uncertain. Hanfstaengl’s account has Hitler deciding to send Papen to Vienna in the immediate wake of a telephone call from Meissner with bad news of the President, then flying off to East Prussia to visit Hindenburg. The chronology is, however, conflated. Hitler’s letter to Papen, requesting him to undertake the ‘special mission’ for a limited time as ambassador in Vienna, was dated 26 July. The public was informed of Hindenburg’s condition on 31 July; Hitler, presumably, some time before that. Hitler’s visit to Neudeck took place on 1 August (Hanfstaengl, 15 Jahre, 354; Domarus, 429).

144. Sauerbruch, 520. Sauerbruch was Hindenburg’s chief doctor during his last illness. See also Papen, 334, for Hitler’s last visit to Hindenburg. Sauerbruch, 519 and, apparently following him, Meissner, Staatssekretär, 377, place Hitler’s visit on 31 July. A notice in VB, I August 1934, makes it clear that Hitler flew to Neudeck that morning, returning within a few hours. He held a cabinet meeting that evening at 9.30 p.m. (AdR, Reg. Hitler, ii.1384). Hanfstaengl’s story (15 Jahre, 355) that Hitler and his entourage spent the night in Neudeck – where Hitler allegedly refused to sleep in the same room used by Napoleon in a nearby Schloß – before returning to Bayreuth, where the news of Hindenburg’s death was received, then returning immediately to Neudeck, appears to lack any foundation.

145. AdR, Reg. Hitler, ii.1384. Hindenburg died at 9.00 a.m. on 2 August.

146. AdR, Reg. Hitler, ii.1384; Domarus, 429; Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 75–6; Müller, Heer, I33.

147. AdR, Reg. Hitler, ii.1387; Domarus, 431.

148. Müller, Heer, I34; Fallois, 161.

149. Müller, Heer, I35.

150. Domarus, 444. This was on 20 August, the day after the plebiscite. Hitler referred in his statement of thanks to the ‘law of 3 August’, though this was, of course, the law passed by the cabinet on the headship of state on 1 August – before, therefore, not after, Hindenburg’s death.

151. Müller, Heer, I34; Papen, 335–6.

152. Müller, Heer, I34; Gritschneder, ‘Der Führer’, 76.

153. Cit. Müller, Heer, I35.

154. Cit. Müller, Heer, I36.

155. Cit. Müller, Heer, I37.

156. Müller, Heer, I38.

157. Müller, Heer, I39 and n.313–14.

158. Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 4 August 1934.

159. Domarus, 438.

160. AdR, Reg. Hitler, ii. 1385–6, 1388–9 and n.8; Meissner, Staatssekretär, 377–8.

161. Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 1935, Berlin, 1935, 537. There were significant levels of no-votes – up to a third – in some working-class and Catholic areas.

162. TBJG, I.2, 475 (22 August 1934).

163. Domarus, 447–54.

164. Loiperdinger and Culbert, 17–18; David Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933–1945, Oxford, 1983, 147–59. The account in Leni Riefenstahl, A Memoir, New York, 1993, 156–66, as Loiperdinger and Culbert (15–17) have pointed out, has to be treated with caution.

CHAPTER 13: WORKING TOWARDS THE FÜHRER

1. Niedersächsisches Staatsarchiv, Oldenburg, Best. 131 Nr.303, Fol. 131V.

2. See Ulrich Herbert, ‘“Die guten und die schlechten Zeiten”. Überlegungen zur diachronen Analyse lebensgeschichtlicher Interviews’, in Lutz Niethammer (ed.), ‘Die Jahre weiß man nicht, wo man sie heute hinsetzen soll’. Faschismuserfahrungen im Ruhrgebiet, Berlin/Bonn, 1983, 67–96, here esp. 82, 88–93.

3. See, for the implications of the term, Mommsen, ‘Kumulative Radikalisierung’; and Hans Mommsen, ‘Cumulative Radicalisation and Progressive Self-Destruction as Structural Determinants of the Nazi Dictatorship’, in Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin (eds.),Stalinism and Nazism, 75–87.

4. See Müller, Armee, Politik und Gesellschaft, 39–47.

5. Dietrich, Zwölf Jahre, 44–5.

6. Broszat, ‘Soziale Motivation und Führer-Bindung’, 403.

7. Lothar Gruchmann, ‘Die “Reichsregierung” im Führerstaat. Stellung und Funktion des Kabinetts im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem’, in Günther Doeker and Winfried Steffani (eds.), Klassenjustiz und Pluralismus, Hamburg, 1973, 192, 202.

8. See Wiedemann, 69, 71.

9. Wiedemann, 68–9.

10. Wiedemann, 80–82.

11. Wiedemann, 78. Once the Berghof had been completed, in 1936, with full projection facilities, it was frequently the case that two films would be shown each evening (BBC Archives, interview, 1997, with Hermann Döring, Manager (Verwalter) of the Berghof, transcript, Roll 243, 31).

12. Wiedemann, 79, 90–91. See Schroeder, 60, 81, 84, and the interviews conducted in 1971 (Library of Congress, Washington DC, Adolf Hitler Collection, C-63, 64, 9376 63–64, and C-86, 9376 85) with Gerda Dananowski and Traudl Junge for confirmation of this, mainly relating to later years. See also Gitta Sereny, Albert Speer: his Battle with the Truth, London, 1995, 113–14, for the comments of Maria von Below, widow of Hitler’s Luftwaffe adjutant (also referring to later years).

13. Wiedemann, 76, 78, 93; Percy Ernst Schramm, in the Introduction to Picker, 34; see also Spitzy, 126–7, 130 (though for a later period).

14. Wiedemann, 69.

15. Wiedemann, 85; Schroeder, 53, 78–82.

16. See, e.g., Friedelind Wagner, 93, 124–5, for Hitler’s ambitions to be a patron of the arts in the grand style.

17. Wiedemann, 194ff.; Smelser, 166.

18. See Frank Bajohr, ‘Gauleiter in Hamburg. Zur Person und Tätigkeit Karl Kaufmanns’, VfZ, 43 (1995), 269–95, here 277–80, for specific examples of corruption in Hamburg which were characteristic for the local and regional level.

19. Robert Koehl, ‘Feudal Aspects of National Socialism’, American Political Science Review, 54 (1960), 921–33.

20. See Hanisch, 13ff; Geiß, 65–95.

21. Wiedemann, 72, 74–6, 94–6.

22. Wiedemann, 69–70.

23. The text of the decree is printed in Walther Hofer (ed.), Der Nationalsozialismus. Dokumente 1933–1945, Frankfurt am Main, 1957, 87.

24. See Bajohr, 286, for Kaufmann’s attempts to uphold wage levels for workers in Hamburg.

25. BAK, R43II/541, Fols. 36–95; BAK, R43II/552, Fols.25–50; and see Mason, Sozialpolitik, I58–9.

26. BAK, NS22/110, Denkschrift, 15 December 1932; see Mommsen, ‘Die NSDAP als faschistische Partei’, 267–8.

27. Orlow, ii.67–70; Peter Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter. Führung der Partei undKontrolle des Staatsapparates durch den Stab Heß und die Partei-Kanzlei Bormann, Munich/London/New York/Paris, 1992, 16 (and see Parts I–IV for the operations of the office of the Deputy Führer).

28. Orlow, ii.74–5; Mommsen, ‘Die NSDAP als faschistische Partei’, 262–3; and see Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 24, for emphasis on the improvised and unclear structure of the party at the top, under Heß.

29. Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, I8–20, and Part II. As Longerich points out (257), from the state’s point of view, the approval of the office of the StdF for civil service appointments was not recognized as legally binding, though in practice adhered to.

30. See Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, ch.8, pts.2, 4 210ff, 234ff.

31. Dietrich, Zwölf Jahre, 45.

32. See Diehl-Thiele, 69–73.

33. MK, 433–4.

34. Anatomie, ii.46. The conflict between the Gestapo and Reich Justice Ministry over the question of the representations of lawyers in cases of ‘protective custody’ stretched back to October 1934. Himmler had subsequently informed Gestapo offices in April 1935 that such representations were banned where political and police interests might be endangered. Gürtner did not give up the attempt to preserve the rights of the legal profession, even after Hitler’s intervention in the autumn. Himmler dragged the affair out, however, and the Reich Justice Minister made as good as no progress, whatever concessions he was prepared to make. Resting on Hitler’s authority, the Gestapo was able to block all attempts to constrain the arbitrary use of its power. (See Gruchmann, Justiz, 564–73.) For his part, Gürtner was himself, however, woefully weak in upholding legal principles against political expediency. On 8 October 1935 he wrote to Hitler about the case of an SA man accused of the torture of six Communists in a Berlin ‘SA-Home’ in January 1934. ‘Despite the seriousness of the maltreatment, which shows a certain sadism,’ Gürtner wrote, he was prepared to recommend quashing the indictment (Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1413-I-6, Fol.36).

35. Anatomie, ii.39–40.

36. Johannes Tuchel, Konzentrationslager, Boppard am Rhein, 1991, 314–15. ‘Kampf gegen die inneren Feinde der Nation’ was a formulation used (Tuchel, 314) by Hitler at the Party Rally on 11 September 1935. See also Robert Gellately, ‘Allwissend und allgegenwärtig? Entstehung, Funktion und Wandel des Gestapo-Mythos’, in Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mallmann (eds.), Die Gestapo: Mythos und Realität, Darmstadt, 1995, 47–70, here 54–5.

37. Anatomie, i.50–54.

38. RGBl, I936, Teil I, 487–8.

39. Anatomie, i.118.

40. Anatomie, ii.50–51. See also Herbert, Best, I63–8.

41. For the expansion of the Gestapo’s spheres of activity, see Herbert, Best, I68–80. One example was the extension of persecution, not greatly in evidence before the publicity stirred up by the Röhm affair, to homosexuals. Lists of practising homosexuals were collected by a newly established department in the Gestapa in Berlin from October 1934 (Günter Grau (ed.), Homosexualität in der Ν S-Zeit. Dokumente einer Diskriminierung und Verfolgung, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, 74). Regional Gestapo offices joined suit in widening their persecution, coordinated from 1936 by the ‘Reich Headquarters for the Combating of Homosexuality and Abortion’ (Burkhard Jellonnek, ‘Staatspolizeiliche Fahndungs- und Ermittlungsmethoden gegen Homosexuelle’, in Paul and Mallmann, Die Gestapo, 343–56, here 348–9, 353. See also Burkhard Jellonnek’s monograph,Homosexuelle unter dem Hakenkreuz. Die Verfolgung von Homosexuellen im Dritten Reich, Paderborn, 1990).

42. See Christine Elizabeth King, The Nazi State and the New Religions: Five Case Studies in Non-Conformity, New York/Toronto, 1982.

43. The subtitle of the first of Weinberg’s two-volume analysis of German foreign policy between 1933 and 1939.

44. AdR, Reg. Hitler, i.313–18, here 318. See also Wollstein, ‘Eine Denkschrift des Staatssekretärs Bernhard von Bülow vom März 1933’, 87, 93; and Wendt, 75, 79.

45. See Weinberg, i.46, 166–70.

46. See Wendt, 85; Weinberg, i.171.

47. Weinberg, i.60–61, 69–73.

48. Cit. Wendt, 78.

49. Herbert S. Levine, Hitler’s Free City. A History of the Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925–39, Chicago/London, 1973, 56–7.

50. See Levine, 9–17, 61–7.

51. Weinberg, i.63–8, 71.

52. Józef Lipski, Diplomat in Berlin, 1933–1939, New York/London, 1968, 105.

53. Weinberg, i.73.

54. Leonidas Ε. Hill (ed.), Die Weizsäcker-Papiere 1933–1950, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Vienna, 1974, 78.

55. Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, ANA-463, Sammlung Deuerlein, E200263–9, Dirksen to Bülow, 31 January 1933; Bülow to Dirksen, 6 February 1933, and E496961, Dirksen telegram to Neurath, 28 February 1933.

56. Weinberg, i.81.

57. Weinberg, i.180–83.

58. Müller, Heer, 147ff.

59. Müller, Heer, I55–7.

60. Domarus, 468 and n.8; Orlow, ii.138–9; Müller, Heer, I58–61.

61. For the term, see Hüttenberger, ‘Nationalsozialistische Polykratie’, 423ff., 432ff.

62. Patrik von zur Mühlen, ‘Schlagt Hitler an der Saar!’ Abstimmungskampf, Emigration und Widerstand im Saargebiet, 1933–1945, Bonn, 1979, 230, refers to 1,500 meetings and rallies and over 80,000 posters as part of the campaign. For months before the plebiscite, special efforts had been made to organize broadcasting propaganda to the Saar, including distribution of cheap radios (the Volksempfänger) and transmission of a flow of programmes hammering home the message in different ways that the Saar was part of Germany (Zeman, 51–4).

63. François-Poncet, 221–2; Weinberg, i.173–4, 203·

64. See Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mahlmann, Milieus und Widerstand. Eine Verhaltensgeschichte der Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus, Bonn, 1995, 60–77, 203–23, 352–71. See also Gerhard Paul, ‘Deutsche Mutter – heim zu Dir!’ Warum es mißlang, Hitler an der Saar zu schlagen. Der Saarkampf 1933 bis 1935, Cologne, 1984.

65. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 284.

66. Paul and Mahlmann, Milieus, 66, 73–7.

67. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 283.

68. Schultheß’ Europäischer Geschichtskalender, Bd.76 (1936), Munich, 1936, 14 (90.76 per cent).

69. Paul and Mahlmann, Milieus, 222.

70. Domarus, 472.

71. Domarus, 476. Ward Price was convinced, so he wrote in the Völkischer Beobachter after the interview, of Hitler’s ‘love of peace’ (cit. Domarus, 474 n.19). He still thought in 1937 that Hitler was sincere in his ‘desire for peace’ (G. Ward Price, I Know these Dictators, I43).

72. Domarus, 485.

73. DRZW, i.415 and n.62, 416.

74. Klaus-Jürgen Müller, General Ludwig Beck. Studien und Dokumente zur politisch-militärischen Vorstellungswelt und Tätigkeit des Generalstabschefs des deutschen Heeres 1933–1938, Boppard am Rhein, 339–42; and Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg, ‘Drei Dokumente zur Planung eines 300.000-Mann-Friedensheeres aus dem Dezember 1933’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 22 (1977), 103–39.

75. DRZW, i.403–10, 416; Müller, Beck, I92–4, 341; Müller, Heer, 208.

76. Müller, Beck, I89, 339–44.

77. Müller, Beck, I90.

78. François-Poncet, 224–5; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 294–5; Domarus, 481; Müller, Beck, I95; Weinberg, i.205.

79. Domarus, 482.

80. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 295.

81. Schmidt, 295–6; François-Poncet, 225; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 297.

82. Domarus, 489.

83. Seraphim, Das politische Tagebuch Rosenbergs, 74–5. For the difficulties facing Hitler in the timing of announcing Germany’s new military strength, see Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 295–6.

84. Domarus, 489; Müller, Beck, I95; François-Poncet, 226; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 298. The secret decree on the air-force had been agreed in cabinet on 26 February – before the announcement of the visit by Simon and Eden – to take effect on 1 March, and be announced a few days later (Weinberg, i.205).

85. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 298. Göring told the British Air Attaché that the Germans had 1,500 aircraft; in reality the number was 800. The British had reckoned with a Luftwaffe of 1,300 aircraft by October 1936.

86. Schmidt, 296.

87. Müller, Beck, I95; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 287–8.

88. François-Poncet, 229.

89. Friedrich Hoßbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 1934–1938, Wolffenbüttel/Hanover, 1949, 94–5.

90. Hoßbach, 95.

91. Müller, Heer, 208; for the surprise of army leaders, see also Esmonde M. Robertson, Hitler’s Pre-War Policy and Military Plans, 1933–1939, London, 1963, 56.

92. Müller, Heer, 209.

93. Hoßbach, 95–6.

94. Müller, Heer, 208–10; Müller, Beck, I96; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 287–9, 298–9.

95. Müller, Heer, 208. Feeling in the Foreign Office was nevertheless that what was achieved by Hitler’s action could have been brought about by negotiation (Schmidt, 296). Fritsch, too, was of the view that, though unavoidable, the announcement of general conscription could have been made ‘with less drama’ (cit. Müller, Heer, 209).

96. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 303–4. And see Rosenberg’s information from within the British Air Ministry, Seraphim, Das politische Tagebuch Rosenbergs, 75·

97. Hoßbach, 96.

98. Hoßbach, 96; Müller, Heer, 209.

99. Domarus, 491; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 299.

100. Hoßbach, 96; Müller, Heer, 209; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 299; Hitler, Monologe, 343 (16 August 1942).

101. François-Poncet, 228–9.

102. Seraphim, Das politische Tagebuch Rosenbergs, 77. See DGFP, C, III, 1005–6, No.532, 1015, No.538. The official record notes the French ambassador’s protest, states that the Italian ambassador refrained from any comment, and indicates the British ambassador’s inquiry about continuation of discussions raised in the Anglo-French communiqué of 3 February.

103. Domarus, 491–5, here 494.

104. François-Poncet, 230; William Shirer, Berlin Diary, 1934–1941, (1941) Sphere Book edn, London, 1970, 32.

105. Shirer, 33.

106. Shirer, 33–4.

107. Domarus, 491–5; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 299.

108. François-Poncet, 230.

109. DBS, ii.275–82.

110. DBS, ii.277–9.

111. DBS, ii.279.

112. Jens Petersen, Hitler-Mussolini, 397–400.

113. Schmidt, 296; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 304; Weinberg, i.206.

114. François-Poncet, 231.

115. Schmidt, 297.

116. Seraphim, Das politische Tagebuch Rosenbergs, 77; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 302.

117. The following is based on Schmidt’s account, 298–308.

118. Eden, Facing the Dictators, I33 (and, for Eden’s impressions on first meeting Hitler on 20 February 1934, 61). See also Winston Churchill’s published comment in 1935, ‘Hitler and his Choice, 1935’, reprinted in his Great Contemporaries, London, 1941, 223–31, here 230: ‘Those who have met Herr Hitler face to face in public business or on social terms have found a highly competent, cool, well-informed functionary with an agreeable manner, a disarming smile, and few have been unaffected by a subtle personal magnetism.’

119. Schmidt, 301–2 (where he gives the figure of 126, not 128, Memelländer).

120. Eden, Facing the Dictators, I35.

121. Schmidt, 306.

122. Schmidt, 307. The official account of the talks is recorded in DGFP, C, III, 1043–80, No.555.

123. Schmidt, 306–8.

124. Friedelind Wagner, 128–9, recounted how her mother, Winifred Wagner, a guest at the banquet in honour of Simon and Eden, told of Hitler ‘slapping his knees and clapping his hands like a schoolboy’ in pleasure at his diplomatic success. For the suggestion that this meeting, nevertheless, brought the first sign of recognition on Hitlers part that British resistance to his desired alliance with Great Britain might be stronger than he had originally bargained for, see Josef Henke, England in Hitler’s politischem Kalkül 1935–1939, Boppard am Rhein, 1973, 38–9. An indication of Hitler’s new assertiveness, revealed at the discussions with his British guests, was the raising of demands for the return of colonies which he mistakenly regarded as an attempt to ‘persuade’ the British into friendly cooperation. (See Klaus Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich. Hitler, NSDAP und koloniale Frage 1919–1945, Munich, 1969, 447ff; Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, London, 1973, 36–7; Klaus Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich. Deutsche Außenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler 1871–1945, Stuttgart, 1995, 598.)

125. Eden, Facing the Dictators, I36.

126. Eden, Facing the Dictators, I33–4, 139.

127. Weinberg, i.207; A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, (1961) revised edn, Harmondsworth, 1964, 116–17.

128. TBJG, I.2, 485 (15 April 1935).

129. TBJG, I.2, 486 (17 April 1935).

130. Domarus, 506.

131. Domarus, 511.

132. After the Dollfuss affair of July 1934, and given the continued instability of the position of Austria, Mussolini was anxious to ward off any possible repeated German coup there, particularly since his own eyes were cast on Abyssinia, and he was aware of powerful opposition at home to his proposed adventure. Neurath was reportedly concerned – as the Italian leader no doubt intended him to be – about Mussolini’s pro-western and anti-German position adopted at Stresa (William E. Dodd and Martha Dodd (eds.),Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 1933–1938, London, 1941, 236–45). See also Robert Mallett, The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935–40, London, 1998, 28–9.

133. Domarus, 505–14. For the reception in Germany, see Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, I25–6. The Times described the speech as ‘reasonable, straightforward, and comprehensive’ (cit. Toland, 372).

134. Domarus, 512–13.

135. Jost Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine. Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1910–1939, Düsseldorf, 1973, 256–7.

136. Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine, 266–7.

137. DRZW, i.455–8.

138. Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine, 280, 291, 301, and see 319–20; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 308–9; Weinberg, 1.212.

139. Schmidt, 317. See Spitzy, 92–122, for a biting description of Ribbentrop’s personality and style as German ambassador in London. The development of Ribbentrop’s foreign-policy ideas, with differing emphasis to those of Hitler but ultimately devoid of independent standing, is examined in Wolfgang Michalka, Ribbentrop und die deutsche Weltpolitik 1933–1940. Außenpolitische Konzeptionen und Entscheidungsprozesse im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1980.

140. Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop, paperback edn., London, 1994, 54–8. The continued efforts on Ribbentrop’s part to cultivate good relations with ‘fellow-travellers of the Right’ in Britain and the mutual misunderstandings which ensued are detailed by G. T. Waddington, ‘“An idyllic and unruffled atmosphere of complete Anglo-German misunderstanding”: Aspects of the Operations of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop in Great Britain, 1934–1939’, History, 82 (1997), 44–72.

141. Bloch, Ribbentrop, 69; Domarus, 515; DGFP, C, IV. 253, n.2.

142. For the talks, and their consequences, see esp. Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine, 325–54.

143. DGFP, C, IV, 257.

144. Schmidt, 318.

145. DGFP, C, IV, 250.

146. DGFP, C, IV, 277–8; Bloch, Ribbentrop, 73.

147. Schmidt, 319.

148. Ribbentrop, 41. British sources in Berlin were nevertheless claiming by early 1936 that Hitler, disappointed that the Naval Treaty had not produced the desired close relations with Britain, regretted his haste in concluding it (Geoffrey T. Waddington, ‘Hitler, Ribbentrop, die NSDAP und der Niedergang des Britischen Empire 1935–1938’, Vf Z, 40 (1992), 273–306, here 277).

149. Other powers, Sir John Simon had told the German delegation, were merely to be informed that the British Government ‘had decided’ to accept the German Reich Chancellor’s proposal (DGFP, C, IV, 280).

150. Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini, London, 1983, 228–35, quotation 232.

151. See Taylor, 118–29, for the Abyssinian crisis and its impact. The feeble British response to Italian aggression underlined Hitler’s growing feeling that Britain was weak and lacked the will to oppose his territorial ambitions in Europe. It played its part in persuading him that there was little prospect of Britain intervening should he act to remilitarize the Rhineland (Henke, 40–47).

152. See Donald Cameron Watt, ‘The Secret Laval-Mussolini Agreement of 1935 on Ethiopia’, in Esmonde M. Robertson (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War, London, 1971, 225–42.

153. Sonderarchiv Moscow, 1235-VI-2, Reichskanzlei, Lammers, Vermerk, 16 October 1935.

154. Monologe, I08 (25 October 1941).

155. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, 236–7.

156. Schleunes, 116.

157. Kurt Pätzold, Faschismus, Rassenwahn, Judenverfolgung. Eine Studie zur politischen Strategie und Taktik des faschistischen deutschen Imperialismus 1933–193s, Berlin (East), 1975, 194–5; Ian Kershaw, ‘The Persecution of the Jews and German Popular Opinion in the Third Reich’,Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute, 26 (1981), 261–89, here 264–5; David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism, Oxford/Cambridge, Mass., 1992, 35; Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews. The Years of Persecution, 1933– 39, London, 1997, 137ff.

158. Adam, 114–15, 119–20; Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 35.

159. ‘How Popular was Streicher?’, (no author), Wiener Library Bulletin, 5/6 (1957), 48; Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 35.

160. David Bankier, ‘Hitler and the Policy-Making Process on the Jewish Question’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 3 (1988), 1–20, here 9.

161. Akten der Partei-Kanzlei, 4 Bde., ed. Institut für Zeitgeschichte [Helmut Heiber (Bde. 1–2) and Peter Longerich (Bde.3–4)], Munich etc., 1983–92, Teil I, Regesten, Bd. 1, 98, No.10807, Microfiche, 124 05038, Wiedemann to Bormann, 30 April 1935: ‘I’ve told the Führer about the reservations over these signs on account of the Olympics. Nothing has changed in the Führer’s decision that there is no objection to these signs’ (‘Ich habe dem Führer von den Bedenken, die wegen der Olympiade in Bezug auf diese Schilder geltend gemacht wurden, erzählt. An der Entscheidung des Führers, daß gegen diese Schilder nichts einzuwenden ist, hat sich dadurch nichts geändert)’. See also Bankier, ‘Hitler and the Policy-Making Process on the Jewish Question’, 9.

162. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 28–35.

163. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 33.

164. Otto Dov Kulka, ‘Die Nürnberger Rassengesetze und die deutsche Bevölkerung im Lichte geheimer ΝS-Lage- und Stimmungsberichte’, VfZ, 32 (1984), 582–624, here 609.

165. Cit. Marlis Steinert, Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen. Stimmung und Haltung der deutschen Bevölkerung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Düsseldorf, 1970, 57; Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 38.

166. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 38.

167. Adam, 118 (where other examples are also given). See Hans Mommsen, ‘Der nationalsozialistische Polizeistaat und die Judenverfolgung vor 1938’, VfZ, I0 (1962), 73, 84, Dok. Nr.II, for the subsequent ban imposed in Bavaria by the Bavarian Political Police on 6 March 1935.

168. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 38–41; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, 50, 127–30, 205–6; Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, I01–2.

169. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 70–76; Kershaw, ‘The Persecution of the Jews’, 265–72.

170. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 74–5; Kershaw, ‘The Persecution of the Jews’, 268–70.

171. Bayern, i.430, 442–7; Bayern ii.293–4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, 234 n.28; Pätzold, Faschismus, Rassenwahn, Judenverfolgung, 216–21.

172. TBJG, I.2, 493–4 (15 July 1935); Adam, 120; Ted Harrison, ‘“Alter Kämpfer” im Widerstand’, VfZ, 45 (1997), 385–423, here 400–401; Reuth, Goebbels, 330–31; Irving, Mastermind, 206–7. See Helmut Genschel, Die Verdrängung der Juden, I09–10, for the spreading of the boycott to numerous other areas during the spring and summer.

173. Adam, 120.

174. Schacht, 347; Adam, 123; Genschel, 111. Economic concerns, alongside the need to avoid conflict with the police, had doubtless been behind the fruitless order by Heß to the party on 1 April 1935 to avoid ‘terror actions against individual Jews’. A further order in June to maintain party discipline was equally ineffective (Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 212).

175. Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 212.

176. Adam, 121; see also Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 37.

177. Lothar Gruchmann, ‘“Blutschutzgesetz” und Justiz. Zu Entstehung und Auswirkung des Nürnberger Gesetzes vom 15. September 1935’, VfZ, 3 (1983), 418–42, here 430; Mommsen ‘Polizeistaat’, 70–71.

178. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 36–7.

179. Adam, 115, 119.

180. Adam, 120.

181. ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung. Aufzeichnungen von Dr. Bernhard Lösener’, VfZ, 9 (1961), 262–311, here 277–8.

182. Gruchmann, ‘“Blutschutzgesetz” und Justiz’, 418–23.

183. Cit. Gruchmann, ‘“Blutschutzgesetz” und Justiz’, 425.

184. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 44.

185. Frick himself had on 26 July instructed registry offices to postpone such forthcoming marriages indefinitely (Adam, 122). An indefinite postponement was decreed in Württemberg in August (Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 44).

186. Gruchmann, ‘“Blutschutzgesetz” und Justiz’, 426–30; Adam, 122; Jeremy Noakes, ‘The Development of Nazi Policy towards the German-Jewish “Mischlinge” 1933–1945’, Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute, 34 (1989), 291–354, here 307–8.

187. Adam, 122.

188. Kurt Pätzold (ed.), Verfolgung, Vertreibung, Vernichtung. Dokumente des faschistischen Antisemitismus 1933 bis 1942, Leipzig, 1983, 103; Adam, 123; Schacht, 349–52; Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 44–5; 1MT, xii, 638 (where Schacht claimed that the laws he expected were to give the Jews legal protection, in line with demands he claimed he had been making to Hitler).

189. Bayern i.430.

190. DGFP, C, IV, 569.

191. Kulka, ‘Die Nürnberger Rassengesetze’, 615–18; Adam, 123–4; Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 212–13; Schacht, 356, states that the meeting was packed to capacity, lasted nearly two hours, and that Frick protested at his ‘Over-trenchant method of speech’.

192. DGFP, C, IV, 570.

193. DGFP, C, IV, 570. In fact, during the Nuremberg Rally Hitler chastised Streicher – though in gentle fashion – for the mistakes of the Stürmer. Goebbels thought Streicher had taken note, but that it would make no difference. (TBJG, I.2, 513 (11 September 1935)).

194. Kulka, ‘Die Nürnberger Rassengesetze’, 618–19 and n.126; Adam, 124.

195. TBJG, I.2, 515 (17 September 1935).

196. Kulka, ‘Die Nürnberger Rassengesetze’, 620 n. 128, citing the Jewish Chronicle, 30 August 1935. See also Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 44.

197. Schleunes, 119.

198. Adam, 126 n.66.

199. IfZ, MA-1569/42, Frame 1081, Interrogation of Dr Bernhard Lösener for US War Crimes Trials at Nuremberg; ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 273; Adam, 126–7. The comment indicates that little work had been done prior to this point on preparing legislation.

200. IfZ, MA-1569/42, Frames 1081–2, Lösener testimony: ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 274.

201. Max Domarus, Der Reichstag und die Macht, Würzburg, 1968, 101–2; Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 45.

202. Mommsen, ‘Realisierung’, 387 and n.20.

203. IfZ, MA-1569/42, Frame 1081, Lösener testimony; ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 273; Domarus, Der Reichstag und die Macht, I02 n.21.

204. See Peter Reichel, Der schöne Schein des Dritten Reiches. Faszination und Gewalt des Faschismus, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, 116–38, esp. 126–31.

205. Domarus, 525.

206. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 45.

207. Domarus, 534.

208. IfZ, MA-1569/42, Frames 1081–2, Lösener testimony; ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 274; Schleunes, 124; Adam, 127.

209. IfZ, MA-1569/42, Frame 1082, Lösener testimony; ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 275.

210. The text of the law is published in Pätzold, Verfolgung, I14.

211. Adam, 128.

212. Gruchmann, ‘“Blutschutzgesetz” und Justiz’, 431–2; Adam, 128 and n.74.

213. The text is published in Pätzold, Verfolgung, I13–14.

214. The incident took place on 26 July. Six dock workers involved were given mild sentences on 12 and 14 August, but five were ordered to be released on 7 September, when the magistrate, Louis Brodsky, delivered an attack on Nazism and described theBremen as a ‘pirate ship’. The incident, widely reported in the German press, soured German-American relations. ‘The whole of Germany [is] enraged about the judgement in New York about the agitators who rioted around the “Bremen” and pulled down the swastika flag,’ noted Louise Solmitz in her diary on 7 September 1935 (Forschungsstelle für die Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, Hamburg, Louise Solmitz, Tagebuch, Bd.I, 1932–1937, Fol. 248). Hitler’s fury was said to have impulsively made him decide to proclaim the swastika banner as the new German Flag (Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 45; Domarus, 534 and n.201).

215. JK, 89–90.

216. In an interview at the end of November for the American United Press, Hitler repeated his assertion that ‘the necessity of combating Bolshevism is one of the main reasons for the Jewish legislation in Germany’. He claimed that the laws were there to protect the Jews, and that the decline in anti-Jewish agitation within Germany was proof of their success. The Reich government, he went on, had been led by the intention of ‘preventing through legal measures the self-help of the people, which could unburden itself among other things in dangerous explosions…’ (Domarus, 557–8)·

217. Domarus, 536–7.

218. Domarus, 537–8. Goebbels, a radical on ‘the Jewish Question’, found Göring’s speech ‘almost unbearable’. Whether by accident or design, the broadcast of the speech was turned off (TBJG, 1.2, 515 (17 September 1935)).

219. Domarus, 538.

220. Domarus, 538–9; and see Gruchmann, ‘“Blutschutzgesetz” und Justiz’, 432; TBJG, I.2, 515 (17 September 1935), where Goebbels mistakenly has the entry under ‘Samstag’, not ‘Sonntag’. Hitler repeated his ban on all ‘excesses’ at a meeting of the Gauleiter on 17 September, though Goebbels was sceptical of its effect (TBJG, I.2, 516 (19 September 1935)).

221. A hint of Hitler’s own ambivalence, and determination not to be pinned down by legalities, could be seen in his refusal to allow Frick to publish any commentary on the ‘Jewish law’ (TBJG, I.2, 517 (21 September 1935)).

222. ZStA, Potsdam, RMdI, 27079/71, Fol. 52, LB of RP in Kassel, 4 March 1936.

223. The violence had already been in decline during the weeks preceding the Rally (Adam, 124).

224. Kulka, ‘Die Nürnberger Rassengesetze’, 622–3; Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 76–80.

225. Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, 237.

226. Gruchmann, ‘“Blutschutzgesetz” und Justiz’, 433–4; Adam, 134; ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 279–82; IfZ, MA-1569/42, Frames 1082–3, Lösener testimony. On the ‘Mischling question’, see especially Noakes, ‘The Development of Nazi Policy towards the German-Jewish “Mischlinge” 1933–1945’, 306–15.

227. Bankier, ‘Hitler and the Policy-Making Process on the Jewish Question’, 14.

228. Adam, 132–5.

229. TBJG, II.2, 518 (25 September 1935). Lösener (‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 281) mentions being summoned to a meeting of the party leadership in the Town Hall at Munich on 29 September. His memory must have been faulty, since, as Goebbels’s diary entry makes clear, the meeting took place on 24 September.

230. ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 281. According to confidential information passed to press representatives, Hitler had tended at the meeting to favour the position of the ministry officials (Mommsen, ‘Realisierung’, 387–8, n.20).

231. TBJG, I.2, 520 (1 October 1935).

232. Adam, 139–40.

233. ΤΒJG, I.2, 537 (7 November 1935).

234. Adam, 140–41; Schleunes, 129; Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, I48–51 and (for consequences of the racial definition in a number of personal cases) 155–62; above all, Noakes, ‘The Development of Nazi Policy towards the German-Jewish “Mischlinge” 1933–1945’, 310–15, and Jeremy Noakes,‘Wohin gehören die “Judenmischlinge”? Die Entstehung der ersten Durchführungsverordnungen zu den Nürnberger Gesetzen’, in Ursula Büttner (ed.), Das Unrechtsregime. Verfolgung, Exil, Belasteter Neubeginn, Hamburg, 1986, 69–90. Those not counting as Jews under this definition, but descended from one or two ‘non-Aryan’ grandparents, were labelled ‘Mischlinge’. In practice, ‘Mischlinge Grade Γ (of two ‘non-Aryan’ grandparents) came under the ‘Blood Law’ to be associated with ‘full Jews’ (see Adam, 143–4)·

235. TBJG, I.2, 540 (15 November 1935).

236. Adam, 142–3 and 142 n.130.

237. Until Gustloff’s death, the Auslandsorganisation (AO) of the NSDAP in Switzerland had a Landesgruppenleiter and constituency groups (Ortsgruppen) in various cities. Following the assassination of Gustloff, the Swiss government did not allow the filling of his post, but the duties of theLandesgruppenleiter were in practice taken over by the German embassy in Bern (Benz, Graml and Weiß, Enzyklopädie, 724).

238. Bayern, ii.297.

239. Domarus, 573–5.

240. Hildegard von Kotze and Helmut Krausnick (eds.), ‘Es spricht der Führer’. 7 exemplarische Hitler-Reden, Gütersloh, 1966, 148.

241. For some cases of intervention by Hitler in 1936–7, see Bankier, ‘Hitler and the Policy-Making Process on the Jewish Question’, 15.

242. DBS, iii.27.

243. Der Parteitag der Freiheit vom 10.–16. September 1935. Offizieller Bericht über den Verlauf des Reichsparteitages mit sämtlichen Kongreßreden, Munich, 1935, 287; also in: Parteitag der Freiheit. Reden des Führers und ausgewählte Kongreßreden am Reichsparteitag der NSDAP, 1935,Munich, 1935, 134–5.

244. Ε. C. Helmreich, ‘The Arrest and Freeing of the Protestant Bishops of Württemberg and Bavaria, September–October 1934’, Central European History, 2 (1969), 159–69; Paul Sauer, Württemberg in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus, Ulm, 1975, 185–9; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, I64–79.

245. Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, I70, 172, 178.

246. Cited in Conway, 76–7.

247. See Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, I19.

248. Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, 205ff.

249. TBJG, I.2, 504 (19 August 1935). See also 505 (21 August 1935): ‘Rosenberg, Himmler, and Darré must stop their cultist nonsense’ (‘Rosenberg, Himmler und Darré müssen ihren kultischen Unfug abstellen’).

250. TBJG, I.2, 511 (6 September 1935): ‘In the question of Catholicism, the Führer sees things as very serious.’

251. For the impact of the ‘Church Struggle’ on the attitudes of the Catholic population in Bavaria, see Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, ch.5.

252. For the ‘1918 syndrome’ of Hitler and the Nazi leadership, see Mason, Sozialpolitik, ch. I.

253. TBJG, I.2, 504 (19 August 1935): ‘Führer gibt Überblick politische Lage. Sieht Verfall:

254. BAK, R43II/318, Fols.205–13, 28, 61–2 (and also Fols.195–203, 214–15); R43ll/318a, Fols.45–53. See also Mason, Arbeiterklasse, 72 and n.102.

255. DRZW, i.254–9. The extent to which Germany was successful in economically exploiting the Balkan countries has been disputed by Alan S. Milward, ‘The Reichsmark Bloc and the International Economy’, in Hirschfeld and Kettenacker, 377–413, drawing a rejoinder from Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, ‘Südosteuropa in der nationalsozialistischen Großraumwirtschaft’ in the same volume, 414–28.

256. John E. Farquharson, The Plough and the Swastika. The NSDAP and Agriculture, 1928–1945, London, 1976, 166–8.

257. BAK, R58/535, Fols.91–6, Stapo Berlin, October 1935.

258. TBJG, I.2, 522 (5 October 1935); see also BAK, R43II/863, Fols.69–83; R43II/318a, Fol.15.

259. BAK, R58/567, Fols.84–93, Stapo Berlin, January 1936. Police reports frequently pointed to a revival of the activities of the illegal KPD in the winter of 1935–6. It is doubtful whether much of the unrest was attributable to organized Communist agitation. Rather, underground opposition groups were easily able to exploit the prevailing poor mood (Detlev J. K. Peukert, Die KPD im Widerstand. Verfolgung und Untergrundarbeit an Rhein und Ruhr 1933 bis 1945, Wuppertal, 1980, 204–50). The renewed Communist activity predictably brought an intensified onslaught by the Gestapo, to the point where the KPD had to recognize that there was no longer the slightest prospect of mass action against the regime, and that this would only bring needless sacrifices. By spring 1936, the ferocity of Nazi repression drastically reduced KPD resistance groups in size and greatly limited the possibilities of contact between underground activists (Allan Merson, Communist Resistance in Nazi Germany, London, 1985, 186–7).

260. IML/ZPA, St.3/44/I, Fols.103–7, Stapo Berlin, 6 March 1936. See also DBS, ii.1013, 1251–5 (16 October 1935, 12 November 1935). There were increased numbers of strikes in 1935–6, and widespread reports of the revival of illegal opposition groups. The strikes were invariably on a small scale and lasted only a matter of hours. Details of many such small strikes are contained in a 381-folio file, ‘Streikbewegung’, in IML/ZPA, St.3/463.

261. Wiedemann, 90.

262. BAK, R54II/193, Fol.157, Lammers to Darré, 30 September 1934. Complaints from different parts of Prussia, forwarded by Göring to the Reich Chancellery, are in the file.

263. BAK, R43II/193, Fols.122–245.

264. BAK, R43ll/315a, FoI.31.

265. BAK, R43II/318, Fol.2; the reports are included in Fols.1–29.

266. BAK, R43II/318, Fols.62–4.

267. BAK, R43II/318, Fol.31, 205–13; R43ll/318a, Fols.45–53.

268. The title of Reichel’s study on the stage-management and aesthetics of coercion and force in Nazi imagery and propaganda: Der schöne Schein des Dritten Reiches.

269. BAK, R43II/318, Fols.219–22 ‘Vermerk’ for Lammers, brought to Hitler’s attention; (also Fols.205–13 and R43ll/318a, Fols.45–53).

270. TBJG, I.2, 516 (19 September 1935).

271. BAK, R4311/318a, Fols.11–31. See also Ritter, 79. According to the later account of Alfred Sohn-Rethel, at the time aware of thinking in business circles, Goerdeler’s memorandum encountered considerable support in some sections of industry and prompted a good deal of debate, with even some talk of a possible putsch (Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Ökonomie und Klassenstruktur des deutschen Faschismus, Frankfurt am Main, 1975, 177).

272. Similar ideas advanced by Goerdeler some months later, at the time of the introduction of the Four-Year Plan, were rejected out of hand by Göring in early September 1936 as ‘completely unusable’ (‘völlig unbrauchbar’) (Dieter Petzina, Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich. Der nationalsozialistische Vier jahresplan, Stuttgart, 1968, 47; and see Ritter, 80).

273. Ritter, 80. More critical and penetrating as an analysis of Goerdeler’s actions in the early years of the regime, which gradually shaped his growing opposition to it, is Michael Krüger-Charlé, ‘Carl Goerdelers Versuche der Durchsetzung einer alternativen Politik 1933 bis 1937’, in Jürgen Schmädeke and Peter Steinbach (eds.), Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler, Munich, 1986, 383–404.

274. BAK, R43ll/318a, Fols.35, 66.

275. Petzina, Autarkiepolitik, 32–3; Farquharson, 168.

276. Petzina, Autarkiepolitik, 32–3.

277. BAK, ZSg. 101/28, Fol.331, ‘Informationsbericht Nr.55’, 7 November 1935.

278. Goebbels reflected the concern on a number of occasions in his diaries: TBJG, I.2, 501 (11 August 1935); 503–4 (19 August 1935); 505 (21 August 1935); 506–7 (25 August 1935); 507 (27 August 1935); 522 (5 October 1935).

279. TBJG, I.2, 504 (19 August 1935).

280. TBJG, I.2, 529 (19 October 1935).

281. Petzina, Autarkiepolitik, 33–4.

282. Petzina, Autarkiepolitik, 35.

283. BAK, R43II/533, Fols.91–6.

284. As we have noted, the savage repression of the Gestapo, able to infiltrate and smash KPD cells, meant that any new life in Communist illegal activity was rapidly extinguished. Material discontent rather than ideological commitment of the level needed to court exposure to the enormous personal risks involved had provided the background to the short-lived increased appeal of Communist verbal propaganda in urban working-class areas. For the adjustment of the KPD in western Germany to the far less favourable circumstances from 1936 onwards, see Peukert, Die KPD im Widerstand, 252ff. The poor morale of Nazi Party members in early 1936 is highlighted by Orlow, ii.170–75.

285. IMT, XXV, 402–13 (here 409), Doc. 386–PS.

286. Esmonde Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, VfZ, I0 (1962), 178–205, here 203. See Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 50–55 for evidence of popular unrest to support the view that internal causes were decisive.

287. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 204.

288. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 204–5; Manfred Funke, ‘7. März 1936. Fallstudie zum außenpolitischen Führungsstil Hitlers’, in Wolf gang Michalka (ed.), Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, Darmstadt, 1978, 277–324, here 279.

289. See BAK, R58/570, Fols. 104–8, report to Gestapo Cologne, 6 February 1936; and BAK, NS22/vorl-583, reports of Gauleiter Grohé of Cologne-Aachen, 8 June, 6 July, and 10 December 1935, for comments on the poor economic position of the demilitarized zone and the strength of the Catholic Church’s position there. See also TBJG, I.2, 374 (19 February 1936).

290. The cancellation at the last minute of the Works Councils elections scheduled for April 1936 can probably be attributed to the assumption that the results would have been less favourable than those of the plebiscite (Mason, Sozialpolitik, 206). Labour Minister Seldte was told (after learning of the postponement in the evening papers) that Hitler wanted the elections postponed to prevent a large part of the population having to go to the polls again immediately after the Reichstag election (BAK, R43ll/547b, Fols. 2, 19).

291. DRZW, i.424.

292. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 195; DGFP, C, IV, 1166.

293. Weinberg, i.240–42; James T. Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis, 7 March 1936. A Study in Multilateral Diplomacy, London, 1977, 63.

294. Petersen, 466–71.

295. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 196–9; Funke, ‘7. März 1936’, 298–9; Petersen, 468.

296. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 320; Emmerson, 46; Taylor, 126–7.

297. Emmerson, 39–41, 47–8, 51–2; Weinberg, i.243.

298. Emmerson, 77; Funke, ‘7. März 1936’, 287–9.

299. Emmerson, 57, 80; Funke, ‘7. März 1936’, 283–6; Weinberg, i.244–5; DRZW, i.604.

300. See Dülffer, ‘Zum “decision-making process”’, 194–7.

301. Marquess of Londonderry (Charles S.H. Vane-Tempest-Stewart), Ourselves and Germany, London, 1938, 114.

302. Hoßbach, 97.

303. The Pact, signed on 2 May 1935, was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies on 11 February. The final vote in the Chamber took place on 27 February. The ratification bill was laid before the Senate on 3 March (DGFP, C, IV, 1142 n.4, 1145 n.).

304. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 192, 194–6, 203–4; Funke, ‘7. März 1936’, 279–82; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 323–4; DGFP, C, IV, 1164–6. The German Chargé d’Affaires in Paris, Dirk Forster, had also argued against unilateral action – meeting a sarcastic response from Hitler (Emmerson, 83–4 and 285 n.106).

305. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 192. For Hitler’s later remarks that he had envisaged remilitarization in 1937, but that circumstances had favoured accomplishing it a year earlier, see Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), Das Dritte Reich. Dokumente zur Innen- und Außenpolitik, 2 vols. Munich, 1985, i.267–8 (Hitlers Geheimrede vor den Truppenkommandeurern, 10 February 1939).

306. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 194–6, 203–4; DGFP, C, IV, 1165.

307. TBJG, I.2, 575 (29 February 1936).

308. TBJG, I.2. 576 (29 February 1936).

309. TBJG, I.2, 576 (29 February 1936).

310. TBJG, I.2, 577 (2 March 1936).

311. TBJG, I.2, 578 (4 March 1936). See also NCA, v. 1102, D0C.3308–PS, testimony of Paul Schmidt; Hoßbach, 97; Emmerson, 98, for military anxieties.

312. TBJG, I.2, 579 (4 March 1936), 580 (6 March 1936). Goebbels instigated a rumour (580) that the Reichstag would meet again on 13 March.

313. TBJG, I.2, 579–81 (6–8 March 1936).

314. Domarus, 582.

315. TBJG, I.2, 581 (8 March 1936); Hoffmann, 83; and see Shirer, 46–7. The surprise element was maximized by staging the coup on a Saturday, when British and French cabinet members had dispersed for the weekend (Emmerson, 100). And see Shirer, 51.

316. Shirer, 48; TBJG, I.2, 581 (8 March 1936). For the text of the speech, Domarus, 583–97; and for the description of the atmosphere in the Reichstag, Shirer, 48–50; Dodd, 325.

317. Domarus, 594.

318. Shirer, 49.

319. Domarus, 595.

320. Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 195, 205; and see Emmerson, 95.

321. Shirer, 49–50.

322. Domarus, 596.

323. Eden, Facing the Dictators, 343–5; Robertson, ‘Zur Wiederbesetzung des Rheinlandes 1936’, 205.

324. Emmerson, 102.

325. TBJG, I.2, 581 (8 March 1936); Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 325.

326. Shirer, 51, 54; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 326. Bishop Galen of Münster and Bishop Sebastian of Speyer also voiced an unsolicited and effusive welcome for the remilitarization (Lewy, 202).

327. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 325, Emmerson, 97–8; Hoßbach, 97. D. C. Watt, ‘German Plans for the Reoccupation of the Rhineland. A Note’, Journal of Contemporary History, I (1966), 193–9, argues that German troops were under orders to resist, not withdraw, but accepts (199) that those units which actually crossed the Rhine were to withdraw to the defensive line Roer-Rhine-Black Forest. Any breach of German borders through enemy offensive action was to be resisted by armed force. (See also Max Braubach, Der Einmarsch deutscher Truppen in die entmilitarisierte Zone am Rhein im März 1936, Cologne/Opladen, 1956, 19.)

328. Emmerson, 106.

329. Schmidt, 327; see also Hoffmann, 84.

330. Frank, 211. This was the common view of western journalists in Berlin at the time (Shirer, 51–2).

331. TBJG, I.2, 581–2 (8 March 1936).

332. Emmerson, 162; Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 329–30; TBJG, 1.2, 585–6 (15 March 1936); Hoßbach, 98.

333. Höhne, Zeit der Illusionen, 330.

334. Frank, 211 –12; extracts from the text of Hitler’s speech in Cologne are given in Domarus, 614–16.

335. DBS, iii.30off.; 46off.

336. DBS, iii.460.

337. See DBS, iii.303, 310, 468.

338. Forschungsstelle für die Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, Hamburg, Louise Solmitz, Tagebuch, Bd.I, Fols. 282–3 (7 March 1936).

339. Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), Bonn, ES/M33, Hans Dill to Otto Wels, 20 April 1936.

340. Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, ed. Statistisches Reichsamt, Berlin, 1936, 565. See TBJG, I.2, 594 (31 March 1936).

341. See Shirer, 55; and Theodor Eschenburg, ‘Streiflichter zur Geschichte der Wahlen im Dritten Reich’, VfZ, 3 (1955), 311–16, for polling irregularities.

342. Domarus, 641 (trans., Stern, Hitler: the Führer and the People, 90).

343. Der Parteitag der Ehre vom 8. bis 14. September 1936, Munich, 1936, 246–7; Domarus, 643.

344. Domarus, 606.