CHAPTER SEVEN
It was 12 June, D+6, and Lieutenant Colonel Desmond Gordon was delighted. He had just been told that 1st/7th Battalion The Queen’s Regiment, a Lorried Infantry Battalion which he commanded in 131 Infantry Brigade of 7 Armoured Division, was to move forward as quickly as possible to join 22 Armoured Brigade. Delighted on two accounts. First, the armoured brigade was to lead a deep thrust into the German lines, and he was keen that his Queensmen should be at the front of it. Secondly, while he did not greatly respect his Infantry Brigade Commander, the prospect of coming under command of Brigadier Robert ‘Looney’ Hinde was immensly encouraging.
Armoured divisions consisted, in Normandy in June 1944, of one armoured brigade of three regiments of tanks and a motor battalion of infantry in half-track vehicles, and one lorried infantry brigade of three infantry battalions. The weakness of this organisation was that the motor battalion, formed in most armoured divisions by battalions of the 60th Rifles and The Rifle Brigade, had so many men tied up in the specialist tasks of drivers, gunners and radio operators, that a platoon, dismounting on its feet, was woefully short of Riflemen to clear an enemy position. Furthermore, 1st Battalion The Rifle Brigade, the motor battalion in 22 Armoured Brigade was still short of one company which had not yet arrived from England. Aware of a need for more Infantry for this operation, Brigadier Hinde had asked the divisional commander, Major General Bobby Erskine, for another infantry battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Gordon’s 1/7 Queens would join 22 Armoured Brigade, while Lieutenant Colonel Carver’s 1 Royal Tank Regiment made the reverse journey.
Colonel Gordon escorts General Montgomery on a visit to 1/7 Queens shortly before D-Day.
As light faded 1/7 Queens started its move forward, and within minutes all were covered with a film of dusk and grime thrown up by the lorries as they moved up. By dawn next morning they had caught up with the rest of 22 Brigade near Livry - a welcome chance to clean up men and weapons, have that essential requirement for any soldier, a ‘brew’ of tea, allow the stragglers to catch up, and, for Gordon, to find out what was in store for them.
Two days earlier, on 10 June, 7 Armoured Division had passed through 50 Division astride the Bayeux - Tilly-sur-Seulles road, and pressed on south. By dusk the leading elements had reached Bucéels, just two miles north of Tilly. But here they ran head-on into Panzer Lehr Division which had been ordered to advance on Bayeux. Little progress was made next day. Early on 12 June Generals Bucknall of 30 Corps and Erskine of 7 Armoured Division discussed the future. Intelligence suggested that there might be a gap in the German defences between Caumont, now under attack by the Americans, and Panzer Lehr in the Tilly-sur-Seulles area. If 7 Armoured Division could launch a swift right hook, through St Paul-du-Vernay, Livry, Briquessard, Amayé and on to Villers-Bocage and the high ground north-east of it, it might cut-off Panzer Lehr in the Tilly and Lingèvres areas.
22 Armoured Brigade led the thrust which went well until held up around 1600 in the Livry area. By 2000 the opposition had been cleared by a motor company of 1 RB, but it was decided to halt the advance for the night, in order to allow the rest of the division to catch up, essential maintenance to take place, and contact to be made with the Americans who were attacking Caumont on the right. Doubtless the decision to halt made sense at the time, but, in the light of the events that followed next day it was a pity that Brigadier Hinde did not push on the remaining six miles, securing Villers-Bocage that night. But war is full of ‘if onlys’!
Very early on 13 June Hinde gave orders to his commanding officers. Surprisingly he decided not to lead with his reconnaissance regiment, 8th King’s Royal Irish Hussars, as would have been normal when advancing out of contact with the enemy. The tanks of 4 County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters), with A Company 1 RB under command, would lead through Villers-Bocage and on to the high ground of Point 213 about a mile northeast of the town on the Caen road. 1/7 Queens would secure the town east of the church, while the rest of 1 RB held the western end. 5 RTR would take the high ground near Maisoncelles-Pelvey, 2 miles south-west of Villers-Bocage and the 17-pounder self-propelled guns of 260 Anti-tank Battery, Royal Artillery would provide a screen between the two tank regiments, covering the approaches from the south-east.
22 Armoured Brigade moved forward at 0530 on 13 June. A Squadron of the Sharpshooters, with the half-tracks of A Company and two 6-pounder anti-tank guns of 1 RB tucked in behind, passed through Amayé and reached Villers-Bocage at about 0800. Stopping to ask some French civilians whether there were any Germans in the town, they were delighted to hear that it was clear. Lieutenant Colonel Lord Cranley, the Sharpshooters commanding officer, keen to secure his objective as quickly as possible, ordered Major Scott’s A Squadron to press on to the high ground beyond the town. The rest of the regiment would halt in the town until they heard that that Point 213 had been captured. This would also give the crews a welcome chance to check over the tanks and grab a quick bite of breakfast, neither of which had been possible in the rush to press on quickly that morning. The A Squadron/A Company group motored on through the town, bending left at the end of the main street and climbing the hill beyond.
Cromwells belonging to the 7th Armoured Division advancing through the Bocage.
To ensure that the objective was firmly in his hands, Cranley decided to follow the leading squadron closely himself. He could then call forward the rest of the regiment, leaving the infantry of 1/7 Queens and 1 RB to secure the town itself. He moved off with the four Cromwell tanks that constituted his Regimental Headquarters - his own tank, that of his second-in-command Major Carr, the Regimental-Sergeant Major’s tank, and Captain Dyas in a spare tank, with a Daimler scout car also in tow. Shortly after passing the bend at the top of the main street he halted this group, left the tanks behind and went forward in his scout car to join A Squadron, who had reached Point 213 unmolested. All seemed to be going entirely according to plan. Doubtless Panzer Lehr Division was full committed facing 50 Division further north, unaware of the threat mounting behind them.
To reach the battlefield of Villers-Bocage, take the D6 south from Tilly-sur-Seulles. About one mile south of Tilly the road crosses the D9, which involves turning left along the D9 for about 200 yards, over the River Seulles and immediately right, signed for Villers-Bocage. Follow the D6 for about five miles to a junction at the east end of the town. Turn hard left, and you will see a straight road climbing the hill ahead of you. It is the summit of that hill which is your destination, though the route to it is less simple than it looks. Follow the road under the new N175 dual carriageway bridge, then keep left until you rejoin the old N175 to Caen. Shortly after rejoining it, look right down a small road which runs through Montbrocq to Epinay - this plays an important part in the story. Then proceed to the summit. This is Point 213, reached by A squadron of the Sharpshooters at about 0815 on the morning of 13 June 1944. Once there you will realise why this was such an important objective. The view of the road ahead stretches for miles. Locate a small turning to the left, just by a cottage, with a gate in the fence opposite - call it Milner’s Gate, which will mean something later in the story. Because of the new dual carriageway, this small road ends abruptly in a bank, after just a couple of hundred yards. Turn round and park on the main road where you can look down the hill, towards Villers-Bocage.
The first part of the story of the battle takes place near the Montbrocq turning, down the hill in front of you. It then moves to the middle of the town. But the action returns to Point 213 later in the morning, so it is worth taking a mental picture of the scene before leaving for the town centre. Picture, if you can in today’s tranquil scene, a squadron of tanks just arriving at Point 213. Behind, climbing the hill from Villers-Bocage are the carriers and half-tracks of the motor infantry company.
Lieutenant Michael Wittmann was already a legend in the German Army. His tally of armoured vehicles knocked-out stood at 119 and he held the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd Class and the Knight’s Cross, to which had already been added the Oak Leaves. For his actions this day he would later add the Swords to his Knight’s Cross, and be promoted Captain. But as dawn broke on the morning 13 June he had no idea, as commander of 2 Company of 101 SS Heavy Tank Battalion, that action was imminent. On D Day, just a week before, 101 SS had been at Beauvais, near Paris. Given hasty orders to move to Normandy, they had arrived in the Villers-Bocage area on the afternoon of 12 June. 2 Company now consisted of just five Tiger tanks, having suffered from the close attention of the Allied Air Forces during their move to Normandy. They spent the night 12/13 June in a small wood just south of the small hamlet of Montbrocq, about a mile north-east of the town. Rumours are frequent in war, and the rumour that night was that a British armoured force was trying to outflank and cut off Panzer Lehr Division. So, early on 13 June Wittmann decided to investigate the truth of this rumour. Leaving his other tanks to carry out their normal morning maintenance (much needed after an arduous journey), Wittmann opted to explore on his own. He would go through Villers Bocage and head north-west towards Balleroy to see whether he could locate any British advance. He did not have far to look.
Wittmann’s gun aimer Balthasar Woll (above) and Michael Wittmann - an effective tank killer team. The German ace accounted for 138 enemy tanks destroyed.
Wittman’s Tigers, SS Panzer Abteilung 101, three days before the action at Villers-Bocage.
Shortly after moving off he met an aggitated German sergeant in the woods just south of the Villers-Bocage/Caen road. There were the ominous noises of tanks grinding up the hill from the town, and yet there were no German tanks in the area. Leaving his Tiger tank behind, Wittmann crawled forward and peered through a hedge, to see A Squadron of the Sharpshooters heading up the slope towards Point 213. The Cromwell tanks and the accompanying infantry half-tracks would be easy meat for a Tiger’s 88mm gun; nor would the 75mm gun on the Cromwells pose much of a threat to the heavily-armoured German.
It must have been shortly after 0830 that Wittmann’s vast Tiger tank ‘expoded’ into the midst of the British force. The leading elements of A Squadron, having reached their objective unopposed, were confidently taking-stock of their position. At the front Colonel Cranley had just joined Major Scott and Major Wright of A Company 1 RB. Many of the tank crews already had a ‘brew’ on. Behind, still climbing the slope towards Point 213, were the carriers and half-tracks of A Company followed by the light ‘Honey’ tanks of the Sharpshooter’s Reconnaissance Troop. Captain Milner, second-in-command of A Company, was bringing forward some junior officers and a section of Riflemen, in order to receive orders for the next phase of the operation from their seniors at the front. They had just passed the last two Sharpshooters tanks, when Wittmann struck, from the Montbrocq track, about half way up the hill. Milner could only watch helplessly as the two British tanks frantically tried to traverse and depress their guns to engage the Tiger advancing up the slope towards them. At times like this, when instant reaction is called for, the power traverse of a turret must seem frustratingly slow. They never made it. Wittmann’s huge 88mm gun erupted, and the first two shots destroyed both tanks, effectively blocking the road, and thereby isolating the rest of A Squadron up at Point 213. Wittmann now turned his attention towards the town and the rear of the British column. Within minutes most of the half-tracks of A Company 1RB, which were strung out along the road from Villers-Bocage, were ablaze as Wittmann motored down the line. One 6-pounder anti-tank gun, manned by Sergeant Bray and his crew of Riflemen, swung quickly into action - and was blown to bits by the mighty Tiger’s gun. The road was strewn with bodies and burning vehicles, while men sought what cover they could find in the ditches and hedges. Further up the slope towards Point 213, Milner could only watch this carnage with horror.
Satisfied that he had blocked any chance of a British withdrawal, Wittmann left this scene of mayhem behind him and motored on down into Villers-Bocage in search of further easy pickings. Next he met the light Honey tanks of the Sharpshooters Reconnaissance Troop. They, too, proved to be no match for the Tiger; within a few seconds all were reduced to burning hulks.
Now is the time to follow Wittmann’s route down into Villers-Bocage, taking with you a clear picture of Point 213. Drive back down the hill, under the dual carriage-way and on into the town. Shortly before the road bends right, from near the garage on the right, you will be able to compare the view with the picture on page 118. Park near the TOTAL Garage and turn to face the road towards Point 213 (photo p110). The tanks of RHQ were parked in the area of the pedestrian crossings ahead of you.
A Sherman Firefly on the hill to Point 213. The gun traversed to meet the threat from Wittmann’s Tiger - but never made it.
Carnage on the road leading up to Point 213. The remains of the anti-tank guns of A Coy IRB after Wittmann’s struck.
British dead littered the roadside ditch at Point 213.
In Villers-Bocage main street, Major Carr saw the smoke and heard the noise of firing ahead at Pt 213. A Squadron had either encountered an enemy force or come under artillery fire. Perhaps the Colonel, who was up with A Squadron, would need further reinforcements. Leaving the other RHQ tanks, Carr decided to investigate. He started to drive towards Point 213 - and met a Tiger tank advancing towards him out of the smoke. Following a quick order to his gunner to fire, he watched in dismay as the 75mm shell bounced off the Tiger’s armour, without even slowing the German’s progress. Wittmann’s gunner replied, and within seconds Carr’s tank was a blazing inferno, with all the crew dead or wounded. Wittmann drove calmly past the wreck and, with his next shot, similarily destroyed the Colonel’s tank. The RSM had already started a hasty withdrawal. He had not got far before a third shell from the Tiger crashed into his tank. With every prospect of more successes ahead Wittmann pressed on, round the bend and down the main street towards the road junction at the far end.
Easy pickings - a knocked-out Honey of the Sharpshooters Reconnaissance Troop.
The remaining Cromwell tank in the RHQ group was that of Captain Pat Dyas. Wounded in the North African desert in 1942, Dyas had only rejoined the Sharp-shooters shortly before D Day, although no specific appointment was avail-able. He would come ‘as spare captain in RHQ; we’ll doubtless find something for you’. And so, with that rather imprecise role, Dyas was commanding the fourth RHQ tank in Villers-Bocage that morning. Prudently, when the other three tanks stopped in the main street, Dyas had backed his tank into a garden at right-angles to the street - and waited.
Captain Pat Dyas
There are some days when every fall of the dice seems to bring misfortune. It was misfortune that Colonel Cranley and A Squadron group were now isolated at Point 213.
Looking northeast from Villers-Bocage towards the high ground of Pt 213, 1998. When Wittmann struck, A Squadron was at the top of the hill, A Company strung out on the slope towards it. Wittmann motored down this road into the town and destroyed the tanks of RHQ in the area where the cars are shown on this photograph.
It was misfortune that Major Carr, the regimental second-in-command was now a casualty. And it was misfortune indeed that shortly before Wittmann made his dramatic entry into Villers-Bocage that morning, Dyas’ gunner had asked permission to leave the tank ‘to answer the call of nature’. Dyas agreed, but, having heard the sound of gunfire ahead, told him to run over to the Colonel’s tank and try to find out what was going on. Had Wittmann passed the muzzle of Dyas’ gun five minutes earlier or later, an armoured-piercing round, at a range less than 20 yards, would doubtless have ended his journey there and then - a broken track or a jammed turret would have sufficed. Although the Cromwell’s 75mm gun could not penetrate the Tiger’s frontal or side armour, it could certainly have blown off a track at point-blank range. Dyas heard the Colonel’s and RSM’s tanks explode. Quickly he ordered his wireless operator to climb into the gunner’s seat and prepare for action. But it was too late. To his utter frustration, Dyas could only watch Wittmann’s huge Tiger tank lumber by, its commander oblivious of the threat to his flank. Perhaps fortune favours the brave, in which case Wittmann was admirably qualified for his ample supply of luck.
Liutenant-Colonel Lord Cranley, Commanding Officer of the Sharpshooters.
As soon as his new gunner was installed, Dyas ordered the driver to start up and ‘follow that tank’. If he could sneak up on the Tiger from behind he might be able to destroy it with a shot in its more thinly armoured rear. The Cromwell swung out left onto the main street as Dyas set about stalking his prey.
On reaching the Caumont junction at the west end of the main street Wittmann ordered the driver to slow down. Peering round the corner to the right he could make out the long barrel of a Sherman Firefly’s 17-pounder gun. Simultaneously, Sergeant Lockwood, the Firefly commander, hearing the clatter of tank tracks and, expecting it to be one of his own regimental tanks returning from further forward, realised with horror that he was confronted by the vast outline of a Tiger tank. Frantically he ordered ‘Tank Action’. Wittmann fired first and the shop behind Lock wood’s tank collapsed in a shower of rubble and dust. Lockwood returned fire, but his shot merely glanced off the angled plates of the Tiger’s turret.
Realising that he was now confronting a sizeable force, Wittmann quickly reversed out of trouble, turned his tank round and drove back up the main street again, round the bend at the top - and met Dyas’ Cromwell. As it advanced towards him Dyas realised that it was not the vulnerable rear of the Tiger that now confronted him, but its thickly armoured front. But the Tiger’s formidable gun was pointing the other way, towards the obvious threat from which it had just retired. This gave Dyas sufficient time to get off two rounds, as he watched the German turret traverse slowly round towards him. Both rounds struck the Tiger squarely at a range of about 70 yards - and, to Dyas’ utter dismay, both rounds bounced-off. Neither halted nor even slowed the advancing German. By now the Tiger’s gun had swung round onto the Cromwell, and, as Dyas and his crew tried frantically to fire again, one round of 88mm crashed into their tank, hitting it at the bottom of the turret. The effect was devastating. Dyas was blown clean out of the tank, landing on the road. The acting-gunner was killed instantly. And the driver, who managed to clamber out of the stricken tank, was cut down by a burst of machine-gun fire as he ran across the road. Within a few minutes a column of smoke was spiralling up from the tank. Wittmann continued his journey east, passing the wrecks of the four Sharpshooters RHQ tanks, his own undamaged by at least five British hits.
Looking west along the main street. Wittmann s Tiger met Lockwood’s Firefly at the junction at the far end.
Dyas could only watch him go, before crossing the road to the RSM’s tank. Here he found the wireless headset hanging outside the tank. He was quickly able to contact Colonel Cranley, still forward with A Squadron at Point 213, tell him of the devastation in the town, and warn him that a Tiger tank was moving east towards him. Cranley replied that they, too, were under attack. As Dyas spoke to his commanding officer, a burst of machine-gun fire from the withdrawing German whipped over his head, causing him to cut short the conversation and dive over a nearby hedge into a small garden. To his amazement he found a young French girl hiding in the garden. Together they hid briefly in a pigsty while she explained, remarkably calmly considering the machine-gun rounds passing just overhead, that she knew all the back alleys of Villers-Bocage. She then proceeded to lead Dyas safely back to join the rest of the Sharpshooters at the west end of the town. On arrival he explained to Major Aird, B Squadron commander, that the Colonel and A Squadron were cut off and that Major Carr, the second-in-command, was either dead or seriously wounded. Without further delay Major Aird assumed command of the Sharpshooters and told Dyas to take over as Adjutant.
Captain Dyas’ Cromwell tank after its encounter with Wittmann’s Tiger. To the right is the road towards Pt 213.
Among those at Point 213 Captain Christopher Milner, second-in-command of A Company 1 RB, had not been idle. Having watched Wittmann’s first strike, he had immediately set about sorting out the chaos. With the company commander, Major Wright, up ahead with Colonel Cranley, he effectively took over command of the remainder of A Company. He posted sentries to ensure that they were not caught napping again, organised a hasty defensive position, and arranged for the treatment of the wounded. While he was frantically busy, up at Point 213 there was something of a lull, as the Colonel tried to find out what was happening and decide what to do. Vehicle movement back from the high ground was effectively cut off by the burning tanks blocking the road. It is difficult to be exact about the sequence and timings of events at Point 213. When Cranley told Dyas that they were under attack, it seems most likely that he was actually reflecting Wittmann’s first strike, largely on A Company 1 RB. While action may begin suddenly, in a surprise strike, it seldom ends quickly. With two of A Squadron’s tanks, the carriers and half-tracks of A Company and the Honey tanks of the Reconnaissance Troop all destroyed, and countless dead and wounded, the confusion of battle will certainly have lasted some time. It is entirely reasonable that the commanding officer, on the top of Point 213, a quarter of a mile from the attack, might think, when he spoke to Dyas probably about 15 to 20 minutes later, that they were still under attack, although, with the advantage if hindsight, this seems unlikely.
It was, perhaps, an hour and a half later that Milner heard the noise of tanks approaching. Doubtless this was a relief force on its way to reinforce them. That hope was short-lived, when the other four Tiger tanks of Wittmann’s company struck, doubtless responding to radio orders from their commander. Systematically they destroyed all the remaining A Squadron tanks and machine-gunned anyone who moved. The Cromwells and Shermans proved no match for the vastly more powerful Tigers. Within a few minutes all were reduced to burning wrecks. A Squadron of the Sharpshooters had virtually ceased to exist. The battle, if battle it could be called, was brief, brutal and totally one-sided. The crews could only take what cover they could find from the withering fire. As the German tanks moved on, German infantry started to round-up those who had survived. Among the dead was A Squadron commander, Major Scott. Colonel Cranley, Major Wright, A Company commander, and all those still alive at Point 213 became prisoners-of-war - all except Milner.
A Cromwell - no match for the Tigers and Panthers - blazes away after receiving a direct hit.
Point 213 German troops examine the destroyed tanks of A Squadron of the Sharpshooters.
As the German infantry started to round up the survivors, Milner was near the summit, where a small lane runs off north from the main road, beside a cottage. Capture or escape were the only options, and Milner just had time to run through the gate into the orchard on the right of the lane, hoping that he had not been seen. But an alert German infantryman had noticed his flight and proceeded to stalk him, calling on him to surrender. To avoid capture and get a better view of the German locations, Milner climbed a tree in the orchard - and found an enemy unit setting up a defensive position just a few yards away, on the far side of a hedge below his tree. Clearly escape was not going to be easy; it might be sensible to await nightfall. When, as he watched and waited, a British artillery bombardment fell on the area, he decided that he would use this to cover his escape. Descending quickly from his tree, he crawled out of the orchard, found a convenient and well-concealed dip in the ground, curled up and slept till dusk.
Point 213 in 1998. The gate on the left by the cul-de-sac sign is where Captain Milner escaped.
After dark, Milner set out to rejoin the rest of 1 RB west of Villers-Bocage. He crossed the road and took a wide flanking course south. It proved to be an eventful journey. Early on he found a farm trough in a field. Realising that he had had nothing to eat or drink that day, he filled his beret and had a satisfying drink before moving on. At one stage, alerted by the sound of heavy snores, he found himself in the middle of a German infantry position. Fortunately they had failed to post a sentry - all were sleeping, with their rifles piled up in the centre. Mastering the urge to waken them rudely with a burst of fire or a grenade, he crept on. Some time later he was challenged by a British voice, but, aware that itchy fingers would be on triggers that night, he thought it prudent to melt back into the dark. A Verey pistol fired, and he just had time to dive over a nearby bank before the illuminating flare burst overhead. After a pause to allow things to quieten down he continued his hazardous journey. It was with some relief that, around dawn on 14 June, Milner met 5 RTR, south-west of Villers-Bocage - the only man to escape from the mayhem at Point 213.
Another who was lucky not to be caught in the action on the road to Point 213 was Brigadier Hinde. He had followed Colonel Cranley forward and must have witnessed some of Wittmann’s slaughter of A Company and the Reconnaissance Troop, before rapidly retracing his steps back through the town. At about 1000 he ordered 1/7 Queens to move into Villers-Bocage. Thereafter he seems to have disappeared from the battlefield, not reappearing until late in the afternoon. Colonel Gordon, the Queens commanding officer, quickly sent forward his Anti-tank Platoon, while the rifle companies dismounted from their lorries at Amayé and walked the two miles into Villers-Bocage, arriving sometime after 1100.
On leaving the town Wittmann had returned to his company, changed to a different tank and, accompanied by two of his Tigers which had just destroyed A Squadron at Point 213, and one Mk4 tank, he returned once again to the town centre of Villers-Bocage. But by now the British were waiting. Major Aird, now commanding the Sharpshooters, had despatched Lieutenant Cotton and his troop to move round the southern outskirts of the town, avoiding the main street, and try to reach Point 213. After a short brush with some Germans on the edge of the town, Cotton considered it unwise to try to cross the difficult railway embankment and swan off into open country with his troop. Prudently he returned to the town centre and established a well-prepared ambush position. With his tanks concealed and set back from the main street, in the area of the town square, he hoped to get a short-range flanking shoot at any enemy tank driving along the main street. Determined not to miss, Cotton ensured that his tank guns were sited through the gun barrels at easily identifiable marks on the opposite walls. He and his troop waited. And in a narrow alley just further west Colonel Gordon of 1/7 Queens similarily deployed a 6-pounder anti-tank gun. Wittmann’s luck was about to run out; the trap was baited, and it was a trap into which he and his tanks were about to enter.
Once again Wittmann drove down the main street of Villers-Bocage, passing the now smouldering remains of the four RHQ tanks which he had earlier destroyed. The action that followed was short, sharp and conclusive. Wittmann himself passed Cotton’s ambush but was disabled by a well-placed shot from the Queens anti-tank gun. Cotton’s troop completed the destruction. Sergeant Bramall’s 17-pounder Firefly destroyed the second Tiger; Corporal Home, having missed the Mk4 with his first shot, motored out into the main street and knocked-out the German tank with a shot in its vulnerable rear. The third Tiger was also destroyed, in one of the smaller streets just to the south.
Wittmann’s second battle-run into Villers-Bocage passed the smouldering remains of the RHQ Sharpshooter tanks. Dyas’ wrecked Cromwell is just short of the bend in the road. The other vehicles and the MkIV tank on the left are part of the German force which took over the town after the battle.
The same scene in 1998. The motorcycle passes the spot where Dyas’ tank was destroyed.
Among the locals in Villers-Bocage that day was the son of the owner of the Château de Villers, just south of the town. Although the family had been allowed to stay in a wing of their home, the Château had been used as a German HQ throughout the war. On 13 Jun Count Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre, aware of the intense fighting, had donned his Red Cross armband and gone into the town to see whether he could help with any casualties. He watched Wittmann’s second battle-run down the main street. When the German tank was hit and the crew started to clamber out, he ran forward to help the injured. As he helped the uninjured Wittmann to the ground he asked whether it was not rather rash to take on the British almost alone. ‘Certainly not’, replied Wittmann, ‘I knew that the others would follow me’, and he and his crew, like Dyas before him, disappeared into the back-streets of the town to make good their escape. De Clermont-Tonnerre was struck by the confidence, indeed haughty arrogance, of the German.
Wittmann’s knocked out tiger in Villers-Bocage Main Street. Note the effects of the RAF bombing which obliterated the town after the battle.
After the fighting - the main street of Villers-Bocage. Wittmann’s Tiger is in the foreground with a further knocked-out Tiger down the street alongside a wrecked MkIV.
Viliers-Bocage main street, looking east, 1998. Both of Wittmann’s battle-runs came down this street. The town has been completely rebuilt so it is impossible to pin-point the location of Wittmann’s Tiger when it was destroyed.
By now the rifle companies of 1/7 Queens were arriving. Gordon quickly deployed them - not a moment too soon. The Germans, too, were amassing forces. The Tiger tanks of Captain Mobius’ 1 Company 101 SS Heavy Tank Battalion had arrived from Noyers-Boacge, about five miles north-east, and been joined by infantry from 2 Panzer Division and a few Mk4 tanks from Panzer Lehr which happened to be nearby. This force started to infiltrate the town from the east just as Gordon and his Queensmen established their defences near the western end. As the afternoon wore on tank-hunting and infiltration parties of both sides clashed in the streets of Villers-Bocage. It became a ‘soldiers’ battle, in which tenacity and fighting qualities counted most, and in which a colonel could be as personally involved as a private, as Colonel Gordon, on meeting a Tiger tank in one of the streets, recounts:
‘This was altogether too much for me. I am ashamed to say that I grabbed a PIAT Team and rushed into a nearby shop to see if we could get a shot at the Tiger from a first floor window - not really, I suppose, what a battalion commander ought to do. I remember the appalled faces of the owners, particularily as we made a terrible mess of their bedroom when we fired. But PIATs were notoriously inaccurate and unreliable, and the round fell short. We moved quickly to another house which was nearer the Tiger, which now seemed to be stationary. We hit it with two shots, but seemed to do absolutely no damage at all - most frustrating. Perhaps we shook up the crew a bit, gave them a headache or something, for the tank started to reverse away back round the bend.’
But, while the Germans seemed prepared to throw in more troops in an attempt to seize the town, 1/7 Queens and the battered remains of the Sharpshooters were left to their own devices. Doubtless the absence of Brigadier Hinde, whose whereabouts throughout much of the day remains a mystery, explains the lack of decision and command by the British. As the afternoon wore on, Gordon, who had established his command post near the road junction where Wittmann had encountered Sergeant Lockwood, realised that the enemy were getting stronger, and that unless he was reinforced, his battalion must either pull back or eventually be over-run. This must be a decision for the brigade commander. Leaving his second-in-command, Major Griffiths, in temporary command, Gordon drove back in his jeep to see Hinde, who was now back at Brigade HQ west of the town. He explained the situation very clearly and stated that he and his Queensmen were quite prepared to fight to the last round, if that was what Hinde required. But if Hinde wanted to pull them out, he must give the order quickly, before the situation in Villers-Bocage became so confused, with hand-to-hand fighting in the streets against an ever-increasing enemy, that orderly withdrawal would be impossible. Hinde did not delay; ‘Well, Desmond, its no good trying to win a VC here. Pull the battalion back while you still have tight control of them’.
After quickly locating a new position on the high-ground near Amayé, west of the town, Gordon returned to his command post in Villers-Bocage, sent Griffiths back to prepare the new position and gave orders for the withdrawal. It was shortly after 2000 on 13 June that Gordon stood at the road junction and watched his companies withdraw. ‘First bloody time the Queens have ever had to retreat,’ growled one soldier as he passed his commanding officer. ‘And I very much hope it’ll be the last,’ replied Gordon. By 2020 the British had left Villers-Bocage - to which they did not return for nearly two months.
The night passed quietly for Gordon and his battalion, but at dawn the Germans attacked. Halted by well-controlled artillery fire, they were put to flight when Major Reid, one of the Queens company commanders, reacting quickly to the moment of indecision in the attack when the pendulum of battle seemed to hang limp, suddenly led his company in a fierce counter-attack. There were sporadic German attacks throughout 14 June, but none managed to penetrate the British position, and by nightfall the attacks seemed to have petered out completely. However, at a meeting that afternoon, General Bucknall, commander of XXX Corps, decided that progress by 50 Division in the Lingèvres area (see Chapter 8) had been insufficient to allow a link-up between it and 7 Armoured Division, whose position, some six miles further south, was now somewhat isolated and vulnerable to German attack. 22 Armoured Brigade must withdraw overnight 14/15 June. To many, including Gordon, this was an extremely disappointing decision. Convinced that they could have held on indefintely, if reinforced, Gordon considered that a strong position held in the area of Amayé would have posed a huge threat to the Germans, forcing Panzer Lehr Division to withdraw or be cut off, and providing a strongly-held launch-pad for future operations deep in enemy territory.
For his action at Villers-Bocage Michael Wittmann was awarded Cross Swords to the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross and promoted to Hauptsturmführer (captain). He was killed, along with his crew, 8 August 1944 south of Caen.
Often it is the commander who keeps his nerve and the soldier who goes on fighting longest who win the day. In his splendid anthology, Other Men’s Flowers, Field Marshal Earl Wavell records his favourite military maxim, ‘Man cannot tell, but Allah knows, how much the other side was hurt’. He suggests that ‘when things are going badly in battle the best tonic is to take one’s mind off one’s own troubles by considering what a rotten time one’s opponent must be having’. The Germans were certainly ‘having a rotten time’. By the end of the battle the wreckage of six Tiger tanks lay in the streets of Villers-Bocage - nearly half the fighting strength of 101 SS Heavy Tank Battalion. They had thrown everything available into the battle, and now had no further reserves upon which to call. Of course they had the advantage of the Tiger tank, but they won, not because their soldiers fought better, but because the nerve of their commanders lasted longer. They also had, in Michael Wittmann, a supremely brave soldier and a junior commander who always sought to impose his personality on the battlefield - at Villers-Bocage with devastating results.
It is very easy for the post-war, arm-chair tactician, with the advantage of hindsight, to criticise those who had responsibilities for taking decisions in battle - easy, usually unwise, and often unkind. The Sharpshooters leading squadron had certainly been destroyed. But the other squadrons and 1/7 Queens were still an effective fighting force. And 22 Armoured Brigade still had 5 RTR uncommitted. Behind them was 131 Brigade, with one armoured regiment and two lorried infantry battalions which General Erskine, commander of 7 Armoured Division, could have sent forward. And further back still, General Bucknall had 49 Infantry Division uncommitted. It seems a pity that the destruction of just one part of one regimental battlegroup was allowed to over-ride the fact that there were at least another ten battlegroups which could have joined the fray, perhaps decisively. The British senior commanders seem to have been so obsessed with their own problems that they had little time to consider the greater worries which con-fronted ‘the other side’. One cannot help wondering how the battle of Normandy might have fared if more aggressive and confident leadership at brigade, division and corps level had been displayed on 13 June.
Major-General Desmond Gordon (in the 1970s).
Perhaps an opportunity was lost. And perhaps it is not unrelated that by the time the British were finally to capture Villers-Bocage on 4 August, General Bucknall of XXX Corps, General Erskine of 7 Armoured Division, and Brigadier Hinde of 22 Armoured Brigade had been removed from their posts. Colonel Desmond Gordon was also removed from his post - to be promoted to Brigadier and take command of 151 Infantry Brigade a few days after the Battle of Villers-Bocage.
On the afternoon of 14 June, and in an effort to cover the withdrawal of 7 Armoured Division from the disaster of Villers-Bocage, the town was almost completely destroyed by Allied bombers. Hardly a building survived.