Chapter Two
3 July
At 9.00am the attack was renewed. The 7th Borders immediately came under machine gun fire as they advanced from the front of Fricourt Wood towards Railway Alley. The officers leading the battle patrols were Captain Crosse and Second-Lieutenant Crompton who always carried a Lewis gun when going into the attack but both officers soon became casualties. The 7th Borders were supported by the 7th Lincolns who twice that morning at 10.50am and 11.40am were called in to send reinforcements of battalion bombers and Lewis gun crews. Similarly drawn into the attack were detachments of the 8th South Staffordshires and 10th Sherwood Foresters.
It was not until 11.30am that Railway Alley was entered and finally cleared by 1.20pm.
During the night of 2nd/3rd patrols of the 21st Manchesters (7th Division) had been pushed forward into Bottom Wood and had remained there before the advance of the 7th Borders, and were under heavy machine gun fire. An interesting account exists of the events given by Colonel W Norman of the 21st Manchesters who states that:
‘About 1.55am a message was received that the 17th Division was to attack on the line Shelter Wood, Birch Tree Wood and Bottom Wood, at 9 am.
About 8.30 am 1 moved up to the advanced company HQ and learnt that a patrol had during the night entered Bottom Wood and found it apparently clear. I sent two strong patrols into the wood under Lieutenants Thorniley and Farnsworth. As they entered the wood, under my observation, a small party of Germans bolted in front of them. These were evidently artillerymen for they emerged from behind a low bluff where we found three guns. As these men bolted one of our shells dropped among them and they scattered in a north-easterly direction. It was nearly time for the contemplated attack, and, I came to the conclusion that the shot was the precursor of a barrage in front of the attack. I at once sent to recall the patrols. Lieutenant Farnsworth returned, but, Lieutenant Thorniley had gone too far. He eventually reached the point where Bottom Alley emerged from Bottom Wood, and held that point, after reporting to me that all was clear. Soon after our attack was seen coming through the edge of Fricourt Wood, but there were no signs of any advance on its left along Willow Avenue. It appeared that there must be a wide gap between their right and my left, I accordingly sent a company to occupy the wood and to make connection. Considerably later a company (7/Border) appeared coming up Willow Avenue, and entered Bottom Wood but seeing it held by my men inclined to its left.’
Railway Alley ran diagonally from the right hand end of the wood to bottom left. The 7th Borders attacked from the right.
By 3.00pm the line held ran from the front of Bottom Wood along the long hedge towards towards Shelter Wood.
An advance was also made on the left in the 21st Division sector and Crucifix Trench and Shelter Wood captured, including a whole battalion of the 186th Regiment with its Commanding Officer. One German officer hid a grenade in his hat and suddenly threw it at an unsuspecting British soldier killing him instantly. The officer was immediately taken away separately to be tried by a court martial.
Map 4. The capture of Railway Alley and Bottom Wood.
Site of Crucifix Trench with Shelter Wood behind.
The surrender of the German battalion had left a gap in their line and Colonel Norman continues:
‘I had gone over to interview the O.C. 7/Borders. On my return I found my men walking about most unconcernedly in the open, outside the wood and in full view and easy range of Quadrangle Trench. A patrol had entered the copse called Quadrangle Wood and reported that it contained a couple of dummy guns.
Though within easy range of Quadrangle Trench not a shot was fired at us from that trench or from Mametz Wood.’
Brigadier General Fell wrote later of the events of 3 July:
‘I then received orders from the division to take Railway Alley, Railway Copse, Crucifix Trench and Bottom Wood, and then consolidate in front of Quadrangle Trench. This we did with a loss of about 600 men and we captured the Commanding Officer and what remained of the 186th Regiment of Germans, who surrendered to us, we also got some of the 13 th, 111th and 118th Regiments, and also 3 guns, machine guns and a huge underground dug-out full of food and stores. On the morning of the 3rd I was down at Fricourt seeing the Borders go on, slapping them on their backs being countrymen of mine, when General Pilcher arrived he was very angry, said he had been to Brigade HQ and could not find me there and gave me a direct verbal order not again to leave my brigade HQ without his permission. In the evening he came again and I told him we had the Germans stone cold in Quadrangle Trench and I was satisfied we could take it there and then. General Pilcher however disagreed.’
Meanwhile on the right the 7th Division consolidated. The 1st South Staffordshires took up position in Bottom Wood and linked with the 8th South Staffordshires of the 17th Division, and many greetings from old friends were exchanged. The excavations in Cliff Trench and White Trench were completed and the 2nd Queens were still in position overlooking the southern part of Mametz Wood and Bottom Wood.
German prisoners taken in the opening stages of the Battle of the Somme.
TAYLOR LIBRARY
As the patrols of the 21st Manchesters sent in by Colonel Norman at 8.30am reached Bottom Wood so parties of Germans were driven into the open and bolted towards the comparative safety of Quadrangle Wood and the trench beyond it. At a range of about 1,000 yards the Lewis gunners of the 2nd Queens dug in on Fusilier Ridge had them easily in their sights and many of the Germans became casualties.
Patrols sent out during the afternoon at 2.00pm had found Mametz Wood and Quadrangle Trench empty but no orders were issued until 8.15pm from XV Corps. These directed the 7th Division to occupy the southern end of Mametz Wood along Strip Trench and Wood Trench to Quadrangle Trench. This would assist the 17th Division which was to approach Mametz Wood from the west.
Night of 3/4 July The First Attack on Mametz Wood
Two battalions, the 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the 2nd Royal Irish were detailed to carry out the attack of the 7th Division.
Soon after midnight on 3/4 July the two battalions left the railway halt at Mametz. The guides of the 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers lost their way with the result that the Fusiliers did not reach the deploying position until about 6.00am when it was already getting light and too late to attack.
Second Lieutenant Siegfried Sassoon who was serving with the 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers later wrote a brief account of the wasted journey made by the Fusiliers.
Original XV Corps map showing the battle area for Mametz Wood covered by this book.
‘July 4 4.30am
The Battalion started at 9.15pm yesterday and, after messing about for over four hours, got going with tools, wire, etc. and went through Mametz, up a long communication-trench. Came down across the open hillside looking across to Mametz Wood, and out at the end of Bright Alley. Found that the Royal Irish were being bombed and machine-gunned by Bosches in the wood, and had fifteen wounded. A still grey morning; red east; everyone very tired.’
The 2nd Royal Irish attacked under the impression that Quadrangle Trench was in British possession. The narrative of the 2nd Royal Irish War Diary describes what happened:
‘In the evening about 7.30pm the Battalion received orders to march via Mametz and consolidate the line Quadrangle Trench - Wood Trench - Strip Trench and to make a reconnaissance of Mametz Wood. The three trenches were stated to be in our hands and it was also mentioned that probably no resistance would be encountered in Mametz Wood. The Battalion was heavily encumbered with materials for consolidating and was halted on the road first south of Strip Trench for a rest. Lieutenant Tod and the Battalion scouts were sent out to reconnoitre Strip Trench and one of the scouts returned almost immediately with a prisoner who informed us that there were a considerable number of Germans in the wood. As the CO understood that the 1/R Welsh Fusiliers were in position on our right he ordered an immediate attack on the Mametz Wood before the approach of daylight would reveal to the enemy that a battalion was halted in fours along a road within 100 yards of their position, so the Grenade coy was ordered to attack Strip Trench with D coy in support, while A and C coys formed a defensive flank facing towards Quadrangle and Wood Trenches both of which contrary to our information were discovered to be very strongly held by Germans. The Grenade coy almost immediately got touch with the enemy and succeeded in bombing along Strip Trench almost as far as its junction with Wood Trench. The enemy was at this point strongly reinforced from the wood which was very dense and impenetrable and the Grenade coys were gradually bombed back again and forced to fall back on their Supports which were also heavily engaged with the enemy. Enemy machine gun fire of great intensity was coming from the east of Mametz Wood and a heavy crossfire from Quadrangle Trench which made our whole position untenable. The CO ordered a retirement to be made to a position about 300 yards back which afforded some cover, and applied for artillery support so that he could effect a retirement to Mametz. This retirement was eventually accomplished and the Battalion mustered again at Mansel Copse. The retirement was made reluctantly as many casualties had been inflicted on the enemy and on one occasion a footing had been effected in the wood and two field guns captured. But the failure of the 1/R Welsh Fusiliers to get into position on our right and the strength of the enemy who was being rapidly reinforced made it imperative to retire. Our casualties were 75 all ranks. Lieutenant Usher and 2/Lt Kerr were killed leading attacks on Strip Trench. The former had been wounded but refused to leave his platoon. 2/Lt Perrin was wounded by a bomb in the leg which killed the German who threw it - this officer killed two Germans with bombs after being wounded. CSU Hayes was wounded in a gallant attempt to save Lieutenant Usher’s life. Attached is a copy of narrative by Captain Colter who commanded D Coy.’
Railway halt at Mametz 1998.
Road where the 2nd Royal Irish halted before entering the wood to the left.
The remains of Strip Trench (note the unexploded shells).
The position of the 2nd Royal Irish was impossible and they had no alternative to withdraw. They brought back the breech blocks of two guns found near the bank between Bottom Wood and Mametz Wood.
At XV Corps a somewhat more optimistic view of the night’s events was taken. Although in possession of a patrol report, all the problems encountered seem to have been overlooked in favour of information taken from the prisoner who said that he was a member of only one patrol in the wood and that everyone else had retreated. This information differed from that which the same prisoner gave to the 2nd Royal Irish.
The report in their possession was written by Captain Colter of D Company and it is an interesting record of the unsuccessful attack on Strip Trench. It shows an appreciation of what was going on about him while he was leading his own company. Considering the attack took place in darkness, it is remarkable how he was able to produce a map of the area attacked (immediately recognisable today) and the position of enfilading machine gun fire.
On 4 July Siegfried Sassoon recorded
‘This morning the facts were: R.W.E and Royal Irish were sent up to consolidate trenches close to the south-east end of Mametz Wood and to clear the wood outskirts. The Irish got there and found enemy machine-guns and bombers and snipers in the wood, which is of big old trees. Our A Company went forward to join them but were sniped on the road and got into a quarry where they lost four wounded and one killed. The Irish meanwhile had tried to bomb the Bosches in the wood, failed entirely and suffered 60 casualties (one officer killed and one wounded). Our guns then chucked a lot of heavy shrapnel over the wood and the Irish got away. The whole thing seems to have been caused by bad staff work (of the Division). We were out eleven hours and got back to our field about 8.30am.’
Showing the bank where the 2nd Royal Irish found two German guns. Mametz Wood (Strip Trench in background).
The guns from which the Royal Irish took the breech blocks.
While all this was going on the Germans were actively re-occupying Quadrangle Trench and re-inforcing Mametz Wood and what might have been a simple task several hours previously was now going to be a much larger and more costly operation. The absence of orders for a more substantial attack may be due to Lieutenant-General Horne’s presence at a Corps Commanders’ Conference during the afternoon of 3 July. There was disagreement on General Rawlinson’s plans to attack the German second line at Bazentin. General Haig would not agree to the assault before both Mametz Wood and Trones Wood had been captured and any threat of counter attacks on both flanks thereby avoided.
The Official Historian concluded:
‘It would appear that if XV Corps had encouraged more vigorous action on the afternoon of the 3rd, a hold on Mametz Wood could have been secured and Wood Trench and Quadrangle Trench occupied.’