PROLOGUE
1.The description of the scene on the lead Chinook is based on interviews with the following soldiers: Baltazar; Blair; Edwards; Fichter; Harry; Koch; Marye; Mendenhall; Moore; Nielsen; Preysler; Thompson; and Wahl, as well as on Combat Camera footage and photographs taken by some of the soldiers. The description is also informed by my participation in a very similar air assault into the valley later the same day.
IPB
Chapter 1
1.…the hotel…ugly. This description comes from the article “Losing the Peace?” by Michael Massing, The Nation, May 13, 2002.
2.And so it was…Afghan cuisine. The description of the Ariana is drawn from interviews with numerous U.S. sources who visited the hotel in early 2002.
3.On this frigid…S-H-A-H-I-K-H-O-T. The account of the meeting is drawn from an interview with a participant; a U.S. military source who attended other meetings in the same room helped with the description of the surroundings. The word Shahikot has several possible spellings. I was assured that John spelled it with three h’s, so I have spelled it that way here. However, in the rest of the book, it will be spelled Shahikot.
Chapter 2
1.Two weeks earlier…“Buster” Hagenbeck. Wille, Hagenbeck; Ziemba (from a presentation by Major Francesca Ziemba at the Fire Support Conference, October 3, 2002, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, which I attended).
2.A native…of taking command. CJTF Mountain “Operation Anaconda” Command Briefing; Hilferty.
3.By late December…defeating the Taliban. Hagenbeck.
4.He was by no means…spring offensive. Edwards; Task Force Dagger source; remarks by Robert Andrews at the Military Reporters and Editors annual meeting in Alexandria, Virginia, October 3, 2003. Andrews was acting assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict during the war in Afghanistan.
5.When, against all expectations…by U.S. commanders. A senior U.S. officer with knowledge of the plan.
6.So instead…December 1. Hagenbeck, Mikolashek, Gray, Edwards.
7.When Franks…Hagenbeck’s fingers. Edwards, Hagenbeck.
8.But he wasn’t about…to do something.” Hagenbeck.
9.He knew there were still…puddles of resistance.” Edwards.
10.Hagenbeck gathered his…to head up. Hagenbeck, Wille.
11.Wille and Ziemba…rough plan. Wille.
12.Their job was made…return to Fort Drum. Hagenbeck, Wille, Edwards.
Chapter 3
1.Within forty-eight hours…Colonel John Mulholland,…Hagenbeck.
2.Under his command…only forty-nine days.The Mission, by Dana Priest, publ. by W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., p.143…Special Forces’ finest hour. Special Forces are not the same as special operations forces, a term which includes not only Special Forces (often called—but never by themselves—“Green Berets”) but also special operations aviation units, Rangers, Navy SEALs (the acronym stands for Sea, Air, and Land), Air Force special operators and other commando organizations.
3.…Task Force K-Bar. A K-Bar is a knife particularly popular with sailors.
4.According to Lieutenant Colonel Mark…eight weeks.” Rosengard.
5.The TF Dagger leaders…in the north.” Rosengard.
Chapter 4
1.In late November…Tora Bora. Edwards.
2.There were strong…also there… Task Force Dagger source.
3.$5 million reward. On December 13, 2001, the State Department raised this reward, in place since October 1998, to $25 million. The announcement had been in the works for several weeks and had nothing to do with Tora Bora, according to Andy Laine, a spokesman for the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service.
4.Dagger’s success…to the Pushtun heartland. Task Force Dagger source.
5.From the very start…Afghanistan. Edwards.
6.This approach…Rumsfeld. A Pentagon official who participated in videoteleconferences on this issue.
7.“The message…our psyche.” Edwards.
8.“We don’t want…field-grade officers in Afghanistan. Bello. I heard this line repeated numerous times during conversations with U.S. officers in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration version of the same notion was presented by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 26, 2002. The transcript can be found at: http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020626-depsecdef2.html.
9.120,000 troops…in the 1980s.Stumbling Bear—Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan, by Scott R. McMichael (London: Brassey, 1991).
10.Inside the Pentagon…for their service. White; Keane. The secretary of the Army is the top official in the Army. A civilian political appointee, the secretary’s primary job is to make sure the administration’s policies are implemented by the service. His boss is the secretary of defense. The chief of staff is the Army’s most senior officer, whose job, in concert with the secretary, is to plot the strategic direction of the Army in areas like doctrine, modernization, and personnel policies, and to advise the president as one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The vice chief of staff is the chief’s second-in-command, and runs the Army on a day-by-day basis.
11.But when Shinseki…White said. White.
12.It didn’t help…the Army leadership. “A Different War—Is the Army Becoming Irrelevant?” by Peter J. Boyer, The New Yorker, July 1, 2002; “Pentagon Faces Transformation,” by Tom Bowman, The Baltimore Sun, March 13, 2001, p. 1A; “Wolfowitz: More Resources, Better Management Keys to Defense Transformation,” by Hunter Keeter, Defense Daily, August 9, 2001; “The ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ has an Enemy: Politics,” by Michael Catanzaro, The American Enterprise, October 1, 2001.
13.The Pentagon’s—and, by…work on the ground. Edwards; senior officer involved in planning in the Pentagon; 10thMountain Division (Light Infantry)—Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan, Joint Center for Lessons Learned Final Report, 6 June 2003, Col. George Bilafer, team chief, p. 8; numerous other U.S. military sources.
14.Thus the attack…tried to escape. Rosengard; Task Force 11 source.
15.It seems incredible…flee outta there.” Edwards.
16.A few days…bin Laden himself. U.S. special operations source.
17.But even then…Franks].” Edwards.
18.American surveillance…over the border. Bishop; Edwards.
19.At least two…effort foundered. Bishop.
20.The Pakistanis intercepted…bin Laden was at Tora Bora. “U.S. Concludes Bin Laden Escaped at Tora Bora Fight,” by Barton Gellman and Thomas E. Ricks, The Washington Post, April 17, 2002, p. A1.
21.Deputy Defense Secretary…allowing them to flee. Wolfowitz’s June 26, 2002, testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, op.cit.
22.But among…conventional forces. Edwards; Task Force Dagger source; another U.S. special operations source; Gellman and Ricks, The Washington Post, op. cit.; A senior officer involved in Pentagon planning said bin Laden “probably escaped” from Tora Bora.
23.Rosengard was more…all people in Afghanistan.” Rosengard.
24.But to planners…do the mission,” Edwards said. Edwards.
Chapter 5
1.In the cold, muddy…on the plate.” Fletcher; Rosengard; other Task Force Dagger sources.
2.The disappointing performance…a new approach. Task Force Dagger officer…. accepted bribes…safe passage. Wolfowitz’s June 26, 2002, testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, op.cit. “Bribery is an Olympic sport throughout Afghanistan,” commented a Dagger officer.
3.By mid-December…Campbell, Kentucky: Fletcher; another Dagger source.
4.The Bear…best against them.The Bear Went Over the Mountain—Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, by Lester W. Grau (London: Frank Cass, 1998) Afghan Guerrilla Warfare—In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters, by Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau (St. Paul, MI: MBI Publishing Company, 2001) (originally published as The Other Side of the Mountain by the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command); Fletcher; other special operations sources.
5.While most…brilliant,” Rosengard said. Rosengard; other special operations sources …working as an information operations specialist… Some Army officers are trained in two fields: their primary branch (infantry, armor, aviation, etc.) and their functional area (operational support, information operations, institutional support). In Sweeney’s case, his branch was SF, but in his LIWA job he was working in his functional area.
Chapter 6
This chapter is based entirely on interviews with special operations sources familiar with events in Gardez.
1.Texas 14…ODA 594. Each A-team in Afghanistan had two names. One was its three-digit team number, which tells someone familiar with the numbering system a lot about the team. The first digit refers to the team’s parent group, the second digit to the team’s company and battalion—there are three battalions in a group, and three companies in a battalion; for the purposes of the team numbering system, A Company, 1st Battalion, is 1, A Company, 2nd Battalion is 4, and so on—and the third digit to the team’s number within that company. Thus ODA 594 was the fourth team in C Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group. The other name given to the team was its call sign or code name. This only lasted as long as the mission. In Afghanistan, many of the teams were given the prefix “Tiger.” But when the eleventh team went in, Dagger decided to change the prefix to “Texas,” to avoid anyone confusing a team called “Tiger 11” with “Tiger 1” in a broken radio transmission.
2.“He was not interested…of moxy.” Rosengard.
3.The town into…in the 1990s. Larry Goodson, a professor at the Army War College and one of the United States’ foremost experts on the Afghanistan; McHale.
4.Like many…was combat. Sources familiar with operations in the Gardez safe house. The description of the safe house is informed by photographs I have seen of it.
Chapter 7
1.The bulky…moonlit landscape. Source is someone present in Bagram the night that Blaber arrived.
2.The first American troops…October 21. “Special Forces OD Alpha-555,” by Lance M. Bacon, Soldier of Fortune, September 2003.
3.Bullets had pockmarked…beside the runway. My personal observations, February through April, 2002.
4.In fact, many…dangerous enemies. Task Force 11, JSOC, and other special operations sources; Pitfalls of Technology: A Case Study of the Battle on Takur Ghar Mountain, Afghanistan, by Col. Andrew N. Milani. An experienced special operations aviation officer, Milani conducted Joint Special Operations Command’s investigation into the Takur Ghar episode, which occurred March 4 during Anaconda. His extensive report is classified. However, while attending the Army War College, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in the 2002–2003 academic year, Milani drew heavily on his report to write his strategy research project (essentially a short thesis that all AWC students must write). He kept this paper unclassified by giving pseudonyms to the various Task Force 11 components. He referred to Task Force Blue, for instance, as Task Force SEAL, and AFO as Task Force RECCE. He also referred to Task Force 11 members only by their positions, ranks, and initials. During my research, I cross-referenced the Milani paper with interviews with CJTF Mountain staff and members of the special operations community.
5.Established…a few dozen…Delta Force, by Col. Charlie A. Beckwith (ret.) and Donald Knox (New York: Avon Books, 2000).
6.…almost 1,000…for the CIA. Special operations sources.
7.The first Delta squadron…Task Force Blue. Special operations sources; Pitfalls of Technology.
8.Formed in 1980…from the ground up.Brave Men, Dark Waters—The Untold Story of the Navy SEALs, by Orr Kelly (New York: Pocket Books, 1993) pp. 208–236; retired Army special operator.
9.It took a few years…Delta’s. Retired Army special operator.
10.Some of the bitterness…coming apart.” Navy officer who has worked extensively with both Army and Navy special operations forces.
11.Joint Special Operations Command…outright animosity. Retired JSOC staff officer.
12.Many strong…each organization. Special operations sources.
13.Nevertheless, JSOC…Army special ops source. Special operations sources.
14.But Dailey…for success. Senior Army officer.
15.Dailey applied…Gregory Trebon. TF Sword source; other sources in the special operations community.
16.Curiously…Air Force or joint staffs. Trebon’s Air Force résumé; sources in the special operations community…. over 7,000 flight hours in fifty-five different military and civilian air frames. Asked how Tebon amassed flight hours in so many different aircraft, Major Cynthia Teramae, his spokeswoman for his next command, Special Operations Command—Pacific, said, “It is common for a pilot who commands many different units to conduct familiarization flights in the different types of aircraft assigned to each unit in which he commands.”
17.His specialty…Dailey’s boss. Retired officer who served on the JSOC staff in the 1990s; a TF Sword officer; other special operations sources; senior Army officer.
18.A barrel-chested man…warn visitors about. I have shaken hands with Gary Harrell on numerous occasions, and on at least one was warned by one of his staff officers beforehand to beware the general’s grip. Mark Bowden made the same point in Killing Pablo (New York: Penguin Books, 2002, p. 149).
19.He had spent all…between 1998 and 2000. Harrell’s Army résumé.
20.Harrell was no stranger…Aidid in Somalia.Killing Pablo, ps. 149, 150, 152, 153; Black Hawk Down, by Mark Bowden (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999) passim.
21.Despite his…“door-kickers”…Edwards.
22.Since July 2000…“fusion cell.” Harrell.
23.…that would take…back to Franks. Edwards.
24.The CENTCOM commander…could match. Gray; Harrell; other CJTF Mountain, special operations, and intelligence sources; Edwards; I walked past the detention facility several times a day during my stint at Bagram.
25.Nested inside Bowie…enemy territory. Special operations sources. Pitfalls of Technology.
26.AFO was not…familiar with AFO. Special operations sources.
27.Although AFO was small…in the 1990s. A source who served on the JSOC staff in the 1990s; other sources in the special operations community.
28.Prior to taking…Bagram with TF Bowie. Special operations sources.
29.In briefings…positively shone. CJTF Mountain sources; special operations sources; my own observations watching Dagger, Bowie, and TF 11 personnel in briefings at Bagram in the days leading up to Anaconda.
30.But beneath…deploying into Afghanistan. JSOC officer; other sources in the special operations community; Edwards; retired officer who served on JSOC staff in the 1990s; senior Army officer.
31.Edwards, the deputy…operational control.” Edwards.
32.Some in TF 11…Afghanistan experience.” Special operations sources…. rising to command B Squadron. Because of the Rangers’ status as the Army’s most elite airborne infantry, officers command Ranger battalions only after successfully commanding another infantry battalion. Thomas was the first to follow a Delta squadron command with a Ranger battalion command. For Thomas, the opportunity to command and mold young infantrymen proved irresistible.
33.TF Red had been…a waste.” Special operations sources.
34.This was the situation…Another former Ranger, Special operations sources; CJTF Mountain sources; Special operations timeline—this ninety-nine-page document, a detailed account of many special operations activities related to Operation Anaconda compiled by some of the participants, was mailed anonymously to me. Henceforth it will be referred to as “special ops timeline.”
35.Jimmy was in…movie-star good looks. I met Jimmy very briefly in Bagram before Anaconda.
36.A 10thMountain…Serpico. CJTF Mountain staff officer.
37.Indeed in some…Jimmy that guy. Special operations sources; CJTF Mountain sources.
Chapter 8
1.For a week…point in the war. Source familiar with the meetings in the Ariana; special ops time line.
2.Since mid-December…that region. Edwards; Rich’s biographical background is from Ghost Wars, by Steve Coll (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004).
3.Now, a month…highest priority. Special ops timeline.
4.“In no conversation…really did.” Edwards.
5.After receiving…assembling in Gardez. Thomas; Southworth.
Chapter 9
1.By January 20…U.S. allies. Task Force Dagger source.
2.By now…in the works. Fletcher; another Task Force Dagger source.
3.After studying…wants to do.” Rosengard.
4.Despite the evidence…all these Afghans.” Rosengard; Fletcher.
5.The second reason…understood it. Rosengard.
Chapter 10
1.At his Kuwait…varied wildly. Mikolashek; Edwards.
2.For a long time…around the valley. Source in the special operations community.
3.To Mikolashek…enemy in the Shahikot. Mikolashek, Task Force Dagger sources; another source in the special operations community.
4.Based on intelligence…(IMU). Mikolashek.
5.The IMU fighters…run with it. Mikolashek. “…the main effort…” Army doctrine defines “main effort” as “the activity, unit, or area that commanders determine constitutes the most important task at that time. Commanders weight the main effort with resources and priorities and shift it as circumstances and intent demand.” (Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations).
6.…by early February…about that time.” Mikolashek.
7.However, CENTCOM…blocking positions.” Mikolashek; Edwards; Task Force Dagger source. Mikolashek’s comments, echoed by several other knowledgeable sources, throw a harsh light on the following statement by Wolfowitz to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 26, 2002: “So when in Anaconda we relied more heavily on American and coalition forces, it wasn’t because we had, quote, ‘learned a lesson,’ but because we had more capability available.”
8.If the CIA…yet again. Mikolashek.
9.CENTCOM finally…Edwards said. Edwards; Nocks.
Chapter 11
1.It was a cold…dream posting. Wiercinski; my personal observations from Kandahar.
2.The Army had…twenty-five infantry brigades, Monica Manganaro, media relations officer, U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia. In addition to the twenty-five infantry brigades, the active Army also has twenty infantry “training” brigades, which are not combat formations.
3.The 101stAirborne…the world’s militaries. The official 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Web site: www.campbell.army.mil/dhistory.htm.
4.Such was the case…falling umbrella.” The official Web site of the 3rd Brigade, particularly the history pages at www.campbell.army.mil/3bde/3rdbde_history.htm and www.campbell.army.mil/3bde/187th_history.htm.
5.The legacy of valor…was unrelenting. Wiercinski.
6.In early November…ranges at Jacobabad. Sarat; Wiercinski.
7.As the Rakkasans…operations,” Mikolashek said. Mikolashek; Edwards.
8.…Forces Command… Forces Command is in charge of all the Army’s conventional war fighting units in the continental United States.
9.In the 101st, these slices…military intelligence elements. Cody.
10.With all its components…5,000 soldiers… Wiercinski.
11.But Franks didn’t want…I can’t get there.” Cody; Edwards; Keane; Mikolashek; Wiercinski; Burns.
12.CFLCC and CENTCOM…missing artillery. Mikolashek.
13.…Mikolashek was telling…“full-spectrum operations,” Wiercinski.
14.When TF Rakkasan deployed…Al Qaida prisoners. Cody; Marye; Wiercinski.
15.The force package allotted…nowhere with Rumsfeld. Cody; Edwards; Mikolashek; White; Wiercinski; senior officer involved in Pentagon planning; another Pentagon official.
16.The chartered flights…the Sinai. I was on this flight.
17.Situated several…bargained for. Larsen; Wiercinski; my personal observations from the six weeks I spent with the Rakkasans in Kandahar in January and February of 2002.
18.As the Rakkasans adjusted…to go to work. Cody; Edwards; Marye; Wiercinski; a general officer familiar with Franks’s relations with the senior Army leadership.
Chapter 12
1.The addition…handle on its own. Mikolashek; special operations sources.
2.He had already…spell Bagram.” Hagenbeck; Mikolashek; Edwards; Wiercinski; Larsen; Gray.
3.Jim Larsen, in Bagram…disappeared inside. Larsen; Fletcher.
4.The Rakkasan officer…conducting in Uzbekistan. Larsen; Gray.
5.Larsen and LaCamera…and it showed. Larsen; Nocks; my own observations driving from Bagram to Kabul and back. The next morning. The date of the meeting at the Kabul safe house is the subject of some confusion. Some documents state that it happened on February 8, others that it occurred February 9. The memories of the attendees’ are similarly nonconclusive. Weighing the evidence, it seems more likely to me that it occurred February 8.
6.The Toyotas pulled up…get ourselves into.” Larsen; Nocks; Harrell; Bishop; Haas; other sources familiar with the meeting in the Kabul safe house and with the safe house’s design; special ops timeline…. Glenn…Mark… In cases in which I have been unable to determine last names, or in which it is clear that the individuals involved may be operating undercover at the time of this book’s publication, I have only used first names, sometimes with last initials.
Chapter 13
1.In the late…the puddle.) Larsen; Wiercinski; Rosengard; another attendee at the meeting.
2.Listening to Rosengard…trust and support. Wiercinski; Larsen; another attendee at the meeting.
3.The Rakkasan officers…battalion to Afghanistan.” Larsen.
4.Wiercinski, Gibler, and Yates…of the infantry force. Wiercinski; Larsen.
5.Meanwhile, Bishop…Anaconda. Larsen; Nocks; Bishop.
Chapter 14
Except where noted below, this chapter is based entirely on interviews with U.S. personnel familiar with events in Gardez during the prelude to Operation Anaconda.
1.Only when the CIA…only as “Spider.” Special ops time line.
2.“They went with…paramilitary guys.” Haas.
Chapter 15
1.Blaber’s decision…lay beyond it. Special ops time line; sources in the Gardez safe house; other TF Dagger source.
2.For signals intelligence…ambushes now. “SIGINT Marines Help Fight War on Terrorism in Afghanistan,” Intelligence Community Newsletter, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Department, February 2003; TF 11 source; Briley; another source in the CJTF Mountain TOC in Bagram; special ops time line; Gardez safe house sources; another TF Dagger source; Blaber briefing—this refers to a set of briefing slides I obtained that were used by Blaber to brief the story of Anaconda to many different audiences in Pentagon and around the U.S. military; I also spoke to several people who had attended one or more of these briefings for elaboration on the points made in the slides.
3.Around this time…himself was in the Shahikot. Special ops source; source in the Gardez safe house; “Ali Mohamed: The Defendant Who Did Not Go to Trial,” by Judy Aita, U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, May 16, 2003, accessed on the Internet at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/security/a1051502.htm; “The Infiltrator: Ali Mohamed Served in the U.S. Army—and bin Laden’s Circle,” by Peter Waldman, The Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2001.
4.Another document…report stated. I obtained a copy of this debrief.
5.During this period…those missions. Special ops time line; Blaber briefing; sources in the Gardez safe house.
6.But when he…AFO’s approach. Special ops time line; a source familiar with the VTC.
7.In fairness…element in Gardez. TF 11 source in Masirah; special ops time line; source in the Gardez safe house; senior Army officer.
8.As it was…went native. TF 11 source.
9.But to Chris…to us,” Haas said. Haas.
10.Part of the reason…American in Gardez. Special ops time line; Gardez safe house source; Blaber briefing.
Chapter 16
1.The dark…to war again. Hagenbeck; Edwards; Gray; Wille; Mikolashek. Details on MC-130 Combat Talon landings at Bagram were provided by Major Perry Panos, a Combat Talon pilot with the 919th Special Operations Wing who made over ten landings at the air base.
2.The 10thMountain Division had…(Light Infantry).The Army of Excellence—the Development of the 1980s Army, by John L. Romjue, publ. by Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, pp. 15–16. The 10th Mountain Division Web site, http://www.drum.army.mil/history/divisionhistory.htm.
3.In November 2001…headquarters at K2. Gray…. a more intact division like the 101st … The 101st’s Second Brigade returned from a six-month deployment to Kosovo in November.
4.When Mikolashek…division headquarters, Edwards; Mikolashek.
5.…but when…for operations. Burns. That Cody commanded Delta’s aviation squadron is from his official Army résumé.
6.The generals and colonels…limited war with Iraq. Mikolashek; another senior officer familiar with the plan.
7.The response…Paul Wolfowitz. Woodward, pp. 49, 60–61.
8.But in October…or Saudi Arabia. Mikolashek; another senior officer familiar with the plan.
9.Burns was unaware…to train,” Burns said. Burns; Edwards; a senior special operations officer.
10.Shortly…war was over.” Burns.
11.As they would…auspicious start. Gray; Bello, in a briefing he and Ziemba delivered at the Senior Fire Support Conference at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, October 3, 2002. I attended the briefing, hereafter referred to as “Bello at Sill,” or “Ziemba at Sill.”
12.…“the culminating point”… Lockwood.
13.The draft plan…counterparts’ requests. Wille.
14.…D-Day… Although the general public tends to associate the phrase D-Day with the Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, D-Day is actually the term used in every U.S. military plan for the day on which an operation is to commence. The D stands for day. Similarly, the hour at which an operation kicks off is known as “H-Hour.”
15.Nor did it help…in country. Gray.
16.…about eight modular olive drab tents… Gray.
17.The TOC soon…adventure.” Bello at Sill.
18.The Mountain staff…“ad-hocracy.” Bello at Sill.
19.“There were a lot…he added. Lockwood.
20.The common…two communities. Gray; my personal observations at Bagram.
21.Despite…previous jobs. Bello; Hagenbeck, Wille.
22.The most obvious…knew he did.” Wiercinski.
23.But it was the Ranger…leader that he was.” Larsen; Wiercinski; Wille; Rosengard; Blaber; Grippe.
24.Then Hagenbeck…doing,” Wille said. Gray; Hagenbeck; Wille.
25.To reduce…from Hagenbeck’s headquarters. Gray.
26.But there was only…pheasants.” Sources in the Mountain TOC; TF 11 officer in Masirah.
27.(Despite the…in the Shahikot, Bello; Briley; Wille; TF 11 source.
28.…the very presence…cadre of guards. Bello.
29.This added…Harrell said.) Lockwood; Harrell; numerous conversations I had with officers in the run-up to Anaconda.
30.Blaber installed…raising his voice. Sources in the Mountain TOC; TF 11 officer in Masirah.
31.The first Mountain…occurred February 17. Wille; Nocks; Hagenbeck; Gray.
32.Hagenbeck was briefed…aside for Anaconda. Bishop; Gray; Larsen; Nocks; Rosengard.
33.(Mikolashek, however…forces,’” he said.) Mikolashek.
34.Finally, the leaders…(CJTF) Mountain. Rosengard; Hagenbeck; Gray.
Chapter 17
1.Pete Blaber had…otherwise have taken. Special operations sources…. handpicked these men… The core of an AFO force was usually drawn from Delta’s operational support troop, a unit trained to infiltrate cities under cover (sometimes using female operators posing as girlfriends or wives of male operators, because couples attract less suspicion than single males or groups of men), but the AFO commander also had the option of drawing personnel from Delta’s three reconnaissance and surveillance troops.
2.Blaber envisioned…between them. Task Force 11 source.
3.Juliet was the larger…peer, anywhere.” Task Force 11 sources; special ops time line…. nickname “Speedy.” A Delta operator’s nickname functions as an internal call sign…. “SF baby,”… This was the name given to soldiers who joined Special Forces straight out of high school, instead of from another part of the Army. The Army ended the program, but revived it soon after Anaconda because of the high demand for Special Forces troops.
4.Juliet had the northern…mountain streams. Special ops time line; The Bear Went Over the Mountain; Afghan Guerrilla Warfare, p. 171.
5.Twenty-five years…entire operation.) Special ops time line; special operations source.
6.The first phase…Task Force Orange. Special ops time line; other special ops sources; http://www.specwarnet.com/americas/isa.htm.
7.Once again…operations in the Shahikot. Special ops time line; other special ops sources. The description of the Sate Kandow is from Afghan Guerrilla Warfare, p. 167.
8.On February 20…upon the Shahikot. Special ops time line; other special ops sources…. headlights off using night-vision goggles… AFO’s pickup trucks had infrared headlights that could be seen using the night-vision goggles, but the operators rarely turned them on because they would have been visible to an enemy equipped with similar night-vision equipment.
9.The Shahikot’s terrain…and the finger. Ziemba at Sill.
10.From the Whale…the bag.” TF Dagger source.
11.Juliet spotted…gathering in the Shahikot. Special ops time line; other special ops sources; Thomas.
12.This support…resources.” Rosengard.
13.In a briefing…lifesaver. Blaber.
14.As night fell…time to start planning. Special ops time line; other special ops sources.
Chapter 18
1.What this plan…Lincoln. CJTF Mountain slide briefing.
2.The plan envisaged…operation,’” Wille said. Gray; Wille; Bishop.
3.Central to the plan…contingent at Gardez. Briley; special ops source.
4.Locals usually…operation, however.) Briley; Wille; Ziemba at Sill.
5.As to the…experience.) Briley; Ziemba at Sill.
6.The planners…might use. Hagenbeck.
7.Their biggest…later were low. Ziemba at Sill; special ops source; rock drills I attended in the final days before Anaconda.
8.Of greater threat…Hagenbeck acknowledged. Hagenbeck.
9.The Rakkasans and Zia’s…air defense threats. Ziemba at Sill; rock drills I attended; Rosengard.
10.Worries over…fierce resistance.” Hagenbeck.
11.(Rosengard…RPGs. Rosengard.
12.Ziemba’s prediction…Ziemba said. Ziemba at Sill.
13.Like other…doubt the intel.” Hagenbeck.
14.To help with…snatch him.) TF 11 sources; Wille.
15.Undeterred…“Goody.” Blaber; special ops time line.
16.No sooner…into the Upper Shahikot. Rosengard; Wille; Haas; other special ops source.
17.From the moment…them,” Wille said. Rosengard; Wille; Larsen; Wiercinski.
18.But, the Rakkasans…Wiercinski and Larsen. Larsen; Wiercinski; Hagenbeck; Wille.
19.Wiercinski also…to escape?” Wiercinski; Larsen; Wille; Rosengard; Mountain staff officer; my observations of meetings and rehearsals I attended.
20.Matters came…fuming mad.” Mountain staff officer; Antenori; two other SF soldiers reported hearing Mulholland make similar comments at other times.
21.It appeared…Antenori said. Special ops sources…. Delta staff officer… Many Delta staff officers are on short tours from elsewhere in the special ops community. These officers serve only at the headquarters and do not go through Delta’s operator training course required for service in the assault or reconnaissance and surveillance troops.
22.(Not all…could get.”) Bentley; Lundy.
23.With Wiercinski…Lower Shahikot.) Hagenbeck; another source in the Mountain TOC.
24.That the Mountain…back door.” Mountain officer; Wiercinski; Rosengard; other special ops source.
25.While the Dagger…into the Fishhook. Wiercinski; Bello; Hagenbeck; Bentley.
26.This plan reflected…be there.” Bentley; Bello; Wille; Rosengard.
27.The inclusion…meetings, he said. Gray; Wille; a source on the Mountain staff.
28.The Mountain commander…good enough?” Hagenbeck; Gray; Wille.
Chapter 19
1.Amidst all…supporting artillery. Dr. Richard Stewart, U.S. Army Center of Military History. The arguments made by senior officers in the Pacific to support their decision not to deploy artillery to Papua foreshadowed those made during the war in Afghanistan. “The artillery in this theater flies,” one senior general told a subordinate in the Pacific, according the to official Army history of the campaign, Victory in Papua, by Samuel Milner, p. 135.
2.The Mountain and Rakkasan…assets that we had.” Wille; Bello; Hagenbeck; Bentley; two senior Army officers.
3.Bringing air power…Air Force channels. Bello.
4.However, there…of the war. Gray; Bello; Bochain; Wille.
5.But this wasn’t…operation,” he said. Bochain.
6.In the absence…air support.” Donnelly; Gray.
7.But to Mountain…the debate. Donnelly; Bochain; Sources in the Mountain TOC.
8.But even…or imagery. Bentley.
9.But it was…haystack.” Bello; Ziemba at Sill.
10.When the war…missions in Anaconda. Air Force pilot who flew missions over Afghanistan.
11.But Louis…gave me.” Bochain.
12.The Air Force’s…Air Force officer said. Air Force pilot who flew missions over Afghanistan; Mikolashek.
13.That Anaconda…Over.” Air Force officer; a senior Army officer said that while Renuart may not have been “asleep at the wheel,” he was “overloaded and didn’t use his staff well.”
14.Word of…component. Corley; Stutzriem.
15.Donnelly acknowledged…operation,” Donnelly said. Donnelly.
16.Hagenbeck, Mikolashek…a deal.” Wille.
Chapter 20
1.There were reports…Tohir Yuldeshev. Mikolashek; Briley.
2.A skilled…hideouts of eastern Afghanistan.Jihad—The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, by Ahmed Rashid (New York: Penguin, 2003); interview with Ahmed Rashid on National Public Radio’s All Things Considered, March 25, 2002, accessed at: http://gencturkler2.8m.com/MISC/ahmedrashid.html.
3.By late…in that way.” Mikolashek; Bello; Briley; TF 11 officer. More evidence that Yuldeshev was in the valley came after the operation. U.S. forces came across “battlefield litter” indicating that he had been there and some of the few Al Qaida prisoners taken indicated that Yuldeshev had been present. “We had pretty solid information that he was there,” the TF 11 officer said.
Chapter 21
1.Obsessing over…back to the Shahikot. My personal experience. The military gave journalists ridiculously contradictory advice to “pack for a high-altitude, cold-weather mission, and pack light.”
2.U.S. forces…forces, Ziemba said. Ziemba at Sill; Rosengard.
3.The Rakkasan company-grade…returning to Bagram. My observations.
Chapter 22
1.Every few…latest discoveries. Source present when Blaber and Spider arrived at the Mountain TOC.
2.By now…with Dailey. Special ops time line; special ops sources; Hagenbeck; Edwards.
3.But in Dailey’s…commitment,” he said. Senior Army officer.
4.However, the perception…control setup. Special ops sources; sources on the Mountain staff.
5.By late February…different organizations. CJTF Mountain slide briefing; special ops time line; McHale; Blaber; Haas.
6.It was now…destiny.” Special ops sources in Gardez; special ops time line.
7.The two A-teams…into the battle.” McHale; Haas; Thomas; Antenori…. “jinga”… The trucks are also known as “jingle” trucks, on account of the decorative chains that rattle off their sides as they move.
8.But if the SF officers…coffins. Special ops source.
Chapter 23
1.There was an eerie…plan anyway.) My personal observations—I attended all the briefings and rehearsals mentioned; Rosengard; Wille; Gray…. confirmation brief… According to Army doctrine, a confirmation brief is where the subordinate commanders repeat back to their commander their understanding of his intent the missions he has assigned them. In this case, the confirmation brief became something of a back brief, in which the battalion commanders went into more detail than is normal for a confirmation brief.
2.As for engaging…infantry-on-infantry fight.” My personal observations.
3.Once the crowd…about,” Rosengard said. McHale; Rosengard; another Dagger source.
4.But the result…idea,” McHale said. McHale; Thomas; Rosengard; Haas.
5.Between all…Bagram and Tampa. Bilafer, p. 8; Gray; Edwards.
6.Some officers…important.” Wiercinski.
7.But others…[with fewer]?” Mountain staff officer; Operation Anaconda—Lessons for Joint Operations, by Richard L. Kugler, Michael Baranick, and Hans Binnendijk, National Defense University, p. 20.
8.Edwards, the CFLCC…number.” Edwards.
9.But many…issues with it. Gray. Moseley, traveling, was called by his nighttime CAOC director Brigadier John Corley shortly after Corley was briefed on Anaconda February 23. Moseley received his first formal briefing on Anaconda February 25, five days after the CAOC was informed of the operation (source: “Operation Anaconda: Command and Confusion in Joint Warfare,” by Major Mark Davis, June 2004. Davis, a Special Forces officer, wrote this thesis paper while at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. It is a superb effort to “peel back the onion” to get to the heart of the close air support issues during Anaconda.)
10.The first misunderstanding…attack Serkhankhel. My personal observations; Hagenbeck.
11.That was not…support,” Haas said. McHale; Haas; another TF Dagger soldier; other sources in the special ops community.
12.But the officers…that,” he said. Bentley; Bello; Wille; Rosengard; Haas.
13.The final…operations” purposes McHale; Bentley; Army Field Manual 100–106, Information Operations.
14.While scores…presence in Gardez. Special ops time line; another special ops source.
15.None of this…but ignored. Hagenbeck; Wille; Gray; Haupt; Briley; Harrell.
Chapter 24
1.On the morning…before D-Day. Wiercinski; Gray; Larsen.
2.Of all…were pros.” Wille; Burke; other TF Mountain officers.
3.The Australian SAS…transportation,” Bishop said. Bishop; other special ops sources.
4.At the Gardez…course of the operation. Special ops time line; other special ops sources.
Chapter 25
1.On the morning…36 hours away. Special ops time line; Blaber; other special ops sources…. MBITR… The acronym stands for Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio.
2.By the evening…up the tab.” My personal observations.
Chapter 26
1.Shortly after…horrifying life. Special ops time line; other special ops sources; Blaber; photographs taken from an AFO PowerPoint briefing.
2.“The success…heart of Operation Anaconda. Blaber; my personal observations; Bello.
3.The SEAL snipers…mountain perch. Special ops time line; other special ops sources; photographs taken from an AFO PowerPoint briefing…. Adidas sneakers… An investigation based on a sales sticker found on one of the shoes revealed them to have been purchased at The Underground mall in Atlanta, Georgia.
4.The AFO reports…to adjust. Special ops time line; Rosengard; other special ops source; source in the Mountain headquarters; Wiercinski; Larsen; Hagenbeck.
5.The reports from the AFO…around the civilians. Special ops time line; other special ops sources; my observations of Rakkasan briefings.
6.Why not?…in the Shahikot. Special operations sources.
7.One officer…about it.’” Special operations source; a source in the Mountain TOC.
8.At 12:30…present itself? My personal observations; Quinlan…. entire 1,700-soldier task force… This includes headquarters and support troops, as well as the 1,411 who went into the Shahikot.
9.Late that…all concerned. Mikolashek; another CFLCC officer.
10.As the infantry…was gone. Nielsen.
REACTION TO CONTACT
Chapter 1
1.On the road…they said. McHale; Southworth; Thomas; Haas; other special ops sources.
2.Finally…showtime. Special ops time line.
3.The Americans…platoon leader.” McHale; special ops time line; source in the special operations community.
4.Behind them…of it,” McHale said. McHale.
5.Joining Harriman’s…back to Gardez. Special ops time line.
6.Next in…engineer squad. McHale.
7.There was also…south of the Shahikot. Thomas.
8.Bringing up the rear…at the Fishhook. Special ops time line.
9.There were also…breakdowns. McHale.
10.As they drove…into the valley. McHale.
11.The Zermat Road…local hospital. McHale; other sources in the special ops community; Weapon of Choice—ARSOF in Afghanistan, by Charles H. Briscoe, Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroder, and Kalev I. Sepp. Published 2004 by the Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 285. This book, written under the guidance of Briscoe, U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s historian, is a quasi-official history of Army special operations forces in Afghanistan. It avoids all but the vaguest mentions of classified special ops units, and repeatedly uses pseudonyms in place of soldiers’ real names.
12.No sooner…to the U.S. troops. McHale; special ops time line; other sources in the special ops community.
13.The two A-team leaders…“racing time.” McHale; other sources in the special operations community.
14.Nevertheless…2.55 a.m. Special ops time line.
Chapter 2
1.Shortly after…overhead. Special ops time line; other special ops sources.
2.Once they…bloodstream. Special ops time line; CENTCOM investigation report; special ops sources.
3.For the SEALs…yet again. Special ops time line; special ops sources.
4.The SEALs…mountainside. Turner; other special ops sources; report.
5.The sound…peaks.” Special ops time line and other special operations sources.
Chapter 3
Hermany; Ryan; Hardy; Chenault; Hurley; Hamilon; Pebsworth; Pierce; author’s general knowledge.
Chapter 4
1.A quietly religious…relented. Bishop.
2.Now the short…problems. Report; special ops time line.
3.Both…purposes.) Report; Pitfalls of Technology.
4.Grim…instantly. Report; Turner.
5.Mako 31…before sunrise. Report; Turner; http://www.specialoperations.com/Memorial/spirit.html.
6.The crew…evening.) Report; Turner.
7.Investigators…left. Report; Turner; Thomas.
8.McArthur…target. Report.
9.The Grim 31…Shahikot. Turner; report.
10.It took…vehicles. Report; Thomas.
11.Harriman’s…hip. Report.
12.Inside…another round. Turner; report.
13.Again…mortar fire. Report.
14.“I’m taking…radio, Fletcher.
15.a transmission…Grim 31. report; Turner.
16.Then…bone. Special ops time line.
17.The truck…over. Report.
18.As soon…fire. Report.
19.“Chief…radio. Haas.
20.Their colleagues…over the radio. Report.
21.At first…north. Report.
22.Meanwhile…radio. Special ops time line.
23.The Grim…sign. Special ops time line; report; Turner.
24.Afew…situation. Report.
25.Back…life. Special ops time line; report.
26.About…auspiciously. Report; McHale.
Chapter 5
1.Despite…recalled. McHale; Haas.
2.The original…Whale. McHale; Southworth.
3.It was about…start. McHale; Haas.
4.The Americans…deepened. McHale; Haas; Southworth.
5.Zia Lodin…planes?” Source in the special operations community; Weapon of Choice, p. 286.
6.The events…valley.Operation Anaconda: Command and Confusion in Joint Warfare; Murray; Blaber; Coe; Donnelly.
7.With Task Force…unrealistic. Hagenbeck.
8.We can…progress. Bentley.
9.Colonel…Bello said. Bentley; Bello.
10.When…radio. Report.
11.The helicopters…flew on. Apache pilots.
12.In fact…call. Marye.
13.The smoke…again. Anderson; Fichter.
14.The medevac…incident. Apache pilots.
15.One…loose. Chenault.
16.By…372. report.
17.Once…Bagram. Report; special ops time line.
18.After…wounded. Report.
19.John…body. report; special ops time line; McHale.
20.Onboard…difference. Anderson; Fichter; Morgan; Boehm; Moore.
21.McHale’s…problem. McHale; Southworth.
22.Hearing…dust. Apache pilots.
23.That…of it. McHale.
Chapter 6
1.Sergeant…doorway. Mendenhall; Harry; Chapman; Nielsen; Baltazar.
2.But…shorn. Nielsen; Chapman; Tucker; Harry; Baltazar; Koch; Wiercinski.
3.Outside…Apache. Baltazar; Koch.
4.As Apache…Mr. Hardy.” Hardy; Hurley; Pebsworth; Chenault; Hamilton; Ryan et al.
5.As sounds…positions. Preysler; Nielsen.
6.The southernmost…of the LZ. Luman; Helberg.
7.About…elsewhere. Crombie.
Chapter 7
1.The scene…fight.” Grippe.
2.One of…that.” Ropel.
3.Scrunched…remained. Perez.
4.Frank…into. Grippe.
5.What…subordinates. Kraft.
6.Seated…targets. LaCamera.
Chapter 8
1.Chalks…moved out. Higley; Kraft.
2.As…spots. Grippe.
3.Higley and…Contact, he said. Kraft; reference: FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.
4.Kraft…zone. Kraft.
5.Once in…back. Kraft; Hall.
6.He called…fire. Kraft.
7.O’Keefe’s…guns. Ropel.
8.Task Force…needed. Kraft.
9.The man…little about. Peterson.
10.Peterson…place. McGovern; Higley; Peterson.
11.Kraft…over.” Kraft.
12.With…halfpipe. Kraft; Peterson; Ashline; LaCamera.
13.Peterson’s…whatsoever. Peterson; Ashline.
Chapter 9
1.As the Al…attention. Murray; Savusa; Marye; Overbaugh; special ops time line; Wiercinski.
2.With the…valley. Ryan.
Chapter 10
1.After…Halfpipe. Ropel; Peterson.
2.Ropel…element. Ropel.
3.Helberg’s…Diane. Helberg.
4.Luman’s…position. Luman; Schmitz; Nielsen.
5.Luman…making it. Schmitz; Luman.
6.Luman…240. Schmitz; Luman.
7.It was…ammunition. Luman; Schmitz.
8.For…crack.” Luman; Schmitz.
9.By 10:30…tomorrow. Baltazar; Nielsen; Preysler.
10.LaCamera…Army.” Kraft; Peterson.
11.When…happen.” Kraft.
12.Kraft…safety. Higley; Kraft; Grippe; Peterson.
13.Grippe…whatsoever.” Grippe; LaCamera; Hagenbeck; Kraft.
14.Among…decade. Perez; Kraft.
15.Perex…there? Perez.
16.The Army’s…day.” Grippe; Perez.
17.“He…Perez.” Kraft.
18.Up and down…of there.” Grippe; Kraft.
19.But as…fight.” Peterson; another 1-87 infantry mortarman; Perez.
20.The plan…fixed.” Grippe; LaCamera.
Chapter 11
1.The FARP…Hurley said.” Pebsworth; Hardy; Bardwell; Hurley; Wiercinski.
2.A couple…saviors. Achey.
3.The pilots…lot worse.” Ryan.
4.Roger…position. Specialist Jason Gonzalez; Alcaraz; Peterson; Crombie.
5.When…tally. Alcaraz; Crombie.
6.Lying…upbeat. Special ops time line; other special ops sources; Pitfalls of Technology.
7.When…telephone. Bello.
8.Already…afternoon,” Hagenbeck said. Hagenbeck; my personal experience waiting with the second lift.
9.But as…night. Hagenbeck; other sources in the Mountain TOC.
10.By early…thought. Nielsen; Helberg; Baltazar; Crombie; Luman.
11.But then…done. Special ops time line; Hagenbeck; another Bagram source.
12.Jimmy…dark. Hagenbeck.
13.To Hagenbeck…initially. Source in the Mountain TOC.
Chapter 12
1.As…rucksacks. Ropel.
2.As the…forget. Kraft.
3.Bullets…slope. Ashline; Peterson.
4.Others…fell.) Healy; Grippe.
5.In the…ankles. Perez.
6.Unlike…Bagram. Kraft; Peterson.
7.Lying…wondered. Kraft.
8.Where the…ignored. “Afghanistan—Fire Support for Operation Anaconda, by Robert H. McElroy, Field Artillery, September-October 2002; COMACC Sight Picture—Joint Air-Ground Operations (a December 2002 press release from Air Combat Command); “Left In Dark for Most Anaconda Planning, Air Force Opens New Probe,” by Elaine Grossman, Inside The Pentagon, October 3, 2002.
9.Lost in…targets.” LaCamera; Achey.
10.By seizing…combat. Achey.
11.However…unanswered. Thomas; McHale; Haas; Kraft; special ops time line.
12.The problems…Iraq. Davis, p.88.
Chapter 13
1.Back…hill.” McHale.
2.“Fires priority…after the battle. Bentley.
3.By the time…minutes. McHale; Haas; Southworth.
4.The overall…MRE. McHale.
5.While the SF…Carwazi. McHale; Southworth.
6.McHale and…truck. McHale; another TF Hammer source.
7.The two…support. McHale.
8.Haas…cover. Haas.
9.Task Force…bomb.” McHale; Haas.
10.Other…Whale. Southworth.
11.Soon…minutes. McHale.
12.In the…pass. McHale; Haas.
13.It was there…Haas said. Haas; McHale; another TF Hammer source.
14.Then RPGs…convoy. McHale; Haas; special ops time line.
15.The Special…his men. Haas. “Kojast planes?!?” Kojast is a Dari, not Pushto, word, and Zia was a Pushtun. However, like many Pushtuns, he spoke some Dari, and knew that while Haas spoke no Pushto, he did speak a little Dari also. Therefore, after venting in Pushto, Zia switched to Dari in order to make himself understood.
16.The SF officers…support McHale said. McHale.
17.For…be.” McHale; Haas.
18.Haas eventually…them down. Haas; McHale; Rosengard; Weapon of Choice, p. 286; special ops time line.
19.Hammer’s…Zia. Bentley.
20.“The bottom…day.” Rosengard.
Chapter 14
1.Night…ass.” Kraft; Ropel.
2.Then, during…in the Halfpipe. Kraft; Ropel; Healy; Peterson; Beers; Brault.
3.Knowing they…binos. Kraft; LaCamera.
4.Word came…another day. Healy; Ropel; Kraft.
5.What LaCamera’s…blessed.” LaCamera; Kraft; Peterson.
6.The night…bitches.” Murray; Savusa; Wiercinski; special ops source.
7.When…light. Nielsen; Koch.
8.Helberg’s…watch. Helberg; Luman.
9.After…protectively. Crombie.
10.While…failure. special ops time line; other special ops sources.
Chapter 15
1.At midnight…to love. Butler; my personal experience.
2.In the middle…up and moving. Baltazar.
3.Butler’s…in their chests. My personal experiences. Hagenbeck.
4.By 8 a.m…. returned fire. Butler; Baltazar.
5.Roger Crombie…to their north. Crombie.
6.Baltazar had just…over their heads. Butler; my personal observations.
7.To Baltazar…couple of wadis. Baltazar.
8.As the incoming…added dryly. Butler; Ouditt; Blossom; my personal observations.
9.Watching…to the wadi. Musella; Celano.
10.There, Kevin Butler…pal replied. Butler; my personal observations.
11.Baltazar’s Third…heavy fire. Baltazar; Luman; Schmitz.
12.As his men…recover the rucksacks. Crombie.
13.Baltazar’s Second…creek bed. Baltazar.
14.Hagenbeck had intended…to show up. 1-187 Infantry After Action Review; special ops time line.
15.March 3 began…than in Gardez. Special ops time line; other special ops sources.
TAKUR GHAR
Chapter 1
1.As dawn…was an order. Special ops time line; other special ops sources; senior Army officer.
Chapter 2
1.While the SEALs…to the valley. Special ops time line.
2.That plan…back in, tonight.” McHale; another ODA 372 source; Thomas; Haas; special ops time line.
3.With Trebon and…about four hours. Special ops time line; other special ops sources; Pitfalls of Technology, pp. 7–8.
4.Glenn P. gave…any different. Special ops time line; Al.
5.In and of itself…to the airstrip.Pitfalls of Technology, pp. 13–14; a JSOC officer; another special ops source.
6.In Bagram, Hagenbeck…winter bite. Hagenbeck; another source in the Mountain TOC; a special ops source; special ops time line.
Chapter 3
1.The two Chinooks…fighting for.” Al; Pitfalls of Technology; special ops time line; sources in the special ops community, Weapon of Choice, pp. 296–297…. pilot-in-command… There were two pilots on a 160th Chinook. The more experienced of the two was referred to as the pilot-in-command; the less experienced pilot was referred to simply as the pilot. In the civilian world the less experienced pilot would be referred to as the copilot and I have used that word here, with the understanding that in strict Army terms, the word copilot has a different meaning. If more than one helicopter is flying a mission, an air mission commander flies in one of the helicopters and to provide command supervision and ensure all pilots-in-command are following the plan.
2.Of course…version of events.Pitfalls of Technology, pp. 7, 14, 36; special ops time line; special ops sources.
3.(However…minimal.)Pitfalls of Technology, p. 10.
4.But the realization…any combat operation. Wille; Bello; two other sources in the Mountain TOC; special ops time line; special ops sources.
5.At 2:20 a.m…landed there.Pitfalls of Technology, pp. 8, 10, 11; Haas; Weapon of Choice, p. 297.…apparently consisted of eight personnel… The number of personnel in Mako 30 has been shrouded in mystery, due to the reluctance of the Pentagon to acknowledge the existence of Gray Fox, and hence, the presence of a TF Orange man on the initial infil on Razor 03. I concluded there were eight team members on the aircraft by working backward from the number of five SEALs and one combat controller (Chapman) Milani says went back to the mountain to look for Roberts after dropping off the aircrew plus Thor at Gardez.
6.At 2:38 a.m…left of the Chinook. Al; Pitfalls of Technology, p. 11; Milani report (the chronology of the Takur Ghar battle put together by the official U.S. Special Operations Command investigator of the event, Colonel Andrew Milani, and released to me in redacted form under the Freedom of Information Act) pp. 10–11; special ops time line; a source in the special ops community; “Bravery and Breakdowns in a Ridgetop Battle,” by Bradley Graham, The Washington Post, May 24, 2002.
Chapter 4
1.In Bagram…couldn’t miss. Hagenbeck; another source in the Mountain TOC.
2.The RPG slammed…cabin window. Al; Pitfalls of Technology, pp. 11–12; Milani report, pp. 10–11; special ops time line; Weapon of Choice, p. 298; “Bravery and Breakdowns in a Ridgetop Battle,” by Bradley Graham, The Washington Post, May 24, 2002.
3.Al’s copilot…from Takur Ghar. Al; Pitfalls of Technology, pp. 11–12; Milani report, pp. 12–13; special ops time line; Weapon of Choice, pp. 11–12.
4.The landing…went to work.Pitfalls of Technology, p. 16; Milani report, pp. 13–15; a source in the special ops community.
5.About 50 miles…he was alive.” Turner…. Grim 32… An AC-130 crew’s callsign changed from night to night. The numbers reflect which aircraft took off first from K2 (Grim call signs) or Masirah (Nail call signs).
6.Thinking the Chinook…friendly forces.Pitfalls of Technology, p. 17; Milani report, pp. 13–14.
7.At this time…and Mako 30. Turner.
8.Once Slab understood…on the radio.) Milani report, p. 15; sources in the special ops community.
9.Slab called…mountain,he thought. Blaber.
10.As they soared…forever. Turner.
Chapter 5
1.Battlefield friction…top of the mountain. Pitfalls of Technology, p. 17.
2.Other than Slab’s…aviators and SEALs.Pitfalls of Technology, p. 19; Blaber; other special ops sources; Preysler.
3.Blaber and Slab…was inbound.Pitfalls of Technology, pp. 19–20; Blaber.
4.Colonel Joe Smith…events on the battlefield. Hagenbeck; Donnelly; another source in the Mountain TOC.
5.Suddenly another…guy on the ground. Special ops sources; sources in the Mountain TOC; Pitfalls of Technology, pp. 19–20; special ops time line.
6.Perhaps acknowledging…transport aircraft. Special ops sources; a senior Army officer.
7.It took Razor 04…saving Neil Roberts. Al; special ops time line; sources in the special ops community; Weapon of Choice, p. 300; “Bravery and Breakdowns in a Ridgetop Battle,” by Bradley Graham, The Washington Post, May 24, 2002.
8.Razor 04 flew…last to Takur Ghar. Special ops time line; a source in the special ops community; Weapon of Choice, p. 301.
9.It took Grim 32…was not so.) Turner; other special ops sources.
10.When Razor 04…neared the peak. Sources in the special ops community; Weapon of Choice, pp. 301–302.
Chapter 6
1.Roberts hit the snow…Roberts was dead.Pitfalls of Technology, pp. 16–18, 26–28; Donnelly; Milani report, p. 18. Two sources in the special operations community. In the wake of the battle, rumors circulated that Roberts had been tortured and mutilated in hideous ways. These rumors were not true. Roberts also sustained a neck wound at some stage during his ordeal, but it was the head wound that was almost certainly fatal.
2.Razor 04 was…4:55 a.m. Milani report, p. 22; Pitfalls of Technology, p. 21; Turner; Weapon of Choice, p. 302.
3.Before the helicopter’s…nearby knoll.Weapon of Choice, p. 302; Milani report, p. 22; “Bravery and Breakdowns in a Ridgetop Battle,” by Bradley Graham, The Washington Post, May 24, 2002.
4.The whirling of…nonflyable.Weapon of Choice, p. 302; special ops time line.
5.As the helicopter…in the bunker. Milani report, pp. 22–23; Pitfalls of Technology, pp. 21, 29; Weapon of Choice, p. 302; Turner.
6.To Grim 32…about it,” Turner said. Turner.
7.Another SEAL climbed…quick-reaction force. Milani report, pp. 22–24; Pitfalls of Technology, pp. 21–22; Turner; Self; Weapon of Choice, p. 302.
Chapter 7
1.At 3:45 a.m…. Captain Nathan Self.Pitfalls of Technology.
2.Born and raised…and their weaknesses. Self.
3.By the time Trebon…all the details straight. Self; Canon; Don…. tacsat… Tactical satellite radio.
4.Meanwhile, in Bagram…of misunderstanding.”Pitfalls of Technology, p. 22.
5.As Razor 01 bucked…about the AC-130. Self.
Chapter 8
1.On the side of…monitoring the call. Turner.
2.Radio and phone…with Mulholland. Special ops time line; sources in the special ops community; Donnelly.
3.The folks most worried…might run into. Turner.
4.Yet again…out of the sky.” Special ops sources.
5.At 6:07 a.m. Razors 01 and 02…assaulted at 6:07 a.m.Pitfalls of Technology, pp. 25–29.
6.Slab said that…continue the fight.Pitfalls of Technology, p. 29; Self.
7.Nate Self, who…could have made. Self.
8.Chapman sustained…in that situation.Pitfalls of Technology, p. 29; a source familiar with Chapman’s wounds; a special operations source.
9.Milani said…broke contact,” he said.Pitfalls of Technology, p. 29.
10.If the man…over the mountaintop. Self.
Chapters 9 through 12
All the material in these chapters came from the following sources: Self; Canon; Cory; Don; Greg; other sources in the special ops community; Pitfalls of Technology; Milani report; Weapon of Choice, pp. 304–319; Hagenbeck.
WINDING DOWN
1.On March 3…no casualties. 1-187 After Action Review.
2.The change in…attack helicopters.) My personal observations in the Shahikot and at Bagram.
3.The demonstrated value…down,” he recalled. Peterson; Ashline.
4.After the Takur…be pulled out. Special ops time line; other special ops sources.
5.Juliet Team left…leave the Shahikot. Special ops time line; other special ops sources; my personal observations (I flew out of the Shahikot on the same helicopter as Juliet Team).
6.There remained…and waited.” Larsen.
7.Encouraged by…finest,” Rosengard said. Rosengard; Haas; other special ops sources.
8.Afghan forces finally…something to see.” Haas.
9.Unfortunately…executive officer, said. Larsen.
10.Meanwhile, Blaber…enemy corpses. Blaber.
11.Blaber and his men…But where? Blaber; special ops time line.
12.Many never…body parts. My conversations with U.S. generals, and personal observations. I walked on patrol down Ginger Pass with 4-31 Infantry on March 18.
13.A better estimate…as died there. Special ops sources.
14.On March 13…hosts poorly. Special ops time line; Blaber; other special ops sources.
15.The only enemy…security forces. Mikolashek; Hagenbeck; “Al Qaida’s Uzbek Bodyguards,” by Owais Tohid, The Christian Science Monitor, September 28, 2004; Blaber; special ops time line; other special ops sources.
16.No intelligence…in 2004. Special ops time line; other special ops sources.
17.But for AFO…found succor. Special ops source.