CHAPTER 1

The Canadians

It was on 3 July 1943 that orders started to descend the chain of command from Headquarters First Canadian Army, informing 3rd Canadian Division that they were to begin preparations and training for the Allied invasion of North-West Europe. Lieutenant General McNaughton’s letter read:

‘The 3 Cdn Div has been selected for assault training with a view to taking part in the assault in Operation OVERLORD. The plan for this operation will not be available for some months…’

The selection of a Canadian division for the Assault Phase was both entirely predictable and necessary. The Canadians now formed a significant part of the Allied armies assembling in the United Kingdom and they were the only members of the Allied armies who had direct experience of attacking the German’s Atlantic Wall. This experience had been bought at a heavy price, with Canadian bodies littering the shingle of the beach at Dieppe.

The Canadian Army

In the twenty years following 1918, the Canadian Army that had earned the highest reputation in the Great War, amongst both friend and foe alike, had dwindled to a force of a mere 5,000 Regular Army soldiers. Throughout this period, without a military threat to Canada, the Army’s main role had become that of ‘local police actions in aid of the civil powers’. Even the officer who eventually commanded II Canadian Corps in action, Lieutenant General Guy Symonds, gained a large portion of his experience between the wars commanding operations such as strike breaking. However, Canada’s latent military strength lay in its well established, locally recruited, volunteer militia, which had been reconstituted after the Great War under its original names, rather than the anonymous battalion 14–18 war numbers.

War is announced to the Canadian people 3 September 1939.

The men who were to land with 3rd Canadian Division came from across Canada. There were the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, nicknamed the ‘Little Black Devils’, the Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada from New Brunswick and the Chaudiere Regiment, one of fifteen French Canadian battalions in the Dominion’s order of battle. However, the North Shore Regiment was the product of an amalgamation between the wars, of militia battalions who, since Victorian times, had recruited from Canadians of French and Scottish extraction. In contrast, the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa and the Canadian Scottish had retained their names and clear connections with the old country. The 3rd Canadian Division’s full order of battle can be found at the end of the book.

The Canadian Army rapidly mobilized at the outbreak of war in 1939. As in the Great War, the militia soldiers were asked to serve overseas and supplemented by volunteer recruits, the Army’s mobilized strength grew quickly. By December 1939, Canadians had started to arrive in Britain with a view to joining the BEF in France, as they had done in the Great War. However, it was apparent that while the men were first rate material, the preparation and training of the division was such, that it would be some time before the Canadian Division could fully take to the field. Before the division was fully prepared, the fall of France in June 1940 meant that the growing number of Canadians would help to defend Britain in its darkest hour.

Part of the first contingent of Canadian troops to leave British Columbia for Britain on board a train at Vancouver.

As the invasion threat subsided, the emphasis switched to training and the growing number of Canadians became some of the best trained Allied troops in Britain. The First Canadian Army eventually consisted of two corps HQs, two armoured divisions, three infantry divisions and two independent armoured brigades, plus a full array of corps and army support and logistics troops.

After two and a half years in Britain, in mid-1943, I Canadian Corps along with 1st Infantry and 5th Armoured Divisions deployed to the Mediterranean, where they took part in fighting in Sicily and in Italy. While diverting the tough Canadian soldiers away from the invasion of Northern Europe, it did allow the Canadian field army and its commanders to gain vital combat experience. When eventually committed to battle in Normandy, the First Canadian Army and HQ II Canadian Corps usually fought with British and other formations, such as the Polish Armoured Division, in order to flesh-out their order of battle.

Dieppe

‘Wednesday, August 19, 1942 – Dieppe. For thousands of Canadians, that was the day stark memory and deep grief were born. It was a day also of full hearted pride. It was a day on which one of the greatest adventures in war’s history flared to its height in battle on the French beaches. It was a day that saw tried out the first complete modern experiment in combined operations – which became a fundamental pre-requisite to Allied victory.’

Ross Munro, Canadian Press

Leaving aside the war reporter’s patriotic gloss, it is no overstatement to say that what at the time seemed to be a ‘terrible reverse’ was in fact ‘fundamental to success’. The ‘costly disaster’ that befell 2nd Canadian Division on the beaches of Dieppe, bought vital experience of conducting an assault on the defences of Hitler’s Atlantic Wall. The lessons learned, arguably, saved many thousands of lives on the beaches of Normandy in 1944. It is, therefore, important to consider Dieppe’s contribution to the plan that the Canadians put into operation on D Day.

Following the success of the St Nazaire raid in destroying a dock capable of berthing a battleship, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten tasked his Combined Operations staff to identify a suitable objective for a larger and more ambitious operation. In 1942, Allied and German attention was focused on the development of radar, which was becoming increasingly important to the conduct of the war. It was feared that the Germans had deployed more advanced equipment since the Bruneval raid earlier in the year. However, German radar sites within striking distance of southern England, were very well defended, and thought to be beyond the capabilities of a traditional small raid. One such site was standing on the cliffs just west of Dieppe, seventy-five miles across the Channel from England.

The Dieppe plan, including the participation of the Canadians, was the subject of many debates between the Combined Operations staff and HQ Home Forces. In its final form, the operation was more of a direct attack than a raid, with no fewer than sixteen specific objectives. The objectives, assigned to the commandos and soldiers of the Anglo-Canadian force, ranged from capturing the cliff top radar site in order to enable an expert to examine the German radar, attacking a Luftwaffe airfield, to the destruction of militarily useful infrastructure around Dieppe. When questioned about the risks inherent of such an ambitious attack and its place in the war’s strategy, Field Marshal Alanbrooke told Churchill that:

‘… no responsible general will be associated with any planning for invasion until we have an operation at least the size of an attack on Dieppe behind us to study and base our plans upon.’

In a night assault, Number 3 and Number 4 Commandos would land and take on two batteries of guns that menaced the shipping’s approaches to Dieppe. After dawn, two battalions of Canadian infantry would land to the east and west of the port and seize high ground. The main force would land in a frontal assault on the beaches at Dieppe. The whole raid was planned to last around eight hours.

There is insufficient space here to cover the Dieppe Raid in any detail but the operation started to go wrong when, with the force still six miles out to sea, it encountered a German patrol boat. This alerted the enemy. Number 3 Commando’s landing failed, while in the main force, there was some confusion and delay before troops landed on Dieppe beach. Elsewhere, there was limited success against strong German ground resistance and air attack. Only Lord Lovat’s Number 4 Commando had been completely successful. Anglo-Canadian casualties numbered 3,371, of which, 667 Canadians were killed, 218 were listed as missing and 1,894 were prisoners of war. The Canadian force had consisted of 5,000 men.

The Lessons and Developments After Dieppe

What had gone wrong? First, the Allies questioned their security. Had the German reconnaissance planes seen the amphibious force assembling or had there been a leak from the troops assigned to the raid? Was an operation order allowed to fall into enemy hands? As a result of these questions, in the run up to D Day security became one of the highest considerations; keeping the invasion secret was paramount. Only those who needed to know would be given such information as was essential for their planning. Movement in southern England would be strictly controlled and once briefed, the invasion troops would be kept in quarantine away from the public. In the air above the ports where the assault craft were assembling, the Allied airforces would keep the Luftwaffe away.

A knocked out Churchill, a burning landing craft and two wounded Canadians on the shingle beach at Dieppe sums up the failure.

The intelligence estimate of the German air, naval and land forces that could be mustered in the six hours of the raid had been incomplete but even so, its findings had been largely ignored by troops and commanders who were eager to get into battle. In preparing the D Day plan, establishing air supremacy and carefully calculating the Germans’ potential build up of divisions in Normandy were fundamental in establishing the required rate of arrival of follow on forces.

Perhaps the greatest problem revealed by Dieppe was that strong German defences were unlikely to be overcome by surprise alone. General Crerar commented:

‘Until the evidence of Dieppe proved otherwise, it had been the opinion in the highest command and staff circles in this country that an assault against a heavily defended coast could be carried out on the basis of securing tactical surprise, and without dependence on overwhelming fire support, in the critical phases of closing the beaches and overrunning the beach defenses.’

The response to this problem was the development of a wide range of fire support craft to subdue the enemy’s coastal defences. Following their experience at Dieppe and the news that one of their divisions was to take part in the invasion’s initial assault, the Canadians took a leading part in formulating the operational requirement for support craft and tactical doctrine for their employment. A series of exercises in secluded parts of the British Isles were conducted with the new equipment. Ideas were put forward, tested and rejected or earmarked for further development. The resulting fire support craft, that were available in significant numbers on D Day, included up-gunned Landing Craft Gun (LCG), the original version of the 6-pounder armament was replaced by a larger craft, mounting two highly effective 4.7-inch guns. A new weapon designed to ‘deluge’ the beach defences with fire was a Landing Craft Tank, converted to fire a devastating salvo of high explosive rockets. Earlier versions mounted 792 rounds of 5-inch (36-pound) rockets, while later versions had salvos totalling 1,100 rockets. Their range was 3,500 yards and could ‘drench’ an area of 750 yards by 150 yards with high explosive. Critical to the effective use of the LCT(R) was the correct positioning of the craft, which was assisted by a simple radar based ranging device. A total of eight LCT(R) were employed against the strong points on Juno Beach.

A landing craft tank converted to carry racks of rockets with which to drench the beach with fire.

Another new craft was the ‘Hedgerow’ conversion of the infantry’s diminutive Landing Craft Assault (LCA). This fired twenty-four 60-pound bombs, which were designed to blast a path through barbed wire and mines at the back of the beach. Other special craft included the ‘Concrete Buster,’ which would engage obstacles and defences in and around German strong points.

One idea to multiply the quantity of fire support available during the run in to the beach that was particularly embraced by the Canadians, was the use of army field artillery firing from landing craft. After a considerable amount of trial, error and technical development, it was found that the ordinary 25-pounder guns could accurately engage targets on a beach out to a range of 12,500 yards. In trials at the Combined Ops Training Centre at Inverrary in Scotland, Canadian gunners demonstrated that they could keep up an impressive rate of overhead fire, yet maintain accuracy. The Canadian official historian recorded that:

‘In initial experiments, a battery of guns supported a company of infantry and this was gradually increased until several regiments of guns were firing with an infantry Brigade as it landed.’

105 mm SP gun, Priest, and its Canadian crew.

The development and initial training phases culminated in October 1943 with Exercise PIRATE. Designed to validate the emerging amphibious assault doctrine and tactics, the exercise scenario was based on overcoming the vaunted Atlantic Wall. Central to the exercise’s aims was the testing of the integrated fire plan that General Crerar had proposed. Lieutenant Colonel Stacey recalled that ‘He emphasized the need for overpowering fire support to get the assault onto the beach and through the defences’. Carrying the Canadian 3rd Division to the exercise assault area on the Dorset coast, was Force J (Juno), which, now renamed, had in fact been the naval task force that had taken the Canadians to Dieppe. A reporter for the Canadian Press, Ross Munro, watched the exercise:

‘This highly secret exercise drew most of the senior officers in Britain to Bournemouth to see the Canadians land at Studland Bay. The feature was a demonstration of the new fire support plan.

‘It was the newest thing in combined operations and was conceived to be the answer to an opposed landing on a fortified beach. The 3rd Division had developed this fire plan in the months of training. Now it was being displayed for the High Command.

‘They watched the landing from the headland by Studland Bay. It was done in broad daylight, a significant hint of what was to happen later, and we saw the fleet of several hundred landing craft and the ships carrying the Division come out of Southampton and sail towards the beaches in perfect formation. The destroyers came up and opened fire.

‘They pumped shells on to the flat beach; then the Canadian artillery on the landing craft drummed forth with its barrage from the sea. At first, most of the shells fell short but the range was corrected and the beach was showered with bursting high explosives. The rocket craft sailed in towards the shore and did their stuff, hitting the target dead on. Small craft swept the beach with fire from close in and infantry in assault landing craft landed under this curtain of fire, as fighter planes cannoned and machine-gunned dummy pillboxes. It was a minute but accurate demonstration of the D Day plan. Many features had to be tied up and improved, but the great secret was this new conception of devastating fire support from the sea. Everything was to be done to give the infantry more than a fighting chance once they got ashore. Dieppe had clearly shown a need for this.’

Even with land, sea and air firepower integrated to form a powerful rolling blow, the fact that at Dieppe, armour had landed behind the vulnerable infantry and had struggled to get off the beach, was a factor that needed to be addressed. ‘Hobart’s Funnies’ of 79th Armoured division provided the solution. In April 1943, Major General Hobart took command of the Division and, with Combined Operations assistance, studied the experience gained in the Mediterranean and at Dieppe. This he combined with an analysis of the German defences. The result was a series of armoured fighting vehicles or ‘funnies’ that were manned by men of armoured regiments and the Royal Engineers. Each vehicle was designed to address a specific beach assault problem.

Major General Hobart

Duplex Drive (DD) Valentine amphibious tank.

DD Sherman tank with its screen down.

Winston Churchill’s enthusiasm for ‘gadgets’ and technology gave impetus to the development of new weapons, which he encouraged in a Cabinet memo:

‘This war is not, however, a war of masses of men hurling masses of shells at each other. It is by devising new weapons and above all by scientific leadership that we shall best cope with the enemy’s superior strength.’

Major General Hobart took over development, forging a creative atmosphere and led the work to refine some ‘Heath Robinson’ designs into effective battlefield weapon systems. In parallel, he developed tactical doctrine for effective use of his ‘zoo of funnies’. One of Hobart’s first developments was the amphibious tank, capable of landing in the leading wave. The idea of ‘swimming tanks’ was not new. However, in July 1943 Hobart’s demonstration of launching the Duplex Drive Valentine tank from a tank-landing craft persuaded the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to authorise the conversion of 500 valuable Shermans. The key features of this ‘funny’, were a tall canvas flotation screen and a pair of small propellers that could be driven by the engine instead of the tracks. Viewing a later exercise at Studland Bay, Montgomery, to the Navy’s horror, supported the proposal that the DD tanks were to lead the infantry ashore during the assault. However, these ‘unseaworthy craft’ with only a low freeboard, were limited to operations in calm seas with a wind strength of less than Force 4. 79th Armoured Division trained ten armoured regiments to use the DD tanks at Stokes Bay on the Solent and on various Scottish lochs. These regiments included the Canadian 1st Hussars and the Fort Garry Horse, who were to lead 3rd Canadian Division ashore. Lieutenant Little of the Fort Garry Horse described his first encounter with a DD tank:

Badge of the 79th Armoured Division

‘This little barge turned and headed towards us, and as it rolled you could see it touch the bottom of the lake and started to roll up. This was a tremendous surprise. Then as it rolled forward the tracks kept coming higher; and then as it got to the edge of the water, down came the screen and there was the gun. This was a surprise and a shock.’

The Allies went to extraordinary lengths to ensure secrecy, so that the German defenders would share Lieutenant Little’s surprise and shock.

Most numerous of the ‘funnies’ were the Armoured Vehicles Royal Engineer (AVRE). A conversion of the heavily armoured Churchill Tank, the AVREs’ main weapon was a Petard Demolition Gun that fired a 40-pound projectile, known as a ‘Flying Dustbin’, out to a range of 200 metres. The gun’s shaped charge warhead, most accurate at a range of eighty metres, was designed to take on steel and concrete defences on the coast of France. A variety of obstacle crossing devices could be carried on the back of the AVRE. The most commonly used was a fascine of logs for dropping in anti-tank ditches or craters.

AVRE with its Petard Demolition Gun.

Two pictures from a series showing an AVRE crossing a small section of mock Atlantic wall, using a small box girdar bridge and a Chepsale fascine.

Another version of the AVRE was a vehicle mounting a device for placing charges against sea walls built by the Germans. The Royal Engineers carried out much of the development work on training areas in Hampshire. A piece of ‘Atlantic Wall’ was built on Hankley Common (near Aldershot) that can still be seen today, along with breaches made in it by the AVREs during trials.

Twenty year old Lance Corporal Stuart Stear of the Royal Engineers, who was to land on Juno Beach with the Canadians, described seeing a series of encouraging exercises:

‘In 1944, 619 Company was based in Troon, Scotland and nearby at Mocham Loch we built a replica of the Atlantic Wall It took us a month to pour the concrete and complete the building work and not nearly so long for Hobart’s Funnies of 79th Armoured Division to literally smash it up. It gave us a lot of confidence to see how quickly their great big demolition guns destroyed it and to watch the infantry and DD tanks practising coming ashore.’

A Sherman flail tank, specifically designed for mine clearance, and dubbed the ‘crab’.

Flamethrowing tank known as the Crocodile.

Completing the line-up of new vehicles were the Crab and the Crocodile. With resistance organizations reporting that the Germans were laying more and more mines along the coast, and appreciating how slow and ponderous conventional mine clearance was, a quicker less vulnerable method had to be developed. Again under Hobart’s direction, the unreliable Matilda Scorpion, as used at El Alamein, was developed on a Sherman chassis into a successful operational vehicle. The Crab or Sherman Flail, mounted a revolving drum with heavy chains that beat the ground, setting off mines and ripping up wire as it advanced at 10 MPH. Second Lieutenant Ian Hamerton had envisaged ‘elegant armoured advances across the plains of Europe’ when he joined the 22nd Dragoons. He was disabused of this traditional notion during a visit by General Hobart:

‘You have been chosen to sweep away all the mines in front of the army.’ There was a silence as we pondered unenthusiastically the role of minesweepers. Hobo left behind him a sad and disillusioned collection of men. No sweeping across the fields of France in our cruiser tanks – just sweeping mines.’

Unglamorous maybe but crewing a flail was a vital task that did much to help the Canadians get off Juno Beach and through the Atlantic Wall.

The Crocodile was a flame thrower conversion of a standard Churchill tank. Towing a 400 gallon armoured trailer, the Crocodile could squirt a lance of flame a hundred yards long, at a rate of four gallons a second. The result was a fearsome weapon system but as it was delivered only just before the invasion, few troops of the assault divisions knew about the Crocodile and little use was made of flame on D Day, despite numerous suitable targets.

The divisional historian recorded that up to the last moment challenges to the 79th’s technical inventiveness were received.

‘An unexpected difficulty appeared a few weeks before D Day. A very daring reconnaissance confirmed a fear hitherto only hinted at by geologists – some beaches [including Mike Sector of Juno Beach] had strips of a peculiarly soft blue clay, in which all vehicles would bog. A geologically similar beach was found at Brancaster in Norfolk and a special trials wing had to be very quickly established… to evolve solutions to this new problem.

‘As a result a proportion of the AVREs were equipped with Bobbins on which were wound coir and tubular scaffolding carpets laid by the AVRE as it advanced up the beach. By means of these carpets, the Crabs and tanks would be able to ascend the beach and sand dunes.’

The final lesson of Dieppe was that some officers attributed the failure to ‘bad luck’. However, Allied Combined Operations staff were determined, in the time available before the invasion, to make their own good luck, with some highly detailed planning of the enormous undertaking that lay ahead.

Training and Preparation

3rd Canadian Division had been training hard for the invasion since the autumn of 1943. The following quotes from General Keller’s weekly progress report to Canada dated 22 January 1944 give a flavour of the preparations.

‘North. Shore Regt, who represented this Division at a Marching and Shooting competition, will carry out a six day trek commencing 24 Jan. The trek will include field firing at Canford Heath (including 3-inch mortars) and street fighting in Southampton. … 7 Cdn Brigade: Combined Ops training both dryshod and with craft, continued.… Regiment de Chaudiere carried out further training in clearing booby traps. 2 Cdn Armoured Brigade’s range firing will take place at Lydd from 24–30 Jan.’

While the assault troops were training, others were making technical preparations. Lieutenant General Morgan described another essential aspect of training and preparations before more ambitious exercises could be undertaken:

‘… every single vehicle that is to be discharged on to a beach must be waterproofed, that is so protected that it will suffer minimum harm from immersion in the sea to a depth of some feet … for instance, a Jeep could be driven along the seabed with nothing protruding above the surface but the drivers head and a few inches of air intake pipe.’

Lance Corporal Stear was amongst the many soldiers who had to learn the techniques for covering his vehicle’s electrics with specially developed, colour coded, material made from grease and asbestos fibres. The process included the fitting of extension pipes and specially manufactured splash plates. In this aspect of assault landing preparations, the British and Canadians were at a disadvantage. They had over one hundred different types of non-armoured fighting vehicles and engines in service compared to only twelve in the US inventory:

Canadian 3 inch mortar crew – Training early 1944

‘My first amphibious landing training was a vehicle-waterproofing course at Warminster on Salisbury Plain. Here we were taught how to fit extensions to exhausts and engine breathing pipes to enable vehicles to drive from the landing craft onto the beach. Our final exam was to drive the vehicles down a ramp into a tank full of water, to test the sealing of the plugs in the vehicle hull. If you drove through successfully, you passed but if your vehicle stopped in the tank, you were sent back to keep practising!’

With D Day approaching, exercise followed exercise, as all aspects of the coming invasion were practised. The 3rd Canadian Division embarked at Southampton and from the small ports of the Isle of Wight and set out for the amphibious exercise SODAMINT, which took place at Bracklesham Bay and Selsey Bill. According to the exercise intelligence summary, the small coastal town of Emsworth was held by the German 582 Grenadier Regiment. The ‘Germans’ were in fact being played by British Home Guard and troops from holding units who were earmarked as battle casualty replacements for D Day.

The final exercise, even though it wasn’t known as such until much later, was Exercise FABIUS III. It took place in early May. The Canadians used almost the exact D Day landing tables and practised the operation from embarkation through the assault, to the setting up of the beach organization. The smooth flow of entries in the battle log indicate that the exercise, with its multitude of components, went according to plan and units reported steady well organized progress.

With training complete, final preparations were under way. The routine of the last few weeks was broken by a series of visits by ‘Distinguished Visitors’ to 3rd Canadian Division. On 13 May, General Eisenhower visited 9 Cdn Brigade at Rooksbury Camp where, according to the war diary he was greeted by the Brigade’s massed pipe bands under Pipe Major Corsterphine of the Highland Light Infantry of Canada. Amongst other visitors the 3rd Division was the Right Honourable WLM King, Prime Minister of Canada who met all officers and Senior NCOs on 18 May. On 20 May, Montgomery addressed the division’s senior officers at a Southampton Girls Grammar School amidst great security.

A Canadian infantry platoon photographed in a Landing Craft Assault during Exercise FABIUS III.

D Day Plans

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Churchill and Roosevelt ordered the formation of a combined military staff, under Lieutenant General Morgan. As Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) he was to plan Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of North-West Europe. The scale and depth of planning and the preparation required to break through Hitler’s vaunted Atlantic Wall was unprecedented in military history. However, even this plan to assault the Normandy coast, was expanded by General Montgomery on his return from the Mediterranean. In his Presentation of Plans at HQ 21st Army Group, on 7th April 1944, Montgomery explained that he had lengthened the frontage of the Allied assault to sixty miles by increasing the number of landing beaches to five. The amphibious landings were to be preceded by the insertion of three airborne divisions on the flanks of the invasion area. His logic was that with a longer frontage the Germans would be less able to concentrate their forces for a decisive counter attack against the Allied beachhead.

1st British Corps was to command the landings at Sword and Juno Beaches and, therefore, took operational control of 3rd Canadian Division until such time as the Canadian II Corps HQ came ashore at about D+20. XXX Corps was to land at Gold Beach, spearheaded by a single division, the US V Corps on Omaha Beach and VII Corps on the Cotentin Peninsula at Utah Beach. Further troops were to land behind the assault troops on D Day’s second tide. A 21st Army Group memo recorded that ‘Success is dependent on speed; speed in overcoming opposition to the initial landing, and speed in getting ashore a follow up and build up force superior to anything the enemy can bring against it.’

Lieutenant General Crocker’s I Corps Operation Order gave an overview of the Anglo-Canadian part of the Allies’ Overlord plan:

‘Second Army is assaulting with I and XXX Corps through beaches between Port en Bessin and the Orne with the object of securing and developing the bridgehead south of the line Caumont – Caen and SE of Caen in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the flank of First US Army.’ ‘After completion of landing of I and XXX Corps, VIII And XII Corps are landing in succession.’

The same document went on to give the Corps mission and method to be employed:

Lieutenant General Sir John Crocker

‘I Corps will assault the beaches between Graye-sur-Mer and Ouisterham and will advance to secure, on D Day, a covering position on the General line Putot en Bessin – Caen – thence R Orne to the sea, preparatory to a subsequent advance south and SE.

Method

‘I Corps will assault, 3 Cdn Inf Div Right, two bdes up; 3 Br Inf Div Left, one bde up. The tasks of the assaulting divs are to break through the coastal defences and advance some 10 miles inland on D Day. It will be the task of these divs to secure the covering position…

‘Great speed and boldness will be required to achieve this. It will be necessary to forestall the action of the enemy’s local reserves quickly, to overcome minor resistance met with during the advance, to get set before the arrival of reserve formations, and be ready to meet the enemy’s first counter attacks, which must be expected to develop by the evening of D Day.

‘As soon as the beach defences have been penetrated therefore, not a moment must be lost in beginning the advance inland. Armour should be used boldly from the start. Such action will forestall the enemy’s reaction, confuse him, magnify his fears and enable ground to be made quickly.

‘All available artillery must be ready to support the advance. If opposition is met which can not be overcome by these strong advance guards, simple plans embodying the full resources of the artillery and armour must be employed to dislodge the enemy quickly and certainly’

3rd Canadian Division’s Plans

7 Cdn Brigade recorded in its war diary that on 14 May the ‘Div Op O was received’. Brigade Commander and Brigade Major spent all day ‘reading in’. Major General Keller’s orders were, however, not only for his Canadian infantrymen but for his fellow countrymen in 2 Armoured Brigade and a whole host of British units, mainly the ‘funnies’ of 79th Armoured Division and elements of 103 Beach Group. This force totalled some 24,000 men of which 61 percent were Canadian. The divisional operation order gave General Keller’s D Day mission.

‘10. 3 Cdn Inf Div, with under comd, 2 Cdn Armd Bde and 4 SS[Special Service – commando] Bde less two commandos, is to assault between GRAYE-SUR_MER and LAGRUNE-SUR-MER and is to adv and secure on D Day a covering position on the gen line PUTOT EN BESSION–CARPIQUET- to road and railway bridge 995682 [Outskirts of Caen].’

Having landed astride the small but well defended port of Courseulles, in common with other division’s D Day tasks, 3rd Canadian Division’s objective lay almost ten miles inland from Juno Beach. It would be difficult to reach and in the event proved to be more than a little optimistic. The operation order goes on to divide the operation into code named phases and allocate troops to task:

‘11. (a) 3 Cdn Inf Div is to assault on a two bde front through MIKE and NAN sectors. It is to be done in four phases:-

PHASE 1 – Assault and capture beachhead YEW.

PHASE II – Capture the intermediate objective ELM.

PHASE III – Capture of the Final objective OAK

PHASE IV – (D plus 1) Reorganization of the final objective.

‘(b) The assault is to be done with:

RIGHT [MIKE] – 7 Cdn Inf Bde Group – two battalions up with under command 6 Cdn Armd Regt.

LEFT [NAN] – 8 Cdn Inf Bde Group – two battalions up with under command 10 Cdn Armd Regt.

RESERVE – 9 Cdn Inf Bde Group with under command 27 Cdn Armd Regt.’

9 Cdn Brigade had two landing options; Plans A – Mike Sector and Plan B – Nan Sector. Depending on circumstances, General Keller reserved the option, which was not available on any other D Day beach, to switch the landing of his follow up brigade to either of his two sectors. 2 Cdn Armoured Brigade, as its operation order detailed a ‘Special task’:

‘INTENTION

26. 2 Cdn Armd Bde will sp 3 Cdn Inf Div onto the final objective OAK and will be prepared to adv on afternoon of D Day to secure the high ground at EVRECY.’

This task has often been taken as a firm requirement. However, the following sentence from the operation order makes it clear that this was a contingency plan:

‘32. Should serious enemy resistance fail to develop on D Day, 2 Cdn Armd Bde with under command [an all arms group of armour, artillery, infantry and engineers] will adv to secure the high ground at EVRECY. C Sqn Inns of Court [Yeomanry – Corps recce regiment] will probably be placed under command. Their tasks included the blowing of bridges over the River Orne and acting as a base for subsequent operations.’

The ‘BIGOT Top Secret’ D Day plans were released down the chain of command and the men who were to carry them out spent a nervous few weeks contemplating the obstacles and defences that they were to be pitted against. Major Fulton of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, who was ‘Bigoted’ or let into the invasion plan during in May 1944, wrote:

‘Once we were made aware of where the invasion was to take place, the next thing was to find out all we could about the beach defences and the troops that manned them… Every day prior to D Day we received new air photos of the beaches. Every morning we studied them diligently looking for any new beach obstacles which could change our plans.’

The Juno Beach H Hour

Amongst the lessons of the trials and exercises was the fact that with so many different craft, all with different speeds and characteristics, it would be impossible to muster them all in assault formation in the dark. Therefore, for this simple practical reason, it was determined from an early stage that the assault would need to be some time after dawn. Supporting this decision was the need for accurate air and naval bombardment, which would be better achieved in daylight. The combination of good moonlight for parachute operations and bombing, along with the correct state of tides shortly after dawn, limited OVERLORD to two windows of opportunity, both of only a few days per month.

Each of the assault beachs had its own practical problems that dictated the exact time of landing. Due to the time lag in the tide flooding in from the Atlantic, H Hour for the landings on the British beaches was to be fifty-five minutes later than those on Omaha and Utah Beaches. However, air photograph interpreters noted that the rocks off Juno’s Nan Sector did not appear to be covered by the incoming tide as predicted. The Navy defended the accuracy of their charts but visual evidence won the day and H Hour on Nan Sector was delayed by twenty minutes to 0745 hours and, in order not to have a vastly different H Hour, by ten minutes to 0735 hours in Mike Sector. These adjustments proved to have been unnecessary, as it was subsequently found that the data on the naval charts was correct and that the ‘rocks’ seen on air photographs were in fact, beds of six foot long seaweed! However, in the event, the actual H Hour on Mike and Nan Beaches was governed by delays in the arrival of some elements of Force J.

Embarkation and the Weather

The plan to embark 3rd Division efficiently and quickly was, if anything, more complicated than the actual landing plan. Delivering troops, with their vehicles, stores and equipment to the correct landing craft in the reverse order to the assault was a piece of, largely unrecognized, detailed staff work by the Combined Operations planners. Despite the heavy training commitments, the Royal Navy had ensured that 97.3 per of the 4,000 plus landing ships and craft of various types were serviceable at the beginning of June 1944, negating much last minute ‘hot planning’. While overhead, the Royal Air Force kept enemy aircraft away from the south coast, 3rd Canadian Division moved via a number of marshalling and staging areas around Portsmouth and Southampton. From here, they moved in carefully planned convoys to embarkation points in ports and the smaller harbours along the Solent and on the Isle of Wight.

Royal Engineer Lance Corporal Stuart Stear was amongst those bound for Juno Beach:

‘As D Day approached, we moved down to a tented camp in the New Forest and then on to a concentration camp near Southampton where we were sealed in prior to embarkation, which took place on about 4 June 1944. We drove our truck across the specially built concrete hard and once on board our American LCI, we moved out into the Solent and anchored off the Isle of Wight. There were thousands of ships all of different size around us.’

The ‘sausage machine’ started on 30 May. Assault paraphernalia, including life belts, sea sickness tablets and sick bags, was issued to all men along with their pay in French Francs, which finally confirmed that their destination would be France. The fact that it all went so smoothly is a testament to the thorough organization and the repeated practices to which both troops and locals had become familiar.

Out in the Solent, Canadian Press reporter Ross Munro, had been assigned to the Canadian Headquarters aboard HMS Hilary.

‘Staff officers of the 1st Corps and the 3rd Canadian Division were aboard now and they had little to do but await the start of the battle they were to direct. The plan was fixed and nothing could alter it.

‘But the weather would dictate whether the attack could be made or not and the wind was still whipping down the Solent from the white-capped Channel. Even in the lee of the land the sea was rough and the small craft clustered around us tossed sickeningly. Finally, the signal was flashed to the invasion fleet: “Twenty-four hours postponement.”

‘It was dismal news… [but] “If we can’t do it tomorrow, we’ll do it the next day or the day after that,” said Major Bill Seamark, who was on the divisional staff. ‘We have four or five days leeway now – that is, the tides will still be okay for that period – and if the weather is completely impossible there will be a postponement for a few weeks until the tides are right again. But the attack is going in.”

‘We went up on deck every few hours to look at the sea. The wind did not abate. The rumors started. A gale was sweeping in from the Atlantic … ships were being swamped in the Channel, a Spitfire pilot reported the sea quite calm near the French coast, so the grapevine reports ran.’

However, for the ordinary soldiers waiting on the cramped craft, with little information on which to base rumours, time weighed heavily. Lance Corporal Stear recalled:

Packs including air photographs and maps were circulated amongst the soldiers waiting on the landing craft. Compare the detail shown on the map and photograph of Courseulles.

‘We were sharing the LCT with the French Canadians of the Chaudiere Regiment [8 Canadian Brigade] and some Shermans on the lower deck. To pass the time the Canadians taught us to play a dice game called Shoot. There was nothing else to do and I lost all my invasion money but it kept my mind off the invasion.

Southwick House.

A short distance away, on the northern outskirts of Portsmouth, General Eisenhower had a difficult decision to make. Assembled with his staff in Southwick House, the Supreme Commander pondered ‘…the big question’; the weather that would prevail during the only period of early June that we could use, the 5th, 6th and 7th.

‘We met with the Meteorlogic Committee twice daily, once at 9.30 in the evening and once at 4 in the morning. The committee … was headed by a dour but canny Scot, Group Captain JM Stagg. At these meetings every bit of evidence was carefully presented, carefully analysed by the experts and carefully considered by the assembled commanders. With the approach of the critical period the tension continued to mount as the prospects for decent weather became worse and worse…

‘At 3.30 the next morning [4 June], our little camp was shaking and shuddering under a wind of almost hurricane proportions and the accompanying rain seemed to be travelling in horizontal streaks. … in such conditions there wasn’t any reason for even discussing the situation.’

However, the following day, at the 2130 hours meeting, Group Captain Stagg reported:

Group Captain Stagg.

‘Gentlemen, since I presented the forecast last evening some rapid and unexpected developments have occurred over the north Atlantic. In particular a vigorous cold front from one of the depressions has been pushed more quickly and much further south than could have been foreseen. This front is approaching Portsmouth now and will pass through all Channel areas tonight or early tomorrow. After the strong winds and low cloud associated with that front have moved through there will be a brief period of improved weather from Monday afternoon…

‘Admiral Creasey put the first question after a rather prolonged silence. “Is there a chance that conditions over Wednesday to Friday could be better than you have pictured them to us?”

‘Air Chief Marshal Tedder then asked, “What confidence have you in the forecast you have given us?” “I am quite confident that a fair interval will follow tonight’s front. Beyond that I can only repeat that the rates of development and speeds of movements of depressions in the Atlantic have been exceptional for the time of year.

‘…Both Air Chief Marshal Leigh Mallory and General de Guingand questioned me further about the details of cloudiness expected overnight Monday/Tuesday. Admiral Ramsay said “If OVERLORD is to proceed on Tuesday, I must issue provisional warnings to my forces within the next half-hour”. Air Chief Marshal Leigh Mallory was still anxious about the effectiveness of his heavy bombers.… Some of his colleagues seemed to think this was an unnecessarily pessimistic view, but Air Chief Marshal Tedder supported Leigh Mallory: “Yes, the operations of the heavy and medium bombers will probably be a bit chancy.” General Eisenhower put the question directly to General Montgomery: “Do you see any reason why we should not go on Tuesday?” Montgomery’s reply was immediate and emphatic: “No, I would say–go!”

‘…the Supreme Commander started his summing up: “After hearing all your views, I’m quite certain we must give the order for Tuesday morning. Is there any dissenting voice …?”.’

At 0415 hours on 5 June 1944, the Supreme Commander, with a look of confidence in his eyes, said ‘Ok lets go’. The D-Day assault was on.

The assembled Allied commanders and staff left Southwick House and returned to their own headquarters and issued orders for OVERLORD to begin. Eisenhower returned to his tactical headquarters (codenamed Sharpener) in Sawyer’s Wood less than a mile from Southwick. Here, General Eisenhower wrote a short speech which he was to broadcast in the event of the assault failing. In his script, he accepted full blame for failure. However, a few hours later a smiling, light-hearted and outwardly confident Supreme Commander was bidding farewell to his airborne troops.

Supreme Commander General Eisenhower.

By 0445 hours, the signal confirming that D Day was on had been flashed to Commodore Oliver aboard HMS Hilary. With radio silence in force, boats went from ship to ship around Force J, passing the welcome news that D Day was on. Once breakfast was complete, as recounted by Lieutenant Colonel Stacey, the troops opened their:

‘… sealed parcels of maps were broken open and final briefing began. Bogus names and coordinates were exchanged for genuine ones. Troops spent their remaining time cleaning weapons. On such occasions, messages were read to the troops from the Supreme Commander, from General Montgomery and General Crerar!.’

Aboard their Landing Ship Infantry (LSI), the departure of the Highland Light Infantry of Canada (HLI of C) seemed almost routine. Their war diary recorded:

‘… There were no bands or cheering crowds to give us a send off on the biggest military operation in history. A few dockworkers silently waved goodbye. Friends called farewell and bon voyage from one craft to another. A few craft blew their whistles and up on the bridge Sagan the piper played ‘The Road to the Isles.

‘…There were craft of every type imaginable, there were blunt nosed LCTs butting their way along, small LCIs riding the crests like corks, big channel packets with their LCAs lashed to their sides and proud cruisers running hither and yon in search of an enemy who would dare to poke his head out of the water. In the distance big ‘battle wagons’ lent an air of confidence and security to the scene. The 9th [Canadian] ‘Highland’ Brigade was on its way.’

FIRST CANADIAN ARMY

A PERSONAL MESSAGE

FROM

LT-GEN H. D. G. CRERAR, C.B., D.S.O.,

GOC-in-C, FIRST CDN ARMY

It is not possible for me to speak to each one of you, but by means of this personal message, I want all ranks of the Canadian Army to know what is in my mind, as the hour approaches when we go forward into battle.

I have complete confidence in our ability to meet the tests which lie ahead. We are excellently trained and equipped. The quality of both senior and junior leadership is of the highest. As Canadians, we inherit military characteristics which were feared by the enemy in the last Great War. They will be still more feared before this war terminates.

The Canadian formations in the assault landing will have a vital part to play. The plans, the preparations, the methods and the technique, which will be employed, are based on knowledge and experience, bought and paid for by 2 Canadian Division at DIEPPE. The contribution of that hazardous operation cannot be over-estimated. It will prove to have been the essential prelude to our forthcoming and final success.

We enter into this decisive phase of the war with full faith in our cause, with calm confidence in our abilities and with grim determination to finish quickly and unmistakably this job we came overseas to do.

As in 1918, the Canadians, in Italy and in North West Europe, will hit the enemy again and again, until at some not distant time, the converging Allied Armies link together and we will be rejoined, in Victory, with our comrades of I Canadian Corps.

To be read to all troops.	(H. D. G. Crerar) Lt-Gen