CHAPTER ONE
In early September 1944, 6th Airborne Division returned to its camps on Salisbury Plain, after an almost unique hundred days in contact with the enemy in Normandy. There were many bed spaces left empty or filled by battle casualty replacements, not all of whom had been airborne selected or trained. Meanwhile, the pursuit across northern France frustrated their sister division, 1st Airborne, who despite a succession of nineteen planning cycles, was still kicking its heels at its bases across the east midlands and cruelly being named ‘1st Stillborn Division’ by those looking for a fight. Such was the speed of the ground advance that identified objectives were reached before the airborne operation could be mounted.
The pervading view amongst the Allies was that final victory over Germany was near. So high was the optimism that normally cautious intelligence officers were predicting that victory was ‘within sight, almost within reach’ and they reported that it was ‘unlikely that organized German resistance would continue beyond 1 December 1944’. Dissenting voices who believed that the German forces were not finished and were preparing a ‘last-ditch struggle in the field at all costs’, were, in the prevailing enthusiasm, ignored.
Obersturmbannführer Hubert Meyer, Chief of Staff of 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, disputes the claimed completeness of the Allied victory in Normandy.
Your histories claim that my division was reduced to a couple of hundred men.
The last few hundred did have to break out of the Falaise Kessel but they joined almost 12,000 who had already escaped. Although we had lost much equipment, Feldmarschall Model conducted an excellent withdrawal to the east the significance of which is largely unrecognized.
Obersturmbannführer Hubert Meyer.
Consequently, Montgomery in his attempt to ‘bounce’ 21st Army Group across the Rhine onto the North German Plain in Operation MARKET GARDEN found that the Germans were far from defeated. There was to be no repeat of the 1918 German civil and military collapse that many Great War veteran commanders predicted and no dash into the heart of Germany to finish the war by Christmas 1944. With the Allies stalled, having outrun their supplies, with the weather worsening, 200,000 mostly slave labourers, worked to strengthen the pre-war German defences known as the West Wall or Siegfried Line. The physical barrier was to be manned by new citizen or volksgrenadier formations, with Himler calling to arms the young, the old and many men previously excluded from the Wehrmacht on grounds of economic necessity, health, etc. To these men, were added the now largely redundant manpower from the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, who with the Volksgrenadier divisions now prepared the defence of the borders of the Third Reich. The Allies had underestimated the German’s genius for highly effective military improvisation and were largely unaware of the remarkable strategic recovery the enemy was staging.
With the failure of MARKET GARDEN at Arnhem, General Eisenhower reverted to his broad front strategy. This favoured US doctrine of the time, was politically acceptable in that it would see all three allied army groups fighting on the German frontier, breaching the West Wall and then battling their way to the Rhine; Germany’s last strategic barrier. Destruction of the German field armies and the capture of the Ruhr, Germany’s industrial powerhouse, were to be the principal objectives rather than a headlong advance across the North German Plain to Berlin. The consequences of this policy were fully apparent to the British, who had an eye on the post-war situation in Europe rather than the simple defeate of Germany.
In the deteriorating autumn weather, which heralded a bad winter, the fighting was costly and Allied progress slowed almost to a halt. Nowhere was progress slower and more expensive in both British and American lives than at the Dutch town of Overloon in the Mass Pocket. Further to the north, the Canadians fought to open the Scheldt Estuary to gain access for shipping to the vital port of Antwerp, which was to be the supply base for the Allied advance into Hitler’s Reich. Elsewhere, desperate battles were fought by British and American troops to reach and then penetrate the West Wall, at points such as Geilenkeirchen, where the British 43rd Wessex Division fought alongside the US 84th Division to overcome a determined enemy in weather and ground conditions that foreshadowed those they were to experience later in the winter. Meanwhile, General Patton grumbled and swore, as his armour bogged down in the mud of Lorraine. The Germans fought with courage and determination to defend the borders of their Fatherland and it was obvious that despite the continuing bomber offensive, the war was not going to be won until well into 1945.
The Battle of the Bulge
Hitler’s counter-attack with his rebuilt army in the Ardennes in mid-December 1944, launched under the cover of bad weather, caught the Allies by surprise. The German aim was to separate the Allied armies by striking north-west to Antwerp, enveloping and destroying the Ninth US Army, along with the British and Canadian Armies. Initially, the Germans, benefiting from a lax American stance on a lightly held, quiet front, were successful and created a significant ‘Bulge’ in the Allied lines. However, the relatively inexperienced staffs of the Allied Armies of D Day were now honed to a high state of competence and reacted quickly to close off the German advance before they reached the River Meuse.
Men of 6th Airborne Division, complete with snow suits in the wintry Ardennes.
An airborne section goes to ground as they come under effective enemy fire.
6th Airborne Division were dragged away from what promised to be a grey and frugal Christmas to join other British forces heading south to establish blocking positions on the Meuse. In the event, with an improvement in the weather, the Americans contained the enemy. Now under Major General Lewis Bols, the veteran British paratroopers, had arrived in Ostende on Christmas Eve and were concentrated and ready to help in the counteroffensive that was already gaining momentum. Attacking the very tip of the German Bulge, the paratroopers drove the enemy back across the snow covered country during the following weeks. Winter clothing and equipment helped but the Division, as its Allied counterparts, had to learn the skills of winter warfare on the job.
By the middle of January, the Germans were back behind their start lines, with their reserves of men and material further depleted by their offensive. 6th Airborne had been withdrawn to a sector of the line on the River Mass, as they were still needed to hold the front. Their strength, however, was being preserved for the coming Rhine operations. They were the only viable British airborne formation, as 1st Airborne Division was a far from combat effective. Corporal Cooper of 195th Air Landing Field Ambulance recalled the deployment to Holland:
By early February, the danger was over and we were pulled back to a village not far from Antwerp where we spent approximately a week billeted in a private house with a family consisting of a father, mother and two daughters, with whom we had pleasant evenings sitting around the stove. Following this pleasant interlude, we moved into Holland to take over the defence of a line on the River Mass, previously held by the 15th Scottish Division, who we relieved in order for them to take part in exercises for the main amphibious crossing of the Rhine.
In general, the locals were not too friendly, but with the Germans having only recently been driven back across the river and now entrenched on the far bank, they were probably concerned that they might return and take vengeance on those who had been friendly to us.
We had trouble travelling around as many of the roads collapsed, following a thaw and for days at a time nothing heaver than a jeep was allowed to go out. Unfortunately, we didn’t know from day to day which roads were closed.
In due course, we in turn were relieved, and returned to our camp in Bulford, where we were granted ten days leave prior to our anticipated participation in the Rhine crossing, which, although no formal announcement had been made, we knew was imminent. Whilst on leave we heard that the Americans had captured intact a railway bridge over the Rhine and we hoped that this might obviate the need for an airborne landing.
With the 6th Airborne Division returned to its camps in February and with preparations underway for the Rhine crossing, there was, however, the Rhineland to clear and parts of the West Wall to overcome before PLUNDER and VARSITY could be launched.
The Winter War
Eisenhower, now fully aware of the German capacity for resistance, prepared operations, delayed by the Battle of the Bulge, to clear the Rhineland as far as the River Rhine. SHAFE planners planned operations that were designed to destroy the main German field forces in the west, before their remnants could withdraw across the great river.
The damaged bridge at Remagen.
The fighting in early 1945 to reach the Rhine on a front from the Swiss border all the way north to Nijmegen is a subject in itself. In the north, Montgomery’s 21st Army Group was to fight a massive and carefully planned battle; using General Crerar’s First Canadian Army (Operations VERITIBLE) and General Simpson’s Ninth US Army (Operation GRENADE). These operations were designed to reach the Rhine north of the Ruhr, while further south, First US Army’s delayed operations to capture the seven Roer dams. With the dams captured, First US Army’s operations focused on crossing the River Ruhr and then reaching Rhine around Cologne. Yet further south, Patton’s Third US Army was to clear the difficult terrain east of the Ardennes, cross the River Moselle, fight through the Eiffel and reach the central sector of the Rhine between Coblenz and Mannheim.
While General Crerar’s First Canadian Army was fighting the main body of the Germans in the west in the Battle of the Rhineland, the US army groups further to the south were approaching the Rhine across greater distances and some equally difficult terrain. First US Army reached the Rhine near Cologne and on 7 March, after several attempts to take a Rhine bridge by coup de main, the spearhead of 9th US Armoured Division approached Remargen on the Rhine and found the railway bridge was still standing. With the demolition guard lacking orders to blow the bridge and inadequate explosives, First US Army gained the honour of establishing the first Allied bridgehead across the Rhine. However, the country beyond the Remagen Bridgehead was so unsuitable for offensive operations and without strategically important objectives within striking distance; this was, in reality, a cul-de-sac of little strategic importance. However, it can be argued that the main effect of the Bridge’s capture was to draw precious German divisions away from Eisenhower’s main effort in the north.
21st Army Group’s shoulder flash.
Sergeant Alex Drabik – first man across the Rhine.
General Patton, ‘I sneaked a division over last night’.
The next crossing was further south and was of greater importance. General Omar Bradley, commander 12th US Army Group, received a telephone call on the morning of 23 March at his HQ in Namur from General Patton’s Third US Army HQ. His account illustrates the competition and vanity (both British and American) that now bedevilled Eisenhower’s command.
‘Brad, don’t tell anyone but I’m across.’ I replied ‘Well I’ll be damned – you mean the Rhine?’ ‘Sure am,’ he [Patton] replied, I sneaked a division over last night. But there are so few Krauts around they don’t know it yet. So don’t make any announcement – we’ll keep it a secret until we see how it goes.’
Patton’s formal situation report about his crossing at Nierstein pointedly included the statement that this had been achieved ‘…… without the benefit of aerial bombing, ground smoke, artillery preparation, and airborne assistance, the Third Army at 2200 hours, Thursday evening March 22, crossed the River Rhine.’ However, as Bradley recalled. ‘That evening Patton telephoned again’.
‘Brad,’ he shouted and his treble voiced trembled, ‘for God’s sake tell the world we are across. We knocked down thirty-three Krauts [aircraft] today when they came after our pontoon bridges. I want the world to know Third Army made it before Monty starts across.’
General Omar Bradley.
Rhineland Operations of 21st Army Group
Meanwhile, with the limited British involvement on the northern flank of the Battle of the Bulge over, Montgomery turned his attention to Operations VERITABLE and GRENADE. He described the aims of the fighting west of the Rhine to close up to the great waterway between Xanten and Nijmegen.
The object of the battle of the Rhineland was to destroy all enemy forces between the Rhine and the Meuse from the Nijmegen bridgehead as far south as the general line Julich-Düsseldorf, and subsequently to line up along the west bank of the Rhine with the Ninth US Army from Düüsseldorf to Moers, Second [British] Army from Moers to Rees and [First] Canadian Army from exclusive Rees to Nijmegen.
Field marshall Montgomery.
This was to be achieved by First Canadian Army, with British formations under command, in Operation VERITABLE; an attack south-east from the Groesbeek Heights near Nijmegen, which had been seized during MARKET GARDEN in September 1944. The Canadian’s immediate objectives were the breaching of the West Wall’s defences and clearance of the Reichswald. Subsequently, they were to take the defended towns of Udem and Goch before heading south-east to Geldern and Xanten where they would link up with Ninth US Army, who, in Operation GRENADE, would be advancing in a north-easterly direction.
Facing 21st Army Group was General Schlemm, commander of the First Fallschirmjäger Army. He was experienced in holding operations, having been schooled in the art, in the resource starved Italian theatre. Here he learnt to utilise terrain to maximise his defensive effect. However, on the Rhine, Schlemm recounted that his orders were to hold the ground come what may:
Once the battle was joined, it was obvious that I no longer had a free hand in the conduct of the defence. My orders were that under no circumstances was any land between the Maas and the Rhine to be given up without permission of the Commander in Chief West, von Rundstedt, who in turn had to ask Hitler. For every withdrawal that I was forced to make due to an Allied attack, I had to send back a detailed explanation.
Even so, Schlemm and other German commanders repeatedly requested that they be allowed to fall back to the Rhine where they could adopt strongly held positions. Instead Hitler kept eighty-five divisions fighting west of the Rhine, forbidding any withdrawal and threatening to execute commanders who lost a bridge intact.
Starting on 8th February 1945, VERITABLE and its continuation BLOCKBUSTER is characterised by Brigadier Essame of 43rd Wessex Division as:
General Schlemm.
General Simpson, commander Ninth US Army.
…… lasting for twenty eight days and nights in almost unspeakable conditions of flood, mud and misery. The troops were soaked with almost incessant rain; there was no escaping it and no shelter. We met the First Parachute Army, the last remaining German indoctrinated youth, fighting with undiminished courage on German soil supported by 700 mortars and almost a thousand guns, on virtually equal terms.
Fighting through the northern extensions of the Siegfried Line, which the Germans had five months to work on since the failure of MARKET GARDEN, was a costly business. The densely wooded and heavily fortified Reichswald, the defended towns, such as Udem and Goch, and the positions in depth (the Hochwald Layback) took a month to fight through. The level of destruction of the German homeland, as he entered the ruins of Cleve, was recorded by a veteran member of 4th Wiltshires:
There were craters and fallen trees everywhere, bomb craters packed so tight that the debris from one was piled against the rim of the next in a pathetic heap of rubble, roofs and radiators. There was not an undamaged house anywhere, piles of smashed furniture, clothing, children’s’ books and toys, everything, was spilled in hopeless confusion amidst the bombed skeletons of the town.
Infantry from Canada, the West Country, Wales and Scotland bore the brunt of the costly fighting through the ruined towns and the sodden German countryside.
General Simpson’s Ninth US Army was formally under operational command of 21st Army Group for the clearance of the Rhineland in operation GRENADE, but the degree of influence Montgomery was able to exert by this stage over US forces under his command was strictly limited. Simpson’s objective was the seizure of the Rhine’s western bank, from where his army would, in subsequent operations, strike at the northern edge of the Ruhr. However, delays in starting his attack resulted from floodwaters in the river valley and First US Army’s failure to capture the Roer Dams in some very difficult mountainous terrain. Without the dams being secured, there was a very real threat that the Germans could release millions of gallons of water, and isolate a Ninth US Army bridgehead, which would, consequently, be vulnerable to destruction. In the event, to prevent an attack across the Roer, the Germans, however, released the water from the Schwammenauel Dam which flooded the river valley and formed an obstacle that prevented the Ninth Army advance. Eventually, after a two week delay, with the worst of the flood waters receding, six US divisions launched a surprise assault crossing over the still violent river on 24 February 1945, preceded by a massive forty-five minute bombardment by over 1,500 guns. During the delay caused by the flooding, nine German divisions had been sucked away from the US front, north to the bitter VERITABLE battle being fought by General Crerar’s troops. This contributed to the US assault divisions losing fewer than a hundred men killed in action on the first day of the assault.
Ninth Army’s badge.
With VERITABLE, GRENADE and the advance of the First US Army underway, a programme of air operations on a large scale was conducted by the Allied tactical and bomber commands. ‘This was designed to weaken the German defence as a whole, and to assist 21st Army Group and 12th Army Group in particular, by the isolation and reduction of the Ruhr’s war-making capacity.’ According to the British Official History, the principal aims were, firstly:
… to isolate the Ruhr from central and southern Germany by cutting the main railways…, secondly, to attack continuously west of that line the enemy’s communications and transport system; and, thirdly, to prepare the battle area for the impending Rhine crossing by 21st Army Group.
The official historian concluded that: ‘In the next few weeks much of the industrial power of the Ruhr was dissipated in the dust of explosions from a rain of bombs which fell almost daily from the air’.
Meanwhile, Simpson drove his men on to the Rhine and with massive US material strength, his divisions poured over the Roer by nineteen pontoon bridges and:
The enemy’s resistance was soon characteristic of a general retreat in which only an attempt could be made to delay the Allied advance by holding road junctions and communications centres in key towns or villages, using in each case a number of assault andanti-aircraft guns and mortars and groups of supporting infantry.
Hitler used the threat of execution to bolster his commanders’ determination to hold ground west of the Rhine.
As planned, the 35th US Division met up with Montgomery’s 53rd Welsh Division at Geldern at mid-afternoon on 3 March and together the armies advanced east, squeezing the remains of fifteen German divisions belonging to First Fallschrimjager Army, into a rapidly reducing bridgehead. Hitler would still not sanction their withdrawal despite General Schlemm’s protestations. In his post war interrogation, he commented that once he was hemmed in to a shrinking bridgehead whose perimeter ran from Xanten, the Bonninghardtwald and down to the Rhine at Moers: ‘I could see my hopes for a long life rapidly dwindling, since I had nine bridges in my sector!’ A verbatim note in the Führer Conference records, gives Hitler’s reasoning in response to a suggestion that they redeploy east of the Rhine. ‘I want him to hang on to the West Wall as long as is humanly possible, since withdrawal would merely mean moving the catastrophe from one place to another.’
Eventually, with Hitler’s threat of execution hanging over him, Schlemm authorised, on his own initiative, the withdrawal of what manpower he could save before blowing the Wesel bridges. On 5 March 1945, Montgomery’s armies reached the Rhine in the area chosen for the crossing of the great River, having suffered a total of 23,000 casualties in First Canadian and Ninth US Armies.
The Battle of the Rhineland had cost General Schlemm’s First Fallschirmjäger Army between 90,000 and 100,000 men, with casualties being largely concentrated amongst nineteen infantry divisions, which, in many cases, were now reduced little more than cadres. Altogether fighting west of the Rhine cost von Rundstedt, C-in-C West, half a million men and, for the third time, his job. At the age of seventy, however, he could finally retire knowing that he had delayed the enemy more successfully than any other commander and that the end would be not long in coming.
The Strategic Situation
It is widely accepted that Hitler’s decision to remain fighting west of the Rhine, was a major mistake that probably shortened the war by a few weeks, compounding earlier errors. By gathering the majority of his best troops for the Ardennes offensive, Hitler had also left Germany open to the Soviet Winter offensive launched by Zhukov and Koniev. In the east, facing a five to one superiority in men and materiel, the German armies collapsed and the Red Army, driven on by Stalin’s threats, advanced some 250 miles to within forty miles of Berlin, where running out of steam they were eventually halted by last ditch German resistance. Meanwhile, at the Yalta Conference, the Allies were only able to report to Stalin that they had restored their lines of the previous November.
The Ardennes offensive had cost Hitler his last strategic and operational reserves. With, in addition, the losses suffered during the Rhineland Battles, the Wehrmacht was in March 1945 only capable of standing on the defensive. As Eisenhower wrote, with the benefit of hindsight‘… the enemy was now in no condition to hold fast in the defended line to which he had been compelled to retreat’. The end indeed would not be long in coming but the Rhine and the heavily defended Ruhr would first have to be overcome to defeat Germany.
A pair of 6th Airborne Division’s signallers in Holland in early 1945.
Montgomery and Senior Allied Commanders show Prime Minister Churchill around a captured section of Hitler’s West Wall.
Second British Army
At the end of Operation VERITABLE, after nine months of active campaigning, the British Army that had crossed the German frontline and was about to take part in the last major Allied offensive of the war, was very different from the army that had landed in Normandy. Brigadier Essame of 43rd Wessex Division wrote of the state of the British Second Army at the end of March 1945:
Despite exposure twenty-four hours a day for over a month, to the almost incessant rain and sleet and intense and sustained enemy fire, the morale of the British troops as the battle progressed rose, rather than declined, to a higher level than at any stage during the campaign.
This seemingly counter intuitive statement is supported by the fact that the number of Second Army soldiers reporting sick was at an all time low in February and March 1944 and the incidence of psychiatric casualties had declined markedly. Essame accounts for this phenomenon as‘... men, the majority of whom had been new to the horrors of the battlefield in Normandy, had now got into their stride and had become inured to the sights and smells of battle.’
Not only were Montgomery’s troops in a better mental and physical shape but they had become experienced campaigners. 6th Airborne Division, though having suffered heavy casualties in Normandy, was skilled in the art of war and its officers knew their business. During the autumn training exercises in the UK, commanders who had proved themselves in battle were promoted and cut their teeth in their new roles in the Ardennes.
Ordinary infantry soldiers who joined 6th Airborne as casualty replacements, and had impressed in battle, wanted to stay with the Division (having survived long enough to bond with their comrades, most wanted to stay) and were sent on parachute training, where they were joined by individual soldiers from the Airlanding Brigade, who had volunteered to undergo parachute training. Officers and men returning to duty having recovered from wounds also stiffened the Division. 6th Airborne Division was at its zenith in terms of experience and military efficiency.
Costly though the Rhineland battles had been, the British, American and Canadian armies were well led and their soldiers had endured the worst of the winter. With replacements swelling their ranks, they knew that victory was inevitable, despite the motivational cautioning of their officers about the battles to come. With logistic superiority and air supremacy to support them, the only real question was when it all would end. Conversely, the Germans after, the Battle of the Bulge and the losses suffered facing VERITABLE and GRENADE, were in a parlous state.
Men of 6th Airbourne Division Headquarters.