CHAPTER NINE
By 1130 on 24 March 1945, most of 6th Airborne Division’s important objectives had been seized and between 1300 and 1500 hours, the three brigades reported that they were in place on their objectives or defensive positions and digging-in. Their battle was, however, far from over. They had in effect superimposed themselves on top of the enemy’s defences. Although they had effectively subdued most organized opposition plenty of enemy soldiers were still in the Divisional area. They had also taken up positions sandwiching the remains of 84th Volksgrenadier Divisionbetween them and the advancing 15th Scottish Division, with whom substantive contact was yet to be made. They were also in possession of crossings of the River Issel, vital to both the defence by 6th Airborne Division and to German counter-attacks.
The two parachute brigades were digging-in; 3 Parachute Brigade in the Dieserfordterwald around Bergfurth and 5 Parachute Brigade north-east of the forest and across the railway line, while 6 Airlanding Brigade was preparing to defend the Issel bridges and the village of Hamminkeln. The latter village was a significant feature in the Divisional layout and Colonel Gledell’s 12 Devons were establishing a strong point in its substantial buildings. Major General Bols intended that Hamminkeln would be ‘a pivotal point in the Division’s scheme of defence, that an enemy counter-attack, which had successfully crossed the Issel, would find hard to overcome’.
Having fought with the infantry during the landing phase the glider pilots were now concentrated into their squadrons and running the brigades’ and Divisional PW cages, but now the initial rush of prisoners was subsiding and with most of the Germans seemingly content to be out of the war, some glider pilots were released to prepare additional defences in the Airlanding Brigade perimeter, against the inevitable German counter-attacks. The Glider Pilot Squadrons, however, continued to be responsible for the prisoners who were to be held east of the Rhine for some days, as, initially, there was a strict one-way (forward only) policy on the bridges that the Royal Engineers were to establish across the Rhine.
3 Para Brigade
Brigadier Hill’s plan was for his brigade to dominate the Dieserfordterwald with aggressive patrols, covering gaps and identifying enemy attempting to advance or infiltrating through their part of the Divisional area. They were also manning prearranged contact points on the Wesel-Emmerich road where they would meet members of 507 PIR and to their west where they would link up with 15th Scottish Division.
Shortly after midday, DZ A was finally cleared and, while moving into brigade reserve, 8 Para encountered a pair of 88 mm guns in the Dieserforderwald. These guns fired high explosive shells into the trees, as the paras approached. The effect of the bursting shells was enhanced by numerous splinters of wood that caused nasty wounds, which were difficult to treat and in previous wars would have had led to a very high mortality rate. However, penicillin now greatly enhanced survival rates.
The nature of the patrol actions that developed from midday into the night differed widely. In some places it was a question of rounding up stray Germans, in others ambushing or indeed being ambushed. Others fought off organised groups of enemy, of up to platoon strength, who clearly intended to fight their way back across the Issel. In these circumstances, casualties mounted and, for example, a group of 8 Para, including a liaison officer and the Padre, who were on their way to visit the wounded at 224 Field Ambulance, located in the nearby houses in the hamlet of Bergfurth, were ambushed and killed.
Royal Engineers established light and heavy ferries across the Rhine on 24 March.
A 44 Lowland Brigade armoured car brought 15th Scottish Division officers forward to make the link with the Airborne.
A little further to the north in the same wood, 1 Canadian Para were sending out clearance patrols:
… Sergeant A. Page took out a six-man patrol to reconnoitre the woods in the vicinity of the company’s positions. He returned a short while later, escorting nearly a hundred prisoners who were promptly added to those already captured.
During the afternoon, it was reported that C Company’s 5 Platoon, who had been left on the DZ had suffered very heavy casualties, when Fallschirmjäger pushed forward from the hamlet of Höfges and that Lieutenant Brunnette, the platoon commander, was reported to have been killed. Nevertheless:
C Company consolidated its defences [in the Dieserfordterwald] and proceeded to bring effective fire to bear on numbers of enemy troops who were moving around the company’s area. By mid-afternoon the situation had quietened down and the area seemed clear of the enemy.
Later in the day, the enemy counter-attacked in an effort to recapture the area but they were beaten off. A heavy mortar concentration was then brought down on A Company’s position, followed by a large enemy patrol moving up. This attack was also beaten off, with several enemy being taken prisoner.
The all-important link up with the leading elements of 15th Scottish Division was made at 1400 hours, at the small bridge to the west of the Dieserfordterwald known as ‘Alpha’. The first unit to reach 3 Para Brigade was 8 Royal Scots, while patrols from 6 Kings Own Scottish Boarder met 9 Para patrols a little further south. To avoid fratricide, the recognition signal to prevent exchanges of friendly fire was the ‘… waving yellow cleanse triangles, carried by all ranks of the brigade groups who cross on D Day’. Brigadier Poett commented that‘In addition, red berets were to be worn after the initial drop’. Finally, a radio contact channel (No.38) had also been established to manage this most dangerous of situations, where two friendly forces approach each other during the height of a battle in order to link-up. At 1545 hours, Commander 44 (Lowland) Infantry Brigade and the Commanding Officer of 8 Royal Scots arrived at HQ 3 Para Brigade, met Brigadier Hill and‘were given a rousing reception by the parachutists’.
HQ 6th Airbourne Division was dug-in at Kopenhof.
Divisional Headquarters
Divisional HQ and the Artillery Group HQ, with C Company of 12 Devons to protect it, had landed in gliders on DZ P and set up at Kopenhof. At 1100 hours they reported having established communications with the two para brigades but it took a further 28 minutes to raise 6 Airlanding Brigade, who were of course locked in battle with Kampfgruppe Karst. Rear link communications were established with XVIII US at 1335 hours. Meanwhile, individual FOU parties had been speaking to their guns west of the Rhine almost immediately and HQ RA 6th Airborne was running a support net to coordinate artillery fire and air support across the Division.
As dusk fell, despite patrols from the three brigades combing the woods, farms and villages, the enemy, many of whom had been lying-up until dark, became more active, either with aggressive intent or simply trying to exfiltrate to their own lines under the cover of darkness. Either way, the number of Germans in the wood and making their way around Divisional HQ was becoming a severe nuisance and:
…REAR Div HQ, in a farm WEST of the railway, about half a mile away was subject to sniping and mortaring from woods to the WEST during most of the afternoon.
That evening REAR Div HQ was ordered to join MAIN Div HQ as there were not sufficient forces to protect both during the hours of darkness.
To improve this situation, 8 Para was eventually ordered to move to positions on the wood edge south-west of Kopenhof. Colonel Hewson recalled:
The tracks in the wood led in every conceivable direction, darkness was coming on and groups of enemy were becoming quite active and soon it was very obvious that the battalion was utterly and completely lost. The decision was made to stay put where we were and send out patrols. There were a few clashes with the enemy and prisoners were taken. This activity startled Div HQ in no mean way and caused them to ‘stand-too’ most of the night.’
When dawn broke, as Colonel Hewson said, ‘miracle of miracles’, 8 Para found its self secure and in the intended place!
Despite the presence of enemy in the woods and fields around Kopenhof the exhausted Headquarters staff spent most of the night in the routine of planning subsequent operations, albeit punctuated by alarms that had them regularly ‘standing-too’ in their defensive positions, when the firing was a little too close for comfort. The 6th Airborne Division after action report records that:
At 2245 hrs Maj Gen MB RIDGEWAY, Commanding XVIII US Corps (Airborne) in company with Maj Gen WM MILEY, Commanding 17 US Airborne Div, visited Div HQ and issued orders for 25 March. His instructions were to maintain the positions then occupied by the Div; for 6 Airlanding Brigade to be relieved by 157 Brigade of 15 (Scottish) Div during the night 25/26 March, and for the Div to be prepared to advance at first light 26 March to secure the phase line ‘PARIS’. 17 US Airborne Div was ordered to secure phase line LONDON on 25 March.
Moving around the Corps area in a Jeep with only a small escort was a not inconsiderable risk. On his way back to his headquarters, co-located with 17th US Airborne’s:
…the Corps Commander drove into a considerable number of Germans going east from 3 Parachute Brigade area. He was fired on and grazed in the shoulder. It is claimed that he shot at least one German himself. The majority of this party of Germans were rounded up later in the night by 5 Parachute Brigade.
Senior US commanders were always prepared to be active on the battlefield, preferring face-to-face contact to exchange of lengthy coded messages.
Gunners of 53 (Worcester Yeomanry) Airlanding Light Regiment ready to open fire with their 105 mm howitzer.
5 Para Brigade
In the more open country covering the Division’s northern flank, Brigadier Poett’s men spent most of the afternoon digging-in but had to put up with regular fusillades of small arms fire and the occasional mortar bomb. At 1730 hours, however, the expected and well organized counter-attack developed from the north across DZ B, which Colonel Pine-Coffin’s 7 Para had now abandoned. This was not the heavy armoured attack expected but an attack by 7th Fallschirmjager Division, supported by SP guns that closed on 13 Para’s position. As an experienced and efficient Division that also benefited from 1st Aiborne Division’s lessons at Arnhem, the guns of 4 Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery (8 x 17-Pounder and 8 x 6-Pounder) and battalions’ medium machine guns were all sited in pits, albeit incomplete, that gave some protection against enemy fire. To deal with the infantry, the Brigade’s medium Vickers machine guns were sited with interlocking and overlapping arcs of fire. Indirect support was immediately available from a battery of 75mm guns of the 53 (Worcester Yeomanry) Airlanding Light Regiment, who were positioned on DZ P in the centre of the Divisional area. Also available west of the Rhine were the 4.2-inch mortars of the Recce Regiment. In the event of a crisis, the Commander Royal Artillery could direct all his divisional assets against a specific target and call for fire from XII Corps, which would bring a massive weight of fire down on Target Groups code named COUSIN, CULPRIT and CLOG that surrounded 5 Para Brigade. The fact that the Brigade was in position, with nearly finished trenches and ready to face an enemy counter-attack, fully justifies General Ridgeway’s decision to drop on his objectives. With all this fire available, it is hardly surprising that the enemy counter-attack was broken up before reaching 13 Para’s position.
It is recorded that 5 Brigade ‘spent a relatively quiet night’ and the following day watched battalions of 15th Scottish fighting their way towards them.
Counter-Attacks
6 Airlanding Brigade had secured their three bridges across the Issel and driven-off, killed or captured elements of Kampfgruppe Karst that were west of the river and set about digging-in, with battalions having already lost over a third of their landing strength. While the infantry dug, the Royal Engineers prepared the bridges for demolition, should they be in danger of recapture by the enemy.
RAF Sergeant Stan Jarvis was amongst the glider pilots to be deployed to a sector of the Brigade’s perimeter, between the two forward infantry battalions, on the banks of the Issel at 1800 hours.
I RUR dug-in on the banks of the Issel.
The German troops were approximately 250 yards away beyond the River Issel, therefore we were instructed to dig slit trenches for protection. It was comparatively quiet until about 8 P.M except for the occasional duel between our Bren guns and the German equivalent, of Spandaus – then suddenly a vast series of whines were heard overhead followed by crashes, the noise was tremendous. The Second Army had started a bombardment beyond the Autobahn to prevent the enemy bringing up reserves. Incandescent shells ceaselessly passed over for a couple of hours, which was very reassuring as they were from our side! The bombardment suddenly stopped and the silence was almost deafening!
The German armour, largely neutralised by close air support sorties flown by Allied fighter bombers during daylight, needed to capture the Issel bridges for their own operations but, more importantly, deny their use to the British for their breakout. They now planned to launch an attack under cover of darkness. During the evening of 24 March, 2 Ox and Bucks LI, who had in the last of the daylight completed their defences, reported enemy activity on the approaches to the road bridge just after 2000 hours:
… B Company began to hear movement of tracked vehicles in Ringenburg and the Mediums [artillery] began a series of impressive and encouraging shoots. However, tanks and some infantry approached B Company’s [road] bridge and the infantry got into houses just on the other side of the river.
Enemy mortaring and artillery fire, which had increased steadily across the Divisional area, engaging opportunity targets, was now concentrated in support of the attack. Lieutenant Denis Edwards of D Company wrote:
…my section was sheltering below a high embankment when the enemy began a powerful bombardment of the area. A lot of heavy stuff was crashing in all around the place and, without well-dug trenches such as we had in Normandy, it was impossible to find anywhere that offered good protection.
There were several of us crouched in the lee of the embankment when a large shell exploded on the top of the bank just above my head, killing many of those in the immediate area …I remember nothing else for the next 36 hours.
Edwards was one of a significant number of airborne soldiers reported Killed in Action during VARSITY, only to have the administrative error later corrected when he was located in the Second Army’s medical chain.
Initially the enemy’s attacks were driven back and, although ‘impressive and encouraging’, in darkness, friendly artillery was far less effective and, around midnight, the enemy were able to press home their attack on the Road Bridge. The regimental historian wrote:
Our anti-tank guns [6-pounders] engaged the enemy and scored hits, but the tanks were too heavy and continued to threaten the bridge. The fighting around the bridge in darkness was very confused. A ‘B’ Company position on the east of the bridge was overwhelmed, and Lieutenant Clarke led his platoon in a charge to retake it and was subsequently decorated for this action.
The situation was, however, only temporarily restored and as enemy pressure again built on B Company, Colonel Darrel-Brown, sought permission to blow the bridge if it was likely to be captured. Authority to blow was duly delegated from Brigade HQ to the Ox and Bucks and amidst the fighting the Sapper firing party went forward to insert the detonators into the circuit, thus arming the demolition.
At the same time, HQ 6 Airlanding Brigade made counter-attack plans and issued orders to 12 Devons to be prepared to deploy from Hamminkeln in support of the Oxs and Bucks LI, to either occupy defensive positions vacated by counter-attacking troops or to deliver a counter-attack themselves. In turn, 5 Brigade received a warning order to occupy the Hamminkeln strong point, with 7 Para, should the Devons have to deploy.
At 0200 hours, with the enemy tanks and infantry again advancing from the line of the Autobahn and the 6-pounders able to do little to stop the tanks, it was apparent that the remains of B Company were not going to be able to hold the enemy. According to a Light Infantryman ‘one large tank came perilously close. We hoped it was actually on the bridge when the order was given for it to be bridge to be blown’. This attack was shortly after 0230 hours and at 0240, HQ 6 Airlanding Brigade received word that demolition of the small but vital structure was complete.
The Devon’s counter-attacks to secure the Oxs and Bucks’s positions were not required, as with the blowing of the bridge the enemy armour were unable to cross the river and their supporting infantry fell back under heavy fire. The medium artillery thereafter covered the direct approach to the river with a standing barrage.
The enemy were, however, not content to let the matter rest and directed infantry attacks around the open northern or left flank of the Ox and Bucks. The 6th Airborne report recorded:
Shortly before dawn small parties of enemy infiltrated into the NORTHERN edge of 2 OXS & BUCKS area and set light to buildings there. In spite of efforts to clear them some enemy remained in that area most of 25 March.
At 0730 hours, 1 RUR reported that two tanks had attempted to rush the bridge but what was probably the leading element of an attack, was halted by a 17-pounder sited to cover the bridge. One tank was knocked out and the other damaged. The enemy infantry decided not to press the point!
With the return of daylight, the Allied airmen were again able to mount close air support and air interdiction patrols. The Airborne report continued:
During the day a continuous air ‘cab-rank’ was maintained over the area and a total of about twelve targets were attacked with good results. Tac R [Tactical Air Reconnaissance] later reported only slight movement on the roads leading to the bridgehead.
The Link-up
While contact between patrols had been made west of the Dieserfordterwald the previous afternoon, 15th (Scottish) Division started to arrive in 6th Airborne’s positions in strength on the morning of 25 March. The patrol mounted by 7 Para at the gap in the woods code named FORTNUM was approached by 6 KOSB at 0900 hours to the relief of the beleaguered CANLOAN Lieutenant Patterson, whose task of holding a key piece of terrain had, in retrospect, been more fitting for a company than a platoon.
Almost as soon as the amphibious crossing of the Rhine was under way, before dawn on 24 March, the Royal Engineers, with the largest ever accumulation of bridging equipment, started work on their pre-recced ferry and bridging sites. Breaching the massive earthen flood dykes, bringing forward, off-loading and beginning to assemble components were all a part of the first phase of a well-rehearsed and thoroughly planned operation. The first ferries to be established were at the DD tank entry points. One Sapper officer recalled:
… our Engineering Company was in the front of the assault under a huge barrage of artillery. It was our job to bulldoze the ramps down to the river, drive in the posts to guide the tanks down to where the floating bridges were being assembled and place them into position.
According to the 6th Airborne Division VARSITY report:
During the night, considerable traffic from the RHINE started to pass through 3 Parachute Brigade area. Visitors to 3 Parachute Brigade HQ included the Commanding Officer of 44 ROYAL TANK REGIMENT (DD Tanks) and the Commanding Officer of 3 SCOTS GUARDS (Tanks).
The ‘tail’ of the 6th Airborne Divisions vehicles assembles, having crossed the Rhine.
The officers and men of 6 Guards Tank Brigade, whose tanks were to be amongst the first across the bridges and come under command of XVIII US Airborne Corps, ‘felt their responsibility keenly’:
It was difficult at the time to forget the tragedy of the previous September when another tank formation of the Brigade of Guards had been given the task of joining up with another airborne force. Would this be a second Arnhem?
The Commanding Officer and squadron leaders of 3rd Tank Battalion, The Scots Guards (3 Tk SG), who were to join 6th Airborne, flew to England to meet officers of the Division during March and officers of the Brigade’s other battalions had travelled to France to meet 17th US Airborne to ensure they had a complete and mutual understanding of the plan and to meet those they would be working with. Thus, another failing of MARKET GARDEN was addressed.
On 24 March 3 TK SG joined the Division’s radio command net late in the afternoon, as they moved from hide to hide down to the Rhine. Their final hide was near the riverside village of Wardt where they waited until around midnight before being called down to the Class 50/60 rafts. The tanks were carefully loaded onto the rafts one at a time before being towed across the river to undergo the equally difficult operation of off-loading. It took a long time to get even the first tank across and into an assembly area on the east bank.
As soon as the first squadron was complete, the Left Flank Squadron, it drove four miles on narrow country roads across the flood plain. These roads were only designed for light traffic but at 0430 hours on 25 March, the Canadian Para Battalion’s war diary recorded the arrival of the first armour in a clearing in the western part of the Diersfordterwald. The Airborne Corps was thus provided with armoured reinforcements little more than sixteen hours after their descent. However, the Churchills were held in the forest under Corps control until the regiment as a whole was assembled some three hours later but with the favourable operational situation they were not called on until the breakout.
This meant that it was not until 1045 hours on the 25th that the forward elements of 6th Airborne Division received the support of ‘heavy metal’ when ‘…one squadron of DD Tanks arrived in the area and moved to the vicinity of 6 Airlanding Brigade HQ. One battery of self-propelled anti-tank guns also soon arrived’. The DD tanks of 44 RTR had of course crossed the river the day before and the squadron (minus several tanks KO) was to be used to bolster the forward Divisional reserve, waiting in the woods around LZ P. The Battery of M10 tank destroyers started to arrive, having crossed the river by Class 50/60 ferries, with 6 Airlanding Brigade at 1030 hours. The deployment of a troop M10 to help support the companies holding the Issel bridges convincingly confirmed the balance of combat power in favour of the British Airborne troops.
The vehicles of the Division’s Main Land Tail, who had left UK on 15 and 19 March loaded with supplies, were, thanks to a careful convoy schedule, now waiting to cross the Rhine along with sixty-nine preloaded DUKWs. These vehicles only required entrances and exits to the river and could cross on demand with few restrictions, while the Land Tail had to await completion of ferries and bridges and their turn in the order of priority to cross to the east bank. Advanced detachments were the first to cross during the course the 25th, followed by an RASC Light Transport Platoon during the afternoon.
US infantry and armour pressing forward to link up with 17th US Airborne Division.
Breakout
With units of 15th Scottish Division advancing east through the northern edge of 6th Airborne Division’s area and both armour and combat supplies coming into the Divisional area, the orders given by General Ridgeway for the breakout could be put into action. During the night of 25 March, 157 Infantry Brigade took over 6 Airlanding Brigade’s area, releasing that brigade for the beginning of the breakout to the east.
The fighting west of the Rhine had exhausted the Wehrmacht and the descent of an airborne corps in the heart of their position to the east of the river had dislocated their defences. Consequently, progress was swift and by 31 March, according to the Second Army historian:
There were east of the River RHINE, under command of Second Army, eight infantry divisions, four armoured divisions, two airborne divisions and four independent armoured brigades. All initial objectives had been gained, the defence line of the enemy had been broken and Second Army was 40 miles on from the river.
It was estimated that 30,000 casualties were inflicted on the enemy during these operations while in the period 24-31 March, Second Army incurred losses to the extent of 233 officers and 2,491 other ranks.
A week after the assault crossing and parachute drop, Field Marshall Montgomery was able to issue his intentions:
… To exploit the present situation rapidly, and to drive hard for the line of the River ELBE, so as to gain quick possession of the plains of Northern GERMANY.
Second Army will operate strongly to secure the line of the River ELBE between WITTENBERGE and HAMBURG.
In less than six weeks of the Rhine crossing the war in Europe was over.
