Little is known about military training within the Military Orders, despite the fact that young notices must have entered with very limited military skills. Their initial training seems to have been informal and took about a year, being based upon practical texts in French rather than translations of archaic Latin texts. On the other hand most Hospitaller brethren-at-arms were trained soldiers before they joined the Order. It was popularly said in 12th century Western Europe that, ‘You can make a horseman of a lad at puberty, but after that never. He who stays at school until the age of twelve is fit only to be a priest.’ But there was no prejudice against literacy in the knightly class, as Abbot Philip de Bonne-Esperance wrote to Count Philip of Flanders around 1168: ‘for many, chivalry does not preclude learning, nor does knowledge of letters in a moral cause preclude chivalry’. It is also worth noting that in the German prose version of the Romance of Lancelot, the hero’s guardian sent him directly from his nurses to a monk who taught Lancelot to read and write.
From the age of 12 the education of young warriors focused on riding, discipline, the use of lance and shield, and an ability to evade enemy blows. During the 12th century the tournament and jousting ceased to be a genuine form of military exercise and became a sport. Perhaps for this reason Hospitaller regulations only permitted limited practice jousts in the presence of the Master. Hunting anything other than lions, which were still a hazard in the Middle East, was also banned, although by the 13th century unauthorised hunting was only seen as a minor offence. Crossbows could only be used against targets - in other words in military training - and there are plenty of references to knights using them.
The couched lance, firmly tucked beneath a cavalryman’s arm and used in a close-packed conrois of horsemen, demanded considerable discipline and unit cohesion. It also entailed the proper use of a shield, as the Song of Roland said: ‘Shields on their necks and with their lances well ordered.’ Such group training had the added advantage of developing strong comradeship. The couched lance not only added weight, and thus penetration to a thrust, but enabled a successful cavalryman to topple a foe from his saddle or even overthrow both man and horse, as the Song of Roland again eloquently put it: ‘The girths are burst, the saddles swivel round.’
The little evidence which survives from the medieval period indicates that swordsmanship was firmly associated with the use of the shield. Available literary and pictorial sources also have interesting similarities with training manuals from Byzantine and Islamic literature. Unlike the gentlemanly duelling of later centuries, medieval fencing relied on a heavy blade to cope with the greater variety of helmets, armour and opposing weapons. Thrusts were usually aimed at the opponent’s face, cuts were directed against legs and feet, while defensive parries used both sword and shield. Thrusts were also considered more effective than cuts.
The Hospitaller castle at Belvoir in Palestine. A: plan of castle. B: reconstruction of castle.
The Greeks build their ships and then set sail to attack Troy in a manuscript of the Histoire Universelle by William of Tyre, made in Acre around 1286. The ships, and the way in which they are built, reflect those which maintained contact between the Crusader States and Western Europe. (British Library, Ms. Add. 15268, f. 105v, London, England)
Crusading warfare was significantly more dangerous than knightly combat in Western Europe, and members of Military Orders would have expected to suffer higher casualties, particularly numerous facial injuries from archery. The Hospitallers’ leading military role also meant that they lost a great many horses. Nevertheless, the idea that the heavily armoured knights dominated the battlefield is a myth, even within Europe. Cavalry almost invariably needed the support of good infantry, but men on horseback, whether they were heavily armoured, lighter cavalry, or mounted infantry did predominate in the raiding warfare which played a major role in the Crusader States.
Where the Military Orders were concerned a campaign would begin with the brothers mustering in their quarters with horses, pack animals and livestock to provide food on the hoof. At this stage they were under the command of the Marshal, but would often be transferred to the Gonfanonier as a raid set out. When larger armies were on the move, the Hospitallers and Templars often provided van and rearguards, the Hospitallers being in the rearguard at the battle of Arsuf during the Third Crusade.
The Rule of the Templars provides detailed information which is lacking for the Hospitallers, but they are likely to have been very similar.
These simple late-12th or early-13th century wall-paintings show knightly opponents using lances and then fighting with swords. (In situ, Church of All Saints, Claverley, Shropshire, England.
When a Templar force was preparing to march, for example, the brother-knights assembled ahead with the squires following with the baggage. Once they were ready to move, the squires rode ahead with the knights’ weapons and spare horses. Secular sources indicate that the raising of banners was taken as a signal for a force to move. Hospitaller statutes indicate they were usually accompanied by priests, probably from the Order itself, that there should be no individual looting and that all booty was assembled collectively. In hostile territory brother-knights rode with their shields, and when near to the enemy they put on helmets. In friendly territory, however, the shields were carried by squires or servants. Again, Templar sources are more detailed. For example if a man wanted to change position on the march he did so downwind from the main body, so that he did not kick dust into their eyes. In peacetime the men could water their horses at streams, but in enemy country they could only do so when the Gonfanonier signalled a halt. If an alarm sounded, those closest should mount their horses, take up their weapons and await orders while those further away should muster around the Master.
Fortunately plaster casts were made of the superb effigies in London’s Temple Church before they were damaged in the Second World War. TOP: the effigy of William Marshal the Younger shows chausses secured by a narrow knotted lace or thong. BOTTOM: the sword, scabbard and sword-belt on the effigy of Gilbert Marshal. (Victoria and Albert Museum, London, England; author’s photograph)
Similarly if an encampment was attacked, those nearest the threat hurried to repel the enemy, while the others mustered in the chapel-tent for orders. On campaign the Templars and presumably the Hospitallers erected their tents around such a chapel-tent. All equipment was put inside their tents, and servants were sent to forage for firewood and water, although they could not go beyond earshot. Imad al-Din al-Isfahani described one skirmish between Saladin’s reconnaissance units and a crusader force from Saffuriyah, adding the strange observation that as the crusaders charged ‘The Templars were humming like bees, the Hospitallers bellowing like the wind.’
Large-scale training for battle did not exist during this period, but large forces did move in a co-ordinated manner, as described by the Anglo-Norman chronicler Wace: ‘Those on foot led the way, in serried ranks bearing bows. The knights rode close, protecting the archers from behind. Those on horse and those on foot, just as they had begun, kept their order and the same pace, in close ranks and at a slow march, so that no-one might overtake another, nor get too close nor too far apart.’ The similarity with 12th century Arab (though not Turkish) tactics is astonishing. Great discipline was required of crusader armies since their tactics normally left the initiative to their Islamic foes. Under such circumstances the steadiness of the Military Orders must have been invaluable. According to Templar sources, no man could leave his position in the ranks once an army was arrayed, unless it was to test his horse and saddle, or to help a comrade in distress. If a man wanted to speak to the master he had to go on foot and then return to his place, perhaps because riding off on horseback might cause alarm. On campaign the Military Orders certainly operated in eschielles, or squadrons under nominated leaders. They were smaller than a conrois, though the term may have referred to a tactical rather than organisational unit. Each conrois numbered between 20 and 40 men drawn up in two or three ranks, while several conrois drawn up in line formed a bataille or battlefield division.
It is possible that crossbowmen overcame the weapon’s slow rate of fire by loosing concentrated volleys when lightly armoured Islamic horse-archers came close. It also seems clear that a substantial proportion of infantry in the Crusader States, including Hospitaller brother-sergeants, were quite heavily armoured. The renowned discipline of the Hospitallers made them less vulnerable to horse-archers than most Western European cavalry, especially when they were operating in close co-operation with disciplined infantrymen.
The structure of a crusader cavalry charge was more complex than might be thought. The Gonfanonier organised squadrons of squires with spare war-horses who could ride behind the brother-knights as they charged, while other squires with riding horses remained close to the banner. The turcopoles could also charge behind the knights in case they needed support or rescue. Brother-sergeants sometimes charged with the knights or formed a supporting rank. It was important for the horses to remain very close together, but the charge itself was probably only at a trot, perhaps spurring into a canter just before impact. An ill-considered charge might itself be hit in the flank or rear but in the melee or close-combat which followed a successful charge no man should leave his position even if wounded.
The Hospitaller castle at Krak des Chevaliers in Syria.
A: reconstruction of castle.
B: plan of castle.
Both Christian and Islamic sources indicate that it was difficult to knock an armoured Western knight from his saddle. Muslim soldiers were therefore trained to attack the Crusaders’ horses rather than their riders. Abu Shama described the result at the battle of Hattin: ‘A Frankish knight, as long as his horse was in good condition, could not be knocked down. Covered with mail from head to foot, which made him look like a block of iron, the most violent blows make no impression on him. But once his horse was killed, the knight was thrown and taken prisoner. Consequently though we counted them (Frankish prisoners) by the thousand, there were no horses amongst the spoils whereas the knights were unhurt.’ Under such circumstances it was important for brethren-at-arms not to become scattered - hence the supreme importance of standards as rallying points - and some Military Orders had regulations stating how a man should rally to the banner of another Order, or indeed any Christian banner if his own fell.
Siege warfare was equally important to the Hospitallers. According to Abbot Guibert de Nogent, writing in the early 12th century, knights were assigned to wooden siege towers so that they could fight similarly well-armoured opponents defending the walls opposite them. It was, however, a dangerous position as the besieging knights were exposed to archery, crossbow fire and javelins which could pierce armour at short range. When defending a fortification, a Hospitaller garrison employed sorties as was usual, though not necessarily by knights. During Saladin’s attack on the Hospitaller castle of Belvoir, for example, there was a sortie by 200 crossbowmen described as ‘skilled in mountain warfare’. During the Mamluks’ final siege of Acre, both the Hospitallers and the Templars made large-scale sorties against the enemy’s left and right flanks, though with minimal success.
The Hospitallers had enjoyed considerable freedom of action during the 13th century, with the right to make local alliances and exploit Mongol raids, as well as internal Islamic quarrels. This was particularly true along the borders of Antioch, Tripoli and Cilician Armenia. In fact, the secular rulers of these Crusader States agreed to abide by truces arranged by the Hospitallers, whereas the Hospitallers could ignore truces negotiated by the secular rulers. In the kingdom of Jerusalem the Military' Orders did not have this freedom of action, but this autonomy could lead to problems. During a crusade of 1239-41, the Muslim rulers of Damascus and Cairo were at loggerheads; the Hospitallers wanted to support Cairo but the Templars wanted to support Damascus. The Hospitallers may also have assumed the same freedom of diplomatic action elsewhere, sometimes going against papal policy as a letter from Pope Gregory IX to the Hospitallers in 1238 made clear: ‘You are not ashamed to give aid against the Latins in horses and arms to Vatatses [the Byzantine Emperor John Ducas Vataces].’ This was done in return for land and farms.
The question of whether or not the Crusader States should seek an alliance with the Mongol invaders of the Middle East was more serious. Eventually the Mongol invasion was rolled back by the Mamluks of Egypt, but the Hospitaller castle of Marqab was taken by the Mamluks in retaliation for the help the Hospitallers had given to their foes. An alliance between the Hospitallers and the ruling dynasty of Cilician Armenia was also influenced by the Mongol question, particularly after the Armenians became the Mongols’ enthusiastic allies. It was even said that in 1281 the Prior of England and other Hospitaller brethren-in-arms fought alongside King Hethoum of Cilician Armenia and his Mongol allies against the Mamluks, though this is probably a myth.
Hospitaller castles served the same function as other Crusader fortifications. In the early days they were primarily a base for offensive operations, although they also served as places of refuge. In the later years, these castles could not plug an invasion route, but they provided defence in depth as their garrisons could threaten an invader’s communications or supply lines. Many of the most impressive Hospitaller castles were located in rugged, inaccessible areas where they were difficult to reach but this did not make them invulnerable. They may have been difficult to bombard with existing siege machines, but Islamic armies normally enjoyed a considerable superiority in infantry, and foot soldiers could harass the defenders physically and morally by repeated small assaults against different sections of wall.
Penthesilea, Queen of the Amazons, as illustrated in a copy of William of Tyre’s Histoire Universelle. Queen Penthesilea rides an armoured horse, but the horse armour is more Middle Eastern than European in design. (Bibliotheque Nationale, Ms. Fr. 20125, f.141 v, Paris, France)
In another copy of the Histoire Universelle by William of Tyre a team of unarmoured men prepare to pull the ropes on an early form of man-powered stone-throwing mangonel. (M.E. Saltykov-Shchredrin State Library, Ms. Fr. v.lV.5, St Petersburg, Russia)
The psychological aspects of medieval siege warfare have rarely been studied, but the emphasis which Military Orders such as the Hospitallers put upon communications suggests that they were fully aware of the feeling of isolation in garrisons. The Hospitallers quickly copied the Muslims’ highly developed pigeon-postal system. A letter written by Jacques de Vitry in 1217 explained how they were used when Krak des Chevaliers was threatened: ‘When on account of our fear of the pagans we would not dare to send messengers, we used to send pigeons carrying our letters under their wings to summon men of the city to us.’ A Scottish source described how in 1266 a Hospitaller raid won considerable booty from the Mamluks: ‘And the brothers of the Hospital sent to the Hospital (the headquarters in Acre) their pigeon with a letter concerning their deed.’ This message was premature, however, as the raiders were ambushed on their way home.
The Master of the Hospitallers, Jean de Villiers, survived the fall of Acre in 1291 and escaped to Cyprus, although he was severely wounded. The Order’s headquarters was then re-established in Cyprus but, following fears of a Mamluk naval invasion, the new Master, Guillaume de Villaret, wanted to move all the way back to Provence in southern France. He was dissuaded, however, and a new hospital was built for pilgrims at Limassol in Cyprus and the island itself was considered as a base for any future Crusades. Unfortunately Cyprus was not fertile enough and lacked sufficient good harbours; even the Hospitallers had too few properties on the island to finance the forces stationed there. For a time Cilicia seemed to offer an alternative, but it was rejected as unsuitable and too vulnerable. Transferring the Hospitaller headquarters to Byzantine territory was politically impossible - unless, of course, the Hospitallers seized some Byzantine territory for themselves. One thing was now clear. Crusading warfare against the Mamluks would henceforth be primarily naval. So the Hospitallers limited their numbers in Cyprus and concentrated on building up their fleet. In 1306 the Pope gave the Order a licence to arm its ships, which the king of Cyprus had so far refused, and that same year the Hospitaller invasion of Byzantine Rhodes began.
Medieval armies, like those of modem times, were dependent upon their supply trains. The laden pack horse seen here has the reliquary of a saint on its special baggage saddle. (In situ west door of Abbey, Casauria, Italy; author’s photograph)