During the American phase of the Vietnam War (1964–1975), a substantial number of American visual artists created works that were either conceived of or interpreted as being “antiwar.” Significant examples of this politically engaged production, which encompassed painting, sculpture, performance, installation, posters, short films, and comics—and which ranged from the most “representational” to the most “abstract” forms of expression—have been seen often since the war in exhibitions devoted to individual artists, or occasionally in exhibitions concerning the broader relationship between art and war.1
Two exhibitions have attempted a survey of this material: Maurice Berger’s 1988 Representing Vietnam at Hunter College and half of Lucy Lippard’s traveling 1990 exhibition A Different War: Vietnam in Art (the other half of the exhibition concerned art created after the end of the war). Additionally, art-historical scholarship outside of exhibitions has dealt with this material through monographic studies, within broad surveys of art and war, or in projects concerning the relationship between avant-garde practice and leftist politics, such as Francis Frascina’s Art, Politics, and Dissent: Aspects of the Art Left in Sixties America (1999) and Julia Bryan-Wilson’s Art Workers: Radical Practice in the Vietnam War Era (2009).2
To date, however, art history has not produced a suitable survey of this work. Consequently, we know little about the overall character of antiwar art production and its producers during the Vietnam War; and the greater definition of what “antiwar” art was during the period remains quite vague.
While this lack of scholarship can be explained by the aesthetic disengagement with social issues of many New York avant-garde artists during the Vietnam War; the resistances to such work in the American fine art system of the 1960s; or the prevalent notion that art conceived or interpreted as antiwar is one-dimensional (and not complex enough for substantial scholarship), this has resulted in a significant art-historical gap. Far from one-dimensional, the best examples of Vietnam-era engagement are some of the most formally challenging, emotionally devastating, and memorable American paintings, sculptures, graphics, and photographs of the last fifty years. These works have also been influential on subsequent generations of American (as well as international) artists, primarily in that they created a renewed sense, “at the so-called triumphant moment of American high modernism,” that art could play a significant role in social change. These Vietnam-era works also provided some of the formal and conceptual starting points for 1970s and 1980s politically and socially engaged art-making.3
Accordingly, a greater understanding—using a range of art-historical methods—of the collective nature of antiwar art, both its producers and its public—and therefore a refined but also expanded definition of what antiwar art was in the United States during the Vietnam War—is the purpose of this book.
Chapter 1 concerns the origins of the Vietnam War and aims to provide historical context for all later discussion of the war—and specifically antiwar engagement by artists. It begins with the U.S. support of France in its “dirty war” against Vietnamese Nationalist communist forces that lasted from 1946 to 1954. It then discusses the conclusion of this war—the 1954 Geneva Accords, which split Vietnam into democratic and communist states—and U.S. postwar clandestine actions to support democratic South Vietnam against encroaching communist forces from within and from the North over the next decade (e.g., a U.S.-engineered coup that overthrew the besieged South Vietnamese Diem government in 1963). Subsequently, chapter 1 considers the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, after which the U.S. role in Vietnam changed drastically. The resolution, created in reaction to two incidents between U.S. naval forces and the North Vietnamese, for the first time formally established a conflict in Vietnam for the United States and authorized President Lyndon Johnson to use military force in the region without officially declaring war. Chapter 1 then continues to discuss Johnson’s 1964 reelection and heavy debate in November and December 1964 among his cabinet as to what strategies they would pursue next in Vietnam. Then the chapter discusses the Johnson administration’s approval of air strikes in North Vietnam and the sustained bombing of the country (code-named Operation Rolling Thunder) in response to communist attacks of South Vietnamese army installations in Pleiku in early 1965. Against this background, the chapter turns to American domestic dissent regarding the war. The first major antiwar protests in the United States were organized. College students mobilized for huge marches in Washington, DC, New York City, and Berkeley. In addition, the first “teach-ins” took place. These were lectures given to students outside of class hours by experts or academics engaged with U.S. foreign affairs. American intellectuals began to write against the conflict in significant numbers in major periodicals, such as The Nation, the New Yorker, Harper’s, and the New York Review of Books.
Chapter 2 begins with the first protests by American artists in 1965. Artists’ initial antiwar actions were what I define (within what will in this book emerge as a general typology for antiwar protest) as extra-aesthetic actions. This category of protest (nothing new to protest in the least) encompassed an array of strategies of engagement: marches, advertisements, strikes, walkouts, and petitions. These strategies in themselves also suggested an assortment of aspirations. Chief among them were raising awareness of the irrationality of specific actions of the U.S. government, and shutting down art institutions and art-making in order to propose that art could not support war-making. Extra-aesthetic actions occurred throughout the war, but inasmuch as they lacked a visual aspect or did not relate to what could be considered an art context, I label them extra-aesthetic. (In this way these actions often resembled those undertaken by nonartist protest groups.)
Extra-aesthetic actions were one of the most common means by which American artists protested over the entire course of the war, and by the end of the war these actions had involved more artists than any other type of artistic engagement. This fact stands in contrast to a prevalent conception, based on a scholarly reliance on the activities of a few avant-garde artists, that the majority of politically active artists began their protest making works of art, and, in a manner of radical progression, gravitated toward these types of more immediate actions after finding engaged artworks to be ineffective.
In the spring of 1965, the New York–based group Artists and Writers Protest (AWP) organized the first extra-aesthetic actions: two full-page advertisements in the New York Times, which asked those in the cultural community to “End Your Silence” on the war (figs. 1 and 2). Around the same time, the Los Angeles–based Artists’ Protest Committee (APC) ran its own comparable ad in the Los Angeles Free Press, in which the group pleaded with the government to stop its escalation of the war (fig. 3). APC followed the ad with a series of “Stop Escalation” protest activities in Los Angeles. In one of them, they asked local galleries not to exhibit art but instead to cover their works of art and windows with white paper bearing their “Stop Escalation” logo, an inverted ladder. As much as this activity could be understood as an extra-aesthetic action, because it whited-out all works, it can be seen as another type of engagement, which I have defined as collective aesthetic endeavors. (It should be said here that this ability of works to demonstrate more than one strategy simultaneously was common over the course of the war.)
Collective aesthetic endeavors were group artworks, usually murals or large quilt-like works, which relied on their size and collective facture—rather than the particular character of the individual contributions involved—to make their statement against the war. While this is the nature of the type, it was made obligatory by the characteristically low quality of individual contributions. Most dispensed with substantive creative expression in word-based rants (lashing out against political figures or stating harsh realities of the war), opting instead to go without pictures. Almost as often contributions consisted of one-dimensional symbols like skeletons or images of bombs. APC’s Stop Escalation protest also involved the picketing of the new Los Angeles County Museum of Art and the obstruction of car and pedestrian traffic in the central Los Angeles gallery district on La Cienega during LA’s monthly Monday night “Art Walk,” when most of the galleries arranged to hold their exhibition openings. In June, APC continued its engagement with the war by protesting outside the RAND Corporation. RAND (whose name stemmed from Research ANd Development) was a nonprofit formed by the Douglas Aircraft Company in 1948 that offered research and analysis to the United States Armed Forces. During the Vietnam War, RAND was one of the major forces behind formulating American military policy.4 APC’s protest of RAND led to two debates between RAND and APC. One was private, held at RAND headquarters, and the second was public, held in August 1965 at the Warner Playhouse in downtown Los Angeles. Both debates were seen as triumphs for the Los Angeles artistic community, since artists had debated “ably” at both venues and helped show that at many points “the war was indefensible even in front of non-experts.”5
Chapter 3 describes America’s further expansion of the war during 1966 and artists’ attempts during that year to incorporate antiwar sentiment into works of art for the first time. In Los Angeles, which continued to be a center of engagement, APC created one of the major collective aesthetic endeavors of the war, its Artists’ Tower of Protest, more commonly called the Peace Tower (figs. 4 and 5). In New York, former marine Marc Morrel’s controversial exhibition of antiwar flag sculptures was installed at the Stephen Radich Gallery (fig. 14). Morrel’s was the first of a host of antiwar works that would deface patriotic symbols. In addition to the American flag, the Statue of Liberty and Uncle Sam were also defaced (figs. 49 and 50). Such defacement characteristically took patriotic symbols and visually reversed what they stood for; rather than acting as symbols of freedom, idealism, and democracy, they were revised into images representative of a police state, terrorism, or fascism. Also in New York, but in the confines of her studio, Nancy Spero began her War Series (fig. 17). The War Series, which Spero would work on until 1970, and which would become one of the best-known pieces to concern the Vietnam War, was one of the first artworks to disfigure American weaponry. Spero’s work turned helicopters into serpents and snakes, converting what in the wake of World War II had been symbols of pride into images of sin and deceit. Spero’s series was also the first to graphically associate American weaponry with the male sex drive—faulting men for the death and destruction of war. This practice could be seen later in works by Judith Bernstein (fig. 18) and in antiwar posters (fig. 19). Further, 1966 saw the first instances of minimalist works engaging with the war: Dan Flavin’s crossbow of fluorescent red lights titled monument 4 those who have been killed in ambush (to P.K. who reminded me about death) (fig. 6) as well as Wally Hedrick’s series of black paintings (fig. 7). Despite these works, and in the face of recent scholarship arguing for political engagement particularly in the works of Carl Andre and Donald Judd, minimalism’s engagement with the war was limited. To understand why this was the case—as well as how unwelcome initial artistic contributions were in the larger art world and how disconnected American artists were from previous political art—this chapter discusses the dominance and politically disengaged character of formalism, pop, and minimalism in the American fine art system of the 1960s.
Chapter 4 follows the continued escalation of the war during 1967 and considerable events of the antiwar movement from that year, such as the Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam, which took place in New York, and the publication of Noam Chomsky’s “The Responsibility of Intellectuals”—arguably the single most important piece of antiwar literature written during the war.6 Subsequently, it discusses activities by artists. Collective aesthetic endeavors against the war flourished in 1967. The most important was Angry Arts Week, the largest collective aesthetic protest effort of the antiwar arts community that would ever be held. Angry Arts Week featured five hundred artists and included virtually anything that could fit into the allotted areas of artistic “dissent.” The central work of the week was the Collage of Indignation (fig. 23), a large mural of protest paintings, drawings, and prints contributed by any artists who wanted to be involved. Carolee Schneemann’s film Viet-Flakes (figs. 20 and 21) was another highlight of the week. Its incorporation of atrocity images made it one of the first examples of a work to include direct evidence. “Direct evidence” as a legal term refers to evidence directly related to the facts in dispute. I use this term here—as Maurice Berger did in his previous study—to identify photography from the war front that characteristically featured Vietnamese women and children civilians injured by American attacks. Since the dawn of photography, images of direct evidence from the war front have been central to dissent—these historical examples will be explained in this chapter—and it would be no different during Vietnam.
Apart from Angry Arts Week, 1967 saw Abbie Hoffman’s attempt to collectively exorcise the Pentagon during the March on the Pentagon in October, one of the central antiwar protests of the era. One hundred thousand people confronted the Department of Defense at its Arlington, Virginia, headquarters. Hoffman and his later work with the Yippies is integrated into art history here because of its correspondence with other performative works of the sixties, such as Happenings, as well as Hoffman’s links to the downtown New York artistic community. Another, much more traditional form of group aesthetic endeavor during 1967 was the creation of a print portfolio by Artists and Writers Against the War in Vietnam (details are figs. 41 and 42). This portfolio included works by artists, in the words of Max Kozloff, whose “consciences have been provoked” and who have “chosen to express their conscience through the medium of their own work.” While most of the works in the portfolio employed direct evidence, disfigured American weaponry, or defaced patriotic symbols to make their respective statements, abstract works were included that had nothing to do with the war. These were examples of what I will call benefit works. Benefit works were created by artists who wanted to donate their work to benefit the antiwar effort financially (in portfolios, auctions, and gallery exhibitions) but did not want to modify their work—which did not engage with the conflict—in any way to do so.
Though collective aesthetic endeavors were the primary foci of the antiwar movement throughout 1967, extra-aesthetic protests continued, as did the creation of individual works employing new strategies. An unsuccessful petition was circulated that asked Pablo Picasso to remove Guernica from the Museum of Modern Art as a symbolic protest against the war. Guernica was chosen in order to draw comparisons between the actions of the United States in Vietnam and those of the Nazis and Franco in Guernica during the Spanish Civil War, but also because it was the most significant piece of political art in New York (and arguably in the world). In 1967, Martha Rosler also began her series of collages, Bringing the War Home: House Beautiful (figs. 24, 25, and 26). These works exhibited an innovative approach to making antiwar work: the juxtaposition of direct evidence from the war with contemporary domestic interiors. In so doing, they suggested the stark division between home and the war, and the apathy of the American public regarding the war. Rosler would continue to work on the series until 1972.
Paintings whose central images were rape and napalm victims first surfaced in 1967 as well. Images of napalm victims—which were either photographs or photographic imagery adapted into paint—served as further immediate and shocking examples of direct evidence from the war. Images of rape rendered in paint testified to the ubiquity of the practice by American soldiers of Vietnamese women and the symbolic rape of the country of Vietnam itself by the United States. Examples of how napalm and rape images were incorporated into works by Peter Saul (figs. 29 and 30), Rudolf Baranik (fig. 37), Jeff Schlanger (fig. 31), and Leon Golub (figs. 32–34) are the focus of the end of the chapter.
Chapter 5 opens with an extended discussion of the critical and divisive political events of 1968: the Vietcong’s Tet Offensive, Johnson’s announcement that he would not run for reelection, the shootings of Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy, and the riots during the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Chicago. Though Tet had great potential to encourage antiwar protests, Johnson’s shocking decision, the shootings of King and Kennedy, and the events surrounding the DNC led to confusion among those involved in the antiwar movement and the concentration of their energies elsewhere. Candidates, feminists, and those combating racial inequalities integrated antiwar messages into their protest or left them aside for others to tackle. This predicament of the antiwar movement was also generally reflected in artists’ behavior in relation to the war. A few important exhibitions featuring antiwar works were organized nevertheless. In September, following the violence in Chicago—which was provoked by Mayor Richard J. Daley and the Chicago Police Department’s harsh security measures—Chicago gallerist Richard Feigen organized the Richard J. Daley Exhibition of protest works. Most of the works, such as Barnett Newman’s Lace Curtain for Mayor Daley (fig. 40), focused on insulting or injuring the mayor—akin to other antiwar works seeking to do the same to other political figures (like Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon, such as in Philip Guston’s Poor Richard series of drawings). Yet the combination of directness, subtlety, and violence in Newman’s work was unique. It comprised only a vertical open square steel structure with barbed wire crisscrossing its interior. For the Daley exhibition James Rosenquist contributed an image (fig. 39) of the mayor painted on thin strips that hung down vertically. Visitors could interact with these strips—which were akin to those at a car wash—and thus break the mayor’s face apart (if they wanted to). Back in New York, during the fall, Lucy Lippard, the artist Robert Huot, and Ron Wolin (a political organizer with the Socialist Workers Party) organized the first minimalist protest exhibition at the Paula Cooper Gallery (fig. 43). Despite Lippard’s effort to frame the show as a groundbreaking effort by nonobjective artists to engage with politics, none of the artists altered his or her work at all for the exhibition, and as a result the event was a (by then) familiar example of an exhibition of benefit work.
Outside of exhibitions, in 1968 artists continued to expand the possibilities for protest works. May Stevens insulted another kind of American symbol, the “ordinary working-class man” who supported the war, by making him a grotesque, bald, fat, pasty white figure in her Big Daddy series (fig. 51). Edward Kienholz created the first of what I will call advance memorials with his Portable War Memorial (fig. 44). Advance memorials critiqued historical war memorials—the principle example in the United States being the national Marine Corps Memorial—through the following techniques: featuring dead soldiers or empty, grave-like spaces instead of valiant heroes; siting works on the floor without historical contextualization (as opposed to elevated, monumental podiums that clearly explained the historical event); and constructing monuments out of ephemeral materials. Kienholz was also one of the first artists, in The Eleventh Hour Final (fig. 45), to juxtapose body counts with an individual victim. Such a strategy could be seen in later protest works and aimed to humanize the death toll. At the University of Michigan, the antiwar movement appropriated Michele Oka Doner’s Tattooed Dolls (fig. 36) as symbolic of victims of napalm attacks (discussed in the previous chapter). Oka Doner’s was not the only work somewhat inaccurately identified as antiwar. A similar situation occurred with James Rosenquist’s F-111 in 1968—the painting was finished in 1965—and Claes Oldenburg’s Lipstick (Ascending) on Caterpillar Tracks (fig. 9) in 1969 (discussed inchapter 3).
Chapter 6 begins with the calm that settled over the antiwar movement in the fall of 1969 after the election of Richard Nixon and his promise to scale back American involvement with his strategy of “Vietnamization.” In general, Vietnamization sought to progressively replace (and bring home) American troops through increased air power and larger numbers of South Vietnamese troops. Yet this calm was short-lived. In November 1969, the reporter Seymour Hersh broke the story of what would become known as the My Lai Massacre, American soldiers’ March 16, 1968, assault and murder of more than five hundred unarmed South Vietnamese men, women, and children without any proof that they were Vietcong. The disclosure of the events at My Lai spurred another increase in antiwar engagement in general as well as significant activity by artists. Participants in the activist group Art Workers’ Coalition (originally formed around the cause of artists’ rights vis-à-vis museums) created And Babies (fig. 52).7 And Babies was a protest poster featuring an image of direct evidence from the war: dead men, women, and children from My Lai with two lines of text superimposed at the top and bottom of the image. The text “Q: And babies?” was at the top and “A: And babies” was at the bottom. And Babies has ended up being—with the Peace Tower—the most recognizable example of protest work from the war. The Guerrilla Art Action Group (GAAG), a small offshoot of AWC, created graphic performance “actions,” such as A Call for the Immediate Resignation of All the Rockefellers from the Board of Trustees of the Museum of Modern Art (better known as Blood Bath) (figs. 54–57), which took place at the Museum of Modern Art, and which, in its final presentation—of a pileup of bloodied bodies—directly recalled photographs of My Lai. GAAG’s contribution to protest was groundbreaking. It fused street actions, performance art, damning research, and powerful images of direct evidence into an entirely new form of artistic activism, which engaged with the art institution directly and immediately.
The conclusion of this chapter discusses the first appearance in 1969 of works presenting dead American soldiers, such as Duane Hanson’s War (also called Vietnam Scene) (fig. 58) and Edward Kienholz’s The Non-War Memorial (fig. 59), both further examples of advance memorials. Though images of dead Vietnamese were available and used from the beginning of the antiwar movement, images of dead American soldiers appeared relatively late in the movement. This was due to America’s historical (and still present) practice of keeping images of war casualties from the public, for fear of the intense discomfort they would create in the American populace. As such, for much of the war, images of dead Americans were not available (and were possibly viewed as too extreme) for use in artworks.
Chapter 7 discusses Nixon’s invasion of Cambodia in the winter and spring of 1970—a shocking event for the American public. While the president rationalized the invasion by explaining that he was attacking significant enemy forces hiding out in Cambodia, in the eyes of the American antiwar movement, he was controversially and illegally expanding the war across borders when the expectation since his election had been that he was scaling the war back. Labor unions and students demonstrated across the country in reaction to Nixon’s actions. This led to rioting and in some cases to tragic deaths, such as at Kent State in Ohio and Jackson State in Mississippi. New York artists responded with a return to extra-aesthetic actions on an unprecedented scale. They organized the largest artists’ action against the war (which also sought to fight the American racial divide), The New York Art Strike Against Racism, War, and Repression (fig. 60), a one-day attempted shutdown of major New York museums and galleries. Out of the Art Strike, a group formed calling itself the Emergency Cultural Government. This group continued the energy and strategy of the Art Strike with an attempted strike of the 1970 Venice Biennale. As a result, many of the artists chosen by the American government pulled out of the exhibition. During 1970, the Guernica petition (of 1967, discussed in the previous chapter) was also reprised, though again the organizers met with little success.
The prevalence of extra-aesthetic actions in 1970 did not mean artists stopped attempting to protest the war through works of art. A few antiwar exhibitions were organized, such as My God, We’re Losing a Great Country at the New School for Social Research, and the Academic and Professional Action Committee for a Responsible Congress published an antiwar print collection, the Peace Portfolio. Artists also continued to create works apart from collective projects. Robert Morris completed a series of prints, hisFive War Memorials (fig. 61), which again, like the works of Kienholz and Hanson, employed the strategy of the anti-memorial. Hans Haacke exhibited his MoMA-Poll (fig.62)—one of the lone examples of conceptual art to engage the war—in Kynaston McShine’s seminal MoMA exhibition of conceptual art, Information. To contextualize Haacke’s contribution, the relationship between conceptual art and politics is evaluated.
Chapter 8 discusses the dissolution of the antiwar movement after the spring of 1970. Nixon’s successful institution of Vietnamization and the beginning of peace talks with the North Vietnamese in 1972 pacified many protestors, while others continued the drift, which had begun in 1968, toward other political causes. A small minority pursued further antiwar radicalism, as seen in the antigovernment terror of groups like the Weathermen. Women gravitated toward the feminist movement. While artists’ activity was again a reflection of the behavior of the greater antiwar movement, there were still important isolated instances of engagement in 1971 and 1972. In New York in 1971, a new Collage of Indignation—comprising posters, not a continuous mural of written statements and drawings—was installed at the New York Cultural Center, and the exhibitions The Artist as Adversary at the Museum of Modern Art and American Posters of Protest at the New School were organized. Both of these exhibitions sought to generally foreground the idea of the artwork as politically antagonistic in reference to a range of issues, including the war. And in 1972 the Brooklyn Museum exhibited Vietnam: A Photographic Essay of the Undeclared War in Southeast Asia, which featured photojournalistic coverage of the war in order to expose what war truly was. These years also marked the beginning of Leon Golub’s series of Vietnam paintings (fig. 63), and the creation of Öyvind Fahlström’s exceptional political map works (figs. 64a and64b), which used the approach of a cartoon map to inundate the viewer with copious information and small illustrations indicting American imperialism.
The conclusion discusses the influence of American artistic protest during Vietnam to further establish this engagement’s relevance and importance. First, it discusses the impact of AWC, Vietnam-era “artist calls,” and GAAG on art and activism in the 1970s and 1980s. Subsequently it looks at the substantial effect of Vietnam-era engagement on artistic engagement during American conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan after September 11, 2001. For example, during this period, contemporary practitioners re-exhibited or revised Vietnam-era (and previous) examples of dissent, and strategies of the Vietnam era continued to be found. Government rhetoric was again juxtaposed with direct evidence, direct evidence again infiltrated contemporary advertising, and the strategy of the advance memorial was often utilized, such as in the 2007 exhibition Memorial to the Iraq War at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, London, which invited twenty-six contemporary artists to create a memorial to the war before the war had ended. As a final note, I discuss the major difference between Vietnam-era and contemporary protest work: contemporary production’s emphasis on more complete media coverage of the war. This was not an issue during the Vietnam War because media coverage was groundbreaking and extensive. However, since Vietnam (and as a result of it), the United States and its allies have markedly restricted media access to the front of any military conflicts in which they have been involved.
While the constraints of this study don’t allow everything to be covered—particularly protests against the Vietnam War outside of the United States, as well as further analysis of the relationship between Vietnam-era antiwar and political work since—hopefully these chapters collectively provide one of the most detailed understandings of American antiwar engagement during the Vietnam War yet. I also hope this project directly informs the work of others undertaking monographic studies of artists included in this book, as well as the work of scholars trying to understand artists’ relation to war more broadly.
Now, moving on from this preamble, we will begin this narrative in Vietnam in the aftermath of World War II.