UTAH
H-hour was several minutes late on Utah Beach. Two naval control vessels went missing and dust and smoke from the bombardment obscured the beach. As the landing-craft neared the shore strong coastal currents pushed them southwards, and the landing was eventually made two and a half kilometres south of the originally intended spot. As it turned out the defences at La Madeleine (la Grande Dune) were luckily far less than those on the original objectives.
From then on things went well for 4 (US) Division. By midday all resistance had been overcome for only light casualties, the beach was clear and the troops were moving inland. Resistance stiffened in the afternoon but by nightfall 23,250 men, 1,700 vehicles and 1,695 tons of stores had been landed over the beaches. Contact had been made with 82 Airbourne Division at Chef-du-Pont and a bridgehead established taking in Sainte-Mère-Église and a large pocket of land north of Carentin.
OMAHA
The sea was rough off Omaha and this made the landing extremely hazardous. Ten landing craft were sunk during the run-in to the beach and amny artillery pieces lost. Only 5 out of 32 amphibious tanks reached the beach after being launched five kilometeres from the shore. In the confusion many parties were landed on the wrong stretch of beach.
As the landing craft, water lapping over the gunwales, landed their troops, they were met by a hail of fire from strong enemy positions reinforced by troops of the 352 Division who were stationed nearby. Such was the strength of the defence that the 1 (US) Division could not force their way inland from the shoreline. Troops huddled for shelter under the high dunes as artillery fire pounded the beaches and machine guns whipped the sea into a foam. Successive waves, landing at their appointed time, added to the chaos on the beach, which soon became cluttered with burning vehicles and abandoned equipment. By 0930 hours the German commander at Points et Raz de la Percée judged that the landing would fail. Gradually, however, the tables turned. Small groups of gallant soldiers, supported by the fire of destroyers venturing dangerously close inshore, fought their way through the dunes and in the end sheer numbers and dogged perseverance told against the defenders. Futher along the coast at the Pointe du Hoc, 225 Ranger Battalion scaled the cliffs to destroy the battery, found it empty, discovered the cannon nearby, destroyed them and then came under severe counter-attack themselves. Less than 100 men in number, they held out for two days and nights before being relieved by troops from Omaha.
By the end of the day more than 34,000 Americans were crammed into a bridgehead only one or two kilometres deep and seven kilometres wide. They had suffered over 2,000 killed or wounded to achieve that much and their situation was precarious. Only one road inland was open. Only 100 tons of stores were ashore out of the 2,400 tons which the plan had called for. Ammunition was short, almost all the artillery and most of the tanks and vehicles had been sunk or knocked out. The Americans were ashore at Omaha - but only just. It was the beach on which the invasion came closest to failing.
GOLD
German resistance was strong and determined on Gold Beach as well as on Omaha. In the west it took 231 Brigade until late i the afternoon before they could capture the strongpoint at Le Hamel and, to the east, the capture of La Rivière cost 69 Brigade 94 men killed, including six officers. Aided by numerous extroadinery tanks carrying flails to explode mines, flame-throwers and obstacle breathing equipment, 50 Division established themselves ashore by the middle of the day and by nightfall had secured a firmbridgehead well inland. Nearly 25,00 men had been landed for the loss of 413 killed, missing or wounded and a link-up had been made with 3 (Canadian) Division to the east.
Betweeen Gold and Omaha, at the junction of the British and American sectors, 47 Commando, Royal Marines, were given the task of capturing Port-en-Bessin. After losing 43 men and all their signalling equipment when four of their landing crafft were sunk by underwater explosive devices, 47 Commando were unable to commence their attack on the port until the following morning. It fell on 8 June after the Commando had suffered 200 casualties.
JUNO
Progress on Juno beach was, as elsewhere, hampered by a high sea, submerged obstacles and a stiff resistance. Despite this, 3 (Canadian) Division had placed 21,400 men, 3,200 vehicles and 2,100 tons of stores on the shore by the end of the day. In the course of establishing their bridgehead the Canadians lost 304 killed, 574 wounded and 47 captured. Several strongpoints remained intact as D-Day ended and 48 Commando Royal Marines had failed to capture the strongpoint at Saint-Aubin. Nevertheless liason had been established with 50 Division to the east and the Canadians were firmly launched into France.
SWORD
3 (British) Division had a patchy but overall successful day. The mission of capturing Caen was not accomplished, but a substantial lodgement was achieved during the day despite a prolonged resistance from numerous strongpoints and a counter-attack during the evening from 21st Panzer Division. This division attacked with more than 100 tanks supported by two battalions of infantry in the 9 Brigade sector around Biéville and Périers. When the attack finally ran out of steam, around seven o’clock in the evening, more than 50 German tanks were left on the battlefield. Six Commando units were landed to capture isolated strongpoints between the main divisional beach and the area of the airbourne landings and were largely successful in achieving their missions.
By midnight on D-Day 28,845 men were ashore: 630 had been killed or wounded on the beaches alone.