5

Intelligence

GERMAN INTELLIGENCE

In 1940 Germany undoubtedly possessed the most powerful air force in the world but the German intelligence system was disorganised and inefficient. Personal jealousy, poor officers and complete lack of co-operation at all levels were the main reasons for this surprising situation which was to be a major factor contributing to Britain’s survival.

Germany possessed two large and wealthy intelligence organisations at top level, the Abwehr under Admiral Canaris and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) under Heinrich Himmler. Both supplied information to the armed forces and they had separate foreign services and agents. Little or no co-operation existed between the two; on the contrary, there was severe antagonism. Efforts were duplicated and there was no cross check on the accuracy of either. Many of the Abwehr officers were unsuited to their jobs and had little technical ability while the SD was often preoccupied with internal German affairs.

It was against this background that the 5th Abteilung of the Luftwaffe General Staff was established on January 1st, 1938, with a brief to collate information about foreign air forces and to prepare target information for an air war. The Abteilung took over the functions of two small units known as the target data unit and the ‘department for foreign air forces’ at the Reich Luft-ministerium (German Air Ministry).

Command of the 5th Abteilung as Chef IC (Intelligence) was given to Major Josef Schmid, who was recommended to Göring by Jeschonnek. He rejoiced in the nickname of ‘Beppo’ and previously held a ministerial appointment. He was shrewd, ambitious and noted for his ‘conviviality’, but he spoke no foreign languages and was not a pilot. It is significant of the value placed by the Luftwaffe on intelligence that the appointment was only in the rank of major. In Britain authority at the time was vested in the director of operations, intelligence, with the rank of air commodore.

Schmid found that the two units forming the basis of his department were staffed with civilians and reserve officers who had no clear idea of what they were supposed to be doing. Their files seemed to consist entirely of mountains of newspaper cuttings and foreign magazines.

He began steadily to introduce some sort of order and laid down objectives. Many of the staff were replaced by officers of his own choosing who would not menace his own position.

The first few months of the new organisation were spent in classifying information, sorting out and filing requests for more to the Abwehr. Schmid gradually began to widen the scope of the 5th Abteilung and consolidate his own position through friendship with Göring and as the Marshal’s personal general staff officer.

Schmid’s ultimate objective was, justifiably, to subordinate all sources which could provide air information. In this he was never completely successful. His only real triumph came in the spring of 1939 when the German air attachés came under his control. Chef IC was allowed no direct contact with foreign technical bodies and even his foreign newspapers were doled out by the SD.

Despite many stumbling-blocks Schmid succeeded in making progress, especially regarding target information on Eastern Europe. After the occupation of Austria, the latter half of 1938 and the first half of 1939 were devoted to studies of Poland and Russia and investigation of Britain. In the case of Poland the date for completion of the study was July 1st, 1939.

While the preliminary work on Britain was proceeding an order was issued by Göring for a high priority examination of the air and industrial armaments capacity of the country. The subject was considered so important that a study committee was formed with Milch, Udet and Jeschonnek as permanent members and with Schmid in the chair. Numerous other officers were called in when their departments were affected.

Milch took a major part in the committee’s work because he had toured the R.A.F. and the shadow factories in 1937 with Udet and was personally interested in the subject. Milch’s first step was to write to a leading London bookseller on German Air Ministry notepaper requesting several copies of a comprehensive work on British industry. This formed the basis for the committee’s report on Britain which appeared in July 1939, with the title of Studie Blau (Blue Study). For most of the war Studie Blau was the basic reference on which attacks on England were planned.

By the outbreak of war the Luftwaffe possessed considerable information about R.A.F. bases and units from their air attaché, General Wenniger, the Press, and such occasions as Empire Air Days. The airfield and target information was supplemented by a comprehensive photographic reconnaisance of Britain. This was carried out by a unit of special He 111C aircraft under the direction of Oberst Rohwehl. Bearing civil markings, these planes operated from Staaken airfield, Berlin, on ‘civil route proving flights’.

With the opening of hostilities the normal channels of information from Britain were cut off and Abteilung 5 had to rely on newspapers, reports from neutral countries, and the German Signals Intelligence Service. This organisation was under the command of General Martini, Director of Luftwaffe Signals, who, as outlined in the Prologue, was responsible for the flights of the Graf Zeppelin in 1939.

Signals intelligence, Abteilung 3 of Martini’s staff, supplied information to Schmid in the form of daily intelligence summaries and ten-day or monthly surveys. The Service was to provide almost all the useful material available during the Battle of Britain as there were few prisoners of war to interrogate during the period. The Abwehr’s juvenile efforts in dropping by parachute low-mentality half-trained spies over England almost without exception ended in disaster. The agents were collected by British security men as they landed, like fond parents meeting homecoming schoolchildren.

Schmid went to war a somewhat surprised man. He had considered with Jeschonnek and others that Britain’s grovelling at Munich indicated a strong desire to keep out of the European conflict.

While realising that Britain militarily was a foe to be respected, Schmid had already begun to underestimate the potential and efficiency of the R.A.F., perhaps to please the omnipotent Göring. In the spring of 1939 in a survey of world air forces Schmid stated:

‘The English and French air fleets are still much out of date. British air defence is still weak…. England will not be able to avoid a conflict with the German Luftwaffe. German aircraft are superior in view of their advantage in armament, armoured fuel tanks and flying instruments. In Germany alone has an overall view been taken of air warfare.’

Separately Schmid issued figures for British air strength computing the total of R.A.F. and Fleet Air Arm aircraft at 5,500 of which 3,600 were first line. He estimated that there were 200 first-line fighters; in fact the R.A.F. mustered 608 at that time. His calculation of 500 first-line bombers was nearer the mark. The correct figure was 536.

As September and October 1939 passed and winter set in both sides realised that the all-out bomber offensive each expected had not materialised. To Britain it was a relief, while to Germany it meant fighters could be concentrated in preparation for ‘Operation Yellow’, the invasion of France and the Low Countries.

Schmid devoted his time to working out an offensive plan against Britain which would do her most damage regardless of the outcome of Operation Yellow. This document, issued on November 22nd, 1939, as ‘Proposal for the Conduct of Air Warfare Against Britain’ was far-sighted. It was probably the last in which he was able to make an objective and accurate forecast of the British problem. After reviewing the progress of the war Schmid wrote:

From Germany’s point of view Britain is the most dangerous of all possible enemies. The war cannot be ended in a manner favourable to us as long as Britain has not been mastered. France on the other hand ranks in the second class for unlike Britain she would not be capable of carrying on the war without her allies. Germany’s war aim must therefore be to strike at Britain with all available weapons, particularly those of the navy and air force.

In pursuit of this aim it is considered of decisive importance that operations against the British Isles should begin soon, and in as great strength as possible—under any circumstances in the present year. The enemy must not be allowed the time to use past experience to perfect his defences. Furthermore, economic assistance from the British and French colonial empires and from neutrals, particularly the U.S.A., and the encirclement of Germany, must not be permitted to come fully into operation.

The whole theme of Schmid’s paper was the strangulation of British supply lines and harbour facilities. He proposed to attack as follows:

(a) The most important ports must be attacked without exception and as far as possible simultaneously. The intermixture of residential areas with dockyards in some British ports is no reason for failing to attack such ports. The most important ports are those of London, Liverpool, Hull, Bristol and Glasgow. In all these ports the primary target will be shipping. As secondary targets, dockyard and warehouse installations, in particular food and oil stores and silos, may be attacked. Raids must be constantly repeated—by day and by night. To achieve the maximum effect, even small formations may be usefully employed.

(b) Warships under repair and under construction on the point of completion are also to be considered as targets worthy of attention.

(c) It is necessary that ports of secondary importance should also be subjected to occasional attack. Nevertheless, in view of their very limited capacity, they should only be considered as secondary or alternative targets.

(d) In view of the superior bad weather flying training of the Luftwaffe it is also possible that we may be able to achieve some purely tactical successes should the enemy air force choose to counter-attack, which is unlikely.

Schmid’s hypotheses were correct, but two vital factors were omitted—the radar chain which spelt death for unescorted bombers and the lack of maritime bombers and torpedo aircraft in which Göring was completely disinterested.

The memorandum was read, commented on, and then laid aside. In the offing were bigger fish to fry nearer home and Operation Yellow was fast approaching.

In May 1940 the grey-clad columns poured across the Dutch, Belgian and French borders and the defences of those states crumbled like houses of paper. By mid-June the Wehrmacht was the undisputed master of Europe. The British Expeditionary force, its equipment abandoned, was saved from the holocaust of Dunkirk while the R.A.F. was licking its wounds, trying to fill yawning gaps in the pilots’ ranks and feverishly re-forming its squadrons.

The German forces were borne along on a wave of emotion and enthusiasm. The campaign was gloriously successful, every estimate and appraisal having proved correct. It is hardly surprising that this atmosphere should have penetrated even into the intelligence department of the Luftwaffe, where that unit’s analysis of French Air Force equipment and morale was confirmed in every detail. Schmid’s belief in his own abilities was enhanced. Abeteilung 5 rose in the Luftwaffe’s estimation in the general back-slapping that ensued.

As the weeks went by and Britain failed to sue for peace it became clear to the Germans that the R.A.F. would have to be destroyed and if necessary Britain invaded. Schmid concentrated on his Studie Blau and on the mass of information that had fallen into German hands on the fall of France. French officers and politicians, smarting and bewildered at their defeat, discussed British war potential openly and agreed with their German victors that the R.A.F. was in a hopeless position. The poor quality of the Spitfire and Hurricane was stressed by a department in General Udet’s production ministry under Oberst Ingtschersich, which was responsible for evaluating captured enemy equipment. This department, not attached to IC, had its head in the clouds and wrote only what it hoped Göring and the air staff would like to read.

Having assembled his background information, Schmid compiled in July 1940 an overall survey of the R.A.F. on which the forthcoming offensive would be based. This is an historic document because it reveals all the blind spots and faults of the intelligence system behind the Luftwaffe when it fought the Battle of Britain.

The following is a translation of the entire paper:

Luftwaffe Operations Staff IC

Headquarters. 16th July, 1940.

COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF R.A.F. AND

LUFTWAFFE STRIKING POWER

I THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE R.A.F.

A Strength and Equipment

1 Fighter Formations

With 50 fighter squadrons, each having about 18 aircraft, there are 900 first line fighters available of which approximately 675 (75 per cent) may be regarded as serviceable.

About 40 per cent of the fighters are Spitfires and about 60 per cent Hurricanes. Of these two types the Spitfire is regarded as the better.

In view of their combat performance and the fact that they are not yet equipped with cannon guns both types are inferior to the Me 109, and particularly to the Me 109F*, while the individual Me 110 is inferior to skilfully handled Spitfires.

In addition to the above formations Blenheim squadrons are available for night fighter tasks as auxiliary heavy fighters and operate in cohesion with particularly intense searchlight defence.

2 Bomber Formations

Assuming the average squadron strength to be 20 aircraft, the 55 to 60 bomber squadrons contain about 1,150 first line bombers, of which about 860 (75 per cent) may be regarded as serviceable.

This strength is divided among four types of aircraft of various series, approximately as follows:

Hampden	400
Wellington	350
Whitley	300
Lockheed Hudson	100

Comparison of these types shows that the Hampden has the best qualities as a bomber.

In addition, there is a large number of Blenheim bombers available. Most of these are in training schools but there are also some in operational units. However, in view of its performance, this type can no longer be considered a first line aircraft.

In comparison with German bombers all these types have the following disadvantages:

inadequate armour,

poor bomb-aiming equipment.

However, they usually have strong defensive armament.

3 Other Formations

These include coastal formations equipped with Lockheed Hudsons (reconnaissance) and flying-boats and with various obsolescent types of aircraft—close reconnaissance and low-level attack aircraft designed for co-operation with the army. These need not be taken into consideration in this report.

4 Anti-aircraft Artillery

In view of the island’s extreme vulnerability to air attack and the comparatively limited amount of modern equipment the number of heavy and light A.A. guns available (1,194 plus 1,114) is by no means adequate to ensure the protection of the island by ground defences.

The large number of efficient searchlights available (3,200) constitutes an advantageous factor in defence at night.

Only limited importance should be attributed to the numerous barrage balloons, as these can be used only at low altitudes (1,000 to 2,000 metres) owing to the medium wind velocities prevailing over the island. The balloons cannot be raised at all at appreciable wind velocities.

B Personnel and Training

At present there are no difficulties regarding the number of men available.

From the outset training is concentrated on the production of good pilots and the great majority of the officers in particular are trained solely as such. By comparison tactical training is left far in the background. For this reason the R.A.F. has comparatively well-trained fighter pilots while bomber crews are not up to modern tactical standards. This applies to the bomb-aimers in particular, most of whom are N.C.O.s and men with little service experience. Although there are deficiencies in equipment the comparatively low standard of bombing accuracy may be attributed to this factor.

C Airfields

In the ground organisation there is a considerable number of airstrips in the southern part of the island and in some areas in the north. However, only a limited number can be considered as operational airfields with modern maintenance and supply installations.

In general, the well-equipped operational airfields are used as take-off and landing bases, while the numerous smaller airfields located in the vicinity serve as alternative landing grounds and rest bases.

There is little strategic flexibility in operations as ground personnel are usually permanently stationed at home bases.

D Supply Situation

1 As regards aircraft, the R.A.F. is at present almost entirely dependent on home production. American deliveries will not make any important contribution before the beginning of 1941.

If deliveries arriving in Britain in the immediate future are supplemented by French orders these aircraft may be ready for operations by the autumn.

At present the British aircraft industry produces about 180 to 300 first line fighters and 140 first line bombers a month. In view of the present conditions relating to productions (the appearance of raw material difficulties, the disruption or breakdown of production at factories owing to air attacks, the increased vulnerability to air attack owing to the fundamental reorganisation of the aircraft industry now in progress) it is believed that for the time being output will decrease rather than increase.

In the event of an intensification of air warfare it is expected that the present strength of the R.A.F. will fall and this decline will be aggravated by the continued decrease in production.

2 Unless an appreciable proportion of present stocks is destroyed the fuel situation can be regarded as secure.

3 Bombs

Bomb production is limited by the method of manufacture (cast casings).

However, there will be no difficulty in the supply of bombs as long as present stocks are not expended and operations continue on a moderate scale.

It is believed that these stocks would be adequate for intensive operations lasting several weeks.

Most of the bombs available are of medium calibre (112 and 224 kilogrammes), of which a large proportion are of an obsolete pattern with unfavourable ballistic qualities (bombs with fins).

E Command

The command at high level* is inflexible in its organisation and strategy. As formations are rigidly attached to their home bases, command at medium level suffers mainly from operations being controlled in most cases by officers no longer accustomed to flying (station commanders). Command at low level is generally energetic, but lacks tactical skill.

II THE OPERATIONAL SCOPE OF THE R.A.F.

(a) For its operations the R.A.F. has at its disposal an area of only 200 to 300 km in depth. This corresponds approximately to an area the size of the Netherlands and Belgium.

There is little possibility of Ireland being used in the system of depth owing to the lack of ground organisation and the fact that once R.A.F. units have been transferred there they cannot restore their serviceability.

In contrast the Luftwaffe has at its disposal an area extending from Trondheim, across Heligoland Bay and along the North Sea and Channel coasts to Brest with a practically unlimited zone in depth.

(b) In view of the inferiority of British fighters to German fighters, enemy bomber formations even with fighter escort are not capable of carrying out effective daylight attacks regularly, particularly as escort operations are in any case limited by the lack of long-range single-engined or heavy fighters.

The R.A.F. will therefore be obliged to limit its activity primarily to night operations even in the event of intensified air warfare. These operations will doubtless achieve a nuisance effect but will be in no way decisive.

In contrast, the Luftwaffe is in a position to go over to decisive daylight operations owing to the inadequate air defences of the island.

III CONCLUSION

The Luftwaffe is clearly superior to the R.A.F. as regards strength, equipment, training, command and location of bases. In the event of an intensification of air warfare the Luftwaffe, unlike the R.A.F., will be in a position in every respect to achieve a decisive effect this year if the time for the start of large-scale operations is set early enough to allow advantage to be taken of the months with relatively favourable weather conditions (July to the beginning of October).

The report contains many inaccurate and misleading statements. In the assessment of strength the R.A.F.’s fighter force was again overestimated. In July only 600 fighters compared with Schmid’s 900 could be considered available and reserves were slim.

The suggestion that the Spitfire was inferior to the Me 109 was wishful thinking. The guarded reference to the Me 110 being inferior to ‘skilfully’ handled Spitfires was naïve and undoubtedly a sop to Göring’s pet ‘destroyer’ units. The bomber statistics were exaggerated, but the selection of the Hampden as having the best qualities as a bomber was yet another feat of Udet’s technical evaluation team. The claim that German bombers had better armour than the British was refuted in the battle.

The report underestimated the number of antiaircraft heavy guns and grossly overestimated the available light weapons, but was correct in assuming a shortage of modern guns. The figures for heavy A.A. guns in A.A. Command after the fall of France were 1,204 and for light guns 581, compared with the German figures of 1,194 and 1,114 respectively.

In item (B) Schmid made one of his cardinal errors of the campaign. Men and not planes were Dowding’s nightmare. The R.A.F. flying training schools were slow in expanding. The Civil Air Guard, for instance, was formed before the war to provide pilots for such an expansion but many of its partially trained members who joined the R.A.F. at the outbreak of war were kept waiting on the ground five or six months before their training was continued. Some at least, though inexperienced, could have been available for the squadrons the following summer. When the report was written Fighter Command had already been forced to ask the Fleet Air Arm for the ‘loan’ of sixty-eight pilots while army co-operation, bomber, and coastal squadrons were being combed for likely talent.

In (C) Schmid did not appreciate the arrangements for the repair and maintenance of fighter aircraft. He failed to realise in the ensuing three months that despite the havoc wrought on British fighter bases repairs went on day and night at sector and satellite airfields and that a network of factories and workshops rebuilt seemingly wrecked machines in a matter of days.

Production of new fighter aircraft was of great importance. German intelligence based its assumptions on pre-war knowledge of industrial expansion. Schmid felt safe in assessing fighter output at between 180 and 300 machines a month and in forecasting ‘the continued decrease in production’. He was not aware of the concentration of fighter production taking place in which even small garages, schoolboys and old ladies assembled parts. Above all he had not met Lord Beaverbrook.

Far from decreasing, production soared and stayed up despite attacks on the factories. Instead of the figure of 180–300, which Schmid continued to believe during the battle, Britain produced 496 fighters in July, 476 in August and 467 in September. Thus the aircraft strength of the R.A.F. presented an enigma which the Germans never solved; Spitfires and Hurricanes which according to the German files had been destroyed or not even built kept appearing from nowhere with monotonous regularity.

A German target photograph of the Ventnor Chain Home radar station on the Isle of Wight taken on August 12th, 1940. This was the day when 15 Ju 88’s caused severe damage to the site. The caption to the picture reads as follows:- Radio Station with warning capability 1. 3 transmitter masts 2. 4 small transmitter masts 3. Low level defences 4. Special fuel installation 5. Anti-aircraft position; additional buildings under construction

On the subject of command (section E), Schmid was completely mistaken. He was not intimately acquainted with the R.A.F. or its members. He based his opinions mainly on air attaché reports and cuttings from publications. His assumption that formations were ‘rigidly attached to their home bases’ came from published British material which stressed the link between particular squadrons and an airfield. For instance the pre-war home of Nos. 1 and 43 squadrons was at Tangmere. Also the radio interception reports of close ground control tended to confirm this view. The British system was good for morale and competitive reasons but it in no way stopped the transfer of any unit at short notice from one end of the country to the other. Dowding continually switched his squadrons to quieter areas as they became exhausted and replaced them with others which were resting.

The reference to station commanders and officers at group level being ‘no longer accustomed to flying’ could more readily have been applied to the Luftwaffe than to the R.A.F. Station commanders frequently flew on operations. The generation of station C.O.s somewhat rusty on their ‘aviating’ had almost entirely disappeared by the end of the first six months of hostilities. Had Schmid known when he wrote his report that in May, two months earlier, a notable ‘group level’ officer, Air Vice-Marshal Park, A.O.C. of No. 11 Group, had flown over Dunkirk in a Hurricane to view the situation for himself, he might have modified his opinion on this point.

It was, in fact, the Luftwaffe which suffered throughout the battle from top-weight of officers who were not up to flying standards. This included the Luftflotten commanders. Many officers in the ‘medium’ echelons of the Luftwaffe never learned to fly at all.

Schmid, however, was not employed to look too closely at the shortcomings on his own doorstep. His attitude, like that of Göring, was ‘The Luftwaffe is clearly superior to the R.A.F. in strength, equipment, training, command and location of bases.’

Beyond the errors contained in the document an astounding omission becomes apparent. There is not a single mention of the close-knit British defence system with its radar stations, operations rooms, and complex H.F. and V.H.F. radio network. Schmid was not a technician and he lacked such ability among his staff. His chief, Göring, knew even less about radio and was not interested. The German Air Force signals troops under Martini were concerned but their voice was a small one and carried little weight in a strictly non-technical High Command.

Apart from the flights of Graf Zeppelin hardly any effort was made to analyse British defence or to obtain information from agents on the spot. The radar research station at Bawdsey was for years wide open to interlopers with no barbed wire and almost unrestricted access from the beach. Holidaymakers on the beaches near Dover amused themselves taking photographs of the unusual lattice masts above the cliffs. Any foreigner in shorts with suitable equipment in a haversack could have picked up and measured the radar signals radiating into space. Almost any radio enthusiast could have deduced the length of the aerials and from this calculated reasonably accurately the wavelength employed.

By 1939 it seemed almost impossible that Germany could lack information on the basic principles of the British scientific defence system. Many people were making the equipment or operating it and so many sites were being requisitioned and built on that a visitor with an adequate electrical engineering background could have pieced much of the jigsaw together. The reliable and security-conscious technical journal The Aeroplane remarked in a report on the August 1939 air defence exercises that ‘The Observer Corps is an important link in the defence system of communications, and although there are now other means of learning of the approach of the enemy the Corps is likely to be used for some time.’ The portents went unnoticed in Berlin and the Abwehr continued to produce papers on the decadence and the lack of will to fight of the British people.

The Luftwaffe knew in 1938 that Britain was experimenting with radar, but until July 1940 no efforts were made to assess the system fully or to counteract it. By then it was too late. Even the capture of a British mobile radar station on the beach at Boulogne in May 1940 failed to stimulate real action on the problem. German scientists considered the set crude and on a wavelength which they felt did not give the best results. They claimed that German radar was superior in performance and thereby lulled still further the senses of the High Command.

With a fighter-defence system hardly worthy of the name and with a force geared entirely to offensive warfare the Luftwaffe turned a blind eye to the unique British layout.

In July radio monitoring stations picked up British high frequency radio telephone chatter and by analysis deduced that fighters operated under close radio control. It was concluded that this made the whole R.A.F. system inflexible, but in fact exactly the opposite was the case.

On August 7th Schmid issued a circular to Luftflotten and Fliegerkorps giving an appreciation of British radio control. This led to the wrong targets being attacked in many cases and it was erroneously assumed that mass attacks would completely swamp the system.

The circular stated:

As the British fighters are controlled from the ground by R/T their forces are tied to their respective ground stations and are thereby restricted in mobility, even taking into consideration the probability that the ground stations are partly mobile. Consequently the assembly of strong fighter forces at determined points and at short notice is not expected. A massed German attack on a target area can therefore count on the same conditions of light fighter opposition as in attacks on widely scattered targets. It can, indeed, be assumed that considerable confusion in the defensive networks will be unavoidable during mass attacks and that the effectiveness of the defences may thereby be reduced.

Having weighed up the estimated potential of the R.A.F. and found it lacking, Abteilung 5 concentrated its energies on providing target and general information to Luftflotten 3, 3 and 5, supplementing this with frequent up-to-date photographic reconnaissance surveys.

The targets were selected on a broad basis to meet dual requirements: the High Command preparations for invasion and Göring’s wish to destroy the R.A.F. and bring Britain to her knees by air power alone. These required the British fighter aircraft to be brought to battle, the destruction of fighter airfields and associated installations, attacks on aircraft and munitions factories and the continuous complementary task of wrecking harbours, shipping, dockyards and warships. Certain ports on the south coast were omitted from the list of targets to preserve them for use during the invasion.

Radar stations were included as targets for the first phase of air attacks after an analysis by the signals branch of the Luftwaffe, but the German bombers found that they were extremely difficult to hit. In dive-bombing there was the danger of the aircraft colliding with the aerial masts, while from a height the target appeared small. Even if a near miss was obtained most of the blast went between the lattice girders without causing great damage. The control rooms, power plant and other equipment were clustered under the towers which also made them difficult to distinguish.

The German reconnaissance photograph of the fighter airfield at Northolt taken on August 31st, 1940. The runways have been skilfully painted to merge with the surrounding countryside

After the first assaults attacks were few and not concerted. The reason for this has up to now been something of a mystery but the reasoning was logical. Crews reported having successfully bombed several radar stations but General Martini’s troops later the same day detected transmissions which they presumed meant that the stations were still working.

From this intelligence assumed that the radar operations and equipment rooms were underground and that further heavy bombing would be wasted as the aerials could not be put out of action. The layout and working of the radar sites and the communication system linking them to fighter defence were unknown to the Germans. Vital points which might have been more susceptible to accurate attack therefore remained undiscovered.

There were no reports from agents on radar and none could be obtained. Had there been German intelligence would have been surprised to learn that the power and receiving rooms were not underground and that the attacks had damaged some considerably, particularly at Ventnor, Isle of Wight. Even where the stations could not detect aircraft, signals were generally still transmitted in some cases by mobile units. This misled Luftwaffe signals intelligence and the commands. If, after the bombing, several stations had ceased to transmit and a large gap in the area had appeared, it is almost certain that bombing of radar sites would have been increased with serious consequences for Fighter Command.

After the official opening of the full-scale air war against Britain the only real intelligence came from the radio monitoring service and from reconnaissance, although a number of reconnaissance planes were shot down.

The four days estimated by Göring for the elimination of the fighter forces in southern England soon passed, but Schmid, examining the victory claims, felt certain that the R.A.F. was being bled to death. The transfer of squadrons from northern groups on Dowding’s rotation system was incorrectly interpreted as a sign that reinforcements were needed to replace units destroyed in battle. Even the heavy losses of Luftflotte 5 in east coast attacks on August 15th failed to shake Schmid’s convictions.

By August 20th German intelligence estimated that the Luftwaffe had destroyed no less than 664 British aircraft in the period August 12th to 19th and that up to August 17th forty-four R.A.F. airfields had been attacked of which eleven had been ‘permanently destroyed.’

This extraordinary assessment was lower than the claims put forward by the operations branch (IA). Had it been true it would have meant that Fighter Command was almost finished. In fact, in the period August 12th to 19th only 103 R.A.F. fighters and some bomber and training aircraft on the ground were lost.

The airfields claimed by Schmid as destroyed were Eastchurch, Gosport, Lee-on-Solent, Lympne, Man-ston, Tangmere, Hawkinge, Portsmouth, Rochester, Driffield and Martlesham Heath. Only five of these were Fighter Command bases. A further twelve airfields were described as ‘severely damaged’ and twenty-one ‘partly damaged’. Contrary to German belief, only one airfield, Manston, was put out of action for any length of time.

The process of self-delusion in Abteilung 5 was accelerated as the battle progressed. Schmid found himself unable to present any cohesive picture of the situation, while the High Command made its own progress reports based on a mixture of ‘intuition’ and the tales of glorious victory which poured in daily from the operations branch. He was severely hampered by the low status of his department and the fact that none of his officers worked with the groups or squadrons.

The only ray of light in this fog of confusion came once more from the radio monitoring service which, by listening to British radio-telephone chatter, managed to pinpoint the sector stations in No. 11 Group using direction-finding devices. One part of the jigsaw was completed, but as soon as the attacks on these sites were becoming effective the High Command turned the assault on London.

The London raids, which came as a blessed relief to the hardpressed sector stations, were the outcome of the conference of senior air force commanders at The Hague at the beginning of September. The whole position of the air war against Britain was discussed. Luftflotten and Fliegerkorps leaders showed a marked divergence of opinion about the strength of Fighter Command. The complete lack of any accurate information on the subject was revealed by Kesselring’s declaration that the R.A.F. fighter force was finished, while Sperrle maintained that it still had 1,000 aircraft.

Schmid considered the figures showed that a large proportion of the fighter strength had been disposed of, but that concentration on R.A.F. targets such as airfields and on aircraft factories should be continued. He also referred frequently to his beloved Studie Blau, which was his constant companion throughout the battle.

After heated arguments Kesselring prevailed and Fighter Command was out of action—on paper. The Luftwaffe was then committed to what was hoped would be the final phase, the bombing of London. By this it was expected to wreck in a short time the morale of the capital to such an extent that peace terms would be sought.

In June 1940 Dowding remarked to some of his staff at Bentley Priory: ‘The nearness of London to German airfields will lose them the war.’ On September 6th this was proved true.

The attraction of London was the German Air Force’s undoing. Like an indestructible sponge it absorbed punishment and diverted what might have been the death blow from the sorely tried organism of air defence.

Throughout the campaign the Luftwaffe was groping in the dark. There existed no organisation to sort out the conflicting plans and opinions which emerged on all sides or to impress some sense into Göring.

Intelligence IC was frequently blamed by high air force circles in later years for the defeat in the Battle of Britain, but this was grossly unfair. IC was a product of its own environment and it accurately mirrored the disunity of the High Command. To set up an intelligence organisation for the largest air force in the world, appoint its commanding officer in the rank of major and then deny it the facilities to do the job was sheer folly. The outcome was inevitable.

At no time during the battle was the IC organisation able to assess with any accuracy the state of Fighter Command, its aircraft and pilot reserve position, and its technical resources such as the radar chain. From June onwards Britain was a closed shop with only meagre and mostly inaccurate information from neutral diplomatic and Press sources. The morale of the British people and their ability to repair and improvise under constant attack were misjudged. For this unusually stupid men like Ribbentrop were largely to blame. Luftwaffe intelligence could only accept these views as it knew nothing of the British character and was given little opportunity to learn.

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE

Before 1940 there was little to choose between British and German air intelligence. Extraordinary blunders were made on both sides. Britain relied on agents of the various military intelligence sections, on the Foreign Office, the service intelligence departments and attachés and on ordinary British people from many walks of life who kept their eyes and ears open.

The agents covered a wide field but they were limited by the briefs given them and by the various authorities who lacked knowledge. There was some very brilliant work in the political and economic spheres but where aviation was concerned the results were patchy. Vital scraps of information were often mislaid or misused.

Estimates of Luftwaffe strength in peacetime were greatly exaggerated, as Göbbels intended they should be. This had a boomerang effect because it made the R.A.F. call for faster and greater expansion from 1935 onwards. In many instances the information which Churchill got from his private sources on the Continent was more up-to-date and accurate than that assembled by the Foreign Office and the service departments.

The Foreign Office had some extraordinary ‘off’ moments. These included a habit of mistranslating German, particularly Hitler’s speeches. Prior to the war Hitler in the course of one address declared that he would amaze his potential enemies. This was translated literally by the Foreign Office as a new weapon which would ‘blind and deafen’. A scientist who later became one of the principal intelligence experts of the war was sent post-haste to a special retreat in the home counties to look at every intelligence file available in a vain search for the elusive secret weapon. Exhausted, he resorted to a university professor of German who had no trouble in producing a correct translation, to the chagrin of Mr. Neville Chamberlain, then Prime Minister, and Foreign Office officials.

It was, however, in the realm of technical air intelligence that the worst blunders occurred. A well-known aircraft engineer was assisting with investigations into important German projects, including the Me 109, when his meticulous reports disappeared into the depths of Whitehall. They could not be found when they were badly needed in 1940.

Early in 1940 an Me 109 caught fire after it belly-landed. The fuel injector pump was said to have been burned out, although this was difficult to believe because it was made of steel. Not long after, Michael Golovine of Rolls-Royce, who later became an important member of Air Ministry intelligence, found himself sitting in a small café on the outskirts of Belgrade clutching a brown paper parcel containing the Me 109 fuel-pump which had been thrust into his hand by a mysterious stranger who had telephoned and spoken in Russian—Golovine’s native language.

Golovine duly presented his precious package to the British Air Attaché, only to be told: ‘I don’t want the thing. You take it back with you.’ Golovine pointed out that he would look extremely stupid carrying a German injector pump through Italy on his way home. Finally he prevailed on the reluctant officer to send it through the usual channels. Through stupidity it never reached England.

Had it done so Spitfires and Hurricanes which were not so equipped in the Battle of Britain might have been able to dive in the same manner as the Me 109 without their engines stopping. Many pilots’ lives would have been saved and the R.A.F.’s score against the Luftwaffe increased.

On yet another occasion a complete handbook on the Me 109 became available for twenty-four hours in London. The document was photographed but the copies could not be found in the files when they were required.

Many unusual documents were put away on remote Air Ministry bookshelves and forgotten. When the problems of dealing with unexploded bombs became acute in 1940 there was a lack of information about German fuses. Eventually a copy of the Rheinmetall Company’s fuse catalogue was found on the shelves. It had been sent by the company itself and had lain there for months gathering dust.

On radar intelligence before 1940 neither side knew what the other was doing. Germany realised that the R.A.F. had radar but discovered very little about it and came to the wrong conclusions concerning its operation. The R.A.F. gathered that German firms were working on radar detection, but until stations were set up on the German, French and Norwegian coasts late in 1940 the wavelength and other details were not discovered. No efforts were made to use aircraft for interrogation or jamming until the conflict was well advanced.

One of the best efforts of British Air Intelligence was to break the German squadron and radio codes and make a very accurate assessment of Luftwaffe strength.

At the long range wireless intercept ‘Y’ station in Kent Squadron Leader Maggs could decode as he listened to German radio chatter. When a new unit was formed, say, on the Baltic coast, Maggs would send a message to Wing Commander Bill Coope, the Air Attaché in Berlin, asking him to investigate and see if their aircraft bore a particular fuselage/fin insignia.

The Germans very foolishly had their unit and R/T codes on the aircraft and it was not until 1941, following the escape of a prisoner of war, that the Germans changed their codes to seven letters, although these too were eventually broken.

Wing Commander Coope was a very resourceful officer who spoke fluent German, could more than cope with entertainment and had an aeroplane at his disposal.

He had a remarkable flair for running out of petrol and in the case in question would just make a forced landing and stay for lunch. It took no time at all to find out the codes of aircraft standing around and thus another vital item was added to the Air Ministry Order of Battle for the Luftwaffe.

In the first few months of 1940 a considerable change came over the operational intelligence branch of the R.A.F. Apart from the hard-working regulars a number of newcomers made their appearance. They were civilians hurriedly converted into R.A.F.V.R. officers, each with an extensive knowledge in his particular subject. The organisation was subdivided, the main divisions being, Technical run by Wing Commander J. Easton, Production under Squadron Leader Allom, Wireless Intercept under Wing Commander Maggs, Order of Battle with W. Williams, Knights-Whittome and Asher Lee, and Enemy Equipment Captured under M. Golovine and H. F. King. Golovine was the son of a General in the Czar’s army and a first-class engineer speaking three languages while King was a journalist from the editorial staff of the technical paper Flight.

Reichmarschall Göring confers with his commanders during the Battle of Britain. On the desk is a map of the battle area. On the extreme right is General Jeschonnek, the chief of Luftwaffe General Staff, while nervously fingering his tunic is Colonel ‘Beppo’ Schmid, head of Luftwaffe Intelligence

Working in close accord with these sections was the P.O.W. Interrogation Unit under Squadron Leader Felkin which produced astounding results using subtlety and common sense in place of threats and coercion. The whole team came under the Director of Operations Intelligence. Originally the intelligence team was headed by Colonel Archie Boyle, an Army officer being given the job because Flak in Germany came under the Luftwaffe! Boyle was later transferred to the R.A.F. as an Air Commodore.

Above this department were several scientists well qualified for intelligence work. One of the most notable was Prof. R. V. Jones, the former pupil of Professor Lindemann, who developed infra-red detection and was in 1940 Deputy Director of Scientific Intelligence, Air Ministry.

Thus from early 1940 onwards British air intelligence grew in stature and reliability while the IC departments in the German Air Ministry steadily declined. The improvement in the R.A.F. was also largely due to the fact that intelligence officers were employed right down the line, at groups, stations and squadrons. In the Luftwaffe there were no representatives of the intelligence organisation stationed at units below the size of Fliergerkorps until 1944.

For the Battle of Britain the major task of R.A.F. intelligence was to obtain a correct Luftwaffe order of battle. The information was combed from secret sources, published documents and radio monitoring.

After months of painstaking assessment and reassessment it was estimated early in August that the Luftwaffe had an operational strength of about 4,500 planes. This was close to the mark, the correct figures being 4,119 on June 29th and 4,295 on August 10th.

Every Gruppe, Staffel and the types of aircraft employed were correctly identified before Eagle Day, August 13th.

What Churchill wanted to know, however, after Dunkirk was how long the air battle would last, when invasion was imminent and when the threat of invasion would recede. In mid-July Air Intelligence completed an assessment for him which, as a piece of prophecy, was almost perfect.

After the Battle of France A.I. had discovered that some seven German units had had to be cannibalised, therefore they deduced, rightly, that there were not 100 per cent, reserves and expansion of the Luftwaffe was at a slower pace than propaganda had suggested. There was a clash of opinion between the Ministry of Economic Warfare and Intelligence over this, the former producing some very exaggerated figures.

Intelligence won the point by providing that replacement machines were being flown direct to units and not, as normally, to aircraft parks—which were the equivalent of R.A.F. Maintenance Units.

In the final report to Churchill, in mid-july, Air Intelligence stated categorically that if the Luftwaffe, in daylight attack, could be held off until mid-September then invasion could not take place in 1940 because of worsening weather, the effects of losses and lack of reserves.

This indeed proved to be the case and the Battle of Britain was the turning point for Air Intelligence within the British High Command.

Both air forces suffered from exaggeration of each other’s battle losses during intense air lighting and from differences of opinion between the operational groups and the sleuthing analysts of intelligence. British estimates of German losses were a little less than twice the confirmed figures. The German estimates of the R.A.F.’s losses proved to be five times too great. R.A.F. intelligence after careful study decided that about 50 per cent, of the British claims should be taken as a reasonable figure. This was not far wrong. There was considerable opposition to the assessment from within Fight Command, but it was eventually accepted by the Air Ministry because the claims over land could not otherwise be matched by the wreckage found. Amendments were not publicly made at the time because it was thought that morale would be adversely affected.

One of the vital elements in deducing the German order of battle was the interception of radio transmissions particularly after the collapse of France and the Low Countries. Before the war Britain, like most countries, possessed a long-range monitoring service. It was one of these receivers which picked up Graf Zeppelin’s position signals. There was, however, no organisation similar to General Martini’s aircraft reporting service with a listening watch on the high-frequency bands. Such an organisation was essential to detect aircraft, ship and even tank H.F. radio-telephone.

It was not until the beginning of 1940 that the Air Ministry turned their attention to this aspect of the intelligence war. Thanks to a healthy peacetime radio industry and large numbers of amateur radio ‘hams’ in the R.A.F.V.R. there was no shortage of enthusiasts.

Concentration on radio intelligence began in earnest in December 1939, when Flying Officer Scott Farnie (a peacetime member of the volunteer civilian wireless reserve and later Group Captain) was recalled from duties as station signals officer at Oban, Scotland, to report to a deputy director of signals at the Air Ministry. Pulse signals had been coming from Germany. They were later discovered to emanate from a mountain scientific establishment peacefully engaged in ionospheric research, but they prompted investigation. Scott Farnie was given the job and from this evolved the monitoring system. In February 1940 Scott Farnie, as a flight-lieutenant, was instructed to set up the first listening post at Hawkinge near Dover, Kent.

He found that there were no suitable high-frequency receivers in the R.A.F. and was forced to bargain with Webb’s Radio, Ltd., in London, for the whole of their stock of American Hallicrafter 510 civil receivers. This unorthodox step had a sequel two years later when Air Ministry officials were still arguing about who should pay for the equipment.

With Flight Lieutenant Allway, a former B.B.C. engineer, Scott Farnie installed the sets in a hut at Hawkinge and began a listening watch on the forty-megacycle band. The choice of frequencies was fortuitous. There was no certain knowledge of what waveband the Germans used for radio-telephony.

For over two months nothing was heard, but in mid-May, at the height of the Battle of France, German transmissions began to come through loud and clear. Delight in the hut was tempered by the sudden realisation that none of the crew spoke German. This simple point had been overlooked.

One of the staff asked in desperation at the guardroom if anyone spoke German. Surprisingly one army private was a linguist. He was hustled in and the headphones rammed on. He was able to take down and translate the conversations which turned out to be from a formation of Ju 87s making a ground attack.

The private, Mattheson by name, found himself almost overnight transferred to the R.A.F., much to the annoyance of the personnel department of the War Office. He remained with the signals intelligence service until killed later in the war on a reconnaissance flight.

Having established the German radio-telephony frequencies, the Hawkinge unit suffered from an acute shortage of German translators to keep continuous watch. It was decided to recruit women to fill the gaps and to the consternation of the ‘queen bees’ of the W.A.A.F. suitable candidates were given direct entry in the rank of sergeant. The W.A.A.F.s performed a great service working six-hour shifts and taking down messages in longhand. One operator. Section Officer A. B. Morris, won a well-earned M.B.E. for her work in 1940, but the citation gave no hint of her job.

The success of Hawkinge and the fact that E-boats also worked on the forty-megacycle band led to the establishment of a chain of joint air force and naval monitoring stations along the east coast of England.

With the opening of the Battle of Britain in July it became clear that Hawkinge was too vulnerable, and the unit looked for new premises. Scott Farnie and Flight Officer ‘Billy’ Conan Doyle of the W.A.A.F. found an old garage at Kingsdowne, near Wrotham, Kent, and the operators were moved in as a temporary expedient. Scott Farnie and Conan Doyle again searched the countryside. They found Hollywood Manor at Kingsdowne and managed to have it commandeered. This became the operations centre for radio-telephony monitoring for the remainder of the war, and from Kingsdowne information was relayed to all R.A.F. commands and to the other two services.

Two pages from the Luftwaffe airfield-target handbook of Britain. The Biggin Hill map was based on a British Ordnance Survey sheet, while the oblique aerial photographs were taken before the war by a Lufthansa aircraft on its way to Croydon

Radio monitoring apart from its major part in compiling the Luftwaffe order of battle, was to become one of the prime tools of British intelligence. Early in the organisation’s life German Air Force codes were successfully deciphered by concentration on the wireless telegraphy signals transmitted by the regular Luftwaffe meteorological flights between Bordeaux, France, and Stavanger, Norway.

The Kingsdowne station also played a part in one of the most successful technical intelligence operations of the war. From 1935 the Luftwaffe worked on radio aids to blind bombing. Three were finally developed, known as Knickebein, ‘X’ Geràt (instrument) and ‘Y’ Geràt. Of these only Knickebein was available during the Battle of Britain, the ‘X’ and ‘Y’ being introduced for the winter blitz.

Basically Knickebein (bent leg) was a system whereby German bombers received long-range signals on their standard thirty-megacycle Lorenz beam approach landing receivers. In the pilot’s headphones a continuous note was heard if he was flying along the beam heading for the target. If he deviated to left or right he heard dots or dashes and changed course accordingly. A further note was heard when he was required to drop his bombs. Although Knickebein was accurate only to within about 500 yards of the target it indicated the general position of many sites already receiving the attention of the day bombers, and others such as aircraft and aircraft engine factories, which were beyond the range of day fighter escorts.

Early in June 1940 the Luftwaffe made widespread probing attacks over Britain which led Professor Jones at the Air Ministry to suspect that the aircraft were testing a new bombing aid. His suspicions were heightened by the knowledge that documents from two aircraft of K.G.100 shot down earlier in the year mentioned ‘Knickebein’ as a type of radio beam.

Radio monitors also picked up a mysterious message beginning ‘Willi Knickebein …’ and giving frequency and position references which indicated Cleve in West Germany and Derby in the midlands, where the Rolls-Royce works were situated.

Professor Jones was certain that directional radio beams were being used but other scientists were equally sure that a beam on the particular frequency could not be bent round the earth’s surface to give the range. One enterprising security official started a witch hunt for a clandestine transmitter on the ground at Derby.

Jones refused to let the matter drop. On June 6th a full meeting to discuss the subject was held. Churchill presided. On June 17th Squadron Leader Felkin’s interrogation of prisoners of war yielded results which confirmed the existence of Knickebein as a bombing aid. The following day steps were taken to investigate fully the beams using a van receiver and an Anson aircraft of the Blind Approach Aid Development Unit at Wyton.

At Wyton the work came under Flight Lieutenant R. Bluck, who had more experience than anyone in Britain on blind-landing techniques. Using an American thirty-megacycle receiver he found the Knickebein beam on his second flight. It still lay over Derby.

Further discussions between Churchill, intelligence chiefs, scientists and R.A.F. senior officers led in July to the formation of No. 80 Wing under Wing Commander E. B. Addison. This unit was intended to render German bombing aids useless. It was the beginning of Britain’s electronic countermeasures organisation which was to play a major part in winning the war.

No. 80 Wing immediately put in hand measures to counteract Knickebein and also to disorganise the German medium frequency beacon system which allowed bombers to navigate by direction-finding methods.

First the wing found the positions of the remaining Knickebein receivers. Staff with radio receivers were sent up the 240-foot high C.H. radar towers to detect the characteristic dots and dashes. By listening in this manner round the south and east coasts by day the bearing of the target for the night could be found and measures taken to nullify the beam’s effect. High-powered X-ray apparatus from hospitals which could be made to radiate jamming signals was set up in police stations and mobile vans, and when turned on it was impossible for the German pilot to hear his beam signals.

In some cases the beam was deliberately distorted by nine special transmitters so that it extended over a wide area and became too inaccurate for use. Means were also found to inject a powerful signal short of the target so that bombs were dropped in the open countryside. Fires were lit in the decoy area to assist this ruse.

There is no doubt that the measures taken in August wrecked the Knickebein system and helped to prevent accurate and concentrated German night bombing intended to back up the daylight operations.

German crews reported that the beam was being interfered with and that night fighters were being directed on to it. There was general dissatisfaction in Luftflotte 3 over this. Crews rapidly lost confidence in Knickebein, particularly when reconnaissance showed a target supposedly destroyed to be still standing the following morning.

At first German scientists refused to believe counter-measures had been taken by the R.A.F. because they were certain that Knickebein beams could not be detected by British ground receivers. It was not until several weeks after the Knickebein raids began in August that proof of countermeasures was obtained by sending out experienced Luftwaffe signals officers with the bombers.

* The Me 109F took no part in the Battle of Britain

* High level = Air Staff; Medium level = Group; Low level = Squadron