6
Donald J. Kagay
This article deals with two unlikely political figures who emerged during the most important phase of the War of the Two Pedros (1356–1366), the sea war of 1359 during which the Castilian king, Pedro I (1350–1366/69), attacked the Valencian, Catalan and Majorcan coasts only to be repelled by the Aragonese sovereign, Pere III (1336–1387). The first of these figures was Pere III’s third wife, Elionor of Sicily, who, as one of the only Aragonese queens of that time to receive a formal coronation, was a true political helpmate to her husband. As Governor of Catalonia and royal lieutenant, Elionor took it on herself to arrange for the coastal defense of Catalonia and Valencia while her husband was pursuing his Castilian enemy into Majorcan waters, She raised these military units by enforcing emergency taxes on Catalonia. Elionor was also a strong supporter for her husband’s naval campaigns and repeatedly took it on herself to spread the news of these exchanges. The other unlikely figure to emerge during the naval crisis was Bishop Berenguer of Gerona who received authority to gather even larger tax amounts than did the queen when in the same year of 1359 he was elected as the first president of the Catalan Deputació, a permanent parliamentary body of Catalonia which remained in session to fully carry out the directives of Catalonian Corts. In some ways, then, these largely forgotten figures helped the badly pressed Crown of Aragon to stand once again against its much stronger Castilian opponent.
The War at Sea, 1359
Medieval Spain’s longest conflict between Christian forces, the War of the Two Pedros (1356–66), was largely fought along the rugged frontiers of Castile and Murcia on the one hand and those of Aragon and Valencia on the other. Military exchanges between the Iberian enemies were normally fought as cabalgadas, cross-border raids that seldom involved more than 3,000 troops, most of them mounted.2 After almost three years of this kind of asymmetrical warfare, the twenty-five-old Castilian king, Pedro I (r. 1350–66/69), attempted to attack the lucrative Mediterranean waters of Valencia and Catalonia. In May 1359, he gathered a fleet of over 130 vessels at Seville, including galleys from Genoa, Granada, and Portugal. In late spring, 1359, the Castilian king sailed this massive force down the Guadalquivir River into the Atlantic and along the Mediterranean coast. Although this force surprised the small Valencian outpost of Guardamar in early June, Pedro’s force was eventually shadowed by Pere III (Pedro IV) of Aragon’s (r. 1336–87) administrators, including his wife, Elionor of Sicily (r. 1349–75) and the king’s own fleet that awaited the enemy armada at the Catalan capital.3
On 10 June 1359, the Castilian fleet anchored off Barcelona and an attack on the city seemed imminent. Despite heavy crossbow and artillery exchanges between the fleets, Pedro did not engage in an amphibious operation against the city and withdrew after two days of fighting. Sailing south toward Valencia, the Castilian eventually turned his ships eastward towards the Balearic Islands. The Aragonese king’s fleet followed first to Majorca and then to Ibiza where Castilian forces were besieging the island’s major fortress. After a standoff between the two sovereigns, Pedro drove his ship southward by the Valencian port of Alicante. After several days of naval operations around the port, the Castilian king broke off his attack and sailed back to Seville with few victories to show from the expensive expedition.4
These naval actions might have led to an immediate conclusion of the bloody dispute between the Aragonese and Castilian kings and, as a result, to a rapid unification of the Iberian Peninsula under the control of its largest polity, Castile. Despite this possibility, the Crown of Aragon was saved from this fate by the Castilian king’s increasing lack of confidence in his own men and by the support of the Aragonese monarchy by highly motivated mercenaries led by important Castilian captains such as Count Enrique de Trastámara and Pere’s half-brother, Prince Fernando.5 Below the effect of these military leaders on the survival of the Crown of Aragon, the largely forgotten work of two administrative heroes, Pere III’s third queen, Elionor of Sicily, and Berenguer de Cruïlles, the bishop of the ancient Catalan city of Gerona, were also of great importance during the crucial year of 1359.
Elionor of Sicily
Elionor was clearly the Aragonese king’s most important partner due to a very traditional consideration. While the king’s earlier wives had presented him with healthy female heirs, they failed to produce a male successor whose very existence would guarantee survival of the Barcelona dynasty that stretched back to the ninth century. Intent on doing his duty to the long line of predecessors that led directly to his reign, Pere declared that his oldest child, Constanza, would qualify as his successor if he died with no male descendant.6 Though unusual, this solution was not unprecedented, since the twelfth-century Aragonese queen Petronilla (r. 1139–64) (whose marriage with Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona [r. 1131–62] had created the political ties that linked Aragon and Catalonia) had ruled her own realm very much in her own name.7 Such succession novelties proved unnecessary, however, since in 1350, a little after Elionor’s marriage to Pere III, the queen presented him with a healthy son, Joan, following this feat with the delivery of two other offspring before eight years had passed.8 The king’s gratitude to his third wife for saving his royal heritage was effusive, but that was not the only accomplishment that had recommended his Sicilian niece to the Aragonese king.
Described by one modern scholar as a person with an “iron will” that steadily drove her toward the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to become the leader of her dysfunctional Sicilian family and the sovereign of her equally dysfunctional Sicilian realm, Queen Elionor quickly impressed her husband with her skills as an effective administrator of her dower possessions – the Aragonese, Catalan, Balearic, and Valencian cities, towns, villages, and fortresses that supported her through the taxes they paid each year.9 Through her determination and accomplishments, Elionor slowly expanded her authority and position of power against her husband’s most important adviser, Bernat de Cabera, his family, and Pyrenean supporters in Pere III’s government.10 Once her husband’s “principal enemy,” Pedro I of Castile, declared war in 1356, the Aragonese queen became a stern voice for the royal position, repeatedly proclaiming the justice of Pere’s cause to the Avignon papacy and to the rulers of Aragon’s most important neighbors. She was also a fearless taskmaster for Pere’s corps of military captains, including Count Enrique de Trastámara and Prince Ferran.11
Elionor’s energy and skill in managing royal administrative matters went far beyond what Pere’s first wives could handle, which quickly led the king to reward her shortly after she had given birth to her first son. In 1352, over a decade after he himself had gone through a coronation ceremony similar to that of his father, Alfons III (r. 1327–33), the king had his infant son crowned, and, at the same time, honored his Sicilian wife similarly in the same ceremony.12 Elionor won an even greater honor in 1359 when her husband bestowed on her the title of “lieutenant general” (locumtenens generalis). This new honor allowed the queen to act on all “arduous matters and questions… just as if [the king had done so].”13 Though this remarkable grant was temporary and generally owed its existence to the king’s need to be away from the royal court, it seemed to permanently advance Elionor’s sense of status, especially during the decade of conflict with Castile.14
The Queen Attempts to Win the Day
The only advantage gained from the hesitant water ballet between the Castilian and Aragonese fleets in the summer of 1359 seemed to fall to the Aragonese queen, at least for the short time when she put into operation across a good portion of Aragon and Catalonia her newly won authority drawn from the post of lieutenant general. Elionor may even have looked past the desperate possibilities that may have emerged from the naval conflict toward an even greater enhancement of her ruling position in the Crown of Aragon or Sicily. Her greatest concerns, however, seemed to mostly focus on the task of safeguarding Aragonese, Catalan, and Valencian territories threatened by the Castilian fleet during a period when she was not fully aware of her husband’s fate.
Between June and August 1359, Elionor remained in Barcelona, but extended her area of command as far south as Alicante on the southern Valencian coast which was the last of her husband’s towns to undergo an attack from the Castilian fleet during the eventful summer.15 While the queen’s words were bolstered by her new authority, her tone was very similar to her communications during the first months of the war. She thus repeated time and again the great danger Aragon’s royal couple were in and how desperately they needed the help and funds of their subjects.16
In the months before her husband took to the Mediterranean in pursuit of his Castilian enemy, the queen’s expanded authority became increasingly obvious even in regard to Pere III himself. As the conflict with Pedro I intensified between 1356 and 1359, she sternly warned Pere against diverting taxes to pay off his principal captain, Enrique de Trastámara. Though she distrusted that Castilian soldier, her advice to her husband against him had little to do with hatred, but rather came from an effort to maintain the stability of each realm within the Crown of Aragon.17
Occasionally unwilling to hold her tongue, however, the queen openly criticized Pere’s officials and captains alike in a tone that often brought with it new enemies. In this way, she occasionally confronted such important military leaders as Juan Fernández de Heredía, the castellan of Amposta, Prince Ferran, and Arnau de Eril in a manner that to these captains seemed dangerous meddling.18 Her scolding tone was especially galling to Pere III’s most important soldier, Count Enrique de Trastámara, whom she excoriated for having left his post on the Aragonese frontier to raise money for his unpaid troops.19 The deepest source of resentment among these professional military leaders was the imperious tone the queen often took with them. Her words, however, made clear that she was in the right, and they grudgingly had to admit it. Her communications with those who risked the dangers of the battlefield also demonstrated to them that the queen had very definite ideas about human conflict:
We know well that victory in battles comes about neither from human encounters or conflicts. Nor does it reside in the multitude and great numbers or men, but is rather in the hands of the Lord God, and in the hearts of the warriors.20
Elionor was even less philosophical in her relationships with the great nobles and clergy of the lands she controlled as lieutenant general and governor of Catalonia. Even though they often allowed their own vassals to be taxed by the parliaments of the various realms of the Crown of Aragon, the queen had no compunction in demanding even more money from them during the crisis of 1359. She utilized the same method for raising emergency funds: the household tax (fogatge), which set a sum to be paid by the residents of each dwelling of the villages which were feudally bound to Catalan churchmen and nobles.21 Even with the important bishops and abbots of the lands she administered, Elionor took an extremely harsh tone for those who attempted to dodge a duty that she viewed as essential for the continuing existence of her husband’s realms and for her very administrative existence. These religious leaders could not refuse to do their duty “for the good of the commonwealth of realms and of the lord king.”22 The Aragonese queen would tolerate no “postponements or delays” among the nobles and great churchmen, labeling such actions as clear treason.23
While she used a great amount of her own revenues and treasure to protect the Catalan and Valencian coastlands, she soon attempted to expand her efforts by tying them to her lieutenancy and gubernatorial powers. Proclaiming that her actions were on a par with her husband’s, Elionor attempted to establish an emergency fund from all the crown’s Catalan subjects. She would then use this money to pay for the expenses of military companies raised by the nobles, great clergy, and their vassals. While Elionor claimed she would accept any sum donated by the Catalans, no matter how small, she published a list of suggested contributions that the Catalan nobles and prelates were expected to promptly pay. While some of these sums were collected and supported clusters of troops along the Catalan coastline, the rapid dissipation of the Castilian danger by late summer 1359 soon rendered these coastal units unnecessary. With the remaining funds, the queen took up the remarkable project of fitting out galleys for her husband’s fleet, which was still in Mediterranean waters between the Balearics and the eastern Spanish coast.24
For both the urban sites and the castles that the Aragonese queen controlled, she took a far more personal interest during that dangerous summer of 1359. Two years before, in March 1357, she had suffered the loss of Tarazona, one of the largest towns on the Aragonese frontier. Furious at the slovenly defense of the town, she made the repair of all her towns and fortresses a priority that helped guide many of her actions during 1359.25 As the Castilian war continued to threaten her townsmen and their homes, Elionor attempted to reduce the amount of taxation they owed every year. She also tried to make these walled sites into places of security for neighboring villagers, their property, and animals. This was often possible even in her smallest towns, since many of their Jewish and Muslim residents had deserted their homes and fled to Castile or Granada.26 Besides this desertion of an important economic segment of her towns and growing dissent between townsmen and troops fighting for the Aragonese crown, the queen was increasingly concerned with the poor conditions of urban defenses, spending a good amount of money to repair and lengthen walls and moats.27
A Talented Episcopal Leader and Basic Changes to Catalonia’s Parliamentary Culture
Queen Elionor’s efforts at protecting Pere’s realms from Castilian attack took place at much the same time that her husband summoned a Catalan corts at Cervera, a small town north of Tarragona. After two months of royal demands and Catalan foot-dragging, the assembly agreed to give the crown 144,000 libras of Barcelona over a two-year period. This sum was divided equally between the urban estate on one hand and the clerical and urban members on the other.28 To assure the money would be properly collected, the Aragonese king temporarily surrendered some of his governmental power to parliamentary agents called “deputies” (diputats), who would hold office for the full two years during which the parliamentary grant would be in effect. This transient surrender of royal power eventually led to an institution that arose from the parliamentary meetings of Valencia in 1358 and those of Aragon and Catalonia in the following year. In all these cases, Pere III’s desperate need for money to support his troops forced him to extend unprecedented control to the members of his representative institutions. This forced on him at least a temporary loss of “initiative in policy and finance.”29 He thus had no choice but to accept the emergence of an “executive committee” (diputació general) that took over the administration of funds voted by the Aragonese and Valencian cortes and the Catalan corts to support the king’s war effort. These deputies, appointed by the parliaments, were responsible for the collection, maintenance, spending, and auditing of money raised by war taxes as well as the stationing and oversight of troops. Though not fully recognized institutions until the fifteenth century, the Catalan Diputació del General and the Aragonese and Valencian Diputacións were already carrying out important functions before the end of Pere’s realm in 1387.30
Like Queen Elionor, Berenguer de Cruïlles saw an increase in his authority from the demands of the Castilian war in 1359. Becoming the bishop of Gerona in the same year, he remained in the episcopal office until 1362 when he died at the age of fifty-two. When the Cervera assembly finished its work shortly before Christmas, Bishop Berenguer had won a new administrative role. Before Pere III concluded the meeting, the three estates chose deputies to represent them in the tax-collection process. With a reputation as a powerful speaker, the bishop of Gerona became the leader of the Catalan clergy and was then elected as the presiding officer over Cervera’s deputies. Almost immediately, he hired two notaries, who, fortunately for later historians, did not follow the institutional directive that ordered that all official papers produced by Cervera’s deputies be “burnt and [their ashes] scattered” after their two-year term of office had ended, ordered so that they would not be drawn into the decisions of future deputies. From this fortunate violation of protocol, most of Berenguer’s decisions as the head of the Cervera deputies were preserved in his episcopal archive. As a “skillful politician,” Berenguer soon won Pere’s approval, and emerged as a builder of consensus in an attempt to fully support the crown’s war effort while representing the Catalan church’s vassals, who often had to help pay for the conflict and even fight in it.31
Berenguer’s orders to the clergy of his bishopric mirrored Pere III’s letters of the same period that demanded the support of the urban and peasant vassals, but, like Elionor, he made exceptions if such support might alleviate the danger of starvation for poorer citizens and prevent them from abandoning their homes.32 Besides his decisions as president about how the Catalan parliament’s war imposts were to be collected, the Gerona bishop also fought to maintain the “ancient custom” that insisted that the bishop could only tax clerics and other vassals under his jurisdiction. He sent firm reminders of this ancient usage to Count Ramon Berenguer II of Empuries (r. 1341–64) and Viscount Felipe Dalmau I of Rocabertí (r. 1342–92) who had tried to draw war funds from the same clergy and other vassals who were directly subject to Bishop Berenguer.33 Such careful restatements of his superior standing both as the presiding officer of Cervera’s deputies and Gerona’s bishop did not always impress nobles of Empuries like the lord of Valpach, who tried to force clergy and villagers under feudal control of the bishopric of Gerona to serve in his company against Castilian invaders. If they “closed their door against him,” the noble promised to return and demolish their dwellings. Very much as a secular official, Berenguer lectured the angry lord and his superior, the count of Empuries, about the proper way to raise such forces.34
In addition to reinforcing his manifold authority against such noble challenges, the bishop spent much of his time in forcing the payment of Cervera’s household taxes in installments down to the end of 1361. He also announced on certain occasions that Princeps namque, the call for military support of the count of Barcelona (also the king of Aragon) was in effect for a certain period. Though stern in sending Catalan townsmen and villagers to answer this call for national defense by serving as coast guards to fend off Castilian attacks from the sea, Cruïlles occasionally forgave those who did not carry out his orders if he viewed their excuses for avoidance of service as plausible.35
As an important figure in Catalonia’s evolving parliamentary institutions, the bishop of Gerona was in fairly regular communication with Aragon’s royal couple. Because of the need to make the short journey from Gerona to Barcelona, Berenguer occasionally borrowed mules from the abbots of nearby monasteries and other clerical subordinates. His hectic schedule as religious and political leader sometimes affected his health, as it did in May 1359, when he announced that he could not meet the king and queen because of a “great and dangerous affliction of… [his] throat,” which led him to send a substitute.36 No matter how the negotiations were carried out, the president showed himself to be an efficient parliamentary agent who stationed small military units up and down the Mediterranean coast as long as the Castilian danger loomed. He also followed to the letter the agreements of the Cervera corts. Despite the overlap of their duties, Berenguer seemed to encounter fewer difficulties with the royal administrators than he did as bishop with some of the Catalan abbots and other clerics who were engaged in “continual prejudices and grievances” about the payment of the fairly moderate war taxes that Cervera’s deputies had to collect.37 Unlike royal tax collectors, Cruïlles occasionally returned some portion of a community’s fogatge if he found that some of the residents were exempt from the tax or a portion of the impost had not been spent. This did not stop him, however, from issuing general instructions to inform all Catalan ratepayers that if they proved delinquent in the payment of their justly owed household taxes, they would be excommunicated.38
The Compartmentalization of National Power
The massive Castilian fleet that seemed poised in 1359 to facilitate Pedro I’s conquest of large swaths of Balearic, Catalan, and Valencian territory seemed to subdivide in some ways the power that Pere III had possessed when the conflict with Castile began three years before. The complexity of the war caused by the king’s decision to hold out defensively in two of his largest realms against his enemy’s fast-moving forces cost Pere dearly. The king now had to pay daily wages to professional troops, many of them Castilian. When, in 1359 and then in 1364–65 the Aragonese monarch was increasingly needed in the field, he temporarily subdivided his administration. Already utilizing lieutenants to manage distant parts of the “commonwealth” (cosa publica) of his realms, he bestowed on his wife a temporary authority that allowed her to assume powers every bit the equal of her husband’s, at least as long as the emergency lasted.39
During the critical weeks of the summer of 1359 when her husband led his fleet against that of his Castilian enemy, Elionor attempted to raise emergency funds to pay troops posted along the Mediterranean coast and on the Aragonese frontier with Castile. Her efforts on a national scale, however, largely came to nothing, not because of inefficiency or failure of nerve on her part, but because the crisis caused by the Castilian fleet was short-lived and few of her mustered troops saw any meaningful action. The emergency funds she raised fell far short of her posted goals but brought in enough money to sponsor the arming of new galleys for the Aragonese fleet. With her administrative response in 1359, Elionor demonstrated her worth to her husband and his people. During the critical years of 1364–65, she again showed her governmental savvy and courage by bringing the stormy sessions of the corts of Barcelona to a successful conclusion.40 In many ways, the queen had achieved more than any other royal wife in the long history of the Crown of Aragon. She pointed to a clear administrative path for later Aragonese queens, such as María of Castile (1401–58), who all but ruled the Crown of Aragon for much of the reign of Alfonso V (r. 1416–58), who spent much of his life conquering southern Italy.41
Though barely recognized by Elionor or her husband during the emergency-filled year of 1359, the barest marks of a new institution, based on the Catalan corts, emerged from the assembly of Cervera. A narrowly drawn parallel governmental structure worked to see that funds promised by the corts would be properly collected, delivered, and used, with very little interference by the king or his administrators. Though headed by the bishop of Gerona, his ecclesiastical title was irrelevant. As the elected leader of the Cervera deputies, Berenguer de Cruïlles stood above the members of the other estates, no matter their rank. In a very short time, the Aragonese king and his new lieutenant had to become accustomed to a new kind of nobility, one established by political sagacity, but which was most often ended not by death or disease, but by the time-limit of an elected office.
1 I appreciate the stellar aid of the editors of the Journal, John France, Kelly DeVries, and Clifford J. Rogers, as well as that of the outside reader, for making this a much better article. »
2 For the War of the Two Pedros, see: Archivo de la Corona de Aragón [hereafter ACA], Registro [hereafter R.] 1381, ff. 205–07; Cartas reales [Pedro IV], caja 49, no 6003; José Vicente Cabezuelo Pliego, La guerra de los Dos Pedros en las tierras alcantinas (Alicante, 1991); María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, “Causes i antecedents de la guerra dels Dos Peres,” Boletín de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura 63–64 (1987), 445–508; Ferrer i Mallol, “The Southern Valencian Frontier during the War of the Two Pedros,” in The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus, eds. L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2005), pp. 75–115; Antonio Gutiérrez de Velasco, “La conquist de Terazona en la guerra de los Dos Pedros (año de 1357),” Cuadernos de Historia Jeronimo Zurista [hereafter CHJZ] 10–11 (1960), 69–98; Gutiérrez de Velasco, “La controfensiva aragonesa en la guerra de los Dos Pedros: Actitud militar y diplomática de Pedro IV el Ceremonioso (años 1358 a 1362),” CHJZ 14–15 (1963), 7–30; Gutiérrez de Velasco, “La fortelezas aragonesas ante la gran ofensiva castellana en la guerra de los Dos Pedros,” CHJZ 12–13 (1961), 7–39; Donald J. Kagay, “Border War as a Handmaiden of National Identity: The Territorial Definition of Late-Medieval Iberia,” Journal of the Georgia Association of Historians 28 (2009), 88–138; Donald J. Kagay, “The Defense of the Crown of Aragon during the War of the Two Pedros (1359–1366),” Journal of Military History 71 (2007), 11–53; Mario Lafuente Gómez, Dos coronas en guerra: Aragón y Castilla (1356–1366) (Zaragoza, 2014), pp. 94–104; Lafuenta Gomez, Un reino en armas: La guerra de los Dos Pedros en Aragón (1356–1366) (Zaragoza, 2009); María Rosa Muñoz Pomer, “Preliminares de la guerra de los Dos Pedros en el reino de Valencia (1356),” Anales de la Universidad de Alicante. Historia Medieval [hereafter UAMH], 1 (1982), 117–34. For a much larger list of sources on the conflict, see Donald J. Kagay and L. J. Andrew Villalon, Conflict in Fourteenth-Century Iberia: Aragon vs Castile and the War of the Two Pedros (Leiden, forthcoming). »
3 Pedro López de Ayala, “Crónica del rey Don Pedro I,” ed. Cayetano Rosell, Crónicas de los reyes de Castilla, 3 vols, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, vol. 66 (Madrid, 1875), pp. 485 (1358, chap. ix), 494–95 (1395, chap xi). Despite the presence of more recent editions of Ayala’s chronicle, including Corónica del rey don Pedro, eds. Constance L. Wilkins and Heanon M. Wilkins (Madison, 1985), the Rosell edition is cited here because it is by far and away the most easily available to American scholars. Pere III of Catalonia (Pedro IV of Aragon), Chronicle, trans. Mary Hillgarth; ed. J. N. Hillgarth, 2 vols (Toronto, 1980), 2:522–23 (VI:22). »
4 Ayala, Pedro I, pp. 495–96, 498 (1359, chaps. xii–xiv, xvii–xix); Pere III, Chronicle 2:525–29 (VI:25–26) »
5 Antonio Ramón Pont, “El infante don Fernando, señor de Orihela en la guerra de los Dos Pedros (1356–1363),” UAMH 2 (1983), 63–92; Julio Valdeón Baruque, Enrique II de Castilla: La guerra civil y la consolidación del régimen (1366–1371) (Valladolid, 1966). »
6 Pere III, Chronicle, 2:392–94 (IV:4–5, 11); Alfonso García Gallo de Diego, “La sucesión al trono de Aragón,” Anuario de historia de derecho español 36 (1966), 5–188, at pp. 33–34. For early Aragonese and Catalan rulers, see: The Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña: A Fourteenth-Century Official History of the Crown of Aragon [hereafter CSJP], trans. Lynn H. Nelson (Philadelphia, 1991), pp. 18–31 (chaps. 15–19), 41–43 (chap. 23). »
7 488 CSJP, pp. 50–51 (chap. 31); Therese Martín, “Fuente de potesdad para reinas e infantes. El infantazgo en los siglos centrales de la Edad Media,” Anuario de Estudios Medievales [hererafter AEM] 46/1 (2016), 97–136, at pp. 121–22; William Clay Stalls, “Queenship and the Royal Patrimony in Twelfth-Century Iberia: The Example of Petronilla of Aragon,” in Queens, Regents, and Potentates, ed. Theresa M. Vann (Dallas, 1993), pp. 49–61; José Ángel Sesma Muñoz, La corona de Aragón: Una introducción crítica (Zaragoza, 2000), pp. 37–40. »
8 Pere III, Chronicle, 2:451, 518 (IV:66; VI:18). »
9 Francesco Giunta, Aragonese y catalanes en el Mediterráneo, trans. Juana Bignozzi (Barcelona, 1989), p. 175; Sepastian Roebert, “‘Que no tenemus a dicto domino rege pro camera assignata,’ The Development and Administration of the Queenly Estate of Elionor of Sicily (1349–1375),” AEM, 46/1 (2016), 231–68. »
10 Donald J. Kagay, “The ‘Treason’ of Bernat de Cabrera: Government, Law, and the Individual in the Late-Medieval Crown of Aragon,” Mediavistik 13 (2000), 39–54, at pp. 40–41, 46–47; J. B. Sitges, La muerte de D. Bernardo de Cabrera (Madrid, 1911), pp. 1–5, 19–23, 34–36, 40–42, 68–69. »
11 For the Aragonese queen’s development as a successful administrator, see Donald J. Kagay, “Elionor of Sicily: A Mediterranean Queen’s Two Lives of Family, Administration, Diplomacy, and War,” Journal of Medieval Military History [herafter JMMH] 17 (2019), 81–102. »
12 Antonio Durán Gudiol, “El rito de la coronación de rey en Aragón,” Argensola 103 (1989), 17–37, at pp. 20–22; E. L. Miron, The Queens of Aragon: Their Lives and Times (London, 1914), pp. 196–97; Jaume Riera i Sans, “La coronación de la Reina Elionor (1352),” Acta historica et archaeologica español medievalía [Homenatge á la Profesora Dra Carmen Batlle Girart] 26 (2005), 485–92. »
13 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1137, ff. 40–41. For a thorough discussion of Elionor’s various appointments of the office of the lieutenancy and the various documents confirming them, see Sebastian Roebert, “The Nominations of Elionor of Sicily as Queen-Lieutenant in the Crown of Aragon: Edition and Commentary,” Mediaeval Studies 80 (2018), 171–229, at p. 199 (doc. 1); Lleidó Ruiz Domingo, “‘Del qual renim loch,’ Leonor de Sicilia y el origen de lugartenencia feminina en la Corona de Aragón,” Medievalisme 27 (2017), 303–26, at p. 311. »
14 Besides the 1359 grant, the queen received lieutenancy powers four other times in her later life: 1362, 1364, 1372, and 1374. For this documentation, see: ACA, Cancillería real, R. 970, ff. 186–89v; R. 1537, ff. 122r–v; R. 1573, ff. 68–69v. For editions of these documents, see Roebert, “Nominations,” pp. 203–13 (doc. 4), 221–24 (doc. 6), 226–27 (doc. 7), 228–29 (doc. 8); Deibel, “Reyna Elionor,” p. 449 (doc. 6). »
15 Ayala, Pedro I, p. 498 (1359, chap. xvii); Jeronimo Zurita y Castro, Anales de Aragón, ed. Ángel López Canellas, 9 vols. (Zaragoza, 1969–85), 4:382 (IX:xxiv). »
16 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1566, ff. 89v, 124v, 158v; R. 1567, ff. 3v, 44v, 72, 133v. »
17 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1568, f. 7v. »
18 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1568, ff. 10–11, 46r–v, 47v. »
19 ACA, Cancillería real, R.1568, ff. 10v, 46r–v, 52v–53, 62r–v. »
20 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1568, ff. 74–75. »
21 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1567, ff. 106r–v, 107v; R. 1568, ff. 12r–v, 17v–18, 23r–v, 27–28v, 33–34, 38, 39–40, 45, 46. For the functioning of the fogatge in the Crown of Aragon, see: María Teresa Andres, “El fogatge aragonés de 1362: Aportación de demografía de Zaragoza en el siglo XIV,” Aragón en la Edad Media 9 (1989), 33–59; J. M. Pons Guri, “Un fogatjament de contegut de l’any 1358,” Boletín de Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona 30 (1963–64), 322–498. »
22 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1568, ff. 32v–33. »
23 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1568, ff 32, 43v. »
24 For a fuller discussion of these activities, see: Donald J. Kagay, Elionor of Sicily (1325–1375): A Mediterranean Queen of Two Worlds (London, 2021). »
25 Tarazona, a community “better defended than any other,” went down to ignominious defeat on March 9 1357, almost without a fight. ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1149, f. 96v; R. 1151, f. 65v; R. 1379, ff. 147–48, 161r–v; Epistolari, ed. Ramon Gubern (Barcelona, 1955), 155 (doc. 21). »
26 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1566, ff. 107, 110, 115v, 161, 188r–v; R. 1567, ff. 18, 117r–v, 125, 133v; R.1568, ff. 1v, 66. »
27 ACA, Cancillería real, R. 1537, f. 51v; R. 1566, ff. 108v, 157; R. 1567, ff. 22–24, 40r–v, 43v–44, 46, 123v–24, 125, 127, 139; R. 1568, 173. »
28 Colecciión de las Cortes de las antiguas reinos de Aragón y Valencia y del principado de Cataluñs, 27 vols. (Madrid, 1896–1922 ), 2: 1–37, 383–87, 389–90; José Luis Martín, “Las Cortes catalanes en la guerra castellano-aragonesa,” in La Corona de Aragón en el siglo XIV, 2 vols. (Valencia, 1969–70), 2:79–90, at pp. 82–83; Donald J. Kagay, “The Parliament of the Crown of Aragon as Military Financier in the War of the Two Pedros,” JMMH 14 (2016), 57–77, at 63–64. »
29 T. N. Bisson, The Medieval Crown of Aragon. A Short History (Oxford, 1986), p. 118. »
30 Bisson, Medieval Crown of Aragon, p. 157; Alberto Estrada Rius, “Resumen de los origenes de la Generalitat de Catalunya (De Deputació de General de Catalunya. De los precedentes á la reforma de 1413),” PhD. Diss., Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2001; José María Font y Rius, “The Institutions of the Crown of Aragon in the First Half of the Fifteenth Century, 1369–1516,” in Spain in the Fifteenth Century, 1369–1516. Essays and Extracts by Historians of Spain, ed. Roger Highfield, trans. Frances M. López-Morillas (New York, 1972), pp. 169–92, at pp. 175–77; José Martínez Aloy, La Diputación de la Generalidad de Reino de Valencia (Valencia, 1930), pp. 144–45; Kagay, “The Parliament of the Crown of Aragon as Military Financier”, at p. 76; Ignacio Rubio Campronero, La Diputació del General de Catalunya en los siglos XV y XVI, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1950), 1:135–53; Peter Rycraft, “The Role of the Catalan Corts in the Later Middle Ages,” English Historical Review 351 (1974), 241–69, at pp. 249–50; José Ángel Sesma Muñoz and J. A. Armillas, La Diputación de Aragón: El gobierno aragonés de reino y la comunidad autónoma (Zaragoza, N.d.); José Ángel Sesma Muñoz, “Las transformaciones de la fiscalidad real en la Baja Edad Media,” in XV Congrés d’història de la Corona de Aragón [El poder real en la Corona de Aragón], 5 vols. (Zaragoza, 1993), vol. 1 (Ponencias), pp. 239–91, at pp. 286–89. »
31 CAVC, III:402; Jaume de Puig Oliver and Josep María Marquès Planagumà, “Els primers documents del primer president de la generalitat de Catalunya, Berenguer de Cruïlles, bisbe de Girona (1359–1362),” Arxiu de textos antics 26 (2007), 288–384, at pp. 284–92. »
32 “Primers documents,” pp. 296–98 (docs. 1–2). »
33 Ibid., pp. 298–302 (docs. 3–4, 6–7); Santiago Sobreques i Vidal, Els barons de Catalunya (1957, repr. Barcelona, 1980), pp. 134–35, 206–07. »
34 “Primers documents,” pp. 305–07 (docs. 10–11). »
35 Ibid., pp. 304–05, 309–12 (docs. 8–9, 13–14, 16–17); Jaume de Puig Oliver and Josep M. Marquès Planagumà, “Els darrers documents del primer president de la Generalitat de Catalunya, Berenguer de Cruïlles, bisbe be Girona (1359–1362),” ATCA 27 (2008), 7–43, at pp. 20–21 (docs. 72–73). For Princeps namque, article 64 of the Usatges of Barcelona, see The Usatges of Barcelona: The Fundamental Law of Catalonia, ed. Donald J. Kagay (Philadelphia, 1994), 80 (art. 64); Donald J. Kagay, “The National Defense Clause: Princeps namque and the Emergence of the Catalan State,” in Crusaders, Condottieri, and Cannon: Medieval Warfare in the Societies Around the Mediterranean, ed. Donald J. Kagay and L. J. Andrew Villalon (Leiden, 2002), pp. 57–100; Manuel Sánchez Martínez, “The Invocation of Princeps Namque in 1368 and its Repercussions for the City of Barcelona,” in The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus, eds. L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden, 2005), pp. 297–323. »
36 “Primers documents,” pp. 309, 313 (docs. 13, 18). »
37 Ibid., pp. 308, 310 (docs. 12, 14, 26). »
38 Ibid., pp. 334–35 (doc. 29), 337–38 (doc. 31), 244–45 (doc. 34), 369–70 (doc. 55), 383 (doc. 66) »
39 For the concept of cos publica, see: Donald J. Kagay, “Rule and Mis-rule in Medieval Iberia,” in War, Government, and Society, Study IV, pp. 48–66, at p. 50; José Antonio Maravall, Estudios de história de pensamiento español, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1983), 1:254; Joseph F. O’Callaghan, “The Ideology of Government in the Reign of Alfonso X of Castile,” Exemplaria Alfonsina 1 (1991–92), 1–17, at pp. 4–5. »
40 Manuel Sánchez Martínez, “Negociación y fiscalidad en Cataluña a mediados de siglo XIV: Los Cortes de Barcelona de 1356,” in Negociar en la Edad Media/Négocier en la Moyen Âge. Actas de coloquio celebrada en Barcelona las dias 14, 15, 16 de octubre de 2004, eds. María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, Jean-Maríe Moeglin, Stéphane Pequinot, and Manuel Sánchez Martínez (Barcelona, 2005), pp. 123–64. »
41 Theresa Earenfight, The King’s Other Body: María of Castile and the Crown of Aragon (Philadelphia, 2010). »