1
Mamuka Tsurtsumia
In 1089, when David IV ‘the Builder’ (1089–1125) ascended the throne, the problem of the Turkmen nomads was probably the most difficult he faced. Confrontation with Turkmens was characterized by small-scale but high-intensity clashes distinguished by dynamism and mobility. Due to this, the struggle with the nomads and the suppression of their raids required specific methods of warfare. The theoretical foundations for dealing with raids had already been developed by the Byzantine military, which in the tenth century produced a detailed and practical manual, De velitatione bellica, whose author was a comrade-in-arms of Nikephoros II Phokas (963–69). Though it is hard to show with certainty that the Georgian king knew and followed De velitatione, it is very possible that he derived some ideas about warfare from this Byzantine treatise. In the military career of David the Builder can be seen both the observance of the recommendations of De velitatione (for instance the formation of a strategic barrier and stopping the enemy in a mountainous region with small forces in Trialeti; destroying the enemy camp by a surprise attack in Upper Tao and Botora; luring and then destruction at Avchala), and creative understanding and rethinking of the treatise. There is evidence that he extended the tactical recommendations of the treatise to the strategic level, including when the king addressed the method of luring his adversary at both the tactical (Avchala episode) and strategic level (marching beyond Likhi): David the Builder took the treatise’s recommendation to detain the enemy in a border area to a new height when he attacked the nomads outside the country, meaning that he successfully used the military experience of the Byzantium treatise and enriched it with his own ideas.
At the end of the eleventh century, Georgia was in an extremely difficult military-political situation: the kingdom had been defeated in a war with the Great Seljuk Sultanate and paid tribute to the Seljuks. The territory of the country was reduced, and the king’s authority did not go far beyond the Likhi Range, the natural border between the western and eastern parts of Georgia. Turkic nomads raided Kartli (central Georgia) every year and settled on Georgian lands, which they turned into pastures. Under such circumstances, in 1089, David IV (1089–1125) ascended the throne, and amongst the urgent issues he had to solve, the problem of the Turkmen nomads was probably the most difficult and urgent.2 Since the beginning of the 1080s, when the Turkic invasions, referred to as didi turkoba (“the Great Turkish Troubles”) began, Georgia and the Turkmen nomads were in a state of permanent war with each other. Defeat in this war threatened to extinguish Georgian statehood. As a result of the systematic raids of the nomads, the agricultural system was completely destroyed and the population was forced to shelter in castles and fortresses: “When David ascended the throne, Kartli was in ruins; there was not a man anywhere, only in a few strongholds, and there were no complete buildings left.”3 The first measures taken by David IV (strengthening the central government, improving the state apparatus and military structure, restoring the military potential of the Georgian army and local combat operations) were aimed at curbing the waves of Turkmen nomads and methodically banishing them from Kartli.
Map 1 The Expansion of the Kingdom of Georgia under David IV “The Builder” (r. 1089–1125), Historical Atlas of Georgia, ed. D. Muskhelishvili (Tblisi forthcoming)..
Confrontation with nomadic Turkmens was characterized by small-scale but high-intensity clashes that were distinguished by dynamism and mobility. Due to this, the struggle with the nomads and the suppression of their raids required specific methods of warfare.4 The theoretical foundations of the war against raids had already been developed by the Byzantine military, which, in the tenth century produced a detailed and practical manual – De velitatione bellica. As will be seen below, the Georgian king effectively used the tried-and-true Byzantine tactics for fighting enemy raiders, against even more mobile adversaries (Turkmen nomads).5 In this new situation, he took these tactics to new heights and expanded them creatively. It is likely that King David had read De velatatione bellica and was consciously applying its precepts; but even if this was not the case, the text can help us understand his success against the Turkmen nomads, because it so clearly reveals the principles that enabled him to campaign so effectively. Before that case can be made, it is necessary to briefly consider the treatise and its role in the history of military thinking.
The Byzantine military treatise De velitatione bellica (Περί παραδρομής) is a unique theoretical work based on the author’s experience. The tactics outlined in the treatise are the result of decades of border wars in the mountainous zone between Byzantium and Islam.6 The author was a high-ranking military official who seems to have been, at least, a strategos (military governor) of a theme (province). He was a comrade-in-arms of Nikephoros II Phokas (963–69), and possibly even a member of his family.7 The writing of the treatise, based on the emperor’s records,8 was commissioned by Nikephoros himself.9 Vladimir Kuchma shares the view of Gilbert Dagron that the treatise was probably created thirty to forty years after the introduction of the new tactics10 and dates it to the second half of the 970s.11
The treatise is clearly written and the flow of thought is consistent and logical.12 Mark Whittow classes this treatise as one of the most remarkable documents from the Byzantine world that have survived, and Kuchma shares this opinion.13
De velitatione bellica occupies a special place in military theory because it suggests specific and systematic methods to be used against raiders.14 The centuries-old Greco-Roman polemological tradition consists mainly of encyclopedic textbooks.15 Unlike them, De velitatione bellica does not aim at generality and universality. Its merit lies in the fact that it provides detailed and reliable information concerning specific military issues through an in-depth elaboration of the problems posed by them. Therefore, this work is a highly practical military manual.16 In the treatise, strategy and battle tactics are given in much more detail than in any other source.17 Charles Diehl rightly points out that the tiniest details (intelligence, supply and mobilization, ambush, night fighting tactics, etc.) were included in the treatise’s instructions and carefully written down.18
De velitatione bellica tells us much about maneuver warfare, which the author cites as a παραδρομή (paradromi, shadowing the enemy forces), and claims that “by making use of it some commanders with only a small fighting force have achieved prodigious and truly remarkable results.”19 This method is recommended to prevent the systematic raids of the opponent. Such warfare is characterized by rapid movement and the absence of sieges, protracted actions, and long confrontations.20 Constant and close surveillance prevented looting and provided opportunities to destroy the attackers by exploiting favorable opportunities.21 The treatise describes war in which surprise, the speed of movement, the exchange of reconnaissance information, and the art of pursuing the enemy occupy a major place.22 The author attaches great importance to the geography of the theater of operations, especially the peculiarities of mountainous regions, and integrates all of these in his tactics.23 The treatise presents a model of mobile tactics that can be implemented equally well by day and by night.24 The main aspects of these tactics are to pursue, track, and attack the enemy, and the main idea is to weaken the invading army until the defender is able to concentrate his forces.25 The idea is that the commander, in the first stage of the campaign, can neutralize the adversary’s army, which possesses a numerical advantage and holds the initiative, by means of smaller forces.26 Preference is given to small but well-trained cavalry detachments that are familiar with the environment and utilize aggressive tactics based on speed and surprise.27
According to the anonymous author of the treatise, this method, based on past experience, was developed by the Byzantine commander Bardas Phokas (879–969) and perfected by his son, the famous general and later emperor, Nikephoros II Phokas.28 George Dennis also notes the great contribution of Leo Phokas, the second son of Bardas, a successful commander, in perfecting the method.29
Gilbert Dagron divides the combat actions reflected in the treatise into four phases. Phase I begins with scouting of the frontier and roads and includes intelligence and espionage measures to identify the direction and character of the opponent’s raid (Chapters I and II of the treatise). In Phase 2 (Chapters VIII, IX, X, XII, XIII, XVII, XVIII), a detachment must be deployed to pursue the enemy and establish constant contact with him (VIII). Attacks on the enemy are organized (IX) – they attack either the raiders directly (X, XVII and XVIII), or hold them until the villagers manage to evacuate (XII), or attack the remaining forces at the camp (XIII). In Phase 3 (XX–XXII), before a sufficient number of troops has assembled to fight head-to-head against the numerous enemies, guerilla attacks wear down the invading army, while diversionary operations are conducted against enemy territory in the hope of persuading the enemy to turn back to protect his homeland. Finally, in Phase 4 (XXIII–XXV) the returning enemy, exhausted and encumbered with booty, should be blocked and could be challenged in open battle or by night attacks on his camp.30
The most important and necessary condition for success is the correct organization of intelligence and patrolling services, both before the start of and during the campaign.31 Checkpoints should monitor the enemy from his approach into the country. These posts should be deeply echeloned in several lines and spaced three or four miles apart.32 Before reaching the commander, the information should be transmitted through at least four rows of posts.33 As soon as the border is crossed, the pursuit and “shadowing” of the adversary should take on a systematic character. This is done by tracking the enemy at the required distance, as well as by capturing the heights and observing the adversary from there, determining the enemy’s numbers and direction of movement according to the smoke of their bonfires and the dust and traces left by the raiders on the grass.34 Tracking is also carried out according to the principle of the echeloned system: in the immediate vicinity of the enemy there are three pairs of soldiers – the first pair hears their voice, the second sees the first pair, and the third pair sees the second one. However, these soldiers should not get closer to each other. Behind these three pairs there are three groups of four soldiers, so that the first four soldiers see the last pair, the second four see the first four, and so on. The third group of four soldiers are reinforced with two additional men who can carry reports to the commander.35 They are followed by a cavalry detachment (led by the turmarch36), followed by a commander (strategos) with the main forces, guarded by thirty cavalrymen on each flank, followed by a cavalry rear guard.37 The main forces have to pursue the enemy at such a distance that the latter are not able to attack them. At the same time, the commander must be prepared to attack the enemy whenever convenient: if possible, he must attack the enemy’s core forces, or, in the event of a major imbalance of power, its scattered detachments.38 No matter how small the commander’s forces might be, he is obliged to follow the enemy’s raiding groups while observing all precautions, and to attack the isolated soldiers.39 Under no circumstances should the commander remain passive, and he should select the part of the enemy against which he will have the greatest advantage and guarantee of success in the event of an attack.
Lucas McMahon drew attention to the fact that the Byzantine emperor Romanos IV Diogenes (1068–71) successfully used the method described in De velitatione bellica against the Seljuk Turks.40 According to Michael Attaleiates, when Diogenes learned in 1068 that the Turkish raiders had sacked Neocaesarea, he pursued them. When approaching Sebasteia, he left his baggage and infantry and continued with his cavalry far into the mountains. Due to a well-planned route, he intercepted the enemy eight days later and destroyed them.41 McMahon notes that the Byzantine emperor left the baggage in the rear, in a fortified place, as he approached the enemy.42 The emperor attacked the Turks only with cavalry: this echoes the statement of the treatise that with a sufficient force of cavalry (5,000–6,000 men), the commander can successfully accomplish any task.43 McMahon is certainly right when he points to the importance of intelligence during the capture of the Turkish raiders.44 At the same time, I would like to draw attention to the instruction of De velitatione bellica, according to which, if the direction of the enemy’s movement was clearly indicated, the commander could calculate their possible location by “four stations away” (or in other words, four days in advance) and intercept them at an appropriate place.45 It seems that Romanos Diogenes took advantage of this method and, after checking the data provided by the intelligence, was able to capture the enemy even after eight days.
This episode shows that the instructions of De velitatione bellica continue to be useful in new circumstances. So this treatise could also be useful to David IV, but how was it possible that copies of the manuscripts from the Phokas circle ended up in the Georgian king’s library? What connection could there be between David the Builder and Nikephoros Phokas? There is evidence indicating that Nikephoros Phokas had personal connections with the Georgians46 who had participated in his wars against the Muslims.47 Nikephoros presented David III of Tao48 with “upper lands,” thus ending the old dispute between the empire and the Tao kingdom, described by Constantine Porphyrogenitus.49 Nikephoros Phokas was well acquainted with all three Georgian monks living on Mount Athos – John, Euthymios, and Tornikios. John of Athos, the former commander of David III, was accepted at the royal court, often visited Constantinople and brought gifts for the Lavra monastery of Athos.50 Even after Nikephoros Phokas’ assassination,51 the Lavriotes did not forget their patron and helped to popularize and disseminate his cult.52 In such a situation, it is clear that the Georgians, who were actively involved in the life of Mount Athos and the Great Lavra, would have had accurate information about Nikephoros and access to many manuscripts about him. Moreover, it can be argued that David IV’s chronicler must have read the poem by Theodosius the Deacon about the conquest of Crete by Nikephoros Phokas, as evidenced by a semantically identical passage in both works.53 Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the Georgian king had access to some sources about the Nikephoros and Phokas families. We also know that David IV utilized past experience: that is directly pointed out by his chronicler, who mentions that the secret of the king’s success was hidden in the ancient histories he read and reflected on, without the knowledge of which he could not have risen to prominence.54 The king’s longing for books was well known.55 He always carried a book with him and did not stop reading even during the war and the military campaigns:
Spending days and nights in constant travel, in permanent marches and in tireless labors, he kept many mules and camels loaded with books. Dismounting his horse a book would be the first thing in his hands and he did not stop reading until he was exhausted.56
Moreover, both Nikephoros Phokas and David IV espoused the notion of holy war for the defense of Christianity, as a counterweight to jihad. In De velitatione bellica the concept of the “Christian army” as a protector of the Christians is pronounced: soldiers are portrayed as “the defenders of Christians and, after God, their first saviours.”57 According to Dagron, what was only a desire or a project with Leo VI was turned into a program of full ideological mobilization by Nikephoros Phokas.58 The concept of the “Christian army” was adopted and expanded by David the Builder, who took full advantage of this ideology and opposed Muslim religious fanaticism with the idea of a Christian holy war (the war for the “faith of Christ”).59 In David’s era, Georgians had to fight for their existence against the Seljuk Empire: and the ideological battle against Islam became a cornerstone of state policy. With David IV, this ideology acquired an orderly basis. It was during his reign that Georgian polemical literature was born and anti-Muslim polemical treatises were both translated and created.60 The new militant ideology found its highest expression in the royal title of David. After many victories over the Muslims and the capture of Tbilisi (1122), a new title appeared on the coin minted by the king – the Sword of the Messiah. This title clearly expressed David’s policy of protecting and supporting Christians throughout the Caucasus. It is found on coins inscribed in Arabic, which means that the king announced to the Muslim world his ideological program of defending Christianity with arms.61
Kuchma notes that new strategic ideas rarely appear in Greco-Roman military works. However, De velitatione bellica comes up with a new, theoretically well elaborated idea that, along with practical recommendation, makes its author an important military theorist.62 Chapter III of the treatise deals with an original idea – the formation of a strategic barrier to be implemented at the first, most dangerous stage of the campaign, when the defender’s army has not yet been mobilized.63 Such maneuvering requires swift action from the commander and involves blocking the enemy army with small forces in a narrow defile. Upon receiving information about the adversary’s army, the commander must be able to block a narrow passage located on the enemy’s route. The most important factor in this maneuver is speed, and the size of the army does not play a decisive role, because the mountainous terrain and narrow passage eliminate the numerical advantage of the opponent. A successful maneuver also provides a moral advantage over an adversary: the exhausted enemy, who has been marching for several days, is no longer able to advance; the advantage acquired without fighting but merely by holding a position encourages the defenders. As a result, the opponent is forced to retreat or risk battle in unfavorable circumstances.64
The battle of Trialeti, when David the Builder outmaneuvered the Turks and thwarted his enemy’s advantage at the beginning of the campaign, provides an excellent example of the strategic halting of an adversary that the treatise advocates. The chronicler tells us that in 1110, the Seljuk army suddenly invaded the kingdom’s territory with a rapid march (“the Sultan’s army appeared unexpectedly and cunningly”). The king was staying in the heart of the country, in Nacharmagevi, accompanied by only a personal detachment – tadzreuli (household).65 David was faced with a choice: to avoid the enemy and gather an army or to try to stop them. The first option would result in ruining the country. Moreover, the king would probably not even be able to form an army before the Turks retreated. He chose the more aggressive course. All of his subsequent steps are brilliant illustrations of the implementation of the strategic maneuver proposed by the treatise: as soon as he received information about the Seljuk army, he made a swift decision. With the small but select army at his disposal (tadzreuli numbering 1,500 warriors), he organized a forced march at night and managed to block the enemy’s path in the Trialeti mountains, before they could enter the Kartli plain. As a result, events unfolded exactly as described in the treatise: the Georgians gained an obvious moral advantage and the Seljuks, exhausted by a long march, were forced to fight in an unfavorable position. Despite their numerical superiority, the Turks were unable to defeat David’s detachment (located in a better position) and left the battlefield in despair.66
De velitatione bellica pays considerable attention to the methods of destroying the enemy’s camp, detailing the detection of the enemy’s whereabouts, the approach to the enemy, and the attack. Places with water suitable for making a camp should be identified.67 The enemy must be approached at night so that they do not notice the resulting dust from the army’s movement.68 Prior to the attack, it is necessary to reconnoitre the area where the enemy tents have been set up and to identify natural obstacles (such as rivers or streams).69
From the data available to us, it is difficult to determine exactly how much of the formula provided in the Byzantine treatise was followed by the Georgian king, although some common points can still be deduced from his historian’s laconic narrative. For instance, it is certain that every attack on the Turkmen camps was preceded by the collection of information (“the King employed spies”), and the attack itself was unexpected and devastating.70 Episodes of this kind are frequently described. For example, in 1116 David suddenly attacked and destroyed the Turks in Tao (“fell unexpectedly upon the unsuspecting Turks”);71 in 1118 he destroyed the Turks encamped on the banks of the Aras;72 in 1120, the Turkmen camps in Botora (“fell upon the Turks unexpectedly”),73 Arsharunik and Sevgelamej;74 and in 1121 he did the same in Khunan and Barda.75 In all these episodes, the enemy camp was destroyed, meaning that the Georgian army managed to secretly approach it and perform a surprise attack.
The repulse of the nomads would not have been possible without the establishment of a flexible regional defense system with the ability to respond quickly to the raiders’ incursions. The formation of a well-organized system of border marches, which decades later occupied an important place in Georgian military organization, seems to have begun during the reign of David the Builder.76 In this system, each of the border districts was to use local detachments to suppress the frequent incursions of small groups of raiders. Large enemy forces were to be shadowed and harassed. For this system to operate perfectly, it was necessary to have continuous control of the border, with sentries connected to a centralized communication and signal system. If the enemy appeared, all the components of the system would have to be put into action.
The office of otkhmizduri, introduced during the reign of David the Builder and confirmed by the records of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, was an integral part of the regional defense system. This office, which stood below that of eristavi (military governor), has been carefully examined by Elene Metreveli.77 She compared the Georgian and the Byzantine materials, concluding that the otkhmizduri was a high-ranking military official in local government.78 This office is first found in the “Great Nomocanon” translated by Arsen of Ikalto at the end of the eleventh century, where its Greek equivalent is a duox.79 Under Nikephoros Phokas, the duox appeared as the commander of the provincial tagma (or part of it) in the empire’s frontier themes.80 The duox did not replace the strategos, who was the military governor of the theme, but co-existed with him.81 It seems, therefore, that otkhmizduri is an office created by following the example of the Byzantines. There is an evident analogy between the Byzantine strategos and duox on the one hand, and the Georgian eristavi and otkhmizduri on the other: both the strategos and the eristavi commanded the army of the region, and the duox and the otkhmizduri were in charge of part of the troops of the same region. In Greek and Georgian practice, the otkhmizduri/doux was probably a cavalry commander able to react in a timely manner to enemy action. Like Nikephoros Phokas, David the Builder needed to introduce such an office to strengthen cavalry forces in the border regions.
The material scattered in the writings of David’s chronicler allows us to gain some insight into the functioning of the border system created by the king. The deeply echeloned sentry system had to control the approaches to Lower Tao. The destruction of the Turkmens in Upper Tao in 1116 must have been the result of reports provided by this system, since information about the Turkmens camped near the border was promptly received at the royal court.82
The chronicle’s description of Beshken Jaqeli’s death provides some limited information about the creation of the defensive system. In 1118, while David was preparing to attack the Turkmens, he was informed of Beshken’s fall.83 Beshken Jaqeli, eristavi of the border region of Tukharisi, was killed in Javakheti fighting the Turks far from his own territory. How did Jaqeli get to Javakheti and what caused his death? It appears that he avoided battle with the raiders, whose numbers exceeded his own detachment’s. However, very much in line with the advice of De velitatione, he pursued the enemy as they penetrated deep into the country.84 It seems that the Turks managed to outmaneuver the pursuing Georgian troops in Javakheti, destroying them and their commander. Despite detailed instructions, the shadowing of an enemy was by no means an easy task and demanded careful action, especially against such a mobile enemy as Turkmen nomads.85
De velitatione bellica prescribes eroding enemy strength by carefully prepared minor attacks. After a series of assaults, a feigned retreat would draw the weakened enemy in the direction of the main forces, where they could be ambushed and completely destroyed.86 The treatise suggests a cavalry force of three hundred for the initial ambush, with a main force of five to six thousand to finish the enemy off. The author demands that only the commander should know the location of the ambushing forces.87
David the Builder was acting in accordance with such ideas when he lured the Turks away from Tbilisi.88 According to the chronicler:
… a large caravan from Gandza, accompanied by many Turks entered the town. Learning of this, the King sent fifteen of his chosen servants to drive away the town’s cattle which were at pasture in a place called Loch’ini, in order to exterminate the Turks in case they undertook the pursuit. He, on his part, with three hundred horsemen, hid in one of Avch’ala’s valleys. Trusting nobody with the task of keeping watch, he patrolled alone… and ordered his troops to stay in place until he returned. The servants, doing what they were ordered to do, took away the cattle. The Turks, about a hundred in number, overtook them… [but] he [David] fell upon the Turks like an eagle and scattered them about like partridges… they killed so many of the Turks, that only few were given the chance to hide in the fortress; and the roads were full of their corpses…89
This episode described by the chronicler shows that the Georgian king organized the ambush in the manner suggested in the Byzantine treatise. Even the size of his detachment (three hundred cavalrymen) is the size recommended by De velitatione bellica. That David the Builder does not entrust anyone with the crucial phase of the operation is of particular interest (“Trusting nobody with the task of keeping watch”). If the king could earlier have been accused of negligence, he is now seen to observe proper caution and secrecy.
It cannot be shown with any certainty that David knew and followed De velitatione. He was, after all, fighting in very similar circumstances to those faced by the Byzantines in the tenth century, and it would be hardly surprising if he thus adopted similar methods of his own volition. David therefore lured his adversaries at both the tactical (Avchala episode) and the strategic level (marching beyond Likhi). The chronicler notes that the Turks feared direct confrontation with David (“When the King went to Abkhazia, the Turks and their garrisons breathed a sigh of relief”).90 The Georgian king turned this circumstance into one of the tools of the war – strategic luring. His chronicler gives us a detailed description of the maneuver in 1120:
The King got into the habit of going to Abkhazia, and so doing, lured the Turkmens down to the wintering places by the banks of the Mt’k’vari. Spies had been watching the King and were following his tracks. The King went to Geguti and from there to Khupati and thus gave the Turks the confidence to return. Learning that he was away, they descended to Bot’ori. There were many of them, and they set up camps to pass the winter. The King for his part, kept his eyes open, and rushing along on the fourteenth day of February fell upon the Turks unexpectedly. Only a few of them had time to take their horses and flee. There was a countless number of captives and much booty was taken.91
Later in his reign David became more aggressive. If the most daring maneuver of the treatise is to halt the enemy at the border, the Georgian king attacked the nomads outside his country, after receiving relevant information from his intelligence. In 1116 his attack on the Turkmen encamped in Upper Tao kept them out of the country.92 In 1118 David destroyed the Turks encamped outside his kingdom, on the banks of the Aras.93 In 1120 he destroyed Turkmen settlements in Arsharunik, in Armenian territory,94 and, in 1121, in Arran.95
On the other hand, it must be said that David lived within the milieu of Orthodox Christianity and its literate tradition. His learning and love of books is celebrated in sources concerning his reign, and they seem to be something more than mere empty praise. It is, therefore, very possible that he derived some ideas about warfare from this celebrated Byzantine treatise. It can certainly be said that his style of war closely resembled its prescriptions.
1 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for his valuable comments on my draft and for raising the issue of ideology in De velitatione and the Georgian king’s war. My special thanks also go to Clifford J. Rogers and John France for editing this paper. »
2 The Turkmens made a great contribution to the Seljuk conquests. The very nature of their economy and society was frequently antagonistic to of sedentary societies. Their invasions, settlements, and raids played a crucial role in the fate and transformation of Byzantine Anatolia. Speros Vryonis, Jr., The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 194, 258. »
3 “The Life of David, King of Kings,” trans. Dmitri Gamq’relidze, Kartlis Tskhovreba, ed. Stephen Jones (Tbilisi, 2014), p. 173. »
4 The tactics of the Turkmens were based on the mobile character of their society. The bulk of Turkmen forces consisted of mounted archers. With lighter armament and more agile horses they were quicker and more flexible than their opponents. Great mobility and archery enabled them to fight at distance, use different ways of feigned retreat, attack an enemy on the flanks and rear, or on the march. R. C. Smail, Crusading Warfare, 1097–1193, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 77–83. »
5 John Haldon notes that the appearance of Seljuk Turks and nomadic raids made the old Byzantine tactics again current. John Haldon, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204 (London, 1999), p. 180. »
6 Łukasz Różycki, “Byzantine Asymmetric Warfare in Light of ‘De velitatione bellica’,” Prace Historyczne 143/4 (2016), 645–62, p. 660. »
7 “Skirmishing,” in Three Byzantine Military Treatises, text, translation, and notes by George T. Dennis (Washington, 1985), p. 139 (hereafter “Skirmishing”); V. V. Kuchma, “K probleme avtorstva traktata ‘De velitatione bellica’: novaya gipoteza,” [On the problem of authorship of the treatise ‘De velitatione bellica’: a new hypothesis], Vizantiyskiy Vremennik 55/1 (1994), 132–37, p. 133. »
8 Eric McGeer, Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century (Washington D.C., 1995), pp. 173–78. »
9 “Skirmishing,” pp. 148–49. Catherine Holmes notes that De velitatione bellica served the political ambitions of the Phokas family: “Byzantine Political Culture and Compilation Literature in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries: Some Preliminary Inquiries,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 64 (2010), p. 74. »
10 Le traité sur la guérilla (De velitatione) de l’Empereur Nicéphore Phocas (963–969), text established by Gilbert Dagron and Haralambie Mihăescu, with a translation and commentary by G. Dagron, appendice: les Phocas, by J.-C. Cheynet (Paris, 1986), pp. 163–64; V. V. Kuchma, “Metod παραδρομή: fenomen voennoj teorii i boevoj praktiki X v.,” [The method of παραδρομή: the phenomenon of the military theory and combat practice of the tenth century], Voennaya organizatsya Vizantijskoj imperii (St. Petersburg, 2001), p. 395. »
11 “De velitatione bellica,” in Dva vizantijskih voennyh traktata konca X veka, ed. V. V. Kuchma (St. Petersburg, 2002), pp. 30–31 (hereafter “De velitatione bellica”). See also, Alexander Kazhdan, Eric McGeer, “De Velitatione,” The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, 3 vols., ed. A. Kazhdan (Oxford, 1991), 1:615. »
12 V. V. Kuchma, “Vizantijskie voennie traktati VI–X vv. kak istoricheskie istochniki,” [Byzantine military treatises of the sixth to tenth centuries considered as historical sources], Vizantiyskiy Vremennik 40 (1979), 49–75, p. 58. However, Dagron believed that the standard of strategic reasoning largely exceeds its literary merits. Le traité sur la guérilla (De velitatione) de l’Empereur Nicéphore Phocas, p. 195. »
13 Mark Whittow, The Making of Byzantium, 600-1025 (Berkeley, 1996), p. 177; V. V. Kuchma, “K voprosu o nauchno-teoreticheskom urovne traktata ‘De velitatione bellica,’” [On the question of the scientific-theoretical level of the treatise “De velitatione bellica”], Byzantinoslavica 56/2 (1995), 389–96, pp. 389, 396. Gastone Breccia also maintains a high opinion of the treatise, believing that De velitatione bellica is the first example of a specialized manual. The issues are thoroughly elaborated and various situations arising during the war and the ways to solve them are carefully analyzed. Gastone Breccia, “Educazione e cultura militare a Bisanzio (IV–XI secolo),” Formare alle professioni: La cultura militare tra passato e presente 4 (2011), 64–80, p. 75. The Italian researcher also notes that this type of specialized work did not exist until the seventeenth century, which is why the treatise seems to have a modern touch. Ibid., p. 76. »
14 V. V. Kuchma, “Dva traktata – odin avtor?” [Two Treatises – One Author?], Voennaya organizatsya Vizantijskoj imperii (St. Petersburg, 2001), p. 301. »
15 Kuchma, “On the question of the scientific-theoretical level of the treatise ‘De velitatione bellica,’” p. 389. »
16 “De velitatione bellica,” pp. 45, 68. »
17 Georgios Theotokis, “Border Fury! The Muslim campaigning tactics in Asia Minor through the writings of the Byzantine military treatise Περί παραδρομής του κυρού Νικηφόρου του βασιλέως,” ATINER’S Conference Paper Series (Athens, 2012), p. 14. »
18 Charles Diehl, Les grands problèmes de l’histoire byzantine (Paris, 1943), pp. 72–73. »
19 “Skirmishing,” pp. 146–47. »
20 “De velitatione bellica,” p. 69. »
21 Ibid., p. 11. »
22 Le traité sur la guérilla (De velitatione) de l’Empereur Nicéphore Phocas, p. 185. »
23 Ibid., p. 219. »
24 Ibid., pp. 228–29. »
25 Georgios Theotokis, Byzantine Military Tactics in Syria and Mesopotamia in the Tenth Century (Edinburgh, 2018), pp. 54–55. »
26 Kuchma, “The method of παραδρομή,” pp. 386–87. »
27 Breccia, “Educazione e cultura militare a Bisanzio,” p. 75. »
28 “Skirmishing,” pp. 148–49. Both Haldon and Hugh Kennedy, as well as Lucas McMahon, cite examples that show that the elements of defensive tactics described in the treatise had been employed in Byzantium from the second half of the seventh century. J. F. Haldon, H. Kennedy, “The Arab-Byzantine Frontier in the Eighth and Ninth Centuries: Military Organization and Society in the Borderlands,” Recueil des travaux de l’Institut d’Etudes byzantines 19 (1980), 79–116, pp. 84–85, 97, 101–5; Lucas McMahon, “De Velitatione Bellica and Byzantine Guerrilla Warfare,” Annual of Medieval Studies at CEU 22 (2016), 22–33, pp. 23–33. »
29 George Dennis even attributed the authorship of the treatise to Leo Phokas, though Kuchma convincingly disputed this assumption. “Skirmishing,” pp. 139–40; Kuchma, “On the problem of authorship of the treatise ‘De velitatione bellica,’” pp. 134–37. »
30 Le traité sur la guérilla (De velitatione) de l’Empereur Nicéphore Phocas, pp. 195–96. »
31 Kuchma, “The method of παραδρομή,” p. 387. »
32 The length of a Byzantine mile is 1,574.16 meters. “Skirmishing,” p. 151. »
33 Ibid., pp. 150–51. »
34 Ibid., pp. 164–67. »
35 Ibid., pp. 168–69. »
36 The turmarch was one of the top commanders of the Byzantine army, second only to the strategos. »
37 “Skirmishing,” pp. 170–71. »
38 Ibid., pp. 170–73. »
39 Ibid., pp. 202–3. »
40 Lucas McMahon, “The Past and Future of De velitatione bellica and Byzantine Guerrilla Warfare,” MA Dissertation, Central European University (Budapest, 2015), pp. 42–44. »
41 Michael Attaleiates, The History, trans. Anthony Kaldellis and Dimitris Krallis (Cambridge, MA, 2012), 17.4–5, pp. 192–95. »
42 See, “Skirmishing,” pp. 200-1. »
43 Ibid., pp. 204-05. »
44 McMahon, “The Past and Future of De velitatione bellica and Byzantine Guerrilla Warfare,” pp. 43–44. »
45 “Skirmishing,” pp. 230–31. »
46 Some scholars even believe that the Phokades hailed from Georgia or, more likely that they had Georgian kinsmen. J.-C. Cheynet, “Les Phocas,” in Le traité sur la guérilla (De velitatione) de l’Empereur Nicéphore Phocas (963–969), text established by Gilbert Dagron and Haralambie Mihăescu, with a translation and commentary by G. Dagron (Paris, 1986), p. 290; Whittow, The Making of Byzantium, p. 364. »
47 John Skylitzes, A Synopsis of Byzantine History, 811–1057, trans. John Wortley, with introductions by Jean-Claude Cheynet and Bernard Flusin and notes by Jean-Claude Cheynet (Cambridge, 2010), p. 257. »
48 The Kingdom of Tao was a medieval Georgian state located in modern north-east Turkey and south Georgia. »
49 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando Imperio, ed. Gy. Moravcsik, trans. R. J. H. Jenkins, rev. ed. (Washington, 1967), pp. 206–15. »
50 Actes de Lavra, pt. 1: Des origines à 1204, ed. Paul Lemerle et al. (Paris, 1970), p. 44. »
51 Georgians continued their friendship with the Phokades after Nikephoros’ death: in 979, thanks to an army sent by David III Kouropalates, Bardas Phokas defeated Skleros. In 987–89, Kouropalates assisted Bardas Phokas for the second time, this time during a failed revolt against Basil II. Whittow, The Making of Byzantium, pp. 363–65, 370–73. In 1022, Nikephoros Phokas, Bardas’ son, became an ally of George I and rebelled against Basil II, who had invaded Georgia. Skylitzes, A Synopsis of Byzantine History, p. 346; Aristakes Lastivertc’i, Istoria [History], ed. E. Tsagareishvili (Tbilisi, 1974), pp. 48–50. »
52 Rosemary Morris, “The Two Faces of Nikephoros Phocas,” Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 12 (1988), p. 106. »
53 For more information see Mamuka Tsurtsumia, “Nikephoros II Phokas and David IV the Builder: Military and Political Portraits,” forthcoming. »
54 “The Life of David,” p. 184. »
55 “A man burdened with so much labor, and having no spare time (at all), regarded reading as the most attractive thing in the world,” says his historian. Ibid. »
56 Ibid., p. 183. »
57 “Skirmishing,” pp. 216–17. »
58 Le traité sur la guérilla (De velitatione) de l’Empereur Nicéphore Phocas, pp. 148–49. »
59 See Mamuka Tsurtsumia, Omis ideologia sakartvelosa da akhlo aghmosavletshi: kristianuli saghvto omi da islamuri jihadi [The Ideology of War in Georgia and the Near East: Christian Holy War and Islamic Jihad] (Tbilisi, 2019), pp. 228–31. »
60 Ibid., pp. 224–26. »
61 Ibid., pp. 240–42. »
62 Kuchma, “On the question of the scientific-theoretical level of the treatise ‘De velitatione bellica,’” p. 395. »
63 “Skirmishing,” pp. 154–57. »
64 Kuchma, “On the question of the scientific-theoretical level of the treatise ‘De velitatione bellica,’” pp. 394–95. »
65 “The Life of David,” p. 177. »
66 Ibid. »
67 “Skirmishing,” pp. 150–51. »
68 Ibid., pp. 170–71. »
69 Ibid., pp. 174–75. »
70 “The Life of David,” p. 177. »
71 Ibid. »
72 Ibid. »
73 Ibid., p. 179. »
74 Ibid. »
75 Ibid., p. 180. »
76 See, Mamuka Tsurtsumia, Shua saukuneebis kartuli lashkari (900–1700): organizatsia, taktika, sheiaragheba [Medieval Georgian Army (900–1700): Organization, Tactics, Armament] (Tbilisi, 2016), pp. 75–78. »
77 Elene Metreveli, “Samokheleo terminebi chororodi da otkhmizduri,” [Terms denoting State Officials Chororod and Otkhmizduri] Essays from the History of the Cultural and Educational Center of Athos (Tbilisi, 1996), pp. 79–85. »
78 Ibid., p. 82. »
79 Ibid. »
80 Les Listes de préséance byzantines des IXe et Xe siécles, with introduction, text, translation and commentary by Nicolas Oikonomides (Paris, 1972), p. 344. »
81 Jean-Claude Cheynet, “Du stratège de thème au duc: chronologie de l’évolution au cours du XIe siècle,” Travaux et Mémoires 9 (1985), 181–94, pp. 181–82. »
82 “The Life of David,” p. 177. »
83 Ibid. »
84 As is known, according to the instructions of De velitatione bellica, the local commanders were obliged to prevent small raids, and, in the event of a major invasion, were to employ guerrilla tactics until the arrival of reinforcements. Różycki, “Byzantine Asymmetric Warfare in Light of ‘De velitatione bellica,’” p. 649. »
85 Georgios Theotokis notes that the Byzantine commanders always found it difficult to follow strictly the treatise’s instructions: superficial pursuit of invading forces, combined with inadequate intelligence, could lead to disastrous defeat. Theotokis, Byzantine Military Tactics in Syria and Mesopotamia in the Tenth Century, p. 63. »
86 “Skirmishing,” pp. 204–11. »
87 Ibid., pp. 206–07. »
88 A similar method can be seen in the Greco-Roman military tradition from the very beginning: Frontinus mentions the ambushing of opponents by the Spaniard Viriathus through driving off his herds. Frontinus, The Stratagems. The Aqueducts of Rome, trans. Charles E. Bennett (London, 1925), III.X.6, pp. 240–41. »
89 “The Life of David,” p. 184. »
90 Ibid., p. 176. »
91 Ibid., p. 179. »
92 Ibid., p. 177. »
93 Ibid. »
94 Ibid., p. 179. »
95 Ibid., p. 180. »