Chapter Eight
The units of the 21st Division which relieved the 38th Welsh Division in the wood were the 12th and 13th Northumberland Fusiliers, the 1st Lincolnshire Regiment and the 10th Green Howards. These battalions comprised the strength of 62 Brigade. They set out at 7.15pm to reach the wood and the two battalions of the Northumberland Fusiliers were deployed in the front line. On the left, the western side of the central ride were the 13th Northumberland Fusiliers while in the centre and towards the eastern side were the 12th Northumberland Fusiliers. The Germans continued to shell the wood throughout the relief and the 1st Lincolns in support reached the wood at 3.00am, entering the wood through Strip Trench which was difficult to negotiate because of the large number of German dead. Two companies deployed into Wood Trench with two further companies dug in the central part of the wood.
Meanwhile the two battalions of the Northumberland Fusiliers immediately began digging in and also pushed out patrols to establish the enemy’s position and strength. The 13th Northumberland Fusiliers pushed the remaining Germans back and out of the wood, and the front line was reformed on the western and north-western edge of the wood. Even less resistance was encountered by the 12th Northumberland Fusiliers who found only isolated groups of Germans who offered only half-hearted resistance. The front line was established thirty yards from the northern edge of the wood. Corporal Fellows and Private Templeton who had been pinned down all day in front of the wood were only able to rejoin their battalion at dusk on the 12 July when they got back the company commander exclaimed ‘Where the hell have you come from?’ Both had been reported as ‘Missing in Action’. The 1st Lincolns and 10th Green Howards were not called forward to assist but a large shell landed directly in Wood Trench and wiped out a whole company of the 1st Lincolns.
At dawn on the morning of 13 July the Germans made a heavy counter attack on the positions held by 13th Northumberland Fusiliers. This was eventually driven off and twelve prisoners were taken. During the period that the Northumberland Fusiliers held the front of the wood between 11 and 17 July they suffered the following casualties. The 13th Northumberland Fusiliers 43 killed and 227 wounded. The 12th Northumberland Fusiliers were less effected having a total of eighty casualties of all ranks killed and wounded. The majority of these casualties were caused by shell fire. The way was now clear for the planned assault on the German second line between Bazentin-le-Petit Wood and Longueval and during the struggle ahead the ground over which the 38th Division attacked, became known as Death Valley. It was one of the major supply routes to the front line and as such attracted considerable attention from the German artillery.
Scene in Death Valley – troops shelter from exploding shells.
Soon after the capture of the wood Lieutenant-Colonel R W Castle of 79 Brigade Royal Field Artillery was ordered to take his brigade into Death Valley. He reconnoitred the battery positions and went into Mametz Wood where he found trenches full of dead Germans. Passing through the wood into the valley he found men of the 38th Division lying thickly on the ground outside the wood, not yet buried. There was heavy shelling and he got to the place where he was supposed to put his guns and found it one mass of bursting shells. He could see nothing but smoke and dust. Realising that it was useless to attempt to put the guns in the valley he selected a quieter place south of Mametz Wood instead; much to the relief of his battery commanders.
Another officer who went into the wood after the battle was Lieutenant-Colonel M J F Fitzgerald of 95 Brigade Royal Field Artillery. On 15 July he was ordered to report on the number and kind of guns the Germans had left in the wood. He explored a deep German dugout with his orderly officer. They had no torch and to find the way they struck matches and lit paper. With revolvers in hand they crept along and hearing a noise found a wounded German who shrieked ‘Kamerad’ in terror, lying on a shelf with his leg badly smashed. Neither officer could speak German but understood his fear to be caused because he had been told the British shot their prisoners. He had been without food and water for three days and though they had no water they gave him some biscuits and chocolate. Returning to the top of the dugout Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald organised medical assistance.
The same scene in the 1990s.
The British artillery did manage to establish themselves both in Mametz Wood and in Death Valley and also in Caterpillar Valley. Lieutenant-Colonel Castle finally got his gun positions established and Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald later recorded that Caterpillar Valley was a remarkable sight soon covered with 18 pounder and 4.5″ Howitzer batteries. Several lines of guns were separated by only 300 yards distance and an occasional premature detonation occurred causing casualties. On one occasion a howitzer shell detonated prematurely and killed the whole gun detachment while later in the same day another howitzer suffered a direct hit from a German shell also killing every man in its detachment.
Gun positions were also established forward of Mametz Wood. Some 4.5″ Howitzers and 18 pounder field batteries were positioned in a hollow near the north-west corner of Mametz Wood. Nearly all were put out of action by salvoes of 5.9″ Howitzer shells which burst with uncanny accuracy. The reason for this became apparent when Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald was visiting 101 Brigade Headquarters and a German artillery officer was brought in. He had been hiding in the south-eastern corner of Bazentin Wood for three days after its capture on 14 July with a telephone and was able to organise fire on to the British positions by direct observation.
There were other less acceptable reasons for casualties. Lieutenant-Colonel Castle was ordered to carry out a relief in daylight. The German air reconnaissance was very active over the wood and the valley and they soon spotted this movement. Many of the men of both brigades were casualties from the resulting shell-fire.
Robert Graves also wrote of his experience in Mametz Wood in his autobiography Goodbye to all That. His battalion, 2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers (23rd Division) was in reserve and bivouacking near the wood. On the night of 16 July he was cold and went into the wood looking for German greatcoats to use as blankets. He stayed as briefly as he was able in the circumstances among the dead and mutilated bodies of Welshmen and Germans, the smashed trees and broken branches. He wrote of the unforgettable sight of a ‘South Wales Borderer and a German soldier of the Lehr Regiment who had bayoneted each other simultaneously.’
A few days later the 2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers moved forward to the attack on the German second position. On 20 July they were in reserve to an attack by units of the 7th Division on High Wood. Waiting near the village cemetery in Bazentin-le-Petit shells were landing uncomfortably close by. It was decided to move back a further fifty yards to a relatively safer location. As he moved Graves was hit by a shell which burst just behind him. He was wounded in his upper left thigh but was more seriously a shard of metal had entered his back by the right shoulder and was protruding through his chest. He was taken back to Mametz Wood and into an old German dugout where he lay unconscious for over twenty four hours. Lieutenant-Colonel Crawshay his commanding officer was told that there was no hope for his survival and wrote a letter of condolence to his mother. On the 21 July when the dead were being removed Graves was found to be still breathing and was put on an ambulance to be taken to Heilly and to survive his wounds. The journey down Death Valley was extremely difficult and painful, the vehicle jolting him out of unconsciousness as it passed over shell holes every few yards.
There are many accounts and descriptions of the wood and the valley and most make mention of the general devastation and death that had prevailed the evidence of which was still very much apparent. This type of warfare was different and it was obvious to all that something particularly unusual and unpleasant had occurred there. Similar scenes would re-emerge in all of the dark woods of Picardy but the concentration of death and destruction in such a limited timescale would never be surpassed.
Yet another author, Gerald Brennan had a similar experience to Graves and wrote of the incredible sight of two soldiers still standing having fallen against a tree but locked together by their bayonets while all around them the shattered remains of the wood and the dead were lying just as they had fallen as if in ‘an exhibit for a war museum.’
The following weeks extended into months and Death Valley was the constant scene of winding columns of guns, ammunition, supplies and troops. The guns of the British continued to launch barrage after barrage. The Germans responded and the ambulances continued to convey their burdens down the valley.
Following the relief of the 38th Division Major-General Watts returned to the 7th Division and Major-General Blackader finally took over the division which after a brief spell near the end of July in the front line at Serre, Redan Ridge and Beaumont-Hamel, moved away from the Somme and did not return to the battle. This has been used as a basis to imply that the division was in some kind of disgrace and there is some evidence of this.
One of the strongest critics initially was Brigadier-General Price-Davies who, it will be recalled witnessed the withdrawal in some panic of some men of the division when he went into the wood on the morning of 10 July. The congestion and confusion he encountered later must have added to this negative view of things. He felt that ‘we should recognise and face our failure’ but later relented and wrote what amounts to a retraction of his report.
Private William Ballard, Welsh Regiment, died of wounds received at Mametz Wood. His parents came from England and his father worked all over the country on Brunei’s tunnels, finally settling in Swansea. From a family of eight children, four brothers and the father joined the army. All except William returned. A sister still lives in Swansea and relatives from Pembroke still visit the grave in Flat Iron Copse Cemetery.
‘since then I have had the accounts of certain gallant actions performed by officers and other ranks and I feel that possibly I may not have given my Brigade full credit for what they did in Mametz Wood… Further, from rumours which reach me, I believe other troops operating in High Wood, Bois du Trones found it extremely difficult to organise an advance under such conditions. I realise it is now too late to add to any account which has been sent forward …’
By 20 July though, the day he wrote these sentiments, it would indeed have been too late to effect much damage limitation.
Some days previously Second Lieutenant Siegfried Sassoon wrote of ‘wild rumours’ that reached the camp about the Welsh Division stampeding under machine gun fire. Perhaps Sassoon’s choice of words betrays his belief in the veracity of such talk and he quickly dismisses the subject preferring to concentrate on his eagerly awaited outing to Amiens.
It was retirements as witnessed by Brigadier-General Price-Davies that similarly affected Captain Glynn Jones who recorded that he was staggered to find that when he arrived back at rear headquarters with his relatively small party of men, many others were already there, having ‘found their way in the early stages’. Captain Glynn Jones goes on to state that the division did not please and that recommendations for awards were not considered in the same manner as those affecting very much simpler operations.
A further strong critic was to emerge some years later when responding to requests for information from the Official Historian in 1930 Major G P L Drake-Brockman wrote at length about both the 17th and the 38th Division. His main target was Major-General Phillips from whom, he alleged, all the problems of the division issued. Phillips, he claimed was ‘ignorant lacked experience and failed to inspire confidence…’ ‘an influential political atmosphere permeated the whole division and was the cause of considerable friction.’
Drake-Brockman transferred from the 7th Division Headquarters to the staff of 38th Division on 8 July. As we know Major-General Phillips left the division in the early hours of 9 July, not a very long time for Drake-Brockman to establish a basis for his assertions which must therefore be largely based on hearsay. Not that that necessarily invalidates all he had to say, but further caution should be observed since some of Drake-Brockman’s claims are factually inaccurate, for example when he states that the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Carden largely contributed to Phillip’s dismissal. As we have seen Phillips had already left when Carden was killed on 10 July.
Drake-Brockman completes his deposition to the official historian by claiming that the ‘stigma’ of Mametz Wood stuck to the 38th Division for many months and that it was common talk in the B.E.F. that the division had ‘bolted’. In looking further at Drake-Brockman’s credibility it is difficult to imagine as a junior officer he could have been at the centre of, and had access to all the reports, comment and opinions, official or otherwise that he claims was so widespread. After all, the 38th Division were removed from the environs of the Somme soon after and communications then were not as we enjoy and take for granted today.
There remains, though, the core accusation that in panic some men left the immediate scene of battle in some disarray. That it occurred cannot be denied but before condemning any instances of this conduct it is important to try and somehow re-create the situation and understand the conditions in the wood as far as that is possible. It is interesting to look back a few day when a frustrated Brigadier-General Evans was prevented by XV Corps from assembling his troops in the concentration that he considered appropriate to capture the Hammerhead. He was ordered not to use any more battalions than absolutely necessary and to avoid risk of casualties from shell-fire by dispersing supporting battalions. All this seems to have been forgotten when Major-General Watts planned the second assault on 10 July. Seven battalions were soon to be engaged in what is the smallest part of the wood and in all eleven battalions were employed in the operation. This might be described in today’s terminology as ‘overkill’ and a glaring inconsistency in tactics and strategy.
Wrecked German transport at the edge of Mametz Wood. TAYLOR LIBRARY
Casualties among the officers was very heavy and there was a great shortage, very necessary for rallying, re-organising and steadying the men at a critical time. Many men were left leaderless, men whose first taste of action this was and in a situation that would have tested the most battle hardened troops. Enfiladed from both flanks, by machine gun fire from the Quadrangle and from Sabot and Flat Iron Copses as well as frontal fire the troops were also caught in two bombardments, the German and the British detonating in the tree tops. As the shells detonated they would send lethal sprays of shrapnel flying through the air and into the trees and undergrowth. We are told that the sound of this factor alone was enough to unnerve some of the troops. Then there would be the high explosive shells detonating with jagged shards of hot metal impacting with great velocity sending splinters of wood hurtling through the air. The trees themselves would be splintering and falling on top of the troops. Those shells that found their way through the foliage would land with an massive explosion throwing huge mounds of earth into the air and burying many men both dead and alive. The flammenwerfer was also used and parts of the wood would be scorched by fire. This then might be something like, just a snapshot of the whole picture in Mametz Wood and the probability of certain death for anyone unwise enough to stay around for too long waiting for someone to tell them what to do.
David Jones was able to say everything in just those few words
‘… and but we avoid wisely there is but death.’
Of death there was plenty. Those who later passed could only conclude that here was incontrovertible evidence that anything but a retreat had taken place. Many years later a survivor of the battle described the men of the 38th Division as ‘civilians in uniform.’ Nevertheless, they were able, through the capture of Mametz Wood in three days of actual fighting, to set the standard for this type of combat that was never to be surpassed on the Somme Battlefields.