CHAPTER 1
IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1944, following their victory in Normandy and pursuit across northern France, the Allies believed that final victory over Nazi Germany was close at hand. The Red Army, to the east, was inexorably closing on Germany; while the Allied air forces harried the Wehrmacht and did their best to obliterate the German industrial base and lines of communication. In the west, Allied armies were ranged from Switzerland to the North Sea, preparing for the final assault on Hitler’s Germany.
Optimism ran high, with normally stoic intelligence officers predicting that victory against Germany was ‘within sight, almost within reach’ and they reported that it was ‘unlikely that organised German resistance would continue beyond 1 December 1944’. Dissenting voices who believed that the German forces were not finished and were preparing a ‘last-ditch struggle in the field at all costs’, were, in the prevailing enthusiasm, ignored.
Montgomery’s attempt, in Operation MARKET GARDEN, to ‘bounce 21st Army Group across the Rhine onto the North German Plain’ had demonstrated that the Germans were far from finished. There was to be no repeat of the 1918 German civil and military collapse after Normandy that many commanders who had served in the Great War predicted and no dash into the heart of Germany in 1944. Quite the reverse, for while the Allies clinched victory in Normandy and the British and American Armies streamed east across France, 200,000 mostly slave labourers, worked to strengthen the pre-war German defences known as the West Wall or Siegfried Line. The physical barrier was to be manned by new citizen or volksgrenadier formations, with Himmler calling to arms the young, the old and many men previously excluded from the Wehrmacht on grounds of economic necessity, health, etc. To these men were added the now largely redundant manpower from the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine. Together they were drafted into the new volksgrenadier divisions for the final defence of the Third Reich. The Allies had and were to continue to underestimate the German genius for highly effective military improvisation and were largely unaware of the remarkable strategic recovery they were staging.
Field Marshall Montgomery. Victor of Normandy but defeated at Arnhem.
With the failure at Arnhem (Montgomery referred to it as a ninety percent success) General Eisenhower reverted to his broad front strategy. This favoured US doctrine (at the time) was also a politically acceptable policy that would see all three allied army groups closing up to the German frontier, breaching the Siegfried Line and then fighting their way to the Rhine, which was Germany’s last strategic barrier. Destruction of the German field armies and the capture of the Ruhr, Germany’s industrial powerhouse, were to be the principal targets rather than a headlong advance across the North German Plain to Berlin. The full impact of this policy rather than a dash east to Berlin was fully apparent to the British, who had an eye on the post-war situation in Europe, rather than simply an ending of the war against Germany in early 1945. In the increasingly bad autumn weather that heralded one of the worst winters for many years, the fighting was costly and Allied progress slowed to almost a halt. Nowhere was progress slower and more expensive in both British and American lives than at the Dutch town of Overloon in the Mass Pocket. Further to the north, the British fought to open the Scheldt Estuary and access to the vital port of Antwerp, which had to be open as the entry point for supplies in time for the final drive into Hitler’s Reich. Elsewhere, desperate battles were fought by British and American troops to reach and then penetrate the Siegfried Line, at points such as Geilenkeirchen, where the British 43rd Wessex Division fought alongside the US 84th Division to overcome a determined enemy in weather and ground conditions that foreshadowed those they were to experience later in the winter of 44/45. Meanwhile, General Patton grumbled as his armour bogged down in the mud of Lorraine. The Germans fought with courage and determination to defend the borders of their Fatherland and it was clear that despite the continuing bomber offensive that the war was going to go on well into 1945.
General Eisenhower. Exercised a highly political command.
Hitler’s counter-attack with his rebuilt army in the Ardennes in mid December 1944, launched under the cover of bad weather, caught the Allies by surprise. The German aim was to separate the Allied armies by striking north west to Antwerp, enveloping and destroying the US Ninth Army, along with the British and Canadian Armies. Initially, the Germans, benefiting from a lax American stance on a lightly held, quiet front, were successful and created a significant ‘Bulge’ in the Allied lines. However, the relatively inexperienced staffs of the Allied Armies of D Day were now honed to a high state of competence and reacted quickly to close off the German advance before they reached the River Meuse. With an improvement in the weather that allowed Allied airpower free reign, by the middle of January, the Germans were pushed back behind their lines of departure, with their reserves of men and material further depleted by their offensive. Meanwhile, the Russians had begun their attack on the Eastern Front and attempts to stem their advance were increasingly sucking German resources away from the west.
‘Old Blood and Guts’ General Patton.
The Winter War
Eisenhower, now fully aware of the German capacity for resistance, prepared operations, delayed by the Ardennes counter offensive, to dominate the Rhineland and to close up to the Rhine. SHAFE planners aimed to mount operations that were designed to destroy the main German field forces in the west before their remnants could withdraw across the river.
The fighting in early 1945 to reach the Rhine on a front from the Swiss border all the way north to Nijmegen is a subject in itself. In the north, Montgomery’s 21st Army Group was to fight a massive and carefully planned battle (Operation VERITABLE) using General Crerar’s First Canadian Army and General Simpson’s Ninth US Army (Operation GRENADE). These operations were designed to reach the Rhine north of the Ruhr, while further south, First US Army delayed operations to capture the seven Roer dams. With the dams finally captured, First US Army’s operations focused on crossing the River Ruhr and the reaching the Rhine around Cologne. Yet further south, Patton’s Third US Army was to clear the difficult terrain east of the Ardennes, cross the River Moselle, fight through the Eiffel and reach the central sector of the Rhine between Coblenz and Mannheim. The southernmost Allied armies of 6th US Army Group, consisting of American and French divisions, who had already reached the Rhine near Strasbourg, were to breach the Siegfried Line and clear up significant pockets held by German divisions west of the Rhine.
British infantry in the Ardennes but the snow had melted by the time of VERITABLE in the Rhineland.
While General Crerar’s First Canadian Army was fighting the main body of the Germans in the west in the Battle of the Rhineland, the US army groups further to the south were approaching the Rhine across greater distances and some equally difficult terrain. First US Army reached the Rhine near Cologne and days later, after numerous attempts to take a Rhine bridge by coup de main, on 7 March, the spearhead of 9th US Armoured Division, led by Lieutenant Karl Timmermans reached the Rhine further south and found the Ludendorf railway bridge at Remagen still standing. With the demolition guard lacking orders to blow the bridge, First US Army gained the honour of establishing the first Allied bridgehead across the Rhine. However, the country beyond the Remagen Bridgehead was so unsuitable for offensive operations and lacking strategically important objectives beyond, this was in reality a cul-de-sac of little strategic importance despite General Hodges (First US Army) pouring troops across. Perhaps the main effect of the Bridge’s capture was to draw precious German divisions away from Eisenhower’s main effort in the north.
Allied Armies advancing towards the Rhine
The next crossing was further south and was of greater importance. General Omar Bradley, commander Twelfth US Army Group, recalls receiving a telephone call on the morning of 23 March at his HQ in Namur from General Patton’s Third US Army HQ. His account illustrates the competition and vanity (both British and American) that now bedevilled Eisenhower’s command.
″Brad, don’t tell anyone but I’m across.″ I replied ″Well I’ll be damned – you mean the Rhine?″ ″Sure do,″ he [Patton] replied, ″I sneaked a division over last night. But there are so few Krauts around they don’t know it yet. So don’t make any announcement – we’ll keep it a secret until we see how it goes″.
The Ludendorf Bridge at Remagen.
Patton’s formal situation report about his crossing at Nierstein pointedly included the statement that this had been achieved ‘... without the benefit of aerial bombing, ground smoke, artillery preparation, and airborne assistance, the Third Army at 2200 hours, Thursday evening March 22, crossed the River Rhine.’ However, as Bradley recalled, ‘That evening Patton telephoned again.’
″Brad,″ he shouted and his treble voice trembled, ″for God’s sake tell the world we are across. We knocked down thirty-three Krauts [aircraft] today when they came after our pontoon bridges. I want the world to know Third Army made it before Monty starts across″.
General Omar Bradley.
Rhineland Operations of 21st Army Group Meanwhile, with the limited British involvement on the northern flank of the Battle of the Bulge at an end, Montgomery turned his attention to the Rhineland in Operations VERITABLE, BLOCKBUSTER and GRENADE. He described the aims of the fighting west of the Rhine to close up to the great waterway between Xanten and Nijmegen.
The object of the battle of the Rhineland was to destroy all enemy forces between the Rhine and the Meuse from the Nijmegen bridgehead as far south as the general line Julich-Düsseldorf, and subsequently to line up along the west bank of the Rhine with the Ninth US Army from Düsseldorf to Moers, Second [British] Army from Moers to Rees and [First] Canadian Army from exclusive Rees to Nijmegen.
This was to be achieved by First Canadian Army, with British formations under command, launching Operation VERITABLE; an attack south east from the Groesbeek Heights near Nijmegen, which had been seized during MARKET GARDEN in September 1944. The Canadians’ immediate objectives were the breaching of the Siegfried Line defences and clearance of the Reichswald forest. Subsequently they were to take the defended towns of Udem and Goch before heading south east to Geldern and Xanten where they would link up with Ninth US Army, who, in Operation GRENADE, would be advancing in a north easterly direction.
21st Army Group’s shoulder flash.
Facing 21st Army Group was General Schlemm, commander of the First Fallschirmjäger Army. He was experienced in holding operations, having been schooled in the art in the resource starved Italian theatre. Here he learnt to utilise terrain to maximise his defensive effect. However, on the Rhine Schlemm recounted that his orders were to hold the ground come what may:
Once the battle was joined, it was obvious that I no longer had a free hand in the conduct of the defence. My orders were that under no circumstances was any land between the Maas and the Rhine to be given up without permission of the Commander in Chief West, von Rundstedt, who in turn had to ask Hitler. For every withdrawal that I was forced to make due to an Allied attack, I had to send back a detailed explanation.
Even so, Schlemm and other German commanders repeatedly requested that they be allowed to fall back to the Rhine where they could adopt strongly held positions. Instead, Hitler kept eighty-five divisions fighting west of the Rhine, forbidding any withdrawal and threatening to execute commanders who lost a bridge intact.
Starting on 8 February 1945, Operation VERITABLE and its continuation Operation BLOCKBUSTER are characterised by Brigadier Essame of 214 Brigade as:
... lasting for twenty-eight days and nights in almost unspeakable conditions of flood, mud and misery. The troops were soaked with almost incessant rain; there was no escaping it and no shelter. We met the First Parachute Army the last remaining German indoctrinated youth fighting with undiminished courage on German soil supported by 700 mortars and almost a thousand guns, on virtually equal terms.
Fighting through the northern extensions of the Siegfried Line, which the Germans had five months to work on since the failure of MARKET GARDEN, was a costly business. The densely wooded and heavily fortified Reichswald, the defended towns, such as Udem and Goch, and the positions in depth (the Hochwald layback) took a month to fight through. The level of destruction of the German homeland, as he entered the ruins of Cleve, was recorded by a seasoned member of 4th Wiltshires:
There were craters and fallen trees everywhere, bomb craters packed so tight that the debris from one was piled against the rim of the next in a pathetic heap of rubble, roofs and radiators. There was not an undamaged house anywhere, piles of smashed furniture, clothing, children’s books and toys, everything, was spilled in hopeless confusion amidst the bombed skeletons of the town.
Amphibious vehicles were at a premium in the flooded country between the Reichswald and the Rhine.
A British infantry company HQ and specialist armour in the Reichswald during Operation VERITABLE.
Infantry from Canada, the West Country, Wales and Scotland bore the brunt of the costly fighting through the ruined towns and the sodden country.
General Simpson’s Ninth US Army was formally under operational command of 21st Army Group for the clearance of the Rhineland in operation GRENADE but the degree of influence Montgomery was able to exert by this stage over US forces under his command was strictly limited. Simpson’s objective was the seizure of the Rhine’s western bank, from where his army would in subsequent operations strike at the northern edge of the Ruhr. However, delays in starting his attack resulted from floodwaters in the river valley and First US Army’s failure to capture the Roer dams in some very difficult hilly terrain. Without the dams being secured, there was a very real threat that the Germans could release millions of gallons of water, and isolate a rashly formed bridgehead, which would be vulnerable to destruction in detail. The Germans, however, released the water from the Schwammenauel’s which flooded the Roer Valley and formed an obstacle designed to prevent the Americans advancing. Eventually, after a two week delay, with the worst of the flood waters receding, six US divisions launched a surprise assault crossing over the still violent river on 24 February 1945, preceded by a massive forty-five minute bombardment by over 1,500 guns. During the delay caused by the flooding, nine German divisions had been sucked away from the US front north to the bitter VERITABLE battle being fought by General Crerar’s troops. This contributed to the US assault divisions losing fewer than a hundred men killed in action on the first day of the assault.
Ninth Army’s badge.
General Simpson.
US combat engineers struggle to maintain a footbridge across the swollen River Roer.
With VERITABLE, GRENADE and the advance of the First US Army under way, a programme of air operations on a large scale was being conducted by the Allied tactical and bomber commands. ‘This was designed to weaken the German defence as a whole, and to assist Twenty-First Army Group and Twelfth Army Group in particular, by the isolation and reduction of the Ruhr’s war-making capacity.’ According to the British Official History, the principal aims were, firstly:
... to isolate the Ruhr from central and southern Germany by cutting the main railways ..., secondly, to attack continuously west of that line the enemy’s communications and transport system; and, thirdly, to prepare the battle area for the impending Rhine crossing by Twenty-First Army Group.
The official historian concluded that: ‘In the next few weeks much of the industrial power of the Ruhr was dissipated in the dust of explosions from a rain of bombs which fell almost daily from the air.’
One of Germany’s airfields receives a pounding.
Meanwhile, Simpson drove his men on to the Rhine and with massive US material strength his divisions poured over nineteen pontoon bridges over the Roer and:
The enemy’s resistance was soon characteristic of a general retreat in which only an attempt could be made to delay the Allied advance by holding road junctions and communications centres in key towns or villages, using in each case a number of assault and anti-aircraft guns and mortars and groups of supporting infantry.
As planned, the 35th US Division met up with Montgomery’s 53rd Welsh Division at Geldern, mid-afternoon on 3 March and together the armies advanced east, squeezing a force of nominally fifteen German divisions belonging to First Fallschirmjäger Army, into a rapidly reducing bridgehead. Hitler would not sanction their withdrawal despite General Schlemm’s protestations, who, in his post war interrogation, commented that once he was hemmed in to a shrinking bridgehead whose perimeter ran from Xanten, the Bonninghardtwald to the Rhine at Moers: ‘I could see my hopes for a long life rapidly dwindling, since I had nine bridges in my sector!’ A verbatim note in the Fuhrer Conference records gives Hitler’s reasoning in response to a suggestion that they redeploy east of the Rhine. ‘I want him to hang on to the West Wall as long as is humanly possible, since withdrawal would merely mean moving the catastrophe from one place to another.’
German infantry fighting alongside a Tiger tank in the Rhineland.
Eventually, with Hitler’s threat of execution hanging over him, Schlemm authorised, on his own initiative, the withdrawal of what manpower he could save before blowing the Wesel bridges. Montgomery’s armies reached the Rhine in the area chosen for the crossing of the Rhine, Operation PLUNDER, on 5 March 1945, having suffered a total of 23,000 casualties in First Canadian and Ninth US Armies.
The Battle of the Rhineland, however, had cost General Schlemm’s First Fallschirmjäger Army between 90,000 and 100,000 men, with casualties being largely concentrated amongst nineteen infantry divisions, which were now reduced to little more than cadres. The fighting west of the Rhine cost von Rundstedt, C-in-C West, half a million men and for the third time, his job. At the age of seventy, he could finally retire knowing that he had delayed the enemy more successfully than any commander and that the end would be not long in coming.
Feldmarschall von Rundstedt, sacked for the final time.
The Strategic Situation
It is widely accepted that Hitler’s decision to remain fighting west of the Rhine, Germany’s last strategic barrier, was a major mistake that probably shortened the war by a few weeks, compounding as it did, earlier errors. By gathering the majority of his best troops for the Ardennes offensive, Hitler had also left Germany open to the Soviet Winter offensive launched by Zhukov and Koniev. In the east, facing a five to one superiority in men and material, the German front collapsed and the Red Army, driven on by Stalin’s threats and blandishments, advanced some 250 miles to a point as close as forty miles from Berlin, where running out of steam they were eventually halted by last ditch German resistance. Meanwhile, at the Yalta Conference, the Allies were only able to report to Stalin that they had restored their lines of the previous November.
One of the last photographs taken of Hitler as he distributes the Iron Cross to members of the Hitler Youth defending Berlin.
The Ardennes offensive had cost Hitler his last strategic and operational reserves, which arguably could have lengthened the war by several months. With, in addition, the losses suffered during the Rhineland Battles, the Wehrmacht was in March 1945 only capable of standing on the defensive. As Eisenhower wrote, with the benefit of hindsight ‘... the enemy was now in no condition to hold fast in the defended line to which he had been compelled to retreat’. The end indeed would not be long in coming but the Rhine and the heavily defended Ruhr would first have to be overcome to knock Germany out of the war.
Second British Army
At the end of Operation VERITABLE, after nine months of active campaigning, the British Army that had crossed the German border and was about to take part in the last major Allied offensive of the war, was very different from the army that had landed in Normandy. Brigadier Essame of 43rd Wessex Division wrote of the state of the British 2nd Army at the end of March 1945:
Despite exposure twenty-four hours a day for over a month, to the almost incessant rain and sleet and intense and sustained enemy fire, the morale of the British troops as the battle progressed rose, rather than declined, to a higher level than at any stage during the campaign.
This seemingly counter intuitive statement is supported by the fact that the number of Second Army soldiers reporting sick was at an all time low in February and March 1944 and the incidence of psychiatric casualties had declined markedly. Essame accounts for this phenomenon as ‘... men, the majority of whom had been new to the horrors of the battlefield in Normandy, had now got into their stride and had become inured to the sights and smells of the battlefield.’
Not only were Montgomery’s troops in better mental and physical shape but they had become experienced campaigners. An officer of the Dorset Regiment who had been wounded in Normandy returned to his battalion in time for the Rhine crossing and found his company greatly changed from the formally dressed and inexperienced unit he left in August 1944.
It was a tonic to find oneself again in the free air of good comradeship, cooperation and good humoured stoicism of the front line after months of jealousies and petty rivalries so rampant further back ... The company looked a truly amazing sight as we marched into our concentration area. The men were loaded down with the usual impedimenta of ammunition, weapons, picks and shovels; but then in addition, every man had some personal treasure; some had hurricane lamps, some oil house lamps or an oil stove, others carried baskets and two whole sections arrived each with some joint of the pig they had killed the day before slung across their haversacks. They looked a motley crew in a variety of battledress, leather jerkins or camouflage jackets, topped with weather beaten faces and a range of scarves but they knew their trade as soldiers and they could be relied on in battle; that was all that mattered.
Second British Army.
General Sir Miles Dempsey, commander Second Army.
The practicalities of everyday life on campaign were not the only changes in the British Army. The green formations, such as 15th Scottish and 43rd Wessex Divisions, who had seen their first action in Normandy, were now made up of experienced combat soldiers and were highly competent; from divisional staff down to the rifle sections, they knew their tasks in battle and understood that the only way to return to their families was to finish the war. Similarly, the desert veterans of 51st Highland Division, who had been criticised for their poor performance in Normandy and, for a while, labelled as one of the ‘non fighting divisions’, had been restored to their former level of performance and determination to win, largely by its new commander Major General Thomas Rennie.
The worst of the infantry manpower crisis of the autumn had also passed. Men were ruthlessly combed out of units in the UK that were now largely redundant. The organisations that bore the brunt of this process were typically, those who earlier in the war provided Britain with her air defence. Anti-aircraft gunners found themselves converted to infantry and undergoing a crash course in small arms and close quarter battle. RAF radar operator, Corporal Southam found himself one of the thousands drawing khaki battledress and joining the Army.
I was surprised that I took to the army, especially as it was mid-winter when I reported to Barnard Castle for infantry training. The discomfort of living in the field more than made up for escaping from the boredom of routine RAF shift work on an air station in the middle of nowhere.
Southam was lucky, he was posted direct to a battalion but others, usually less enthusiastic about their transformation to the dangers and discomforts of life as an infantryman, suffered the misfortune of having to wait in the uninspiring environment of a battle casualty replacement unit.
Also joining the order of battle for the coming Rhine Crossing was 6th Airborne Division. They had since their withdrawal from Normandy at the end of the battle, plenty of time to retrain and take in replacements to make good the losses of a hundred days in close contact, with the enemy. Their austere Christmas 1944 celebrations in their camps on Salisbury Plain were cancelled by an emergency deployment to the Ardennes as a part of the force to block the German drive on the Meuse and their ultimate objective; Antwerp. The veteran airborne division, now under a new British airborne commander, Major General Eric Bols were ready for the battle again. Their former commander, the experienced Lieutenant General ‘Windy’ Gale, however, would not be far away, as he was deputy commander of the Allied Airborne Army.
In summary, costly though the Rhineland battles had been, the British, American and Canadian armies were well led and their soldiers had endured the worst of the winter. With battle casualty replacements swelling their ranks, they knew that victory was inevitable, despite the motivational cautioning of their officers. With logistic superiority and air supremacy to support them, the only real question was when it all would end. Conversely, as we will see in the next chapter, the Germans after the Battle of the Bulge and the losses suffered facing VERITABLE and GRENADE, were in a parlous state.
Victory for the Allies was certain, the remaining question was ‘when’. British infantry pass a column of German prisoners.
